Diplomacy & Crisis News

A new report sheds light on how a tiny fraction of North Koreans browse the open web.

But it's still a powerful signal of Beijing's ambitions in a post-U.S. Asia.

Turkey’s strongman might not be strong enough to survive the early elections he wanted.

If both sides agree on the answers to these three questions, a successful summit just might be possible.

Depuis l'époque du chah, l'Iran soutient l'idée d'un Proche-Orient dénucléarisé. Toutefois, l'histoire nucléaire du pays comporte des trous et des incohérences qui n'inspirent pas confiance. Une opinion assez répandue voudrait que seule la coercition puisse réussir à persuader Téhéran de changer de (...) / États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Golfe, Iran, Nucléaire militaire, Énergie, Nucléaire civil, Pétrole, Relations internationales, Stratégie, Diplomatie - 2012/03

Unlike ex-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, U.S. Agency for International Development chief Mark Green has won over his workforce with his reorganization plan.

Dans une atmosphère d'intense affairisme de spéculation et de trouble intrigues, l'accélération des privatisations en France coïncide avec le démarrage précipité de la campagne pour l'élection présidentielle. Les prétendants — avoués ou non à la magistrature suprême et leurs hommes liges occupent la scène (...) / France, Justice, Libéralisme, Privatisation, Néolibéralisme - 1987/10

For decades, Sweden has represented America’s interests in places where the United States has severed diplomatic ties.

Marking World Malaria Day, the head of the United Nations health agency on Wednesday stressed the need to get the global response against the disease back on track while acknowledging progress that had helped avert millions of malaria deaths, especially among children, since 2000.

Last year Panama became the second Central American country to establish diplomatic ties with China. This is the latest example of how Chinese investment in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region has afforded Beijing closer political ties. As the US reduces its influence south of the border, China’s economic ventures will pay dividends at the expense of its rival.

China’s Central American strategy

China’s advancement in Central America dates back to 2007, when Costa Rica became the first Central American country to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing. Since then, economic relations between both countries have developed, helping to promote China’s regional brand. Economically, China has presented itself as an attractive partner. In 2008, China purchased Costa Rican bonds in excess of $300m, offered the country aid worth $130m, and funded the $105m construction of the Estadio Nacional. Meanwhile, on March 2 Chinese state media claimed that China will finance the expansion of a highway connecting Costa Rica and the Caribbean.

Chinese activity in Costa Rica is not limited to finance. In terms of culture, students at the University of Costa Rica can study Chinese and enrol in Chinese cultural programmes. The Chinese government has also promoted the development of Chinatown in San José, Costa Rica’s capital.

Costa Rica has set an example to follow

Through the relationship with Costa Rica, China’s influence across the region has strengthened, encouraging other countries to pursue closer relations with the Asian giant. In recent years, Chinese investment in Panama has grown substantially. China is the second biggest user of the Panama Canal, which is crucial to its trade routes.

Significantly, China’s economic potency in Panama has generated close political relations between both countries. Last June, Panama formally established diplomatic relations with Beijing. Last November, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Panamanian President Juan Carlos Varela discussed the prospect of a free-trade agreement between China and Panama. After that meeting, Zhao Bentang, head of China’s foreign ministry Latin America division, declared Beijing would ‘assist Panama’s economic and social development to the best of our capacity.’ China’s inroads in Central America are not limited to Costa Rica and Panama.  In other ventures, China is financing a 170 mile Nicaraguan canal which will connect the Caribbean Sea with the Pacific Ocean. Meanwhile, in Honduras Chinese firms have shown interest in investing in hydroelectric projects.

China, Taiwan, and Central America

Given that Central America does not constitute a large market, economic interests alone do not explain China’s regional engagement. Rather, the geopolitical significance and geographic location of Central America underpin China’s financial overtures to countries in the region.

One cannot examine China’s interests in Central America without taking cognizance of its conflict with Taiwan. China sees Taiwan as a breakaway province. It does not recognise Taiwan’s sovereignty and believes that one day Taiwan will be reunited with the mainland.

Significantly, Central America represents the most concentrated global region of support for Taiwan. Out of Taiwan’s twenty diplomatic allies, ten are located in Central America and the Caribbean. Taiwan’s presence in Central America has become more conspicuous amid China’s growing interest in the region. Last year, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen toured Central America to reinvigorate political ties.

Beijing’s ‘One China’ policy is central to China’s strategy in Central America. The maintenance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan by these ten countries effectively precludes them from establishing political ties with China. For Costa Rica and Panama, cutting political ties with Taiwan was, thus, an essential prerequisite for establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing.

China believes it can persuade Central American countries to abandon support for Taiwan through economic incentives. This policy, to erode Taiwan’s international legitimacy and place it in further isolation, is central to China’s political and economic strategy here.

The wider region

China’s Central American interests coincide with its growing influence across Latin America. Resulting from its ‘Go Out Policy’ developed in the late 1990s, China has become a pivotal economic partner for Latin American countries through access to natural resources, foreign markets, and the diversification of Chinese firms.

China’s interest in Latin America, like Central America, is both economic and political. From 2000 to 2012, China-Latin America trade rose from $10bn to $270bn. For Brazil, Chile, and Peru, China has replaced the US as their most important trading partner. Chinese banks have been a significant source of regional finance. In exchange for oil, China has loaned in excess of $65bn and $21bn to Venezuela and Brazil respectively. China is the region’s biggest creditor and has eroded Washington’s financial power in times of economic hardship in the region.

Latin America forms part of China’s global Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). On January 22, Santiago hosted the second meeting between China and LAC countries in a bid to strengthen economic and political ties. Speaking to representatives of 33 countries, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi confirmed that the region is ideal for China’s BRI plans.

Washington’s loss is Beijing’s gain

China’s economic and political gains across the LAC region contrast with North America’s reduced influence. Although the US remains the biggest economic player in Latin America, the 2008 global recession negatively affected its regional commitments. Between 2000 and 2010, the US’ share of Latin American trade fell 14%. More recently, President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and introduce import tariffs on steel and aluminium has further damaged trade relations with the South. In contrast, embracing free trade, multilateralism and globalisation, China has pledged to increase trade and investment with Latin America.

China’s ventures south of the Rio Grande and its increasing global influence appear to have escalated tensions with the US. Speaking ahead of his visit to Latin America in February, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warned against far-away powers ‘that do not reflect the fundamental values shared in this region’. Moreover, Washington views Beijing’s economic policies in Latin America as China’s attempt  to ‘challenge American power’. From Beijing’s perspective, Washington’s decision last June to sell arms to Taiwan indicate hostility to one of China’s core global principles.

Overall, through establishing successful economic and diplomatic relations with countries in Latin America, Beijing seeks to portray China as a beneficial and reliable partner and persuade other countries to strengthen diplomatic ties. Considering China’s economic commitment to the region over the next decade, other Central American countries will likely abandon ties with Taiwan in return for Chinese aid and investment. Furthermore, China’s growing regional influence coincides with growing tension between Washington and Beijing. As the world’s two leading powers face a potential trade war, the LAC could become a battleground as China continues to enhance its global economic and political image.

 

This article first ran on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Niall Walsh.

The post China’s strategic influence is growing in the Americas appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Foreign policy alumni are trying to shake of the “D.C. insider" reputation and sail into Congress

Retrouvez l’article dont est extraite cette citation : « Les États au Moyen-Orient : crise et retour », écrit par Dorothée Schmid, responsable du Programme Turquie contemporaine/Moyen-Orient dans le numéro de printemps 2018 de Politique étrangère.

With one in four of the world’s 1.2 billion youth affected by some sort of violence or armed conflict, the United Nations on Tuesday launched a project to support new, youth-driven initiatives in education, science, culture and the media to prevent violent extremism in Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia

Economic losses to disasters in Asia and the Pacific could exceed $160 billion annually by 2030, the United Nations development arm in the region warned on Tuesday, urging greater innovation in disaster risk financing.

With the conflict in Syria into its eighth bloody year and human suffering worsening by the day, the United Nations and partners on Tuesday made a major appeal for additional funds, as well as for reinvigorating the stalled UN-led Geneva talks.

At the start of World Immunization Week , the United Nations on Tuesday said that while vaccines are protecting more children than ever, more countries need to make immunization a priority, because more than one million children still die every year from vaccine-preventable diseases.

Everyone in the West, royalty or not, gets better maternal health care than parents in the United States.

A new Rand Corp. report finds artificial intelligence could increase the risk of nuclear war.

Bien qu'elle se targue de privilégier les faits, la presse des Etats-Unis traite souvent l'actualité internationale comme un conte moral illustrant les bienfaits du « modèle » américain et les « archaïsmes » de ceux qui refusent de le suivre. Cette fable idéologique réserve à la France un rôle de choix. (...) / États-Unis, France, Culture, Mondialisation - 1998/04

Colombian presidential elections will be held on 27 May. Among its candidates, a new-born star is rising with the right-wing candidate Iván Duque, a strong opponent to the peace agreement.

Iván Duque: future President of Colombia?

According to the latest poll from Polimétrica, run by Cifras & Conceptos earlier this month, right-wing candidate Iván Duque appears most likely to win the presidential election. Per the poll, 35.4% of the interviewees claimed they would vote for him while 24.6% would vote for the leftist candidate, Gustavo Petro, the second runner up in this election and former guerrilla member.

Furthermore, not only is he the candidate with the most favourable image (49%) for Colombian electors – a percentage up from 19% in January, but he has also seen the most steady increase of the intention of votes, from 8% in January to 22% in March – equalling the intentions to vote for Gustavo Petro at that time – to now lead the polls by far (see below graphic).

Political momentum: the peace agreement in trouble

The apparent success of the front runner for the presidential election could be partly explained by two factors: (i) opinion polls against the guerrillas’ agreement and ceasefire, and (ii) the recent arrest of a major FARC figure for drug crimes.

First, according to the poll mentioned above, most of interviewees disagree with the Havana peace deal that was signed by incumbent President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC members in 2012 (51%), as well as the pending negotiations with the other major rebel group of the country, the National Liberation Army (ELN) (56%). This is likely to play in favour for Iván Duque who also stands against the bilateral ceasefire that was agreed between the latest and the government.

Second, the surprising arrest on 9 April, by the US of one of the most important members of FARC, Seuxis Paucis Hernández Santrich, for drug crimes has put a strain on the peace deal. Santrich has been a major player in the negotiations of the Havana peace deal and was about to take a seat in Colombia’s congress – as contemplated by the accord.

Santrich was arrested after evidence found that he was going to sell 10 metric tons of cocaine, therefore he faces the threat of extradition to the US – a policy that has been strictly prohibited by the peace agreement, even though it only applies for crimes committed before its signature. This dilemma could spread fear among demobilized fighters who may think twice about trusting the government and the deal’s benefits.

Who is Iván Duque Márquez ?

Senator Iván Duque, 41, is the leader of the right-wing political party Centro Democrático. Previously, Duque worked as an adviser for the Treasury Department, from 1998-2002, and as a counsellor for the Inter-American Development Bank in the US for 8 years.

During the presidential campaign, Duque promised to enhance economic and social reforms. Most importantly, he has been a fervent opponent to the peace deal and advocates to modernize the Colombian armed forces to fight drug trafficking and criminal groups, such as the ELN and dissident FARC members.

Duque gained support among traditional right-wing sectors, as well as previous sympathisers of former president Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) – who led the “No” campaign on the peace referendum.

Among other points, Duque disagrees with the special justice put in place for guerrilla fighters as contemplated by the Havana agreement, in which he describes as a mockery and a symbol of impunity. Duque proposes a constitutional reform to ensure that drug trafficking is not eligible for impunity.

Outlook: significant changes for the peace deal likely if Duque wins

If and when, Iván Duque wins the upcoming presidential elections in May, according to the data he is on the right road to replace Santos. His win could likely weaken the Havana peace agreement that has partially managed to put an end to more than half a century of armed conflict.

In an interview with El País, Duque mentioned that if he wins, he does not intent to destroy or rip up the accords but to make significant changes to the elements that affect the rule of law. This could potentially lead former FARC members to join growing dissident groups, which would result in the renewal of attacks between militants and the government.

In the meantime, Duque’s leadership has been well received by investors who see in the right-wing candidate as a more business friendly advocate than leftist candidate Gustavo Petro for instance.

 

This article was first published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Mathilde Tisserand.

The post Colombia presidential elections: the rise of right-wing candidate Iván Duque appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.