In this week’s #CCLKOW piece I tread warily into analogy to offer a framework to consider policy and strategy of intervention. There is no wisdom in asserting Situation A is just like Historical Event B. Analogies in policy are impossibly tricky, and the most we can do is to understand well the terms of the past as we consider what may be possible in the present or the future. In this case, “the Saratoga turning point” and the subsequent French participation in the American War for Independence offer some insights into an effective intervention. Why Saratoga enabled a shift in French policy to full diplomatic support of the Colonies in Rebellion and how the assistance was managed were key factors in the objective to assist the American cause. Keeping these in mind as the western nations contemplate whether and how best to assist Iraq against IS offers a compelling alternative perspective to the narrative of intervention which has framed much of American military policy and doctrine since the end of WWII. Read the piece, give a thought to the questions at the end, and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW. Enjoy!
Last July IS opened its overt campaign within Iraq. In rapid fashion they took and held key points which they added to their holdings in Syria to form their Franken-state. Contemplating the gains from Jihadi Blitzkrieg, many did not give the remaining territory or the political entity of the republic much of a chance to survive. As a military historian of the American tradition, I have come to view with scepticism the decisiveness of opening campaigns, so I did not count the contest as over. And in the face of the dominant theme of imminent collapse, through summer’s end and into fall and winter the Iraqi state managed a remarkable political and strategic makeover and turnaround. The clear manifestation of the local will in this fight was the recent ejection of IS from Tikrit. Site of one of IS forces’ more irredeemably abominable acts at Camp Speicher, this victory demonstrated the Iraqi state’s ability to fight and win for themselves.
In much the same way victory at Saratoga manifested American devotion to their cause in the fight for Independence – and the feasibility of their efforts – sufficient to gain allied support from France, retaking Tikrit offers a potential moment and basis to act in the current conflict. As well, this example offers a framework to better understand how to act effectively in the wars of others. War is political, but the terms of those politics are decided by where one sits in the conflict. Thus, from the perspective of a party considering intervention, Saratoga and the French intervention offer some useful markers. There is first the utterly necessary manifested political will of the party seeking assistance, as well as their ability to lobby support for their cause effectively. Second, the policy and strategy of intervention must serve own needs, but is best written in the client state’s terms. Whether the Iraqis are the Americans in Rebellion, the thornier, less considered question may we be whether US could ever match the French policy and strategy.
First, to deal with the initial resistance to this comparison. It is not my intention to directly relate the two conflicts or the parties, but rather to utilize the key diplomatic and policy and strategy issues arising from the outcome of that battle to consider alternative terms of assistance to the Iraqis in this fight. Furthermore, it is to remind that significant though this battle was in the course of the American War for Independence, this advance did not preclude a future rocky course nor the constant refrain of tactical and seeming strategic setbacks. To argue that Tikrit might portend a significant political shift is not negated by critical weaknesses in the ISF or battlefield setbacks. Ando, even as the naysayers have been shouting “But Ramadi!” since the start of this piece, it is worth remembering that after Saratoga the Americans went on to struggle through Valley Forge and a trail of defeats on its way to winning the war. And while I certainly do not need to, I want to make it abundantly clear that IS is not Great Britain, nor do its forces offer anything like the clear superiority of the British Army or Royal Navy facing the Americans. As well, to be fair to France, the United States and the west have more capabilities than Louis’ 18th century France. Finally, it should never be forgotten that France had clear political interests to serve in assisting the Americans. Very often lately this is seen as some bit of seemy double dealing, but it would be best not to be naïve about why states aid others – there must always be some benefit to sustain the intervention. Thus, while I maintain caution as to the analogy, it is necessarily adequate to the current context, especially as it offers a different perspective on policy and strategy options.
Turning to the critical political outcome of the battle, French participation in the war. In the military terms of the alliance, from my perspective, the very compelling aspect of the French intervention was its strategy. Most fundamental to this, France did not assume it was their war. Important points of their participation in the American cause must be remembered. That the needs of the Americans and their military strategy were not France’s primary concern. In alliance they agreed to provide the support the Americans requested as they could. Second, they brought a significant augmentation to the naval war, which degraded British dominance and culminated at the Battle of Chesapeake. Increasing the cost and difficulty of British transport and logistics in the war would reverberate across the entire effort through to Yorktown. When it came to the French Army’s direct participation the style was distinctive. In sum, they subordinated their activity to American needs, their commands to American leadership. Rochambeau’s Army arrived with political and military respect for their allies, and the French commander in chief put himself and his forces at Washington’s discretion. Deficient though the American military forces may have been in comparison to European armies, the role of French advisors was relatively minimal with respect to their total effort. It should also be noted that the French deployed to the American colonies as friends and were hosted warmly by the locals of Newport in their first winter.
The obvious problem here is that the US is not in the habit of subordinating itself politically or militarily. Whether other western powers would be willing to do so may be irrelevant given that American resources would likely dominate any significant intervention. Thus, while the politics in Iraq have a clear chance, how the US and the west respond will determine whether their action aids the cause.
And so, for discussion I would like to consider the issues which confront and confound the strategic latitude the French enjoyed in their intervention:
Can the US military ever effectively work as the subordinate force? Is the refusal to a weakness of the American system? What is the view of other western forces on this issue? Do you even agree that it is necessary or wise in this case or ever?
Does the west have the patience to weather a campaign of difficulties and setbacks on the way to the eventual defeat of IS in Iraq?
French officers served in American forces. Should western militaries allow professional sabbaticals so that their own might serve abroad in certain causes?
Italian Blade 2015, the 8th training event organised under the framework of the European Defence Agency’s Helicopter Exercise Programme (HEP), will start on 22 June in Viterbo, Italy. Gathering about 40 helicopters from seven different countries, it will be one of the largest exercises organised since the establishment of the HEP.
Aircraft from Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Slovenia will attend this year’s exercise. The event will be hosted by the Italian Army Aviation (Aviazione dell'Esercito) in Viterbo airbase, about 80 km north of Rome. In total, more than 1000 military personnel are expected to take part in the event which will run from 22 June to 3 July.
As with previous HEP live-flying exercises, Italian Blade’s main objectives will be to train European helicopter crews in conditions likely to be faced in possible future operations, while promoting cooperation in helicopters training and developing joint interoperability between multinational elements, both in the air and on the ground. A particular focus will be given to the integration of ground forces into the exercise’s scenarios so as to develop common procedures and build trust between flying crews and ground personnel from different nations.
The HEP exercises are only one of multiple projects undertaken by the European Defence Agency to increase the overall availability of European military helicopters, with other initiatives such as the Helicopter Tactics Course (HTC) or the Helicopter Tactics Instructor Course (HTIC) now ongoing. These efforts demonstrate that at very low-cost, quick operational benefits can be yielded to ensure success on tomorrow’s battlefields.
The latest issue of European Defence Matters, the official magazine of the European Defence Agency, is now available. Timed to coincide with the opening of the 51st edition of the International Paris Air Show, it focuses on European military aerospace issues.
This eighth issue of European Defence Matters will cover a wide variety of aerospace-related topics ranging from air-to-air refuelling, satellite communications, implementation of the Single European Sky or remotely piloted aircraft systems. It includes interviews with EDA experts and key players in the area such as Général Denis Mercier, French air force Chief of Staff, or Fernando Alonso, Head of military aircraft with Airbus Defence & Space.
In addition to our European aerospace feature story, this issue also includes an exclusive opinion piece from High Representative and Head of the Agency Federica Mogherini, who shares her thoughts on the future of European defence.