A couple of recent announcements indicate that Russian shipbuilders are continuing to struggle with construction of new types of ships. First came the announcement, right at the end of 2015, that the commissioning of the Admiral Gorshkov frigate was being delayed for another year, until the end of 2016. At the same time, the navy announced that the Admiral Grigorovich frigate will be commissioned in the first quarter of 2016. It had previously been expected to be commissioned in May 2015, before being repeatedly pushed back. In addition, commissioning of the lead ship of the Alexandrit class (Project 12700) of minewsweepers has been pushed back yet again, to May 2016. It was originally planned to be in the fleet back in 2013. And sea trials of the Ivan Gren amphibious ship were also delayed until the first quarter of 2016. As a result, in 2015 the Russian Navy received no new blue water surface ships.
On the other hand, it lost the services of several ships, including the Steregushchiy corvette that suffered a fire in April and both Neustrashimyi class frigates. The latter ships are waiting to be overhauled at Yantar shipyard, but the overhaul will take a long time since Ukraine will not supply replacement engines for the ships. The lack of engines will delay construction on most of the larger classes of surface ships, including Project 22350 (Admiral Gorshkov class hulls 3-4), Project 11356 (Admiral Gorshkov class hulls 4-6), and Project 20385 (Stereguschiy class variant, replaced by Project 20380 with less reliable Russian-built engines).
Submarine construction may seem better on the surface, with the commissioning of two Improved Kilo class ((Project 636) diesel submarines and the return to active service in 2015 of the Akula class submarine Gepard and the Sierra class submarine Pskov after length overhauls. While there is no doubt that Russian submarine construction is in much better shape than the construction of ocean-going surface ships, there are problems here as well. First of all, despite being commissioned back in 2013, the Severodvinsk SSN remains in sea trials for the third year.
But more importantly, development of a new class of diesel-electric submarines appears to be in trouble. Problems with propulsion systems have long delayed commissioning of the lead vessel of the Lada class, resulting in the decision taken several years ago to build six Improved Kilo class submarines for the Black Sea Fleet. The Russian Navy appeared to be moving on in announcing the successor Kalina class, which was to have air-independent propulsion systems (AIP). Russian experts argued that AIP would be ready by 2017-18, and the new submarines could be built relatively quickly after that. However, the Russian Navy recently announced, with quite a bit of fanfare, that it had ordered another six Improved Kilo class submarines for the Pacific Fleet. These are very good submarines, which undoubtedly be equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles that will give them a potent anti-ship and land-attack capability. But the implication of this announcement is that the Russian Navy does not expect to receive any of the new Kalina class submarines any time soon, and is therefore ordering the tried and true submarines to fill the gap.
All in all, it seems that Russian shipbuilding is continuing to “tread water,” successfully building ships that it has already built in the past but having serious problems with delays in the new projects that were expected to form the core of the Russian Navy in the 2020s.
In the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European Defence Agency (EDA) supports EU-led military operations and missions offering a wide scope of services, ranging from managing contracts for satellite communication, through training in cyber defence, ending up with providing HR management software to operational commands. Especially developing a model of ready-to-use framework contracts will give the EDA the possibility to broaden its service to more comprehensively support the establishment and running of CSDP operations and missions.
Support to CSDP Operations is one of the key task for the European Defence Agency, which was highlighted in the recent revision of the statute, seat and operational rules of the Agency. “We are proud to support EU-led military operations: to see our projects being used and to know that our expertise is being appreciated. Continuous service is what makes the Agency valid,” says Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive.
The EDA offers its existing projects as well as ready-to-use contracted solutions that will replicate the successful framework contract model for satellite communications. Consequently, the EDA support to operations is cost-effective and efficient, as it does not generate any additional costs for the Member States or the Agency.
In more detail, the EDA delivered a Human Resources management software for Headquarters (J1FAS) to the EU military operation in the Central African Republic in 2014. Commander Paschalis Gkounidis, the HQ Assistant Chief of Staff for Human Resources said that “the installation of this new system represents a big step forward in managing our personnel and will provide useful lessons for the improvement of the system in the future.” A similar support is also provided for the operational command of the military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (Operation Sophia).
Additionally, the EDA conducted cyber awareness training events in Larissa and Rome Operational Headquarters for the operations in the Central African Republic and in Southern Central Mediterranean respectively. In the case of Operation Sophia, the EDA also offered the MARSUR networking system, which may contribute to increasing the maritime situational awareness.
Following several successful test cases, e.g. contracting Air-to-Ground Surveillance Services for the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) in 2014, the EDA signed an arrangement with the Athena Mechanism (February 2015) to facilitate ad-hoc support for contracting for CSDP operations. Under this arrangement, the Agency has already supported the EU training mission in Mali for procurement of medical equipment as well as the EUFOR Althea for benchmarking current camp management services.
The signature of the arrangement also provided a new impetus for the usage of the already existing EDA Contractor Support to Operations (CSO) platform as a powerful tool for interaction between economic operators and EU-led operations. The platform has successfully been used to assist in fulfilling tailored needs for the EU training missions in Mali and Somalia.
With the Athena Mechanism having joined the EU SatCom Market project in June 2015, the cooperation has gone one step further. CSDP operations and missions can now rely on a ready pre-mission contracted solution for satellite communication. The EDA framework contracts offer high quality service with less administrative burden. The EU training mission in Somalia has successfully been using such solution since October 2015 for Fixed Satellite Services. “Thanks to the excellent cooperation between the EUTM J6 team, the EDA and the contractor, EUTM Somalia benefits from a reliable and secure connection with Europe for its Command and Control chain,” said Brigadier General Antonio Maggi, the Operation Commander. The EU Training Mission in Mali is also relying now on the EU SatCom Market for Mobile Satellite Services.
“I have no doubts that our support to CSDP operations will increase in the future, and will provide more opportunities to deliver civil-military synergies in the contractor support context,” says Jorge Domecq. The EDA, together with the Athena Mechanism and EU Military Staff, is currently exploring possibilities to implement additional ready-to-use solutions for other services, to include medical services with helicopter medevac as the first priority, infrastructure and camp management as well as strategic transportation services. The overall aim is to provide comprehensive contracted support covering all major areas pertaining to operations: from deployment and redeployment of troops, through the establishment and maintenance of camps, satellite communications services to end up with medical service.
There is also a number of EDA-led projects which be might relevant for CSDP operations as they mature in the future. The list includes: smart energy camps to manage renewable energies, Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) awareness and training, cyber situational awareness packages for headquarters to enhance cyber defence planning, a platform to share and analyse geospatial information (GISMO 2), a C-IED joint deployable exploitation analysis laboratory, and an electronic on-line gov-to-gov market platform eQuip to sell or transfer surplus defence equipment.
Block IV Tomahawk is the current generation of the Tomahawk family of cruise missiles. The BGM-109 Tomahawk family began life in the 1980s as sub-sonic, low-flying nuclear strike weapons, before being developed into long-range RGM/UGM-109 conventional attack missiles. They’re most frequently launched from submarines and surface ships, and have been the US Navy’s preferred option for initial air strikes in Iraq, Libya, et. al. Britain has also bought Tomahawk missiles, and launches them exclusively from submarines.
Block IV is the latest variant. It adds innovative technologies that improve combat flexibility, while dramatically reducing the costs to buy, operate, and support these missiles. That’s why the Block IV program, under US Navy PMA-280, has been one of the USA’s defense acquisition success stories over the last decade.
Tomahawk missiles have become the US Navy’s major land strike missile. The USA has bought more than 4,000 over the years, and March 2011 saw the 2,000th GM-109 Tomahawk fired in combat, from USS Barry [DDG 52]. The missile typically flies at 50 – 100 feet above ground using terrain-following radar, and navigates to its targets using a combination of GPS/INS, computer matching of the land’s radar-mapped contours to the missile’s internal maps (TERCOM), and final matching of the target scene (DSMAC). Once on target the missile can fly a direct horizontal attack mode, trigger preprogrammed detonation above the target, or use a pop-up and dive maneuver. CEP is often described as being about 10 meters.
There are 3 fielded variants.
The xGM-109C/D Block III missiles will serve in the US Navy until FY 2020, and can be fitted with either a 1,000 pound unitary conventional warhead (xGM-109C), or a conventional submunitions warhead with hundreds of smaller bomblets (xGM-109D). The Tomahawk Block III has a 750 nautical mile range. Unfortunately, mission planning requires 80 hours of work.
The xGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV achieved Initial Operating Capability in 2004, and current Pentagon plans will end purchases in 2015. Block IV reportedly increases missile range to 900 nautical miles, but it only uses the unitary warhead. Mission planning has been cut from 80 hours to just 1 hour, which makes a big difference to combat usage. The missile also has a 2-way UHF SATCOM datalink that allows the missile to be redirected in flight, or commanded to loiter over an area and wait for instructions from a Fleet HQ’s Maritime Operations Center.
Submarine Launch 109 UGM-109 launchSubmarine-launched UGM-109 missiles are more expensive than their ship launched RGM-109 VLS counterparts, because the submarines’ launch mechanism is more involved and more strenuous. UGM-109 “all-up-round” storage and interface canisters come in 2 types: CLS and TTL. CLS canisters launch UGM-109s from vertical launch tubes installed on many of America’s Los Angeles Class (SSN 719 on), all Virginia Class, and all SSGN Ohio Class submarines. TTL canisters are used to launch Tomahawk missiles from a submarine’s torpedo tubes, which is Britain’s preferred method.
In both cases, a Tomahawk launches “wet”, unlike most anti-ship missiles. The canister remains in the vertical-launch or torpedo tube, while the missile is ejected. Once the UGM-109 has reached a safe distance from the submarine, its rocket booster ignites underwater to power it airborne. That booster falls away just before the missile ignites its jet engine. If the submarine needs to “clear the tube” for torpedoes, anti-ships missiles, mines, UUVs, etc., TTL canisters can be ejected into the sea after launch, as a separate evolution. In contrast, CLS vertical-launch canisters are only removed portside, when the submarine comes into base for servicing and reloading.
Tomahawk: The 2019 Evolution LRASM-A ConceptThere was a plan to develop a successor to the retired xGM-109B ship-killer by 2015, as an interim capability for the US Navy’s Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) program. That was shelved in the FY 2014 budget, as the Navy opted to drop the interim capability. Instead, they’re moving ahead with OASuW’s main xGM-84 Harpoon missile replacement program for air and sea launch. The LRASM derivative of Lockheed Martin’s subsonic but stealthy AGM-158B JASSM-ER is the initial air-launched missile, but there will be competition for air and naval missiles beyond FY 2019.
Raytheon has partnered with Norway’s Kongsberg to offer the stealthy, and accurate JSM for the air-launched OASuW, and their entry has the unique ability to fit inside the F-35C’s weapon bays. They could also offer Kongsberg’s NSM counterpart in the naval realm, but that would leave Tomahawk in the cold. Or would it?
The key to the next set of Tomahawk improvements is actually a warranty. The missile has a 15-year warranty and a 30-year service life, so 2019 will begin a recertification cycle for the fleet that could last until 2030. Threats continue to evolve, so why not add some missile upgrades while they’re back in the shop anyway? The US Navy already has a specifications sheet of possible improvements, and they’ve done a number of capability studies.
Raytheon is investing almost $40 million of its own funds in parallel, and they’re still talking to the Navy about that final package, which will break down into 3 broad categories.
MI conceptAnti-Access/ Area Denial Communications Suite. Saddam Hussein had a sophisticated anti-aircraft system, but he didn’t have the kind of high-end jamming and emissions triangulation capabilities expected of future opponents. The challenge is twofold: keep the enemy from cutting off your communications, and keep your communications from alerting the enemy.
One option that has been mentioned in public involves adding a Line Of Sight datalink capability. The flip side of that move would involve training and tactics changes that push missile control farther down the command chain. That may be necessary, but is the US Navy comfortable doing that? There’s more to these A2/AD-CS discussions than just picking technologies.
Autonomy. The Tomahawk is already an autonomous weapon, in the sense that it can be fired at pre-planned fixed targets and left alone. To remain relevant, it needs to add dynamic terminal autonomy: the ability to acquire targets on its own and hit them, even if the target is moving or has moved. It would also be useful to expand the missile’s navigation autonomy, by offering backups for hardened SASSM M-code GPS.
Both kinds of upgrades are being contemplated. Early tests that aren’t autonomous involve Rapid In-flight Target Update, which allows units that have a lock on a target to transmit rapid final scene updates for the missile’s DSMAC guidance. This is still done via Fleet HQ as Standard Operational Procedure, but that’s enough to hit moving targets in some circumstances. Ships would become vulnerable to Tomahawk strikes if the targeting platform can survive their defenses, and the same is true for land-based air defense systems that can repeatedly move to new fixed locations.
Raytheon and the Navy are looking for more, with a focus on mature technologies to cut down program risk. An ESM system for noticing and geolocating emissions has already begun testing. Raytheon personnel stress its quality, to the point that Navigation via Signals of Opportunity (NAVSOP) might be possible as a backup to GPS. During the attack run, ESM can allow the Tomahawk to home in on an active enemy ship or air defense radars, or even on other intercepted signals. That begins to add autonomous moving target capability, and the firm plans to take the next step by flight testing a dual-mode ESM/ active radar seeker system before the end of 2014. Finally, passive visual spectrum (camera or imaging infrared) guidance has also become popular for long-range strike missiles, because it doesn’t give the missile’s location away by creating electro-magnetic emissions. Raytheon has confirmed that CCD/IIR upgrades are also under consideration for Tomahawk, but stressed that no final decisions have been made about a future guidance package.
Core Strengthening. All of these capabilities are great, but they demand more computer processing power, more memory, more onboard power, etc. The missile’s core will need redesigns, in order to keep up.
Raytheon had to develop a Multi-Function Modular Processor to handle those computing needs. Other efforts will look to add new technology, like the Joint Multiple Effects Warhead System (JMEWS) warhead to allow mid-flight reprogramming, and improve performance against reinforced targets like bunkers. Still other attempts will take advantage of existing upgrades. As an example of the latter, Block III introduced the ability to throttle the missile’s Williams F107-WR-402 turbofan, and Raytheon has been expanding its usefulness over time. It’s a capability that’s obviously handy for adjusting the missile’s time of arrival, or extending range, but the firm has recently been testing a “high speed dash” mode. It’s still subsonic, but it represents some impressive flying that close to the ground.
The Missing Link Saab S340-AEWEven after all of these upgrades, the Tomahawk is still a 1970s design that relies on low altitude to hide from radar. That isn’t really subject to change, even though downward-looking radars are proliferating on small AWACS planes and aerostat blimps, and radars in modern ships and air defense systems are taking big steps forward.
All of the Tomahawk’s proposed technologies are well and good, and they will expand the missile’s usefulness substantially. Adding them to thousands of existing missiles is very cost effective, and makes a great deal of sense. As budget crunches force the Navy to re-examine every aspect of their programs, however, the Navy will have to make decisions about the cost, capability profile, and limitations of every weapon in their arsenal. Raytheon is trying to position Tomahawk as best they can, but the final decisions will lie elsewhere.
Contracts & Key Events 45 min. documentaryUnless stated otherwise, US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contracts to Raytheon in Tucson, AZ. In general, these contracts aren’t competitively procured, pursuant to the “only 1 responsible supplier” exemption in 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1).
Key subcontractors include Lockheed Martin in Valley Forge, PA (Weapon Control System element), QinetiQ North America in San Jose, CA (Command and Control element), and Boeing Inc. in St. Louis, MO (Command and Control element).
FY 2016
January 19/16: Tomahawk cruise missiles could get a lot more destructive if a new development program is successful. Researchers from Energetic Materials Research and Engineering have been successfully utilizing residual fuel left inside a missile during impact and turning it into a fuel-air explosive that can contribute to the blast created by the missile’s warhead. At present the team are looking to find the best way to implode the fuel tank to generate a cloud of fuel that will mix with surrounding air to ignite into an intense, high-temperature explosion. If successful, the add on to the missile could increase the Tomahawks payload without any need to change the dynamics of the warhead.
January 15/16: Testing of a new sensor on the Tomahawk missile has been successful. Raytheon owned T-39 test aircraft carried out a number trials over a three week period engaging moving targets on land and at sea. The development of the sensor was part of company funded, independent R&D looking to enhance the current Tomahawk long-range precision strike/land attack role. Since 2005, Raytheon has been investing in increasing the missile’s seeker capabilities and effectiveness in varying environments.
October 7/15: Raytheon has demonstrated how a Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile can be used to assess battlefield damage, loiter and then attack a target following analysis of the data it provided to operators. The test demonstrated how the missile could be launched from one location, travel to a second area of operations and communicate via a UHF SATCOM link with a third location half-way around the world, before striking a target. The Block IV Tomahawk demonstrated flexible mission planning capabilities in flight during previous testing in August, with this latest round of testing also demonstrating that multiple missiles could be coordinated from a single control point.
FY 2015
August 6/15: Raytheon’s Block IV Tomahawk cruise missile demonstrated mission planning capability during flight tests announced on Wednesday. The upgraded software allowed planners to adapt the missile’s mission profile on the fly, with this new capability now set to be rolled-out across the fleet of Tomahawks in service. The Block IV missile demonstrated similar capabilities in March 2014, when the missile received information in-flight and re-targeted itself to strike a moving vehicle.
Oct 11/14: American A2/AD. Rep. Randy Forces [R-VA-4] sends a letter to Army Chief of Staff Gen. Odierno on the eve of the AUSA conference, pushing for the Army to set up a modern version of its Coastal Artillery: long-range, land-based anti-ship missiles that would be forward-based in friendly countries to endanger Chinese vessels and shipping. Missiles like LRASM and the longer-ranged but less stealthy AGM-109 Tomahawk are obvious candidates for this sort of thing, significantly outranging competitors like Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile or Boeing’s SLAM-ER. The RAND study that Forbes refers to actually posited using shorter-range missiles like NSM, but its maps also showed the number of deployment sites required for effective coverage.
The idea would be a nice turnabout on China’s Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy, and a Philippine deployment would produce a very tangible benefit all by itself, at low cost. On the other hand, Rep. Forbes probably underestimates the difficulty of getting many countries beyond the Philippines to accept an inherently provocative deployment whose use is technically beyond their control. Recent American waffling around the world suggests an even less palatable conclusion: the penalty for saying yes would be immediate, without any assurance that the weapons would actually be used to help the accepting country if push came to shove.
Contrast with the Russian approach. They just sell SS-N-26 shore batteries to interested countries, helping customers to create the same barrier under their own control, without the offsetting political challenges. India’s derivative PJ-10 BrahMos missile may also wind up being used this way, if India can get its act together on the export front. Sources: RAND, “Employing Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles in the Western Pacific” | Breaking Defense, “Army Should Build Ship-Killer Missiles: Rep. Randy Forbes”.
FY 2014
Final dive
(click to view full)
Sept 24/14: Orders. Raytheon in Tucson, AZ receives a $251.1 million firm-fixed-price contract for 231 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round missiles for the U.S. Navy (211: 147 vertical launch systems and 64 capsule launch systems / $224.5 million/ 89.4%) and the United Kingdom (20 torpedo tube launch systems / $26.7 million/ 10.6% – q.v. July 1/14 DSCA request). All funds are committed immediately, using foreign funds and FY 2013 & 2014 US Navy weapon budgets.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32%); Camden, AR (11%); Ogden, UT (8%); Anniston, AL (4%); Minneapolis, MN (4%); Glenrothes, Scotland (4%); Ft. Wayne, IN (4%); Spanish Fork, UT (3%); Ontario, CA (3%); Vergennes, VT (3%); El Segundo, CA (2%); Berryville, AR (2%); Westminster, CO (2%); Middletown, CT (2%); Walled Lake, MI (2%); Huntsville, AL (1%); Dallas, TX (1%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various locations inside and outside the continental United States (11.8%); work is expected to be complete in August 2016.
This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 by US Navy NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-14-C-0075).
US/UK order
July 31/14: Raytheon in Tucson, AZ, receives an $8.7 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification for Tomahawk Depot Missile maintenance, including inventory management for the US Navy and the United Kingdom, and direct fleet support for resolving technical issues with forward deployed, in-theater weapons.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%); Camden, AR (36%); and various other continental United States locations (4%); and is expected to be complete in March 2015. Funds will be obligated on individual delivery orders as they are issued by US Navy NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-13-D-0002).
Sept 9/14: Testing. Raytheon touts a recent pair of live warhead test firings from the USS Hampton [SSN 767: UGM-109] and USS Lake Champlain [CG 57: AGM-109], demonstrating “enhanced flex retargeting” and improved flight performance. Sources: Raytheon, “Tomahawk enhancements showcased in back-to-back flight tests”.
July 17/14: Political. The Senate Appropriations Committee approves a $489.6 billion base FY 2015 budget, plus $59.7 billion in supplemental funding. If they get their way, xGM-109 Tomahawk Block IV production would continue at full rate, with $82 million in extra funding. It has been set to end with a 100 missiles, but the added funds would drive it toward the standard annual buy of 180-200.
The budget still has to be voted on in the whole Senate, then reconciled in committee with the House of Representatives’ defense budget, then signed into law by the President. Sources: DID, “FY15 US Defense Budget Finally Complete with War Funding”.
July 1/14: UK request. The US DSCA announces Britain’s formal request for up to 65 UGM-109 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round missiles plus containers, engineering support, test equipment, operational flight test support, communications equipment, technical assistance, personnel training/equipment, spare and repair parts, and other support. The estimated cost is up to $140 million. DSCA adds that:
“The UK needs these missiles to replenish those expended in support of coalition operations.”
Which is to say, over Libya. The principal contractor will be Raytheon Missile Systems Company in Tucson, AZ, and Britain doesn’t need any more contractors on site from Raytheon or from the US government. Sources: US DSCA #14-30, “United Kingdom – Tomahawk Block IV Torpedo Launched Land-Attack Missiles”.
DSCA request: UK (140)
April 28/14: Testing. Raytheon announces a successful captive-carry test flight, using a small T-39 Saberliner business jet fitted with their passive ESM seeker. The jet flew at subsonic speed and at varying altitudes, while the “passive seeker and multi-function processor successfully received numerous electronic signals from tactical targets in a complex, high density electromagnetic environment.”
This test brings the Raytheon-funded multi-mission processor to Technology Readiness Level 6. The next step for the company-funded effort is an active seeker test, which will combine the processor with ESM and active radar. That combination would likely form the core of future Tomahawk upgrades. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon tests new guidance system for Tomahawk cruise missile”.
April 17/14: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/13 Selected Acquisitions Report [PDF]. It makes early termination official, and explains the savings:
“Program costs decreased $1,832.1 million (25.8%) from $7,109.0 million to $5,276.9 million, due primarily to a decrease of 1,161 TACTOM missiles from 4,951 to 3,790 (-$1,249.2 million) and associated schedule, engineering, and estimating allocations
Note that SecNav Mabus’ comments regarding 4,000 GM-109s in stock (q.v. April 13/14) appear to have been in error. Many have been used over the years.
Termination
April 13/14: Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus sees an inventory of 4,000 Tomahawks that “will carry us through any eventuality that we can foresee,” but Raytheon wants to avoid shutting down their line and cutting the chain to more than 100 suppliers in 24 states. Their lobbying is helped by the fact that the USA’s byzantine procurement and budgeting processes add some strategic risk. News that the Navy was even thinking of a next-generation replacement reportedly came as a surprise to Raytheon in January 2014. Which means that it’s entirely imaginable to have a 20 year wait between the last Tomahawk delivery, and a comparable new operational missile.
On the other hand, every defense production line shuts down eventually, and a dollar spent on Tomahawks can’t buy new ships, fighters, air defense missiles, etc. Rather than waging a frontal assault that tries to keep missile orders coming, Raytheon is reportedly looking to accelerate the combined xGM-109 recertification/ upgrade process by a few years, so it picks up where Tomahawk production leaves off. Raytheon senior program manager Chris Sprinkle says that Raytheon has invested $30 million of their own funds in R&D for upgrades, and plans to invest another $8 million or so. Sources: Arizona Daily Star, “Proposed halt of Tomahawk missile buys raises concerns at Raytheon”.
March 4/14: FY15 Budget. The Navy unveils a preliminary budget request briefing. It doesn’t break down individual programs into dollars, but it does offer planned purchase numbers for the Navy’s biggest programs from FY 2014 – 2019.
The plan confirms 196 Tactical Tomahawk missiles in FY 2014, and proposes to end production with 100 missiles ordered in FY 2015. Source: US Dept. of the Navy, PB15 Press Briefing [PDF].
Feb 19/14: Datalink test. A Tomahawk Block IV missile is launched from the USS Sterett [DDG 104] on a loitering fire test:
“… [the missile] flew a preprogrammed route while receiving updates from a simulated maritime operations center and from advanced off-board sensors updating the missile’s target location. Throughout the flight, the missile maintained communications with all the command and control assets and provided updates on its location before hitting the target.”
Raytheon told DID that this is the first of many tests involving “off-board sensors”, though 2014 will also see a number of flight tests using new on-board ESM and radar sensors. Many will be captive-carry tests, using one of the US Navy’s T-39 Sabreliner modified business jets. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon, U.S. Navy test Tomahawk Block IV’s latest communications upgrades”.
Feb 14/14: Upgrades. Tomahawk program manager Capt. Joe Mauser tells Defense Tech that they’re working on a new Joint Multiple Effects Warhead System (JMEWS) warhead for the Block IV, in order to improve performance against reinforced targets like bunkers.
At the same time, Raytheon is working on a new active & passive dual seeker (q.v. Oct 7/13). Raytheon has been elbowed aside from the OASuW program, which is currently owned by Lockheed Martin’s stealthy LRASM-B. A low-cost upgrade that accomplishes some of OASuW’s goals offers Raytheon the opportunity to get some funds, keep their missile relevant for years to come, and position themselves as a weaker Plan B if further budget cuts remove their competitor. Sources: DefenseTech, “Navy Wants Its Tomahawks to Bust More Bunkers”.
Jan 14/14: #3,000. Raytheon announces that they’ve delivered the 3,000th Tomahawk Block IV missile, as part of FY 2012’s FRP-9 production contract. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon delivers 3000th Tomahawk Block IV to US Navy”.
#3,000
Oct 7/13: ESM multi-mode. Raytheon announces a successful field test of a new multi-mode seeker technology that would add an advanced Electronic Support Measure (ESM) antenna and processor to the Block IV Tomahawk missile. Raytheon told DID that the system is based on the firm’s own technology, rather than being a direct offshoot of the attempt to add AARGM technology to the Tomahawk (q.v. April 27/12).
Raytheon is correct that the current Tomahawk is an open architecture ‘truck’ capable of integrating new payloads and sensors, and an ESM seeker is a helpful addition to recent improvements like the 2-way datalink. ESM would turn the missile into a radar and communications killer that could deal directly with enemy air defenses, and could begin to engage some kinds of moving targets. The challenge is that the missile still needs to survive long enough to hit its target, and the Tomahawk’s low-level flight isn’t enough to protect it from the kind of advanced air defenses that would make you want to use unmanned ESM missiles. Its best use case might be against enemy ships. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon demonstrates new seeker technology for Tomahawk Block IV missile”.
FY 2012 – 2013April 17/13: UK. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Britain’s request to import follow-on support and keep their UGM-109 Tomahawk Weapon Systems (TWS) ready for use. Work can include missile modifications, maintenance, spare and repair parts, system and test equipment, engineering support, communications equipment, technical assistance, personnel training/equipment, and other related elements of logistics support.
The estimated cost is up to $170 million, but actual costs will be negotiated in a series of contracts. The principal contractors will be Raytheon Missile Systems Company in Tucson, AZ; Lockheed Martin in Manassas, VA, Valley Forge, PA, and Marlton, NJ; Boeing in St. Louis, MO; BAE North America in San Diego, CA; COMGLOBAL in San Jose, CA; and SAIC in Springfield, VA and Patuxent River, MD. Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of 1 U.S. Government and 2 contractor representatives to the United Kingdom for the duration of this case.
DSCA: UK support request
April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage.
News for the Tomahawk program is mixed. The OASuW Harpoon replacement program canceled plans for an interim solution based on the xGM-109 family, even as it plans to award Technology Development contracts in FY 2013. Raytheon will need to consider its competitive options carefully, as OASuW could grow to be a huge opportunity.
Within the existing Tomahawk program, yearly budgets are rising even though the number of missiles per year remains constant at 196. This is pushing flyaway cost for new missiles from $956,000 in FY 2013 to about $1.2 million. The extra funds are going to 2 areas: obsolescence replacement/ diminishing manufacturing sources, and restoration of planned missile improvements. The former category includes such key components as the Williams turbojet engine and the satellite datalink, and is important enough that FY 2011 – 2011 contract savings are being applied to address it. Improvements will begin with missile communications that will work even in jamming-rich or otherwise hostile environments.
March 11/13: UK. A $6.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 4 torpedo tube launched (TTL) Tomahawk Block IV all-up-round missiles for the government of the United Kingdom under the Foreign Military Sales Program. All funds are committed immediately.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32.6%); Camden, AR (13%); Ogden, UT (10.5%); Dallas, TX (3.5%); Minneapolis, Minn. (3.3%); Glenrothes, Scotland (3.3%); Spanish Fork, UT (3.1%); El Segundo, CA (3%); Walled Lake, MI (2.6%); Anniston, AL (2.5%); Ft. Wayne, IN (2.3%); Ontario, Canada (2.2%); Vergennes, VT (2.1%); Berryville, AR (1.8%); Westminster, CO (1.6%); Largo, FL (1.5%); Middletown, CT (1.3%); Huntsville, AL (1.2%); Clearwater, FL (0.8%); Moorpark, CA (0.8%); El Monte, CA (0.6%); Salt Lake City, UT (0.6%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various continental U.S. (CONUS) and outside CONUS locations (5.6%); and is expected to be completed in February 2015 (N00019-12-C-2000).
4 for Britain
March 7/13: Support. A $12.8 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for services in support of Tomahawk missile depot maintenance, including direct fleet support for resolving technical issues with forward deployed, in-theater weapons and inventory management for the US Navy and the United Kingdom.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (70%); Camden, AR (24%); Commerce Township, MI (4%); Indianapolis, IN (1%); and various other continental U.S. (CONUS) and outside CONUS locations (1%) until February 2014. $2.4 million is committed immediately, of which $2.3 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-13-D-0002).
Jan 17/13: DOT&E testing. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The Tomahawk gets high marks. It continues to meet its standards, and remains operationally effective and suitable (maintainable).
The one thing Pentagon OT&E would like to see is restored flight testing of the Block III model, until it goes out of service in FY 2020.
Dec 18/12: CCLS. A $45 million firm-fixed-price contract modification from the USN for 120 Tomahawk Block IV Composite Capsule Launching Systems (CCLS), which are used to launch UGM-109s from vertical submarine tubes. All contract funds are committed immediately.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (24.61%); Lincoln, NB (23.17%); Camden, AR (12.48%); Rocket Center, WVA (10.3%); Carpentersville, IL (8.74%); Joplin, MO (6.63%); Hopkinton, MA (4.76%); Huntsville, AR (4.37%); Alamitos, CA (2.05%); Torrance, CA (1.47%); Downers Grove, IL (0.75%); and Brooksville, FL (0.67%), and is expected to be complete in July 2015 (N00019-12-C-2000).
Dec 17/12: 252 missiles. A $254.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising a US Navy option for 252 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round (AUR) missiles: 132 RGM-109s designed to launch from strike-length Mk.41 cells on surface ships, and 120 UGM-109 CLS missiles that are fired from different vertical launch tubes installed on American submarines.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32%); Camden, AR (11%); Ogden, UT (8%); Anniston, AL (4%); Minneapolis, MN (4%); Ft. Wayne, IN (4%); Glenrothes, Scotland (4%); Dallas, TX (4%); Spanish Fork, UT (3%); Vergennes, VT (3%); Walled Lake, MI (2%); Berryville, AR (2%); El Segundo, CA (2%); Westminster, CO (2%); Middletown, CT (2%); Huntsville, AL (1%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various locations in the continental United States and outside the continental United States (11.8%); and is expected to be completed in August 2015. See also Raytheon.
FY 2013: 252
Sept 3/12: OASuW. Aviation Week offers a look into the Tomahawk’s potential future. In June 2012, the US Navy announced a sole-source contract to Raytheon to develop the interim Offensive Anti-Surface Weapon (OASuW) by modifying a Tomahawk Block IV missiles with new sensors and data links. The missile is expected to enter service by 2015… but it’s likely to face competition from Lockheed Martin’s LRASM-A, among others.
Full OASuW Technology Development awards are expected to begin in FY 2013, after a Q2 Milestone A decision. The technical Development phase runs from FY 2013 – FY 2017, to an expected total of $557.2 million. Initial Operational Capability is currently set for 2024.
July 12/12: CCLS. A $45.9 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, buying 123 Tomahawk Block IV Composite Capsule Launching Systems (CCLS) for the US Navy.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (24.61%); Lincoln, NB (23.17%); Camden, AR (12.48%); Rocket Center, WVA (10.3%); Carpentersville, IL (8.74%); Joplin, MO (6.63%); Hopkinton, MA (4.76%); Huntsville, AR (4.37%); Alamitos, CA (2.05%); Torrance, CA (1.47%); Downers Grove, IL (0.75%); and Brooksville, FL (0.67%), and is expected to be complete in July 2014 (N00019-12-C-2000).
June 7/12: 361 missiles. A $337.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for 361 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round missiles for the Navy. This includes 238 RGM-109E missiles that are launched from strike-length Mk.41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells on surface ships, and 123 UGM-109E missiles that are launched from submarines equipped with the Capsule Launch System (CLS).
Raytheon’s release says that the buy includes replenishment of weapons used during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in Libya, as well as the FY 2012 buy.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32%); Camden, AR (11%); Ogden, UT (8%); Anniston, AL (4%); Minneapolis, MN (4%); Fort Wayne, IN (4%); Glenrothes, Scotland, UK (4%); Dallas, TX (4%); Spanish Fork, UT (3%); Vergennes, VT (3%); Walled Lake, MI (2%); Berryville, AR (2%); El Segundo, CA (2%); Westminster, CO (2%); Middletown, CT (2%); Huntsville, AL (1%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various locations inside and outside the continental United States (11.8%), and is expected to be complete in August 2014 (N00019-12-C-2000).
FY 2012 + Libya replacement: 361
April 27/12: New sensors? FBO.gov:
“The Naval Air Systems Command intends to negotiate and award a sole source order under Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) N00019-11-G-0014, pricing arrangement cost-plus-fixed-fee, for engineering services necessary to support a study to assess the possibility of integrating, onto the Block IV Tomahawk weapon, Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) technologies.”
The AGM-88E AARGM uses GPS to navigate to the target’s vicinity, then finds targets that are moving or have moved using a combination of emission-locating ESM and an active millimeter wave radar seeker. AARGM is meant to destroy enemy air defense systems, but a system for a missile of this size would also be able to target enemies like ships. ATK received a $452,000 contract on Aug 22/12.
xGM-109E Block IV TLAMs: A Program Success Story Fly.Block IV missiles offer a number of improvements over previous versions: the missile’s purchase cost drops by almost half, to about $750,000, while lowering its future maintenance costs, and upgrading its capabilities.
Capt. Bob Novak, who was the Tomahawk All-Up-Round (PMA-280) program manager until August 2005, began leading the Tomahawk AUR program team in 2002 during a critical time in the development of the Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile. Under his leadership the program awarded the Navy’s first-ever weapons multi-year contract, and was estimated to have reduced the cost per missile from Block III to Block IV by almost 50%, saving $1 billion over planned lifetime costs while upgrading the missile’s capabilities. While reducing the Block IV Tactical Tomahawk’s purchase costs, improved design and manufacturing also reduced maintenance/ recertification requirements from once every 8 years for Block III missiles to once every 15 years.
PMA-280 was honored with several prominent awards, including the Secretary of Defense Value Engineering Award, the Daedalian Award, and the Ed Heinemann Award.
Boom.One important new capability that Block IV Tomahawk brings to the US Navy’s Sea Strike doctrine is derived from the missile’s 2-way satellite data link, which enables the missile to respond to changing battlefield conditions. The strike controller can “flex” the missile in flight to preprogrammed alternate targets, redirect it to a new target, or even have it loiter over the battlefield awaiting a more critical target. Block IV Tomahawks can also transmit battle damage indication imagery and missile health and status messages via the satellite data link, allowing firing platforms to execute missions in real time.
Global Positioning System-only missions are also possible in addition to the missile’s previous terrain-mapping guidance mode, thanks to an improved anti-jam GPS receiver for enhanced mission performance.
The majority of Tomahawk cruise missiles are currently launched by Navy surface vessels, such as the Ticonderoga Class (CG-47) cruisers and Arleigh Burke Class (DDG-51) destroyers. The later series of Improved Los Angeles Class (SSN-688I) and the newest Virginia Class (SSN-744) attack submarines are also armed with 12 dedicated Tomahawk launch tubes, while earlier Los Angeles boats and the newest Seawolf Class (SSN-21) have to sacrifice some of their stored torpedoes to carry and launch Tomahawks through their torpedo tubes. But the USA’s premier Tomahawk carrier vehicle in future will be the Ohio Class SSGN stealth strike subs, with launch capacity for an astounding 154 Tactical Tomahawks each.
Additional Readings & SourcesDID would like to thank Raytheon Tomahawk Program Director Roy Donelson, and Growth Program Manager Chris Sprinkle, for their assistance with this article. Any mistakes are our own damn fault. Readers with corrections or information to contribute are encouraged to contact editor Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.
Weapon & Program BackgroundIn a brief press conference on Monday 18 January 2016, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced the date for Afghanistan’s next vote: 15 October 2016. But the preparations for the elections – for the lower house of parliament and, for the first time, district councils – are complicated by ongoing controversies over the legitimacy of the current IEC, the nature of the electoral reforms that need to precede the elections, as well as who will be organising them and under which amended laws. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert takes a closer look.
The facts
The IEC had come out in full force for the 18 January press conference, with ten people sitting at a long table in front of a row of large Afghan flags. IEC chair Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani, appointed by former president Hamed Karzai in the run-up to the 2014 presidential vote, started the conference by noting how the government, so far, had failed to show any sign of preparation or cooperation for the upcoming elections, and asking the government to cooperate with the date he was about to announce. He then requested the government to provide the necessary budget, to ensure security – for polling centres, staff, candidates and voters – and to instruct all government bodies to cooperate. He asked civil society, the media, political parties and citizens to take on their roles and responsibilities in an honest manner. He thanked the international community for their support in previous elections and asked them to continue on the same path. He, finally, asked all actors to respect the authority of the IEC.
The date then was announced for 24 Mizan 1395, or 15 October 2016, which is eight months from now. The elections planned for this date are already overdue, as according to the Constitution they should have been held by June 2015. The Wolesi Jirga elections will be held for the third time, but the district council elections are a different matter, with the large number of electoral constituencies, several of which are highly insecure, and the practical obstacles of varying district lists and unclear boundaries. Two days earlier, however, Nuristani had optimistically told the Wolesi Jirga that the IEC was already “fully ready” to hold elections.
Nuristani finally said the IEC had learned from past mistakes and was ready to implement its own reforms as planned, without specifying what these reforms would consist of.
The controversies
The announcement of the electorion date by the IEC is complicated by three controversies: the status of the current IEC, the nature the electoral reform needed before the elections, and the competing pressures surrounding the electoral timeline.
When the National Unity Government (NUG) came into being the two sides agreed on the need for “fundamental changes” to the electoral laws and institutions before the parliamentary elections. It was however obvious that they would have differing views on what kind of reforms would be necessary. The Abdullah camp, apart from generally pushing for changes to the electoral system, has particularly insisted on the replacement of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC).
Although initially very slow, the electoral reform process finally did catch (some) steam. The position of the IEC and IECC became increasingly precarious, as the government got ready to replace at least some of the commissioners. The IEC leadership strongly resisted these moves, arguing that they had been appointed for six years, that the executive did not have the authority to interfere and that, as the country’s main and independent electoral body, they should be in charge of everything election-related – including their own reform. The government, however, increasingly bypassed the IEC, instead relying on the recommendations of the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC) that was established as part of the NUG agreement. So today’s announcement of the election date, whether chosen in consultation with the government or not, will probably look to many Afghans as an act of defiance by the IEC.
The situation is complicated by the fact that the NUG agreement puts competing pressures on the electoral timeline, as it sets out a very ambitious sequence of events: electoral reforms before the 2015 [sic] parliamentary elections; parliamentary and district council elections before the convening of the Loya Jirga; and the Loya Jirga within two years of the establishment of the government. Proper electoral reform is, of course, likely to take much longer, particularly at its current pace (and particularly since the Loya Jirga, strictly speaking, would already have to take place in September of this year).
This tension is already being used by political pressure groups. Shortly after the president on 31 December 2015 indicated that the elections would probably take place between summer and autumn, the Council for the Protection and Stability of Afghanistan, with Ustad Sayyaf as its most prominent spokesperson, released a statement welcoming the government’s commitment, but calling the timeline “unrealistic.” Rather than arguing that the elections would probably take longer to prepare – given the complexity of the reforms and the fact that the district council elections have never been held before – the group argued that the timeline would make it impossible to still organise the Loya Jirga within two years of the NUG’s inauguration. It called for an election between spring and summer, which, the statement noted, would still be possible “if the government really meant to have elections.”
The council says it wants to constructively encourage reform and has no intention of bringing down the government. The fact, however, that the group is already implicitly questioning the legitimacy of a national unity government that does not follow its own agreement, is making the government uneasy.
What about the electoral reforms?
The government’s efforts to effect electoral reform, in the meantime, seem to have stalled. The long delays in the establishment of the Special Reform Commission (SERC) initially led to suspicions that the Ghani camp was dragging it’s feet. When the SERC finally got to work, in the summer of 2015, it prepared two batches of recommended for reforms. The first batch, presented to the CEO on 30 August 2015, resulted in several amendments by presidential decree to both the Electoral Law and the Law on the Structure, Authorities and Duties of the Electoral Bodies (the SAD Law). The most controversial amendments, at least according to the IEC, were those that changed the requirements and tenures of the electoral commissioners, opening the way for the replacement of at least some of them. (1)
On 21 December 2015 the SERC handed in its second, more complicated batch of recommendations, including changes in the electoral system and the electoral constituencies. This however came to a halt, when on the same day the Wolesi Jirga voted off the earlier decree that had amended the SAD Law and that was the basis for the establishment of a Selection Committee which was about to start looking for new electoral commissioners. On 26 December 2015, the Wolesi Jirga proceed to also vote off the decree amending the Electoral Law. On 5 January 2016 the Meshrano Jirga followed suit, voting off both decrees without discussing the merits of the amendments.
With the rejection of the decrees, the electoral reform efforts are not only back to square one, it also means that the legal basis for the replacement of the IEC and IECC commissioners has, for the moment, been removed.
In a press conference on 6 January 2015, possibly emboldened by the parliament’s actions, Nuristani said the IEC would announce the election date in the next week, and added that he hoped the president would now stop sending decrees to the parliament. He stressed once again that the 2014 vote had been the best elections ever and that the Selection Committee had been established against the law. The head of the IECC Saadat also welcomed the parliament’s decision and stressed that both the Reform Commission and the Selection Commission would now have to stop working.
Where to go from here?
The government has not yet formally reacted to the IEC’s announcement, which may be in part because they were busy with the quadrilateral ‘peace talks’ (or rather, the preparatory talks for hoped-for talks with the Taleban) that were taking place in Kabul on the same day.
But on the day before, after the IEC had announced it would hold a press conference, CEO Abdullah Abdullah told the council of ministers (and subsequently the press and social media) that the government considered electoral reform a pre-condition for elections and that “Afghans are still concerned over the flawed management of the previous elections” (the Twitter account in his name was much blunter, saying that “some Afghans are concerned that former commissioners convicted of fraud may be leading another election”). He left no doubt as to what reform would need to entail: “Upcoming elections will be held under the supervision of a new commission.”
President Ghani had earlier said something similar on 31 December 2015 during a televised press conference, when he stressed the government’s continued commitment to reform. He reiterated that the Selection Committee’s work would result in new commissioners (but did not specify how many) and said that the elections would be held between summer and autumn [2016] and that the IEC would fix the exact date. His words, slightly different from what Abdullah said, indicate that he is probably aiming for a compromise which would leave the current electoral bodies at least partially intact and for reforms that are not too far-reaching or time-consuming.
At the end of the day, the electoral reform discussion remains plagued by two fundamental problems: on one hand, the lack of consensus on what the problems of the 2014 election were and, on the other hand, the lack of real options to decrease the likelihood of fraud, manipulation and a contested outcome in the upcoming elections (the most important intervention would be the introduction of reliable voter lists, based on centralised population data, but this is unlikely to go ahead any time soon). It should then come as no surprise that, despite all the talk of commitments to both electoral reform and the convening of elections, there is probably very little real appetite to embark on another complicated and politically tense vote.
(1) The amendments to the two laws by presidential decree included 1) the cancelation of the existing voting cards, the establishment of voter lists based on voters’ tazkeras (ID documents) and the linking of voters to specific polling stations; 2) review of the polling centre distribution; 3) changes in composition of the Selection Committee for the electoral commissioners; 4) changes in the composition and tenure of the IEC by decreasing the number of commissioners and both decreasing and staggering the term of service; 5) changes in the requirements for the IECC commissioners; 6) changes in the composition of the Wolesi Jirga (an extra separate seat for Sikhs/Hindus) and provincial and district councils (25% women’s quota); and 7) the employment of school teachers and others civil servants as temporary electoral personnel.
Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency and Ine Eriksen Søreide, Norwegian Minister of Defence met today for discussions on Norway’s involvement in EDA projects as well as ways to further enhance defence cooperation.
“I am very pleased to welcome the Chief Executive of EDA to Norway”, said Defence Minister Eriksen Søreide. “EDA is an important partner for Norway in the development of our Armed Forces. Although a non-member of the EU, Norway has a strong interest in maintaining European security and prosperity. European cooperation is vital to bolster European defence capabilities and in strengthening European allies’ contribution to the wider trans-Atlantic defence and security community”, said the Minister.
“Norway is actively engaged in European as well as regional defence cooperation. This is not only of benefit for Europe but also for the Norwegian armed forces and defence industry. Today’s discussions concentrated on future projects. At the Agency, we see Norway’s strong support to the Agency’s air-to-air refuelling programme as well as to our research and technology initiatives with a focus on maritime capabilities and to counter chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats”, said Jorge Domecq.
Not being a member of the European Union, Norway signed an Administrative Arrangement with the Agency in 2006. Norway regularly participates in EDA projects and programmes such as helicopter exercises and other flying events, the air-to-air refuelling programme and the Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory. Additionally, since 2006 Norway has contributed more than € 30 million to EDA’s research and technology initiatives.
Taleban fighters broke into the Ghazni jail and freed hundreds of inmates, including key Taleban commanders, in the early morning of 14 September 2015. It was the ninth spectacular jailbreak since 2001, but the Ghazni jailbreak was different than most of them: better planned and with more fighters. The government forces, on the other hand, lacked coordination between the jail protection unit and other security forces, and there may have been someone on the inside helping the Taleban. AAN’s Fazal Muzhary talked to government officials, local witnesses and people close to the Taleban, to find out whether it was the weakness of the Afghan government or the better planning of the Taleban fighters that led to the successful jailbreak.
The Ghazni jailbreak; how it happened
On 14 September 2015, at 1:50, the attack started. Taleban fighters first shot a rocket at the main entrance of the jail to open the way for a suicide attacker who drove his Toyota Corolla to the gate and blew it up. The blast was so big that it shattered the windows of several houses nearby and caused the entrance post to catch fire. The first suicide attacker was said to have had nine comrades, who were ready to blow themselves up if the jail protection guards showed strong resistance. Three of them were killed during the initial, short resistance by the jail guards. After the blast and the short fight, a group of 40 attackers, who had been waiting in an adjacent canal, entered the jail to free the prisoners.
An eyewitness who lives about 120 meters from the Ghazni prison and who was asleep at home when the attack happened, described how the blast shattered the windows of his house and woke him. He first heard the shouting of “Allahu Akbar” and then gunfire. The shooting lasted for a few minutes. The explosion had set the police post at the entrance on fire, so what was happening at the prison’s gates was clearly illuminated. “I could see a large number of people coming out of the jail,” he told AAN. The jail guards, he said, had resisted only briefly and at nearby police check-posts there was only “shooting in the air.” An hour later, he said, “at 2:50am when the [other] government security forces arrived, they started shooting in all directions until sunrise.”
A source close to the Taleban said the group of Taleban fighters that freed the prisoners had been told beforehand that there would be ten persons, who also were inmates, inside the jail who would be wearing white clothes and would be waiting for them. These ten persons had broken the doors of several cells immediately after the blast. When the fighters got in, they did not face any problem freeing the prisoners. The group apparently went from cell to cell fearlessly freeing prisoners. The interior ministry later said a total of 355 prisoners had been released. As a result of the attack, four attackers and seven guards were killed, both by the blast and in the firefight.
At 2:50 when the government security forces from Ghazni city finally arrived at the jail, witnesses said they started shooting in every direction, but by this time, everything had already ended. The freed prisoners were on their way to Andar and other areas out of the government’s reach; some had probably already arrived to safety. The freed prisoners were from Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia and Zabul provinces. They were first moved to Kalakhel, Alizai, Khadokhil and several other villages in Andar district, about 17 kilometres to the south, and were then sent to neighbouring Giro, Qarabagh and other districts of the province.
In a statement later that day, on 14 September 2015, Taleban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahed said that hundreds of fighters from several districts had participated in multiple attacks in the city. Indeed, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) had been caught in a complex situation, as Taleban fighters launched attacks, not just on the prison, but on several other security check posts and key government institutions at the same time, including the main police headquarters. This made it difficult for the security forces to identify the main target of the attacks and probably led to confusion and great difficulty with coordination.
What is clear, however, is that the Afghan National Army (ANA), the prison guards and the police who were in the vicinity of the jail did not put up much of a fight. Although the guards at the gate fought for a short time, the guards in the central and other towers did not support them and the few guards who resisted were ultimately killed. Moreover the jail guards did not contact the police headquarters to ask for help, until much later. Ghazni police chief Muhammad Hakim Angar, who has since then been replaced, told AAN that when they were finally contacted, supporting forces arrived at the jail within ten minutes, but by that time everything was already over.
The Ministry of Interior, on the same day of the attack, sent a delegation to Ghazni to officially investigate the incident. On 19 September, five days later, interior ministry spokesman Sediq Sediqqi told Hasht-e Subh daily that the investigation was completed and the findings had been sent to the president’s office. He said they would share the findings with the media, but months later still nothing has been shared. AAN has tried several times to reach the spokesman, but his phone has either been off or he did not respond.
The media and other commentators, in the meantime, were swift to come up with their own verdict. A day after the attack, local media vehemently criticised what they saw as the security officials’ incompetence and lack of coordination. Hasht-e Subh daily in an editorial wrote: “After the first Kandahar jailbreak, officials said they had learned and were now prepared to prevent similar attacks in the future, however the Ghazni jailbreak proved that the officials did not learn anything.” According to Sarkhat daily, jail superintendent Muhammad Latif Hassanyar and security director Omarakhan had not been at their duty stations when the attack happened.
Taleban preparation
The multiple attacks in Ghazni on 14 September 2015 was a complex operation, targeting a large number of check posts and involving a large number of Taleban fighters. Most of them had apparently not been told what the main target was (except 50 of them, among them, the ten suicide attackers). Interestingly, several separate groups of Taleban fighters participated in these attacks and every group was given a different task without knowing the tasks of the other groups. A source close to the Taleban said that one group of fighters had simply been instructed to follow their commander and only around midnight, when they realised they were close to the main Ghazni-Paktika highway and near the jail, were the fighters told they were attacking the central jail of Ghazni. This group, which he said consisted of 180 men, did not attack the security check posts around the jail; instead, some of them entered the jail after the blast and freed the inmates. Others were told to target the government reinforcements if they showed up, and otherwise to just accompany the freed prisoners to the villages – which they did.
Moreover, the Taleban simultaneously attacked several security posts around the jail and in other parts of the city, as well as in the districts. Targets included the base of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and the check-post in the former base of the US Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Ghazni city, two posts in Qala-e Qazi and Zargar immediately outside the city, and posts in Suleimanzai (in Deh Yak district), and Mullah Noh Baba (in the south west of Andar district). This seems to have successfully confused the Afghan security forces, a trick that the militants did not try in other jailbreaks. Not letting their own fighters know the full plan also appears to be a tactic not used in other, similar attacks, particularly on jails.
Later on the day of the attack on 14 September 2015, the Ministry of Interior said that three – of the 355 – escaped prisoners had been re-arrested, although local sources a week later could confirm only one (a prisoner who had originally been sentenced for theft and who was re-arrested in the Zarghar area near Ghazni city). Former police chief Angar later told AAN that, since then, 28 prisoners had been recovered; he said most of them had returned voluntarily and a small number were re-arrested. This figure has not been confirmed by other sources aware of the incident.
Although NDS director Ali Ahmad Mubariz on 3 October 2015 said that an operation had been immediately launched to track down the freed prisoners, no one in the surrounding areas appears to have seen a single police or government force. If the government had indeed conducted such an operation, local people said they would probably have encountered the Taleban fighters who were waiting for them in Mangor area, not more than ten kilometres to the south of the city.
After the Ghazni jailbreak; flowers and executions
AAN has followed what happened to the prisoners who were freed and found that they were first moved by the Taleban to several villages in Andar district (which neighbours the district centre to the south-west) and then sent to Giro and other districts of the province. Locals in Alizai, Kamalkhel and Hayatwal villages told AAN that a large number of people came to Andar to greet their freed relatives with flowers. Habib Rahman, a Taleban commander from Hayatwal village who is also known as Mansur, and his brother, were welcomed in this way; both received flowers after they arrived in Andar.
Taleban jailbreaks do not only involve the release of their own comrades, but often also general criminal prisoners. After the prisoners’ arrival in Andar, the Taleban divided the prisoners in groups, selecting those whom they believed should be punished and those who should be released. The first group included former members of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and major criminals. Two prisoners were executed by the Taleban. All others, AAN was told, were freed a week after the jailbreak. Some of the freed prisoners who had previously worked in the ANSF were asked for a guarantee that they would not rejoin the government’s forces.
The two prisoners the Taleban executed were Enayatullah Taqat, also known as Natak, from Andar district, and Alawadin from Qarabagh district. Natak ran in the provincial council election in 2014, while Alawadin was with the police in Qarabagh district. The reason for the executions, according to a local source, was that they had committed serious crimes. Natak, who was also the stepbrother of former Andar district chief Lahur, had apparently been involved in kidnappings as well as murders. According to a local teacher who spoke to AAN, Natak had, in the autumn of 2014, killed a man called Sharaf from Laghar village and married his wife a month later. He said Natak had also kidnapped a person from Ghazni city in spring 2015 and had only freed him after receiving a ransom.
Alawadin was executed in the neighbouring district of Qarabagh. He had been involved in killings and robbery. A local resident told AAN that Alawadin had killed his brother, who was working as a doctor in Kandahar, on 1 March 2015. The brother had been driving from Kandahar to his hometown Moqur, when Alawadin, who had recently been deployed to Moqur district as a policeman, asked the victim to drop him off at Moqur bazaar, together with a friend who was a member of the ALP. On the way, between Janda and Moqur, Alawadin and his friend stabbed the doctor, threw his body into a nearby well and stole his car. When the family of the victim learned about this, they informed the district officials, who arrested Alawadin. The other man fled.
How the jail break could have happened
Talking to AAN, deputy governor Ahmadi gave several reasons why the Ghazni jailbreak may have been so successful. He said that, first of all, also according to the investigation team from Kabul, there had been a lack of coordination between the security forces. The jail guards did not inform the nearby security posts; and the police and the army stationed nearby did not show any reaction, even though they must have seen and heard the fighting. There is a security post of ANA soldiers about a kilometre to the southeast of the jail on Kohibad hill, from where soldiers only fired a couple of warning shots in the air, but according to former Ghazni Governor Faizanullah Faizan, they did not contact the jail guards to ask what was happening or if they needed help; nor did the jail guards inform them.
There are, all in all, ten police check-posts in the neighbourhood, but none came to help or rescue the jail guards or to stop the attack. There may be valid reasons for inaction by some of the posts: they could have been confused because they were also attacked, or they did not receive information from the jail security guards. Others may not have come out of their posts for fear of being ambushed by the Taleban fighters outside the posts. However, according to Ahmadi, if they had reacted and with coordination, the attack could have been fought off, or at least they could have prevented such a large number of prisoners from fleeing.
Secondly, according to Ahmadi there was weak management and coordination within the jail protection unit, who did not act as they were supposed to: they barely fought the attackers and did not prevent them from getting into the jail. He said the jail guards did not resist because they were not “serious and faithful people.” Some of the guards were sleeping, he said, while some others had intentionally failed to resist. Last but not least, he said there was the possibility that the Taleban had a secret agreement with some of the jail officials. Ahmadi particularly mentioned superintendent Muhammad Latif Hassanyar and his deputy Agha Jan, who were arrested on 14 September 2015, together with three security guards, on suspicion of negligence and collusion with the Taleban.
Faizanullah Faizan, a former Ghazni Governor who closely followed the jailbreak, also said the jail guards did not honestly resist the attack. He confirmed that the guards near the entrance did show a reaction but received no support from their colleagues, and that this was why only these seven guards were killed. He moreover said that, if the jail guards had immediately informed the nearby soldiers and the police, they could have at least stopped the prisoners from escaping the jail. Faizan, who was a mujahedin fighter in the 1990s, had at the time himself participated in an attempted jailbreak. Comparing this jailbreak with his own experience, he told AAN: “We failed to break into Ghazni jail in the 1990s because the police forces reacted honestly and were well-coordinated.”
One source close to the Taleban said that after the prisoners were freed, a Taleban commander looked around the entire jail, but could not find a single security guard. “It means all the guards of the jail either hid somewhere or escaped during the attack,” he said. This, despite the fact that, based on the attendance sheet, 110 of the total of 173 guards were supposed to have been present on the day of the attack (although according to deputy governor Ahmadi only 60 guards were actually there). Moreover, according to Ghazni police chief Angar: “We found that only four pika machine gun bullets, seven kalashnikov bullets and five pistol bullets were fired by the jail’s security guards and not a single bullet hole could be seen in the exterior walls of the towers.” This is another indicator that the jail guards in the central towers did not resist; if they had done so, they would have been shot at by the Taleban fighters.
Angar also pointed to what he considered interference in the hiring of jail staff. He said that parliamentarians in Kabul and provincial council members in Ghazni had interfered in the appointment of the staff (including the superintendent and security guards) which meant that they were more loyal to the MPs than the government, lacked professional skills and had not been trained in security tactics. He thought they had either lacked the ability to inform the other security forces and/or had not seriously tried to resist the attackers.
Earlier jailbreaks; differences and similarities
Since 2001, Afghanistan has experienced eight Taleban-planned jailbreaks in which a total of 1,954 prisoners were freed and 17 jail guards killed. In the first jailbreak in 2003 in Kandahar’s Sarpoza prison, the Taliban tunnelled their way out of Sarposa and forty-one prisoners escaped. After a weeklong search, only a handful was recaptured). In a second jailbreak in Kandahar in 2008, Taleban fighters carried out a massive attack, which killed 15 security guards, and freed at least 1,200 prisoners including important Taleban members. Before the attack, the Taleban had apparently warned locals living in the vicinity of the prison that they should evacuate their houses. (1) In the third break into Sarpoza prison in 2011, 500 prisoners were freed through a one kilometre long underground tunnel that had been dug by the Taleban. In the north, in Sar-e Pul province, Taleban fighters were able to free 170 inmates in 2012. The jailbreak followed a powerful bomb blast inside the building and a well-coordinated attack from three directions.
Smaller jailbreaks include from Farah prison when inmates broke out by digging a tunnel from their cell to the outside, on 28 November 2009. Officials captured a thirteenth prisoner as he tried to escape. Eight months later, on 18 July 2010 after a bomb went off at the main gate of the same prison, nineteen inmates escaped. Officials said that only one guard was killed. They also had said that eight escapees were re-arrested. In Zabul, eight prisoners overpowered a jail guard, who had taken them out for the Fajr dawn prayer, and fled on 15 July 2009. Lastly, four foreign prisoners escaped from the heavily fortified and well-guarded then US-controlled Bagram jail in 2005. Military officials familiar with the episode said the suspects are believed to have picked the lock on their cell, changed out of their bright orange uniforms and made their way through the heavily guarded military base under cover of night. They then crawled over a faulty wall where a getaway vehicle was waiting for them.
Interestingly, none of these jailbreaks caused many casualties on the side of the Taleban. Only during the Sar-e Pul jailbreak were three insurgents reportedly killed, and one suicide attacker in Kandahar in 2008. This suggests these operations were all well-planned, but also points to the likelihood of repeated inside assistance.
Since the Ghazni jailbreak, two more have ensued. When Kunduz city fell to the Taleban on 28 September 2015, about 700 prisoners were freed, (see a video here), while in another jailbreak, in Ghorian district in the western Herat province on 21 October 2015, six Taleban prisoners were released.
Conclusion
It seems that the Taleban fighters were smart enough and well-prepared enough to carry out their operation exactly as they wanted. They distracted the Afghan government forces by attacking several security check posts at the same time. They also kept their own fighters largely unaware of the plan. Though officials said there was inside cooperation with the Taleban at the government’s side, it also seems that, if this had indeed been the case, there would have been no need for such a big, complicated operation or such a high level of secrecy. Even bearing in mind the multiple attacks that night, the Afghan government displayed great confusion in response to the attack. They were uncoordinated and failed to even try to foil the attack and the escape of the prisoners. If the jail protection guards had immediately informed all the surrounding check posts, the Taleban fighters could have faced a much stronger resistance. It is less likely they could have freed all the prisoners and taken them to local areas while losing so few fighters.
Although, the jailbreak in Ghazni is over, it is clear that similar attacks can happen again, unless the Afghan government manages to improve the protection of its jails and other key institutions.
(1) For a detailed account of 2008 Sarpoza jailbreak see Graeme Smith’s book “The Dogs are Eating them Now: Our War in Afghanistan,” Alfred A. Knopf, Canada, 2013 (pp. 215-233).
More than 80 experts from national administrations participate in the first plenary session of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector. Opened today by EU Commissioner for Energy and Climate Action Miguel Arias Cañete, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq and European Commission's Director-General for Energy Dominique Ristori, the Consultation Forum will examine how energy efficiency measures and renewable energy sources could be better used and implemented within the European defence sector. The consultation will take place through a series of meetings between experts from national administrations, armed forces, industry and academia.
"Some of the world’s most efficient militaries are progressively replacing expensive fossil fuels with power generated by solar panels, wind turbines and rechargeable batteries. This is not only about more reliable on-site energy generation. It's also about making it safer and cheaper for troops to complete their missions", said Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete.
“Sustainable energy use starts at home. This is true for individuals as well as for the armed forces. The energy bill for Europe’s armed forces amounts to billions of euros. The EU legislation in place for energy efficiency, renewable energy and energy performance in buildings can certainly improve the armed forces’ energy output. Ultimately this will not only benefit their environmental footprint but will also result in considerable savings”, said Jorge Domecq during the opening of the first plenary session.
Consultation Forum
The Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector is a European Commission initiative managed by the EDA. It brings together experts from the defence and energy sectors to share information and best practice on improving energy management, efficiency and the use of renewable energy in the civil uses of the military. The focus will be on facilitating the sharing of good practice and expertise by assessing the existing EU energy legislation, in particular the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Energy Performance in Buildings Directive and the Renewable Energy Directive in order to see how different measures could be implemented in the defence sector thus contributing to on-going decarbonisation efforts.The Forum will also be a place to stimulate projects in key areas as well as identifying possible funding streams. Depending on the findings, the Forum might also develop recommendations on how to further develop directives or amending policy in relation to European funding mechanisms for defence.
The Consultation Forum will take place in a series of five plenary meetings over two years. The work will be carried out in three parallel working groups each with a particular focus: (1) Energy management, (2) Energy efficiency & 3) Renewable energy.
Defence is one of the largest energy consumers in Europe. One of the key challenges is to quantify the extent of this energy usage and to assess how projects stimulated through this Consultation Forum can impact on overall EU energy usage.
Background: EDA Energy & Environment Programme
The Agency pursues a comprehensive approach to energy management which is part of its wider Energy and Environment Programme. The programme also aims to identify fully integrated solutions where both energy reduction and environmental impact are assessed together. The EDA Energy and Environment Working Group was established in June 2014 and has so far worked on a number of projects including the Strategic Research Agenda, a Demand Management (Smart Camp) Technical Demonstrator which has recently been deployed to Mali and Power Purchase Agreements (Go Green). A new project addressing water and energy use in military barracks, called “Smart Blue Water Camps” is due to start in 2016.