Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The global crisis in development cooperation will not be resolved by making exaggerated promises about what it is capable of achieving. Instead, the focus should be on improving people’s living conditions tangibly. Adding all kinds of secondary objectives often means that none of the goals can realistically be reached. Tightening resources are forcing projects to focus on more specific and narrow objectives.

The global crisis in development cooperation will not be resolved by making exaggerated promises about what it is capable of achieving. Instead, the focus should be on improving people’s living conditions tangibly. Adding all kinds of secondary objectives often means that none of the goals can realistically be reached. Tightening resources are forcing projects to focus on more specific and narrow objectives.

The global crisis in development cooperation will not be resolved by making exaggerated promises about what it is capable of achieving. Instead, the focus should be on improving people’s living conditions tangibly. Adding all kinds of secondary objectives often means that none of the goals can realistically be reached. Tightening resources are forcing projects to focus on more specific and narrow objectives.

Die weltweite Krise der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit lässt sich nicht durch Maximalversprechen im Hinblick auf die Leistungsfähigkeit dieses Politikfelds lösen. Hauptziel muss die Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen vor Ort bleiben – eine Überfrachtung mit Nebenzielen führt oft nur dazu, dass kein Ziel mehr realistisch erreicht werden kann. Immer knappere Ressourcen zwingen Projekte ohnehin, sich thematisch zu fokussieren.

Die weltweite Krise der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit lässt sich nicht durch Maximalversprechen im Hinblick auf die Leistungsfähigkeit dieses Politikfelds lösen. Hauptziel muss die Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen vor Ort bleiben – eine Überfrachtung mit Nebenzielen führt oft nur dazu, dass kein Ziel mehr realistisch erreicht werden kann. Immer knappere Ressourcen zwingen Projekte ohnehin, sich thematisch zu fokussieren.

Die weltweite Krise der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit lässt sich nicht durch Maximalversprechen im Hinblick auf die Leistungsfähigkeit dieses Politikfelds lösen. Hauptziel muss die Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen vor Ort bleiben – eine Überfrachtung mit Nebenzielen führt oft nur dazu, dass kein Ziel mehr realistisch erreicht werden kann. Immer knappere Ressourcen zwingen Projekte ohnehin, sich thematisch zu fokussieren.

Donald Trump ist es gelungen, Indiens Vertrauen in die USA im Eiltempo zu zerstören. Ein Vasall Washingtons will Neu Delhi nicht werden, analysiert ein Südasienwissenschaftler.

DIW-Studie untersucht Faktoren für Elektrolyse, bei der aus Wasser und Strom Wasserstoff entsteht – Wasserbedarf kann in der Regel gestillt werden – Zügiger Ausbau des Wasserstoffkernnetzes ermöglicht wasser- und stromsystemdienliche Elektrolysestandorte Trotz steigendem Wasserbedarf durch den ...

We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms' participation in international trade through global value chains (GVCs) for six lower middle income MENA countries and territories (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). Our findings add to the literature on “hidden protection” and corruption in the region: trade- and investment policies and regulations are tailored to benefit or protect politically connected firms. Our findings suggest that politically connected firms are more likely to participate in GVCs by 9.8 percentage points and that the intensity of their participation in GVCs increases by 4.1 percentage points. Combining political connections and grand corruption increases firms' participation in GVCs by 13.6 percentage points.

We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms' participation in international trade through global value chains (GVCs) for six lower middle income MENA countries and territories (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). Our findings add to the literature on “hidden protection” and corruption in the region: trade- and investment policies and regulations are tailored to benefit or protect politically connected firms. Our findings suggest that politically connected firms are more likely to participate in GVCs by 9.8 percentage points and that the intensity of their participation in GVCs increases by 4.1 percentage points. Combining political connections and grand corruption increases firms' participation in GVCs by 13.6 percentage points.

We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms' participation in international trade through global value chains (GVCs) for six lower middle income MENA countries and territories (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). Our findings add to the literature on “hidden protection” and corruption in the region: trade- and investment policies and regulations are tailored to benefit or protect politically connected firms. Our findings suggest that politically connected firms are more likely to participate in GVCs by 9.8 percentage points and that the intensity of their participation in GVCs increases by 4.1 percentage points. Combining political connections and grand corruption increases firms' participation in GVCs by 13.6 percentage points.

Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) are a rights-based management strategy that grants area-based fishing rights to specific community groups. In Ecuador, following immense mangrove deforestation caused by industrial shrimp farming, TURFs have been implemented through Mangrove Sustainable Use and Custody Agreements (AUSCEMs, for its Spanish acronym), driven by grassroots demands to conserve remaining mangroves and recognize ancestral territorial rights. This article examines the power-laden dynamics of these agreements in the Gulf of Guayaquil, Ecuador through ethnographic research in two fishing communities. We analyze historical and ongoing conflicts and reveal how multi-scalar power—across visible, hidden, and invisible forms—shapes access to and control over mangrove resources, often reinforcing inequalities and epistemic injustices. Our findings highlight how funding inequities, limited tenure security, and rising threats from organized crime compromise community-led conservation. For this management approach to succeed, it is essential to close funding gaps for stewardship and innovation, address security and service disparities, recognize local ecological knowledge, and fully honor ancestral territorial rights to promote equitable, sustainable governance.

Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) are a rights-based management strategy that grants area-based fishing rights to specific community groups. In Ecuador, following immense mangrove deforestation caused by industrial shrimp farming, TURFs have been implemented through Mangrove Sustainable Use and Custody Agreements (AUSCEMs, for its Spanish acronym), driven by grassroots demands to conserve remaining mangroves and recognize ancestral territorial rights. This article examines the power-laden dynamics of these agreements in the Gulf of Guayaquil, Ecuador through ethnographic research in two fishing communities. We analyze historical and ongoing conflicts and reveal how multi-scalar power—across visible, hidden, and invisible forms—shapes access to and control over mangrove resources, often reinforcing inequalities and epistemic injustices. Our findings highlight how funding inequities, limited tenure security, and rising threats from organized crime compromise community-led conservation. For this management approach to succeed, it is essential to close funding gaps for stewardship and innovation, address security and service disparities, recognize local ecological knowledge, and fully honor ancestral territorial rights to promote equitable, sustainable governance.

Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) are a rights-based management strategy that grants area-based fishing rights to specific community groups. In Ecuador, following immense mangrove deforestation caused by industrial shrimp farming, TURFs have been implemented through Mangrove Sustainable Use and Custody Agreements (AUSCEMs, for its Spanish acronym), driven by grassroots demands to conserve remaining mangroves and recognize ancestral territorial rights. This article examines the power-laden dynamics of these agreements in the Gulf of Guayaquil, Ecuador through ethnographic research in two fishing communities. We analyze historical and ongoing conflicts and reveal how multi-scalar power—across visible, hidden, and invisible forms—shapes access to and control over mangrove resources, often reinforcing inequalities and epistemic injustices. Our findings highlight how funding inequities, limited tenure security, and rising threats from organized crime compromise community-led conservation. For this management approach to succeed, it is essential to close funding gaps for stewardship and innovation, address security and service disparities, recognize local ecological knowledge, and fully honor ancestral territorial rights to promote equitable, sustainable governance.

Deutschland ist sicherer, als viele denken. Doch die Angst vor Kriminalität nimmt zu. Die gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Schäden sind enorm., In kaum einem Bereich klaffen subjektive Wahrnehmung und objektive Fakten so weit auseinander wie bei der Kriminalität. Während sich manche Menschen in Deutschland unsicher fühlen und Angst vor wachsender Gewalt äußern, zeichnen die Statistiken oft ein anderes Bild: Die Kriminalität ist – mit ...