European Union

MCP
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
According to Advocate General Rantos, the courts of a Member State have jurisdiction in a parental dispute in the case where a child, who was habitually resident in that Member State, is wrongfully removed to a non-Member State where he or she acquires habitual residence

A high-profile panel on Monday warned of the economic difficulties stemming from the pandemic, whilst noting that this crisis could offer the chance to rebuild EU economies.
Committee on Budgets
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

A high-profile panel on Monday warned of the economic difficulties stemming from the pandemic, whilst noting that this crisis could offer the chance to rebuild EU economies.
Committee on Budgets
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

The Immigration Issue

The European Refugee crisis, which began in 2015, has provided significant challenges for political parties across Europe and for the governance of the European Union (EU). In 2015, over one million migrants and refugees arrived into Europe. This wave continued into 2016, with a substantial reduction in 2017 and 2018 taking place. The peak number of refugees entering the EU in 2015 is often referred to as the European Refugee crisis.

As a result of the Refugee crisis, the importance of immigration as a political issue has remained high on the list of issues the public say is important to them. This has created electoral opportunities for far-right parties across Europe to lay claim to the immigration issue and capture disaffected voters.

This crucial electoral period has provided challenges for traditional centre left (Social Democratic) and centre right parties (Conservative) to update their party strategies across Europe. Though far-right parties are often seen as ‘owning’ the immigration issue from other political parties, our recent paper published in JCMS shows that this is not the case.

We tested our theory of strategic positioning using data on party competition in national parliamentary elections across 28 EU member states during the Refugee crisis (2015–2018). We found that centre right parties that adopted more anti-immigrant positions can increase their electoral success at the ballot box.

Most significantly, we found that this such a strategy benefits centre right parties more than it does for far-right parties during the European Refugee crisis period. We refer to this political phenomenon as ‘strategic positioning.’ We also find that centre left parties do not benefit at the ballot box from adopting more anti-immigrant positions.

 

The Refugee Crisis: Strategic Positioning

To illustrate the electoral success of centre right parties on the immigration issue during the Refugee crisis, we examined the cases of Austria and the Netherlands in Western Europe.

 

Western Europe

In Austria’s General Election in 2017, the centre right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP)

adopted more anti-immigrant positions. This helped the ÖVP to increase their electoral success and to form a coalition government with the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) after the elections.

In the Dutch General Election in 2017, we found a more complex pattern. Though the governing centre right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) adopted more anti-immigration positions, the party’s vote share decreased and the far-right right party for Freedom (PVV) under Geert Wilders made electoral gains.

Although the VVD performed electorally worse, they still managed to form a coalition government after the election. Adopting ‘tougher’ positions on immigration is likely to have reduced further electoral losses to the far-right PVV. By adopting more restrictive positions on immigration, the centre right in both countries has been able to alleviate the electoral threat that the far-right poses.

 

Central-Eastern Europe

We also identified an additional pattern in our analysis (‘a mainstreaming effect’) that has important implications for the future of liberal democracy across Europe. The ‘former’ traditional centre right Conservative Fidesz Party has now become a fully-fledged far-right party, with their focus on anti-immigrant positions.

This same ideological transformation can also be seen recently in Poland, with the Law and Justice (PiS) Party. This pattern paints a more negative picture for the future of European politics, particularly in the context of Central–Eastern Europe and the rightwards shift of a number of political parties.

 

Why do Centre Right Parties perform better?

Why have centre right parties often adopted hard-line positions on immigration? Scholars have noted that centre right parties are often ideologically ‘pragmatic’, governing parties that generally pursue electoral strategies to maintain and consolidate their political power.

The answer may be simple. The rationale for centre right parties is one of political survival. Such ‘strategic positioning’ may ensure that the centre right can remain in power as a governing party despite the opportunity during the Refugee crisis for challenger parties from the far-right to increase their electoral success.

For the duration of the Refugee crisis, a number of centre right parties across Europe have arguably been electorally resilient by adopting anti-immigrant positions to outmanoeuvre the far-right on this issue.

However, by shifting further right on immigration, centre right parties may have opened up a ‘Pandora’s box’ and brought the ideology of the far-right into the political mainstream. We argue that this strategy is a double-edged sword for centre right parties. This strategy may benefit the centre right in the short-term but may aid the far-right more in the long-term. This has worrying implications for the future of liberal democracy across Europe.

 

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article, “The Looming Refugee Crisis in the EU: Right-Wing Party Competition and Strategic Positioning.”

 

This blog is also adapted from a previous blog post that was published by LSE EUROPP, “Opening up Pandora’s box? How centre-right parties can outperform the radical right on immigration.”

 

 

James F. Downes is a Lecturer in Comparative Politics at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is also a Senior Fellow and Head of The Populism Research Unit at The Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right. James is an Associate Research Fellow in the Global Europe Centre at the University of Kent/Brussels School of International Studies and at the Center for Research and Social Progress (Italy). Previously he was a Visiting Scholar (Visiting Scholar) at The European Union Academic Programme Hong Kong (EUAP). He tweets at @DRJamesFDownes

 

Matthew Loveless is an Associate Professor at the University of Bologna (Italy). He is also a Co-Director and Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Research and Social Progress (Italy). He tweets at @cersporg

 

 

 

 

Andrew Lam is a District Council Member in Hong Kong and also an Associate Lecturer at The Open University of Hong Kong.

 

The post Centre Right Party Electoral Success on Immigration appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In 2015, the Turkish government and the European Commission officially started a process for the modernization and expansion of the Customs Union between the European Union (EU) and Turkey (hereafter called “CU-EUT”). The CU-EUT entered into force 25 years ago on December 31st, 1995. While it provides a far-reaching trade integration for industrial goods, lately both the EU and Turkey have stressed deficiencies in the implementation of the agreement and have discussed extending trade liberalization to new areas like services, agriculture and public procurement. In December 2016, the European Commission asked the European Council for a mandate to launch negotiations with Turkey. However, so far, the European Council has refused to approve the mandate and has suspended any preparatory work for the reform of the CU-EUT over concerns about the democratic development and human rights situation in Turkey. Consultations about the opening of negotiation talks are still ongoing.

Amidst the recent political tensions between the EU and Turkey, we look back and analyze how successful the CU-EUT has been in spurring trade flows between Turkey and the EU.

 

Reassessing the CU-EUT trade effects

Previous studies have mostly drawn an underwhelming picture of trade creation within the CU-EUT. Many academic papers do not find evidence for a significant and relevant trade-enhancing effect. For the preparation of the opening of negotiation talks the European Commission also requested two external studies which reach sobering conclusions regarding the effect of the CU-EUT on bilateral trade flows: while the World Bank finds no statistically significant effect, BKP, Panteia, and AESA identify an overall negative impact of the CU-EUT on two-way goods trade. In order to provide a thorough reassessment of the CU-EUT effects on trade between the EU and Turkey, we apply the latest developments in the quantification of regional trade agreements and rely on a database of international and internal trade flows in the manufacturing sector between 1988 and 2006. In contrast to previous research, we find a statistically significant and strongly positive impact of the CU-EUT. Compared to trade flows under the Ankara Agreement which had been in place before, the CU-EUT has increased manufacturing trade between the EU and Turkey by 60%. We also show that deviations from the best practices in evaluating trade policies can explain why previous studies were often unable to find a significant and economically large effect.

 

The effects on trade between Turkey and non-EU countries

The implementation of the CU-EUT committed Turkey to align to the EU’s customs tariffs and rules, to its commercial policy vis-à-vis third countries, as well as to the EU’s acquis in the areas covered by the CU-EUT. This alignment resulted in a decrease of Turkey´s import tariffs and provided an impetus for reforming Turkey´s customs procedures and internal technical legislation. Besides the immediate effects on Turkish trade flows with the EU, these improvements may also foster Turkey´s trade with other partner countries. Based on recent contributions in the empirical trade literature, we are able to estimate these third-country trade effects. Our results indicate that the reductions in bilateral trade frictions between Turkey and non-EU countries after the entry into force of the CU-EUT have increased trade flows by 28%. Thus, the CU-EUT has significantly fostered Turkish trade not only with EU member countries but also with all other trading partners.

One heavily debated feature of the CU-EUT is its asymmetric structure as to the external commercial policy. The CU-EUT requires Turkey to recognize all trade policies taken by the EU vis-à-vis third countries, such as the signing of a free trade agreement or a change in the EU´s common external tariff. At the same time, as Turkey is not a member of the EU, it neither receives automatic reciprocal access to these outside markets nor is it permitted to participate in the negotiations of trade liberalizations with them. Under this set up the CU-EUT may have asymmetric third-country effects on Turkish im- and exports. Indeed, we find that Turkish imports from non-EU countries increase more strongly than its exports as a consequence of the CU-EUT. Nevertheless, the results also indicate that Turkish exporters benefit from the CU-EUT by gaining market access to non-EU countries.

 

Do some member countries and sectors benefit more from the CU-EUT?

Policymakers are often interested in the specific trade effects for a single member country or sector. Although economic theory suggests that generally countries gain from trade liberalization, recently many political debates about free trade agreements have raised concerns about “one-way trade deals” and challenged that they bring prosperity to the individual nations. Therefore, we also examine heterogeneous impacts of the CU-EUT for each pair of member countries within the customs union as well as for various manufacturing sectors. Estimating country- and sector-specific effects reveals substantial heterogeneity in both dimensions. The largest effects are found for trade between Turkey and Ireland, Portugal, Belgium as well as Finland, while the positive impact of the CU-EUT is lowest for Italy, Austria, and Germany as Turkey´s trading partners. As regards sectoral differences, trade has increased the most in Machinery and Wood, whereas the smallest coefficients are estimated for Minerals, Chemicals and Food.

At the same time, the heterogeneity analysis also demonstrates that the positive CU-EUT trade effects are far-reaching. We find that for almost all country pairs and sectors the CU-EUT has significantly promoted trade flows. Exceptions are Turkish imports from Italy, Denmark, and Austria as well as trade in the Metals sector. We also combine the two dimensions of heterogeneity, allowing for different ex- and import effects in each sector and country, and estimate in total almost 1001 different coefficients for the CU-EUT. Two thirds of these coefficients are significantly positive which demonstrates the widespread benefits from the customs union at a highly disaggregated level. Overall, our results highlight that both the EU and Turkey gained considerably from the CU-EUT in terms of trade creation.

 

Renegotiating the CU-EUT

The small trade effects in some sectors indicate a potential for additional liberalization of manufacturing trade in an upcoming renegotiation of the CU-EUT. Furthermore, the CU-EUT cannot be considered an exceedingly deep agreement in terms of covered provisions since it misses, inter alia, liberalization in primary agriculture, services, public procurement, and investment. There is still room for more far-reaching commitments which may stimulate trade flows between the EU and Turkey even more. Our analysis reveals that deep trade liberalization beyond a mere free trade agreement is a worthwhile endeavour. In that sense, an upcoming modernization of bilateral trade relations should not easily jeopardize the benefits arising from a customs union.

 

This blog is based on our article ”A Tale of (almost) 1001 Coefficients: The Deep and Heterogeneous Effects of the EU‐Turkey Customs Union”.

 

 

Mario Larch is professor of empirical economics at the University of Bayreuth. He is also a scientific advisor at CEPII, research professor of the ifo institute, external fellow of GEP, and CESifo research network fellow. His research focusses on theoretical and empirical international trade and econometrics.

 

 

 

 

Aiko Schmeißer is a PhD student at the Berlin School of Economics. He has worked on research projects in labor economics, international trade, and political economy.

Twitter: @AikoSchmeisser

 

 

 

Joschka Wanner is an assistant professor of quantitative economics at the University of Potsdam and external researcher at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. He works on econometric challenges in the estimation of trade flow determinants, as well as on international environmental agreements and environmental policy in a global context.

Twitter: @JoschkaWanner

The post Revisiting the Trade Effects of the EU-Turkey Customs Union appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

MEPs will debate the Covid-19 crisis and recovery with members of national pariaments, discuss vaccine production and vote on a strategy for tourism.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

MEPs will debate the Covid-19 crisis and recovery with members of national pariaments, discuss vaccine production and vote on a strategy for tourism.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

The UK’s push for the frictionless market of the Norway option, while accepting only the obligations of the Canada option, was not viable. It was a delusion, either due to ignorance or self-deception.

Photo: James Veysey/Shutterstock/NTB

The UK never had the same vision of the EU as the other Member States. A main reason for the UK’s accession to the EEC in 1973 came down to economic difficulties. It did not wait long to show its distinctness, by demanding a budgetary rebate. Then, it got derogations from the common currency, the cooperation in justice and home affairs and social policy.

Jealous of its sovereignty, it slowed, with others, the coordination of the Member States’ economic and fiscal policies, foreign policies, cooperation on defence, as well as on police and justice and internal security.

During its 47-year membership, the UK helped to develop the single market (SM), to open external trade, to welcome new EU members and to preserve its idea of Europe.

PM May’s key decisions

When the British chose to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum, the UK’s concerns had all been met:

• by increasing the number of States and thus of possible vetoes from 9 to 28, without adjusting the EU’s decision-making
• by getting better control of the EU powers (subsidiarity) and eliminating federalist symbols
• by keeping the single market benefits, despite derogations from the euro, Schengen, and normal budget rules
• by preserving vetoes on foreign and defence decisions, police and judicial cooperation, internal security, and many areas

Brexit leaders promised that the UK would keep the single market’s benefits after leaving, as the EEA/EFTA countries do in the EEA framework (the Norway option). However, as soon as the first quarter of 2017, PM Theresa May took two key decisions:

• She triggered the two-year negotiation (duration fixed by article 50 of the Treaty on European Union) too early, at a time when there was no UK position, no study of options and deep divisions among people in the UK, and within Parliament and Government.

This put the UK negotiators under time pressure, while time was necessary to find a solution to avoid a border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

• She announced UK red lines: no freedom of movement, no Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), no customs union.

This excluded the Norway option for the future. It meant that the result could only be a hard Brexit, similar to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Canada and the EU (the Canada option).

Between Canada and Norway, there are only the cold waters of the Atlantic Ocean.

As I said at the time, between Canada and Norway, there are only the cold waters of the Atlantic Ocean. Trying to get a frictionless market, similar to the Norway option, while accepting only the obligations of the Canada option, was not viable. It was a delusion, either due to ignorance or self-deception.

Red lines

When PM Boris Johnson arrived at N°10, he managed to get a positive vote in the House of Commons on the draft Withdrawal Agreement (WA) negotiated by his predecessor, through slightly modifying provisions on the Irish issue. On this basis, he organised and won the general election.

Finally, the Withdrawal Agreement entered into force in February 2020, three and a half years after the referendum. PM Johnson then promised a hard Brexit and negotiated with the EU a Free Trade Agreement on the Canada option’s model. His negotiating team had only nine months to avoid a cliff edge and the application of WTO rules on 1st January 2021.

What were the red lines of the two negotiating parties?

For PM Johnson, the agreement on future relations with the EU had to fully respect the UK’s national sovereignty: the UK should decide alone its laws and policies, be the only master of its borders (no free movement of persons), its waters (EU fishermen), and its external relations (trade). The future agreement should exclude reference to EU law and to the CJEU, as well as cooperation on foreign policy and defence.

For the EU, the essential red line was to preserve the single market’s credibility.  As EU’s trust had decreased sharply after PM Johnson had tabled a bill violating the Withdrawal Agreement, the EU insisted on associating the Level Playing Field (LPF) conditions on open and fair competition (state aid, social and environmental standards) with a binding arbitration and possible unilateral cross-sector retaliations, should an arbitration ruling not be respected.

Both parties got their red lines respected. A solution for a decreasing access of EU fishermen to British waters during a transition period was also finally found, largely in favour of the EU.

The agreement (Trade and Cooperation Agreement: TCA) was initialled one week before the possible cliff edge. It is based on the respect of the rule of law and on the protection of fundamental rights. It provides for cooperation in many areas, while mentioning others for which unilateral decisions of equivalence or agreed cooperation could be developed.

New year, new realities

Despite the provisional implementation of the TCA, huge changes happened on 1st January 2021:

• Provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement permitting the UK to be treated as an EU member ceased to apply. British citizens lost the right to move freely to the EU 27 to reside, study, work, open a business, retire or have health care. Their (visa free) stay in the EU is limited to three months during any six-month period.
• The UK stopped benefiting from the EU’s single market, customs union (except for Northern Ireland), EU policies and most EU programs.
• As the TCA covers all goods, it should be beneficial to the EU, given its surplus of nearly £ 100 billion with the UK. Trade in goods continues to be tariff-free, but with non-tariff barriers: although not paying customs duties, goods must be checked at the border for their conformity with EU/UK sanitary and phytosanitary rules, norms and standards and rules of origin.
• Trade in services became difficult for British economic actors, not only for financial services’ providers, who lost the EU passport and did not get significant EU decisions of equivalence. While services represent nearly 80% of the UK’s economy, the provisions of the TCA for services are weak, comparable to the Canada-EU agreement. UK firms and individuals lost the right of establishment and to deliver some services in the EU.
• As for the fight against crime, including terrorism, the result is lose-lose, the UK being cut from EU institutions, organs, data bases and mechanisms (Europol, Eurojust, the Arrest Warrant, Schengen data bases, etc…), while keeping the Passenger Name Record and the Prüm cooperation. The EU did not adopt an equivalence decision for general transfer of data.

How to improve UK-EU relations?

The strategic, political and economic Brexit effects, especially for the UK, but also for the EU, will be negative, both in the short and the long term.

It was known before the referendum that Brexit could not lead to positive economic results. It was politically and ideologically driven, not aiming at economic results, but at increasing the UK’s national sovereignty.

The TCA’s aim was to reduce obstacles to trade created by Brexit. A soft Brexit was an illusion, excluded in 2017 by PM May’s red lines, confirmed and hardened by PM Johnson’s policies.

Given this context, what could be done to improve UK-EU relations? Should they, together, try to be less dependent on the external world? Should the EU be more open for closer cooperation with the UK in some areas? Which ones? Will both parties show good will?

 

This text is based on Jean-Claude Piris’ chapter in Handbook on the European Union and Brexit (Edward Elgar, forthcoming 2021), co-edited by EU3D researchers John Erik Fossum and Christopher Lord.

The post Brexit: The cold waters between Canada and Norway appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Check out our timeline to find out how the EU is tackling the impact of the coronavirus pandemic in 2021.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Check out our timeline to find out how the EU is tackling the impact of the coronavirus pandemic in 2021.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Something’s bothering me about Brexit.

The main thrust of Johnson’s time in Number 10 has been ‘getting Brexit done’, which I have always taken to mean ‘getting Brexit off the front pages so we can get back to some more interesting/important thing’.

This has manifested itself in Johnson’s lack of engagement with the detail (or even much of the broad sweep) of negotiations for both the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade & Cooperation Agreement, in the lack of desire to get into impact assessments or comprehensive contingency planning/implementation activity, and in the general appeals to looking past whatever problems there are now to the bright, sunlit uplands, etc.

Emblematic in this was the decision after the 2019 general election to banish the very use of the word ‘Brexit’ in government communications, a decision that lasted until late 2020 and the need to ramp up work for the post-transition period required using the vocabulary that everyone else has stuck with.

In short, this government has appeared to have placed a lot of emphasis on moving on and getting away from the dramas of the May years. And the Cameron years, for that matter.

So why then has 2021 been so marked by an antagonistic approach to EU relations by the government?

Whether it’s not recognising the EU’s ambassador, or being holier-than-you on the Art.16 issue, or failing to demonstrably comply with the implementation requirements in Northern Ireland, the government appears to be taking a path of most resistance.

That, in turn, generates more the headlines and comment that it seemed previously to have shunned. Especially as it is the UK that regularly has to make a subsequent u-turn.

So what gives?

Firstly, let’s just think about what some logics of how a UK-EU relationship might work, in theory.

If the UK were to be very positive and friendly, then you’d expect a close relationship, with much effort to make the most of the opportunities presented to work closely and to find common ground.

But if the UK were fundamentally distrusting, then what? Well, the formal relationship would be as thin as possible, with none of the warm words, but you’d still expect that there was a rigorous and scrupulous implementation.

The reason would be that if you don’t trust the other lot, then you want to make sure that you cover your back. That means not leaving any gaps in what you do that could then be used against you, down the line, by them. If you have an agreement, you stick to it, and you make sure they stick to it too. Which means you hold them as close as if you were friends, just to make it harder for them to start pulling fast ones on you.

Again, this is about substantive action, rather than rhetoric: just as the US and USSR waged a war of words from 1945, that did not preclude arms-control treaties (with comprehensive inspection protocols).

Clearly, the EU and UK are not nearly in the same situation as that: armed conflict is no more on the table than are fundamentally different ideologies on the nature of the state and economic organisation. But the point remains that we might expect the practice of relations to be running more smoothly than it has.

Two main thoughts come to mind on why.

The first is the more prosaic explanation. The UK government might feel that having secured the treaties, they have both a pretty robust legal relationship with the EU and a much less interested British public. In that sense, job done. These current issues are minor compared to the high drama of 2017-9 and it’s good to keep the European issue alive to try and show the core constituency the value of having left.

In this view, this is just the rough and tumble of politics, trying to make a bit of local capital where possible. If you score a point, then good for pumping up your voters; if you don’t, then it’s not that serious and it wasn’t as if the EU’s going to just walk away from it all.

The second takes this to a deeper critique of British European policy, one that I’ve made before. In the absence of a strategic intention, the government lacks any clear direction for its dealings with the EU, and so deals with points on a case-by-case basis. Often that generates unintended consequences.

Now this shouldn’t, by itself, generate antagonistic behaviour, but we also know that part of the Johnsonian view of Brexit has been as an opportunity to new things with the country. All that’s lacking is clarity on what those things should be.

In this context, antagonism might make more sense, by preventing the emergence of steady-as-she-goes, pragmatic engagement. If EU relations are sinking back into mundanity, then there’s a risk of creating new path-dependencies that might preclude the bold action that Number 10 wants to take down the line. So keeping as much in the air as possible could be useful, at the strategic level.

What ties together these two ideas is their lack of grounding in the world and a failure to recognise the consequences of actions. Crisis management as a mode of policy-making is not simply a way of dealing with the situation in hand, but is also a product of dealing with it in that way: there is a vicious cycle of production and re-production.

Part of the reason the UK got to leaving was a failure to appreciate the potential consequences of holding a referendum in the first place, and an underestimation of the impact of prior rhetoric.

All of which leads us to wonder whether any lessons from the past have been learnt. On that, we might expect that things will continue to be problematic for as long as it takes for the strategic impasse lasts.

Don’t hold your breath.

The post Why be such a pain? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Learn more about what big data is and what the benefits and challenges are for people, businesses and the environment.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Learn more about what big data is and what the benefits and challenges are for people, businesses and the environment.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

There has been much speculation, and a lot of inaccurate gossip, about the EU’s vaccination programme. So, to get to the facts, please refer to this new and clear question and answer website setup by the European Commission to answer your questions. Just click the graphic:

Just click on one of the themes on the European Commission website to find relevant questions and answers on COVID-19 vaccination in the EU, vaccine negotiations and its authorisation process.

I would like to add this: Everything to do with the management of this pandemic, by everyone, every country, the UK, the EU, the USA, is a gamble.

That is not the issue.

The question is which gambles will pay off? And the answer to that we will not know until the end of this.

 SECOND DOSE DELAYS IN THE UK The reason that the UK has had to delay the second dose of the vaccine is because of shortage of vaccines.

If presented with that problem, based on the information I know (which is of course limited) I would probably take the same route: vaccinate as many of the most vulnerable people as possible with the first vaccine, to give them at least some protection.

But I would not pretend that isn’t a gamble, as full protection is only conferred after the second dose, and even then, we still don’t know for how long protection lasts.

• If vaccine protection lasts just 3-6 months, we are in serious trouble.
• If those that are only half vaccinated, or not vaccinated, help the virus to mutate (which scientists warn can happen) then we are in serious trouble.

The last thing we want is for the virus to outpace the vaccines. That’s why we need as many people across the world to be vaccinated as soon as possible.

 DIFFICULT DECISIONS Most of the government’s ‘gambles’ regarding the management of the virus have most certainly not paid off.

We have among the worst numbers of deaths from Covid-19 in the world.

However, I do hope that the government’s gamble in offering a first vaccine to as many vulnerable people as possible, and delaying the second vaccine, will pay off, and in retrospect, turn out to be the right course.

I have great empathy with the scientists and doctors helping to make these difficult decisions, because they don’t know all the answers, but I am sure they are trying to make the best decisions they can with the limited knowledge we have.

 GLOBAL THREATS If the handling of the pandemic is a practice run for how the world is going to tackle global warming, then I think the world is in serious trouble.

Countries should be working together to tackle the pandemic, just as they should to tackle climate change. Currently, it is not happening on the scale and speed necessary.

 GUY VERHOFSTADT MEP Guy Verhofstadt, former Prime Minister of Belgium, has posted strong criticism of the EU Commission’s deliberations in securing vaccines and calling it a ‘fiasco’.

You can read his objections on Facebook.

Good. It shows that the EU is open to democratic criticism, which is always how it should be.

However, on this, I don’t agree with ALL he has said.

CONTRACTUAL ISSUES Guy blames contractual issues for the delay in supplies of vaccines. His solution is for the EU to renegotiate the contracts.

That, in my view, is not necessary and entirely impractical. The EU is already in talks with the drug companies to facilitate and speed up manufacture so that they can fulfil their contractual promises.

Guy also says it was a mistake for the EU to insist that drug companies must accept civil liability for their vaccines.

I would say that was essential, to give Europeans confidence in the vaccines, especially since there is considerable vaccine scepticism across Europe.

The reason for the shortage of vaccines in the EU is because of problems in manufacture, openly admitted by the drug companies. Those problems are being resolved.

If the drug companies had supplied all the vaccines as contractually promised, this would not now be a problem.

There is a worldwide shortage of vaccines, and many countries (poorer ones) don’t have any. This issue is being addressed, but it will take time.

 MANUFACTURING PROBLEMS I am at pains to repeatedly point out that the date that the EU signed contracts with drug companies has absolutely nothing to do with the delay in supplies, according to currently available information.

If the EU had signed their contracts three months earlier, how would that have prevented today’s vaccine manufacturing problems, that could not have been foreseen last summer?

The EU’s contracts were, reportedly, more comprehensive than the UKs, and required drug companies to accept civil liability for their vaccines.

Furthermore, the EU required their European Medicines Agency to give full approval for the vaccines. The EU also secured vaccines at a much lower cost per unit than the UK.

That, of course, all took time, but from all I have researched on this, none of that is the cause of holdups in supply which are entirely down the problems of manufacture, which are not the fault of the EU.

 VACCINE PRICES I would also say that the EU’s insistence that the vaccines must be sourced at reasonable prices was the right move.

The Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine costs the UK government around £3 per jab, according to the BBC, whereas the EU is paying only around £1.80 per jab. South Africa is paying even more for AstraZeneca, at £3.84 a jab.*

Of course, everything I write today, could change tomorrow. It all depends on currently available information. If the information changes, so will my response.

We will only know which strategies turn out to be the right ones much later on.

But, frankly, we have to hope that all strategies being employed help all humans wherever they are in the world.

Until we can defeat Covid-19 across the entire planet, none of us are safe.

Ditto, global warming.

• 2-minute video:

• *Sources: BMJ The Week

• Join the discussion about this article on Facebook:

The post Don’t rely on inaccurate gossip about the EU vaccine strategy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

AMENDMENTS 1 - 406 - Draft report on the 2019-2020 Commission Reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Paulo Rangel

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

The British approach to the Brexit talks

Another day, another round of Brexit negotiations. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, UK prime minister Boris Johnson has committed to driving a hard bargain of the EU, setting out unrealistic expectations, signalling the UK is prepared for ‘no deal’, launching parallel negotiations with the United States, and adopting a bullish rhetoric towards Brussels. This follows the hard bargaining strategy adopted by his predecessor Theresa May, which involved many of the same strategic: Threats to walk away from the table, Eurosceptic rhetoric, the claim that “no deal is better than a bad deal”, coupled with demands that would never have been met by Brussels.

The failure of hard bargaining might be one of the few valuable lessons from Theresa May’s (mis-)handling of the negotiations on the terms of British withdrawal: Claims to support a ‘no deal’ Brexit were not viewed as credible, unrealistic expectations established red lines which could not be rowed back from, hard-line Eurosceptic rhetoric undermined trust so heavily that the EU sought additional safeguards in the resulting agreement, the failure of which to live up to the promised outcome of the hard-line approach ensured its rejection (three times) in Parliament.

One reason is that hard bargaining only works well when conducted from a position of strength. From a position of weakness, threats do not appear credible, and high demands appear unjustifiable. Without the requisite clout, hard bargaining is either futile, or damaging, depending on the risk to one’s reputation of having one’s approach fail to succeed.

And the UK, to put it bluntly, is the less powerful actor in these negotiations: The EU27 has a far larger combined economy than the UK, greater expertise and bureaucratic capacity when it comes to international negotiations, control of the withdrawal process – through the ability to extend Article 50 or consent to an extension of the transition period – and, perhaps ironically, is more unified in its goals than the UK itself.

The EU is able to withstand a no deal Brexit in a way the UK is not. And the UK has few alternatives to this outcome, since most of the rest of the world opposed Brexit and has promised to prioritise their relations with the EU. The much-vaunted free trade agreement with the US, meanwhile, will come at a hefty cost, and might not pass the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives.

Why, then, does the UK continued to drive a hard bargain in the Brexit negotiations, even as its relative weakness becomes more evident, and the failures associated with hard bargaining begin to stack up?

We argue that a number of sources of British hard bargaining are cultural – that is, they are rooted in the norms of the UK’s political environment and its relations with its European partners which are long-lasting and which continue to impact on how the UK perceives the negotiations, irrespective of its objective bargaining power.

Drawing on interviews conducted in Brussels and London during 2017 and early 2018, we suggest a number of sources of British hard bargaining which are rooted in cultural factors rather than simply in the domestic political environment of the UK.

 

The cultural sources of hard bargaining

To begin with, perceptions are important. British politicians view their country as more powerful than it actually is, a misconception with a lengthy pedigree – consider the Suez Crisis in this respect – and are prone to overestimate the UK’s bargaining capabilities. Discourses of a ‘great global Britain’ and ‘concentric circles’ of British influence reinforce these misperceptions. The predictable result is the adoption of a harder bargaining strategy than is warranted for an actor far weaker than the EU27 combined.

Moreover, British politicians are not used to compromising with Europe. Successive rounds of treaty negotiations – which the UK has stormed in with demands for rebates and opt-outs – have generally resulted in concessions for the British. This is perhaps unsurprising, since the demands of such a powerful member state as the UK have needed to be taken into account during successive moments in the integration process. But it has reinforced the idea that hard bargaining tends to be rewarded.

And then there is the lack of meaningful socialisation. British membership of the EU – as has been noted by many – has been justified on largely instrumental terms. Unlike ‘the six’, or newly democratic nations, membership for the UK meant greater prosperity and greater international influence. The kind of normative bonds necessary for developing a shared worldview, which would have underpinned the search for compromise, were thus never created between the UK and its EU partners.

Then there are aspects of British politics which lend themselves to hard bargaining. For one thing, the Westminster system is more adversarial. Politicians cut their teeth in debating societies and this tradition of uncompromising engagement is carried on in the legislature, with the benches of the British Parliament arranged in opposing fashion. Moreover, single-party majority government is the norm in the UK, and British politicians do not take easily to the kind of compromises required of coalition government.

Ideology is also a factor, notably that held by a number within the governing Conservative party. The ideology of conservatism undergirds hard bargaining in two respects: First, most conservatives tend to be realists when it comes to external relations, and to venerate the demonstration of strength as a precondition for negotiating success in response. Second, conservatives tend to be more individualist, and this competitive worldview lends itself to driving a harder bargain.

 

More of the same?

Hard bargaining is not a rational strategy mandated by the UK’s relative power positions, nor a mere performance for domestic audiences, but is rather rooted in a number of cultural factors specific to the UK and its relationship with Europe, each of which push in the direction of a harder bargaining strategy.

In fact, the cultural sources of hard bargaining in the UK context are somewhat overdetermined, given Britain’s weak socialisation into European norms, its historical experiences of hard bargaining, perceptions of British power and prestige, its conflictual political institutions, and the (present) dominance of right-wing ideologies based on individualism and realist visions of statecraft.

But this does not mean Johnson will be any more successful than was Theresa May in deploying strategies linked to hard bargaining, since he will face the same constraints as May: The UK threat to withstand a no deal Brexit is not credible, Britain stands to lose far more than the EU, and unmeetable demands will ultimately harm the UK more than they will Brussels.

In fact, the upshot of highlighting the cultural sources of hard bargaining is that it exposes the biases ultimately responsible for the choice of a sub-optimal bargaining strategy. But these are deeply rooted. Irrespective of the utility of hard bargaining, expect more of the same in the coming months.

 

This blog draws on the JCMS article Negotiating Brexit: The Cultural Sources of British Hard Bargaining.

 

 

Benjamin Martill, University of Edinburgh

 

 

 

 

Uta Staiger, UCL European Institute

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