Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Analysen

How does armed conflict affect the social fabric of societies? This question is central if we want to understand better why some countries experience repeated cycles of violence. In recent years, considerable scientific work has been put into studying the social legacies of armed conflict. This article brings these academic studies together in a novel way, taking a holistic perspective and analyzing each of the three constituent elements of social cohesion—trust, cooperation, and identity—in detail and along both a vertical (state–society relations) and a horizontal (interpersonal and intergroup relations) dimension. Bringing together insights from fifty empirical studies, I call into question the initial optimism expressed by some scholars that conflict increases social cohesion. Only political participation seems to often be positively affected by experiencing conflict. In contrast, social and political trust as well as identification and cooperation across groups declines. However, research in several of these sub-elements of social cohesion is still nascent so that the strengths and shortcomings of the different studies are discussed and future avenues for research are identified.

Im Jahr 2014 gründeten Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauretanien, Niger und Tschad eine neue regionale Organisation – die G5 Sahel („le groupe de cinq pays du Sahel“). In diesem Kapitel wird die Gründung der G5-Sahel untersucht und erläutert. Das Kapitel analysiert auch die Rolle, die die Europäische Union und ihre Mitgliedstaaten bei der Förderung der Gründung und Entwicklung der regionalen Organisation gespielt haben. Die Analyse kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass ein regionales Machtvakuum, die Bedarf der G5-Sahel-Mitgliedsstaaten an zusätzlichen finanziellen Ressourcen und die wichtige Unterstützung durch die EU und ihre Mitgliedsstaaten die wichtigsten Erklärungsfaktoren für die Gründung der G5-Sahel sind.

Promoting coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) is a key means of implementation for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, yet has been overlooked as policy discussions have predominantly focused on the financing of the agenda. The literature and policy debates about PCSD largely focus on processes and on OECD-countries, and they neglect their political and normative dimensions. This article complements recent literature on policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) by elaborating and testing a relational perspective on the concept. To address these issues, this article elaborates a relational perspective that responds to the misrepresentation of third countries as passive recipients of (in)coherent OECD policy preferences. The analysis presented summarizes the literature on the related concepts of PCSD and Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). Based on this, the article articulates a relational perspective on policy coherence that complements other critical perspectives in the literature. It subsequently explores the potential and pertinence of this relational perspective by analysing how the fisheries policy preferences of the European Union (EU) interact with those of Ghana. Overall, the analysis shows neither the EU's nor Ghana's commitment to sustainable fisheries can be assumed. Furthermore, assessing the EU and Ghana's responsibilities for sustainability and degrees of adherence are hard to determine as the result of the presence of other fishing nations and influences. In view of the EU's ambitious policy framework, the continued overfishing in Ghanaian waters negatively affects the credibility and justification of its continued involvement. Policy dialogue between the EU and the Ghanaian government and accompanying EU technical assistance have supported changes made to Ghanaian fisheries policies, but overfishing continues. Discussions on promoting PCSD should be supported further empirical research on to what extent and how policy preferences that policy makers consider coherent with the 2030 Agenda contribute to advancing the agenda in different country and regional contexts.

In the last years, the number of articles that have been calling for a stronger influence of local actors in conflict transformation and peacebuilding has been steadily increasing. At the practical level of peace-work, we can already find some examples where the local actors play an important role in the peace processes. This cooperative work can be found for example in the German Civil Peace Service (CPS) that is working in (post-) conflict countries with the aim of involving and working together with local actors in local peace processes. This article reflects on this cooperation and looks into the following questions: How can partnership in peacebuilding look like? What role do power-asymmetries play in the work of the CPS? And what do people working in the area of CPS need and what do they do? To answer these questions, the article uses the unique method of storytelling in order to combine voices from CPS-actors as well as researchers in order to discuss different perspectives and answers to this question. The article will introduce the CPS, its history, and forms of cooperation, will speak about chances and limitations for both local actors as well as German peace workers during the cooperation but also in their training and accompaniment and will close with recommendations for peace work that aims to cooperate with local actors.

With the creation of the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021, the European Union (EU) has placed greater emphasis on military instruments in its foreign policy. It has adopted a range of assistance measures under the EPF to support Ukraine against Russia’s aggression, but also for the benefit of African countries and regional organisations. The recent EU decision to provide lethal equipment to Niger’s armed forces demonstrates that the bloc is strengthening its efforts in military capacity-building. It is a key element of its engagement for peace and security in Africa. However, such a one-sided focus on military capacity-building stands at risk of not contributing to sustainable peace in fragile and conflict-affected countries if it is not embedded in a broader political strategy.

What is needed is a clear strategy for the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Africa, the strengthening of EPF safeguard measures to prevent the misuse of delivered equipment, and a fresh impetus for AU-EU cooperation on peace and security.

This paper reports on insights gathered from the recent workshop, “The future of the EU as a global development actor: Building alliances with the Global South in a polycrisis world,” organized on May 10-11 in Berlin. The workshop served as a platform for experts and thought leaders from various backgrounds to come together and delve into the challenges and opportunities presented by the evolving landscape of global development. Building upon the findings of this engaging event, the report encapsulates the collective wisdom and innovative ideas generated during the two-day session. As we navigate the complexities of polycrisis and its impact on EU development policy, this report sheds light on pathways to address pressing issues while fostering sustainable growth and cooperation. We invite you to explore the invaluable insights shared by our diverse panel of speakers, enabling us to pave the way for a more resilient and inclusive future in the realm of global development.

In Nairobi tagte im Juni zum zweiten Mal die Generalversammlung von UN-Habitat, die zurzeit wichtigste Politikkonferenz für nachhaltige Stadt- und Siedlungsentwicklung. Neben thematischen Schwerpunkten vom Recht auf Wohnen über die Klimakrise bis hin zur sozialen Stadtgestaltung war auch die multilaterale Zusammenarbeit Gegenstand der Debatten, schreiben Eva Dick und Kai Klause von Misereor.

Chinese engagement with the UN development pillar reflects a notion of multilateralism that differs from established (Western) concepts. These concepts frame UN entities as actors in their own right, nurtured by core resources and drawing legitimacy from their neutrality. China seems to see the UN more as a platform for facilitating bilateral exchanges, thriving on individual member state contributions. The Chinese approach could help adjust the UN to changing political realities, but brings risks for its commitment to individual and human rightsChina’s approach receives low scores on conventional global governance indices. But it might well offer a mechanism for adjusting the UN to changing political realities. Beyond Chinese power and expertise, a stronger – and more explicit – focus on bilateral stakes might strengthen the UN’s relevance among an increasingly divided membership. It might also open avenues for drawing on development solutions from across the board, and overcoming outdated North-South assistance models. However, China’s approach also comes with a major risk. A UN built more directly around states’ discrete and immediate priorities will find it difficult to maintain its commitment to individual and human rights and a long-term focus on global public goods. In line with the UN Charter, it is in the interest of all member states to ensure that the global organisation provides a stable normative foundation for multilateral cooperation.

As world leaders are packing their bags to travel to Washington for the Spring meetings of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund, these discussions will offer the first opportunity of the year to collectively deliver on some of the propositions to reform the WB and the international financial architecture for sustainable development to make them fit for the poly-crises of the 21st century. The May G7 Summit in Japan, the June Summit for A New Financial Pact in Paris, the September Finance in Common Summit in Colombia, the SDG Summit in New York, the G20 Summit in India, the October World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) annual meetings, and the COP28 in Dubai at the end of the year, are other opportunities to move the reform agenda forward. Building a possible shared European vision on main priorities on the international development financial architecture is key for the European Union (EU) and its member states, given their political and economic weight in the international financial institutions (IFIs) and fora, and their responsibilities as key implementing actors in countries of operations.

Although the EU has now concluded numerous bilateral and regional trade agreements, the framework with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries is now to be signed after bumpy negotiations.

This chapter addresses the evolution of the relationship between masculinity and migration within a Zimbabwean historical, sociocultural, economic and political context. It discusses how migration transitioned from a gender-neutral to a masculinised and, later, feminised activity. The chapter argues that this gendered transition has varied and sometimes contradictory impacts on masculinity. The contradictions stem from men’s differential capacities (or lack thereof) to migrate and convert migration into a resource that can be channelled into performance of normative or socially approved masculinity. The chapter demonstrates how migration potentially resuscitates or erodes aspects of normative masculinity against a backdrop of the protracted economic crisis in Zimbabwe. The interaction between migration and masculinity is observable not only in homosocial relations but also in gender relations within marriages and family life. The chapter accordingly draws attention to contemporary migration, illustrating how its feminisation impacts on men who had hitherto enjoyed a monopoly on migration in the Zimbabwean context. The discussion of migration and masculinity in this chapter draws from qualitative research with Zimbabwean migrants in Germany and South Africa as well as with non-migrants in Zimbabwe.

Chinese engagement with the UN development pillar reflects a notion of multilateralism that differs from established (Western) concepts. These concepts frame UN entities as actors in their own right, nurtured by core resources and drawing legitimacy from their neutrality. China seems to see the UN more as a platform for facilitating bilateral exchanges, thriving on individual member state contributions. The Chinese approach could help adjust the UN to changing political realities, but brings risks for its commitment to individual and human rightsChina’s approach receives low scores on conventional global governance indices. But it might well offer a mechanism for adjusting the UN to changing political realities. Beyond Chinese power and expertise, a stronger – and more explicit – focus on bilateral stakes might strengthen the UN’s relevance among an increasingly divided membership. It might also open avenues for drawing on development solutions from across the board, and overcoming outdated North-South assistance models. However, China’s approach also comes with a major risk. A UN built more directly around states’ discrete and immediate priorities will find it difficult to maintain its commitment to individual and human rights and a long-term focus on global public goods. In line with the UN Charter, it is in the interest of all member states to ensure that the global organisation provides a stable normative foundation for multilateral cooperation.

Creating intergovernmental environmental clubs is a prominent policy proposal for addressing global environmental problems. According to their proponents, environmental clubs provide an incentive to join them and accept their environmental obligations by generating exclusive “club goods” for their members. Yet, the existing literature considers environmental clubs as a theoretical idea that still has to be put into practice. This article asks whether, in fact, the numerous international environmental agreements (IEAs) containing trade-related provisions provide club goods to their parties. It does so by investigating the effects of these provisions on trade flows among parties compared to flows with non-parties. We introduce an original dataset on 48 types of trade provisions in 2,097 IEAs that we make available with the publication of this article. Based on this new data and a panel of worldwide bilateral trade flows, we find evidence that existing IEAs and their trade-liberalizing content are associated with increased trade among their parties relative to trade with non-parties. We conclude from this finding that systems of IEAs provide club goods to their parties. Uncovering the existence of environmental clubs has significant methodological and policy implications. It is an important first step for future research on the actual effectiveness of clubs in attracting participation and raising environmental standards.

Deutschlands feministische Entwicklungspolitik gibt einen neuen Impuls für gerechtere und inklusivere Gesellschaften weltweit. Wenn die Akteure internationaler  sammenarbeit Rechte, Ressourcen und Repräsentation aus der Perspektive eines gesellschaftsvertrags betrachten, können sie Projekte für mehr geschlechtergerechtigkeit so gestalten, dass sie ihr volles transformati-
ves Potenzial ausschöpfen.

Germany’s focus on a feminist development policy provides a new impulse for fairer and more inclusive societies. If the development community looks at rights, resources and representation from a social contract angle, it can design projects for more gender equity in a way that leverages its full transformative potential.

Energy production from fossil fuels is gradually phased out as many countries aim to transition to a low-carbon society. As society and technology are intertwined, phasing out fossil fuels impacts people and communities. Especially those who heavily rely on the fossil fuel industry will be worse off. Therefore, calls are being made for ajust transitionthat ensures the rehabilitation of workers, regions, and communities negatively affected by fossil fuel industry closures. We argue that spatial justice can help inform just transition’s theoretical and practical aspects. Therefore, a spatial justice approach should be a prerequisite for a just transition. The concept of spatial justice is intertwined with the social justice principles of procedural, distributive, and restorative justice, which are central to the current conceptual understanding of just transition. We use the case of the closure of peat-based electricity production in rural Ireland to demonstrate how a spatial justice approach can underpin a just transition and how it can help with practicalities like identifying and addressing the issues and concerns in local communities. To ensure a just transition, a spatial justice approach is needed to identify and address the deeper problems affecting the resiliency of rural and mono-industrial regions dependent on fossil fuels.

We examine and offer causal evidence on the link between trade exposure and social cohesion using rich micro tax data and a natural experiment of exchange rate liberalization in Uganda. Our results show that exposure to exogenous exchange rate shocks has significant albeit economically small effects on social cohesion: it reduces trust, enhances participation, and has ambiguous effects on identity. These effects operate largely through the expenditure channel (or household exposure) and to a lesser extent through the earnings channel (captured by worker and firm exposure).

Does conflict change who desires to emigrate? Surprisingly, we still lack globally comparable empirical evidence on whether the types of individuals who want to leave their country differ between peaceful and conflict-affected locations. In this paper, we address this gap. We analyze unique survey data with global coverage to assess whether individual-level determinants of international permanent emigration aspirations differ during intrastate armed conflict compared to peaceful times and regions. We argue that armed conflict acts as an equalizer that attenuates the effect which individual economic and demographic variables have on international permanent emigration aspirations in peaceful contexts. As a result, aspirations to relocate permanently to another country increase among those demographic groups which are less inclined to move in peaceful situations. Our results indicate that variables related to a longer-term economic cost-benefit analysis, such as income or age, significantly lose importance for international permanent emigration aspirations in conflict situations. This demographic-specific effect explains an overall increase in emigration aspirations during conflicts. On average, we find no evidence that conflict increases the aspirations of all respondents to permanently move to another country. In contrast to income and age, the effects of demographic variables such as gender, household composition, or marital status are not significantly different across contexts.

Increased policy coherence and integrated implementation are necessary to address pressing development problems that cut across different sectors. Meeting these demands, as called for by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, requires institutional innovation. Based on the comparative analysis of 137 countries, this paper investigates how governments have responded to this call and which contextual factors shape their institutional responses. We propose a four-dimensional typology to analyse the institutional set-ups for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), focusing on political leadership, horizontal integration across policy sectors, vertical integration across levels of government, and integration of societal stakeholders. We apply this framework to the descriptions of national SDG-implementation bodies provided by governments in their Voluntary National Review (VNRs) and use qualitative directed content analysis and regression modelling to investigate different driving factors of institutional design choices, including socio-economic development and political regime. Besides a strong commitment from the Centre of Government in most cases, our results show that ministries of the exterior and the environment have a dominant role, indicating that sustainability is not yet perceived holistically. Further, we find that the integration of subnational governments and societal actors is often under-institutionalised: while countries with higher levels of socio-economic development appear more likely to set up mechanisms suited to achieving cross-sectoral integration, political regime type seems to have little impact on institutional design choices for SDG implementation. Conceptually, this study offers a theory-led investigation of the institutional mechanisms for integrated SDG-implementation and the factors that drive institutional innovation or inertia. Empirically, by compiling the information in an original dataset, our study paves the way for future cross-national analysis on effective integrated SDG implementation and identifies entry points for inter- and transnational support of integrated SDG implementation in the context of development cooperation.

Am 26. April 2023 veröffentlichte das Entwicklungsministerium (BMZ) eine Pressemitteilung mit der Nachricht, dass das Bundeskabinett die Unterzeichnung eines internationalen Abkommens zwischen der EU, ihren 27 Mitgliedstaaten und den 79 Mitgliedern der Organisation der afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Staaten (OACPS) beschlossen hat. Zum Zeitpunkt der Abfassung dieses Artikels – Ende Mai und einen ganzen Monat nach dem Beschluss des Bundeskabinetts – haben sich die EU-Mitgliedstaaten allerdings noch nicht auf eine Unterzeichnung des Abkommens geeinigt.