Diplomacy & Crisis News

At the Reagan National Defense Forum last month, United States Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo gave seemingly conflicting statements on the purpose of AI regulation, her stance on the U.S. relationship with China, and the continued development of artificial intelligence. Rather than focus on enabling U.S. development of AI, she threatened companies with lost revenue due to regulations while saying the United States should maintain its AI lead. She compared the U.S. relationship with China with that of the Soviet Union while claiming she doesn’t want “tension.” This comes after her department was greatly empowered by Biden’s recent executive order on AI—an important role that requires trust and a level head.

Raimondo’s statements came with a jibe directed at tech companies who lost money to her capricious regulations. “I know there are CEOs of chip companies in this audience who are a little cranky,” she said, “[be]cause they’re losing revenue. Such is life”. Not only is it unbecoming that of all government officials, the Commerce Secretary would be this actively hostile to industry, but that hostility also risks creating an uncertain environment for AI investment in the United States—a grave error for an industry Raimondo correctly cites as one of the most important for our national security.

Secretary Raimondo, who heads the department that has already once banned the export of chips designed to meet her requirements, then complained that it was “not productive” for Nvidia to respect export controls again by creating new chips below the latest thresholds. These thresholds, designed to restrict extremely high-performance chips, are primarily objective metrics of compute power measured in FLOPS, or “floating point operations per second.” The Commerce Department restricts chips with performance above these thresholds, indicating that those under it are deemed acceptable for export by the United States. Despite this, the strategy of the Commerce Department does not seem to be setting this threshold where they want it to be — or they simply don’t have the understanding to develop consistent thresholds and are setting reactionary regulations. Raimondo claimed that if manufacturers design a chip too close to the threshold—even if it’s still below it—“I’m going to control it the very next day.” This statement hinted at a potential export ban on Nvidia’s upcoming H20 chip, designed in good faith to comply with current regulations.

Such a ban would constitute enormous waste, both of design time and manufacturing, but that doesn’t seem to faze Raimondo, who boasts that “Every time I take an action, it denies them revenue.” Deny them the revenue it has, with the impacts of one regulation on the U.S.-based Nvidia estimated at $400 Million. That’s money that, were it not for the government’s intervention, could be reinvested into furthering chip development and increasing the U.S.’s lead in this technology. It’s difficult to ascribe any motivation to this destructive ambiguity from regulators short of active hostility to business from the Commerce Secretary.

Secretary Raimondo is not only inconsistent on export policy but also on foreign relations as a whole. At the same fireside chat, just minutes after recommending “Cold War” tactics on export controls, Raimondo turned to discuss ties with China, saying, “We have no interest in tension”—not quite the message sent by Cold War rhetoric. Raimondo phrased her export bans as “denying an entire country” access to technology, saying, “We’re going to continue to go in that direction.” This denial of technology to China also denies technology to smaller U.S. companies that can’t afford to train their Large Language Models but can use large “open weights” models released by Chinese researchers. While this may not be a major factor in the current day, with top open-weight models like Mistral and Llama 2 coming out of Western nations, any blow to open-source AI stifles innovation and benefits Sam Altman’s OpenAI, which will have less competition in the space of very large models like ChatGPT.

Raimondo cites an agreeable goal for this policy, stating, “We’re a couple years ahead of China, no way are we gonna let them catch up.” It is, indeed, essential for the United States to retain its lead in this vital technology over China, however useful their contributions may be. But not being caught requires continuing development. Raimondo also railed against the “effective acceleration” (“e/acc”) movement, mainly composed of software and AI engineers who believe in advancing AI development. She said, “There’s a view in Silicon Valley, you know, this ‘move fast and break things,’ effective acceleration. We can’t embrace that with AI, it’s too dangerous.” If Raimondo truly believes this technology is too dangerous, it’s all the more critical to maintain our lead over China—and if it’s not, then we shouldn’t slow down the development of a technology that is already improving outcomes in fields like healthcare.

Perhaps if Raimondo believes in maintaining our lead in AI, she should spend less time railing against the U.S. companies and engineers and leave them room to invest more time and money into staying ahead — something best done without vague threats of regulation and lost revenue hanging over the heads of American companies.

Dylan Dean is a software engineer with degrees in Electrical and Computer Engineering and an advocate for the decentralization of emerging technologies.

Image: Lev Radin / Shutterstock.com.

Russia's Last November-class Submarine Took a Road Trip - In October 2022, a 352-foot-long "Whale" was transported through the streets of Kronstadt near Saint Petersburg, Russia. It wasn't a literal whale but was rather the sole surviving Project 627 Kit (Russian for "Whale"). Known by the NATO reporting name "November," it was the Soviet Union's first class of nuclear-powered attack submarines, which had been in service from 1958 to 1990.

The K-3, which had been at the Nerpa shipyard since 2005, was prepared for its final voyage that included being placed on a floating dock, operated by the Russian Ministry of Defense's Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), where it sailed from the Barents Sea coast via the White Sea and the inner waterways to Kronstadt.

According to The Barents Observer, the floating dock, commissioned at the Zeleodolsk shipyard by the Volga River in 2015, was specially designed for sailing Russia’s inner waterways, including the White Sea Chanel that was built by Soviet prisoners in Karelia during the Stalin era.

The K-3 Leninsky Komsomol, built in 1957, was the Soviet Union's first-ever nuclear submarine. It was developed as part of an effort to counter the United States Navy's USS Nautilus (SSN-571), the world's first nuclear-powered sub.

More than 135 Soviet organizations, including 20 design bureaus, 35 research institutes, and 80 works, participated in the design and construction of this completely new type of submarine in 1952–1958.

Interestingly, the lead vessel of the Project 627 was prototyped in wood, with each of five segments scattered between five different locations around Leningrad, including the Astoria Hotel. The K-3 submarine was subsequently built in Molotovsk, and launched in August 1957.  It was commissioned the following year as part of the Soviet Navy's Northern Fleet.

The torpedo-shaped boat displaced more than 4,000 tons submerged and more than 100 meters long. Seventy-four seamen and thirty officers divided in the K-3's nine compartments, made up the boat's crew.

Despite the issues with the boats, the K-3 reached the North Pole underwater in June 1962, the first Soviet boat to achieve the feat – and just four years after the USS Nautilus.

Though the submarine suffered a fire five years later while transiting the Norwegian Sea, resulting in the death of 39 crew members, the boat was repaired and remained in service until 1988 – seeing three decades of service.

The K-3 served as the prototype submarine for a total of 12 similar subs (Project 627A) that were subsequently built, including the K-159 that sank north of Murmansk in 2003
As previously reported, the Project 627 submarines were seen excellent attack vessels. Once in range, one of these boats could strike with 533mm SET-65 or 53-65K torpedoes; yet while they were technically more powerful than their American counterparts, the Soviet subs were extremely noisy. As a result, the Project 627 vessels were easily detected and could therefore not be employed in submarine hunting operations. 

Another major flaw the boats possessed was the overall lack of safety measures. Crew members were often sickened by the ship's lack of radiation shielding. Multiple incidents plagued the various November-class submarines over the years.

After being taken out of service in 1988, the retired submarine was moved to the Nerpa shipyard in 2005, and a few years later, the work on cutting out the reactor compartment began. The nuclear reactor compartment was removed, and as a result, the restored boat is actually a bit shorter.

The boat had to be carefully moved through the streets of Kronstadt and is now scheduled to be preserved as a museum – a testament to the first Soviet nuclear-powered submarine.

There has been speculation that the Soviet-era sub was saved only because of the efforts made to preserve the USS Nautilus, which was decommissioned in 1980 and designated a National Historic Landmark in 1982. The former U.S. Navy submarine has been preserved as a museum ship at the Submarine Force Library and Museum in Groton, Connecticut, where the vessel receives around 250,000 visitors per year.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary: The article traces the history of German submarines from World War II to the modern era, focusing on the highly capable Type 212A submarines. Developed by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG (HDW) for the German and Italian navies, the Type 212A introduced Fuel Cell Air Independent Power (AIP) technology, enabling silent cruising and extended submerged operations. These submarines have become an integral part of the German Navy, expanding its operational range to Northern Europe, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean Sea. The article also previews the future Type 212CD submarines, featuring improved sensors, extended range, and reduced acoustic presence for covert missions.

The Imperial German Navy (Kaiserliche Marine) was among the earliest pioneers of submarine warfare, and the first to operate submarines successfully on a large scale in wartime. During World War II, the Kriegsmarine further expanded its use of submarines – where they were a major component of the Battle of the Atlantic.

Germany's U-boats successfully operated far from its home waters, as far as the southern African coasts and even into the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. By the end of the war, almost 3,000 Allied ships (175 warships; 2,825 merchant ships) had been sunk by U-boat torpedoes.

Today, the modern German Navy (Deutsche Marine) operates a far smaller number of submarines, but these are considered highly capable boats that could quickly confront an adversary's surface fleet or ballistic missile submarines.

Barred from having submarines in the Bundesmarine after World War II until 1960, West Germany lagged in the development of submarines. Beginning with the Type 201 submarines – the first U-boat class built after the Second World War – there has been renewed focus on submarines that has continued into the 21st century.

The current generation of Deutsche Marine submarines is the Type-212A (aka U-212A) has earned a reputation as a reliable and advanced submarine. Developed by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG (HDW) for the German and Italian navies (as the Torado-class for Italy), the Type-212A was the first to make use of Fuel Cell AIP (Air Independent Power).

The submarines can operate at high speed on diesel power yet switch to the AIP system for silent cruising at slow speed. It can also stay submerged for up to three weeks with little exhaust heat­making the Type-212A virtually undetectable.

The German Navy has boasted that it is the quietest submarine in operation today, and a total of six Type 212A U-boats were commissioned between 2004 and 2015.

As the German Navy has expanded its operating area to cover the waters of Northern Europe, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean Sea, the Type-212A has been crucial­allowing Germany to operate in the littoral areas as well as the open sea. The submarines are also equipped with a highly integrated command and weapons control system that interfaces with the sensors, weapons, and navigation systems.

The Type-212A offers an even greater range, diving depth, and displacement than its predecessor submarines while being equipped with improved communications systems and reconnaissance capabilities. In support of the modernization efforts, the sixth Type-212A submarines in service have also been equipped with land-attack capability. The first of the improved class, U-32 is approximately 183 feet long with a beam of nearly twenty-two feet. It has a draught of nineteen feet.

Notably, that the Type-212A boats are manned by just five officers and twenty-two sailors, and the submarine features two decks­which was able to provide additional sleeping and living space and the end of "warm bunking." The boat's torpedo area is even reported to be spacious enough that it is no longer necessary to divide the interior to reload weapons.

Torpedoes are still the primary weapon, and the Type-212A features six 533-millimeter torpedo tubes. The tubes are positioned in two rows of three, four pointing slightly to the left while two tubes point to the right. Additionally, the submarines can be used to deploy German special operations forces through the torpedo tubes. While the German Navy may only have six of these Type-212A boats in operation these are quite a powerful and quiet boat that has the ability to operate in brown, green and blue water environments.

Germany has already begun to look beyond the Type 212A U-boats, while Norway has begun constructing identical submarines to boost their maritime defense and strengthen military collaboration. Dubbed the 212CD, the vessel will be based on the well-established Type 212A operated by the German Navy and the Italian Navy.

A total of six 212CDs are now being constructed as part of a contract worth 5.5 billion euros ($5.9 billion) signed in 2021. Two of the advanced submarines under construction will be handed over to Berlin, while four will be delivered to the Norwegian Navy beginning in 2029.

The new submarine will be significantly larger than its predecessor, measuring 73 meters (240 feet) compared to the earlier version's 56 meters (184 feet). Moreover, the 212CD will boast a displacement of 2,500 cubic meters (88,286 cubic feet), as compared to the 1,450 tons of the 212A.

The future vessels will be equipped with improved sensors, an extended operational range, and reduced acoustic presence to support covert operations.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org 

Although both the House and Senate leaderships have agreed to a top-line budget of $1.59 trillion (with an additional “side deal” of $79 billion) for fiscal year 2024, there remains the requirement to pass the remaining eight appropriations bills to avoid a partial government shutdown. With time running out before a shutdown, Congress will likely have to pass another Continuing Resolution that would last long enough for the appropriations bills to pass. Critically, however, even if all the appropriations bills were signed into law before January 19, when the first tranche of bills must pass, Congress would not yet have passed legislation to provide additional funding for Ukraine.

The Biden administration’s October supplemental appropriations request for $106 billion, upon which Congress has yet to act, consists of funding to provide additional military and economic support to Ukraine, assistance to Israel and Taiwan, and resources for border protection programs. Funding for Ukraine, which totals $61.4 billion, is by far the largest item in the supplemental request. The defense-related aid package, the most critical element of the Ukraine-related request, amounts to over $44.4 billion for items in the DoD operations and maintenance accounts. These provide for, among other things, personnel support, intelligence analysis, flying hours, replacement of defense materiel sent to Ukraine, reimbursement for services provided to Ukraine, and defense production capacity expansion. The administration is requesting an additional $6 billion in the DoD procurement account, consisting of funds to increase the production of missile systems and critical munitions, for ship depot maintenance, for cybersecurity, and for some classified programs.

Late in December, with Congress failing to act on his supplemental request, President Joe Biden announced yet another drawdown of military equipment for Ukraine. It was the fifty-fourth such drawdown since 2021. The DoD reported that the latest drawdown consisted of air defense capabilities, artillery, antitank weapons, and other equipment totaling $250 million.

While certainly to be welcomed, the sum involved is but a tiny fraction of Ukraine’s urgent requirements and, indeed, what the supplemental calls for. Moreover, reportedly, the drawdown is likely to be the last of its kind, so that absent the passage of the supplemental, even the trickle of military aid to Ukraine will come to a complete halt.

The supplemental’s fate depends not so much on congressional attitudes toward supporting Ukraine, though these have slowly cooled since the Russians invaded the country in February 2022, but rather on whether Congress can reach an agreement on funding and policies for border control. Even if such an agreement could be reached and the supplemental approved, it is not at all certain that the Administration could push through a follow-on supplemental later this year.

Ukraine is no longer the center of media and public attention. Moreover, to the extent foreign policy will be a major issue in the presidential election campaign, it is more likely to focus on the Middle East—especially with Israel still at war—and on China, whose aggression in the South China Sea is unlikely to diminish, rather than on the war in Europe. Moreover, Ukraine’s failure to achieve anything like a decisive result in its much-ballyhooed spring counteroffensive has also dampened congressional enthusiasm, especially among an increasing number of Republicans who question whether it is worth continuing to spend large sums to support Kyiv.

Clearly, should no additional supplemental funding be forthcoming, Ukraine will find itself entirely dependent on European and other allies for equipment, logistics support, and training. Since Washington has provided roughly half of all military funding to support Ukraine, the absence of American support would jeopardize Ukraine’s chances of retaining the territory it currently controls, much less adding to it.

Indeed, in recent days, Russian forces have slowly seized some additional Ukrainian territory, west and south of Marinka near Donetsk City as well as southwest of the city near Novomikhailivka. The Russian objective remains to take control of all of Donetsk and Luhansk to strengthen its claim to the two rebellious provinces. Though Russia has lost most of the forces that initially attacked Ukraine, it has replenished them with a mélange of older and younger draftees. Ultimately, Russian forces vastly outnumber those of Ukraine, and Putin has shown no compunction about employing a meatgrinder strategy if that is what it takes both to block Ukrainian advances and to inch Russian forces forward. While Ukrainian forces have generally kept Russian troops at bay until now, it will be much harder for them to do so if American assistance dries up.

Putin is determined to stay the course and prosecute his war, in President Biden’s words, “for as long as it takes.” Staying the course means, at a minimum, pursuing Russian operations until after the American presidential election, from which Putin surely hopes that Donald Trump, who has no interest in supporting Ukraine, will emerge victorious. Congressional reluctance to fund additional military support for Ukraine would only further encourage Putin to resist any overtures for a negotiated solution to the war.

In the absence of American support for Ukraine, the odds that Russia will achieve its objectives will rise dramatically. It could either ingest all of Ukraine in one fell swoop or bite off a portion of the country, leaving it as little more than a rump state, which Moscow could ultimately swallow much as Hitler swallowed post-Sudetenland Czechoslovakia. Moreover, like Hitler, Putin is unlikely to remain satisfied with absorbing Ukraine into what he considers to be historical Russia. Moldova would probably be next. And then, if Trump makes good on his promise to re-evaluate American participation in NATO should he return to the White House, one or more of the Baltic states would be sure to follow.

There is no predicting the outcome of the November elections. If a month is a long time in politics, ten months is even more so. Still, the specter of an indifferent America led by Donald Trump should worry all legislators who care about the future of a free Europe and what the loss of that freedom would mean for the United States. For that reason, Congress should fund the supplemental as soon as President Biden signs the various appropriations bills that will come before him in the next weeks. And Biden, in turn, should request yet another follow-on supplemental.

The stakes for the United States are simply too high for America to turn a blind eye to a war that could spread well beyond the borders of Ukraine and ultimately threaten both American world leadership and its national security.

Dov S. Zakheim is Vice Chairman of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a member of The National Interest Advisory Board. He is a former Under Secretary of Defense and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.

Image: Shutterstock. 

Sweden is Developing an Advanced Submarine - Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union had the largest fleet of submarines in the world, as well as the largest in world naval history. Today, the Russian Navy is essentially a shell of its former self, but its submarines are still considered capable and that is a fact that has worried NATO leaders for years. Soon, however, the international alliance will have another member state that will help counter Russia's submarine force – namely Sweden.

It was announced in late June 2022 that Sweden, along with Finland, had been formally invited to join NATO, and that news coincided with the word that a keel laying ceremony was held for HMS Blekinge, the first two of two A26 type submarines now on order for the Royal Swedish Navy.

The Keel Laying Ceremony for HSwMS Blekinge took place at Saab's shipyard in Karlskrona. In attendance were representatives from the Swedish Navy.

The A26 program was formally launched in 2015 after FMV (Swedish Defence Materiel Administration) placed an order for two new generation submarines for the Royal Swedish Navy. Each of the Blekinge -class boats will be 65m in length, and the modern submarines will have a surfaced displacement of 2,000 tonnes (2,200 tons). The boats will be equipped with a Stirling AIP and can dive for more than 18 days.

The standard complement will reportedly consist of 26 sailors, but it can accommodate up to 35 sailors including commandos and other passengers.

HMS Blekinge is expected to be delivered to the Swedish Navy in 2027 while the second submarine, HMS Skåne, is set to be delivered in 2028. Construction began in 2015 at Saab's Kockum Shipyard, in the southwest of the country, and according to a report from international analytics firm GlobalData, the contract allocation for the conventionally powered boats is worth $731 million.

According to a December 2023 report from Naval-Technology, the A26 submarine's modular hull structure is made from special steel, which was developed to offer high-seakeeping performance and operational effectiveness. In addition, the boats' X-rudder configuration with four independently controlled control surfaces is meant to provide high maneuverability, while the subs will require low operating and maintenance costs.

Saab has also expressly stated it is "currently constructing the world's most advanced conventional submarine" – and that includes its stealth technology, notably the Sterling Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system, which can enable the diesel-powered vessels to spend longer periods underwater without having to surface to recharge batteries.

As previously reported, the A26 program also makes use of Saab's Ghost stealth technology – the Genuine HOlistic Stealth – which is even quieter than their upgraded Gotland-class submarine.

"This incredibly low acoustic signature is achieved through a variety of means. The Blekinge-class makes use of rubberized mounts and baffles inside the submarine to reduce noise cause by on-board machinery or crew. Additionally, frames within the sub are filled with 'acoustic damping plates' that absorb ambient sound from within the submarine," noted Caleb Larson for TNI.

Sweden may not be the only operator of the advanced conventionally-powered boats.

A modified export variant of the A26 program – designated the C718 design – has been proposed for the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN). It would feature a larger hull diameter, increased length, and greater displacement.

In addition, the A26 Blekinge submarines have been offered to the Polish Navy as a possible choice for the "Orka" modernization program.

In addition to the Blekinge-class boats that will eventually enter service by the end of the decade, Sweden currently has three Gotland-class submarines, which were built between 1992 and 1997. Stockholm is currently undertaking mid-life upgrade (MLU) modernization efforts on the submarines of the class to extend the service lives of those vessels. It was the first operational submarine class in the world to use air-independent propulsion in the form of Stirling engines which use liquid oxygen and diesel as the propellant.

The Royal Swedish Navy further continues to operate two of the original four Västergötland -class submarines dating from the 1980s, while two others were sold to Singapore. Two other submarines were also launched as part of the Västergötland-class, but have since re-launched after an extensive modernization in 2003 and 2004 as the   Södermanland- class. HSwMS Södermanland (Söd) and HSwMS Östergötland (Ögd) are expected to remain in service at least until the Blekinge-class are commissioned.

All of the Swedish submarines will likely play an important role in countering Russian aggression in the Baltic Sea, which could increasingly become a NATO-controlled lake.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. 

Main Image is from Saab. All others are Creative Commons. 

Summary: This analysis discusses the continuous evolution of the Leopard 2 main battle tank (MBT) since its introduction in 1979, focusing on the modernized Leopard 2A7 variant. This advanced MBT features significant upgrades, including enhanced armor, improved energy systems, crew comfort enhancements, and a state-of-the-art weapon and battlefield management system. The article also highlights key specifications and features of the Leopard 2A7, such as its weaponry, protection systems, and mobility enhancements. Furthermore, the author distinguishes between the Leopard 2A7 and the 2A7+ models, with the latter being optimized for urban combat and fortified against RPGs and mines.

Since being introduced into service with the West German military in 1979, the Leopard 2 main battle tank (MBT) has earned significant praise as one of the best in the world. As the successor to the Leopard 1, the German-made tank has been adopted by allied and partner nations around the world.

The platform has been steadily upgraded and improved, so much so that the latest variations are now practically tailor-made for specific roles. This includes the Leopard 2A7, a modernized version of the Leopard 2A6 MBT. It is equipped with new armor, an energy system, a crew compartment cooling system, and a new weapon/battlefield engagement/management system.

The 2A7 variant includes hull mine protection, a 17 kw Auxiliary Power Unit, a third-generation Attica thermal imaging unit for both Commander's Independent Sight and Gunners Sight, and a Spectus multi-spectral driver's vision device. The MBT's weapon system was also adapted for firing HE ammunition.

According to Army Recognition, the main armament of the Leopard 2A7 is similar to the Leopard 2A6 and consists of one L/55 120mm Rh 120 smoothbore gun, one MG3A1 7.62x51mm caliber coaxial machine gun, and a 7.62 mm MG3 machine gun mounted on loader hatch located on the left side of the roof turret. Eight 76mm smoke grenade dischargers are mounted on each side of the turret. The weapon system was further adapted for firing DM11 high-explosive (HE) rounds with an adjustable fuse.

The Leopard 2A7 is equipped with a collective NRBC system, power pack preheating, a crew compartment heater, a fire extinguishing system, electric bilge pumps, and an escape hatch in the hull floor, located behind the driver. To increase the comfort of the crew in hot and humid regions, the Leopard 2A7 is equipped with an energy system and crew compartment cooling system installed at the rear of the turret.

The first Leopard 2A7 was handed over to the German Army in Munich in December 2014, with more than a dozen vehicles produced for Tank Battalion 203, while an additional four went to the Armored Corps Training Center and another to the Technical School for Land Systems and School for Technology of the Army.

There has been no shortage of confusion over the differences between the Leopard 2A7 and the 2A7+. However, it is important to note that while similar and based on the initial Leopard 2 design, the 2A7 variant was not optimized for urban combat.

This is where the 2A7+ model comes into play – as it was developed specifically to operate both in low-intensity and high-intensity conflicts. The MBT's tank's protection was increased by modular armor, while the frontal protection was enhanced via a dual kit on the turret and hull front, providing 360-degree protection against RPGs and mine protection to increase the survivability of the tank and its crew in urban operations.

The modular armor's system components were first employed by the Canadian military in Afghanistan. As with the 2A7, the 2A7+ variant can fire programmable High Explosive munitions, while the turret-mounted MG3 has been replaced with a stabilized FLW 200 remotely controlled weapon station.

Mobility, sustainability, and situational awareness have also been improved. The is equipped with an exterior telephone for dismounted personnel to aid in communication with friendly forces.

Last year, after the Czech Republic had donated the last of its Soviet-designed T-72 tanks to Ukraine, Prague announced plans to acquire the latest Leopard 2A7+ MBTs from Berlin.

Last summer, Hungary also received the first of its Leopard 2A7HU models, the configuration equipped with a new fire control system and remote weapon station as well as reinforced roof protection. In 2018, Budapest ordered a total of 44 Leopard 2A7 tanks and an additional 12 Leopard 2A4s from existing Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) stocks to the Hungarian Defense Forces for training purposes.

The deal was part of an effort to replace its Soviet-era arms, and the Leopard 2 tanks in their newest configuration, dubbed 2A7HU, were also slated to replace Russian-made T-72s.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in some of the largest tank engagements since the Second World War.

Throughout the conflict, Russia has suffered tank losses that many analysts consider staggering, given the perceived disparity in equipment, manpower, and training at the outset of the war. 

Many of these losses have not come during large tank engagements. Instead, they result from Russia’s apparent inability to conduct combined arms warfare.

Tanks may appear to be unstoppable machines, but when left unsupported by infantry, air cover, and artillery fire they are very vulnerable. 

This video from the fall of last year shows one such tank, apparently alone on the road, being attacked by kamikaze drones. 

The tank showed in the video is a T-90M. This is one of the newer variants of the T-90, a line of tanks first introduced in 1992 and now serving as Russia’s main battle tank. Originally, the T-90 was designed to replace three tanks then in service with the Soviet armed forces: the T-64, T-72, and T-80.

Each of these tanks was created and manufactured by a different firm, leading to a huge logistical burden as almost none of their parts were interchangeable. 

While the overall design of the T-90 is derived from the T-72, several upgrades have made it a capable, modern tank. The M variant was introduced in 2016 and has major advantages over previous designs. Its turret is welded instead of cast, increasing its armor capabilities.

Four cameras mounted on the exterior of the tank increase the commander’s situational awareness by providing a 360 degree view. An upgraded fire control system combined with enhanced gunner’s sights aid in engaging targets. Upgraded armor, to include explosive reactive armor, and infrared jammers increase the tank’s survivability. In all, the T-90 is an impressive machine. 

These upgrades were apparently not enough for the crew, however, as the tank can be seen covered in sandbags. This form of up-armoring is as nearly as old as tanks themselves. There are many iconic photos of the Sherman tanks of the U.S. Army stacked high with sandbags, logs, spare tracks, and even concrete. The idea is that anti-tank rounds will detonate against the exterior armor instead of the steel of the tank itself, potentially saving the crew from what would otherwise be a deadly blow. In practice, however, most extra armor is only somewhat beneficial against slower rounds. Against modern, armor-piercing munitions, it is little more than ornamentation. 

The current conflict in Ukraine is not the first drone war, but it has resulted in serious innovations in drone warfare. The video above is a good example of how first-person view drones are used in kamikaze attacks on Russian equipment. Drone teams usually operate by using one machine as a spotter, finding likely targets and guiding the attack drone in. Operators in Ukraine have become skilled at targeting the weak points on Russian vehicles. The attack in the video shows the drone striking the rear of the tank, a vulnerable location where the engine sits.

Russia’s loss of tanks is proceeding at an alarming rate. The T-90 is their mainstay tank. Only the T-14 Armata is more advanced, and this war has exposed it as a paper tiger. As the conflict has progressed, Russia has had to field older tanks that are not nearly as capable as the T-90.

Battlefield observers have spotted T-64s, T-72s, and T-80s, the three tanks the T-90 was meant to replace.

Earlier last year, analysts even saw a T-62, a tank that dates back to the 1960s.

#Ukraine: A Russian T-90M tank with "special" sandbag addon armour was hit by a FPV loitering munition of the Ukrainian 11th National Guard Brigade East of Oleshky, #Kherson Oblast- leading to the detonation of ammunition onboard and a turret toss. pic.twitter.com/g86gR4QHrw

— ???????? Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) September 13, 2023

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: This article delves into the persistent threats and belligerent actions coming from North Korea toward the United States, Japan, and South Korea, with a specific focus on its nuclear arsenal and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities. It offers insights into the historical context of North Korea's nuclear program, its withdrawal from the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and its extensive nuclear testing. Moreover, the article sheds light on North Korea's suspected offensive chemical and biological weapons program, which dates back to the 1960s and includes the acquisition of dangerous agents like anthrax, cholera, and bubonic plague. 

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s government has threatened nuclear war and kinetic war with Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. in recent months. Pyongyang has also increased the pace of missile launches in the region, indicating that the nation is willing and capable of provoking its adversaries.

While analysts mostly focus on the threat of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, Pyongyang’s arsenal of chemical and Biological weapons is also a worry. 

North Korea turned to the Soviet Union after World War Two to give its nuclear program a start. It paid dividends when the USSR built the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, finishing construction by the mid-1960s.

North Korea did ratify the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, but it did not abide by the Treaty for very long, withdrawing officially in 2003. Since that time, Pyongyang has carried out several increasingly sophisticated nuclear tests.

In addition to its nuclear stockpiles, the DPRK is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and is believed to oversee an offensive biological and chemical weapons program. 

According to author Robert Collins, a former intelligence analyst with the U.S. Forces Korea Command, Pyongyang started to research biological weapons in the 1960s. Around this time, a germ weapons research organization was developed under the National Defense Science Institute, which led to the DPRK’s acquisition of anthrax, cholera and the bubonic plague. In an interview with The Hill, Collins added that Pyongyang’s hackers endanger South Korean chemical plants: “These hackers have also hacked into South Korea’s Chemical Accident Response Information system for the purpose of understanding where the South’s chemical plants are located and how much damage would result locally if they were subject to explosions.”

Seoul outlined the DPRK’s possession of anthrax, smallpox, and the plague in a 2018 white paper released by South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense. Analysts believe that North Korea in a future war could weaponize its stocks of phosgene, sarin, mustard and V-type chemical agents. At least 12 facilities are believed to be responsible for developing these chemical agents, according to industry experts.  

According to IHS Jane, a 2017 analysis of Pyongyang’s biological weapons capabilities cites the following evidence:

-“On 17 June (2015), the RoK MND issued a report that stated North Korea possesses an assortment of biological agents - including anthrax and smallpox - and the ability to weaponize them within 10 days. The report also stated that the North did not yet possess warheads to employ bioweapons.”

-“During June 2015 North Korea announced that it has created a vaccine, known as Kumdang-2, that could treat Ebola, HIV, ‘a number of cancers,’ and MERS. Kumdang-2 was reportedly manufactured from ginseng grown in fertilizer made from ‘rare-earth elements’ and ‘micro-quantities of gold and platinum.’ Most serious researchers have significant reservations concerning these claims.”

-“In the aftermath of Kim Jong-nam's death in February 2017 due to toxic nerve agent VX, South Korea's MND was quoted by Yonhap News Agency as saying that North Korea's military is probably operating a regiment-level biochemical weapons unit.”

As Pyongyang continues to make nuclear threats, a detailed analysis of the country’s true nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities is important. But its stockpiles of chemical weapons should also be considered a grave threat.

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. You can email the author at Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: North Korean State Media. 

Summary: The article discusses North Korea's global reputation as a troublemaker due to its threats and nuclear program. Despite its small size and underdevelopment, North Korea maintains a large military, including 200,000 special operations forces, a significant proportion compared to its total military size. These special forces consist of various units, including airborne, reconnaissance, light infantry, and maritime forces, with the ability to infiltrate and disrupt enemy territories. While their capabilities are acknowledged, experts debate the overall proficiency of North Korean special forces, considering the country's military standards. 

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), known by most of the world as North Korea, has long been a troublemaker on the global stage.

With constant threats against its Southern neighbor, general saber-rattling, and a growing nuclear program, it creates constant pressure on the U.S.-led world order. 

While it is a small, underdeveloped nation by nearly every metric, it nonetheless possesses one of the largest standing armies in the world, counting 1.3 million soldiers in its ranks.

Perhaps more impressive are North Korea's special operations forces, or special forces, which experts estimate at 200,000 soldiers. This may not seem like very many compared to the total size of its force, but consider that it means 15 percent of the country’s soldiers belong to the special forces as opposed to only 3 percent of the U.S. military. 

The Special Forces moniker usually encompasses an array of specialized units and teams. For example, Special Operations Command in the U.S. military encompasses everything from Army Green Berets who specialize in unconventional warfare such as training a partner military how best to deal with an insurgency to Navy SEALs who perform high-stakes missions like hostage rescue.

North Korea’s Special Forces also encompass several different units. Their airborne forces use old Antonov An-2 aircraft to carry out infiltration and assault missions. First introduced in 1947, this venerable craft is capable of both airdropping units as well as landing on remote stretches of highway to allow infiltration. The Reconnaissance Brigades operate similarly to the Spetsnaz of the former Soviet Union, training to infiltrate South Korea and then using direct action to attack and destroy key targets across South Korea in an attempt to cripple its economy and industry and disrupt command and control in the event of war.

Light Infantry Battalions of the DPRK are a more typical version of the Reconnaissance Brigades. These lightly armed and armored troops advance ahead of conventional forces using stealth and speed to strike behind enemy lines to disrupt communication and infiltrate rear areas. Finally, the Maritime arm of the DPRK Special Forces is thought to operate somewhere in between the Light Infantry and Reconnaissance forces, infiltrating along the coast to carry out attacks behind enemy lines. North Korea’s fleet of submarines, including 24 Romeo-class diesel boats as well as at least 45 midget submarines make an ideal platform for covertly inserting these forces. 

Size isn’t the only factor on the battlefield and just because the DPRK is fielding a large number of special operators does not mean they are up to snuff. While the U.S. Department of Defense has acknowledged that “North Korean SOF personnel are among the most highly trained, well equipped, best-fed, and highly motivated forces in the KPA.” Given the state of DPRK forces, this is not a high bar to clear, however, South Korean and American planners certainly are aware of the threat these forces pose.

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. You can email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: North Korean state media. 

In November 1896, the popular weekly British magazine “Punch” published one of its regular satirical caricatures. Titled “Turkey Limited,” it announced the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire into a limited company in an attempt to rein in the Sultan’s poor finances. In the caricature, a perplexed Sultan Abdul Hamid II reads the news from a prospectus on some wall and ponders the benefits he will receive from such a development. 

Arcane to modern audiences, the caricature laid bare the poor state of the Ottoman Empire—centered in modern-day Turkey—and its gradual fall from a geopolitical powerhouse after the capture of Constantinople and the defeat of the Byzantine Empire to the “Sick Man of Europe,” as it would be known following the publication of that November 1896 edition of the Punch. 

Today, almost 130 years after British and European audiences laughed at the expense of the poor Sultan, Turkey finds itself in a similar position but now as the sick man of NATO.

Over the past eight years, Turkey has been steadily moving away from the United States and the West. Looking back, the failed coup d’etat against Erdogan in 2016 was the tipping point for the relations between Turkey and the West. 

Whether stemming from a desire to chart a more independent foreign policy course or out of mistrust for Washington, NATO, and Europe, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has managed to offend neighbors and allies with alarming ease while at the same time cozying up with pariah states and terrorist organizations, including Iran, Russia, and Hamas. 

In a relatively short amount of time, Turkey purchased S-400 air defense systems from Moscow, got expelled from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, launched aerial and naval incursions against Greece, threatening war with a fellow NATO member, continued to militarize the illegal state of Northern Cyprus, and harbored terrorist leaders from Hamas. 

Although the Turkish economy has somewhat stabilized, it faces challenging times ahead, making large-scale defense spending and manufacturing much harder for Ankara. 

But as a NATO member, Turkey continues to wield power and influence in the transatlantic alliance. Its recalcitrance to Finland’s and Sweden’s membership bids following the Russian invasion of Ukraine wasted precious time. With Erdogan in power for the foreseeable future and no reasonable alternatives in the opposition, Turkey will likely continue down the path of anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism until something breaks. 

Patience in NATO for a member that is acting as an adversary is running low. Turkey is a powerful country and regional player. Utmost efforts need to be made to ensure that it remains within the West. But its behavior is quickly outweighing its usefulness to the United States and NATO.

Once the sick man of Europe, Turkey is now the sick man of NATO. And as strong organisms often force out weak parts in order to survive, NATO should consider expelling weak links that hold it behind and run against its ideals and policies. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

Another year, and the war in Ukraine continues.

Both sides are in a difficult position, but Kyiv is in a more difficult position than Moscow right now. The Ukrainian counteroffensive failed, and Kyiv must now revitalize interest in its cause among the United States and the rest of its Western partners. 

So, what should the Ukrainian strategy be for 2024? What New Year resolutions should the Ukrainian leadership make?

Now, after the failed Ukrainian counteroffensive and subsequent failed Russian offensive, the two sides are once more in a state of relative stalemate.

To make things clear, the war in Ukraine hasn’t—at least yet—reached a stalemate. The two sides haven’t exhausted their means, and the upcoming spring and summer fighting seasons can decide the fate of the conflict.  

In 2024, Kyiv should try to achieve an operational breakthrough somewhere on the battlefield, preferably in the south, to get within firing distance of Crimea. It’s vital now for Ukraine to show some success on the ground; otherwise, it risks losing some, if not most, of its key Western partners that enable Kyiv’s defense. 

However, Kyiv should also dedicate much effort and resources to training its forces. All the weapons in the world won’t compensate for poorly trained units. Defense is easier than offense. The Ukrainian military is no longer trying to stop the onrushing Russians. In its first counteroffensive in the fall of 2022, the Ukrainian military achieved a resounding success in the east and south because it caught the Russians off guard. A few months later, in the summer of 2023, that wasn’t longer the case.

The Kremlin is on guard now and has mobilized to prevent a catastrophe in Ukraine. Western intelligence estimates put the number of Russian troops in just southern Ukraine to over 300,000. So, against an entrenched adversary, the Ukrainian military must focus on combined arms operations and brigade-level coordination if it wants to achieve real operational progress. 

Ukraine can do a lot to advance its cause. But the U.S. and the West should be more active in their military assistance as well. 

Although the U.S.-led international coalition has committed tens of billions of dollars worth of weapon systems to Ukraine, it has often done so with significant delays. Time and again, the West has been reluctant and slow to provide Kyiv with weapon systems that end up becoming vital to the Ukrainian efforts. 

For example, at around this time last year, there was a heated debate among NATO members about sending main battle tanks to Ukraine. Germany, the country of origin of the populous Leopard 2, wouldn’t budge until the U.S. made a move. The breakout came after the United Kingdom decided to send a squadron of Challenger 2 tanks, prompting the U.S. to commit 31 M1 Abrams, which forced Berlin to greenlight Leopard 2 and Leopard 1 exports to Ukraine.

The result? The Ukrainians didn’t have their complete Western tank fleet ready for the start of the counteroffensive, which played a part in its failure. This is just one instance of the problematic security aid lifeline to Ukraine. 

For the Ukrainian strategy to retain hopes of success in 2024, Kyiv must also get the weapons it needs. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense and national security journalist specializing in special operations. A Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), he holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Pakistan’s senior air force official announced plans to purchase Chinese stealth fighters last week, potentially making Pakistan the first foreign partner to purchase 5th generation fighters from China.

During an induction ceremony for a variety of new military equipment held on January 2, Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu announced the forces’ intentions to purchase Chinese FC-31 Gyrfalcon fighters, according to reporting by Defense News. This reporting was seemingly confirmed by a post on the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Facebook page shortly thereafter.

The FC-31 is China’s second indigenous stealth fighter, which is currently in development for service aboard Chinese aircraft carriers, but has had an eye toward the export market since its inception.

The United States has long maintained a complex and often strained relationship with Pakistan – a country that was seen as a strategic partner at times throughout both the Cold War and the Global War on Terror, but that has also been accused of harboring and supporting terrorist regimes. Today, Pakistan’s primary fighter is the American-sourced F-16 Fighting Falcon, with the country having about 85 operational platforms.

Pakistan’s hostile relationship with neighboring India, which has also been the source of tensions with the United States, has served to deepen military cooperation with China. Pakistan’s relationship with China is often described as “all-weather,” with deep strategic ties extending throughout economic, diplomatic, and military sectors.

The acquisition of FC-31 fighters would make Pakistan the first third-party country ever to purchase stealth aircraft designed outside the United States. Stealth, or low observable, aircraft designs are meant to delay or prevent detection by adversary systems, allowing them to operate inside contested airspace with greater survivability. The US has long maintained a monopoly on stealth aviation, as the only nation on the planet operating stealth aircraft from 1983 until 2017, when China’s first stealth fighter, the Chengdu J-20, entered operational service.

Today, it’s estimated that China has somewhere north of 250 J-20s built, giving it the distinction of operating the world’s second-largest fleet of stealth aircraft. The Shenyang FC-31 Gyrfalcon is the nation’s second stealth effort, developed independently of Chengdu’s J-20 program.

The fighter was meant to be a lower-cost 5th-generation entry with an emphasis placed on the export market, but analysts were quick to point out that the smaller and lighter design may eventually see service aboard China’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers as a replacement for the country’s long-troubled fleet of 4th-generation J-15s. In October 2021, those suspicions were confirmed when a modified carrier-capable iteration of the FC-31, dubbed the J-35, took flight for the first time. According to reports, the Chinese air force has also expressed interest in the platform as a lower-cost addition to its J-20 fleet.

To date, there has been no official word as to when this J-35 could see operational service, though some estimates suggest it could be as soon as 2026.

While China’s larger twin-engine J-20 is meant to fill an air-superiority role akin to the F-22 Raptor, the FC-31, and its Naval J-35 variant, are smaller twin-engine aircraft designed to compete with multi-role fighters like the F-35. In keeping with China’s longstanding approach to aviation design, both the J-20 and FC-31 borrow heavily from foreign fighter designs, with the J-20 often described as an amalgam of the long-defunct Soviet MiG 1.44 stealth fighter program infused with Lockheed Martin-derived low-observable design techniques.

While Russian officials have accused Chengdu of stealing elements of the MiG 1.44’s design, evidence to that effect has largely been circumstantial to date. China’s efforts to steal American stealth fighter designs, however, have been thoroughly confirmed, with a Chinese National named Su Bin ultimately charged with the cyber theft of secrets related to the design of many American military aircraft – including the F-22 and F-35 – in 2014.

In Su Bin’s e-mails to his Chinese government contacts, which were later entered as evidence in his trial, he openly gloated about how the stolen documents would “allow us [China] to catch up rapidly with U.S. levels … [and] stand easily on the giant’s shoulders.”

Su was ultimately sentenced to 46 months in Federal Prison for the theft in July 2016.

That is to say that the FC-31’s aesthetic similarities to America’s F-35 aren’t necessarily a coincidence. Because of the lack of transparency within Chinese state media, details about the FC-31’s actual capability set remain nebulous at best.

Current FC-31s in testing are reportedly powered by two Russian-sourced RD-93 afterburning turbofan engines that are each capable of producing about 18,300 pounds of thrust, though China has expressed plans to use domestically-sourced equivalent WS-13s that may increase power output to a combined 39,200 pounds of thrust with afterburners lit.

With an estimated maximum takeoff weight of 56,000 pounds, that could place the FC-31 on similar performance footing as the slightly larger and more powerful single-engine F-35. The American jet is powered by a Pratt & Whitney F135 afterburning turbofan engine that can pump out around 43,000 pounds of thrust under afterburner in a platform with a maximum takeoff weight of some 65,000 pounds. However, it’s important to note that the F135 is not just a more powerful engine, it’s also more advanced when it comes to reducing both radar and infrared (heat) signatures.

Broadly speaking, the FC-31, like its J-20 sibling, is not expected to be able to match America’s F-35 or F-22 in terms of preventing detection, thanks in large part to America’s multi-decade head start on the technologies involved in fielding truly stealth platforms, but that doesn’t mean the FC-31 wouldn’t represent a significant leap in low-observability over fourth-generation airframes like China’s J-15 or Pakistan’s F-16s.

In other words, the FC-31 may not be able to match the F-35 pound for pound, but could likely outperform many of the older 4th generation aircraft it might run across in a 21st century conflict.

That is, of course, if the aircraft ultimately lives up to China’s claims.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

When will Russia finally collapse? - Policymakers and analysts are getting impatient.

Predictions of Russia’s collapse appear to be wrong.

Instead of getting weaker, Vladimir Putin’s realm seems to be getting stronger.

One critic of the collapse argument puts it this way: “[T]wo years on, Russia looks in alarmingly robust condition.”

If that’s true, it obviously makes sense to negotiate with the Kremlin now, before it gets even more powerful and more stable. That may be a bitter pill to swallow, for Ukraine and its supporters of course, but what’s the alternative?

The alternative is obvious. In fact, Russia is not getting structurally stronger and more stable, and almost all theories of system breakdown lead us to expect something deeply destabilizing to happen in Russia. When? There’s the rub. It could be tomorrow; it could be five years from now. Either way, collapse is coming, though perhaps not “two years on.”

The case for Russia’s getting stronger rests on peculiar interpretations of the existing evidence regarding the Putin regime, the war, the economy, and the Russian population.

Putin may be exuding confidence—though why should we expect anything less from him or any leader?—but appearances can be deceiving, especially as Putin’s public persona is as often inclined to cluelessness as to self-confidence. He’s arrested his liberal and right-wing critics and built up the security apparatus, and his propaganda machine remains as active as ever. Are these signs of strength?

Yes, for obvious reasons, and no, because all these measures wouldn’t be necessary if he didn’t feel threatened. By whom? By important political and economic elites, who are unhappy with the war and its effects on the Russian economy and armed forces. The Prigozhin coup attempt is a case in point. Its very occurrence testified to dissatisfaction within the army. More importantly, the attempt could not possibly have been made without the knowledge—and blessing?—of the security services.

So, yes, Putin survived the coup. But its very happening means that his position was and is precarious.

That’s important because Putin’s weakness means his regime’s weakness, since he’s its essential core. All authoritarian, totalitarian, fascist, and dictatorial systems are hyper-centralized by definition. That can be their strength, if the supreme leader is a Platonic philosopher king, but more often than not it’s a fatal weakness. Supreme leaders are resistant to change and reform.

Their centrality encourages buck-passing, attempts at local power-building, and sycophancy. Most important perhaps, they are prone to strategic mistakes, especially as they age and lose their ability to project invincibility, infallibility, and charisma.

Putin’s most significant error was to pressure Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to back out of an Association agreement with the European Union in late 2013, thereby sparking the Revolution of Dignity that led to Yanukovych’s flight and then the launch of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The Jamestown Foundation's Janusz Bugajski makes the case for viewing the war as disastrous for Russia: “Russian leaders are trying to convince Western leaders that Ukraine is losing the war in order to terminate military assistance for Kyiv. In reality, the war is disastrous for Russia. Although the Ukrainian counteroffensive stalled in Donbas and Zaporizhzhia for the winter, after defeating Russian forces in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson, the Russian army is being decimated, and its navy has been pushed back from the western part of the Black Sea. During two years of combat, Russia has lost at least 315,000 killed or severely wounded, from a ground force of some 360,000 that invaded Ukraine. It has also sustained huge losses in equipment, including 2,200 out of some 3,500 tanks and a third of its armored vehicles.” These are not just incidental problems. Together, they bespeak a fundamental, structural decimation of Russia’s armed forces.

The situation with the economy is just as alarming. The opposition Russian economist Vladimir Milov has shown that the state has invested enormously in four sectors (ammunition, railroads, military security, and machine building) directly connected to the war, while reducing or only minimally increasing investments in consumer goods sectors. Putin’s claims that GDP is growing and inflation is low, therefore, conceal the reality that average citizens are being sacrificed on the altar of militarism. As Milov points out, “Russians have become significantly poorer in the last five and especially in the last two years.”

Yale University’s Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and his colleagues have convincingly shown that sanctions have worked and that “[R]ussia is no longer remotely an economic power and has suppressed the minimum reporting of transparent national income statistics that is required to retain IMF membership. With industrial might below that of Chile, Putin’s Russia survives merely by seizing assets. The increasingly state-dominated economy is cannibalizing its own companies to maintain Putin’s war machine.”

Finally, we come to the Russian population. Yes, they’re inactive, and yes, that makes them morally complicit in Putin’s crimes. But a significant minority, perhaps as many as one fifth, oppose the war and Putin’s fascist regime. They are largely urban, educated professionals resident in Moscow and St. Petersburg. At present, they’re cowed. But as soon as an opening appears, as it inevitably will, they will make themselves heard—as do all urban, educated professionals the world over.

The empirical case for a strong Russia is thus weak. Meanwhile, the theoretical case for collapse is strong, because Russia is exceedingly vulnerable to the structural forces that generally lead to systemic collapse. It’s important to remember that structures are like tectonic plates. We can predict that earthquakes will inevitably happen where two plates meet, but we cannot say exactly when. And we can say which regions—or states—are in greater or lesser degrees of trouble and increasingly face the prospect of collapse.

What are the structural forces besetting Russia?

The above analysis identified them. The brittle regime is one. The parlous condition of the military is another. The sinking economy is a third. The protest potential of Russia’s educated, urban elites is a fourth. We know from history that such states are prone to break down or, at the least, to experience massive popular protests and regime change. The Soviet Union and its East European satellites in 1989-1991 immediately come to mind.

But so, too, do scores of countries worldwide—such as Argentina, Nicaragua, Egypt, Syria, Zimbabwe, and Libya. Some states, such as the Ayatollahs’ Iran, weather the storms of repeated upheaval and survive. Others, such as the Shah’s Iran, do not. Besides invoking platitudes such as “it all depends on state strength or elite cleverness,” we cannot know what the exact outcome will be.

But we do know that, in most cases, the “contradictions” that structural forces produce come to the fore when “sparks” or “triggers” take place. These can be assassinations, earthquakes, fires, natural disasters—or wars, especially unsuccessful wars that strain already impaired economies, militaries, regimes, and populations. It was World War I that destroyed the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian empires and World War II that almost destroyed the Soviet Union, especially after Joseph Stalin’s massive structural changes weakened the Soviet system and made it prone to collapse.

Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine is probably just such a spark. The regime, army, and economy have gotten weaker, and there is no reason to expect things to get better anytime soon. This means that, the longer the war takes, the likelier the structural forces will grind against one another, the greater the contradictions, and the likelier Russia’s breakdown becomes. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, in Russia and the West, time is not on Putin’s side. He’s not getting any younger, and his regime is not getting any stronger. The West should therefore refrain from negotiating with Putin until his country and regime weaken beyond easy repair.

So, don’t be taken in by his forced bravado. The tune he’s singing is his swan song. As to when Putin Russia will meet its end, it may be sooner than you think. Indeed, consider holding your breath.

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

All images are Shutterstock. 

Summary: This article considers the capabilities of modern air-defense systems like the Russian S-200, S-300, and S-400, suggesting that while these systems could potentially target the SR-71 at its historical speed and altitude, an upgraded SR-71 with advanced jamming technology would likely remain immune to their missile threats.

During the Lockheed SR-71 "Blackbirds" nearly 25 years in service, the high-speed aircraft set numerous speed records, and on July 28, 1976, a Blackbird reached an impressive 2,193.167 miles per hour. Flying at roughly 36.55 miles per minute, or 3,216.4 feet per second, it was faster than a bullet fired from the World War II-era M1 Garand rifle, which had a muzzle velocity of 2,800 feet per second.

Moreover, the aircraft still holds the record for a cross-country flight, traveling from Los Angeles to Washington, D.C. in just 64 minutes, 20 seconds.

The SR-71 achieved a record top speed of 2,193 mph – and while other aircraft could reach such extreme speeds in theory – but would melt due to the atmospheric friction and heat – the Blackbird could maintain it for extended periods. It was able to cruise along at more than 2,200 mph (Mach 3+ or more than three times the speed of sound), and at altitudes greater than 85,000 feet.

In addition to flying fast, the SR-71 also set an altitude record – reaching 25,929 meters. It flew so high that pilots navigating by sight couldn't even rely on ground features such as roads and instead needed to look at the mountains, rivers, and major coastlines to get their bearings.

The SR-71 earned its reputation for incomparable speed. No aircraft could catch it, and neither could missiles.

As previously reported, while a dozen Blackbirds were lost to accidents during its service history, not a single aircraft was shot down by an enemy. Though the aircraft carried radar countermeasures to evade interception efforts, the Blackbird's great protection was still its combination of very high speed and high altitude. It also had a low radar cross-section, which gave a very short time for an enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) to acquire and track the aircraft.

By the time a SAM site could track the Blackbird, it was out of range. In theory that made it almost invulnerable. Moreover, if a SAM site was able to track the SR-71 and fire a missile, the aircraft flew high enough to evade it. Yet, those on the ground still tried their best, and during its service history, the SR-71 reportedly evaded some 4,000 missiles fired its way.

Some 800 missiles were fired at Blackbirds over Vietnam alone­but not a single one was lost to enemy fire. One came close, and a CIA A-12 did take a piece of shrapnel from an SA-2 missile that exploded 100 meters away. In addition, SR-71 pilots did report that missiles launched without radar guidance and no launch detection had passed as close as 150 yards (140 m) from the aircraft.

Though the SR-71 has been retired, at least a few experts believe the high-speed aircraft would still be able to get the job done even against the best air-defense systems in service today.

The AviationGeekClub.com recently quoted Damien Leimbach, former United States Air Force Avionics Technician on U-2 aircraft, who said via a post on Quora that "The S-200, S-300 and S-400 are amazing platforms, and given their stated performance, the 300 and 400 could probably hit a target at the SR-71's speed and altitude. But that is not the same as hitting an SR-71."

Leimbach explained that while the Russian-made air-defense systems "could" shoot down the version of the SR-71 that existed in the 1970s or 1980s, it likely couldn't come close to hitting an upgraded SR-71.

The SR-71 was designed as a long-range, high-altitude, strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Its mission equipment for the plane's aerial reconnaissance role included signals intelligence sensors, side-looking airborne radar, and a camera. If the aircraft were in service today it would also have the latest jamming technology.

"It would have received the same jamming and Electronic Warfare upgrades as other planes have," noted Leimbach, who further suggested, "Would these EW jammer upgrades make the plane immune from those missiles? Yes it would."

Leimbach said he spent 6 years, recently, working on the sibling of the SR-71, the U-2 and as an electronics specialist he claimed to have been directly responsible for installing and maintaining the AN-ALQ 221 jammer that made the high flying, but slow moving, U-2 Dragon Lady immune to those missiles."

"The U-2 and the SR-71 don't just take pictures. They listen to cell phones. They monitor radios. And they also listen to, record and analyze the frequencies, pulse rates, variable modes and power outputs of enemy SAM systems like the S-200, 300 and 400," Leimbach noted.

The electronics specialist also noted that the S-300 is Russian technology from the 1970s, which made it about as sophisticated as American tech from the 1950s, while the S-400 is just an upgraded version. Both are very good, but the U.S. has had a lot of time to develop countermeasures.

To his point, "If (Russia's) modern weapons can't even take down the U-2, they could not shoot down the SR-71."

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

Su-25 and Su-34 fighter jets often work in packs during combat operations, Russian state media outlets confirmed last year. The Russian military is likely employing its Su-34 platforms to “cover” the Su-25 as it flies low-altitude attack missions. Analysts studying Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine believe the Su-25 has suffered the most losses over the last two years. In March, widely circulated cellphone footage depicting a downed Su-25 fighter was shared on social media.

While the airframe’s journey to the ground was not documented, the remnants of the platform indicate it most certainly fell from the air.

Regardless of the Su-25’s track record so far in Ukraine, Moscow still depends on the Soviet-era fighter.

In the 1960s, the Soviet Air Force established a competition in order to find its next battlefield close-support aircraft.

Manufacturer Sukhoi developed the T-8 prototype around this time, which evolved into the Su-25 fighter. The ground-attack airframe took its first flight in the early 1970’s and after five years its certification trials were completed.

The USSR’s desire to develop its own close-support airframe followed America’s endeavor to create its A-10 Thunderbolt II “Warthog” tank-busting jet. While the Warthog and the Frogfoot were designed to accomplish similar missions, the two airframes sport quite different capabilities.

Both the Su-25 and A-10 are heavily armored and are often referred to as “flying tanks.” 

However, the Frogfoot is smaller, lighter and faster than its American counterpart. Earlier variants of the Russian jet featured two R-95Sh non-afterburning turbojets.

The aircraft is equipped with self-sealing, foam-filled fuel tanks that provide a total fuel capacity of around 3,600l. Additionally, the provision of four PTB-1500 external fuel tanks which are carried on the underwing pylons can extend the range of the jet.

According to Air Force Technology, the Frogfoot can climb at a rate of 58m/s. “The maximum speed of the aircraft is 950km/h. The combat radius and ferry range of the aircraft are 375km and 7,500km respectively. The normal range of the Su-25 is 750km, while its service ceiling is 7,000m. The take-off and landing roll of the Su-25 are 750m and 600m respectively. The aircraft weighs around 10,740kg and its maximum take-off weight is 17,600kg.”

The Soviets used the Frogfoot extensively during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s.

Since Afghan-fighters trained on U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles were able to shoot down many of the S-25s, the fighter proved to have some significant vulnerabilities. Particularly, shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles (SAMS) wreaked havoc on the Soviet fleet.

The Frogfoot also saw action during the Iran-Iraq War and the subsequent Abkhazia War, where the jet was flown by Georgia’s Air Force.

The Su-25 was exported widely in the 1980s and many of these “flying tanks” ended up in former Soviet states following the collapse of the USSR. Additionally, the Su-25 serves with Air Forces in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South Africa. 

In late February, Ukrainian forces took out a Russian Su-25 airframe and captured its pilot as “revenge” for earlier airstrikes. This incident, along with other reports of Su-25 losses throughout the war, indicate that Russia’s “flying tank” is not performing as well as the Air Force intended.

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Meet the Qaher-313 Stealth Fighter: In late February last year, Iran’s defense ministry revealed that the country was ready to convert its “fifth-generation” stealth fighter into an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The televised announcement was made by Brigadier General Afshin Khajefard, who said the Qaher platform had reached full technological maturity. Iran’s announcement follows a series of lethal drone shipments it has sent Russia over the last year or so.

While Tehran has emerged as quite the prolific drone manufacturer, the country has lagged behind in terms of airplane capabilities.

The Iranian Air Force still flies a version of the aging F-14 Tomcat, suggesting that the Qaher’s purported abilities are exaggerated at best. 

The first mockup of the Qaher-313 fighter was first revealed in 2013 as the regime’s first fully indigenous stealth platform.

According to the defense ministry, the Qaher was developed and designed fully by the Iran Aviation Industries Organization, a division of the Ministry of Defense.

The first jet prototype was revealed almost four years later. Iranian officials boasted that the Qaher could sport a 2,000 kilogram bomb or at a minimum six air-to-air-missiles.

Additionally, Tehran’s former defense minister claimed that the platform had a small radar-cross section, is capable of flying at very low altitudes and can carry a litany of homegrown munitions. 

For many reasons, industry experts and aviation buffs widely dismissed Iran’s dubious claims. At this time, Iran released some footage and photographs of its new premiere fighter. Perhaps laughably, in one video an Iranian pilot is seen crouched down in the cockpit of the jet, which is clearly way too small to actually fly a human being.

Without space for a pilot, the Qaher definitely can’t carry the internal payload as Iranian officials have claimed. Iran also did not possess the analytical and sensor technologies required to develop the capabilities the fighter was purported to have. 

Initial analyses of the available footage of the Qaher highlighted the airframe’s sharp edges, angles and twin tail form, similar to the American-made F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation platforms. As observed by The Aviationist editor David Cenciotti, “The aircraft sports fixed canards and air intakes a bit too small to feed a modern jet plane’s engine; air intakes resemble those used by modern [unmanned aircraft] designs,” adding that “They are located above the wing meaning that at high AoA — angle of attack—the intakes would get turbulent or no air at all for the engine.”

Another serious design flaw appeared to be the nose section of the Qaher. The nose was so tiny that hardly any radar could fit inside it. Additionally, the airframe did not possess a nozzle, which would result in the melting of the entire fighter by the engine’s afterburners.

While the Qaher certainly didn’t make the cut as an actual fifth-generation stealth fighter jet, the plane could be revived as a new UAV flown by Iran.

Tehran’s drone arsenal has become an increasingly lethal enterprise for the regime. In fact, Iran has steadily ramped up its UAV development alongside the expansion of its ballistic missile program.

Over the last decade or so, Iran has mastered the development and shipment of cheap, less advanced but deadly drones to its region-wide proxy groups. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in Iraq, the Houthi rebels in Yemen and sporadic Iranian-aligned groups in Syria all receive consistent deliveries of these combat UAVs.

Most recently, Iran has provided Russian Forces with a variety of lethal drones, including the Shahed family. Due to Tehran’s deliveries, Moscow has been able to carry out a litany of barrages targeting a range of residential buildings, critical infrastructure and personnel in Ukraine.

Drone warfare has arguably monopolized Russia’s ongoing military intervention in Ukraine, fueling Iran’s ambition to become a UAV manufacturing powerhouse. Weakened economically by sanctions, Tehran has been turning to its sale of drones to fund its military apparatus. If successful, the future drone-turned Qaher could be another cash cow for the Iranian regime. 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

The U.S. Air Force recently deployed F-22 Raptors to the Middle East as part of a broader effort to combat Russia’s increasingly provocative behavior in the region.

Over the last year, Russian fighters have engaged in malign behavior targeting American unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) quite frequently. This week, the U.S. military said that Moscow’s fighters have “harassed” American drones over Syria for the third day in a row.

Three MQ-9 Reaper drones were the target of Russia’s harassment, versatile primary offensive strike UAVs for the Air Force. According to the head of the U.S. Air Forces Central Command Lt. Gen. Alex Grynkewich, “Russian aircraft flew 18 unprofessional close passes that caused the MQ-9s to react to avoid unsafe situations.” While these types of provocations over Syrian airspace are significant, Russian fighters have also intercepted a Reaper drone over the Black Sea a few months ago. 

By sending over Raptors in response to Russia’s hostile behavior in the region, the U.S. military is telling Moscow to watch out.

As the world’s first ever fifth-generation fighter platform, the F-22 is widely considered to be the most sophisticated of its kind to ever fly the skies. Russian pilots should consider another time in history when these formidable fighters were sent to protect American spy drones against Soviet aircraft one decade ago. 

In 2012, a pair of Iranian Air Force Su-25 pilots attempted to shoot down the U.S. drone which was operating roughly 16 miles from Iran’s coastline. The U.S. Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator UAV was designed primarily for patient reconnaissance and did not pose a threat to any airframes.

In fact, if attacked, the drone would struggle quite a bit to defend itself. For this reason, the Iranian pilots considered the Predator to be an easy target. Flying Soviet-era Su-25 “frogfoots,” the Iranian pilots reportedly closed in on the drone and opened fire using their 30mm cannons. The Su-25s failed to destroy the drone.

However, the message they were sending was received by the U.S. Going forward.

The Pentagon decided to send F-22 Raptors or F-18 Hornets to escort Predator drones involved in intelligence surveillance reconnaissance missions on the move. 

In 2013, Iranian pilots would again try to take down a Predator drone close to the Iranian shoreline. This time, however, F-22 Raptors were nearby. A pair of Iranian F-4 Phantom pilots began to close in on the Predator, likely scoping out how to best take it down. Unbeknownst to the Iranian pilots, an F-22 piloted by Lt. Col. Kevin “Showtime” Sutterfield was eying the F-4 Phantoms the whole time. Then-Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh explained what happened next:

“He [the Raptor pilot] flew under their aircraft [the F-4s] to check out their weapons load without them knowing that he was there, and then pulled up on their left wing and then called them and said ‘you really ought to go home.’” 

While Russia does fly more modern fighters than the Su-25 these days, no airframe in its arsenal would be completely safe around an F-22 Raptor tasked with protecting an American UAV. The redeployment of Raptors to the Middle East does not bode well for Moscow’s future provocations in Syria’s airspace. 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

The news that the U.S. Department of Defense failed to inform the American public that its Secretary of Defense was hospitalized in Walter Reed for four days represents a stunning breach of transparency standards. It is also a measure of reputational damage from which Secretary Lloyd Austin will never recover. He must be forced to resign.

The original admission – dropped at the end of a Friday to minimize exposure – that the Secretary received multi-day treatment for an unidentified elective surgery introduced immediate and intense scrutiny from national security reporters. It drew a formal admonishment from the Pentagon press.

The issue may have died there, but the subterfuge further grew the story. Additional reporting revealed some critical details not released by the Pentagon in its Friday announcement: Austin was in in-patient intensive care, generally reserved for those in immediate danger. Meanwhile, his Deputy Secretary of Defense, Kathleen Hicks, was vacationing in Puerto Rico.

Many questions now must be answered: Who was adjudicating the Pentagon’s support for the war in Gaza? Who was coordinating with Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant on behalf of the U.S. military? Who approved the Jan. 4 strike into Baghdad that killed a militia leader believed responsible for attacks on American troops? Who coordinated that strike and its aftermath with defense officials in the Middle East? These are the kinds of actions that require leadership from inside the Pentagon. Why did the Deputy Secretary of Defense remain on vacation with the Secretary incapacitated?

Further, still – what is the health status of our Secretary of Defense? Only a severe condition would introduce multi-day hospitalization amidst multiple crises in the Middle East, a log-jammed war in Ukraine, and new Chinese threats against Taiwan. The statement Austin released late Saturday in an attempt to tamp down the controversy reveals he is “on the mend” – whatever that means – and looks forward to “returning to the Pentagon soon.” How long is he out? This seems much more serious than elective surgery – the line the Pentagon press officers are sticking with. What is his medical status at age 70?

More questions still: What did the Pentagon press officers know, and when did they know it? Surely, they are aware of the protocol for publicly announcing medical procedures for cabinet officials. Who was in on the deception? The Secretary of Defense travels with an entire operations center around him at all times: note-takers, communications experts, and intelligence analysts. These people all report to defense officials, who report to other defense officials. It’s hard to believe the Pentagon’s press office was unaware that the Big Boss was in the hospital. In fact, hiding the Secretary of Defense during a tumultuous work week for the American military surely involved the collusion of multiple senior officials.

The Pentagon could have avoided all these questions and all of this controversy with a press statement upon Austin’s entering the hospital and updates throughout. U.S. Air Force Major General Pat Ryder held two press briefings during Austin’s hospital stay – he could have provided updates on his boss’ condition from behind the podium. More importantly, he should have told us who was running the Pentagon. It’s unclear how the nation is to believe anything coming out of the Pentagon press office in the coming months.

The American Secretary of Defense walks the earth with the most essential information any of us can have. He renders decisions on behalf of this country that kill many people in other countries. Lloyd Austin represents American power to much of the world. He runs an enterprise that costs American taxpayers north of $840 billion and employs more than three million workers. We get to know where our Secretary of Defense is at all times. We get to know when he’s on vacation. We get to know when he’s in the hospital.

Lloyd Austin cannot recover from this breach of trust. In fact, he cannot be trusted any longer. If he wants to keep his hospital visits private, he should be allowed to do so – as a private citizen.

Joe Buccino is a retired U.S. Army Colonel public affairs officer and the former communications director of U.S. Central Command. He also served as the spokesman for Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Image: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com

Summary: This article discusses the historical significance of the Soviet Foxtrot-class submarines during the Cold War. One notable incident occurred in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis when a Foxtrot-class submarine almost launched a nuclear torpedo against U.S. forces. The Foxtrot-class, designed to address the shortcomings of its predecessor, played a critical role in the Soviet Navy, with specifications including displacement, size, and armament details. Despite technological obsolescence by the 1970s, Foxtrot submarines remained formidable and was exported around the world.

During the Cold War, one Soviet-designed submarine perhaps gained the most notoriety. In October 1962, four USSR Foxtrot-class diesel subs armed with nuclear weapons were deployed as part of the USSR’s massive Cuba strategy. Unbeknownst to the U.S. at the time, the B-59 Foxtrot nearly launched a nuclear torpedo against American anti-submarine warfare forces.

The Captain of the Soviet vessel mistakenly believed they were under attack. Eventually, the Captain learned that American ships were actually signaling, not attacking, the SSN and backed down. However, it was truly a close call. It was at this moment, when Washington and Moscow came concerningly close to all-out nuclear war, when the Foxtrot-class rose to global prominence.

As the former Soviet Union’s most successful post-Second World War diesel-electric attack submarine, the Foxtrot-class played a critical role in the Soviet’s Navy. These vessels were designed to replace the USSR’s aging Project 611 submarines, which were designated as the Zulu class by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Zulu ships had capabilities similar to the American GUPPY fleet-boat conversions. In the late 1950’s, six Zulu submarines were converted and became the first ballistic missile vessels ever to enter service across the globe.

One was armed with a single R-11FM Scud missile while five other ships in this family were equipped with two Scuds each. Perhaps the Zulu-class’ most recognizable trait is that it served as the basis for the Foxtrots.

Project 641 (NATO codename “Foxtrot”) was developed with the Zulu shortcomings in mind. Specifically, Soviet officials wanted to rectify the perceived lack of strength of these vessels. Each Foxtrot displaced 2,000 tons when surfaced and more than 2,500 tons when submerged. The ships measured 295 feet and were powered by three Kolomna 2D42M diesel units of 2,000 horsepower output, three Electric motors with two generating roughly 1,300 horsepower, with the third outing about 2,700 horsepower.

The first Foxtrot-class keel was laid down in 1957 and commissioned one year later. The last submarine in this class was completed in the early 1980’s. Each boat was built for the Soviet Navy at the Sudomekh division of the Admiralty Shipyard (currently Admiralty Wharves), Saint Petersburg.

While the Foxtrot was larger in size than its Zulu predecessors, each ship in this class had 2 of its 3 decks dedicated to batteries. This enabled underwater endurance for up to 10 days, which stymied the submarines’ speed. The Foxtrot could only travel at an average rate of 2 knots at its maximum submerged time capability.

By the time the last Foxtrot models were laid down in the early 1970s, the submarine family was deemed technologically obsolete. One of the last active service Project 641 vessels- the Zaporizhia- was captured by Russian forces during the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Notably, when the submarine was seized, the Black Fleet did not want the Cold War sub. Instead, the Russian military offered to return the submarine back to Ukraine.

In terms of armament, the Project 641 submarines were quite formidable. The family of ships in total carried twenty-two torpedoes. During the Cold War, the Foxtrot class was a regular component of all four Soviet Navy fleets. In the late 1960’s, India became the first foreign client of this submarine series.

Eight new-build ships were delivered to the Indian Navy and were later renamed as the Kalvari-class. Libya would follow suit a few years later, procuring six boats between the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Around this time, Poland also received a pair of these ships which they operated until 2003.

During the height of the Cold War, several Foxtrot submarines were sent to Cuba from their base on the Kola peninsula to patrol the Caribbean. In one incident, U.S. Navy destroyers dropped practice depth charges near these Soviet submarines to force them to surface and be identified. While three of the four Foxtrots were forced to surface, one was able to evade U.S. detection. Since B-59 was too deep to establish radio contact, the ship believed war had broken out between Moscow and Washington.

Both the captain and political officer onboard the submarine firmly believed that the signaling charges were actual depth charges and that the vessel was under attack. This line of thinking forced both individuals to strongly advocate for arming and firing the nuclear-tipped torpedo onboard. Miraculously, the flotilla admiral Vasily Arkhipov was on B-59 and refused to give his consent to launch the nuclear weapon. By overruling the two other officers on board, Akhipov can be commended for single-handedly preventing the outbreak of nuclear war at this time.

The Foxtrot-class may no longer be in service, but the Soviet submarines will always be remembered for the critical role it played during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Summary: The article highlights the anticipated Type 095 submarine by China's navy. It emphasizes its advanced features, potential applications in escorting aircraft carriers, and its significance in marking a turning point in China's submarine capabilities. Despite historical setbacks, China is steadily advancing its naval strength, possibly evolving into a formidable blue-water submarine force. 

China is working to become a peer of the United States with respect to geopolitical power and influence. And although the US enjoys advantages that China will have a difficult time mitigating (including the world’s most favorable geography and the world’s most robust military budget), China has unrivaled latent economic potential and a revisionist ambition that has alerted American observers. Naturally, the US is beginning to pay closer attention to China’s ability to wage war.

China has the world’s largest population: 1.4 billion people. And while China’s population is aging, reducing its ability to wage war, China still enjoys a unique ability to field a large army, navy, and air force. China, to augment the abilities of their profound human capital, is investing in the development of cutting edge military technologies.

Examples include the recently developed J-20 Mighty Dragon, a fifth-generation fighter that many believe incorporates American technology attained through industrial espionage; the H-20 stealth bomber, which is in the early stages of development; the Fujian aircraft carrier, equipped with a magnetic catapult system comparable to the US’s Ford-class carrier; hypersonic missiles, which the US currently does not possess (and would have a difficult time defending against); and a planned third-generation nuclear attack submarine: the Type 095.

The Type 095 program will complement the ongoing Chinese shipbuilding spree – which has been one of the largest shipbuilding efforts in human history.

Presently, the US still maintains a naval edge over China, respecting fleet quality – but the Chinese have recently surpassed the US with respect to quantity, raising the hackles of the Indo-Pacific region in the process.

The Type 095 is of particular concern to observers – understandably, given that the submarine is a mysterious and fear-inspiring machine, something like the military equivalent of a shark, lurking beneath the ocean's surface. And considering that submarines can deliver nuclear ordnance, submarine-related anxiety is well warranted.

Today, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy Submarine Force (PLANSF) operates a fleet of 56 submarines.

China “possesses both a nuclear-powered submarine fleet and a robust diesel-electric submarine fleet,” the Nuclear Threat Initiative explains. “While the PLAN is currently developing its nuclear-powered submarine capabilities, its diesel-electric submarine fleet remains the backbone of China’s submarine forces. While its growth is declining, the United States government reports indicate the fleet could grow to between 65 and 70 submarines by 2020s.”

The most pressing contemporary concerns are the Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarine and the Type 093 Shang-class submarine. China operates six Type 094s, which is consider China’s first sea-based nuclear deterrent, boasting 12 JL-3 SLBMs with a 6,200 mile range. The Type 093, meanwhile, represented a significant advancement in China’s underwater sub warfare capability, with six 533mm torpedo tubes that can launch either anti-submarine or anti-ship torpedoes.

But despite the adequacy of the Type 094 and Type 093, the most pressing concern of tomorrow, for China’s adversaries, will be the Type 095.

The Type 095 is expected to have an improved hull design, with a significantly reduced acoustic signature. Relative to the Type 093, the Type 095 will have an improved nuclear reactor, vertical launching system (VLS) cells, and more advanced sensors (including active/passive flank array sonar and low-and high-frequency towed sonar array).

Reports indicate that the Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industrial Corporation will be building the Type 095 at a new plant in Huludao of the Liaoning province. The program is shrouded in secrecy, but expectations are that the Type 095 will be used to escort Chinese aircraft carrier task forces.

Here’s what else is speculated about the Type 095 program: “one commentator found it likely that the Type 095 would have electronic noise-cancellation technology, like your noise canceling headphones, a shaftless drive, and a single hull,” Caleb Larson reported. “All of these would be a huge step forward for China’s submarine program.”

Indeed, the Type 095 indicates that the Chinese could be turning a significant corner with respect to submarine technology. “For many years, China was the subject of ridicule in naval circles,” Larson wrote. “The Korean War put the  brakes on Chinese naval innovations, and the Cultural Revolution also hindered naval advancement.” Yet, “despite these setbacks, China has steadily developed its naval capabilities.”

And while China was initially focused on near-shore capabilities, “like smaller diesel submarines, shore-based missile defense, or fast littoral boats, China is now possibly capable of fielding a true blue-water submarine force.”

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.