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Summary and Key Points: The HALO Trust is utilizing artificial intelligence to enhance landmine detection in Ukraine, the world's largest minefield. Supported by a $4 million grant from Amazon Web Services, HALO employs AI to analyze drone-captured imagery, drastically reducing analysis time from days to hours.

-Ukraine’s extensive surface-laid mines make drone detection effective, aiding HALO's mission to clear mines faster and safer.

-With 542 drone flights and 11 terabytes of data already collected, HALO aims to deploy this AI tool by year-end, offering a model for global mine clearance efforts, including in challenging terrains like Colombia.

AI Technology Boosts Mine Detection Efforts in Ukraine

In the third year of its war of self-defense against an invading Russia, Ukraine has developed a reputation as a laboratory for battlefield innovation, from the way it employs drones and drone countermeasures to how it uses artillery. And close to the fight in eastern Ukraine, a nongovernment organization is employing artificial intelligence in a pilot program that may have life-saving implications for the entire world.

The HALO Trust, which has been working to clear mines from conflict zones for more than three decades, is applying AI to imagery captured by aerial drones to develop reliable identification profiles for landmines hidden within the terrain. Its work is partly enabled by Amazon Web Services (AWS), which gave the organization a $4 million grant in June to support secure storage of the vast amounts of data needed to build the profiles. 

The location of the pilot program is deliberate. As of this year, Ukraine is considered the world’s largest minefield, with as many as two million mines scattered across the land and potentially as much as a third of the country requiring demining for safe habitation. As Vox explains, in a conflict, potentially fatal landmines result in a couple of ways: First, artillery, which has been a land weapon of choice on both sides of the fight, can leave behind active and unstable shells, known as unexploded ordnance, or UXO. Second, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines are placed deliberately to kill combatants on foot or in armored vehicles – and these pressure-triggered devices are just as much a threat to the civilian population as to the military.

“As a very general point with Ukraine quickly becoming one of the most contaminated countries in the world, it’s the place where this technology can have the most impact,” Matthew Abercrombie, research and development officer at The HALO Trust, told Sandboxx News. “Even if we had all the resources in the world, it would still take a huge amount of time and effort to clear what’s being reported as the level of contamination. So anything we can do to narrow that down will have a huge impact on our ability to get the job done,” he added.

But there’s another reason, too, that Ukraine makes sense as a test bed for AI-based mine clearance, Abercrombie said. In the current conflict, a significant amount of placed mines are being laid on the surface of the ground, rather than dug into the ground. That allows the RGB cameras on the large commercial drones flown by The HALO Trust to capture their shape and characteristics. While the organization hopes to build in multispectral imaging eventually, which would help them capture evidence not visible to the naked eye, Ukraine offers a straightforward mine detection challenge.

As of late June, the organization had completed 542 drone flights totaling 11 terabytes of data, according to a published announcement. Flights have already been taking place for more than a year, Abercrombie told Sandboxx News, and the information they yield represents an overwhelming workload to human analysts. The information the organization collects is secure and not shared with other military or civil entities; the mine-clearing that follows identification is conducted largely by HALO’s 1,200 staff in Ukraine.

“It very quickly became apparent that the bottleneck is being able to analyze the imagery in time to make it useful,” he added.

And there is a very clear time element: according to Jennifer Hyman, head of communications for HALO, the greatest number of civilian casualties from landmines typically take place as displaced residents try to return to their homes. The technology the organization is hoping to develop, she said, would also significantly accelerate the ability to spot human activity and signs of damage, providing insights on areas that are safer for human movement and return.

“Drone imagery covering maybe a couple of hectares would take a human analyst maybe two days to trawl through and identify,” Abercrombie said. “Whereas our best estimates for the machine learning models is that it could be [done] on the order of an hour.”

Training the AI to identify mines as well as a human analyst will take time and vast quantities of imagery – thousands of images of a single variant of anti-tank or anti-personnel mine, for example. Complicating matters, human rights observers have said Russia and Ukraine are using at least 13 different kinds of each kind of mine.

However, despite the size of the information collection task, HALO plans to have a first version of an AI mine-detection tool ready for distribution to its staff in Ukraine by the end of the year, according to Abercrombie. They’re also already looking ahead, to employing this technology in other minefields around the globe – places like Colombia, where mountainous terrain makes drone imagery a far more accessible option than human in-person identification.

Troublingly, Russia’s activity in Ukraine may create even more spaces for organizations like HALO to operate in: The Washington Post reported that some neighboring European countries, seeking to harden their own defenses, have been considering a return to using the cheap and deadly devices.

About the Author: 

Hope Hodge Seck is an award-winning investigative and enterprise reporter who has been covering military issues since 2009. She is the former managing editor for Military.com.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Summary and Key Points: The Russian Tupolev Tu-95 "Bear" bomber, with its turbo-prop engines, has been a cornerstone of Soviet and Russian air power since its introduction in 1956. Designed for long-range missions, it boasts an operating range exceeding 8,000 miles.

-Despite its age, the Tu-95 remains relevant, capable of carrying nuclear cruise missiles and serving as an electronic surveillance platform. It continues to patrol near American and European borders, including recent activities near Alaska and Ukraine.

-With an expected service life extending to 2040, the Tu-95 is a testament to enduring Soviet engineering, remaining a versatile and strategic asset for Russia.

The Tu-95 'Bear': Russia’s Long-Range Missile Truck

Russia’s Tupolev Tu-95 “Bear” bomber may not look like much. In fact, its turbo-prop engines are an early Cold War-harkening anachronism. But the aging Tu-95 is commonly understood to be the most capable bomber the Soviet Union ever produced.

Designing the Bear

While the turbo-prop engines look more like something you’d find on a regional puddle-jumper, rather than a great power’s nuclear bomber, the old-school engines served a very specific purpose. Of course Soviet designers could have installed turbojet engines on their Tu-95 – but the Soviets wanted a jet that could strike deep into enemy territory, with a minimum range of 6,200 miles. The turbo-prop engine enables such a vast operating range. Once installed, the Tu-95’s turbo-prop engines permitted an operating range in excess of 8,000 miles, meaning the Soviet bomber could fly back and forth across the continental U.S. about three times without needing to refuel.

The Tu-95 entered the Soviet air force in 1956, and it continues to serve today, almost 70 years later. This forces comparisons to the long-serving B-52 Stratofortress, an American bomber of similar vintage. The Tu-95, like the B-52, is still relevant. It even saw action in 2015 against ISIS, and it is expected to remain in service until at least 2040, meaning the airframe could hit the 100-year-in-service mark.

Although the Tu-95 was built as a bomber, the airframe has often been used as an electronic surveillance platform, adding value for cash-strapped Soviet/Russian forces hoping to get as much versatility as possible out of their fleet. 

Of course, the Tu-95 is also outfitted as a proper bomber. The K variant can deploy the Russian Kh-20 nuclear cruise missile, meaning the Tu-95 has both the range and ability to deliver nuclear ordnance to American soil, assuming the non-stealth airframe could penetrate American air defenses.

To be clear, the Tu-95 could not penetrate American air defense systems, nor indeed any modern air defense system, and it would not survive against modern interceptor aircraft. The Tu-95 is a 70-year-old platform, after all, and no match for 21st-century systems.

“But that’s where the ability to fire cruise missiles plays such a vital role,” Brandon J. Weichert wrote. “[The Tu-95 is] basically long-range missile trucks that can engage enemies at a distance, negating the efficacy of air defenses and the threat of intercepts.”

Tu-95: Still Flying Today

The Tu-95 has routinely pestered American and European forces, slinking up to borders and patrolling overlapping areas of interest. The Tu-95 often loiters around the Alaskan coastline, not far from Russia’s easternmost borders. In 2014, a Tu-95 flew to within 50 miles of California’s coastline, forcing the U.S. Air Force to initiate a proper intercept. 

The Tu-95 is also active in Ukraine, fitting in nicely alongside the rest of the Russian equipment – much of which is terribly outdated, yet still capable of performing adequately enough. Expect the 55 still-flying Tu-95s to remain in service for as long as Russian mechanics can keep the bombers airworthy.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Russia is advancing its efforts to counter the American B-2 Spirit stealth bomber by developing the Tupolev PAK DA. This new stealth bomber aims to give Russia a strategic edge similar to that of the B-2, with the capability to carry nuclear payloads.

-The PAK-DA, designed in a flying-wing style to enhance stealth, is nearing prototype completion, with plans for up to six more units.

-While the PAK-DA represents a significant step for Russia in stealth technology, it remains behind the U.S., which continues to lead with its fleet of stealth bombers and fifth-generation fighters.

Russia Advances PAK DA Stealth Bomber to Counter U.S. B-2 Spirit

When the B-2 Spirit was introduced, the flying-wing bomber forced America’s opponents to make defensive adjustments. The B-2 offered an entirely new strategic element. It was the first aircraft that had both stealth technology and the ability to carry a nuclear payload, meaning in essence that the B-2 could end worlds without ever being detected.

The Russians were especially concerned about the B-2, worried that the stealth bomber would be used for deep penetration missions against Moscow or St. Petersburg. Accordingly, Russia was eager to introduce a peer aircraft, something that could help mitigate the advantage the B-2 gave the Americans. 

Decades later, Russia is finally building an answer to the B-2 Spirit: the Tupolev PAK-DA, a stealth bomber capable of carrying a nuclear payload.

Prototype on the Way

Tupolev is understood to be nearly finished with a PAK DA prototype aircraft. The company intends to build up to six more aircraft. If Tupolev can pull off the PAK DA, Russia would become just the second nation, behind the U.S., to introduce a stealth bomber. Even China, whose military capabilities have been improving at a rapid clip, has yet to introduce a stealth bomber, although the Xi’an H-20 is currently under development.

Russia is no stranger to aerospace accomplishments. It is arguably the second most accomplished nation with respect to aerospace (and astrospace) engineering. But in the realm of stealth, the Russians have never come close to matching American capabilities. The U.S. has not only led the way on stealth technology, but has stood head and shoulders above the rest since introducing the F-117 Nighthawk and B-2 Spirit about three decades ago.

Today, the U.S. commands a fleet of stealthy fifth-generation fighters, the F-35 Lightning II and the F-22 Raptor. The B-21 Raider, a new flying-wing stealth bomber slated to replace the B-2 within the next decade, is undergoing flight tests.

All told, the Americans are about a full generation ahead of the Russians (and Chinese) on stealth bombers. Both Russia and China are rushing to catch up, but designing a stealth bomber is much easier than producing or fielding a legitimate, undetectable bomber. Intelligence suggests that Russia is closer to completing the PAK-DA than the Chinese are to completing the H-20, but with the program so obscured from public view, who really knows. 

Very little is known indeed about the PAK DA. What we do know is that the airframe has been crafted in the same flying-wing style as the B-2 and B-21, so we can expect the PAK DA to have a low radar cross section and to cruise at subsonic speeds. Again, easier said than done. The Russians are not known for their stealth accomplishments; their only stealth fighter, the Su-57, is rated as the worst stealth performer of all existing stealth aircraft.

The PAK DA is slated to enter mass production before 2027, but that feels like wishful thinking. Russia has a history of slow weapons program rollouts, and the ongoing war of attrition in Ukraine is burning through resources and industrial capacities that might otherwise be used to produce a stealth aircraft. 

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Cent ans que Paris attendait cela. Des décennies que les fans français de sport, les amoureux de l’olympisme, espéraient ce moment. Vivre les Jeux « à la maison », dans son pays, « une fois dans sa vie ». Mais à l’heure où commence ce qui devrait être une immense fête, les sentiments ont changé. Le sort réservé aux … Continued

The region’s worst typhoon this season leaves mass flooding, shipwrecks, and a potentially devastating oil spill in its wake.

The 2024 running mate of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), Dr. Matthew Opoku Prempeh has called on persons in positions of power and authority to use their offices to influence benefits for the community.

Namibian Michelle Nehoya has spent nearly $500 ( pound;390) on the application process for a visa to visit Canada - but almost two years later it has yet to materialise. The 38-year-old, who lives in Namibia 39;s capital, Windhoek, is desperate to get to Quebec to see her aunt and cousins whom she has not seen for almost a decade.

The Okuapemhene, Oseadeeyo Kwasi Akuffo III, has strongly attested to the humility of Dr. Matthew Opoku Prempeh and encouraged Ghanaians to vote massively for the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in the upcoming general elections.

3G Media Group proudly announces the nomination of Ghanaian actor Bill Asamoah to receive an award at the 13th edition of the Annual Mega 3G Awards and Celebrity Bash to be held in New York. The nominees were announced in April, with the event slated for Saturday, October 5, 2024, at the Ukrainian Youth Center, 301 Pallisade Avenue, Yonke .

In a touching tribute to the struggles and triumphs of African ancestors, Emancipation Day wreath-laying ceremonies were held today at the W. E. B Du Bois Centre, the George Padmore Library, and the Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park.

Since gaining independence in 1991, the Central Asian states have again forged steadily growing ties with China. These ties advanced significantly in 2013 when Xi Jinping formally announced the Silk Road Economic Belt—part of the Belt and Road Initiative—in Kazakhstan. China's expanding presence in the region, however, has raised new concerns among neighboring countries over economic, political, and cultural sovereignty. In light of Xi Jinping’s recent visit to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's annual meeting in Astana and an official visit to Tajikistan, three experts will review the evolving dynamics of these relationships.

On July 25, the Center for the National Interest hosted the fifth in a monthly series of expert discussions organized by the Center’s Central Asia Connectivity Project.

—Elizabeth Wishnick is a Senior Research Scientist in the China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and a Senior Research Scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University. She was a tenured professor of Political Science at Montclair State University from 2005-2024. Dr. Wishnick has dual regional expertise on China and Russia and is an expert on Chinese foreign policy, Sino-Russian relations, Northeast Asian and Central Asian security, and Arctic geopolitics. She received a PhD in Political Science from Columbia University, an MA in Russian and East European Studies from Yale University, and a BA from Barnard College. She speaks Mandarin, Russian, and French.

—Brian Carlson is Research Professor of Indo-Pacific Security Studies at the China Landpower Studies Center of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. Previously, he served as head of the global security team at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zürich and, prior to that, as a postdoctoral fellow and researcher at RAND Corporation. Dr. Carlson holds a PhD in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His research focuses primarily on China-Russia relations. He speaks Chinese and Russian.

—Temur Umarov is a Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, specializing in Central Asian countries’ domestic and foreign policies, as well as China’s relations with Russia and Central Asian neighbors. A native of Uzbekistan, Umarov holds degrees in China studies and international relations from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). He holds an MA in world economics from the University of International Business and Economics (Beijing). He speaks Chinese, Russian, Tajik, and Uzbek.

Andrew Kuchins, Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, moderated the discussion.

Image: Khikmatilla Ubaydullaev / Shutterstock.com. 

Editor’s Note: The Red Cell series is published in collaboration with the Stimson Center. Drawing upon the legacy of the CIA’s Red Cell—established following the September 11 attacks to avoid similar analytic failures in the future—the project works to challenge assumptions, misperceptions, and groupthink with a view to encouraging alternative approaches to America’s foreign and national security policy challenges. For more information about the Stimson Center’s Red Cell Project, see here.

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Red Cell

Digital trade—the movement of data across borders—is the fastest-growing segment of global trade today. When data moves freely, the capacity to innovate and generate economic value expands, turbocharging growth. Nonetheless, American politicians have become increasingly wary of the digital economy, the vast power of Big Tech, and the free-market orthodoxy enabling its rise. The Biden administration has taken this shift in the zeitgeist to a new level by repudiating the market-oriented model of governance for digital trade—even at the cost of diminishing American leadership and fragmenting the global economy.

The United States has long championed protecting the free flow of data, limiting data localization, and safeguarding source code from forced disclosure. These core principles are enshrined in the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), ratified by Congress, and in the United States-Japan Digital Trade Agreement (USJDTA). They once informed the U.S. position on digital governance at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Not anymore.

President Joe Biden reversed decades of U.S. policy last year when his trade representative, Katherine Tai, stopped supporting these principles in Geneva and paused negotiations on the digital chapter of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). U.S. officials wanted “policy space” for domestic regulation. This approach sounds reasonable, but it is unfounded because “policy space” is built into such agreements. Trade-phobia is a partial explanation at best. Democrats in swing states reportedly feared being branded as job-outsourcing globalists in the general election, even though the Republican administration of former President Donald Trump negotiated the USMCA and the USJDTA and tabled a paper at the WTO echoing the old policy line. The Biden team could have done the same, relying on the legal precedent of a ratified USMCA and decades of policy precedent. They had zero precedent to reverse course. So why did they take such a drastic step, and what are the consequences for the United States and the global economy? 

A Reversal Rooted in Biden’s New Washington Consensus

Biden believes historic levels of corporate concentration and the digital revolution itself are “drivers” of economic inequality, weakening democracies. A “fairer” America and a fairer global economic order thus require state intervention. Biden’s new Washington consensus demands that the United States leave its laissez-faire comfort zone and let the government redirect domestic investment, channel innovation, and fight unchecked corporate power using an expansive interpretation of antitrust law and a whole-of-government competition policy. In the bullseye is “Big Tech,” which Democrats and many Republicans agree is too powerful. Biden hired what the New York Times called the most aggressive antitrust team in decades at the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with a roadmap for rewriting the rules of American capitalism.

The team put digital matters at the center of their efforts, arguing that the digital economy enables unprecedented levels of monopoly power and new ways of abusing it. The worldwide connectivity of digital platforms makes this a global challenge. Cheered by progressives in Congress, they focused on IPEF’s digital trade chapter to further those efforts. In October 2023, prior to the annual gathering of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders Biden was to host in San Francisco, his team paused negotiations, deprioritizing U.S. digital leadership in Asia and undermining part of Washington’s approach to technology rivalry with China. The digital reversal at the WTO followed. A U.S. official cited the right to “regulate in the public interest” and the need to “address anticompetitive behavior in the digital economy.”

“Bigness” Is Bad Again

Biden’s antitrust team is not wrong to consider how competition presents itself in the digital era. For many decades, antitrust laws have protected consumers from economic harm through the application of the consumer welfare standard, which considers alleged monopolistic behavior in terms of the impact on price, innovation, and quality. It is reasonable to consider whether digital platforms have changed the architecture of market power such that antitrust enforcement should address it. The U.S. trade representative is also not wrong to assert that digital trade is about more than just “trade rules.” The digital world engages social and political concerns, as well as concerns over national security, geopolitics, privacy, as well as consumer and labor rights. With the rise of artificial intelligence, it has to wrestle with crucial moral, ethical, and philosophical questions. 

Nonetheless, the administration’s starting point is that “bigness” itself is harmful because it allows companies to exert force over how the market operates and facilitates other social and political harms. The idea is not new or unique to the digital era. It originated during the Industrial Revolution when corporate trusts in oil, sugar, tobacco, steel, and railroads used exclusionary practices to crush competitors. In the 1890s, “bigness” became equated with monopolism and “immoral and injurious” pursuits, according to Senator John Sherman, author of the Sherman Antitrust Act, suggesting a broad definition of harm. That view persisted until the 1970s with the rise of the consumer welfare standard, the intellectual underpinnings for which were laid at the University of Chicago by Judge Robert Bork and adopted by the Supreme Court in 1979. The Biden administration wants to deemphasize reliance on analysis in enforcing antitrust laws. As a former Biden antitrust advisor explained, massive economic power can translate into massive political power, undermining democracy and threatening free speech and privacy. The administration wants to capture all these aspects of harm under an antitrust silver bullet rather than rely on other policy tools. 

This suggests that antitrust laws could be used to break up U.S. technology giants because they have too much political power or to protect small firms, even if they are inefficient. More importantly, the assumption that “bigness” is almost unequivocally harmful is disproven by the fact that it also arises because consumers simply like a firm’s products and services. For instance, they like ordering products from Amazon and receiving them quickly. Some corporate concentration also boosts innovation and employment, according to recent research. “Bigness” might even be a necessary condition for innovation and lower prices, some argue. Research and development are expensive. Moreover, sacrificing the benefits of economies of scale and scope to consumers in order to address harm to other groups creates more problems. After all, everyone is a consumer.

Edging Closer to the EU

The administration is kicking America’s market-oriented model of digital governance to the curb and warming up to the rights-driven model of the European Union (EU). The concept of “bigness” as a potential indicator of current or future economic, social, and political harms, for example, lies at the heart of the EU’s designation of Big Tech as “gatekeepers” of the digital world under the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The act changes antitrust from law enforcement to preemptive regulatory compliance, as the Biden team is also attempting to do. Thus far, Big Tech has not exited the EU market but is adapting to the DMA. 

The perspectives of the administration and the EU have converged. The FTC chair, Lina Khan, reportedly praised the DMA for addressing markets controlled by “digital gatekeepers.” U.S. trade representative Katherine Tai has not only extolled regulation as the EU’s “superpower,” but also, in defending the right to regulate in the public interest, has said that even if foreign governments target U.S. corporate giants, the United States should not object because, from a tax perspective, they may not be “American” after all. This is a shocking statement from a U.S. official, but it reflects the mood among some politicians on both sides of the aisle. 

The progressives pushing for these changes believe the United States should not enter into trade agreements, including on digital issues, that could tie Congress’ hands on possible future legislation. They want to enact legislation resembling what the EU is doing, but they do not have the votes to do so. Although both parties want more regulation and strong antitrust enforcement to rein in Big Tech, the members of each party disagree on methods—one of the reasons the United States has no federal privacy laws. Furthermore, taking free things away from consumers is always a political error. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo made that point in February 2023 when she warned that banning TikTok would “lose every voter under 35 forever.”

That said, a growing cohort of younger Republicans are fans of the Biden approach because they think big business imposes a “woke” political agenda on the country. The Heritage Foundation’s blueprint for the FTC under a second Trump administration channels Biden’s arguments about unchecked corporate concentration undermining democracy. Should Trump win in November, given his past activism on antitrust and belief that Big Tech is biased against conservatives, he may continue the Biden policies and force Republicans to fall in line. 

For now, the administration is content to free-ride on Brussels’ activism while designating the DMA a barrier to trade on paper and claiming that its hands are tied on digital trade until Congress acts on digital policy. In fact, the administration is not only fine with the EU reining in Big Tech but also more comfortable than it should be with letting Europe set global rules. That explains the administration’s complacency toward serious bipartisan accusations that the president has ceded global economic leadership with his reversal on digital trade policy.

The Consequences for the United States and the Global Economy

Even if Washington no longer seeks to foster the conditions conducive to the expansion of American corporations abroad, the U.S. government should not support foreign governments in curbing their ability to do so. The EU is going after the most valuable businesses in the U.S. economy, and its targeting of Big Tech in the short run benefits China. The DMA designated only one of its technology titans, ByteDance. Eventually, more Chinese digital platforms will be subject to EU regulations, but by that time, they will have a foothold in the EU market. As for the EU model of governance, there is a reason Europeans “use an American search engine, shop on an American e-commerce site, thumb American phones, and scroll through American social media feeds.” The EU is apparently unwilling or unable to address the need for both innovation and regulation at the same time. 

The U.S. trade representative implies that the administration’s digital reversal does not put America’s global leadership at risk because China’s model of state control over data flows is unappealing to most. Nonetheless, regional digital economy agreements and trade agreements with digital chapters dot the global landscape, but they do not all conform with each other. If trade is resilient to U.S. withdrawal, so is the business of setting the rules and norms governing it. 

The alternative to a global framework for digital rules is a “Splinternet” and balkanized digital trade. All nations would then make things that could only be sold in limited markets abroad. That is a recipe for shrinking, not growing, the middle class. 

Keeping America’s technological edge sharper than its competitors requires constantly running against the best in the business, no matter what corner of the globe they hail from. Ring-fencing American technology companies into the highly regulated, democracies-only global order the administration prefers will incentivize imitation over innovation.   

Unfortunately, the U.S. path is set—regardless of who wins the White House in November. That is the ultimate irony: an approach aimed in part at changing the political climate at home, growing the middle class, and forcing the political marketplace to reward the center rather than the extremes will do the exact opposite. Washington needs to reconsider its direction of travel before the rest of the world makes other plans.

Ferial Ara Saeed is the Founder of Telegraph Strategies LLC, a consulting firm with deep experience in economic, foreign policy, and national security issues. She is also a former senior U.S. diplomat with extensive experience in Northeast Asia and the Middle East. At the State Department, she has served as Deputy U.S. Coordinator for information and communications technology policy, as an advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs on Asia economic policy, and she has played key roles in negotiating landmark trade agreements with China and Japan. Follow her on X: @TelStratLLC.

Image: Salma Bashir / Shutterstock.com. 

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A growing chorus of establishment pundits and policymakers have taken to branding anyone who calls for prioritizing diplomacy over force in U.S. foreign policy as “isolationist.”  

In official Washington, labeling an analyst, advocate, or organization isolationist is essentially an effort to convince the public at large that they are naive, and therefore not to be taken seriously. But recent history suggests that the “military first” (and second and third) approach favored by the Washington establishment is in fact the stance that is the most naive.

The direct U.S. wars of this century, including those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, have done more harm than good, consuming vast quantities of blood and treasure in the process— $8 trillion and hundreds of thousands of lives, not to mention millions of displaced people, all  according to estimates by Brown University’s Costs of War project.  America’s slightly less direct wars – those we fund or supply with bombers and bombs – in Yemen, Gaza, and Ukraine are devastating and costly financially, environmentally, and in humanitarian impact. 

Interventionists – and their cheerleaders in the media and think tanks – are never held to account for their failures.   

Moreover, most advocates of greater restraint are not opposed to all uses of force. For example, U.S. support for Ukraine’s effort to fend off Russia’s invasion of their country is essential. But it must be accompanied by a diplomatic track aimed at preventing a long, grinding war that causes more death and destruction and precludes rebuilding, while constantly risking escalation to a direct U.S.-Russia or NATO-Russia conflict.  This view appears to be gaining traction with at least some U.S. officials. But when advocates of a diplomatic track raised the idea early in the conflict, many experts and policy advocates within the DC establishment mislabeled it as isolationist.

Given the challenges we face, from thwarting Russian aggression in Ukraine, to taking a balanced approach to the challenges posed by China, to stopping the slaughter in Gaza and heading off a region-wide Middle East war, America desperately needs a serious debate on what policies to pursue in a rapidly changing global security environment.  That means evaluating proposals grounded in a policy of restraint seriously, not dismissing them with misleading labels.  

A critical component of a more effective, more affordable approach to national security should be a more realistic view of the challenges posed by China. Unfortunately, many top U.S. officials are doing more to promote exaggerated views of a hostile Chinese regime bent on global domination than they are to encourage a factual assessment of Beijing’s intentions and capabilities. For example, at the recent Aspen Security Forum, Joint Chiefs chair Gen. Charles Brown warned that if the U.S. lapsed into isolationism – a term he did not define – it “opens the door to Xi Jinping and others who want to do unprovoked aggression . . .We have credibility at stake.”

The tensions between the United States and China are real, but there is little evidence to suggest that Beijing is chomping at the bit to invade its neighbors if the U.S. shifts to a more restrained, realistic strategy.  The most contentious issue –the future status of Taiwan – would be best addressed via diplomacy, in the form of a revival of the “One China” policy that has kept the peace in the Taiwan Straits for the past five decades.  The policy holds that the United States will not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation, and that it will maintain informal relations with Taipei and refrain from treating it as if it were a treaty ally. For its part, China would pledge to pursue unification with Taiwan via peaceful means only.

There are larger problems in the U.S.-China relationship, most notably an action-reaction cycle based on each side’s worst case assessment of the other’s motives and military might.  While neither side is actively seeking conflict, there is a danger that the two sides might stumble into war if they remain on their current paths. In this context, a truly defensive strategy in East Asia that seeks to deter Chinese military action against its neighbors while abandoning the more dangerous and costly goal of being able to “win” a war with that nation is the course most likely to establish stability in the region.

As we elect a new President and Congress, we should debate the future of U.S. foreign policy.  But let’s do it honestly, without throwing around misleading labels intended to shut down debate and to keep us mired in a deadly, expensive and counterproductive approach to world affairs.

About the Author: 

William D. Hartung is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

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