Diplomacy & Crisis News

Nikos Kazantzaki (Héraklion, 1883 - Fribourg, 1957) fut un écrivain prolifique à l'œuvre multiple (essais, romans, théâtre, poésie), principalement connu pour deux livres : Alexis Zorba (1946) et La Dernière Tentation du Christ (1954), dont l'adaptation cinématographique réalisée par Martin Scorsese en (...) / Grèce, Turquie, Littérature, Histoire, Conflit, Christianisme, Religion, Inégalités - 2018/03

It might be the case that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine depends greatly on the fate of Crimea towards the end of the conflict. Russia occupied the Ukrainian region of Crimea in 2014 when the larger conflict began between the two nations. While little was done at the time by Western allies to stop Russia from annexing Crimea in 2014, the historical roots of Crimea has long been established in that part of the world for both sides of the conflict.

In the last few generations, the region of Crimea has gained increased importance as the main base of the Soviet and Russian Black Sea fleet, with the city of Sevastopol remaining as fleet command for the Russian Navy even after Ukraine gained its independence in 1991. This peculiar arrangement of having Russia’s Navy based in another country’s territory is strategically significant in the Black Sea region, linked by historical ties to soldiers from both nations.

During the Second World War, Sevastopol held out against heavy German bombardment for an extended period of time. The heroic stand against the Germans by the Soviets was one of the key battles during the Second World War, and showed the resolve of both the Russian, Ukrainian and other Soviet people’s against the invading Germans. The ability to stand to the last solider at Sevastopol is remembered as a defining moment in Soviet, and now current history, and is likely the reason why the port city still remained the home of the fleet after 1991.

During the Soviet era, the region of Crimea was re-designated as part of the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic for various reasons despite its past as the location of important battles in history. The claims Russia made in 2014 over Crimea however did not come from an agreed upon transition, nor did it meet some coordinated approach considering the importance of Sevastopol to Russian and Ukrainian strategic interests. The importance of Crimea for Ukraine as a catalyst for the conflict comes from the fact that there is more of a balance of backgrounds living in the region, unlike in some parts of Eastern Ukraine, so they are fighting to free Crimea with a good amount of local support. The catalyst for Russia besides the fleet is that it has openly focused on Crimean resources being limited as one of the reasons for occupying other parts of Ukrainian territory, and this narrative drove many Russians to support the war. Crimea therefore is one of the main points of conflict and pride between Russia and Ukraine, and the loss or gain of the territory would be considered a demonstrative victory in the current conflict.

The ability for Ukraine to retake Crimea depends a great deal on the continued support it would get from the West for the rest of the year and past 2024. One of the major hurdles to Ukraine is the level of support their offensive receives from NATO and other allies in achieving long term strategic goals. With the politics of support for the war slowly gaining push back in the West, and equipment slowly becoming harder to acquire or simply out of stock, Ukraine must measure its response to Russia by taking key strategic locations without overburdening its forces and amount of equipment. If Ukraine can push Russia back to the 2014 regions, it could likely put up a defensive posture in the medium term and hope to retake the Eastern regions and Crimea at some point in the future. It would be hard to guess the level of Western support Ukraine would receive if planning to push Russia out of the regions occupied in 2014, but removing Russian forces out of the regions captured in 2022 would be a positive outcome.

The loss of Crimea for Russia would demonstrate that decisions made by their leadership gave up more than they had to lose in invading Ukraine, in territory, lives, and pride. The end result may topple the current Government in Russia, as Russia was and still is seen by many as several times more powerful than Ukraine in resources, technology and manpower. The after-effect of a loss for Russia may have consequences on unity in the country, but more likely it will change how the periphery responds to Russia as a hegemon in the Caucasus region and between Russia’s ties with China and the Middle East. The Caucuses would likely abandon Russian ties fairly quickly, as seen with some nations currently. China would certainly take territorial and energy advantages from Russia in the East, or may simply tie Russia’s export economy further my linking their natural resource wealth to China’s manufacturing needs. Russian allies in the Middle East would have to find other powerful allies, or have to face the consequences of poor decisions in dealing with larger powers like the US, China, Europe and India while targeting their energy supplies or bilateral relations. For this reason, Russia may escalate the conflict with its rocket forces if they may lose Crimea and Sevastopol. The fall of Sevastopol has many dimensions and levels of consequences for Russia, especially for the final narrative of the current war.

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Very few countries have proven to be hospitable to Syrian refugees in recent years as the country’s long-running war has resulted in a de facto partition of the country. Lebanon offers no exception to this dynamic, as proven by the numerous attempts by the Lebanese government to return some of the 800,000 to 2 million registered and unregistered Syrian refugees within its borders forcibly and illegally to their home country.

The latest iteration of this dynamic arose last month, as the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) arbitrarily detained hundreds of Syrians across Lebanon, turning them over to Syrian security services at the border. Yet while the army’s intervention in the refugee space is a new development, the political underpinnings behind the operation are not.

No Home for Syrians

Reports emerged in mid-April indicating Beirut’s renewed efforts to identify, detain, and return Syrian refugees after a brief lull in such efforts. In this context, an anonymous LAF official confirmed to local media that roughly fifty Syrians were deported in the first half of April, led by army intelligence. According to the official, the operation prioritized locating undocumented Syrians living in Lebanon. This is operationalized through a 2019 Higher Defense Council administrative procedure allowing immediate deportation of anyone entering the country “illegally” after April 24, 2019.

This number ultimately grew, with many reports indicating over 400 Syrian detainees across roughly sixty raids in April. Of this group, approximately 130 were forcibly returned to regime-held areas in Syria. Other reports highlight 1,100 arrests and 600 deportations across seventy-three raids as of May 4. The raids focused on individuals with invalid residency permits, supposedly under the orders of caretaker Social Affairs Minister Hector Hajjar. The Lebanese General Security Office (GSO) is not conducting deportations—an irregular move given they handle such cases.

Hajjar is a member of the Hezbollah-allied Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and has openly derided the presence of Syrian refugees, warning of a “big explosion” if tensions are not reduced between Lebanese and Syrians in his country. He has also claimed that Syrian refugees make up 40 percent of Lebanon’s population, arguing “no country in the world would accept” such conditions. The minister has plans to lead a ministerial delegation to Damascus to discuss the refugee issue in a similar fashion to previous Lebanese ministers.

However, Hajjar claims that GSO is leading deportation efforts—conflicting reporting focused on the LAF. In this regard, Acting General Security Director Elias Baissari—officially tasked with the refugee file—reportedly visited Damascus last week to meet with Syrian officials about refugees. Following up on these efforts, Prime Minister Najib Mikati on April 27 assigned Baissari with the task of developing a mechanism for returning Syrians.

In parallel, Lebanese interior minister Bassam Mawlawi ordered his ministry to survey and register Syrian populations on May 2, demanding municipalities ensure Syrians are documented before permitting them to buy or rent property. This coincides with a slew of curfews for Syrians in many municipalities, as well as checkpoints and roadblocks to identify undocumented migrants. Finally, Mawlawi, alongside other ministers, demanded the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) revoke the refugee status of any Syrians who go to Syria and return to Lebanon.

Government Failure and Scapegoating

These evolving dynamics surrounding the refugee file suggest a new level of engagement on the part of the Lebanese government. While the GSO has traditionally held authority over the refugee file, the inclusion of the LAF and multiple ministers suggests Beirut is shifting toward a whole-of-government approach as it prioritizes the issue even further in 2023—although such an approach could be decentralized along political alliances. For example, some have argued that the LAF’s involvement suggests Joseph Aoun is catering to the public and other politicians in support of a presidential run.

To be sure, this does not suggest the existence of any serious or effective strategy, nor that multiple governing entities were not previously working on the file. Rather, the intensity of anti-refugee efforts is increasing, albeit amidst a government that is incapable of doing much of anything well—which lies at the core of the situation.

Just as Beirut failed to implement its 2022 refugee return plans, stipulating the return of 15,000 Syrian refugees a month, recent efforts suggest the limits of and impediments facing the Lebanese government. Indeed, while any illegal returns in violation of basic non-refoulment clauses—the international legal statute outlawing forced returns to unsafe conditions like Syria—must be actively fought at all levels, recent efforts to return between 130-600 Syrians highlight Lebanon’s limited capacity to operationalize and scale such a program or any other serious government action today.

This suggests what many migration experts and human rights advocates have argued for years: that Lebanese political figures and elites continue to operationalize a Syrian refugee scapegoating strategy as opposed to any serious return program or domestic reform agenda. Given Lebanon’s historic economic collapse at the hands of a septuagenarian elite that is primarily interested in retaining a corrupt and sect-based political system, defenseless Syrian refugees present an easy target.

Human rights groups have rightly condemned this approach, with Amnesty International releasing a statement on April 24. The NGO cited previous research documenting human rights violations experienced by Syrian refugees upon return to regime-held areas in Syria—not limited to arbitrary detention, torture, and disappearance. Given that these constitute the norm under Assad’s government, Amnesty put it simply: “The Lebanese authorities must immediately stop forcibly deporting refugees back to Syria.”

Syrian Refugees and the Future

Unfortunately, Lebanese officials are not listening. Indicative of broader anti-Syrian hate speech prominent across Lebanon, FPM minister of parliament George Atallah stated that Amnesty should “mind its own business” and “not interfere in the sovereign decision of Lebanon.” This echoed responses to the human rights organization’s tweet on the issue, in which many identified Syrians as synonymous with violence, economic collapse, and land theft.

The heightened rhetoric draws a direct path to Lebanese political actors, producing increasingly violent hate speech and actions against Syrians in Lebanon. The unfortunate reality of this dynamic is circular in that elite rhetoric informs the population, which in turn expresses support for increasingly brutal anti-refugee policies. This scenario mirrors hate speech against Syrians in Turkey.

Thus, 2023 will likely continue to present a rapidly deteriorating situation for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The latest iteration of efforts to make conditions unbearable for refugees will not be the last this year, especially amidst rapidly evolving re-normalization efforts between Arab states and Damascus. 

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: Richard Juilliart / Shutterstock.com

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Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is certainly on a path to enhance his country’s diplomatic profile by turning it into a “middle power,” a concept born during the Cold War to characterize states that “punch above their weight” in world politics. Considered to be neither big nor small powers, these countries can project a global significance that transcends a merely regional profile. Canada is the prototypical middle power. Australia is also frequently mentioned in this context.

Middle-powers are frequently associated with economic significance (for instance, due to their energy resources) combined with what scholars call their “norm entrepreneurship.” They typically do not exert influence through military force but rather through diplomatic means, often involving their role in conflict resolution.

Kazakhstan has all the classical characteristics of a middle power: strategic location, abundant natural resources, and commitment to international principles and cooperation. Kazakhstan has continuously emphasized multilateralism and conflict resolution in its international diplomacy.

One of the key factors contributing to Kazakhstan’s emergence as a middle power is its commitment to hosting and participating in international political conferences. In recent years, Kazakhstan has positioned itself as a neutral ground for dialogue and mediation. For instance, in January 2017, the country hosted high-level talks on the Syrian Civil War in Astana, bringing together the Syrian government, opposition forces, and regional stakeholders such as Russia, Iran, and Turkey in the Astana Process, which has since had a key role in promoting ceasefires and facilitating humanitarian aid.

In 2013, Kazakhstan also facilitated the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 countries (the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany), which culminated in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. As a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) from 2017 to 2018, Kazakhstan emphasized such crucial issues as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conflict prevention, and counterterrorism. Likewise, it was instrumental in addressing the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan after the country’s political turmoil in 2021. 

Kazakhstan has coined its position on the Ukrainian crisis, a policy of non-recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. Such courageous consistency in pushing strategic neutrality in a region neighboring Russia and China has contributed to efforts to strengthen the UN principles in support of the world order, as well as the regional prospects for greater multilateralism.

It is remarkable that Kazakhstan is emerging as a middle power on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea at the same time as Azerbaijan is also doing so on its western shore. The promotion of their bilateral cooperation is driving deeper integration in the region, reinforcing its security structure. The recent agreement with Azerbaijan to leverage the full capacity of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TCITR) is an example. The TCITR, also known as the Middle Corridor, runs from China to Europe through Central Asia and South Caucasus.

The latest bilateral meeting between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan follows the 2021 transformation of the Turkic Council into the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Established in 2009, the Turkic Council was initially a platform for dialogue and collaboration between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey. The creation of the OTS was a natural development from the Turkic Council’s evolution, over the years, into a more comprehensive organization encompassing economic, cultural, educational, and security affairs.

Kazakhstan’s diplomacy was a driving force behind both the foundation of the Turkic Council and, under Tokayev’s leadership, its more recent institutionalization as the OTS. This shift has enabled countries like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to develop stronger ties and to work together more effectively on regional challenges. The OTS’s November 2022 Samarkand Declaration, adopted on occasion of its ninth summit meeting, laid out a broad but grounded multilateral program for cooperation in the foreign policy and security fields as well as in the economy and people-to-people relations and the reinforcement of the institutionalization of Turkic-world activities.

The country is well-placed to cooperate with Azerbaijan to play key middle-power geopolitical and geoeconomic roles in the Caspian Sea region. Each is the economic powerhouse of its area with vast energy resources and a stable political climate, making it an attractive partner for regional and global powers. Similarly, Azerbaijan is a crucial player in the South Caucasus, an important transit hub for oil and gas supplies, connecting Europe and Asia, including the westward transit of energy from Kazakhstan. Their recent bilateral agreement is in line with the 2022-2027 roadmap for the Middle Corridor’s development that Kazakhstan proposed trilaterally among Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey in Aktau last November at the foreign-minister level.

It is worth mentioning that Kazakhstan was among the first to rally for greater regional and intra-regional cooperation to confront global challenges arising from increased polarization and fragmentation. It has reached out to the middle powers around the world, as well as business and academia with the call to convene in Astana at the Astana International Forum on June 8-9. The forum will provide a new means to amplify voices standing for nonviolence in international politics to ensure sustainable economic growth, peace, and security. There is a hope that the call will resonate among “middle powers” to find the path back to peace.

Kazakhstan has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy aimed at maintaining the balance between major powers while advancing its national interests. This pragmatic foreign-policy approach, pioneered by Tokayev as the country’s foreign minister and prime minister in the 1990s and 2000s, has allowed it to thread the needle between Russia and China while deepening its ties to the West as well as to other Asian powers and regional players. This is the policy of an archetypal Eurasian middle power.

Harun Karčić is a journalist and political analyst covering the Balkans and Turkey. Over the past decade, he has authored numerous articles on Islam and foreign influence in the region, including Saudi, Iranian, Turkish, and more recently Chinese and Russian. He also regularly reports on Muslim minorities in Europe and rising right-wing nationalism. He tweets @HarunKarcic.

Image: Shutterstock.

Patriot missiles have finally arrived in Ukraine, but the reality may not live up to the hype. Ukrainian air defense operators have been lauded in training, but the threat environment that Ukraine faces poses challenges that are daunting for the Patriot system.

Ukraine faces threats that run the span of Russia’s missile and drone arsenal. Russia’s unmanned aerial systems range from consumer-grade reconnaissance drones to more sophisticated Iranian-made kamikaze drones. Several classes of drones are interceptable by Patriot, but then it becomes both a tactical and economic issue: Drones can use their maneuverability and terrain-hugging flight patterns to remain undetected by Patriot radars. Moreover, it’s questionable to use $3 million interceptors to take out drones that cost orders of magnitude less. 

This is particularly the case when Ukraine’s supply of Soviet-era interceptors is slated to run out soon, and U.S. resupply of Stinger missiles remains similarly strained. This would leave Patriot as the sole defense Ukraine has against Russian air supremacy. The United States can’t just throw more Patriot interceptors at Ukraine, either. For one, they’re a precious commodity; Washington only bought 252 PAC-3 MSE interceptors this year for the entire U.S. Army, and many of these will be used to phase out more antiquated interceptors.

Patriot operating on its lonesome is a tenuous proposition at best; while a first-rate system technologically, the Patriot cannot be used to full effect if it is divorced from air defense doctrine. Patriot systems are limited to pinpoint defense of major assets and are designed to operate in tandem with air defenses engaging targets at higher and lower altitudes. Without these additions, Patriot will have too many threats to engage and the result will either be porous coverage that doesn’t protect its defended assets, or coverage that quickly subsides when Patriot runs out of interceptors.

Moreover, Patriot systems are themselves vulnerable. Operating a Patriot radar system gives away its location, making it an open target for Russian attacks. This means that Patriot is not a one-stop-shop for defending Ukraine’s military assets or its people.

The “do-somethingism” of handing over this advanced weapons system is also divorced from the strategic ends that the United States could reasonably achieve from doing so. Patriot coverage, or lack thereof, will not bring the war in Ukraine to an end. The air war in general is a means of shaping operations for maneuver forces, and on this front Ukrainian and Russian forces remain stalemated. Insulating Ukraine against air attack also discourages negotiation by providing a false impression that the air threat can be mitigated indefinitely. The longer the negotiation process is delayed, the more Ukrainians are killed and the more damage is done to Ukraine’s infrastructure in the long term. 

Given these tactical and operational flaws, there is dubious strategic value for the United States in sending further systems to Ukraine. Patriot systems are not going to bring the war in Ukraine to an end or enable Kyiv to negotiate for or reclaim Crimea or the Donbas. What they do signal is a false American commitment that may prolong Ukraine’s carnage.

The ideological framing of the sanctity of territorial integrity needs to end, as it exacerbates Kyiv’s more maximalist—and unachievable—aims of retaking Crimea. The end state of the Russia-Ukraine War will likely not look like the status quo ante, and Washington should recognize this. Ukraine managed to make gains in the Donbas in 2022, but both sides’ long-anticipated spring offensives have yet to materialize, with a Stalingrad-esque deadlock in Bakhmut preventing any territorial gains.

The United States can follow a different model, namely one of mediation and deescalation. The United States cedes initiative and influence when it allows others to be the dealmakers, such as China’s recent brokering of the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement or Turkey’s facilitation of Ukraine and Russia’s grain export deal during the war. France’s President Emmanuel Macron has begun undertaking the groundwork along with China for a negotiated end to the war. Germany likewise has not done much to decouple or rearm as its rhetoric suggested early in the war. The United States can take advantage of a stagnant front line to bring about a negotiated end, or at least a ceasefire. Waiting to do so limits what Washington can accomplish when Ukraine’s military means are exhausted.

Washington has misstepped by giving Ukraine Patriot systems that will likely produce few benefits. However, there is an opportunity for Washington to still play a needed role in concluding the war. Tactical means cannot achieve these strategic ends; weapons systems will not prove decisive, but diplomatic power might. Washington can still achieve much by doing less. The path to peace in Ukraine may not be paved with weapons but with diplomatic finesse.

Geoff LaMear is a Fellow at Defense Priorities.

Image: DVIDS.

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