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The next meeting of the Subcommittee on Human Rights is scheduled to take place on 24 and 25 September 2025 in Brussels.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Length of video : 60'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Dauer des Videos : 60'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Dauer des Videos : 60'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Length of video : 60'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

• Turkey occupies a distinctive position—geographically proximate to the epicentres of regional crises and institutionally is embedded in Western security structures such as NATO.
• However, Turkey is more than a geopolitical bridge; it has emerged as a multidimensional actor with ambitions to act both as a regional stabilizer and as a global mediator.

• Turkey’s position within this evolving global order is both advantageous and inherently paradoxical. As a long-standing NATO member, Turkey remains structurally embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet its geostrategic identity—historically, culturally, and geographically intertwined with the volatile landscapes of Eurasia, the Middle East, and North Africa—drives it to adopt a multi-vector foreign policy.

• From an economic standpoint, Turkey’s position remains marked by deep-seated contradictions. While its customs union with the European Union and strategic access to multiple regional markets confer structural advantages, these are significantly offset by institutional fragility, regulatory ambiguity, and elevated geopolitical risk premiums.

• Turkey’s defence industry has evolved into more than a military instrument; it is now a key lever for diplomatic influence and geopolitical ambition. Positioned at the heart of NATO, yet often at odds with its Western allies, Ankara has expanded its strategic footprint across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus by leveraging domestically-developed military platforms.

• Turkey must articulate a clear strategic rationale to underpin its defence investments. This involves moving beyond reactive threat perceptions and developing a holistic framework that aligns defence policy with broader developmental and diplomatic objectives. The protection of democratic institutions is an integral part of this framework, while two interrelated concepts are essential: economic security and open strategic autonomy.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, Non-Resident Senior Scholar, Turkey Programme and Can Selçuki, Economist and public opinion expert.

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HAS BEEN UNDERGOING a profound transformation, marked by increasing complexity and unpredictability, for a long while (Ulgen 2022). This evolution has revalidated the core assumptions of the neorealist paradigm (Hyde-Price 2015), which emphasizes power dynamics, security imperatives, and systemic uncertainty (Kessler and Daase 2008). Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 not only disrupted the European security architecture, it also destabilized global economic equilibria by triggering energy crises, disrupting trade routes, and exacerbating food insecurity (Panchuk 2024). Similarly, the protracted civil war in Libya—fuelled by multifaceted proxy dynamics—has reshaped geopolitical calculations across North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, with significant implications for energy geopolitics and maritime jurisdiction issues (Zoubir 2020). In the Horn of Africa, the intensifying competition between Somalia and Ethiopia is extending beyond bilateral frictions to reflect broader strategic rivalries involving Gulf actors, China, and the United States (Møller 2009). These regional crises have direct consequences for international capital flows, infrastructure development, and trade corridors. These developments and others have in fact led to significant changes in the foreign policies of countries with historically heightened concerns about ontological security—with Turkey first and foremost among them, both geographically and politically (Alpan and Ozturk 2025).

However, the strategic concerns of a country like Turkey are not amplified solely by the factors outlined above; there are more. For instance, the Hamas-led attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, and Israel’s sweeping military response in Gaza, have deepened volatility across the Middle East, drawing Iran further into an escalating regional confrontation. The ensuing conflict between Israel and Iran not only represents a military flashpoint; it also poses risks to global energy markets, investor confidence, and regional financial stability. These dynamics have been further complicated by the start of Donald Trump’s second term in the Oval Office and the electoral ascendance of far-right political forces across Europe (Georgiadou, Rori and Roumanias 2018). Such developments threaten to undermine the normative foundations of the transatlantic alliance and raise fundamental questions about the future of collective security, institutional cooperation, and liberal economic governance.

Reflecting these escalating security challenges, the most recent NATO summit concluded with an agreement to incrementally increase member states’ defence expenditures to 5 percent of GDP—a significant rise from previous commitments. This decision underscores the gravity of the security environment and signals that even established alliances anticipate more turbulent and resource-intensive times ahead, heightening the pressure on member states, including Turkey, to bolster their military and strategic capabilities. Undoubtedly, this situation will affect fragile economies even more negatively. From a neorealist standpoint, this turbulent environment underscores the anarchic structure of the international system (Nedal and Nexon 2019), wherein states—faced with uncertain alliances and eroding norms—seek to maximize their relative power and security through self-help mechanisms. Military build-ups, strategic autonomy in defence production, and regional balancing behaviour have become key instruments of statecraft. Crucially, economic capacity has become inextricably linked with strategic power: fiscal sustainability, industrial resilience, energy security, and technological sophistication now shape the contours of national strength.

Source: Secretary General Annual Report, 2024, NATO, 2025 figure is an estimate

Turkey occupies a distinctive position—geographically proximate to the epicentres of regional crises, but also institutionally embedded in Western security structures such as NATO. Yet Turkey is more than a geopolitical bridge; it has emerged as a multidimensional actor with ambitions to function as both a regional stabilizer and a global mediator.

Against this backdrop, Turkey occupies a distinctive position—geographically proximate to the epicentres of regional crises, but also institutionally embedded in Western security structures such as NATO. Yet Turkey is more than a geopolitical bridge; it has emerged as a multidimensional actor with ambitions to function as both a regional stabilizer and a global mediator (Sofos 2022). However, there are structural constraints on the implementation of this aspiration. Domestically, enduring challenges related to democratic backsliding (Cinar 2018), institutional fragility, and economic vulnerability limit Turkey’s strategic agility. Externally, Ankara’s dynamic and multifaceted foreign policy and defence initiatives—such as the development of indigenous UAV/UCAV technologies, the KAAN fifth-generation fighter program, and participation in multilateral platforms like ReArm Europe—reflect a desire to strengthen its deterrence capabilities. Nevertheless, these initiatives often face diplomatic pushback, de facto arms embargoes, and technological bottlenecks, illustrating the gap between strategic ambition and systemic capacity.

In addition, crucially, these transformations are unfolding at a time when Turkey is grappling with mounting economic challenges, including entrenched inflation, persistent current account deficits, and waning investor confidence. These structural vulnerabilities significantly limit the scope for coherent long-term strategic planning and complicate Ankara’s ability to underwrite its regional aspirations. The erosion of macroeconomic stability—evidenced by sustained inflationary pressures, capital flight, and pronounced currency volatility—undercuts both the credibility and consistency of Turkey’s foreign policy endeavours. In this context, the country’s strategic orientation is shaped not by geopolitical imperatives alone, but increasingly by its capacity for economic resilience and adjustment.

Grounded in this comprehensive background, this paper underscores the necessity and timeliness of critically assessing Turkey’s evolving role within an increasingly fractured and multipolar international order. At a time when conventional security frameworks are being recalibrated, regional conflicts are intensifying, and the normative foundations of the liberal international system are eroding, Turkey stands at the nexus of numerous geopolitical fault lines. Its geographic position, growing defence ambitions, and assertive foreign policy posture—coupled with domestic political volatility—make it a pivotal yet paradoxical actor. This analysis is rendered particularly urgent by the convergence of multiple pressures: the militarization of regional disputes, Ankara’s strained relations with key NATO allies, its simultaneous pursuit of strategic autonomy and Western alignment, and the deepening entanglement of internal political developments with external security policies. Understanding how these dynamics intersect is essential not only for comprehending Turkey’s future trajectory, but also for anticipating broader shifts within the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security architectures. In this context, the paper offers a timely and policy-relevant lens through which to evaluate the constraints, contradictions, and strategic calculations shaping Turkey’s geopolitical behaviour.

New Dynamics in the Global Distribution of Power and Turkey’s Position

As the 21st century enters its second quarter, the global order is marked by growing volatility and systemic fragmentation. The brief post–Cold War unipolar moment, which was dominated by the United States, has given way to a fluid, multipolar system defined by geopolitical, economic, and technological competition. Central to this shift is the intensifying strategic rivalry between the US and China alongside the resurgence of Russia’s revisionist posture, the rise of far-right populism in Europe, and protracted proxy conflicts across the Middle East. Within this landscape, multipolarity reflects not only a redistribution of power but also a reconfiguration of norms, alliances, and global governance tools.

However, the global reconfiguration of economic power—reflected in evolving investment patterns, shifting regional trade architectures, and the strategic decoupling of supply chains—has also fundamentally reshaped the contours of international influence. States no , but increasingly in their capacity to mobilize capital, steer industrial policy, and withstand systemic financial volatility. For Turkey, this transformed landscape presents a dual-edged dynamic: while geographic proximity to burgeoning markets opens avenues for deeper economic integration, persistent macroeconomic imbalances continue to constrain its ability to fully leverage these emerging opportunities.

NATO’s Madrid (2022) and Vilnius (2023) summits redefined threat perceptions by framing China as a “systemic rival” and reaffirming Russia as the principal military threat. The alliance’s agenda now stretches beyond conventional defence to encompass cybersecurity, energy security, disinformation resilience, and food supply stability, reshaping what constitutes strategic power. In this new order, national influence is increasingly tethered to economic robustness, technological sovereignty, and institutional coherence, redefining how states assert agency and respond to crisis.

Turkey’s position within this evolving global order is both advantageous and inherently paradoxical. As a long-standing NATO member, Turkey remains structurally embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet its geostrategic identity—historically, culturally, and geographically intertwined with the volatile landscapes of Eurasia, the Middle East, and North Africa—drives it to adopt a multi-vector foreign policy.

Turkey’s position within this evolving global order is both advantageous and inherently paradoxical. As a long-standing NATO member, Turkey remains structurally embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet its geostrategic identity—historically, culturally, and geographically intertwined with the volatile landscapes of Eurasia, the Middle East, and North Africa—drives it to adopt a multi-vector foreign policy. This ambition for increased strategic autonomy is exemplified by Turkey’s controversial procurement of the Russian S-400 missile defence system, its growing Eurasian alignments, and its proactive diplomacy in Africa. These initiatives reflect an increasingly pragmatic and transactional orientation which is often at odds with Turkey’s formal Western commitments. However, this assertive diversification also reveals deep institutional limitations. The centralization of decision-making, erosion of bureaucratic expertise, and fragmentation of inter-agency coordination significantly undermine Ankara’s capacity to maintain strategic coherence. As a result, Turkey struggles to convert its geopolitical advantages into sustainable regional influence, oscillating between great-power aspiration and governance constraints.

From an economic standpoint, Turkey’s position remains marked by deep-seated contradictions. While its customs union with the European Union and strategic access to multiple regional markets confer structural advantages, these are significantly offset by institutional fragility, regulatory ambiguity, and elevated geopolitical risk premiums.

From an economic standpoint, Turkey’s position remains marked by deep-seated contradictions. While its customs union with the European Union and strategic access to multiple regional markets confer structural advantages, these are significantly offset by institutional fragility, regulatory ambiguity, and elevated geopolitical risk premiums. Over the past decade, the country has witnessed pronounced deindustrialization in critical tradable sectors, coupled with a sustained decline in total factor productivity—developments that collectively undermine its long-term competitiveness. In an era where strategic influence is increasingly predicated on economic resilience and innovation capacity, Turkey’s deficiencies in export sophistication and technological dynamism impede its evolution from a reactive player to a proactive architect of regional order.

Turkey’s economic capacity has emerged as a critical determinant of the viability of its increasingly multifaceted foreign policy. Escalating inflation, persistent currency instability, a marked decline in foreign direct investment, and continued dependence on external technological inputs have collectively undermined the long-term sustainability of its defence-industrial aspirations. These structural constraints are further exacerbated by Turkey’s substantial reliance on energy imports, rendering the country particularly vulnerable to external shocks—especially amid fluctuating hydrocarbon prices and evolving global energy alignments. Although projects such as the TurkStream pipeline and recent gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean illustrate Ankara’s intent to diversify energy sources, fiscal limitations and technological dependency have delayed their strategic benefits. Consequently, Turkey’s geopolitical assertiveness is frequently constrained by its dependence on imported high-value industrial components, raw materials, and energy.

These constraints not only limit the scope of autonomous policy execution; they also expose Ankara’s efforts towards defence indigenisation to indirect embargoes and political pressures—particularly from within the NATO and EU ecosystems—, thereby diminishing its institutional credibility. In this context, Turkey seeks to position itself as not just a reactive actor, but as a proactive participant in crisis diplomacy and regional stabilization. From its facilitative role in the Black Sea Grain Initiative during the Russia-Ukraine conflict to its backing of the UN-recognized government in Libya and involvement in diplomatic negotiations on Gaza, Turkey has sought to assert itself as a constructive geopolitical broker.

Turkey’s foreign policy ambitions cannot rest on geostrategic vision or rhetoric alone; they demand institutional depth, narrative coherence, and above all economic resilience. Also, it is crucial to remember the following: In Turkey under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, domestic and foreign policy issues are often deeply intertwined. In this context, developments in domestic politics tend to influence foreign policy, while shifts in foreign policy dynamics also have significant repercussions on the domestic political landscape. Despite moments of diplomatic success, persistent structural weaknesses—limited diplomatic capacity, political volatility, and economic fragility—consistently strategic continuity. As the global order becomes more fragmented, Turkey stands at a crossroads: its geographic centrality and diplomatic agility provide real potential, but without parallel reforms in governance, economy, and institutions, its influence risks being fleeting rather than foundational.

Turkey’s Defence Industry: An Emerging Power or a Compelled Defence?

Amid this complex and multi-layered landscape, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has sought to construct a system that he controls almost entirely at the domestic level, while simultaneously attempting to build a “national and local” defence industry. However, this dual endeavour has gradually evolved into a structure that is strong in certain respects yet significantly lacking in others.

Since the early 2000s, Turkey’s defence industry has undergone a striking evolution, emerging as both a cornerstone of national security and a symbol of technological ambition. […] platforms such as the Bayraktar TB2 have reshaped modern warfare and showcased Turkish engineering in conflicts from Libya to Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine. These advancements have amplified not only Turkey’s hard power reach but also its soft power appeal. 

Since the early 2000s, Turkey’s defence industry has undergone a striking evolution, emerging as both a cornerstone of national security and a symbol of technological ambition. Institutions like ASELSAN, ROKETSAN, BAYKAR, and TUSAŞ have driven a wave of home-grown innovation, positioning Turkey as a rising military power with increasingly autonomous capabilities. Nowhere is this more evident than in its UAV program: platforms such as the Bayraktar TB2 have reshaped modern warfare and showcased Turkish engineering in conflicts from Libya to Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine. These advancements have amplified not only Turkey’s hard power reach but also its soft power appeal. Yet beneath the surface of success lies a structural contradiction: the persistent reliance on imported engines, electronics, and key materials reminds us that technological sovereignty remains aspirational as long as supply chains remain externally anchored.

Despite Turkey’s celebrated progress in national defence technologies, structural dependencies on critical foreign components continue to undermine its strategic autonomy. A stark illustration of this fragility was Turkey’s removal from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program by the United States in 2019, following its acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile system. This exclusion not only disrupted the Turkish Air Force’s modernization path; it also exposed deep-seated weaknesses in domestic production capacity. One of the projects most affected has been the development of the KAAN National Combat Aircraft, which remains highly dependent on foreign technology—especially in jet engine systems. Although national institutions like TÜBİTAK and TUSAŞ are spearheading efforts to produce local engines, technical maturity remains elusive, placing Turkey at a competitive disadvantage within the global aerospace industry.

The Eurofighter Typhoon case starkly illustrates the multilayered barriers confronting Turkey’s quest for defence autonomy. Although Turkey joined the program in the early 2000s with ambitions of technology transfer and joint production, its integration has been shaped by political hesitation and technical bottlenecks. Over 80 percent of the aircraft’s core systems—including engines, avionics, and flight controls—remain sourced from European suppliers, notably in the UK, Germany, and Spain. More recently, renewed discussions on Turkish procurement have reportedly involved political conditionalities, such as restrictions on deployment against Kurdish groups or in the context of Aegean tensions with Greece, further complicating negotiations. These dynamics reveal a structural paradox: Turkey aspires to strategic independence, yet remains entangled in deep interdependencies. Compounding this challenge is Turkey’s fragile economic landscape—marked by high inflation, currency volatility, and limited fiscal space—which weakens its negotiating leverage and casts doubt on the long-term sustainability of such high-cost defence projects. Without a stable economic foundation, ambitions for defence autonomy risk remaining aspirational rather than achievable.

From a macroeconomic standpoint, the viability of Turkey’s expanding defence ambitions is increasingly constrained by fiscal fragility. As of 2023, Turkey’s external debt exceeds $450 billion, inflation hovers around 60 percent, and the Turkish lira continues its volatile depreciation, driving up the cost of imported defence components. These dynamics significantly impede the localization of high-tech systems, especially in electronic warfare, precision munitions, and propulsion.

From a macroeconomic standpoint, the viability of Turkey’s expanding defence ambitions is increasingly constrained by fiscal fragility. As of 2023, Turkey’s external debt exceeds $450 billion, inflation hovers around 60 percent, and the Turkish lira continues its volatile depreciation, driving up the cost of imported defence components. These dynamics significantly impede the localization of high-tech systems, especially in electronic warfare, precision munitions, and propulsion. Currently, foreign dependency in some critical subsystems surpasses 70 percent, particularly in engine technologies and electro-optical sensors—a figure that not only calls Turkey’s defence sustainability into question, but also its geostrategic credibility in NATO and beyond. Ultimately, Turkey’s dual ambition—to assert itself as a regional defence power while maintaining economic and technological sovereignty—remains encumbered by deep-seated systemic and structural constraints. Unless these are addressed through long-term institutional investment, broader technological partnerships, and fiscal stabilization, Turkey’s strategic autonomy risks remaining rhetorical rather than real.

Turkey’s defence industry has evolved into more than a military instrument; it is now a key lever for diplomatic influence and geopolitical ambition. Positioned at the heart of NATO, yet often at odds with its Western allies, Ankara has expanded its strategic footprint across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus by leveraging domestically-developed military platforms. 

Turkey’s defence industry has evolved into more than a military instrument; it is now a key lever for diplomatic influence and geopolitical ambition. Positioned at the heart of NATO, yet often at odds with its Western allies, Ankara has expanded its strategic footprint across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus by leveraging domestically-developed military platforms. These capabilities have enabled intervention, mediation, and deterrence—but also intensified friction with traditional partners over issues like the S-400 purchase, sanctions, and arms embargoes. In response, Turkey has cultivated alternative defence partnerships with states such as Qatar, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan—an intentional pivot toward a multipolar order in which Ankara seeks to shape, not follow, global security dynamics. The launch of the TCG Anadolu, a drone-capable amphibious assault vessel, and the combat-tested success of UAVs like the Bayraktar TB2, exemplify Turkey’s bid for power projection and defence innovation.

Yet beneath these advances lie unresolved structural vulnerabilities. Turkey remains heavily dependent on imported engines, semiconductors, and electronic warfare components—dependencies that constrain its strategic autonomy. Economic fragilities, including foreign currency volatility and constrained R&D funding, further limit its ability to scale and sustain this momentum. As a result, Turkey’s defence assertiveness risks outpacing its economic and industrial foundations.

Authoritarianism and Geopolitical Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Dimensions

The interconnection between domestic political structures and foreign policy outcomes has become a defining principle in contemporary international relations, underscoring how internal governance dynamics shape a state’s external behaviour. In Turkey’s case, democratic backsliding—characterized by the erosion of judicial independence, suppression of media freedom, and the marginalization of political opposition—has significantly weakened institutional resilience and diminished international credibility. This authoritarian drift is evident in politically charged trials against figures such as Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, sustained government pressure on influential business associations like TÜSİAD, and the silencing of dissent within academia and the press.

These developments have not only narrowed the space for political pluralism—an essential component of democratic legitimacy; they have also eroded Turkey’s normative appeal and soft power, particularly within multilateral institutions such as the Council of Europe. The institutional degradation extends beyond civil liberties, affecting key bureaucratic and strategic organs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, once a cornerstone of Turkish diplomatic competence, has seen its autonomy curtailed and its operational coherence strained under an increasingly centralized presidential system. Similarly, the credibility of the Central Bank has been undermined by political interference, complicating efforts to rein in inflation.

Although the appointment of Mehmet Şimşek signalled a tentative return to orthodox economic policymaking, the program faces structural challenges—most notably, the disconnect between the long-term nature of stabilization and the short-term urgency of political expectations. Inflation remains stubbornly high, and while some investor confidence has returned, it remains fragile amid ongoing institutional volatility. These economic constraints directly impact Turkey’s capacity to project consistent and credible influence abroad, further entrenching the feedback loop between domestic fragility and external limitations.

Although the appointment of Mehmet Şimşek signalled a tentative return to orthodox economic policymaking, the program faces structural challenges—most notably, the disconnect between the long-term nature of stabilization and the short-term urgency of political expectations. Inflation remains stubbornly high, and while some investor confidence has returned, it remains fragile amid ongoing institutional volatility. These economic constraints directly impact Turkey’s capacity to project consistent and credible influence abroad, further entrenching the feedback loop between domestic fragility and external limitations.

Likewise, economic governance institutions struggle with mounting fiscal pressures, ad hoc decision-making, and inconsistent coordination across government branches—all of which limit Ankara’s ability to formulate and execute coherent foreign policy strategies. These dynamics reflect a growing consensus in international relations: without strong domestic institutions, no state can sustain a credible, consistent, or effective foreign policy. When democratic legitimacy, strategic foresight, and institutional robustness are absent, a country’s global standing erodes (Ozturk 2021). In Turkey’s case, foreign policy limitations are no longer primarily the result of external shocks—they are increasingly self-inflicted. A governance model driven by short-term centralization over long-term planning has weakened the state’s ability to act as a reliable and norm-abiding international actor. The dismantling of checks and balances, the erosion of the rule of law, and the personalization of executive power have collectively undercut Turkey’s capacity for international leadership. As leading theorists have long argued, global influence tends to mirror domestic stability. Without transparency, meritocracy, and accountability at home, sustained diplomatic credibility abroad remains elusive.

This strategic paradox is especially stark in Turkey’s simultaneous pursuit of regional leadership and slide into authoritarianism. While Ankara has achieved significant milestones in defence—most notably with UAVs like the Bayraktar TB2—these successes are undermined by unresolved technological dependencies, exposure to sanctions, and a weak innovation ecosystem. Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 program is a case in point: a foreign policy consequence rooted in internal political choices. At the same time, deepening polarization and rising authoritarianism continue to hollow out the institutional base required for values-driven, rules-based foreign policy. This contradiction echoes a central dilemma in neorealist thought: the pursuit of power abroad constrained by dysfunction at home.

Turkey’s future as a consequential geopolitical actor depends not only on its external posture, but also—and, perhaps, to a greater extent—on its internal reform trajectory. The link between democratization and foreign policy capacity is now, to a greater extent, structural, not voluntary. A growing body of empirical research affirms that institutional resilience and democratic governance are the bedrock upon which international credibility and sustained strategic engagement are built. In Turkey’s case, revitalizing judicial independence, restoring media freedom, and safeguarding civil liberties would not only stabilize domestic politics; they would also rebuild diplomatic legitimacy. Without such reforms, Turkey’s claims to regional leadership will continue to ring hollow. The strategic imperative is unmistakable: domestic reform must precede external ambition.

The trajectory of Turkey’s defence sector illustrates this tension vividly. The 2019 decision to acquire the Russian-made S-400 missile system in the face of strong NATO objections triggered sweeping sanctions from the United States, including Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 program. These sanctions cost Turkey an estimated $9 billion in lost revenue and delayed the modernization of its air force by years. More broadly, they severed access to key aerospace technologies and components, exposing critical vulnerabilities in Turkey’s defence supply chains. These disruptions have seriously impacted the operational readiness and long-term viability of Turkey’s military modernization agenda.

The fallout has been particularly acute in legacy systems like the F-16 fleet, where embargoes on avionics and engine parts have driven up costs and reduced operational capability. Experts estimate a 15–20 percent drop in readiness for key aerial platforms. In response, Ankara has ramped up investments in domestic production—especially in drones, missile systems, and naval assets. Yet despite notable advances by firms such as BAYKAR, ASELSAN, and TUSAŞ, efforts toward self-reliance remain hamstrung by technological bottlenecks, insufficient R&D capacity, and ongoing exclusion from Western defence networks.

These strategic constraints have been magnified by strained relations with major European powers–particularly Greece, France, and Germany. The Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean have become militarized flashpoints, with defence spending in the region rising by over 25 percent over five years. France’s naval deployments and Germany’s military aid to Greece have fuelled Ankara’s perception of encirclement, prompting muscular responses ranging from intensified naval patrols to aggressive diplomacy. To counterbalance Western isolation, Turkey has cultivated closer ties with countries like Qatar, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan, and expanded its role in multilateral initiatives like the Organisation of Turkic States. Yet these steps offer limited strategic depth and cannot replace the geopolitical capital once derived from robust engagement with NATO and the EU.

The long-term resolution of this structural impasse lies in a political reset domestically. Should Turkey undertake serious reform—restoring judicial independence, ceasing to repress dissent, and reinvigorating media pluralism—it could begin to rebuild trust with Western allies and reposition itself as a credible regional power. The goal of forming a “security community” based on trust, dialogue, and conflict resolution would become increasingly achievable. The political science literature consistently demonstrates that democratization fosters foreign direct investment, strengthens diplomatic partnerships, and deepens economic integration. Empirical studies show that improved governance can increase FDI inflows by up to 15 percent annually in transitioning economies—resources that could sustain defence modernization and broader economic transformation.

Beyond economic gains, democratization would reduce Western scepticism about Turkey’s reliability as a strategic partner. It would unlock avenues for defence cooperation, technological exchange, and deeper institutional integration with Euro-Atlantic structures. Lifting sanctions, rejoining procurement programs, and restoring Turkey’s role in collective defence initiatives would follow. This, in turn, would reduce Turkey’s exposure to embargo-induced shocks and enhance its influence in conflict zones such as Ukraine, Libya, the Caucasus, and Gaza.

Turkey’s current geopolitical constraints—external sanctions, regional tensions, and internal authoritarian drift—are not inescapable. They are symptoms of a deeper structural misalignment between its internal governance and external ambitions. A return to democratic pluralism, institutional integrity, and transparent governance is more than an idealistic proposition—it is a strategic necessity. Only through reform, not confrontation, can Turkey convert its latent potential into lasting, rules-based power in a multipolar world. Alongside political reform, Turkey must also address its structural demographic and economic challenges. Strategic influence in the 21st century hinges not just on military strength; it also depends on human capital, education quality, and technological innovation. Yet Turkey faces mounting pressure in these areas, with high youth unemployment, low female labour participation, and a deepening brain drain. Reversing these trends requires a long-term industrial strategy, targeted education reform, and regional employment programs. Without integrating economic and demographic planning into a cohesive strategic vision, Turkey’s goals of technological autonomy and regional leadership will remain constrained not by external rivals, but by internal inertia.

Conclusion and Policy recommendations

Turkey’s recent investments in its defence industry reflect both a rational response to global volatility and a strategic effort to enhance national resilience. In an era marked by geopolitical fragmentation, escalating conflicts, and waning multilateralism, Ankara’s drive toward military self-sufficiency—particularly in areas like UAV technology, missile systems, and naval capabilities—offers not only national security benefits, but also the possibility of Turkey acting as a stabilizing force beyond its borders. As European security architectures are increasingly strained and regions like the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Eastern Mediterranean face heightened instability, Turkey is uniquely positioned to contribute to reducing regional tensions by maintaining equilibria and providing humanitarian support. However, to fully realize this potential and translate military capacity into sustainable strategic influence, several foundational issues must be addressed.

Turkey must enhance its democratic capacity at home. A resilient democracy—grounded in the rule of law, judicial independence, media pluralism, and civil liberties—is more than a normative ideal; it is a prerequisite for long-term strategic credibility.

First, Turkey must enhance its democratic capacity at home. A resilient democracy—grounded in the rule of law, judicial independence, media pluralism, and civil liberties—is more than a normative ideal; it is a prerequisite for long-term strategic credibility. Democratic legitimacy strengthens foreign policy coherence, facilitates international partnerships, and enhances the soft power necessary for conflict mediation and regional diplomacy. Without internal reforms of this sort, Turkey’s external actions will continue to be viewed with scepticism, particularly by Western allies whose cooperation remains vital for technological collaboration and institutional integration.

Turkey must articulate a clear strategic rationale to underpin its defence investments. This involves moving beyond reactive threat perceptions and developing a holistic framework that aligns defence policy with broader developmental and diplomatic objectives.  

Second, Turkey must articulate a clear strategic rationale to underpin its defence investments. This involves moving beyond reactive threat perceptions and developing a holistic framework that aligns defence policy with broader developmental and diplomatic objectives. In this context, two interrelated concepts are paramount: economic security and open strategic autonomy. Economic security ensures that defence development is underpinned by a stable macroeconomic foundation, robust innovation ecosystems, and inclusive growth. Open strategic autonomy, meanwhile, allows Turkey to pursue sovereign policy choices while maintaining constructive engagement with both Western institutions and non-Western partners. Crucially, these two pillars must operate in tandem. Our recommendation is that rather than severing its historical ties with the Western bloc, Turkey should strengthen its institutions, economy, and democracy in order to gain greater strategic flexibility. This would enable Turkey to enhance its capabilities—particularly in the field of defence—while also increasing its influence across a range of other domains. A defence posture rooted in economic security enhances industrial sustainability and innovation, while open strategic autonomy ensures that sovereignty does not come at the cost of isolation. This dual approach not only supports Turkey’s strategic flexibility; it also encourages democratic consolidation and institutional development, creating a virtuous cycle in which internal governance reform and external credibility reinforce one another.

Turkey’s ambitions to act as a “balancing power” or “regional stabilizer” are both timely and attainable, but only if pursued through a coordinated, multi-dimensional strategy. Defence modernization, democratic reform, economic resilience, and strategic autonomy should be viewed not as separate tracks, but as mutually reinforcing components of a coherent national vision. A Turkey that invests in its people, renews its institutions, and positions its defence capabilities within a transparent and accountable strategic framework will be far better placed to engage with Western partners on an equal footing and to shape regional dynamics in a constructive, stabilizing manner. The future of Turkey’s geopolitical influence therefore lies not solely in its arsenal, but in the strength, legitimacy, and foresight of the state that wields it.

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On 16 July, during the Human Rights subcommittee meeting, Prof. Clara Portela and Associate Professor Nathanael Tilahun presented the study “Effectiveness of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime”. The work examines the implementation of the EU's Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime since its adoption in 2020, assessing its use and impact.
The session was followed by the presentation of the draft report on "Addressing impunity through EU sanctions, including the EU Global Human Rights sanctions regime - so called EU Magnitsky Act."
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Both World Bank shareholders and the Bank’s management have emphasised the need for large-scale private investment to achieve development and climate goals. For the World Bank Group, this means collaborating more closely between its different institutions, an issue that World Bank President Ajay Banga has prioritised. This paper examines the extent to which these ambitions are being translated into practice, using energy-related reforms, with a focus on renewable energy sources, as an example. Through three country case studies (Romania, Bangladesh and Cameroon), it examines how the Bank’s diagnostic work is reflected in its country strategies and policy-based lending programmes. Coherence is assessed using nine questions. The case studies show that despite many cross-references between the documents and some parallels in the analysis of key constraints, three challenges emerge. First, the diagnostic documents lack coherence. Second, the issues raised in these documents are often not translated into the Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs). Third, in many cases there is a very weak link between the proposals in the diagnostic documents and the CPF on the one hand, and the policy-based lending programme with its prior actions (PAs) and disbursement-linked indicators (DLIs) on the other. The PAs and DLIs are often unambitious. The paper recommends four reforms to address these shortcomings: (1) Diagnostic documents should indicate which policy reforms are considered most binding and suggest steps to address them. In addition, all CPFs should include an annex with the diagnostic documents’ main operational (policy) proposals and how they are reflected in the CPF. (2) CPFs should explicitly explain how management intends to use country platforms. If their use is not considered feasible, the CPF should explain why. (3) Given that fiscal policy is a powerful tool for decarbonising the energy sector, and given the underperformance in translating reform needs into policy-based programmes and appropriate PAs/DLIs, the Bank should review its approach in this area; the new, planned energy policy would be a first opportunity. (4) As bringing together private and public sector perspectives is key to mobilising private sector investment, the Bank’s management should include public sector perspectives and representatives in the Private Sector Lab, set up by the Bank’s president in 2023. The Bank’s management is currently reforming both its country engagement model and its energy policy strategy. Moreover, it has introduced some organisational changes aimed at fostering a closer cooperation between its various institutions. The recommendations in this paper should be considered in this context. Implementing the recommendations would greatly increase private capital mobilisation, which was a key issue on the agenda for the Financing for Development conference in Seville in July 2025.

Both World Bank shareholders and the Bank’s management have emphasised the need for large-scale private investment to achieve development and climate goals. For the World Bank Group, this means collaborating more closely between its different institutions, an issue that World Bank President Ajay Banga has prioritised. This paper examines the extent to which these ambitions are being translated into practice, using energy-related reforms, with a focus on renewable energy sources, as an example. Through three country case studies (Romania, Bangladesh and Cameroon), it examines how the Bank’s diagnostic work is reflected in its country strategies and policy-based lending programmes. Coherence is assessed using nine questions. The case studies show that despite many cross-references between the documents and some parallels in the analysis of key constraints, three challenges emerge. First, the diagnostic documents lack coherence. Second, the issues raised in these documents are often not translated into the Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs). Third, in many cases there is a very weak link between the proposals in the diagnostic documents and the CPF on the one hand, and the policy-based lending programme with its prior actions (PAs) and disbursement-linked indicators (DLIs) on the other. The PAs and DLIs are often unambitious. The paper recommends four reforms to address these shortcomings: (1) Diagnostic documents should indicate which policy reforms are considered most binding and suggest steps to address them. In addition, all CPFs should include an annex with the diagnostic documents’ main operational (policy) proposals and how they are reflected in the CPF. (2) CPFs should explicitly explain how management intends to use country platforms. If their use is not considered feasible, the CPF should explain why. (3) Given that fiscal policy is a powerful tool for decarbonising the energy sector, and given the underperformance in translating reform needs into policy-based programmes and appropriate PAs/DLIs, the Bank should review its approach in this area; the new, planned energy policy would be a first opportunity. (4) As bringing together private and public sector perspectives is key to mobilising private sector investment, the Bank’s management should include public sector perspectives and representatives in the Private Sector Lab, set up by the Bank’s president in 2023. The Bank’s management is currently reforming both its country engagement model and its energy policy strategy. Moreover, it has introduced some organisational changes aimed at fostering a closer cooperation between its various institutions. The recommendations in this paper should be considered in this context. Implementing the recommendations would greatly increase private capital mobilisation, which was a key issue on the agenda for the Financing for Development conference in Seville in July 2025.

Both World Bank shareholders and the Bank’s management have emphasised the need for large-scale private investment to achieve development and climate goals. For the World Bank Group, this means collaborating more closely between its different institutions, an issue that World Bank President Ajay Banga has prioritised. This paper examines the extent to which these ambitions are being translated into practice, using energy-related reforms, with a focus on renewable energy sources, as an example. Through three country case studies (Romania, Bangladesh and Cameroon), it examines how the Bank’s diagnostic work is reflected in its country strategies and policy-based lending programmes. Coherence is assessed using nine questions. The case studies show that despite many cross-references between the documents and some parallels in the analysis of key constraints, three challenges emerge. First, the diagnostic documents lack coherence. Second, the issues raised in these documents are often not translated into the Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs). Third, in many cases there is a very weak link between the proposals in the diagnostic documents and the CPF on the one hand, and the policy-based lending programme with its prior actions (PAs) and disbursement-linked indicators (DLIs) on the other. The PAs and DLIs are often unambitious. The paper recommends four reforms to address these shortcomings: (1) Diagnostic documents should indicate which policy reforms are considered most binding and suggest steps to address them. In addition, all CPFs should include an annex with the diagnostic documents’ main operational (policy) proposals and how they are reflected in the CPF. (2) CPFs should explicitly explain how management intends to use country platforms. If their use is not considered feasible, the CPF should explain why. (3) Given that fiscal policy is a powerful tool for decarbonising the energy sector, and given the underperformance in translating reform needs into policy-based programmes and appropriate PAs/DLIs, the Bank should review its approach in this area; the new, planned energy policy would be a first opportunity. (4) As bringing together private and public sector perspectives is key to mobilising private sector investment, the Bank’s management should include public sector perspectives and representatives in the Private Sector Lab, set up by the Bank’s president in 2023. The Bank’s management is currently reforming both its country engagement model and its energy policy strategy. Moreover, it has introduced some organisational changes aimed at fostering a closer cooperation between its various institutions. The recommendations in this paper should be considered in this context. Implementing the recommendations would greatly increase private capital mobilisation, which was a key issue on the agenda for the Financing for Development conference in Seville in July 2025.

La vie de Muhammadu Buhari a connu des changements spectaculaires au fil des décennies, et il a souvent été au cœur des événements.

Length of video : 120'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Dauer des Videos : 120'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Durée de la vidéo : 210'

Clause de non-responsabilité : L'interprétation des débats facilite la communication mais ne constitue en aucun cas un enregistrement authentifié des débats. Seuls le discours original ou la traduction écrite révisée du discours original peuvent être considérés authentiques.
Source : © Union européenne, 2025 - PE

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Ahead of the upcoming EU-China Summit in Brussels, the DROI meeting on 16 July featured an exchange of views on the human rights situation in China. Civil society representatives with extensive expertise on the country joined the panel to assess the current state of affairs and shared their input on the road ahead concerning the human rights dimension of the EU-China relationship.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

An evaluation of the U.N. country teams states that the resident coordinator system has “proven challenging” with “limited results.” Where to now for the U.N. at 80?

An evaluation of the U.N. country teams states that the resident coordinator system has “proven challenging” with “limited results.” Where to now for the U.N. at 80?

An evaluation of the U.N. country teams states that the resident coordinator system has “proven challenging” with “limited results.” Where to now for the U.N. at 80?