Diplomacy & Crisis News

When the five Central Asian presidents appeared before President Xi Jinping at the first China-Central Asia Summit, one suspects that Xi would not need to consider his “dear friend” Vladimir Putin anymore. With the Russian army bogged down in its invasion of Ukraine, which has been going on for well more than eighteen months, Beijing has taken initiatives to fill in the power vacuum in the post-Soviet region. This summit is just one of China’s geopolitical moves.

Indeed, China and Russia are no longer the China and Russia of a few years ago. Previously, Beijing still needed to pay lip service to Moscow by connecting its massive cash cow Belt and Road Initiative with the Russia-led but financially poor Eurasian Economic Union in Central Asia. This was somewhat moot since any major agreements between China and Central Asian countries have mostly been happening on a bilateral basis anyway. But nowadays, Beijing doesn’t even need to pretend it cares about Russia’s traditional influence in its backyard.

Consider that the port city of Vladivostok, formerly part of the Qing dynasty Chinese Empire, was recently allowed by Kremlin to be used as a transit port for Chinese domestic trade, thus making it a Chinese port (kind of) for the second time. The city has long symbolized China’s century of humiliation, as its name directly translates as “control the East.”

Beijing knows how to massage the sentiments and feelings of its own people. When the grandiose Tang dynasty-style ceremony was performed at the summit, the re-emergence of China’s glorious history echoes the Chinese people’s national pride. The message being telegraphed is that China has restored its historical position, at least in the eye of the domestic public, which directly targets the party’s ultimate goal: the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. As economist Branko Milanovic posited, “being active internationally is a matter of domestic political survival and arises because of potential domestic weakness.” After all, for any and all political entities, their continuing existence is always and naturally of the utmost priority.

However, Beijing’s return to historical grandeur will not be so smooth. Putting aside the fact that Europe is moving in a similar direction as the United States in hardening its stance against China, as shown at the recent G7 meeting, changing Sino-Russian relations, which have increasingly favored China, may not be dealt with as easily as Beijing expects. Sino-Russian expert Alexander Lukin has noted that China and Russia “were historically great and independent centers of power and should not tolerate hegemonic dictate of a foreign power.” This tenet includes each other. In the long run, it may be fundamentally unacceptable to the Russian psyche and domestic nationalist sentiment if Russia were to be subjugated as the junior partner in the alliance with China.

Russia’s fear of China’s demographic expansion in the Far East is yet another issue, although research before the Ukraine invasion has largely demonstrated it is presently just a myth. Nonetheless, as Europe shuts its door on Russia’s western side and other Asian powers also unwillingly engage, China’s economic support could play a leading role in facilitating the prosperity of Russia’s eastern border areas. It is possible that if ethnic Han Chinese grow in influence in the Far East, Putin might have to consider finding ways of tightening control over there.

This may also be the fundamental, albeit concealed, reason why Kazakhstan relocated its capital from Almaty to Astana—many ethnic Russians live in northern Kazakhstan, where Astana is located, while Almaty closely borders China’s sparsely populated Xinjiang area. Ironically, Putin employed ethnic Russians to hold referendums as an excuse to invade Ukraine. In the future, the Kremlin may be alert to similar tactics from China on its own land.

That said, global influence is the natural extension of domestic strength. There are warning bells ringing for China too. Confidence in the Chinese economy from within and outside China is faltering. In addition to the country’s widely reported population decline, the unemployment rate of Chinese people aged between sixteen and twenty-four rose to 20.4 percent this April, which is much higher than in the pre-coronavirus period. As Ruchir Sharma, chairman of Rockefeller International, bluntly pointed out: “something is rotten in the Chinese economy.” Without the underpinning of economic vigor, China’s expanding external power may not be sustainable in the long term.

Dr. Jon Yuan Jiang is an independent scholar, and Mandarin and Russian speaker. He has published over seventy articles in media, think tanks, and academic journals such as South China Morning Post, The Diplomat, Lowy Institute, The Jamestown Foundation, The Canberra Times, Media International Australia, and Area Development and Policy.

Image: Photo courtesy of the Office of the President of Kazakhstan.

This week’s visit by Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Riyadh has rekindled an ongoing conversation over the Middle East, civil nuclear power, and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The debate has been around for decades. Every administration for the last twenty years has sought to address concerns over WMDs while wrestling with the conundrum that civil nuclear power programs can provide abundant, low-carbon energy yet also potentially lead to a nuclear weapons program.

As we come upon the twentieth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, which was driven by false intelligence of WMDs, it is time to take stock of our policies, decisions, and any false predicates that threaten stability in this strategic region of the world. In doing so, the central question we must ask is: do current U.S. civil nuclear power policies strengthen or weaken our ability to deliver on our nonproliferation responsibilities? Our answer must be clear-eyed and strategically empathetic. We must be clear-eyed in that the United States is not the sole or dominant civil nuclear partner in the twenty-first century. We must also be strategically empathetic in that U.S. diplomacy and statecraft should account for the realistic security constraints confronting those countries pursuing civil nuclear programs.

Dictators and WMDs

This should begin with context and recent history. American forces invaded Iraq vowing to destroy Iraqi WMDs and end the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein. If you are Saddam Hussein, you were the one person who knew there was no nuclear WMD program. Yet you said nothing, ultimately losing your country and your life. Why did he do that? One guess is he could not let Iran know he didn’t have a WMD program. “If Iran has a weapon, I must have a weapon,” is a statement we have heard for the last ten years (particularly from Saudi Arabia), yet we do not seem to understand why this statement is made.

We have a blind spot to this mindset, and this appears to have been lost on U.S. policymakers since the invasion and to this today.

On December 19, 2003, long-time Libyan president Muammar el-Qaddafi stunned much of the world by renouncing his county’s WMD programs and welcoming international inspectors to verify that Tripoli would follow through on its commitment. Unlike Saddam Hussein, Qaddafi actually had a program, but after seeing the United States invade Iraq, he more than likely thought he would be next.

This actually would have been a positive for our nonproliferation goals had Qaddafi not been captured and killed on October 20, 2011. Whether there is a direct correlation between the United States and his death is up for debate. It was then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton who famously stated following the dictator’s death, with a laugh, “We came, we saw, he died.” Notwithstanding Qaddafi and how he died (at the hands of rebel forces, supported by a NATO-led no-fly zone), the message that was sent to the world was clear: never give up your WMD program.

This message was and is not lost on Kim Jong-un of North Korea or the mullahs of Iran. Again, we need to strategically empathize with these nations and their leaders—not to accept them or agree with them, but to understand their mindset so we can counter them effectively.

The Inconsistency of U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation

By 2008, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) kicked off its civil nuclear program after several years of consultations with U.S. experts. A key component of any nuclear deal with the United States is the signing of a nuclear nonproliferation agreement, a Section 123 Agreement. Much has been written about the 123 Agreement in general, but recent attention has focused on what has been characterized as the “Gold Standard” 123 Agreement—the type of agreement signed by the UAE. It’s important to note that this agreement was signed by UAE after the requests for proposals (RFPs) had gone out to U.S., Korean, and French vendors, but it wasn’t required as a precondition for U.S. vendors to respond. The agreement was finalized and signed by both countries in December of 2009—the same month Korea was selected as the winner of the $20 billion bid.

A couple of key points in this process are misunderstood today and require clarification. First, a signed 123 Agreement is not a prerequisite to bid or compete on a project, nor does a signed agreement guarantee the United States wins the work. There’s limited, if any, incentive for a country to consider signing a 123 Agreement if there is no viable commercial offer by a U.S. vendor. Second, the signing of a Gold Standard 123 Agreement, which is now being demanded by U.S. nonproliferation policymakers, has severely constrained our ability to compete in civil nuclear power throughout key regions of the world. The reason is that while the Gold Standard 123 (like a standard 123) prohibits uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing, it goes beyond the legitimate intent of the original agreement, which wasn’t designed to challenge a country’s sovereignty with respect to the pursuit of civil nuclear power as granted by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

This is highly relevant because shortly after signing the Gold Standard 123 with UAE came the announcement that the Obama administration had started negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. This produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015. Touted by the administration as the strongest nonproliferation agreement ever struck, it essentially gave Iran the right to enrich uranium (which they had been doing in violation of the NPT) and in many respects allowed Tehran a legitimate and legal path to a weapons program. That is precisely what our nonproliferation policies are designed to stop.

It is fundamentally inconsistent for us to condition nuclear collaboration with our allies on their commitment to not enrich uranium in perpetuity, yet give to Iran, this region’s greatest threat to the United States, Israel, and Sunni Arabs, the right to enrich uranium. The argument will be that the JCPOA gave us unfettered access to what Iran is doing with its nuclear program, yet this has proven to be false. Furthermore, the United States also handed the entire Iranian civil nuclear program to Russia and China. And now China is also aggressively offering Saudi a complete package of nuclear collaboration. In an almost undefendable explanation by U.S. nonproliferation experts as to why we did this, the response is that a 123 Agreement with Iran is unnecessary because the United States is not providing the civil nuclear power program. This sums up precisely the principled inconsistency of our policies and why we need real statecraft.

Working with Allies

Since the signing of the JCPOA in 2015, we have heard a consistent message from our Sunni allies: “If Iran gets a weapon, I must have a weapon.” We must understand this is not only their right to take such a stance, it is the unintended and unfortunate position that policymakers have forced them into.

In June 2022, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) released a solicitation for two large-scale nuclear power plants. France, Korea, Russia, and China all were invited—the United States was not. Why not?

While the Biden administration has offered many explanations, one that is patently inaccurate and devoid of strategic empathy is that the Saudis have refused to sign a 123 Agreement—specifically, a Gold Standard 123 Agreement. Again, to empathize with KSA, their geopolitical context, and their recent history, their position is that they can’t sign such an agreement given the backdrop of the Iranian JCPOA and Iran’s legitimate pathway to a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, the United States has maintained that Westinghouse, a U.S. nuclear power company, didn’t receive a KSA offer to bid due to the absence of a 123 Agreement. However, this explanation is weak and insufficient because, as pointed out in the UAE case, 123 Agreements follow a viable commercial offer—not the other way around.

Currently, the Saudis are working to bring the United States into a legitimate conversation about their pursuit of civil nuclear power. We have been called the “preferred nation” to work with by KSA. That’s a bold statement considering we haven’t offered a viable solution, our track record in nuclear new build is uninspiring, and we continue to watch Iran inch closer to a weapons program. But it demonstrates that we have a chance to recover and get back on track.

First, understand why KSA says what it must about its nuclear program and offer them a better deal; one that brings in commitments to allow KSA to fully utilize their natural resources in uranium, enrichment, reprocessing, etc., a standard 123 with caveats around their peaceful pursuits. In short, a security guarantee that in essence would say to Gulf Cooperation Council nations, “we will come to your collective defense if you are ever threatened by a nation or entity with a WMD capability”—a NATO Article 5 type agreement around WMD threats which is more powerful and strategic than going hands off the wheel as we do now.

The KSA deserves credit for continuing to search for a more strategic alliance with the United States. Let’s not push them into the hands of Russia and China. Instead, let’s empathize with their geopolitical position while considering our own security interests in that region of the world and look for the elusive strategic statecraft in WMD once and for all.

We should not let 123 Agreements be the sole policy agreement that defines our civil nuclear program in the Middle East when the entire kit bag of statecraft and diplomacy could be deployed.

RDML (ret.) Michael Hewitt, U.S. Navy, is co-founder and CEO of IP3 Corporation and CEO of Allied Nuclear Partners. IP3 is the lead U.S. integrator for the development and operations of peaceful and secure civil nuclear power in the global marketplace. IP3’s vision is to create thriving, peaceful environments in critical world markets through the development of sustainable energy and security infrastructure via public/private initiatives and industry-led partnerships.

Image: Shutterstock.

Depuis le 31 décembre 2017, les manifestations de militants catholiques se multiplient en République démocratique du Congo. Ils réclament la tenue d'élections libres avant fin 2018. Le pouvoir réplique violemment : au moins une vingtaine de morts (difficiles à dénombrer précisément), des arrestations (...) / République démocratique du Congo, Démocratie, Élections, Politique, Société civile, Religion, Christianisme, Société, Mouvement de contestation - 2018/04

Et si c'était son culot et son mépris des règles communes qui, bien plus que son libéralisme économique, d'ailleurs relatif, ou ses mesures anti-immigrés, expliquaient la longévité politique de M. Silvio Berlusconi ? / Italie, Économie, Politique, Corruption - (...) / Italie, Économie, Politique, Corruption - 2009/09

The West should help Kyiv retake all its territory.

Why outsiders struggle to understand Beijing’s decision-making.

Lebanon’s parliamentary rival camps are set to convene a new session on June 14 to try once again to elect a new president. This would be the twelfth attempt to find someone who can forge a consensus among all the parties who are divided into different factions. Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri declared he would open the chamber’s doors for a session, provided there were two serious candidates. The names that will receive the most votes are Jihad Azour and Suleiman Frangieh.

The atmosphere feels like a high-stakes showdown between two diametrically opposing visions for Lebanon. In some way, it is. The crucial question is: will the seven-month-long presidential paralysis finally be broken?

It is difficult to say. But Azour’s chances of entering Baabda (the presidential residence) are higher than those who came before him. One example is Michel Moawad, who had the support of multiple parties like the Lebanese Forces (LF), Kataeb, and “Change” members of Parliament. Moawad, who is also a member of Parliament, held a press conference on June 4 announcing his withdrawal and endorsement of Azour after momentum began building behind him.

“I decided to contribute to reaching this intersection that led to the nomination of Jihad Azour, and we shall relentlessly continue our battle,” he said.

For Moawad, a viable rescue plan to bring Lebanon out of its current economic problems had taken precedence over his political ambitions.

Nevertheless, his campaign for the presidency had hit a wall. The support Moawad rallied behind him was not enough to meet the threshold to become former President Michel Aoun’s successor. The negotiations began to proceed in search of a compromise. Azour is not new in Lebanese politics. He has a history of serving in government as finance minister (2005-2008), but also as a senior International Monetary Fund (IMF) official. The cabinet he served in was led by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Added to his political experience, the reputation Azour obtained as a competent global finance expert strengthened the argument that he can lead Lebanon out of its current economic crisis.

Mark Daou, a member of the Parliament of the Taqaddom Party, spoke to The National Interest about why he is casting his ballot for Azour.

“It’s his financial prowess. He knows the international community and can open doors for Lebanon. He has spent time in Lebanon’s archaic system and has broad experience through his IMF days in dealing with crisis ridden states.”

Daou made another point by addressing the fact that he is not Suleiman Frangieh—Hezbollah’s candidate. Hezbollah publicly endorsed the Christian Marada Movement leader early on. Frangieh, who hails from the northern region of Zgharta (same as Moawad), has not received any support from Christian parties. The presidential seat is reserved for a Maronite Christian in Lebanon’s confessional system. So far, the opposition in Parliament is holding the line on their rejection of Frangieh’s ascendency. In fact, it has grown to attract unexpected support.

In an unexpected convergence, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and its leader, Gebran Bassil, announced their intention to vote for Azour. From the beginning of the presidential race, the FPM and Hezbollah (traditionally allies) did not agree on a candidate for the presidency. Hezbollah made it clear that its candidate was Frangieh and has not shown signals of wavering on its position.

This caused a falling out between the two parties who are now at cross purposes on this issue. Bassil has said to the international press that although he has joined with the opposition in supporting Azour, his position is not “entrenched” and the possibility to find other names remains open.

“If we support a name, it doesn't mean we refuse all others. We are always available and ready for dialogue to agree on a consensual name.”

Others have taken a more nuanced view on why they have chosen to rally their support around Azour. One source from the Lebanese Forces told The National Interest what the reasons are for selecting Azour after many months of standing by Moawad.

“First, we did not choose to support Mr. Jihad Azour, as he is not our candidate, nor the candidate of any party. Yet, there was a convergence of several groups over his name.”

Lebanon’s complicated system makes it almost impossible for one side to push their candidate of choice without a political deal. This has held Lebanon back from making substantial progress on reforms, even despite opportunities to save the country.

The LF also believes that Azour’s history in the financial sector both in government and abroad gives him the necessary legitimacy to start the IMF bailout plan. The LF as part of the “Strong Republic” parliamentarian bloc released a statement explaining its official position and praised Azour for his willingness to have a dialogue with all political components and partners.

“Mr. Azour’s records being employed by an internationally renowned institution is credit enough for his integrity, and the quasi unanimity of the opposition group builds on that by opting to endorse his candidacy.”

The importance of tomorrow’s election cannot be understated. Either a president will be chosen who can work constructively with domestic and regional partners to break the cycle of Lebanon’s depression, or more time and the country’s future will continue to be wasted.

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Shutterstock.

When Lewis and Clark began their journey across the United States to the Pacific Ocean, they carried maps, a compass, and used the stars to navigate. Now, humans have a chance to settle among the stars, with several prototype Moon settlements being tested and the cost of space launches continuing to fall. However, just like Lewis and Clark, engineers will need to accurately map and survey the Moon in order to make human settlement a possibility. Technology that can replicate our Global-Positioning System (GPS) on the Moon will be the fastest way to map the surface of the Moon and lay the groundwork for future settlement. This would allow space crews to determine their precise location on the surface of the Moon, and easily navigate around the celestial body. But most importantly, it would put the United States in the driver’s seat to use the Moon’s resources and explore other celestial bodies.

GPS as we know it on Earth uses a system of satellites to determine the location of objects on Earth’s surface. It’s made up of a constellation of twenty-four satellites that all orbit Earth in a precise path, making a full orbit around the Earth in twelve hours. While orbiting Earth, these satellites constantly send out radio signals to receivers on the ground, which then can be used to determine a location on the Earth’s surface based on the time it takes for the signal to reach the receiver. 

The U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) has previously mapped the Moon before the Apollo missions, but is currently working with space industry stakeholders to develop a version of the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84), a standard coordinate reference chart for determining latitude and longitude on Earth, for the Moon. Having the ability to apply a reference frame to the Moon will allow astronauts and crewed space missions to easily identify where they are in relation to other points on the Moon. Establishing transmission stations on the Moon may be the long-term solution, but navigating spacecraft to the Moon’s surface to determine the best location for these stations remains a problem. The U.S. Space Force and NASA have determined that some existing technology could be repurposed for Moon navigation. 

Scientists from NASA’s jet propulsion lab in California have determined that existing satellites—eighty-one in total—have the capabilities to allow other satellites and spacecraft to determine their position above the Moon’s surface. When satellites receive radio signals from Earth’s surface, those same signals radiate into space. With the Moon being an average of 238,855 miles away from Earth, these signals are able to help spacecraft navigate to specific positions above the Moon within 200-300 meters. Existing satellites could also help astronauts navigate where they are on the Moon’s surface, with the exception of the lunar poles, as geologic barriers like craters could block the signal from these satellites. However, satellites like the Lunar Renaissance Orbiter (LRO) can form the basis of a Moon satellite network at a low price.

The cost to manufacture smaller satellites has been dropping alongside space launch costs. Today, some satellites are able to be mass-produced, greatly reducing the cost of launching them into orbit. By pairing smaller satellites in lunar orbit alongside the LRO, we could begin establishing a satellite network for future lunar navigation. 

The United States stands to reap enormous benefits from being the nation that underpins lunar infrastructure and science services. Not only will these systems benefit our astronauts and ability to place a permanent settlement on the Moon, but it will also deter other actors from setting up their own lunar systems which could have military applications. The Moon is currently up for grabs, and the first nation to establish basic navigational infrastructure will have a massive advantage when it comes to establishing and maintaining a settlement on the Moon. The U.S. should be the one in control of these crucial lunar settlement building blocks.

Roy Mathews is an Innovation Fellow at Young Voices. He is a graduate of Bates College and former Fulbright Fellow in Indonesia. He has been published in The Wall Street Journal, Boston Herald, and National Review.

Image: Image courtesy of NASA.

French president Emmanuel Macron recently declared that, while the West must ensure Ukraine’s security, “it must also envisage non-confrontation with Russia and rebuild a sustainable balance of forces.” Many foreign policy commentators lambasted Macron for his supposedly naïve and delusional remarks. Better, the counterargument goes, to simply give Ukraine what it needs to achieve total victory and cripple Russia’s military such that it cannot threaten its neighbors again anytime soon. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky himself, in an interview with the Washington Post, rejected any possibility of talks with Russia, saying, “I think it makes no sense for Ukraine to negotiate with the collective with the name ‘Putin.’”

But what if total victory proves militarily unattainable? What if the only alternative to negotiations is a bloody, protracted, frozen conflict?

The general aversion to negotiations would suggest that, if talks do occur, they should be limited in scope to avoid “rewarding” Russian aggression. This, I argue, gets the strategic calculus backward. Instead of narrow negotiations, the United States and its allies should take the broadest possible approach to any eventual talks with Russia. This promises to both maximize the West’s short-term leverage resulting from Russian weakness and could facilitate peace by allowing someone other than Ukraine to give Vladimir Putin a face-saving “win” at home.

The war has devastated Russia. Its military is decimated. Its economy, while surprisingly resilient to sanctions, will continue atrophying due to international divestment and internal corruption. These effects are compounded by an aging population and the widespread emigration of young, educated Russians.

This is a (self-inflicted) tragedy for Russia. It is also an opportunity for the West. Taking a broad view of eventual negotiations with Russia promises numerous advantages and opportunities.

First, Russia today is at its weakest point in decades. This gives Ukraine, the United States, and the West more broadly unprecedented leverage and freedom of action. Seizing this opportunity to negotiate on the broadest possible terms will maximize that tremendous, but temporary, bargaining advantage. Far from rewarding Russia, negotiating now would be exploiting its massive vulnerability. And while Ukraine’s security is a key priority, the United States should also seek to use that leverage more broadly in forging a more durable and stable regional security architecture.

Second, a broader scope for negotiations offers potentially important advantages for ending the war in Ukraine on favorable terms. Neither Kiev nor Moscow look prepared to make significant territorial concessions at present. Absent total military victory, this portends a protracted frozen conflict that serves no one’s interests. Broader negotiations would allow Washington or NATO to offer incentives that make peace more attractive to Russia, so Ukraine does not have to.

Russia’s temporary weakness allows for such flexibility without seriously undermining Western security. When negotiating with peer competitors, even small margins can matter. A fine balance often works against compromise. Negotiating with a greatly weakened adversary, however, can allow for greater flexibility without giving the other side a potentially decisive advantage. There is simply a larger margin for error and lower costs to taking risks in pursuit of a stable regional order.

To be clear, I am suggesting that the United States and its allies consider, over the long term and only in response to a significant Russian withdrawal from Ukraine, offering concessions beyond what Russia’s power warrants, much less what it deserves. This might include, for instance, a moratorium on NATO expansion. This seems morally repugnant, considering Russia’s egregious and unprovoked aggression. But in the might-makes-right realm of international politics, moralizing in the face of battlefield realities can be dangerous and counterproductive. What’s more, further NATO expansion beyond Finland and Sweden seems extremely unlikely for now, so such concessions wouldn’t really be conceding much.

The more important and realistic concern is that concessions would “reward” Russia’s atrocious behavior and encourage aggression elsewhere. On balance, however, rewards would be far outweighed by the costs Russia has already suffered in this war. Indeed, the main reason the United States should consider broad-based talks is precisely because the war has been so devastating to Russia. Negotiating while Russia is weak reduces the concessions it can hope to extract, further ensuring that the massive costs of its aggression will far outweigh the benefits.

Russia, like it or not, has a big say in the viability of any European security order. Macron is, therefore, largely right: a purely punitive approach that doesn’t consider Russia’s place in the regional order will further weaken Russia but drive it closer to China and ensure that whatever capabilities Moscow can muster will be aimed against us. A peace that achieves Russian buy-in offers better prospects for a durable, stable regional order. Renegotiating the broader regional order offers at least a chance of achieving this stability. Russia’s temporary weakness creates an opportunity to do so at a significantly reduced cost.

In sum, Russia’s weakness presents a unique opportunity to work toward a regional security order that is broadly favorable to the US, its allies, and Ukraine, but still attractive to Russia given its weakness and vulnerability. We should be prepared to grasp this opportunity if it arises.

Kyle Haynes is an associate professor of political science at Purdue University and a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities.

C'est un roman de vie, de mort, de rêves et de désillusions, de fuites et de renoncements, le livre du destin, le requiem de l'infini. Car la mort va venir, le narrateur nous met en garde, « un peu de patience, elle vient ici comme elle vient dans toute histoire identique à celle-ci, à la fin, (...) / Danemark, Scandinavie, Littérature, Fiction, Culture, Femmes - 2018/04

Ukraine, Russia, and the lessons of World War I.

A challenge to Pakistan’s military may only strengthen the generals.

One of the more interesting developments over the past decade has been the “return” of realism in U.S. foreign policy and international relations. The framework was (popularly) considered to have been overthrown by liberalism, which in the eyes of many was destined to reign eternally over a perpetual age of peace and progress. History, though, had other plans.

Yet realism’s “return” has not gone over well. In fact, despite strong grounds for success—especially after neoconservatives’ failures in the Middle East and the significant pushback against neoliberals by populist and nationalist forces—realists mostly remain outside the halls of power. At this point, it is not unreasonable to suspect that something is wrong with realists themselves. This is increasingly manifesting in foreign policy discourse.

Take, for instance, a withering-but-well-intentioned critique put out late last week by Malcom Kyeyune, an essayist and columnist at Compact magazine. In his article, Kyeyune goes after realism through Elbridge Colby: the former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development (2017–2018), a central figure in the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and perhaps Washington’s foremost realist (at least, in terms of public influence and direct political influence). Both the critique, and the response to it by Colby himself, illustrate how American realists struggle to grasp the current historical circumstances in which we live.

From Promised Land to Crusader State

Kyeyune’s critique is composed of two arguments, which must be examined in turn.

The first is his contention, expanding upon John Mearsheimer’s recurring axiom that “America is not a realist nation,” is that “America is a country that cannot run on, legitimate itself by, understand itself through, or inspire a sense of genuine national cohesion through realism.” It should be noted that Kyeyune does not think that the realist framework is itself incorrect; if anything, he asserts that it is “better equipped to explain today’s world than liberal internationalism ever was or could hope to be,” and expresses a great deal of sympathy (if not admiration and praise) for Colby. But his point remains: America cannot function with realism as its underlying ideological basis.

Colby disagrees, stating that while the United States “may not legitimate or understand itself through Morenthau-style realism” (emphasis his), it can run on it. As evidence, Colby draws upon America’s long and proud history of realist policies: leveraging foreign powers to assist in the revolution, the formation of the federal government, Washington’s Farewell Address, its relationships with Europe and its own hemisphere throughout the late eighteenth and must of the nineteenth century, and so on, all the way through the Cold War. In short, Colby summarizes:

…the biggest deviation from this tradition of practical, actual American statecraft has been the last thirty years. Why? The realist in me says we have been spoiled and made hubristic by unipolarity. But it does not need to be this way! American political culture will demand a more elevated rhetoric. But this does not require forfeiting an actually realist foreign policy. There is a tension, to be sure, but I think American history shows it can be reconciled.

Colby certainly has a point that America has a noble and proud realist tradition. But this defense is built on a notable assumption: that one can separate the underlying ideological basis and self-conception of a country from how it’s run.

This is where problems occur, and what Kyeyune is alluding to: you cannot separate the two.

Instrumental in understanding this is are the arguments put forward by Walter A. McDougall in his magisterial 1997 book, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter With the World Since 1776. In brief, McDougall contends that, for much of its history, the United States understood itself as a promised land—a new nation of new beginnings and unbound aspirations, uniquely blessed, and destined towards the maintenance of liberty and greater triumphs. Traces of this can be seen as early as 1783, only weeks after the Revolutionary War had been won, with the preacher Ezra Stiles proclaiming in a sermon—notably named “The United States Elevated to Glory and Honor”— that “the Lord shall have made his american Israel, high above all nations which he hath made, in numbers, and in praise, and in name, and in honor!” (emphasis his). As McDougall observes, “In short, Americans were a chosen people delivered from bondage to a Promise Land, and can’t get more exceptional than that.”

This early American self-conception of a promised land was congenial towards the realist framework; when you, as a people, understand your nation as a promised holy land that is at risk from foreign enemies and must never be lost, you are far more inclined to take its protection seriously. This means making judicious use of limited power and resources, entering deals with foreign powers, compromising here and there, and the like. In other words, the application of a realist foreign policy.

This national self-understanding, however, evolved over time towards that of a crusader state; a nation that purposely goes out to the world and seeks to change it. Consider, in contrast to Stiles’ sermon, a speech given by Senator Albert J. Beveridge (R-IN) in 1898—notably named “March of the Flag”—to defend the annexation of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Hawaii:

Fellow citizens–It is a noble land that God has given us; a land that can feed and clothe the world; a land whose coast lines would inclose half the countries of Europe; a land set like a sentinel between the two imperial oceans of the globe; a greater England with a nobler destiny. It is a mighty people that He has planted on this soil; a people sprung from the most masterful blood of history; a people perpetually revitalized by the virile workingfolk of all the earth; a people imperial by virtue of their power, by right of their institutions, by authority of their heaven-directed purposes, the propagandists and not the misers of liberty.

The shift in tone is unmistakable. While elements of the old self-understanding (a promised land) are still present, America was now a nation that could go forward and materially help the world, with a “heaven-directed purpose” to serve as “the propagandist of liberty.” And fulfilling this greater mission, obviously, requires a new foreign policy approach: one that is certainly not as congenial towards realism, and is more oriented towards liberal internationalism.

It is here that Colby’s defense runs dry: the (liberal internationalist) flaws with America’s foreign policy are not limited to the last thirty years. Rather, the foreign policy of the last thirty years is both the culmination and the inevitable political outcome of a shift in how America sees and understands itself dating back more than a century. While elements of the old realist approach to foreign policy still remain (as was evident in the Cold War), it is, to borrow McDougall’s usage of religious references, the Old Testament. Today, it is the New Testament of liberal internationalism that reigns.

This is the real thrust of Kyeyune’s first argument: that a number of realists—at least, a number of the more politically active ones—do not understand this seismic shift is an indictment. How can supposed realists, who formulate policy by evaluating the world as it is, not as they wish it to be, have a hard time grasping the changed political and cultural environment in which they find themselves? Do they not see that they are in the cultural minority, and are therefore hard-pressed to make change happen?

Colby, by all measures a good strategist and thoughtful thinker, is certainly aware of this. What then explains the gap?

The Magic Runs Out

It is Kyeyune’s second argument, which Colby notably does not reply to, that is perhaps the stronger and the more significant of the two, and illuminates the real problem realists face.

States, Kyeyune explains, run on “magic,” which if lost results in the eventual collapse of the state in question. The term can thus be understood as a shorthand for political legitimacy, yet it is more than that. It can also be described, perhaps, as the sort of transcendental and metaphysical belief upon which human societies are built. Rome existed through the mos maiorum. The European kingdoms depended upon divine right. Chinese dynasties lived and died by the will of heaven (天, tian). The dynamic, one could argue, also exists in religion: Christ’s eternal and universal empire runs on love and the promise of eternal salvation, for which millions are willing to die for to this very day. This is, after all, why an institution like the Catholic Church has been able to outlast kings, empires, revolutions, schisms, technological upheavals, and more.

Kyeyune’s “magic” critique thus has two layers. On the political legitimacy layer, he means that realist attempts to reform U.S. foreign policy—and perhaps, more broadly, the country’s government—are doomed to fail. This is simply because a broad swathe of the population no longer regards Washington DC as being “legitimate”—not an unreasonable charge given historically low levels of public trust in government, institutions, contemporary political leadership, and so forth. Talk of “national divorce” and even civil war appear in the mainstream. These are symptoms of a country where the center, both in the political and the institutional sense, is weak.

But on the more abstract, possibly metaphysical layer, Kyeyune is indicating that attempts to invoke America’s transcendental purpose and self-conception—that of a promised land that takes care of itself through realist means—are at odds with realist assessments of the current situation. How can America be, or return to be, a self-focused promised land with a realist foreign policy if it is so fundamentally dysfunctional and internally divided now, at the supposed height of its political, military, economic, and ideological power? Attempting to invoke the “magic” of America to justify the defense of Taiwan, as Colby does, falls flat: a not-insignificant number of Americans will not see—and more importantly, not feel—how fighting China an ocean away will help in that regard. Just as how Berlin Wall soldiers couldn’t be roused to defend the checkpoints, for the whole Soviet system was an open farce at that point, Americans won’t be roused to man the trenches of Taipei; they don’t believe in the supposed holy mission of America anymore.

Kyeyune is very pessimistic and fatalistic about the United States’ prospects—a doomer, to use the popular online term. But his assessment of America’s present material circumstances is not exaggerated. How can the United States, for example, pretend that it will be able to reorient its political and military might toward confronting China in Asia—an entire ocean away—if it can’t even audit its existing military assets, its Navy is in dire straits, defense supply chains are a bloody mess, and there are still other concerns in Ukraine, the Middle East, Africa, and so on, to say nothing of America’s southern border? This is without factoring in the country’s fragile and recession-bound economy, worrisome debt situation (especially in commercial real estate, which will hit the financial system hard through banks), and more.

Reality Comes for the Realists

In the Amazon television series Foundation (loosely based on the Foundation series of stories by Isaac Asimov), a genius mathematician, Hari Seldon, uses hyper-advanced statistics and modeling to foresee the collapse of the Galactic Empire. Emperor Cleon and his security forces consider Seldon’s proclamations to be a direct threat to the empire’s security and stability, putting a hard-won peace at risk. The empire’s fears are only heightened after a dramatic and devastating terrorist attack—totally not an allusion to the 9/11 attacks, what are you talking about—which results in the emperor exiling Seldon and his followers to the far side of the galaxy. Yet in the years that follow, signs of imperial decline become apparent: mounting costs, domestic insurrection, religious exhortations, and rebelling vassal states. Cleon turns to his own mathematicians for reassurance:

Head Mathematician: “We believe the predictive models of Hari Seldon to be counterfactual.”

Emperor Cleon, after clapping his hands, seeming relieved: “And you believe this… why?”

Head Mathematician: “In the thirty-five years since Seldon uttered his heretical proclamations, the Imperium has expanded, rather than contracted, by every critical metric.”

The mathematicians, in short, are less than helpful: they simply cannot understand Seldon’s math, his modeling, his worldview, and insist that everything is fine despite blatantly obvious evidence to the contrary. Moreover, they are afraid to admit their failure to the emperor and are visibly intimidated (if not terrified) of him. Cleon is left immensely frustrated; he senses his empire is slowly collapsing, but can’t quite grasp why, or accept—as Seldon argued—that he himself is part of the problem.

Contemporary American realists—or at least those realists that are vocal and politically active right now—are not quite the imperial mathematicians, but are equally afraid of uttering “heretical proclamations” that could see them exiled from the imperial capital. After all, exile means a loss of power and influence, and then who would be left to do what must be done? Certainly not the internationalists who got us into this mess. But it is practically impossible to tackle the critical and mounting problems of the day without openly addressing the reality that the empire, such as it is, is not what it once was.

This, I would hazard, is Kyeyune’s real critique of Colby and other realists: that not only is the United States collapsing as an imperial power, with all that implies, but her realists are not recognizing it. This is either because they don’t see it or because they fear doing so openly is an act of political suicide in Washington DC. Not only that, but accepting the premise of imperial collapse—i.e., the end of the Western-led liberal international order—means that a great number of contemporary policy debates are rendered moot. The life’s work of too many academics, theoreticians, think tank wonks, writers, and others are at stake.

Yet if Kyeyune’s diagnosis—and he is far from the only one who holds this view—is correct, or is anywhere close to correct, then realists ought to be the ones grappling with it. This will require confronting diabolically hard and politically sensitive questions. How do we communicate to the American people that they could be facing a permanent increase in the cost of living? What items can and must be cut from a significantly reduced national budget? Which of America’s strategic interests—those that are strictly necessary to preserve and enhance the well-being of American citizens in a free, democratic, and secure republic—take priority over others? Which international alliances and partnerships can be maintained, and which can’t?

None of these questions, and others like them, have easy answers. But realists are the best placed to tackle them. They should probably start doing so.

Carlos Roa is the Executive Editor of The National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

The federal indictment of Donald Trump is of significance in multiple ways.

For one, it is a matter of accountability for the willful, flagrant violation of the law and sustained attempts to obstruct efforts by authorities to enforce the law. In short, the concern is with the rule of law and the consistent application of it.

At another level, the importance of secrecy of the documents that Trump so cavalierly mishandled—and the possible damage to national security from such mishandling—must be considered. Despite discussions about overclassification that often arise in the wake of major leaks or other compromises of classified information, there is a good reason for why the type of materials described in the indictment are kept classified. Exposure would make U.S. plans, capabilities, and sources of vital information vulnerable to hostile foreign powers. It may be hard for individual citizens to see how any of this relates to their daily lives, but it is integral to the security of anyone living in the United States. Harmful exposure could result from the sheer carelessness of Trump’s handling of the documents, or from anything Trump himself might do with them, given his own foreign connections.

More broadly, as David Rothkopf elaborates, the case is but one of the most recently and thoroughly documented facets of the larger danger that Trump has posed to the nation in the past and will do so again in the future if he is put in a position to do so. That danger has included—as in the subject of his second impeachment—no less than the attempted overthrow, including through incitement of violence, of the American democratic system of choosing leaders through free elections and respecting the results of those elections.

An even broader level extends beyond Trump himself and includes reactions to the indictment from many of his supporters or those attempting to appeal to his base of support. Those reactions reflect how many citizens of this country do not identify their interests with the United States of America but rather with a narrower, largely party-based, subset of America. Such sentiment does not uphold the national interest and is often contrary to the national interest. The bluntest way to describe this pattern is in terms of loyalties—of having primary loyalty not to the United States but rather to a party or to some demographic group—although speaking of someone’s loyalties risks sounding like some kind of latter-day McCarthyism.

A safer terminology is that of nationalism—in the non-pejorative sense of strong identification with, and love for, one’s nation. Trump has called himself a nationalist, and in doing so was endeavoring to ride a wave of nationalist sentiment that in recent years has extended to many other countries besides the United States. But in his highly divisive rhetoric and entire political approach, Trump is anything but an American nationalist. He is appealing to only one part of America while fomenting hatred toward other parts. Many of his supporters exhibit an extreme form of political sectarianism, in which Americans of other political persuasions are regarded as enemies every bit as much as foreign adversaries are. Differences across party lines are perceived less as differences of opinion over the best way to pursue a national interest than as a fundamental conflict between adversaries who are not part of the same community of interests.

In interpreting reactions to the case at hand, consider that even before the recent indictment was unsealed, enough was publicly known about Trump’s actions and the Mar-a-Lago documents for legal experts to opine that prosecutors would have a very strong case. Now with the indictment—replete with details of Trump’s own words and actions, his aides’ shuffling of boxes between bathrooms and storerooms and ballroom stages, and duped lawyers being set up to make false statements about the documents—the case is one where, as one former Bush administration official and federal prosecutor put it, “If this were a normal person and a normal case, you’d be talking to your client about pleading guilty.” This prosecution, and seeing it through to a full administration of justice, is unquestionably in the U.S. national interest. It would have been a dereliction of duty by the Department of Justice to have done otherwise.

And yet some politicians, especially concentrated among Republicans in the House of Representatives, are voicing reactions to the indictment, calling it a “brazen weaponization of power” (Speaker Kevin McCarthy), “a sham indictment” (Majority Leader Steve Scalise), and “We have now reached a war phase. Eye for an eye” (Representative Andy Biggs of Arizona). One hears nothing in any of this caustic rhetoric about the nature of Trump’s actions or of the implications for the rule of law and for national security if law enforcement officials did not do their duty and instead gave this sort of conduct a pass.

Nor is there, among all the accusations about supposed weaponization and political persecution, the slightest shred of evidence that federal investigators and prosecutors have acted on this case out of anything other than a sense of duty to enforce the law. If one were to speculate about the innermost thoughts of Special Counsel Jack Smith, they probably would be—beyond a strong sense of duty in doing his current job—that his life would have been much simpler and less unpleasant if he had remained at The Hague prosecuting Balkan war criminals, where he would not be subject to the months of partisan abuse that he now will have to endure.

In the weakening or outright absence of a sense of national interest that is part of extreme political sectarianism, the sectarians have no place for the concept of nonpolitical civil servants whose job is to serve that interest. This exclusion underlies the often-heard nonsense about a “deep state.” It is not clear to what extent politicians who employ such rhetoric really believe that there is no such thing as an apolitical public servant, or if this is merely part of their attempt to appeal to what they see as their constituency. Either way, the willingness to cripple and discredit essential national functions of security and law enforcement—all just to try to shield their party’s man from the consequences of his own misconduct—shows the extent to which some Americans, including powerful members of Congress, have abandoned whatever dedication they may have once had in serving the national interest. The unfounded accusations about the motives of dedicated and honest public servants constitute a new form of McCarthyism.

The damage extends beyond FBI agents and Department of Justice prosecutors. Trump tried to destroy the entire upper reaches of the federal civil service with his “Schedule F” scheme. He certainly would try again if returned to office, and other Republican presidential aspirants are also attracted to the idea as a campaign plank. If such destruction were to occur, the consequences would be severe. Internationally, the United States would present a fractured, inconsistent, and ineffective face to the rest of the world, with no one speaking on behalf of all Americans. Domestically, it would bring the United States a couple of steps closer to a Hobbesian state of nature in which the nasty and brutish aspects would flow from government no longer being populated with officials working in the interests of the entire nation, but only with partisan warriors.

Paul Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was as a National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Professor Pillar also served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of its Analytic Group. He is also a contributing editor for this publication.

Image: Shutterstock.

Late last month, Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva held a summit for the leaders of twelve South American countries with the view of pushing regional integration. The meeting was well-attended with presidents from every country except Peru, whose leader was unable to attend for legal reasons pertaining to an investigation. While the effort to promote greater economic integration was generally appreciated, the Brazilian president’s warm embrace of Venezuela’s authoritarian President Nicolás Maduro one day before the summit set an ideological tone for the event. Indeed, Lula’s efforts to restart some type of South American unity left more questions than answers.

Changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy under Lula

Since his return to office in January 2023, Lula has shifted Brazil’s foreign policy from a generally pro-U.S. stance under right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022) to a return to nonalignment—broadly defined as a preference for a multipolar world—which allows Latin America’s largest country to pursue its own path, reduce the role of the United States (and the West), and work through global South organizations, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Another plank in this policy is for Brazil to lead in continental unity, which would give Latin America greater leverage in global affairs.

Lula’s nonaligned policy also means leaning toward Moscow in the Russo-Ukrainian War and maintaining close economic relations with China. The national interest dimension is evident in that Russia is important as it is a major supplier of fertilizer for Brazil’s agricultural exports, while China is the South American country’s primary export market and has invested $66 billion in its economy between 2007 and 2020, according to the Brazil-China Business Council. As Oliver Stuenkel, professor of international relations at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in Sao Paulo observed: “Non-alignment is seen as a safe bet in a world where great power competition will increase. From the Brazilian point of view, the rise of China and re-emergence of Russia is not actually bad…that is why Brasilia has no interest in joining a western coalition against Russia.”

The Beijing and Moscow tilt is reflected in Lula sending a delegation to Chinese and Russian ally Venezuela in March, refusing to send weapons to Ukraine, and hosting Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov in April. In April, at the BRICS summit, the Brazilian leader also called upon BRICS to come up with an alternative to replace the U.S. dollar in foreign trade. In addition to these China and Russia-related developments, Brazil refused to sign a UN resolution condemning Nicaragua’s human rights abuses; Managua has devolved into a pro-Russia and Chinese leftist dictatorship. Brazil allowed Iranian warships to dock in Rio de Janeiro, despite pressure from Washington to bar them.

The Venezuela Factor

Considering the “nonaligned” stance of Brazil’s foreign policy, the May 2023 Brasilia summit sought to promote the creation of a regional trade currency to challenge the hegemony of the U.S. dollar and to pull Latin American countries closer together under the flag of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The single currency would initially apply to the Mercosur trade bloc (composed of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). In his opening address, the Brazilian president proposed to “strengthen the South American identity in monetary policy, through better compensation mechanisms and the creation of a shared unit of transaction for trading”, instead of being dependent on external currencies, in particular the U.S. dollar.

This idea has kicked around since the early 1990s, but has never gained much support and is likely to go anywhere. There are considerable differences in monetary policy across the region; it is questionable that South America’s major trade partners would be willing to trade in a Mercosur currency (like Argentina’s volatile peso), and any such development would require a broader regional economic foundation based on customs unions and a common market (as done in the European Union over several decades). No doubt the idea was greeted with polite applause, but in the aftermath of the summit there is no rush of willing participants.

What made a bigger splash at the summit was Lula’s embrace of Maduro. Thematically, the meeting of Lula and Maduro prior to the summit was meant to set the tone of conciliation and integration. Lula, however, was strident that the charges against Maduro of human and civil rights abuses were part of a political “narrative” by the West and he condemned U.S. sanctions on the Venezuelan government as “worse than war.” He also noted that it was “absurd” for some governments not to recognize Maduro as the duly elected leader.

The reaction to Lula’s “welcome back, Maduro” stance is seen in two ways. On the pragmatic side, warmer Brazilian-Venezuelan relations reflect the failure of the West’s efforts to dislodge Maduro, and, like it or not, the Venezuelan strongman is here to stay. In that respect, other Latin American leaders like Colombia’s Gustavo Petro and Mexico’s Andrés Manuel López Obrador recognize this and want to move on. Even the Biden administration has softened its stance on Venezuela (though with little to show for its efforts). Another point of consideration for Lula’s determination to mend relations with Venezuela, severed by his predecessor, right-wing Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022) made it much more difficult to address issues related to a shared border, climate change, and the need to deal with Venezuelan refugees.

The other reaction is more negative and related to human rights. Lula worked with Maduro’s predecessor Hugo Chávez in the creation of UNASUR in 2008, which the Venezuelan leader started to counteract U.S. influence in South America. Perhaps some nostalgia for that era remains very much in Lula’s thinking on bringing Maduro in from the diplomatic cold and returning him to the international fold through a regional organization.

But the Brazilian leader’s intentional blind eye to the gross human rights abuses in Venezuela made some of the other South American leaders uncomfortable. While most made no comment, Chile’s center-left President Gabriel Boric stated, “We are glad that Venezuela is returning to multilateral bodies…This, however, cannot mean sweeping under the rug principles that are important to us. The human rights situation is not a narrative construction, it is a serious reality.” According to Uruguay’s center-right President Luis Lacalle Pou, “the worst thing we can do” is pretend there are no significant human rights problems in Venezuela.

Winners and Losers

Looking ahead, the biggest winner from Lula’s South American summit was Venezuela’s Maduro. The summit raised his profile and helped launder him as a national leader deserving of respect, despite his presiding over the largest migration crisis in the Western Hemisphere, the creation of a narco-state, and a disregard for democratic rule and human rights. Consequently, the summit was given an ideological stamp (a willingness to accept dictators), which is likely to complicate any future efforts for deeper economic integration, especially considering that elections could result in political shifts. Currently, South America is dominated by center-left governments, but that could change over the medium term. Argentina’s elections are scheduled for October this year.

While Lula got his summit, asserted Brazil’s growing importance as part of the Global South, and brought in a political pariah from the cold, little is likely to come from it in terms of concrete policies. If nothing else, it comes across as so much background noise from a region that cannot yet exert major leverage on global affairs. Lula and his cadre of foreign policy advisors are right that for Latin America to carry more weight in international affairs it needs greater unity. However, more summits like May’s are not going to do the trick, as ideological indulgences for dictators do not make for economic integration. The European Union was able to proceed on the path to economic integration, but has worked hard to keep its membership a democratic club, something Brazil’s president should have given greater thought to.

Dr. Scott B. MacDonald is the Chief Economist for Smith’s Research & Gradings, a Fellow with the Caribbean Policy Consortium, and a Research fellow with Global Americans. Prior to those positions, he worked for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Credit Suisse, Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette, KWR International, and Mitsubishi Corporation. His most recent book is The New Cold War, China and the Caribbean (Palgrave Macmillan 2022).

Image: Unsplash.

The unfortunate narrative that has defined Lebanon for much of its existence is one of corruption and conflict, culminating in the country’s current (and worst) economic and political crisis. France’s May 16 decision to issue an arrest warrant, followed by a similar May 23 German arrest warrant, for the embattled Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh and two associates offers no exception to this dynamic—hitting the small eastern Mediterranean country’s former financial paragon with money laundering and fraud charges just months before he steps down after nearly thirty years at the helm of the Banque Du Liban.

Yet Paris and Berlin’s decision is hardly the end of the road for Salameh or Beirut’s deeply rooted corruption problem. Rather, the move represents an ever-growing skepticism amongst the international community of Lebanon’s elites and its capacity to govern in a technocratic and effective manner.

France and Germany are only two of many other states currently investigating the central bank chief. Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Luxembourg are also investigating Salameh for similar concerns related to money laundering and fraud. Each case focuses on some or all aspects of roughly $300 million in transfers to European banks from Lebanon via the central bank, which was used to buy various properties and other assets. Investigators and other anti-corruption experts assert the funds likely belong to the Lebanese people. In line with these investigations, France, Germany, and Luxembourg seized assets worth $130 million in early March 2022. Swiss media has reported up to $300 to $500 million in assets embezzled into twelve Swiss banks.

Lebanon is also actively investigating Salameh in spite of strong political resistance from the country’s thoroughly co-opted judicial system. Led for some time by Judge Ghada Aoun—who has become renowned within anti-corruption circles for her brave attempts to hold Lebanon’s banking sector accountable—charged Salameh with illicit enrichment in early 2022. Following a year of back-and-forth questioning and obstruction, the Lebanese judiciary’s disciplinary council removed Aoun from office. She is currently appealing the decision, allowing her to remain in office today.

Salameh continues to deny all charges against him, both in Lebanon and abroad. His brother Raja and a former assistant also deny charges that they aided the governor in efforts to transfer and hide funds in Europe. While all three of these individuals have attended rounds of questioning in Europe and Lebanon with investigators, they have actively delayed the investigation numerous times with the help of Lebanese officials. For example, Lebanon’s Court of Cassation granted Salameh and every central bank employee sweeping legal immunities in September 2022, protecting them from Lebanon’s already poorly enforced banking regulations.

Salameh and associates have also regularly cited health problems or violations of Lebanese sovereignty to avoid hearings and depositions, culminating in his refusal to attend a May 15 hearing or recognize the rights of the investigators that led to the French and German arrest warrants. Rather than cooperate with the Interpol red notice released, however, Lebanese officials instituted a travel ban on Salameh.

Lebanese prime minister Najib Mikati has previously defended the bank chief, recently arguing alongside Salameh that he will complete his term that ends in July, given there is no serious replacement. It should be noted that Mikati and his brother, Taha, have deep ties to Lebanon’s banking system and connections to specific bank transfers facilitated by Raja Salameh between Lebanon and Europe—a point of investigation by the government of Monaco. That said, others in Lebanon—such as Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah—have openly called for his resignation. Critically, Lebanese law makes it illegal to extradite Lebanese citizens.

Thus, Salameh finds himself in a bind but is still largely protected by Lebanon’s ruling class. For figures like Nasrallah, the central bank governor represents low-hanging fruit and is easy to criticize publicly—especially to distract from Hezbollah’s corrupt actions and participation in a government that is increasingly understood to sit at the core of the country’s rot. Other politicians may increasingly concur that Salameh represents an easy target and scapegoat. The question is whether this effectively distracts from the Beirut government’s broader failures inside the country, especially as the international community already understands the country’s elites to be the root cause of Lebanon’s slow collapse.

While unlikely, it would be a mistake for the international community to view Salameh as the sole source of Lebanon’s corruption problem or an easy win to push addressing root issues to the future. While he likely is a key architect of Beirut’s currency exchange Ponzi scheme, his removal from the central bank will not cure the country’s vast corruption problems as he is simply one actor amongst many robbing the Lebanese people. Ultimately, broader political issues—namely banking secrecy, capital controls, and judicial independence reforms—will play a much more transformative role in solving Lebanon’s long-running issues. That being said, accountability measures must be implemented in parallel with such reforms.

For this reason, Salameh can and should be made an example of Lebanon’s near-term future—namely, one that holds corrupt officials to account for crimes that plunder the country at the expense of the average Lebanese citizen. But Salameh cannot be the beginning and end of such efforts. World leaders can support such efforts if they give the Lebanon file a higher priority. This includes supporting the International Monetary Fund’s reform plan through a combination of carrots and sticks that entice Beirut’s leaders and empower the independent opposition. More important, although less realistic anytime soon, should be a broader effort to combat the international kleptocracy that has come to define the neoliberal order and bolstered corrupt actors across the globe.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: Shutterstock.

Since the United States decided to go all-in with a focus on the great power competitions, terms such as irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, and small wars have lost vogue. However, while military theorists would like to return to a more conventional mindset, it is important to understand that a new era of “dirty wars” is on the horizon. This is relatively intuitive for those who understand the causes of unrest leading to instability and insurgency, but it is not clear that the geopolitical or military strategists who could make a difference see it coming.

The majority of insurgencies over the past century were rooted in societal discord in countries that were unable to effectively evolve from the agrarian age to the industrial age. The next such evolution is ongoing—and this one promises more of the same—but much faster and wider.

The metaverse, block chain, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, machine learning, augmented/virtual reality, and quantum, cloud, edge, and spatial computing are foundational elements of the emergent global world order. The possibilities are limitless, but not all are positive. With one foot in the industrial age and one in the virtual age, the risks are daunting. There is much debate about the risks of technologies such as AI eventually outsmarting and overtaking humans, but the risk addressed herein is more comparable to concerns during the Cold War that nuclear weapons would take the world back to the “stone ages.”

Technology is changing (virtually) everything. The traditional constraints of human labor are no longer a limiting factor in the global market. Corporations and governments are the benefactors of cost-cutting and labor-reducing innovations. Rapid technological advances will continue to reduce the demand for jobs. Thousands of people are losing their jobs every week—not because they failed to perform—but because the skills they developed through education, training, and experience are no longer relevant. Labor statistics are not just numbers—they are “hearts and minds.”

These dynamics will force even “skilled” workers down the economic ladder and will disproportionately impact labor markets at the lower end of the skills (and economic) spectrum. With this trend toward large-scale joblessness comes increased economic inequality. As we have seen throughout history, when the divide between the (relatively few) “haves” and the (relatively many) “have nots” is in a perpetual state of growth, a breaking point is inevitably reached. Perhaps more unsettling is that such divides are currently developing, simultaneously within national societies and on a global basis with nation-states landing on either end of the spectrum. This is a domestic and global national security issue.

The Unites States’ recent misadventures in Iraq demonstrated how a people deprived of their economic well-being and social identities will take up rudimentary arms against the world’s most technologically-advanced military force. And while this was more so a case of one nation imposing its will over another, it demonstrated how people react when they are being left behind. As was the experience after the “haves” transitioned into the industrial age, the transition to the virtual age is likely to leave the most needy in the world behind, in much greater numbers.

Fiction becomes fact. As the world pushes faster and further into the virtual age, those being left behind will eventually “rise against the machines.” Then we will see how the relatively small number of “haves” with their keyboards and virtual reality headsets as weapon systems, fare when the masses of “have nots” arm themselves with the weapons of their age—the only ones they have ever known.

Aden Magee is a career intelligence professional. He has performed as a senior advisor in support of the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, and the FBI. He has most recently performed as an advisor to USCYBERCOM, and USSOCOM. He is a retired U.S. Army officer and a veteran of foreign wars. His most recent book is titled The Cold War Wilderness of Mirrors: Counterintelligence and the U.S. and Soviet Military Liaison Missions 1947–1990.

Image: Shutterstock.

Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency proved to be an unmitigated disaster for Brazil. During his four-year term, Bolsonaro pushed competent ministers to resign, likely to shield family members from corruption investigations. He mismanaged the Covid-19 pandemic, replacing health ministers at an alarming pace, toyed with his authoritarian inclinations, and neglected Brazil’s Amazon rainforest, allowing it to burn. He fomented fake news of electoral fraud during the electoral campaign and, after losing to his opponent, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, he incited his supporters to storm Brazil’s presidential palace, Congress, and the Supreme Court in Brasilia. These seditious riots mirror the events that led to Donald Trump’s second impeachment trial, solidifying Bolsonaro’s reputation as an even more idiosyncratic version of Trump, earning him the nickname “Tropical Trump.”

Brazil was in dire need of change, and Lula delivered that change when he was elected president in October 2022. Understandably, U.S. president Joe Biden embraced the newly elected Lula as Brazil’s anti-Trump, believing him to be a more reliable strategic partner. 

However, the question remains: is Lula truly a dependable ally? The two presidents may align on climate change; diversity, equity, and inclusion; and a commitment to nipping the forces of right-wing populism in the bud. But when it comes to the great power competition in the region, Lula is not a friend. He is the proverbial cure that kills the patient. 

Since taking office in January, Lula, who was president from 2003 to 2010 and spent time in jail on corruption charges before being released (but not acquitted) on a technicality, has articulated a foreign policy that corresponds with the visions of China, Russia, and other authoritarians—a multipolar world aimed at challenging American dominance. Rather than confront Washington’s adversaries, which do not uphold environmental standards or champion the rights of marginalized communities, Lula appears inclined to align with them. While a democrat at home, on the world stage, there is no tyrant he will not call his friend.

The discrepancy between Biden’s friendliness and Lula’s commitment to policies antithetical to U.S. interests emerged as early as the two leaders’ first meeting in Washington this past February, barely weeks after Lula was sworn in. 

In their joint statement, Biden and Lula “underscored that strengthening democracy, promoting respect for human rights, and addressing the climate crisis remains at the center of their common agenda.” They identified areas of mutual concern and promised cooperation that included “social inclusion and labor rights, gender equality, racial equity and justice, and the protection of the rights of LGBTQI+ persons,” fighting hate speech and disinformation, and empowering “marginalized racial, ethnic and indigenous communities.” 

However, Lula is at odds with Washington on China. He views China as a check on American power. He believes that a multipolar world is a good thing. It’s not just about trade: it’s about eroding America’s leverage.

Shortly after meeting Biden, Lula traveled to China along with a large business delegation to deepen commercial ties with Beijing (during his Washington visit, no trade delegation accompanied him). The trip yielded multi-billion-dollar agreements in strategic areas, including cyber and semiconductor technology. Lula was explicit that it was his intention to expand Chinese investment in sensitive areas: during his visit to a Huawei factory, he described it as “a demonstration that we want to tell the world we don’t have prejudices in our relations with the Chinese.”

Blunting China’s aggressive purchase of agricultural commodities and across-the-board strategic investments in Brazil is not on his agenda. Opening up to China to balance American influence is.

While in Shanghai, Lula attended the swearing-in of his protege, Dilma Rousseff, as the president of the New Development Bank. One of the bank’s explicit objectives is to promote the de-dollarization of South-to-South trade, directly challenging U.S. dominance. Lula stated publicly, “I ask myself why all countries have to base their trade on the dollar.” 

Following his trip,  Lula endorsed trade denominated in the Chinese yuan between Brazil and China. Furthermore, he has thrown his political weight behind the establishment of a common Latin American currency and a currency for the BRICS nations, aiming to challenge the supremacy of the dollar in global trade. This move extends beyond expanding bilateral trade; as Lula stated, by strengthening Brazil’s partnership with China, he wants “to balance geopolitics,” i.e., weaken U.S. leadership, even if it means Brazil becomes more dependent on China.

China was not the only area of disagreement. In January 2023, in an unprecedented visit designed to boost Iran’s outreach to Latin America, Brazil was preparing to welcome Iranian warships. Under U.S. pressure, Lula’s government postponed the visit—but later allowed the ships to dock after his meeting with Biden. In his first stint as president, Lula attempted to involve himself in nuclear negotiations with Iran and aimed to broker a nuclear deal. However, his efforts did not yield any significant progress. Now that he is back in office, he is once again opening the door to Iran, this time through the BRICS framework. Iran, known for advocating a form of multilateralism that seeks to reduce America’s global influence, is already taking advantage of this opportunity.

On Russia too, Lula has made choices that have led to strained relations with the White House. Last March, he secretly dispatched his closest diplomatic advisor, Celso Amorim, to Moscow to meet with Vladimir Putin (but not to Kiyv), with the intention of positioning himself as a peace mediator between Russia and Ukraine. Such a move was far from being a credible step toward fair mediation. It took a deluge of criticism against Brazil’s one-sided approach for Lula to send Amorim to meet Ukraine’s President Volodymir Zelenskyy a month later—but not before Brazil welcomed Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, on a state visit that gave Russia a podium to spread the kind of disinformation Lula and Biden jointly agreed to fight at their February meeting.

Subsequent Brazilian stances on Russia and Ukraine have only solidified Lula’s pro-Russian posture. He urged Ukraine to give up Crimea for the sake of “world tranquility,” claimed there was no point in determining who was in the right, accused Washington of “incentivizing conflict” by supporting Kyiv, and blamed Russia and Ukraine equally for the war. His advisor, Amorim, added that Russia’s “legitimate” concerns should be considered so as to avoid Russia’s total defeat.

Lula’s flirting with Russia—which includes Brazil’s refusal to transfer German-made weapons to Ukraine and the rejection of sanctions against Moscow—is not his only challenge to Washington’s sponsored global order. 

Last week, Brazil hosted a summit of South American leaders, providing an opportunity for Lula to whitewash Nicolas Maduro’s Venezuelan regime. By then, Lula had already re-established diplomatic relations with Maduro and permitted Conviasa, the U.S.-sanctioned Venezuela airline, to restart direct flights between Brazil and Venezuela. During the summit, Lula warmly welcomed Maduro, pushed back against U.S. sanctions, downplayed criticism of Maduro’s dictatorship as a mere “narrative problem” that led to misrepresentation and misunderstanding of Venezuela, and supported Venezuela’s bid to join the BRICS. He further declined to put Maduro on the spot for large-scale human rights violations, corruption, and ecocide, despite strong pushback from Chile’s president, Gabriel Boric. and Uruguay’s president, Luis Lacalle Pou. But his broader point was clear: the West had no right to interfere in Venezuela’s internal affairs, a position that China, Russia, and Iran share. As a gloating Maduro told the press, unity among South American nations should be based “on a new multipolar world.” i.e., one where American influence is blunted in favor of other rising powers, whose authoritarian inclinations leave Lula unfazed.

The progressive agenda that Biden is prioritizing for Latin America is finding favor among the political allies of America’s strategic adversaries in the region. Rest assured, those in Latin America, like Lula, most inclined to embrace Biden’s priorities—noble as they may be—are also the least likely to act as a bulwark against Chinese, Iranian, and Russian penetration. In fact, as Lula’s case shows, they will welcome it. To keep the Biden White House on side, all they need to do is go along with its green transition and its diversity, equity, and inclusion agenda. 

In the meantime, China will continue to invest in agricultural commodities, mining concessions, public surveillance equipment contracts, equipment supplies to local police forces, and infrastructure projects, gaining heightened influence all along. Russia will keep backing authoritarian regimes in the region and benefiting from their nostalgia for a socialist counterweight to the gringos. And other authoritarian states, like Iran, will piggyback on this sentiment, while America is occupied elsewhere with its humanitarian and ecological agendas.

When the dust settles, the consequences of Lula’s approach will serve neither American interests nor Brazil’s. It will be China, and Russia, hardly the defenders of minorities and the patrons of the environment, who reap the benefits of America’s power eclipse.

Emanuele Ottolenghi is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a non-partisan research foundation based in Washington DC. Follow him on Twitter @eottolenghi.

Image: Shutterstock.

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