It appears that things are picking up in the wonderful world of radicalisation. Following hot on the heels of David Cameron’s speech on extremism, the Evening Standard reports that a primary school has referred one of its pupils to the Government’s multi-agency Channel programme because a child that can’t be older than 11 was “deemed at risk of Islamic radicalisation.” Yes, folks, you heard that right, because “the behaviour of the child’s parents caused concern among staff” a kid is now the subject of government study. That’s because non-violent extremism leads to violent extremism, even in the case of primary school children. Except it doesn’t, or at least doesn’t work like a conveyor belt.
Here’s the resulting paradox in a nutshell: we live in a country that retains global power pretensions (even though we fudge on paying for it) and are committed to retaining a nuclear deterrent to bolster that self-image. At the same time, in a supposedly free and democratic society, we are referring under twelves to a counter-extremism programme because otherwise… bad things might happen?
Channel operates in “pre-criminal space”, which is a nice way of saying that a Channel referral doesn’t require an actual criminal offence. The Channel vulnerability assessment framework is particularly worth reading in full:
1. Engagement with a group, cause or ideology Engagement factors are sometimes referred to as “psychological hooks”. They include needs, susceptibilities, motivations and contextual influences and together map the individual pathway into terrorism. They can include:
• Feelings of grievance and injustice
• Feeling under threat
• A need for identity, meaning and belonging
• A desire for status
• A desire for excitement and adventure
• A need to dominate and control others
• Susceptibility to indoctrination
• A desire for political or moral change
• Opportunistic involvement
• Family or friends involvement in extremism
• Being at a transitional time of life
• Being influenced or controlled by a group
• Relevant mental health issues
2. Intent to cause harm Not all those who become engaged by a group, cause or ideology go on to develop an intention to cause harm, so this dimension is considered separately. Intent factors describe the mindset that is associated with a readiness to use violence and address what the individual would do and to what end. They can include:
• Over-identification with a group or ideology
• Them and Us’ thinking
• Dehumanisation of the enemy
• Attitudes that justify offending
• Harmful means to an end
• Harmful objectives
3. Capability to cause harm Not all those who have a wish to cause harm on behalf of a group, cause or ideology are capable of doing so, and plots to cause widespread damage take a high level of personal capability, resources and networking to be successful. What the individual is capable of is therefore a key consideration when assessing risk of harm to the public. Factors can include:
• Individual knowledge, skills and competencies
• Access to networks, funding or equipment
• Criminal Capability
Maybe it’s just me, but I’m pretty sure that any 10 year old fulfils: “A need for identity, meaning and belonging/A desire for status/A desire for excitement and adventure/Susceptibility to indoctrination/Being at a transitional time of life”. Cynicism aside, the basic problem with this vulnerability assessment framework is that it contains very ambiguous criteria that effectively makes being pissed off at the current state of things a red flag for authorities. This wouldn’t matter so much except that the latest Counter-Terrorism and Security Act put it on a statutory footing. From a not-quite-half-arsed grab bag of indicators that someone might (and could) commit a terrorist offence, to a statutory duty for Councils everywhere to assess people in this way. I have no idea whether a ten year old can develop the intent to cause harm, but I somewhat doubt that they have the capability to cause harm. The question for the rest of us is how well we’d fare if put under the microscope by someone who may, or may not, have any of the training necessary to differentiate between, say, a lonely person and a lone wolf nutcase. Just remember not to express “extreme” opinions to anyone official in future, just in case, like.
Identity? Status? Dehumanisation? That’s got Kafka written all over it.
High Representative and Head of the European Defence Agency Federica Mogherini paid her first visit to the EDA yesterday. She met with the Agency’s Management Board before giving an address to the staff.
During her visit to EDA, the High Representative was briefed on EDA activities including maritime surveillance, prioritisation and funding of research & technology, and support to CSDP operations.
“Today I was able to see first-hand some of the really important work you do. I am happy and proud to see how you are tackling the many challenges of European defence. In the current security environment, I want defence cooperation to be the rule, not the exception”, Federica Mogherini stressed in front of the European Defence Agency’s staff. “The EDA is providing the necessary impetus and means to make this a reality. Your collective role is vital. We are here for results and concrete achievements – and I know you deliver”, she added.
EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq met today with Gerald Klug, Austrian Minister of Defence and Sports, to exchange views on cooperation opportunities and Austria’s involvement in EDA projects.
”The European Defence Agency plays a significant role in the further development of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy. All Member States benefit from the Agency’s coordinating role in various defence matters such as capability development or the promotion of defence-related research and technology. Austria participates in numerous projects of the European Defence Agency to help reduce EU military shortfalls and enhance the EU’s defence cooperation. The added value for Austria especially lies in the transfer of know-how”, said Minister of Defence Gerald Klug.
“Austria is an active member of the European Defence Agency, with the country being involved in activities as diverse as European Air Transport Fleet exercises and events, the European Armements Cooperation Course or the successful collaborative work carried out in the field of Counter-IED”, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq stated after the visit. “We also welcome Austria’s participation in our Cyber Defence workstrand”, he added.
The visit in Austria is part of a series of visits by Mr. Domecq to all EDA Member States following his appointment as EDA Chief Executive at the beginning of 2015. So far, Mr. Domecq visited Spain, Lithuania, Latvia, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands, Ireland, France, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Croatia, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Greece, Cyprus and Finland, Sweden, Italy and Slovakia.
The recent European Council acknowledged the importance of hybrid warfare for EU Member States. In this interview we address the topic with EDA project officer Axel Butenschoen.
Axel Butenschoen is Project Officer for Capability Development Plan within the European Defence Agency.
From an academic point of view we have to state that a broadly accepted definition of “hybrid warfare” does not exist yet. One reason could be that by nature the characteristics of this new type of threat is evolving nearly on a daily basis. However, amongst analysts there are common elements describing this phenomenon of new threats by “violent threats that are simultaneously carried out by state- and non-state actors along all conventional and unconventional lines of operation within a not exclusively military but also diplomatic, information and economic dimensions of conflict in order to achieve a political goal”. From my perspective all the individual elements, for example information warfare, cyber-attacks, conventional military aggressions and destabilisation operations are individually well known but the synchronized, combined approach adds a new dimension to our understanding of aggression.
During the past years Europe’s security has been challenged significantly by this new dimension of conflicts at its eastern and southern borders. The paramount question now is how to counter these so called hybrid threats? Are EU Member States prepared for this challenge and do we have the adequate set of tools in our toolbox? How can EU instruments also support Member States? During the recent European Council, Heads of States and Governments acknowledged the importance of the subject and it can be expected that the EU global strategy on foreign and security policy, to be delivered in 2016, will address the hybrid dimension accordingly.
First of all I believe that exclusive counter-hybrid capabilities do not exist. As explained earlier the new character posed by Hybrid threats is the coordinated combination of more or less existing capabilities by potential adversaries. Consequently, any kind of response also requires a comprehensive but effective approach. In this regard the EDA will not enter into an academic discussion but focus on the military capability dimension.
Together with Member States and other relevant stakeholders we will conduct a series of subsequent assessments in order to identify the implications of Hybrid warfare for defence capability development in Europe. The results will be presented to Ministers and Capability directors for their consideration; it will support Member States’ efforts in countering Hybrid threats. At the same time the objective is to stress test existing Priorities and identify possible need for amendments.
This EDA activity will also supplement other initiatives carried out in this context, for example within the European External Action Service, in charge of preparing a joint communication on hybrid warfare. At this stage one cannot anticipate the results but the key question: “Are European Member States prepared to counter hybrid threats?” may be answered with findings in line with “We have adequate capabilities in place but we need to rethink the way we deploy in a more coherent, comprehensive way”. Also such possible outcomes would be of added value and could trigger effective follow-on activities so that Europe stands ready for these new threats.