Ideas on Europe Blog

All the past British Prime Ministers since 1957 wanted Britain to be a member of the European Community. Could they all have been wrong?

In the past 62 years, there’s only one Prime Minister who wants us to turn our back on Europe – the current incumbent, Theresa May.

(However, before she became Prime Minister, she told the nation that it was in Britain’s best interests to remain in the EU.)

Britain is now throwing away the combined wisdom of ten consecutive past Prime Ministers, all of whom wanted Britain to be in the European Community.

• PRIME MINISTER HAROLD MACMILLAN – CONSERVATIVE, 1957 to 1963

In 1961, Harold Macmillan applied for Britain to join the European Economic Community, just four years after it was formed with the signing of the Treaty of Rome by six other European countries.

Mr Macmillan explained to the nation:

“By negotiating for British membership of the European Economic Community and its Common Market, the present Conservative Government has taken what is perhaps the most fateful and forward looking policy decision in our peacetime history.

“We did not do so lightly. It was only after a searching study of all the facts that we came to accept this as the right and proper course.”

He added:

“By joining this vigorous and expanding community and becoming one of its leading members, as I am convinced we would, this country would not only gain a new stature in Europe, but also increase its standing and influence in the councils of the world.”

• PRIME MINISTER SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME – CONSERVATIVE, 1963 to 1964

Mr Macmillan’s successor, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was briefly prime minister for one year from 1964. He supported Britain’s application to join the European Community. Sir Alec said:

“I have never made it a secret that I cannot see an alternative which would offer as good a prospect for this country as joining the EEC [European Community].”

As Foreign Secretary in Edward Heath’s government, Sir Alec said:

“I, too, have concluded through the years that membership of the Community would be advantageous to Britain.

“I almost add ‘necessary for Britain’, because I am acutely conscious that there are two questions which have to be asked : not only whether we should go in, but what is the prospect for Britain if we stay out.

“Those two questions have to be asked because, whether we are in or out, the Community goes on.”

• PRIME MINISTER EDWARD HEATH – CONSERVATIVE, 1970 to 1974

It was Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, who joined Britain to the European Community following the backing of Parliament after 300 hours of debate.

On the evening of 28 October 1971, Mr Heath addressed the House of Commons during the momentous debate on Britain joining the European Community. He said:

“Surely we must consider the consequences of staying out. We cannot delude ourselves that an early chance would be given us to take the decision again.

“We should be denying ourselves and succeeding generations the opportunities which are available to us in so many spheres; opportunities which we ourselves in this country have to seize”

Mr Heath added:

“..tonight when this House endorses this Motion many millions of people right across the world will rejoice that we have taken our rightful place in a truly United Europe.”

Parliament did endorse the Motion, and Britain subsequently joined the European Economic Community on 1 January 1973.

Mr Heath explained to the nation just before we joined:

“The community which we are joining is far more than a common market. It is a community in the true sense of that term.

“It is concerned not only with the establishment of free trade, economic and monetary union and other major economic issues, important though these are — but also as the Paris Summit Meeting has demonstrated, with social issues which affect us all — environmental questions, working conditions in industry, consumer protection, aid to development areas and vocational training.”

• PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON – LABOUR, 1964 to 1970 and 1974 to 1976

In 1975, just two years after Britain joined the European Community (also then called ‘the Common Market’), Prime Minister Harold Wilson offered the nation a referendum on whether to remain a member.

In that referendum, Mr Wilson endorsed the ‘Yes’ vote which won by a landslide – by 67% to 33%.

Before the referendum, Mr Wilson told the House of Commons on 7 April 1975:

“My judgment, on an assessment of all that has been achieved and all that has changed, is that to remain in the Community is best for Britain, for Europe, for the Commonwealth, for the Third World and the wider world.”

During the referendum campaign, he said that he was recommending continued membership in “strong terms”.

He said that it would be “easier and more helpful” to solve Britain’s economic problems “if we are in the Market than if we were to be out of the Market.”

In recommending continued membership, Mr Wilson’s government sent a pamphlet to every household explaining the primary aims of the Common Market:

• To bring together the peoples of Europe.

• To raise living standards and improve working conditions.

• To promote growth and boost world trade.

• To help the poorest regions of Europe and the rest of the world.

• To help maintain peace and freedom.

• PRIME MINISTER JAMES CALLAGHAN – LABOUR, 1976 to 1979

As Foreign Secretary during the first referendum on Europe in 1975, James Callaghan supported the ‘Yes’ vote for Britain’s continued membership of the European Community, having led the negotiations for Britain’s new terms of membership.

He said, “Britain is in, we should stay in” and he also said, “The Government asks you to vote ‘Yes’, clearly and unmistakeably.”

Although critical of the European Community’s “nonsense” agricultural policy, Mr Callaghan as Prime Minister supported continued membership. For his party’s 1979 manifesto he wrote:

“We are ready and willing to work with our European partners in closer unity.”

The manifesto called for Greece, Portugal, and Spain to “receive an early welcome into the Community” and for reforms to the European Community’s Common Agricultural Policy.

• PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER – CONSERVATIVE, 1979 to 1990

During the referendum campaign of 1975, the Conservative leader, Margaret Thatcher, strongly campaigned for Britain to remain a member of the European Community.

In a keynote speech at the time she said:

“It is not surprising that I, as Leader of the Conservative Party, should wish to give my wholehearted support to this campaign, for the Conservative Party has been pursuing the European vision almost as long as we have existed as a Party.”

During her tenure as Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher is credited with pushing for, and making possible, the Single Market of Europe.

In September 1988 Mrs Thatcher gave a major speech about the future of Europe. She said:

“Britain does not dream of some cosy, isolated existence on the fringes of the European Community. Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community.”

She added:

“Let Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less than our common European endeavour.”

Crucially she said in support of the Single Market:

“By getting rid of barriers, by making it possible for companies to operate on a European scale, we can best compete with the United States, Japan and other new economic powers emerging in Asia and elsewhere.”

• PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR – CONSERVATIVE, 1990 to 1997

It was Conservative Prime Minister, John Major, who negotiated and won Parliament’s backing to sign the Maastricht Treaty, that among other benefits gave us EU Citizenship rights allowing us to reside, work, study or retire across a huge expanse of our continent.

At the Tory Party Conference of 1992, just six months after John Major won a surprise victory in the General Election, he said to the party faithful:

“I speak as one who believes Britain’s future lies with Europe.”

And Mr Major warned about Britain walking away from Europe:

“We would be breaking Britain’s future influence in Europe. We would be ending for ever our hopes of building the kind of Europe that we want.

“And we would be doing that, just when across Europe the argument is coming our way. We would be leaving European policy to the French and the Germans.

“That is not a policy for Great Britain. It would be an historic mistake. And not one your Government is going to make.”

He added,

“Let us not forget why we joined the Community. It has given us jobs. New markets. New horizons. Nearly 60 per cent of our trade is now with our partners. It is the single most important factor in attracting a tide of Japanese and American investment to our shores, providing jobs for our people..

“But the most far-reaching, the most profound reason for working together in Europe I leave till last. It is peace. The peace and stability of a continent, ravaged by total war twice in this century.”

• PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR – LABOUR, 1997 to 2007

Tony Blair, Labour’s longest-serving Prime Minister and, so far, the longest-serving Prime Minister of this century, was and still is a natural pro-European.

Mr Blair was recently described by Andrew Adonis, his former policy chief, as:

“The most instinctively pro-European prime minister since Edward Heath.”

In his memoirs, Mr Blair wrote:

“I regarded anti-European feeling as hopelessly, absurdly out of date and unrealistic.”

Mr Blair’s first manifesto, just before coming to power in 1997, promised that:

‘We will give Britain the leadership in Europe which Britain and Europe need.’

In a keynote speech to the European Parliament in 2005, Mr Blair said:

“I am a passionate pro-European. I always have been. My first vote was in 1975 in the British referendum on membership and I voted yes.”

He added that the European Union is:

“a union of values, of solidarity between nations and people, of not just a common market in which we trade but a common political space in which we live as citizens. It always will be.”

He continued:

“I believe in Europe as a political project. I believe in Europe with a strong and caring social dimension. I would never accept a Europe that was simply an economic market.”

Mr Blair concluded:

“The broad sweep of history is on the side of the EU. Countries round the world are coming together because in collective cooperation they increase individual strength.”

• PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWN – LABOUR, 2007 to 2010

Gordon Brown was the first Prime Minister from a Scottish constituency since the Conservative’s Sir Alec Douglas-Home in 1964. He came into power just as the world was going into economic meltdown.

But he saw the European Union as being uniquely placed to “lead the world through global crisis.”

In a speech to the European Parliament in 2009, Mr Brown said:

“Today we enjoy a Europe of peace and unity which will truly rank among the finest of human achievements and which is today a beacon of hope for the whole world.”

He was proud to say that Britain today was a country “not in Europe’s slipstream but firmly in its mainstream”.

Europe was uniquely placed to lead the world in meeting the challenges of globalisation precisely because it had achieved:

• “the greatest and biggest single market in the world”,

• “the most comprehensive framework of environmental protection”,

• “the world’s biggest programme of aid” and

• “the most comprehensive social protection anywhere in the world”.

• PRIME MINISTER DAVID CAMERON – CONSERVATIVE, 2010 TO 2016

David Cameron was the only leader of a main political party to call for a second referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Community.

During the subsequent 2016 referendum campaign, he urged the country to vote to ‘Remain’ in the EU, which was his government’s official position.

In a keynote speech just days before the vote, Mr Cameron told the country:

“I feel so strongly that Britain should remain in Europe. Above all, it’s about our economy. It will be stronger if we stay. It will be weaker if we leave.”

He added:

“Britain is better off inside the EU than out on our own. At the heart of that is the Single Market – 500 million customers on our doorstep…a source of so many jobs, so much trade, and such a wealth of opportunity for our young people.

“Leaving the EU would put all of that at risk.

“Expert after expert – independent advisers, people whose job it is to warn Prime Ministers – have said it would shrink our economy.”

He concluded:

“I believe, very deeply, from my years of experience, that we’ll be stronger, we’ll be safer, we’ll be better off inside Europe. To put it as clearly as I can: our economic security is paramount.

“It is stronger if we stay. If we leave, we put it at risk.”

 ALL OF THESE 10 PRIME MINISTERS had good points and bad points, and policies that not everyone agreed with.

But during their premierships, they all without exception unanimously supported our membership of the European Community as being in Britain’s best interests.

Could they all have been wrong? Please think about it.

Just one Prime Minister (Theresa May), out of Britain’s eleven Prime Ministers of the past 62 years, wants us out of Europe, when all the other Prime Ministers wanted us in. * Before Harold Macmillan, Sir Anthony Eden was Conservative Prime Minister from 1955 until he resigned on 9 January 1957. He was a Eurosceptic who made the momentous decision for the UK not to be a founder member of the European Economic Community, when six other European countries signed the Treaty of Rome, just two months after Sir Anthony left office. * Before Sir Anthony Eden, Sir Winston Churchill was the Conservative Prime Minister from 1951 to 1955. In the immediate post-war years, he strongly promoted ‘a union of Europe as a whole’ and a ‘United States of Europe’ but he did not envisage at that time Britain joining such a union. There is compelling evidence, however, that Churchill – who is recognised as one of the 11 founders of the European Union – changed his mind in the late 1950s. Please see my separate report ‘Winston Churchill: A founder of the European Union’

• My campaign, Reasons2Remain, is three years old. 2-minute video:

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

________________________________________________________

• Join and share the discussion about this article on Facebook:

 

The post Brexit means destroying the pro-Europe legacy of all past Prime Ministers since 1957 appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

xitIn a moment when so much is changing so fast, it’s hard to know where to begin in trying to make sense of it all. From the upheaval of Parliamentary procedure to the sudden reaching-across-the-aisle by Theresa May, even that which was unthinkable seems to be both thinkable and actually happening.

With that in mind, perhaps the more useful approach is to consider some of the underlying dynamics at work here.

In particular, the moves towards finding a decision in the UK represents a partial confronting of the ambiguities that have existed in and around Brexit from the very beginning.

During the referendum, both sides built up very broad coalitions of activists and supporters. Because of the nature of such a vote, where every single vote counts equally and where there is necessarily going to be one winner, there was a very strong incentive to say whatever it took to secure those votes.

To be more precise, the incentive was to communicate different messages to different voter groups, to secure their support. You’re concerned about immigration? Then voting for us will address that. You’re losing sleep over what they’re doing to our Great British bananas? Sign up here.

There is no judgement about the validity of the different concerns, because what matters at that stage is the vote itself.

And the reason for that is that it is the result of the referendum that matters to political operators: they take it and use it to further their assorted projects and programmes. You’ll recall that the second half of 2016 was a time of many different people telling you “what the referendum really meant was…”.

That sets up the present blockage.

Everyone was able to feel that the referendum was fought on the terms they were interested in, because at the time they could find activists who would be willing to talk in such terms, but now most people discover that the terms are now being set by others.

To take the most obvious example, few people (especially outside Northern Ireland) made their choice in 2016 on the basis of the potential disruption to the Good Friday Agreement and the implications it might have for the territorial integrity of the UK. But now the backstop is front-and-centre in the debate. Likewise, hardly anyone bothered themselves with how customs unions work and what implications they might have, but apparently this is now a resigning matter.

One of the most crucial insights that we can have into politics is that what we talk about matters at least as much as how we talk about it. If you control the agenda, then you have already won half the argument, because you have chosen the points of reference and the language we use.

All of which is to say that this current phase of the British debate was always going to occur. At some point, someone’s conceptualisation of “what Brexit means” had to come to dominate, at which point the disillusion would set in much harder among those whose conceptualisations didn’t succeed.

The problem has been that the collapse of the ambiguity has come very late and with great difficulty.

Parliament still contains many different visions of Brexit, with their proponents all convinced that they can win the day: when everyone around you looks weak and damaged, where is the incentive to compromise or to give ground?

All of this is reflected in the numerous votes of the past weeks: even the process for reaching a decision is confused and uncertain, long before actually winning out in those processes.

I won’t even try to guess what might be the outcome of it all, but I would be happy to suggest already now that whatever decision is reached, the further collapse of the multiplicity of interpretations and framings of Brexit will drive more discontent in the short-term. Whether those who succeed in securing their vision are able to build longer-term buy-in to that, and so create an increased likelihood that it will endure, remains very much to be seen.

The post Collapsing the ambiguities appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

La creación de una Guardia Europea de Fronteras y Costas (GEFC) y la propuesta de transformar la Oficina Europea de Apoyo al Asilo (Easo) en una Agencia Europea de Asilo (AEA) en 2016 responde a la necesidad de garantizar la implementación de las medidas adoptadas por la Unión Europea (UE) en el Espacio de Libertad Seguridad y Justicia (ELSJ). Tras la “crisis de los refugiados” tanto la GEFC como la AEA están llamadas a asistir sobre el terreno a aquellas autoridades nacionales sujetas a presiones extraordinarias en sus sistemas de registro, recepción y asilo, así como a garantizar respectivamente el espacio Schengen y el Sistema Europeo Común de Asilo. Si bien los nuevos nombres con los que se ha bautizado a las anteriormente conocidas como Frontex y Easo parece sugerir que la UE cuenta ya con un verdadero Cuerpo Europeo de Guardias de Fronteras y Asilo, debe señalarse que los nuevos reglamentos de estas agencias se limitan a reforzar las tareas operativas que les fueron inicialmente delegadas.

Ahora bien, la constante expansión de los poderes operativos de la GEFC y la AEA pone de manifiesto una tendencia en el ELSJ por la que la ejecución de las medidas adoptadas por la UE deja de ser una competencia exclusiva de los Estados miembros para gradualmente devenir en una competencia compartida. El desarrollo de funciones de implementación por parte de la GEFC y la AEA plantea un importante desafío: el impacto directo de las tareas operativas de estas agencias europeas en los derechos fundamentales de los nacionales de terceros países a los que asisten. Así, los reglamentos de la GEFC y la AEA incluyen un mecanismo administrativo de denuncia que faculta a los individuos a plantear una queja ante la propia agencia si consideran que alguna de sus actividades ha conculcado sus derechos fundamentales. Este mecanismo está llamado a fomentar una responsabilidad más integral de la GEFC y la AEA pues cualquier persona afectada por las acciones del personal que participa en una operación y que considere que debido a estas actividades se han vulnerado sus derechos fundamentales, así como cualquier parte que represente a dicha persona puede presentar una queja contra las agencias.

El novedoso mecanismo de quejas de la GEFC y la AEA se basa en los arts. 41 y 47 de la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la UE. El art. 41.3 declara que todo particular ha de ver reparados los daños que la UE, instituciones o agentes le hayan ocasionado en el ejercicio de sus funciones. El art. 47 establece que toda persona tiene derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva. Asimismo, los arts. 263 y 340 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la UE habilitan a los particulares a presentar un recurso ante el Tribunal de Justicia de la UE (TJUE) solicitando la anulación de un concreto acto de una agencia europea destinado a producir efectos jurídicos frente a terceros, así como que la UE repare cualquier daño que les haya sido infligido. Sin embargo, la creciente cooperación entre la GEFC y la AEA en los recientemente establecidos hotspots, la falta de transparencia de las operaciones que desarrollan, el complicado entramado multinivel de responsabilidad derivado de los numerosos actores implicados en las fronteras exteriores o la obligación de los nacionales de terceros países de probar ante el TJUE que las actividades de la GEFC y la AEA les afectan directamente dificulta, cuando no impide, su derecho fundamental a una buena administración y a un recurso judicial efectivo.

En concreto, la principal limitación del mecanismo de denuncia de la GEFC y la AEA es su falta de independencia e imparcialidad, así como su carácter puramente administrativo. Toda queja admitida a trámite por el oficial de derechos fundamentales de la GEFC y la AEA ha de dirimirse internamente, bien por el director de la agencia o bien por el Estado miembro implicado, en función de si la denuncia se refiere a un miembro del personal de la agencia o a uno de los oficiales nacionales desplegados. No obstante, ni el director de estas agencias (nombrado por el Consejo de Administración de la agencia y compuesto mayoritariamente por representantes nacionales), ni por supuesto los Estados miembros que se encargan de garantizar un seguimiento adecuado de la denuncia y adoptar las medidas disciplinarias o acciones que consideren pertinentes para resarcir a la víctima son independientes a las agencias.

Asimismo, si la queja presentada es considerada inadmisible, si las medidas adoptadas por la GEFC y la AEA para resarcir la violación alegada se estiman por el denunciante como insuficientes o si las medidas no se ponen efectivamente en práctica porla agencia, el mecanismo de denuncia no prevé ningún recurso administrativo o judicial adicional. La inadmisión de una queja por el agente de derechos fundamentales, la disconformidad del denunciante con el examen de su queja y/o las medidas adoptadas al respecto por la GEFC y la AEA deberían calificarse, a nuestro parecer, como actos que producen efectos jurídicos frente a terceros y así poder ser objeto de control por el TJUE.

En definitiva, las reforzadas tareas operativas conferidas a laGEFC y a la AEA comportan una creciente responsabilidad de las agencias y un mayor impacto de estas en los derechos fundamentales de los nacionales de terceros países. Si bien las tareas delegadas a los agentes de derechos fundamentales deberían haberse expandido al menos en igual medida que las tareas operativas conferidas a la GEFC y la AEA, sus agentes no están facultados para indemnizar y compensar directamente a los denunciantes por daños, ni pueden terminar, suspender o retirar el apoyo financiero a una operación de las agencias en la que haya quedado probado que los derechos fundamentales de los nacionales de terceros países han sido vulnerados. El agente de derechos fundamentales no está facultado para emitir decisiones vinculantes o investigar de manera independiente e imparcial quejas relativas a violaciones de derechos fundamentales.

Por ello, estimamos que la eficacia e imparcialidad del mecanismo de denuncia diseñado por los reglamentos de la GEFC y la AEA se vería claramente reforzado si sus agentes de derechos fundamentales fueran las autoridades competentes para llevar a cabo la investigación de las quejas y para hacer cumplir las medidas adoptadas en su totalidad. Esto es, el actual mandato de los agentes debería ser reformado con el fin de permitirles aplicar mejoras operativas internas, ejecutar las medidas adoptadas por la GEFC y la AEA o los Estados Miembros respecto a una denuncia admitida a trámite e imponer, si fuera preciso, sanciones contra las propias agencias.

 

Este post apareció en primer lugar en el Blog del Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos en el marco del proyecto: “Mi Propuesta para una Europa mejor”

 

The post Mi Propuesta: “Un mecanismo de quejas efectivo para Frontex y Easo” appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Climate politics are increasingly looking at decarbonizing the transport sector. Part of the debate focuses on increased pollution from civil aviation, where Ryanair is in the top 10 of EU emitters. Part of the debate focuses on flying less, i.e. twitter #flyingless, and staying on the ground, i.e. rail travel. More recently, the Danish Socialist People’s Party has proposed to increase cross-border rail travel thereby taking the debate into mainstream climate politics. Thus, there is an increased focus on the railways to deliver cross-border services.

Why is cross-border train travel so difficult? The short answer, railways are inherently national whereas aviation and maritime are international in nature. The European Commission has promoted the European railways, for almost 30 years, through market opening and Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T). Simultaneously, the EU has liberalized air travel and road haulage. Whilst air travel have become cheaper and more competitive, the railways continue to be mainly state-owned railway companies financed by national governments.

The EU railway governance structure and market opening attempt to create transparent administrative procedures at national level that enable cross-border rail travel and  domestic market opening. However, some member states and incumbent railways have not supported market opening, which are reflected in EU decision-making (for detailed discussion see my book).

Some of the obstacles to more cross-border rail travel mentioned in the flying less debate are; lack of one-stop shop ticketing, expensive fares, lack of night trains and lack of investment in high-speed trains

The Commission has talked about a one-stop shop, including ticketing, since I was a PhD student doing interviews a decade ago. Some rail operators have started to work together to provide online ticketing e.g. https://www.raileurope-world.com/, just as you can book international journey on individual operators’ websites, e.g. bahn.de. The man in seat 61 website tells you how to get around Europe by rail and how to get the best deals. However, these tentative steps cannot compete with the traditional travel websites. Instead, there is a need for collaboration between rail operators and traditional travel website to make international rail travel more accessible.

Rail fares are expensive and the idea of breaking up journeys to save money is new to many who are used to booking flights. Governments can use taxes and charges to faciliate modal shift from air to rail, e.g. many climate movements have suggested a carbon tax on flying. Another option is to create an EU fund or use regional funds or TEN-T funds to facilitate start-up operations of cross-border rail traffic, such rail service promotes mobility and cultural exchange, which are central to the EU principles, crucially the programme would have to comply with state aid rules. Nevertheless, member states would have to agree on funding in the new multi-annual budget.

The lack of night trains in some parts of Europe is problematic. The geographical periphery like the Baltic countries and the Nordic countries would benefit from cross-border night trains to the geographical centre. By comparison, ÖBB, the Austrian railway company, is successful in operating cross-border night trains to neighbouring countries. Moreover, night trains can be expensive, and more demand for night trains necessitate change in consumer behaviour, so consumers see night trains as part of the holiday and an extra hotel stay.

The TEN-T investment in cross-border high-speed rail infrastructure is behind schedule because large-scale cross-border infrastructure projects are difficult, e.g. the Eurotunnel and more recently the Fehmarn bridge. It takes time for big national infrastructure projects to find the right window of opportunities, and international projects require different national agendas to merge into one window of opportunity. Thus, there is no real prospect that all the planned priority TEN-T rail projects will be built in the near future.

Overall, successful cross-border rail traffic requires strong bottom-up mobilisation to push for change at national level and EU level. More importantly, it requires grass-root pressure on the railway industry and traditional travel agencies to deliver competitive rail travel solutions. Until then, “EU railway market … is not a high-speed train, which is quickly reaching its destination – A Single European Railway Area – instead it is a slow regional train, stopping at all stations” (Dyrhauge 2013: 160).

The post Flying less and the problems with cross-border trains appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Over a million people marched in London yesterday demanding a new People’s Vote on Brexit. The tide has turned. There is now no doubt that Britain doesn’t want Brexit.

Today Remainers outnumber Leavers. There are no longer 17.4 million Leave supporters.

According to analysis of recent polling, there are now only around 14.8 million Leave supporters compared to around 16.5 million Remain supporters.

Remain has been in the lead in over 60 consecutive national opinion polls since the 2017 general election.

YouGov’s latest polling this month shows that if there is now a new referendum with a choice between remaining in the EU or leaving on the government’s Brexit terms, Remain would win by 61% to 39%.

[Excluding Don’t know, Would Not Vote and Refused AND weighted by likelihood to vote. See page 5]

If those who didn’t vote in the 2016 referendum decide to vote in a new referendum, Remain could gain an extra 4.7 million voters net, according to new research by YouGov.

A petition to revoke Article 50 and remain in the EU has now reached a record 4,899,767 signatures (as of writing – it’s going up at a rate of 545 signatures per minute).

Remember, the majority for Leave in the referendum was just 1.3 million. The margin for Remain in a new referendum could greatly exceed that.

If the government now goes ahead with Brexit, they will be going against the will of the people. Britain doesn’t want Brexit.

• Watch this 2-minute video explaining why there are no longer 17.4 million Leave supporters:

• Watch this 2-minute video on why a new vote on Brexit is democratic:

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

________________________________________________________

• Join and share the discussion about this article on Facebook:

The post Britain doesn’t want Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Nine weeks away from the European Parliament elections, Brexit and the suspension of Fidesz from the European People’ Party has been worthwhile developments to pay attention to in the context of the EP elections campaigns.

The evening of the 20th of March and the following day have been critical moments for both the British and the Hungarian politics, but more so for the EU.

The British Prime Minister Theresa May waited until the very last minute of the 20th of March to send her letter of Brexit extension request to Donald Tusk, the European Council President.

Once the letter was sent, she made an appearance outside the Number 10. Luckily she had her voice back, viewers did not have to check their TV frequencies or radio signals to make sure what they were hearing was what May was saying.

While May heavily criticised the UK Members of the Parliament for the delay in the Brexit date, disregarding how the democratic process works in the House of Commons, she did not look like a leader in control, but she was more like a toddler having a tantrum because things did not go the way she envisaged.

May’s speech is very damaging for her authority in her own party, as well as in the British political establishment. Reverberations of the position May have adopted on that very night will be something to watch out in the coming days, but some MPs have already reported on the Twitter how the Brexit supporters have harassed them and blamed them for the delay.

In the light of these developments and their possible ramifications, the future of the Brexit is ever more ambiguous.

There is still a possibility that the UK participates in the EP elections, depending on how the Meaningful Vote (III) results next week, considering May’s treatment of the MPs and lack of change in her deal, it is very likely to be voted against.

Under these circumstances, then the UK will need to leave the EU on the 12th of April with no deal or have decided to a new plan by then. However by this date the UK will need to tell the EU what it plans to do next. Tusk said that the UK could ask another extension, if the UK agreed to stand in the EP elections in May.

Talking of the EP elections, suspension of Fidesz, the Hungarian Civic Alliance Party, from the European People’s Party has also been remarkable. Not least because we all thought the question was more about whether the EPP will decide to expel Fidesz.

I do not know what happened during that meeting and what conversations the EPP members had between them, but there is a huge difference between expulsion and suspension.

Fidesz will not have  a say on the business of the EPP, will not be allowed to nominate candidates for jobs in the grouping or attend party meetings—however it will be loosely connected to the EPP.

This means that the Fidesz will continue to run its election campaign as a suspended member of the EPP, having denied all their wrongdoings and blamed the media for producing fake news about their election material.

In a way Fidesz survived for another day and the EPP has given the impression to the outside world that the EPP does take actions against those who do breach it’s values—effectiveness of these actions is not for discussion, at least for now.

Drawing on the debate about the extension of the Brexit date and the suspension of Fidesz, I like to make two points about the current state of the EU and why these were critical moments for the EU.

The fact that the EU 27 stands united concerning the Brexit and can act together in the common interest of the EU shows that regardless of the speculations about how divided the EU is, there are more unifying the EU then dividing it. 

The second point is that the way the EPP is dealing Fidesz is exactly how the EU is handling the Member States which are in breach of the the Article 2 of the TEU. By which response I think not just the values of the EPP and of the EU, but the future of the EU have been put at a greater risk. 

The post #EP2019—Brexit Delay and the Suspension of Fidesz (II) appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The first duty of all MPs is to put the safety of the country first.

Contrary to popular belief, MPs are not beholden to follow the opinions of their constituents.

• That means that MPs in constituencies that voted for Leave are not under any legal or constitutional duty to support Leave if they believe that is not in the best interests of Britain.
• Conversely, that also applies to MPs in constituencies that voted for Remain. That in itself does not mean those MPs must also support Remain, if they don’t believe it’s in Britain’s interests.

Also contrary to popular belief, MPs are not beholden to follow the result of the 2016 EU referendum.

That referendum was advisory only, not legally binding, and Parliamentarians were (and are) under no legal or constitutional obligation to ‘obey’ that referendum.

MPs are not the delegates of their constituents. They are representatives. MPs are free to act in whatever way they believe to be in the interests of the country.

Indeed, they have a solemn duty to do so. The country comes first. Their constituents and their party come second and third.

Before the referendum, Parliamentarians by a huge majority – around 70% – would have voted for the UK to remain in the EU, because they believed that was in the best interests of our country.

None of the facts have changed since then, except that a highly divisive referendum offered a different point of view, by the slimmest of margins, and by a minority of the electorate.

For complicated reasons, MPs felt bound to ‘respect’ the result of the advisory referendum, even though in the heads and hearts of most of them, they didn’t believe that Brexit was in Britain’s interests.

It’s now crunch time.

Britain is facing the worst constitutional crisis in generations. We are due to leave the EU within a few weeks, either with a deal that most MPs don’t support, or without any deal, that most MPs don’t want.

And the decision must be made next week.

Or MPs could push to give ‘the people’ a new democratic opportunity to reconsider Brexit, now we know so much more than we did in 2016. Or they could vote to revoke Article 50 and to bring an end to Brexit.

It’s time for all Parliamentarians to examine closely the onerous responsibility they must now confront.

Should they act in the narrow interests of their parties; in the fear of losing their seats if they upset their constituents, or in the overwhelming interests and safety of the UK?

There is no doubt about the first and foremost duty of MPs, overwhelmingly agreed by Parliamentary precedent and practice.

As published by our Parliament the role and duty of MPs is clearly stated by two leading authorities on the subject, the 18th Century Parliamentarian Edmund Burke, and Britain’s greatest 19th Century war leader, Winston Churchill.

In Edmund Burke’s Speech to the Electors of Bristol on 3 November 1774 he said:

“Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion …

“Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.

“You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament.”

And on 26 March 1955, a few days before he tendered to Her Majesty his resignation from the office of Prime Minster, Sir Winston Churchill spoke about the duties of a Member of Parliament:

He said:

“The first duty of a member of Parliament is to do what he thinks in his faithful and disinterested judgement is right and necessary for the honour and safety of Great Britain.

“His second duty is to his constituents, of whom he is the representative but not the delegate.

“Burke’s famous declaration on this subject is well known.

“It is only in the third place that his duty to party organization or programme takes rank.

“All these three loyalties should be observed, but there in no doubt of the order in which they stand under any healthy manifestation of democracy.”

We have heard that a number of MPs have received death threats by people who disagree with the way they are speaking and voting. That is reprehensible, and entirely unacceptable.

As the Speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow made clear  yesterday:

“The sole duty of every Member of Parliament is to do what he or she thinks is right.”

Please support your MP to do what they believe is right for the country. That’s their first and foremost duty, regardless of your opinion, or mine.

• Watch these short (less than a minute) related videos:

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

________________________________________________________

• Join and share the discussion about this article on Facebook:

The post Brexit: Support your MP to do what’s right appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

For younger readers, Millwall FC garnered much public interest in the 1980s for their forthright style of football and their supporters, whose chant of “nobody likes us, but we don’t care” resounded around stadiums (and punch-ups). Yes, things have moved on, but still the label has hung around.

Theresa May hasn’t yet got into any fist-fights, but she does seem to have adopted the F-Troop motto in these dying days of Article 50.

And they are dying days. With scarcely a week left, there is much talk of an extension, but the EU27 have been clear that re-negotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement remains off the table, so this is essentially about whether the UK signs up or shoves off.

May’s strategy of “my deal or no-deal” has led her inexorably to the current place and as last night’s televised statement showed, she has now reached a point of not even trying to sell the Agreement on its merits, but rather as the only way out of the impasse she has had a large part in creating.

Impressively, she appears to have turned some MPs that might have come round to supporting her in a Meaningful Vote 3 into much more vociferous opponents than before. The entire structure of her statement was that it was the Commons’ fault that delays had occurred and were to blame for it all: an odd strategy ahead of a vote early next week that would unlock the short Art.50 extension she had asked for just earlier that day.

And it’s not only the Commons that May doesn’t appear to be trying to charm. The EU too has been deeply unimpressed by her management of the extension request itself.

It has been clear for several weeks that an extension was necessary, and it’s always been clear that European Councils can’t make decisions there and then – especially if, as here, there’s been no prior discussion of positions – so to leave a request until 24 hours ahead of the meeting was always a recipe for further delay. Further complicate that by, a) not clearly asking for one particular length of extension, and b) more importantly, offering no justification for the extension other than a vague hope that “this time it’ll be different” on the Meaningful Vote, and it’s no surprise that the Commission and EU27 are spitting feathers.

This is all the odder for May’s approach hitherto of asking the EU to do her a favour in Art.50: this is such a slap in the face to them and makes granting an extension all the more difficult that one has to wonder what’s going on in Number 10.

As ever, I resist the “she’s stupid” explanation, because that neither helps us very much nor does it actually fit the evidence.

Instead, this all speaks to two general ideas.

The first is that May hasn’t got a Plan B. In keeping with the rest of her political career, she has set on a course and she will stick to that come hell or high water, unless and until she absolutely is forced to abandon it. And remember, that was an approach that didn’t always work, but did work enough to get her into Number 10, so the chances of her changing that model now are minimal.

The second is that nobody else has a viable plan. As much as it’s bad politics for May to tell everyone that they have no choice to do do as she wishes, it’s also apparent that everyone else is struggling to build up an alternative path through all this that might command broad support.

Yes, the choices still remain the same: revocation, deal or no-deal, with a side order of extension to delay having to choose among these. But none those combinations is the clear challenger to May’s approach.

The EU can’t do much more than set out conditions for an extension and hope the UK complies; Parliament can’t decide if it wants to take control of the process and, even if it does, where it might go; Tories talk a lot about removing May, but don’t do it; Cabinet is unhappy, but passive.

All of which brings us back to Millwall’s latest signing.

The post The Millwallisation of May’s Brexit strategy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Over the weekend, I had a twitter conversation about who is a climate researcher. Twitter is obviously not the place for deeper and complex conversations. Thus, this blog post explains my argument that it is not helpful to debate who is or is not a climate researcher, instead climate research requires interdisciplinary dialogue and cooperation in order to solve the multiple crises we are facing.

Let me start by outlining the argument I met this weekend. A climate researcher is someone who research the physical and chemical processes in the atmosphere!

I do not disagree that such a person is a climate researcher. My point is that climate research and climate change is much broader because it affects all elements of life on Earth. The changes in the atmosphere affect our ecological systems and socio-economic structures. Thus, everything is connected and to be able to understand these connections we need to talk across disciplines to find ways of breaking the current structures that are causing climate change.

It is not helpful that natural sciences, social sciences, humanities, engineering etc. are standing in our own corner looking at the big climate elephant in the middle of the room whilst trying to understand it from our own perspective. By focusing on disciplinary research alone, we only understand parts of the climate elephant. What we need is for natural scientists and social scientists to talk together. For example, natural scientists show how climate change affects our ecological systems, whilst social scientists identify how socio-economic structures contribute to climate change. Similar, engineering develops technological solutions to mitigate climate change. In short, we need each other to develop successful climate mitigations at all levels and across all areas.

Importantly, many of us are already work with colleagues in other fields on shared climate change problems, which we only can solve through shared research.  Similarly, research grants increasingly require us to develop interdisciplinary research proposals, which often end up with different fields of social sciences, e.g. politics, sociology and geography, working together. Indeed, we need to think wider in terms of our research partners and we have to start talking with colleagues in other fields, who are looking at similar climate change issues. It is only through interdisciplinary research that we can change the projections in the IPCC reports and achieve a low carbon society in 2050.

Does it matter how we define ourselves? Of course, but limiting the definition of a climate researcher to someone studying the atmosphere is not useful when all research from all fields show that climate change is affecting us all in many different ways. Thus, let us move on from this debate over definitions, and instead talk about how we together can solve the climate crises. After all, that is what all the students striking last Friday 15th March, were asking us grownups to do.

The post Climate change: We need more interdisciplinary dialogue and research appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

At the end of 2018, the UACES  Gendering EU Studies Research Network and the Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) brought together a group of academics, civil society, policy makers, practitioners and military officials who work on gender to consider the integration of gender into peace and security from a European perspective. The resulting discussions shed light on some of the current challenges and future opportunities to realising an inclusive vision of peace and security and the transformative potential of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Despite the different backgrounds and perspectives of participants, some key issues emerged which we consider further here. They related to ownership, advocacy, insider-outside coalitions and ensuring the change we pursue is the ‘right’ change.

The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda is encapsulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the seven follow-up resolutions (UNSCR 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122 and 2242). It calls for women’s inclusion in peace and security, but also highlights their particular needs in conflict and post-conflict situations. It calls on the UN and member states to integrate gender into their peace and security apparatus. As the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) highlight, the WPS agenda has transformative potential or ‘the potential to escape cycles of conflict, to create inclusive and more democratic peacemaking and to turn from gender inequality to gender justice’.

Who can claim ownership of the Women, Peace and Security agenda? The UN, many member states and regional organisations including the EU, NATO, African Union (AU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) all claim the relevance of WPS to their own work through their respective policies on the issue. This is in many respects a positive development, yet, it also requires reflection. WPS did not originate out of thin air with the adoption of UNSCR 1325 by the UN Security Council in 2000. Indeed, the Resolution built on decades of feminist organising inside and outside of the UN. From The International Women’s Congress in The Hague in 1915 to the UN Conference on Women in 1995. This knowledge building created the space to consider a reconceptualisation of what ‘peace’ and ‘security’ mean for those whose needs are often marginalised or excluded from such policy considerations. It is crucial that academia, civil society and those working within institutions on WPS acknowledge this, as well as the global nature of the WPS agenda.

At a European level, much scholarship has emerged to examine regional engagement with WPS by actors such as the EU and NATO. While this is welcome, it also bears reflection that Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (which has been the focus of much of this research) is not the only EU policy area for which gender is relevant. If, as we claim, the EU and EU Studies are co-constitutive – meaning that the way we study the EU ‘shapes the way we understand it and determines which elements take center stage’ – then feminist scholars need to be cognisant not to reify a narrow militaristic definition of security, and relatedly the relevance of WPS, in their own work. They need to heed the warning of their civil society counterparts.

As we approach the 20th Anniversary of UNSCR 1325 we can see that there has been much progress. Yet, in many countries, including within Europe, we see pushback and regression on gender equality. Gender and gender studies are under attack and often branded as ‘gender ideology’. We are then at a critical juncture for the WPS agenda, will it go forward or will it go backwards? And will we know what distinguishes these two trajectories? In order to ensure we are pursuing the ‘right’ change gender advocates need to be reflective. This means considering whose security are we talking about? How do we make sure it is as inclusive as possible? And, who do we involve in addressing these security concerns?

Within our own fields (be it the military, policymaking, civil society or academia) we also face push back. Be it day-to-day microaggressions because of our work as gender advocates or the still all too common assumption that ‘gender’ = ‘women’. Something only reinforced by the title of the Women, Peace and Security agenda (even if it does encompass gender mainstreaming and provisions for men and boys). This speaks to one of the compromises made to ensure the UN Security Council would adopt the WPS agenda, ‘gender’ was felt to be too ‘political’ for some members of the Security Council to palate. Naming the agenda Women, Peace and Security also centered women and moved them away from the margins of peace and security. Yet this decision has contributed to reinforcing perceptions that gender is only applicable to women.

Building on this, our discussions also drew attention to the fact that men’s experiences of ‘doing’ gender are often very different to women. Often their expertise is not questioned in the same way as women’s often is. Men can also face an assumption that it is somehow more noteworthy that they are engaging with gender issues than their women colleagues (again often built on a false premise that gender = women). Practically, men as gender advocates can use their positions to draw attention to the work of women colleagues in this area (who may not be getting credit which is due), they can also refuse to participate in all-male panels which we found to be an issue across all our areas of work.

The symbolic exclusion of women remains pervasive across civil society, policymaking, academia and military circles. Yet women’s inclusion across peace and security issues is a key underlying principle of the WPS agenda. Women’s absence is noticeable in the all-male panels which are still evident in some panels at conferences such as the 2018 Paris Peace Forum and the International Studies Association (UACES has now banned all-male panels). Some of the responses often received by those who call out an all-male panel are nicely summarised in these bingo cards produced by Sam Cook (and free to download). One token women on a panel is just as damaging as an all-male panel, with that women effectively speaking for all women as a homogenous group. Having no women is a visible representation of a silence in the field. How do we ensure the message of representation and inclusion is heard?

For feminist academics within the discipline of Politics and International Relations there are signs of progress, with many Universities now actively appointing gender scholars. And while this is welcome, there is a real danger that these scholars then come to embody the institution’s commitment to gender equality at the expense of real structural change. The same could be said for the appointment of Gender Advisors in militaries or at the EU or NATO, and gender positions within civil society organisations. We need to be careful that this does not let others of the hook for their own responsibilities for ‘knowing’ gender.

The feedback we received from the workshop highlighted the value of conversations across silos. Bringing together academia, civil society, policy makers and military demonstrated some of the commonalities in the challenges we face. It provided a space to share lessons and strategies from our own experiences. So how can ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ better support each other? Part of the answer certainly lies in recognising the value of situated and experiential knowledge of gender as well as that gleamed from scholarship endeavour (see also Aiko Holvikiki’s discussion of this). There are significant experiences in our shared experiences as gender advocates, learning from each other has to be part of pushing for transformative change to the current flawed peace and security architecture.

——-

The workshop was held on the 26- 27th November 2018 at Quaker House in Brussels under Chatham House rule. It was co-convened by the Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) and the Academic Association for European Studies (UACES) Gendering EU Studies Research Network. It also received funding from Newcastle University. We would like to thank all the participants for their contributions.

About QCEA: The Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) works to bring a vision based on the Quaker commitment to peace, justice and equality to Europe and its institutions. It does so through a peace and a human rights programme through its publications, a quiet diplomacy approach and through its networks such as the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office and Human Rights and Democracy Network.   It recently published Building Peace Together, which makes the case for peacebuilding, including through gender inclusiveness.

About the UACES Gendering EU Studies (GES) Research Network: is funded by UACES and brings together a rich and growing body of work in the area of gender and EU politics and policies. The Research Network seeks to explore and challenge the obstacles which curtail feminist influence in EU Studies and leave gender analysis on the periphery.

The authors and conveners of the workshop:

Olivia Caeymaex (QCEA), Katharine A. M. Wright, Newcastle University (GES)
Hanna Muehlenhoff, University of Amsterdam (GES), Toni Haastrup, University of Kent (GES, Roberta Guerrina, University of Surrey (GES), Annick Masselot, University of Canterbury, New Zealand (GES)

The post Towards an Inclusive Peace and Security: taking stock on the gender dimension appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, this week described the vote by UK MPs to block a no-deal Brexit in any circumstances as, “the Titanic voting for the iceberg to get out of the way.”

It’s worse than that. The entire Brexit fiasco has sunk our democracy, leading the country to disaster.

Yes, Brexit is the iceberg, our Parliament is the Titanic, and we are heading for one almighty crash.

There is no band playing, there is no re-arranging of the deckchairs.

Instead, at the very last minute, MPs have been discussing amendment after amendment, voting on the same déjà vu deal over and again, and traipsing in and out of lobbies, whilst an imminent and crushing Brexit impact is just days away.

The country is now close to a state of emergency, with a government minister admitting that he’s the world’s biggest buyer of fridges, so that vital medicines can be stockpiled as they will be in short supply if we default to a ‘no deal’ Brexit.

Businesses across the country are in a state of panic and distress as the government has suddenly announced new tariffs that will be applied to exports and imports if ‘no deal’ happens.

Dover and other Channel ports are bracing themselves for months of disruption if we leave without a deal.

And really, all that is just the tip of the iceberg.

• How on earth did the country spend three tiresome years navigating itself to this?
• And is there now any quick and easy emergency escape from the chaos that now confronts us?

The answer to the first question is complicated, but in a nutshell, the journey to where we are now started off as being entirely undemocratic.

If democratic principles and safeguards had been applied from the start, we would not now be in such a calamitous situation.

And the answer to the second question is yes, there is a quick and easy way out of this. (But you’ll have to read on to find out what it is).

The assault on our democracy began when, in 2015, Parliament approved a referendum on EU membership which, because it was advisory only, did not have the same checks and balances of a legally binding vote.

Then the government responded to the referendum result as if it was a legally binding decision, but at the same time, not allowing our Parliament the usual scrutiny and oversight that should have followed an advisory-only referendum.

If the referendum had been legally binding, then Parliament would have set a minimum threshold for Leave winning – just as Parliament did for the 1979 referendum on whether Scotland should have its own assembly.

On that occasion, ‘Yes’ won 52% to 48% – just like the EU referendum.

But ‘Yes’ didn’t win, because Parliament had set a minimum threshold of 40% of the electorate having to vote for an assembly before Scotland could have one.

Less than 40% of the Scottish electorate voted for an assembly, so on that occasion the ‘Yes’ vote failed.

Only 37% of the electorate voted for Leave in the EU referendum. So, if the same rules had applied as the 1979 referendum, Leave would not have won.

In any event, Leave should not have won with only 37% of the electorate voting for it.

Most democratic countries across the world that have referendums would not allow such a minority vote to win such a major referendum.

Indeed, even your local golf club would not allow 37% of its members to change their constitution.

But there’s worse.

We now know that the Leave campaigns only won – by the slimmest of margins – because of lying, cheating and law breaking.

• They overspent what’s allowed under electoral law by a significant margin.
• Masses of stolen personal data were used to target potential voters in illegal ways.
• The Electoral Commission is suspicious that millions of pounds given to the Leave.eu campaign originated from a foreign source – which would be illegal.
• There are now several ongoing criminal investigations into Leave campaigns and campaigners (none against Remain).

And here’s the rub.

If the referendum had been a legally binding vote, then under UK law, such illegalities and irregularities of such magnitude would have resulted in the referendum result being annulled by the courts.

But as the referendum was an advisory exercise only, it escaped such legal scrutiny – even though the referendum result was treated as if it was legally binding.

The courts cannot annul an advisory vote in the same way that a legally-binding vote can be annulled when serious irregularities may have affected the result.

It could all have been so different.

Following the referendum, the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, could have appointed a Royal Commission to explore and decide which form of Brexit was viable and then asked Parliament if it wanted to do that Brexit.

Instead, Mrs May was in a hurry to trigger the Article 50 notice by bypassing Parliament, using the ancient and arcane ‘Royal Prerogative’.

Gina Miller’s legal challenge stopped that.

The Supreme Court confirmed that the referendum was only an advisory exercise and that the decision to leave the EU had to be taken by Parliament.

However, Parliament wasn’t given an opportunity to decide whether the UK should leave the EU.

The then Brexit Secretary, David Davis, erroneously advised Parliament that such a Parliamentary decision wasn’t necessary, as ‘the decision’ to leave had already been taken by the referendum.

A ‘decision’ that the Supreme Court had already ruled that the referendum wasn’t capable of making.

Mr Davis told Parliament that, since the ‘decision’ to leave the EU was already made, all that Parliament was required to do was to give the Prime Minister authority to notify the EU of an ‘intention’ to leave.

Parliament was presented with one of the shortest bills ever, ‘The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill’.

When Parliament passed this Act to give power to Theresa May to notify the EU of a decision that had yet to be made, the world was led to believe that Parliament had voted to leave the EU.

Nothing of the sort had happened.

Parliament has never actually debated and voted on the specific question of whether the UK should leave the EU.

• So, since the referendum couldn’t make a decision to leave the EU, and Parliament didn’t make the decision, who did?

That mystery was unravelled in June last year, at a ‘permission hearing’ in the High Court regarding the validity of Article 50.

That hearing established that the Prime Minister, Theresa May, exclusively and individually made the executive decision for the UK to leave the EU.

Lord Justice Gross and Mr Justice Green unusually made their judgment citable and ruled that the decision to leave the EU was contained in the Prime Minister’s Article 50 notification letter of 29 March 2017, to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council.

[∞ Link to judgement]

In that letter, the Prime Minister stated that ‘the people of the United Kingdom’ had made ‘the decision’ to leave the EU, even though the Supreme Court had ruled that the referendum was advisory only and not legally entitled or capable of making any decision.

She then erroneously advised Mr Tusk that ‘the decision’ to leave the EU had been ‘confirmed’ by the United Kingdom Parliament.

Parliament had only given the Prime Minister permission to give notice to the EU of an ‘intention’ to withdraw from the EU. That’s not at all the same as a specific decision to leave.

Had Parliament been asked following the advisory referendum to debate and specifically vote on whether the UK should leave the EU, a bill to this effect would have required a plan, impact assessments and evidence from all the Brexit committees.

Parliament has recently been asked twice if it wants to leave the EU on the terms negotiated by the Prime Minister.

The House of Commons has twice voted NO with historic majorities.

Parliament is deadlocked because the executive tricked us all by asking Parliament the wrong question following the referendum.

The question put to Parliament following the referendum should have been the same one that the UK electorate was asked:

‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?’

Asking Parliament instead if it will give permission for the Prime Minister to notify the EU of an ‘intention’ to leave is not at all the same as a debate and vote on whether we should remain or leave.

Now, Parliament is alarmed that we are just days from crashing out of the EU without any deal, which almost all politicians – and businesses – agree will cause chaos.

At the last minute, this week Parliament voted by a large majority that the UK must not leave the EU without a deal.

But the Dutch Prime Minister, who compared that to, “the Titanic voting for the iceberg to get out of the way,” was depressingly right.

Parliament has no power to stop the UK leaving without a deal.

Our Parliamentarians have been led into a cul-de-sac by a cunning government, which has acted dictatorially rather than democratically, and in their own narrow interests, rather than that of the country.

The only way to avoid a ‘no deal’ exit is for Parliament to either ratify Theresa May’s deal, or revoke Article 50.

Extending Article 50 will merely push back the impact of the iceberg, and doesn’t take away the potential danger.

(Although a delay would give time for a new referendum on Brexit, so ‘the people’ could decide whether they accept ‘the only deal on the table’ or to remain in the EU after all. However, so far, Parliament has voted against having another referendum).

• So, what’s the easy way out of Brexit that was promised at the start of this article?

Since it’s been demonstrated in the High Court that it was the Prime Minister alone who made ‘the decision’ to leave the EU, she also has the power to undo what she has done.

The most sensible and honourable course for the Prime Minister to take now would be to revoke her Article 50 notice and order a Brexit Inquiry.

She can do this entirely on her own without any statute or Parliamentary approval.

The Inquiry would have to explore how our country:

• was taken on an undemocratic course to calamity;
• on the ‘decision’ of a minority of the electorate;
• in a non-binding vote, that was only won by illegalities and irregularities;
• of such breath-taking proportions, that had the referendum been a legally binding vote, it would have been annulled.

Yes, Brexit is a titanic sham.

 

• Thanks to Liz Webster for her assistance on this article.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

________________________________________________________

• Join and share the discussion about this article on Facebook:

 

 

The post Brexit has sunk our democracy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Participants of the Madrid meeting, December 2018. Photo credits: S4D4C

Including science and technology as key dimensions of foreign policy and international relationships at different political levels is one of the calls backed by a group of scientists, research administrators, officials and policy makers. They see a confluence of interests in the benefit of both the scientific endeavour as well as legitimate broader political and societal objectives.

After a meeting in Madrid ‘EU Science Diplomacy beyond 2020’, organized by S4D4C, a Horizon 2020 funded initiative coordinated by Austria’s Centre for Social Innovation, a group developed the “Madrid Declaration on Science Diplomacy” which aims to foster agreement and raise awareness about the need to strengthen science diplomacy strategies and practices world-wide.

Science diplomacy is often not fully exploited at all levels of governance, and especially at supranational levels: A greater scientific voice would add value to bi- and multilateral discussions and decisions about global challenges and directly or indirectly serving to advance diplomatic goals. More explicit science diplomacy strategies would allow for a more effective alignment of interests and a more efficient coordination of resources. It is an extremely useful tool for addressing global challenges and for improving international relationships as long as it is not distorted by ideological goals compromising the independence of science. Thus, science diplomacy should be given a greater role in efforts to solve global challenges and promote sustainable development.

The Madrid Science Diplomacy declaration sees science diplomacy as a multi-actor effort in which diplomats, scientists and science managers as well as other non- state actors can have a role and can contribute to its deployment. This applies at the local, regional, national and international level. This innovative model brings new governance and coordination mechanisms that need to be managed in dialogue with all stakeholders.

The reach of the declaration is truly global, the declaration features signatories from India, the United States, Latin America and Korea as well as several international scientific institutions.

This blog post has been prepared by the representatives of the S4D4C consortium.

The post What role for science diplomacy in addressing global challenges? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As we move into the final weeks of the original Article 50 time period, it is useful to try and round up several aspects of the EU27’s positions, insofar as they impinge on the UK’s decisions (which is to say, a lot). As much as Parliament is caught up in working out what it might accept, it is essential that this is done in the context of understanding the EU side, given that this is a negotiation.

Renegotiation and the backstop

The first stopping point on this has to be the question of renegotiation.

The EU, both collectively and in its member states, has been very firm that it will not consider renegotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement itself, although that does not preclude discussions on the Political Declaration or another document to provide elaboration of position.

However, those discussions will not include the kinds of changes still being discussed in Westminster, such as an end-date to the backstop or an unilateral exit clause.

This is best understood as a function of three elements that have reinforced the firmness of the EU’s stance.

Firstly, the Irish border issue has long been framed in terms that make it very hard indeed for the EU to move on its requirements. The Irish government was very successful in its lobbying of the Union and other member states that the border issue was an fundamental one for Ireland, that also threatened several core EU values, not least the peace project on the island that the Union has long supported and promoted. Moreover, other small member states have recognised that leaving Ireland exposed on this at any point much cause problems should they themselves need help on something in future.

Secondly, the EU view the backstop as something that they have already made major compromises on: the temporary customs arrangement was a concession to the UK and causes substantial concern in several member states, on the grounds that it gives the UK unfair access to the EU, including for smuggling. To be told that it is the UK that has given all the ground has not made a positive impression in Brussels or elsewhere.

Thirdly, the British approach to date has been to offer problems, rather than solutions. Dislike of the backstop is well-understood, but the repeated request on the EU side is for detailed proposals on how to address this, to which very little has been forthcoming. The EU sees it as the UK’s responsibility to take the lead, given that it is the one that will be leaving and since it should know better what is likely to be acceptable to Parliament.

Extension

Of increased importance is the matter of an extension to Article, 50 since even the most problem-free path to approving the Withdrawal Agreement seems to be taking the UK past 29 March.

The EU’s position is cautiously framed at present, but the main thrust appears to be that it is willing to consider and agreed to an extension. However, this comes with several caveats.

Procedurally, it must be remembered that the EU27 have to give unanimous approval to an extension. This leaves open the possibility of one or more states pressing from side-payments, especially if they are not so exposed to the direct effects of a no-deal Brexit: this possibility would only grow if there were to be future requests for further extensions.

Politically, the EU has long-underlined that extension must be for a purpose: it cannot be given simply in the hope that something might pop up. Thus a short extension to allow the UK to complete ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement and/or enabling legislation would be acceptable, as would a longer extension for a general election or referendum that would have a material impact on British government policy.

The European elections will be one major issue in all this.

Recall that that European Parliament has to approve the Withdrawal Agreement too: its last sitting is 18 April, so it cannot give that approval between then and 2 July, when it first sits post-election.

Legal advice to both the UK and EU suggests that an extension to the end of June would be unproblematic, since while the UK would not participate in the elections, MEPs would not be sitting. However, that bumps up against the need for approval of the Agreement, not to mention that the Court of Justice – if asked – might come to a different view on the need for elections on 23 May.

If the UK remains a member states past the end of June without MEPs, then this would be an infringement of Art.223 TFEU, which requires direct elections: proposals to second or appoint MEPs have been floated, but without any great support to date.

However, if the UK does hold elections and/or appoints MEPs, then this is also problematic. The Parliament forms its groups on the basis of minimum numbers of MEPs from a minimum number of member states: currently two groups would not meet the threshold without UK MEPs. Groups matter because they also determine the allocation of Parliament’s officers, speaking time and funding, even before it gets to the matter of voting for the new Commission in the late summer. Those member states that are due to receive additional seats post-Brexit would also have to work out whether to elect to these seats pre-Brexit.

No-Deal

Behind all of this is the concern over a no-deal Brexit, something that is a clear and substantial concern for all EU member states and its institutions.

While the primary effort has been directed to secured a Withdrawal Agreement, there has also been very substantial work (especially in the past year) on preparing for a no-deal outcome. The consistent advice from many national agencies in the EU27 has been that until there is a signed and ratified Withdrawal Agreement, there is nothing and business and individuals would be sensible to prepare as such.

The extent of resources available can be gauged from the websites available from the Commission and the governments of Ireland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark (to take just the immediate neighbourhood): each provides a lot of information on the impact of no-deal for assorted groups and individuals. These also highlight the substantive funding that has gone into place already, including 580 new customs officials in France and 400 in Ireland.

However, despite the very substantial range of work, it is also evident that very major gaps remain. As the Institute for Government notes, only Germany, Cyprus and Malta will have full legislation in place to protect UK citizens’ rights by 29 March: Spain will only have arrangements ready in relation to voting, rather than residence or access to services. Likewise, reports from various member states report very incomplete preparation by businesses (especially smaller ones), which will make the impact of the uncertainty generated by a no-deal even more substantial.

Finally, it should be noted that a no-deal would also strongly condition how member states and the EU approach any subsequent negotiations. The first priorities will be any life-critical systems not already addressed, but then the focus will be on securing the resolution of the content of the Withdrawal Agreement – that is citizens’ rights, financial liabilities and the Irish backstop – before any discussion of future trading arrangements. Given that the UK would no longer be a member state at that point, there is no indication that there would be any immediate reason to offer more generous terms on these points than are already embodied in the Agreement.

The post The EU view on the Article 50 endgame appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Outside the EU, we’ll only have a say in our country, and there will be barriers to trade with our most important customers and suppliers in the world.

But inside the EU, we have a say in our country AND our continent, and enjoy NO barriers to trade with our most important customers and suppliers in the world (by far).

Brexiters say we must have full sovereignty over Britain. Why would that be a good thing?

The definition of sovereignty is ‘supreme power or authority’. Only one country in the world has that. North Korea.

But whilst North Korea has cast iron sovereignty over its nation and people, in the outside world it has very little power, authority or influence.

Indeed, North Korea is considered to be a pariah state, shunned and excluded by the outside world, and with tough sanctions imposed upon it.

In the modern, rational, democratic world, countries recognise that sharing some sovereignty actually increases their power and strength….and sovereignty.

NATO countries realise that in their promise to come to the immediate aid of another NATO country under attack. That’s a classic example of sharing power and sovereignty.

Brexiters say that Britain was misled into thinking that the European Community was only ever about free trade. That, of course, is nonsense – which any cursory study of history will reveal.

The European Economic Community (now called the European Union) was always about a Union of countries sharing some of their power, sovereignty and strength for the common good.

Back in 1961, when Britain first applied to join the European Community, there was much talk about what impact joining would have on Britain’s sovereignty.

The then Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, explained to the British people:

“Accession to the Treaty of Rome would not involve a one-sided surrender of ‘sovereignty’ on our part, but a pooling of sovereignty by all concerned, mainly in economic and social fields.

“In renouncing some of our own sovereignty we would receive in return a share of the sovereignty renounced by other members.”

Mr Macmillan added:

“The talk about loss of sovereignty becomes all the more meaningless when one remembers that practically every nation, including our own, has already been forced by the pressures of the modern world to abandon large areas of sovereignty and to realise that we are now all inter-dependent.

“No country today, not even the giants of America or Russia, can pursue purely independent policies in defence, foreign affairs, or the economic sphere.

“Britain herself has freely made surrenders of sovereignty in NATO and in many other international fields on bigger issues than those involved in the pooling of sovereignty required under the Treaty of Rome.”

Almost 60 years later, one might have thought these issues would have been settled and agreed by now.

But it seems some British people (actually, they most often refer to themselves as ‘English’ rather than British) do not accept this idea of sharing some sovereignty for the common good.

They want England to have ‘supreme power’, meaning complete sovereign rule over its nation and its people, presumably just like in the ‘good old days’ when England had supreme power over its nation, its citizens and its Empire.

For those of us who belong to the modern world, we can see this makes no sense.

Britain is part of a planet that increasingly needs to work together with other nations, and working together, means sharing some power and agreeing some rules.

That’s our road to more civilisation, safely and prosperity.

That, of course, is the great strength of the European Union. 28 neighbouring countries coming together to share power and influence for the common good. It’s a huge success.

The EU is the world’s most successful economic, trade and political union of countries. No one can deny that the EU is the world’s biggest, richest trading bloc, and that it has considerable influence in the world.

Brexit means less sovereignty. In the EU, we gain sovereignty over our continent. In the EU, we have MORE control, not less.

Let’s not throw that away by retreating into an island mentality. Having 100% sovereignty – like North Korea – will not make Britain Great. It will make us small.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

________________________________________________________

• Join and share the discussion about this article on Facebook:

The post The truth about sovereignty appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Being a member of the EU costs us only around 34p a day each. That’s a bargain, especially as the value of EU benefits far outweigh the cost.

The Confederation of British Industry has estimated that EU membership is worth around £3,000 a year to every British family — a return of nearly £10 for each £1 we pay in.

So, in reality, EU membership costs nothing – it makes Britain, and Britons, better off.

(Source: CBI)

Article continues after one-minute video:

The calculations for our annual EU membership fee have been published by the UK’s Office of National Statistics.

(Source: ONS)

When deducting from the EU membership fee all the money we get back from the EU, including our £5 billion rebate that’s never actually sent to the EU, the net cost of EU membership in 2016 was only £8.1 billion – or £156 million a week, or just 34p per person per day

That’s far short of the claim made on Boris Johnson’s campaign bus that we send £350m a week to the EU. That was entirely incorrect.

But after the referendum, the Vote Leave campaign director, Dominic Cummings wrote:

“Would we have won without £350m/NHS? All our research and the close result strongly suggests no.”

(Source: Spectator)

So, we are leaving the EU based on a whopper of a lie (actually, lots of whopping lies).

Ok, if Mr Johnson had instead put ‘£156m a week’ on his bus, it would still have seemed a lot of money. But something Brexiters never like to do is reveal how much we get back in return for the membership fee.

Back in 2011, this was estimated by the government to be between £30 billion and £90 billion a year – a return of between 800% and 2370%.

(Source: UK government)

Can anyone name any other government expenditure that gives a return of over 800%?

Let’s put this in another context.

In 2016, the government spent £814.6 billion on all aspects of public spending. This means that the net annual EU membership fee represented only 1% of all UK government expenditure. (A miniscule amount).

Furthermore, the EU funds many thousands of projects in the UK every year, that our national government would be unlikely to finance. Such as Liverpool’s John Lennon Airport, or superfast broadband in Cornwall.

(Source: European Commission)

In addition, across Europe, our annual membership fee helps to fund projects that benefit our continent and its people as a whole – such as Galileo, to give Europe its own satellite navigation system.

And the Horizon 2020 project – the world’s biggest multinational research programme, funding leading-edge research in all aspects of science and innovation that will directly benefit all EU citizens.

Individual European countries could not afford to take on the projects that the EU helps to fund for the welfare and prosperity of its half-a-billion citizens.

The advantages of EU membership considerably outweigh the cost of membership. So, why are we leaving?

I cannot find one valid or validated benefit for Brexit. Not even one.

Indeed, by NOT paying the annual EU membership fee, we will all be poorer, according to the UK government’s own impact assessment reports.

(Source: The Guardian)

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

________________________________________________________

• Join and share the discussion about this article on Facebook:

The post EU membership is a bargain appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Britain’s vote to leave the EU has produced a wealth of books, which should come as no surprise given the unprecedented challenges and debates it has led to in the UK, the rest of Europe and around the world. Recently published in International Politics Review, ‘Brexitology: delving into the books on Brexit’ covers almost 60 books. It looks at the full range of books published in the run-up to and after the referendum, ending with books published in late 2018.

It offers a way of breaking down the literature into seven manageable topics: how to study Brexit; the history of UK–EU relations; the referendum campaign; explaining the result, Britain’s Brexit; Europe’s Brexit; and Global Brexit. The review identifies some common themes in the books so far published and looks at what the future holds for this topic.’

Full article – Brexitology: Delving into the books on Brexit – can be found here– https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41312-018-0069-1

Books reviewed or referenced in the review—

• Adonis, A. (2018). Half in, half out: Prime ministers on europe. London: Biteback.
• Armour, J., & Eidenmüller, H. (Eds.). (2017). Negotiating Brexit. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
• Armstrong, K. (2017). Brexit time: Leaving the EU—Why, how and when?. Cambridge: CUP.
• Ashcroft, M., & Culwick, K. (2016). Well, you did ask… why the UK voted to leave the EU. London: Biteback.
• Bailey, D., & Budd, L. (2017). The political economy of Brexit. Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda.
• Banks, A. (2016). The bad boys of Brexit. London: Biteback.
• Barnett, A. (2017). The lure of greatness: England’s Brexit and America’s Trump. Kansas City: Unbound.
• Bennett, O. (2016). The Brexit club. London: Biteback.
• Bickerton, C. (2016). The European Union: A citizens guide. London: Penguin.
• Booker, C., & North, R. (2005). The great deception: Can the European Union survive?. New York City: Continuum.
• Buckledee, S. (2018). The language of Brexit: How Britain talked its way out of the European Union. London: Bloomsbury.
• Cato the Younger. (2017). Guilty men: Brexit edition. London: Biteback.
• Clarke, H., Goodwin, M., & Whiteley, P. (2017). Brexit: Why Britain voted to leave the European Union. Cambridge: CUP.
• Clegg, N. (2017). In his how to stop Brexit (and make Britain great again). New York City: Vintage.
• Connelly, T. (2017). Brexit and Ireland: The dangers, the opportunities, and the inside story of the Irish response. London: Penguin.
• Diamond, P., Nedergaard, P., & Rosamond’s, B. (2018). The Routledge handbook of the politics of Brexit. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Dinan, D., Nugent, N., & Paterson’s, E. W. (Eds.). (2017). The European Union in crisis. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Drozdiak, W. (2017). Fractured continent: Europe’s crises and the fate of the west. New York City: W.W. Norton.
• Dunt, I. (2016 and updated in 2018). Brexit: What the hell happens now? Kingston upon Thames: Canbury Press.
• Fossum, J. E., & Graver’s, H. P. (2018). Squaring the circle on Brexit: Could the Norway model work?. Bristol: Policy Press.
• Gamble, A. (2003). Between Europe and America: The future of British politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• George, S. (1998). An awkward partner: Britain in the European community. Oxford: OUP.
• Gibbon, G. (2017). His breaking point: The UK referendum on the EU and its aftermath. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Glencross, A. (2016). Why the UK voted for Brexit. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Green, D. A. (2017). Brexit: What everyone needs to know. Oxford: OUP.
• Hannan, D., & Next, W. (2016). How to get the best from Brexit. London: Head of Zeus.
• Hassan, G., & Gunson’s, R. (Eds.). (2017). Scotland and the UK after Brexit. A guide to the future. Edinburgh: Luath Press.
• Hillman, J., & Horlick, G. (Eds.) (2017). Legal Aspects of Brexit: Implications of the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the EU. Washington: Institute of International Economic Law.
• Humphreys, R. (2018). Beyond the border: The Good Friday agreement and irish unity after Brexit. Kildare: Merrion Press.
• Kearns, I. (2018). Collapse: Europe after the European Union. London: Biteback.
• Lyons, G., & Halligan, L. (2017). Their clean Brexit: Why leaving the EU still makes sense—Building a post-Brexit economy for all. London: Biteback.
• MacShane, D. (2015). Brexit: How Britain will leave Europe. London: IBTauris.
• MacShane, D. (2016). Brexit: How Britain left Europe. London: IBTauris.
• MacShane, D. (2017). Brexit, no exit: Why Britain won’t leave Europe. London: IBTauris.
• McGowan’s, L. (2017). Preparing for Brexit: Actors, negotiators and consequences. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Melchior, A. (2018). Free trade agreements and globalisation: In the shadow of Brexit and Trump. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Menon, A., & Evans, G. (2017). Brexit and British politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Mindus’s, P. (2017). European citizenship after Brexit: Freedom of movement and rights of residence. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Morphet, J., & Brexit, B. (2017). How to assess the UK’s future. Bristol: Policy Press.
• Morris, D., & Thomson, J. (2018). Can you Brexit?: Without breaking Britain?. Avening: Spark Furnace.
• Mount, H., & Madness, S. (2017). How Brexit split the Tories, destroyed Labour and divided the country. London: Biteback.
• Oliver, T. (Ed.). (2018). Europe’s Brexit: EU Perspectives on Britain’s vote to leave. Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda.
• Oliver, T., (2018). Understanding Brexit: A concise introduction. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
• Oliver, C., & Demons, U. (2016). The inside story of Brexit. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
• Outhwaite, W. (2017). Brexit: Sociological responses. Cambridge: Anthem Press.
• Owen, D., & Ludlow, D. (2017). British foreign policy after Brexit. London: Biteback.
• Peston, R. (2017). WTF. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
• Rohac, D. (2016). Towards an imperfect Union: A conservative case for the European Union. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Sanders, D., & Houghton, D. P. (2016). Losing an empire, finding a role. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Shipman, T. (2016). All out war: The full story of how Brexit sank Britain’s political class. Glasgow: William Collins.
• Shipman, T. (2018). Fall out: A year of political mayhem. Glasgow: William Collins.
• Simms, B. (2016). Britain’s Europe: A thousand years of conflict and cooperation. London: Allen Lane.
• Smith, J. (2017). The UK’s journey into and out of the EU: Destinations Unknown. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Staiger, U., & Martill’s, B. (Eds.). (2018). Brexit and beyond: Rethinking the futures of Europe. London: UCL.
• Tannam, E. (Ed.). (2018). Beyond the Good Friday agreement: In the midst of Brexit. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Wall, S. (2012). The official history of Britain and the European community, volume II: From rejection to referendum, 1963–1975. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Welfens, P. (2017). An accidental Brexit: New EU and transatlantic economic perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Young, H. (1998). This blessed plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair. New York: Overlook.

The post Brexitology: delving into the books on Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It might not be the first question on your mind when you think about Brexit, but should French SMEs be better prepared for a no deal scenario?

Pierre Séjourné

Pierre Séjourné certainly thinks so. As the head of the international mission at DIRECCTE, a French trans-ministerial agency for economic development, he politely but very firmly has been pressing business leaders across the country to start realising that ‘no deal’ has become the most likely option, and that there is an urgent need to prepare for the unpleasant consequences that the UK’s messy departure will inevitably have for their activities.

No public comment he makes lacks a reference to the government’s virtual helpdesk brexit.gouv.fr which provides assistance to smaller firms with the necessary risk assessment and mitigation.

As a recent public event held on 7 February at ESSCA School of Management in Angers – dedicated to the impact Brexit on Western France’s Pays-de-la-Loire region – showed, Monsieur Séjourné is not alone in having growing concerns with the relative ‘unpreparedness’ of French business.

The public authorities, regional councils or larger conurbations known as ‘métropoles’ in the French provinces are also increasingly worried, as every single regional policy maker pointed out in the various round-tables of the event

The key word is, of course, uncertainty. Since nobody is capable of providing any clarity on what scenario will prevail at the end of March, SMEs are caught like rabbits in the Brexit headlights.

Brexit is destabilising in many ways: this is the first time in most business leaders’ lifetime that intra-European trade has not led to fewer barriers, and it turns back the clock in order to reinstall long-forgotten ones. It is also deeply unsettling on a cultural level.

In France, with its long-standing tradition of high principles often thwarted by practical earthly details and regularly resulting in collective frustration, there has always been a strong belief that pragmatism and phlegmatic down-to-earth problems-solving were the very essence of Britishness.

Giving priority to concrete business interests rather than indulge in grandstanding philosophical dogma was a collective aptitude attributed to the British, despised and envied at the same time.

And now France and the rest of Europe are witnessing how pragmatism is drowned in a sea of collective hysteria, and how clear business interests have been sacrificed on the altar of irrational politics.

This irrationality, to which Hervé Jouanjean, former DG at the European Commission, pointed in his keynote, simply does not fit century-old cultural patterns. There are many business leaders who are convinced that reason will prevail in the very last minute and a sensible solution will be found that will keep consequences down to a perfectly manageable minimum.

As Gérald Darmanin, the French budget minister, recently pointed out, this was the first time in his political career where the public authorities seemed to be better prepared than the corporate world.

At the Angers conference his assessment was indirectly corroborated by the panel dedicated to the transport sector.

Pierre Rideau, director of the customs office for Western France, explained very clearly how they had already been preparing for the worst case for several months and what resources (both human and material) were being mobilised to mitigate the forthcoming problems of cross-border trade.

What they would be unable to avoid, though, was the expected increase in transport costs, which he had no doubt would drive many French SMEs out of the British market.

On each of the round-tables, experts from The UK in a Changing Europe (Raquel Ortega-Argilés, Carmen Hubbard, Christopher Huggins, John-Paul Salter, Ignazio Cabras, and Simon Usherwood) shared their own understandings about the likely disruptions in the different sectors that were addressed by the panels composed of policy-makers, business representatives and researchers.

The agrifood round-table, with Fabrice Sciumbata (Brioches Pasquier), Lydie Bernard (Regional Council Pays-de-la-Loire), Joao Pacheco (Farm Europe), and Carmen Hubbard (UK in a Changing Europe).

One of the major takeaways of the event was the perceived need to give more consideration to regional perspectives.

Just as Scotland feels – understandably – left out of a debate that circles around Westminster issues, so too the French regions, across which the impact of Brexit will vary considerably, have not been helped by a national approach either.

As one the regional councillors, Lydie Bernard, complained, even in a sector as essential to the French economy as the agrifood business, the available data is hardly ever broken down on a regional level.

Beyond the business data and economic prospects, however, the event concluded in a surprisingly humanistic profession of faith in transnational cooperation.

The Pays-de-la-Loire, as provincial as they may seem on a map, have their Brussels representation right on Rond-Point Schuman. Their policy makers and high civil servants are embedded in European networks, the British counterparts they regularly meet with are highly appreciated.

Vanessa Charbonneau

As Vanessa Charbonneau, Vice-President of the Regional Council, repeatedly insisted, they would – ‘of course!’ – be willing to continue to work together with their British neighbours in order to make the best of whatever would be going to happen.

Rather than shoulder-shrugging at the unforced self-destruction of a former premium nation, the overall attitude that seems to prevail in this part of France is one of compassion with a trusted partner whom you would like to help out of an impasse, but are unable to.

 

This post was initially published
on “The UK in a Changing Europe”

The post Business interests and cultural perception patterns. A French region’s view on Brexit. appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

So here we are. In little more than one month, Britain is due to crash out of the EU without an agreement as the single outcome a strong majority MPs abhor because of the damage it would do to jobs, tax receipts and relations to European and international partners. The agreement actually negotiated by the government was strongly rejected by two thirds. Instead, a fragile majority of MPs demand ill-defined ‘alternative arrangements’ to the Irish backstop, or want it gone completely. Labour insists on a permanent customs union that is a matter for the future relationship and is perfectly compatible with the withdrawal agreement, while the party’s ‘six tests’ can realistically only be met by staying in the single market with all the obligations this brings or remaining.

Those who know how the EU works such as the former UK permanent representative in Brussels, Ivan Rogers, are tearing their hair out over the level of ignorance and his sense of frustration is widely shared among the community of people who study the EU professionally. I don’t wish to rehash the critique of the government approach to the negotiations, but want to explore why so many MPs, both Tories and Labour, misjudged the degree of the EU’s unity, what the core interests of EU member states are, the asymmetry of power in the negotiation, and how to best influence it. If we consider insights from research into foreign policy and intelligence failures, four main reasons stand out:

Firstly, the EU-related knowledge basis and professional connections have been eroding over years, because of declining priority and associated career incentives of being successful in Brussels. During the Blair years the government was keen to and proud of setting the policy agenda in the EU in economic strategy, counter-terrorism and security and defence policy. This started to change already under Gordon Brown who showed little interest in or appreciation of Brussels politics.

Labour’s loss of knowledge continued the longer it stayed out of power, but also because those MPs with experience of governing under Blair were being side-lined by the new front-bench under Jeremy Corbyn. Mr Corbyn himself, a lifelong Eurosceptic as well as his key advisors and some on the front bench, tend to see the EU as an unreformable neoliberal project and, erroneously, think that delivering the 2017 Labour manifesto requires freedom from EU state-aid rules. From this perspective, there is no need for coalition building with the socialist parties in Europe who called to stay and reform.

The Conservatives’ understanding of the EU suffered from Cameron’s early decision to withdraw his party from the conservative grouping in the European parliament in exchange for Brexiteer support for his leadership. This cut off the Conservatives from the European mainstream, damaged relations to sister parties such as the German CDU, and disrupted information flow and influence. As a result, British MPs overestimated both Germany’s capacity as well as its willingness to help accommodate British demands, which were increasingly about stopping things rather than setting the agenda for new policies. The 2011 watershed failure of the government to block the Fiscal Compact designed to save the Eurozone was the first sign of misreading EU partners, closely followed in 2015 by futile efforts to block Jean-Claude Juncker becoming Commission President after his party grouping won the European Parliament elections.

The second explanation for the misjudgement is confirmation bias. This is a problem affecting not just MPs but many commentators and members of the public with the most passionately held political beliefs. Confirmation bias involves seeking and accepting information, because it supports actions that are in line with ones’ beliefs and disregard evidence that contradicts them, regardless of reliability, relevance or track-record of the source. One can always find some “expert opinion” from an ideologically compatible “think-tank” that supports ones’ view and avoid or discard those that jar or contradict it.

One of the benefits of confirmation bias for true believers is that you can never be disproven by real world events. If the EU did not blink and yield as David Davis and other Brexiteers argue it must have been because it was intransigent, arrogant and out to “punish” Britain – not because the UK harboured unrealistic ideas. If the deal was somehow approved at the last second and negotiations about a post-Brexit trade-deal turned out not to be “the easiest in history” it was because the Commons had lost its nerve to fight for a better deal. If the EU did not respond positively to a new approach from a potential Corbyn-led government it was because the Tories had destroyed trust through the negotiating tactics, rather than Labour engaging in wishful thinking.

The third problem is mirror-imaging whereby uncertainty about the intentions of the other side is filled by imagining what is rational from ones’ own point of view. From the perspective of many British MPs the EU insisting on the backstop even if it risks a no deal is an irrational strategy given the economic damage a no-deal would incur. Many also do not understand why Britain could not enjoy the same kind of access to the Single Market as before as it creates new barriers to European businesses. This reflects a strong tendency in British political discourse to see evaluate policies and the EU in particular from a narrow “bottom-line”, cost-benefits perspective.

In contrast, EU institutions and the overwhelming majority of its members see Brexit not just on its own terms, but as precedence creating and future credibility-defining. Cutting an economically favourable deal with a country wanting to be politically more distant would come at an unacceptable price of weakening the Union at a time when populist parties in government attempt hard-ball tactics. The integrity of the Single Market is at stake if Northern Ireland was outside the customs union without border controls or by allowing Britain to undercut standards to gain competitive advantage whilst enjoyed good access to the Single Market. The EU is determined to defend the Treaties as its quasi constitution, which is something difficult to understand in a country without a written constitution. The difficulty of arriving at a legally-binding text among 27 member states also helps to explain why such texts, once agreed, become very difficult to change and why the EU says it will not reopen the withdrawal agreement shaped around and agreed by the British government and the EU 27 at the end of last year.

Beyond the immediate issue of the Brexit negotiations, many British MPs struggle to understand the compromise-nature of EU politics. They see Brussels through the lens of their own confrontational system with strongly whipped parties and underpinned by first past the post elections. Many continental European countries are run by coalition governments and problem-solving-focused parliaments, making it easier for them understand the give and take in Brussels. The EU is a compromise-making machine geared towards building the broadest possible support even when majority votes are allowed. This works only because members agree on informal rules on how to act and share a minimum level of trust not abuse their rights. Casting vetoes, going into battle with publicly announced red-lines and reneging on agreements made has lost the UK trust and good-will even among the most Anglophile countries. The lack of trust has now become a major obstacle for negotiation success.

Finally, assumption drag helps to explain why many MPs still do not realise that their perceived understanding of how Brussels works does no longer apply. Not just MPs, but also many journalists remember long EU summit negotiations and the late-night compromises that typically enable a deal to made. Indeed, in the now distant past, Britain won some special concessions at these negotiations over new Treaty texts. However, this is not a normal EU summit over a new treaty or a major agreement where everyone needs to have prizes to sell at home. By voicing its intention to leave Britain has placed itself in a fundamentally different position of a prospective “third country” against which the remaining EU members defend their interests. While the EU is keen to get Brexit over with and passed and will show flexibility, particularly on the political declaration, it is not going to let either Ireland or its mandated negotiator, the European Commission, stand in the rain on such a high-stakes issue. Smaller member states in particular will watch this closely as a test-case.

The need to address these misunderstandings rises whatever the outcome of Brexit. It will be central to making a success of the coming negotiations about future relations if May’s deal passed. Remain will require a change of attitude. And even if Britain crashed out, it will still remain strongly connected to and impacted by the European Union by virtue of geography, economic links, law, security cooperation and, indeed people. As long as the EU exists and confounds Brexiteers predictions of its imminent demise, Britain without a seat at the table and voting rights will have an even greater need to understand how the EU works in order to influence it from the outside.

 

*Christoph Meyer is Professor of European and International Politics at King’s College London. An abbreviated version of this text was published under the title ‘Brexit turmoil: five ways British MPs misunderstand the European Union’, in The Conservation and Uk in a Changing Europe, on 7 February 2019.

The post Why do so many British Politicians get the EU so wrong? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

What is Communicating Europe?

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License, created by Niaz.

Communicating Europe really started as an idea, or rather a reflection, after watching the BBC Great Debate in June 2016 between representatives of different UK-based political parties regarding whether to leave the EU, or to stay inside and make it stronger.  The reflection I had at the time was that, for all the importance of the issues being discussed and indeed the importance of EU membership more generally, here were several politicians speaking past each other on these issues, all with very different understandings of what the EU is, how it functions, what it does, and why it does it.  What is the EU?  What are its values?  Is it an oppressive, distant bureaucracy, crushing the sovereignty of its composite members?  Is it a neoliberal economic project, seeking instead to extract whatever financial value there may be from its workers, to the detriment of their welfare, quality of life and happiness?  Is it instead a compromise between states, flawed or otherwise, that nevertheless stands for certain fundamental principles such as the rule of law, equality, human rights and social democracy?  Is it none of these things?  Or perhaps is it a complex amalgamation of all these things?

Communicating about the EU

The EU fundamentally changes, depending on who you speak to, and what they say.  The same individuals may even speak differently about the EU depending on their audience.  We are all familiar with the political actors who support the EU and its project in Brussels, taking full part in its activities and policy-making, who then decry it in domestic politics.  The trade unionist who talks of making stands against the onslaught on workers’ rights by a removed technocracy in public speeches to delegates, who realises the importance of compromise and shared responsibilities when attending closed stakeholder meetings.  We know of traditional media, becoming increasingly balkanized in their communications to their target audience, dividing themselves into camps that could almost be considered ‘EUrophiles’ and ‘EUrophobes’.  So too are we aware of new ways of communicating about Europe, far from the language and rules traditional media.  Online citizen campaigning about Europe, academics engaging in ‘public intellectualism’ through short YouTube videos or symposiums, and somewhat more shady, unknown entities going beyond expressing views or opinions on the EU based on the facts as they see them, instead seeking to deliberately mislead through the creation of extreme narratives and ‘false facts’.  The various ways and means of talking about the EU and its actions, policies, values and value are becoming increasingly complex, emotive, and yet, incorporating a greater number of actors than ever before.  How can we understand what is happening?

About the Research Group

Communicating Europe is the attempt to explore these fascinating interactions between different actors and audiences in far more detail.  Coordinated by Dr Benjamin Farrand at Newcastle University, Dr Isabel Camisão at the University of Coimbra, Dr Katjana Gattermann at the University of Amsterdam, and Professor Catherine de Vries at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, this UACES Research Network seeks to bring an interdisciplinary perspective to bear on the questions of who talks about the EU; how; why; and with what effect, bringing insights from international relations, law, sociology, politics and communication.  Through its activities in workshops and panels at international conferences, Communicating Europe will create a larger network of researchers considering how the EU is communicated, what influences the mode and content of communications, how it relates to broader trends, and how, if at all, these communications should be regulated by legal systems.  This first blog post, as the reader is no doubt aware, does not shed any particular light on any of the issues raised – it instead constitutes a statement of intent, a beginning of a conversation, and perhaps, a call to action.  Communicating Europe welcomes any and all academics, whether established Professors or Early Career Researchers just beginning a PhD to become involved.  We will be publishing information shortly regarding our initial UACES conference panels on these topics, and a call for papers for an opening event to take place in late May or early June 2019.  We look forward to working with all of you.  If you are interested in finding out more, do not hesitate to contact uacescommunicatingeurope@gmail.com to be added to our mailing list.

Benjamin Farrand, on behalf of Communicating Europe.

Follow Communicating Europe on Twitter

The post Communicating Europe: Who Speaks, and Why? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

University of Tartu. Photo from www.ut.ee

Teele Tõnismann

In my paper “Paths of Baltic States’ public research funding 1989–2010: Between institutional heritage and internationalization” (Tõnismann, 2018) I analyse transformations in public research funding of the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The paper is part of my PhD thesis where the topic is further explored with the example of research funding practices in the discipline of sociology.

 

Divergent impact of European Union politics in the Baltics

The paper focuses on the international competition in research funding policy. In research policy literature, competition is mostly seen to accompany “project-based” funding systems, which spread in the Western world since 1960 as a counter to so-called “institutional” or “basic” funding models. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, project-based funding systems were also established in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As with the other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, the EU accession is considered to have played significant roles in actualising these developments (Radosevic, Lepori, 2009). The overall transformation in these three countries encompassed the establishment of independent funding bodies, the introduction of project-based funding instruments, and the linking of institutional evaluation with research funding as was taking place in Western European countries.

 

However, against theoretical assumptions developed by neo-institutionalist authors (see below), these changes entailed significant differences. First, all three countries ended up with different shares of funding instruments. In a fashion similar to the ‘US system’, Estonia and Latvia rely mostly on project-based funding instruments while Lithuania’s public funding is built on a combination of core and project funding; this is typical of the ‘continental European funding systems’. Secondly, international dimensions of competitiveness in these systems occurred at various times: In Estonia before, in Latvia during, and in Lithuania after EU accession. Finally, policy changes gave different outputs, meaning that the research performances of the three Baltic States differ, with one country of the three—Estonia—surpassing the others. Consequently, the aim of this article was to better understand the factors that influenced the divergence in these three countries.

 

Limits of historical neo-institutionalism in explaining the impact of internationalisation

The Baltic case allows the discussion of works that have addressed similar questions using neo-institutional approaches. Although traditionally the external context is seen to have an impact on national institutional arrangements only through major ruptures or changes in an institutional environment, some recent historical neo-institutional authors have claimed this view. They claim that besides external factors, such as the restoration of national independence or accession to the EU, endogenous factors such as local political context and actors’ ability to interpret institutional rules play a crucial explanatory role in delineating the different change trajectories (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

 

In the article, I have applied the approach to the Baltics case and found that it raises at least two questions. First, if the political veto power could indeed explain the differences between the late Lithuanian reforms and those of its two northern neighbours, then how can we explain the Estonian reformers’ decision to move towards criteria favouring international competitiveness in a project-based funding system, while Latvian reformers did not? Secondly, if Latvian reform could be explained by political pressure coming from the EU, then how can we explain Lithuanian change agents’ motivation to delay change until 2009 even when political context would have allowed the change in the early 2000s? And although Latvia’s first changes were implemented in 2005, why has no substantial change occurred since?

 

These questions are showing the limits of the historical neo-institutionalism approach for understanding change in the Baltics. Instead, for a better understanding of the Baltic case, we drew on the works of recent historical neo-institutionalist authors and supplemented them with an analysis of change actors’ knowledge resources acquired from different international contexts.

 

Internationalisation as an endogenous factor of change?

In sum, the paper proposes the following hypothesis: to better understand the Baltic States’ divergent policy trajectories, internationalisation should be conceptualised as an endogenous factor of change, instead of perceiving it as an exogenous factor, as is theorised by historical institutionalist authors. The “endogenous” factor of change denotes here the “resource”  that change actors might engage for undertaking national policy reforms (Knoepfel et al. 2007) and that they have collected through their educational, professional, administrative, associative and political life trajectories.

 

Indeed, we found that the higher level of Western international knowledge resources with Estonian reform actors, compared to their Latvian counterparts at the beginning of the 1990s, and coupled with the political and institutional context, could explain the Estonian reformers’ decision to move towards integrating criteria favouring international competitiveness in a project-based funding system while Latvian reformers did not introduce these criteria. Similarly, a higher level of Western international knowledge resources with Lithuanian reformers compared to their Latvian counterparts can explain Lithuanian change actors’ motivation to undertake substantial changes in 2009 at the moment of national political change. At the same time, in Latvia, the changes were implemented incrementally and in a top-down method since 2005, as there has not been the emergence of a strong group of reformers with relevant knowledge resources.

 

It seems that actors’ knowledge resources gathered from different international contexts influence their intervention capacities in political processes and hence allow them to shape the institutional paths in given national contexts. Also, political and institutional contexts offer opportunities for change actors to use their resources to enact these changes. Hence, both the knowledge resources that actors have gathered from international environments and the motivation for their utilisation in national contexts need to be analysed in the context of the historical neo-institutionalism framework.

 

The results provide further understanding about the factors that have had a role in forming the differences in the Baltics’ research funding policy systems, and the given analysis can also contribute to better understanding the more general transformation in CEE innovation policies. The focus on the groups of reforms actors’ trajectories and their coalitions could better explain why some strongly pushed EU R&D policy objectives (such as private sector R&D specialisation or a socio-economically relevant public R&D system) are not fully implemented in the Baltics. Lastly, relative to long-term transformation in CEE policies, the Baltic cases expose the need to shift the focus from “eurocentrism” and to take multiple international change factors into account when explaining international impacts on local policy trajectories. The utilisation of different international contexts by change actors can explain the repertoire of solutions that are within the actors’ grasp.

 

Teele Tõnismann is, since 2014, a PhD student under the joint supervision of Sciences-Po Toulouse LaSSP and Tallinn University of Technology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance. She currently holds a prominent Estonian Government research scholarship: Kristjan Jaak.

 

References

Knoepfel, P., Corinne, L., Varone, F. et al. (2007) Public Policy Analysis. Bristol: Policy Press.

Mahoney, J. and Kathleen, T. (2010) Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. Cambridge: CUP.

Radosevic, S., Lepori B. (2009) “Public research funding systems in Central and Eastern Europe: between excellence and relevance: Introduction to special section”, Science and Public Policy, 36/9: 659-666.

Tõnismann, T. (2018) “Paths of Baltic States public research funding 1989–2010: Between institutional heritage and internationalisation”, Science and Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scy066

The post Paths of Baltic States’ public research funding 1989–2010: Between institutional heritage and internationalization appeared first on Ideas on Europe.