Defence`s Feeds

Ministers of Defence today met in the European Defence Agency (EDA) Steering Board, under the chairmanship of Federica Mogherini in her capacity as Head of the Agency.

The EDA presented among other things progress of the four cooperative capability programmes, the interim report on the implementation of the Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation as well as a preliminary implementation roadmap for a dual-use strategy on RPAS regulation.

Furthermore the Agency highlighted the key findings of the hybrid threats table-top exercise it conducted last month. The exercise involved some 80 experts from Member States, EU institutions and NATO. It underlined for example the critical importance of strategic awareness to allow Member States to detect and identify hybrid threats. The detection of hostile hybrid threats is the most challenging and yet most important aspect of an effective defence posture in this context. Greater levels of information and intelligence and close cooperation between civil and military actors were identified as important. Additionally, rapid decision-making and deployment of the necessary capabilities needs are necessary. While in a hybrid threat scenario civil actors might be in the lead, the military must stand ready and provide decision-makers with the full scope of military capabilities if necessary. Specific focus should be given to the ability to communicate. Therefore the resilience, redundancy and protection of CIS networks remains vital and the contribution of more secure defence systems (including those using satellites) is important.

“The exercise was very useful as it allowed us to stress-test military capabilities in a hybrid threat environment. It also underlined the importance of close co-operation between military and civilian stakeholders in a hybrid threat scenario. However, we also saw that existing military capabilities should not be completely reoriented towards countering hybrid threats as the full spectrum of military missions must be considered”, Jorge Domecq, the Chief Executive of the EDA said. A second exercise in June will focus on the way ahead in different capability areas.

Ministers of Defence were also presented with an interim report on the implementation of the Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation. The interim report – which was compiled on the basis of questionnaires sent to and completed by the Member States – highlights that the policy framework is well supported. The focus on information-sharing through the Agency’s Capability Development Plan as well as the Collaborative Database is deemed crucial by a large majority of Member States.

Defence Ministers endorsed a preliminary implementation roadmap for a dual-use strategy on RPAS regulation involving questions of rulemaking, standardisation, technological solutions and issues of cyber security. The EDA will now start consolidating the roadmap with the European Commission and other relevant actors. 

The Steering Board tasked the Agency, in close coordination with Member States, to engage with the Commission in the preparation of the Space Strategy for Europe, to ensure that common military views of Member States are taken into account. Furthermore, the EDA will support Member States’ dialogue and consultation with the Commission in order to contribute to the European Defence Action Plan.

Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive, also informed Defence Ministers of recent activities in R&T. Between 2004 and the end of 2016, the Agency will have managed research projects with a total value of around € 1 billion in contributions by the Member States.  Mr Domecq also stressed that the EDA will continue to actively support Member States in their discussions with the European Commission in view of defining and agreeing on the research topics and priorities, the rules as well as the working modalities of the Preparatory Action (PA) on defence-related research scheduled to be launched in 2017.

More information:

• Council conclusions on Countering Hybrid Threats

The SSR Resource Centre is pleased to present a new series on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) in Myanmar that is led by Dean Piedmont of the Peacebuilding, Reintegration & Stabilization Group (PRSG) in collaboration with the Centre for Security Governance.   This blog series features analysis on the state of DDR and SSR

Want to keep up to date on the SSR field? Once a week, the CSG’s Security Sector Reform Resource Centre project posts pertinent news articles, reports, projects, and event updates on SSR over the past week. Click here to sign-up and have the SSR Weekly News Roundup delivered straight to your inbox every week!   SSR Resource Centre

2015 was again a busy year for the European Defence Agency (EDA) in supporting Member States to enhance European defence capabilities and cooperation. The Agency’s main activities and achievements of last year are summarized in the EDA’s 2015 annual report which has been published just now. 

You will find in the report a succinct overview of new developments which occurred in 2015 such as the adoption of the revised EDA Council Decision, as well as of the progress made in implementing the revised Capability Development Plan (CDP), the four key capability programmes and the roadmaps for future cooperation projects. Support to operations, research and technology (R&T), Single European Sky, exercises and training, energy and environment or VAT exemption on cooperation projects are additional EDA activities which progressed substantially in 2015 and are showcased in the report. All major 2015 EDA facts & figures are also included.

Have a look here!

A new UN report highlights how access to healthcare and education in Afghanistan, particularly for children, is being increasingly compromised by violence, threats, intimidation and abuse of facilities. The number of verified incidents over the last three years (2013-2015) in particular shows an increase in recorded incidents of threats and intimidation, as well as a continued considerable number of deaths, injuries and abductions. The violations, to a differing extent carried out by all parties to the conflict, directly harmed or impacted health and education personnel, reduced the availability of healthcare and limited children’s access to education and medical facilities. AAN highlights the UN report’s main findings.

The year 2015 was the bloodiest year in Afghanistan yet. And children were particularly hard hit: one in four documented casualties was a child. (1) UNAMA’s data on civilian casualties for the first quarter of 2016, released on 17 April 2016, shows a continued increase in the numbers of civilian casualties, including an increase in child casualties:

The Mission has documented a five per cent increase in women casualties (195 women casualties – 52 deaths and 143 injured) and a 29 per cent increase in child casualties (610 children casualties – 161 deaths and 449 injured) compared to the first three months of 2015. Ground engagements caused the highest number of women casualties, followed by suicide and complex attacks, and IEDs. For children, ground engagements killed and maimed the most, followed by unexploded ordinance and IEDs. (1)

A new UN report now shows how children are additionally affected by the on-going conflict through incidents that affect their access to health care and education across Afghanistan.

The report, which is based on data collected over the last three years (from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2015) by the Human Rights Unit of UNAMA and UNICEF focuses on conflict-related attacks and incidents on education and health care facilities. It paints a grim picture of post-transition Afghanistan, showing how the number of incidents involving education and health care facilities and providers sharply increased in the last three years. (2) The conflict-related incidents had the effect that children were either denied access to education or missed their immunisations due to limited access to the health facilities and providers in 2015. Hospitals were damaged or destroyed by targeted attacks and crossfire, and many schools and health facilities were closed – and often remained closed – due to insecurity, threats or military use.

Nicholas Haysom, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan called the findings of the report “deeply troubling” and emphasised that it was “simply unacceptable for teachers, doctors and nurses to be subjected to violence or threats, and for schools and medical facilities to be misused or attacked.”

Infographic from UNAMA Report published on 18 April 2016

Schools under attack

Afghanistan has made significant progress in terms of primary and secondary education enrolments rates since 2001. In 2014 more than 8 million pupils were reported to be enrolled in schools, 39 per cent of them girls. The average annual growth rate, from 2001 to 2012, was said to have been nine per cent (according to a 2015 Ministry of Education review report). The conflict has, however, had a dampening effect in terms of access to education. As noted by the Education Ministry in the same report: “insecurity often include[s] attacks on schools resulting in closure of schools for long periods of time, shortage[s] result in long walking distance to schools, – all these factors negatively affect enrollment and retention rates and ultimately students’ learning.”

In 2015, the UN documented 132 conflict-related incidents affecting education facilities and education personnel (as compared to 63 incidents in 2013 and 71 in 2014). Of the 132 incidents affecting access to education, the UN report documented the highest number of cases (38) in the eastern region (23 in Nangarhar province, nine in Kunar, five in Laghman and one in Nuristan). An additional 27 incidents were recorded in the western region (12 in Farah province, seven in Herat, six in Ghor and two in Badghis), and 26 incidents in the northeastern region (16 in Kunduz province, seven in Badakhshan and three in Baghlan).

According to the Ministry of Education, as reported by AP recently 615 schools in the country’s 11 most volatile provinces had to close because of violence in 2015. For example, in Helmand alone as reported by Pajhwok more than 50 schools had been closed in the provincial capital and three nearby districts of southern Helmand province, as of November 2015, due to clashes between security forces and insurgents. (See also previous AAN reporting on the situation in Helmand here  and here). The UN report, which only counted conflict-related incidents that constituted a violation of applicable national and international laws and that could be verified by multiple sources, (3) had the following figures:

More than 369 schools closed partially or completely, affecting at least 139,048 students (65,057 boys and 73,991 girls) and 600 teachers.

According to the report, 75 educational personnel or students were killed, injured or abducted during 2015 (11 deaths, 15 injured, 49 abducted); all but one of the cases were perpetrated by anti-government elements. There were 29 direct attacks on schools (a decrease from 2014 and 2013 when respectively 34 and 30 direct attacks were recorded).

In cases where schools were used for military purposes (a total of 35 incidents), the government forces were at fault in two-thirds of the cases:

In 2015, 35 schools (compared to 12 schools in 2014 and ten schools in 2013) were used for military purposes for a cumulative total of 1,311 days, the majority (24) by Pro-Government Forces. Military use of schools varied from a few days to months, and impeded access to education for at least 8,905 students (5,614 boys and 3,291 girls). Anti- Government Elements used at least 11 schools in Nangarhar, Nuristan, Logar and Kunduz provinces for military purposes.

The highest number of incidents of schools being used for military purposes during 2015 was documented in Kunduz province, where 15 schools were used by the pro- government forces, affecting 6,680 students (3,980 boys and 2,700 girls).

Girls most affected

The UN report documented 19 incidents in 2015 where anti-government elements directly 
or indirectly limited girls’ access to education, including direct restrictions such as: complete bans on education for girls, restrictions on girls’ attendance beyond 4th or 6th grade, or explicit prohibitions on girls attending school without a female teacher. The 19 incidents also included “other forms 
of violence, which impeded girls’ access to education such as: threats and intimidations, two school-burnings, two improvised explosive device attacks
and one incident of abduction.”

Of the 14 recorded incidents 
of threats and intimidation against teachers and students, nine incidents led to the closure or partial closure of a total of 213 schools (including 94 mixed schools that were closed to girls only), affecting at least 50,683 girls. In Shindand district of Herat province alone, between June and December 2015, threats and intimidation carried out by anti-government elements led to the closure of five girl schools and the suspension of female classes in 94 mixed schools, affecting at least 27,103 girls.

The report notes that “The increase in attacks impacting education attributed to the Taliban – 82 incidents compared to 29 in 2014 – contradicts a decree issued by Mullah Mohammad Omar in 2011 instructing his followers not to attack schools or intimidate school children,” as well as a 2012 declaration by the Taliban that they were not against the education of girls.” (For more details on the Taleban’s education policies see these two AAN reports, here and here).

Increased number of incidents on health care

As reported earlier by AAN in March 2016, health workers have been coming under increasing pressure from all sides in the war. This is confirmed by the newly released UN report.

The UN report documents an increase in the number of incidents affecting access to health care, with 125 incidents reported in 2015, compared to 59 in 2014 and 33 in 2013. In 2015 20 health workers were reported killed, 43 injured and 66 abducted. Overall, anti-government elements perpetrated 109 of all verified cases affecting access to health services in 2015 (the UN report attributes 15 incidents to pro-government forces and one remains unknown).

Similar to the findings in the education sector, threats and intimidation of health personnel constituted the majority of the cases – with 64 incidents making up 52 per cent of all verified cases. Approximately one third of all health-related incidents took place in the eastern region which experienced 40 incidents: 23 in Nangarhar, ten in Kunar, six in Laghman and one in Nuristan (all attributed to Anti-Government Elements). In the northeast, UN documented 21 incidents, attributing eight incidents to Pro-Government Forces (five in Kunduz and three in Badakhshan) and 13 incidents to Anti-Government Elements (nine in Kunduz and four in Badakhshan). Additionally, 18 incidents were documented in the northern region, all perpetrated by Anti-Government Elements (seven in Balkh, three in Faryab, three in Samangan, three in Sar-e Pul and two in Jawzjan).

Of the ten recorded cases where medical facilities were used for military purposes, the perpetrators were anti-government elements in 80 per cent of the cases (8 incidents); in the remaining two cases pro-government forces used the facilities for the military purposes.

Compared to
 23 in 2014 and 15 incidents in 2013, the UN documented 64 incidents of threats and intimidation in 2015. Threats and intimidation targeting health personnel led to the closure of at least 19 clinics, including 12
in the eastern region (11 in Nangarhar, all attributed to ISIL-Khorasan Province and one in Kunar attributed to anti-government elements).

The violence also affected the vaccination campaigns:

A total of 89,873 children could not be vaccinated during the December 2015 Sub-National Immunization days. These children are mostly from Kunar (12,638), Nangarhar (59,650) and Helmand (13,493) provinces.

UN calls for greater responsibility

The UN called for the immediate cessation of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks that target or affect civilians and civilian objects, including schools and hospitals, and calls on all parties to the conflict to ensure that perpetrators of attacks on education and health institutions, personnel and beneficiaries are held accountable. Such attacks – except in highly exceptional cases – amount to violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law 
(for more details on the rules of war, see here).

 

 

(1) In total the UN report documented 1,943 civilian casualties (600 deaths and 1,343 injured) in the period between 1 January and 31 March 2016. This represented a 13 per cent decrease in deaths and an 11 per cent increase in injuries, compared to the same period in 2015.

(2) The UN report notes that due to on going insecurity and access constraints “figures provided may underrepresent the number of incidents attributed to the parties to the conflict and the severity of the impact of conflict on children.” The methodology used for monitoring and verifying the incidents is the same as used for the regular reports by UNAMA on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, with all reported incidents having been verified by three sources.

(3) The UN counted only those cases that constituted a violation of the applicable international humanitarian law, international human rights law, international criminal law and national legislation. In particular, UN applied the international legal framework that Afghanistan is a party to, such as the four 1949 Geneva protocols and the second protocol of 1977, which relates to the protection of civilians in a non-international armed conflict. Under international humanitarian law, attacks against civilians and civilian objects, including schools and hospitals, are generally prohibited. Additional Protocol II prohibits acts or threats of violence when the primary purpose is to spread fear among the civilian population.

The country is also the signatory to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which establishes as a war crime “intentionally [directing] attacks against buildings dedicated to […] education […], hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives.

When collecting the data, the UN applied Security Council Resolution 1998 (Monitoring and reporting attacks on schools and/or hospitals and related protected personnel), which highlights the impact of armed conflict on the safety, education and healthcare of children, and calls for greater action to ensure that schools and hospitals are protected. The resolution refers to “attacks on schools and hospitals” as an umbrella formula both for attacks directed against schools and hospitals, as well as indirect harm resulting from conflict-related violence. This definition includes all acts that lead to the total destruction, compromised functioning or partial damage of educational and health institutions, as well as harm to protected persons, including killing, injuring, abduction and use of civilians as human shields.

 

 

Indonesian Bung Tomo Class Corvette

On 21 April, SEDE will hold a public hearing to address the cyber defence and resilience from the CSDP perspective at the EU level and national levels. How to build the resilience and efficiently protect critical infrastructures? Which are the cyber warfare capabilities in our changing world? Given that cyber security stays high on the European agendas and is one of the Presidency priorities, it will be extremely interesting to gather different experts and hear which their insights are.
Location : Paul-Henri Spaak 5B001
Programme
Programme
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs will hold on 20 April, jointly with the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, a hearing on "Securing the External Borders of the EU - a challenge for External and Internal Security".

The objective of the hearing is to discuss the way the EU's naval operation to combat people smuggling in the Mediterranean, border assistance and capacity building in the Sahel, and Frontex operations function together. The current crises in the EU neighbourhood demonstrate how deeply internal and external security are interlinked.

Location : Room Paul-Henri Spaak (5B001), Brussels
Further information
Programme
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

On 20 April, SEDE will hold an exchange of views with Amada Paul, European Policy Centre and a representative from the EEAS (tbc) on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its impact on the stability in the South Caucasus. In the 1920s, the region was assigned the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Upon the end of the Soviet Union, this frozen conflict escalated into open war which lasted from 1988 to 1994. Recently hostilities erupted again with mutual shelling of positions along the line of contact.
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The current crises in the EU neighbourhood demonstrate how deeply the EU’s internal and external security interlink, how essential it is for the EU and for its Member States to ensure effective and appropriate controls over the external borders. The SEDE/LIBE joint hearing on 20 April will in particular address how the EU's naval operation to combat people smuggling in the Mediterranean, border assistance and capability building in the Sahel, and Frontex operations function in concert.
Further information
Hearing programme
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Indian INSAS Light Machine Gun

The Centre for Security Governance has just published its latest CSG Paper, “Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation in South Sudan: The Case of Western Equatoria’s Arrow Boys” written by Mareike Schomerus and Anouk S. Rigterink. This is the second of four papers produced as part of the CSG’s project on Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation

The Taleban made their yearly spring offensive announcement on 12 April 2016. The statement attributed to Taleban leadership council (Rahbari Shura) named the offensive “Operation Omari,” in honour of the movement’s late leader and provides clues with regard to both the Taleban’s plans and the way they wish to present themselves. Of particular note are the instructions to fighters on how to behave in “villages and cities where the Islamic Emirate has established its rule.” Two days into the ‘offensive’ several dozen Taleban attacks have taken place across the country, indicating a wish to back up the announcement with a portrayal of presence and strength at the local level. So far there have been no large-scale or complex attacks. AAN’s Borhan Osman and the rest of the AAN team examine the spring offensive announcement, looking at how this year’s statement differs from past ones and what it might indicate for the 2016 fighting season.

The Taleban launched their 2016 ‘spring offensive’ with an announcement on their website on 12 April 2016. This announcement was followed by reports of dozens of attacks for which the Taleban claimed responsibility, including in Baghlan, Badghis, Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunar, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Parwan, Sar-e Pul and Zabul within the first 48 hours. Although the Taleban initiated armed clashes in more than 10 provinces, and in same cases in several districts per province, they did not yet orchestrate any major attack. The majority of attacks during the first two days of Operation Omari, based on the Taleban’s own reporting, appear to have focused mostly on ANSF, pro-government militias and foreign forces, district administrative centres and the “clearing of villages” in districts where the Taleban were already active, such as in Badakhshan’s Tagab district. Casualties reported by the Taleban (who are known to inflate the numbers of those they claim to have killed and injured), ranged from two to fifteen “enemies” killed per attack. The numbers of injured reported were in a similar range.

The announcement’s content

The announcement starts off by saying that “with the advent of spring it is again time to renew our Jihadi determination and operations.” In fact, Taleban operations did not stop over winter and the term “spring offensive” as well as the notion of a winter stop or lull in fighting has become increasingly meaningless. In this reading, this announcement is thus not so much about practical fighting, but rather a propagandistic instrument.

The statement remembers the late Amir ul Mu’mineen Mullah Muhammad Omar Mujahed under whose reign the Islamic Emirate “pacified 95 percent of our nation’s territory from wickedness, corruption and oppression, and vanquished the maligned and wicked.”

The stated aim of Operation Omari is ambitious and focuses on “clearing the remaining areas from enemy control and presence,” which is to be achieved by

large scale attacks on enemy positions across the country, martyrdom-seeking and tactical attacks against enemy strongholds, and assassination of enemy commanders in urban centers. The present Operation will also employ all means at our disposal to bog the enemy down in a war of attrition that lowers the morale of the foreign invaders and their internal armed militias. By employing such a multifaceted strategy it is hoped that the foreign enemy will be demoralized and forced to evict our nation. In areas under the control of Mujahideen, mechanisms for good governance will be established so that our people can live a life of security and normalcy.

Although announcements in previous years also focused on the capture of territory, they tended to mention simey (Pashto for: areas), which usually refers to swathes of rural areas. Although last year’s statement did also refer to urban centres, it was mentioned only as a target for guerrilla warfare. This year, however, it seems the Taleban have set their sights on capturing both urban population centres and larger territory.

As part of this stated confidence – whether genuine or portrayed for propaganda purposes – with regard to expanding their realm of control, the Taleban for the first time in their spring offensive announcement also talk about post-conquest situations:

During the span of Operation Omari, in areas including villages and cities where the Islamic Emirate has established its rule, the lives and property of the dwellers will be safeguarded as is its duty. Therefore we call upon the dwellers of these areas, be they the professional classes or businessmen, not to fall prey to enemy propaganda and not to feel threatened by the Mujahideen. As it is our duty to protect and assist the wronged and helpless, so we will pay particular attention to the freedom of prisoners.

The 2016 spring offensive statement gave specific instructions to the fighters “to implement their operations in such a manner that takes pains to protect civilians and civil infrastructure” and described how the Taleban intended to make conquests easier by encouraging Afghan forces to defect and abandon the ANSF/NUG ranks:

Simultaneously with the present Operation the scholars, elders and leaders of the Islamic Emirate will open a dialogue with our countrymen in the enemy ranks to give up their opposition to the establishment of an Islamic government and join the ranks of the Mujahideen so as to safeguard them from the shame and failure of this World and the Hereafter.

The commission for outreach activities has indeed been gaining prominence within the Taleban structure and there have been repeated claims by the Taleban that the commission has been instrumental in causing large-scale defections by government forces (for instance in Helmand, Sar-e Pul, Uruzgan and Nuristan). During the past year, in addition to threats and violence, the Taleban appeared to have focused on trying to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of ANSF members, often by establishing channels of communication through their families or other social networks. In order to persuade ANSF members to quit fighting, the Taleban in several cases seem to have released ANSF soldiers they had captured on the battlefield and in some cases even paid them the needed transport fare to return to their home province – in exchange for the promise not to return to the ANSF. (There have however also been very different experiences, as illustrated by the gruesome killing of ANSF soldiers after the fall of the Jurm military base.)

The announcement’s vision

The statement’s vision of conquest, its instructions to protect civilians and infrastructure, and the emphasis on persuading government forces to defect were reportedly also part of the annual religious-ideological course for Taleban commanders and sub-commanders that was recently held in Pakistan. According to Taleban sources from Helmand, fighters who participated in the course received instructions to be prepared to rule the conquered lands. Reportedly, this was the first time that topics such as explicit instructions on how to treat the local population, public service providers and humanitarian organisations made up an extensive part of the three-month course that ended around mid-March this year. Instructions on how to persuade their enemies to surrender or join their ranks also constituted a significant part of the lectures and training.

Unlike the spring offensive announcements from previous years, the announcement for 2016 withheld details about specific targets of the Operation Omari. The targets were described in rather general terms, with reference only to “large scale attacks on enemy positions across the country, martyrdom-seeking and tactical attacks against enemy strongholds, and assassination of enemy commanders in urban centers.”

In contrast, in the 2015 statement ahead of Operation Azm, the following categories of people were specified as targets:

…the foreign occupiers especially their permanent military bases, their intelligence and diplomatic centers, officials of the stooge regime, their military constellations, especially their intelligence, interior ministry and defense ministry officials and other pernicious individuals.

…top priority will be given to safeguarding and protecting the lives and properties of the civilian people, ” and “the Islamic Emirate has never and will never target religious and other educational institutions like mosques, madrassas, schools, universities, health centers like clinics and hospitals, public buildings and other projects of public welfare.

The instructions to avoid harming civilians and their property are not new; they have been issued many times before and have not significantly altered the fact that civilians are regularly harmed, and sometimes targeted, during Taleban operations. According to UNAMA – that continues to remind the Taleban that aid workers, civilian government officials, journalists, human rights defenders, judges and prosecutors are all to be considered civilians –  the Taleban was still responsible for more than 62% of the civilian casualties in 2015. With the lack of detail in their statement this year, the Taleban have avoided providing explicit rules as to who can be targeted in the new operation. There are so far no indications that the Taleban have actually adjusted their definition to ensure a greater protection of civilians in practice.

While proclaiming a stronger ambition than before to rule large parts of the population, the Taleban also seem determined to enhance their political image as potential benign rulers. They did not only repeat the explicit instructions to the fighters to protect public infrastructure and properties already included last year, but also claimed that “in areas under the control of Mujahideen, mechanisms for good governance will be established so that our people can live a life of security and normalcy.” (It is not completely clear what mechanisms the statement referes to, as structures already exist, such as the Taleban shadow judicial system and commissions that can be reached by petitioners and, occasionally, travel through Taleban-controlled areas to query the local population about commanders’ and fighters’ bevahiour.)

The overall spirit and tone of the Taleban’s propaganda to motivate its fighters seem more than ever couched in a vision of imminent victory. This seems to mirror the optimism that was found among Taleban foot soldiers after the short-lived capture of Kunduz in September 2015 and that to some extent has prevailed since then. While it will take some time to discern and understand the patterns of tactics employed by Taleban this year, sources within the movement indicate this may include trying to close in on provincial capitals and obstructing ANSF access to its major bases by blocking or threatening major logistics routes. This seems to match the Taleban’s build up of forces along key highways and supply routes over the past year, in particular in both the southwest (Helmand, Farah, Uruzgan) and the northeast (Kunduz, Badakshan, Baghlan and Sar-e Pul), and the warnings from Uruzgan, Helmand and other provinces about the possible imminent fall of districts through which major transport routes run.

Recent rumours within the Taleban movement moreover suggest, that in order to boost the morale of fighters, Taleban leader Akhtar Mansur may have travelled to Afghanistan. At the closing of the earlier-mentioned winter training course in Pakistan, Mansur delivered his speech on 18 March 2016 through a messenger, rather than attending the ceremony in person. Whether Akhtar Mansur is indeed in Afghanistan, or not, the rumours seem intended to portray confidence by suggesting that Taleban fighters believe they have made Afghanistan ‘safe’ enough for their leaders to return. It is perhaps also meant as a signal to Pakistan that it may no longer be in a unique position to manipulate the Taleban leadership by exploiting its need of Pakistan as an exclusive sanctuary.

The announcement’s impact on peace talks

The announcement of the spring offensive, finally, throws cold water on the hopes that the efforts towards peace talks, notably through the Quadrilateral Cooperation Group (QCG) platform, would lead to a drastic reduction of violence in the short run. The Afghan government, when initiating the QCG, had hoped the talks could at least prevent or postpone the 2016 spring offensive. The QCG process, however, has direly suffered from the choice to deliberately bypass the Taleban in favour of relying on Pakistan to bring the movement’s representatives to the table. (See also the latest postponement of the next round of quadrilateral talk and the strong criticism of Pakistan by the Afghan government.)

For those who wonder whether the spring offensive announcement was delayed because of efforts to bring the Taleban to the negotiation table, this does not appear to be the case. For the third year in a row, the announcement was made on or around the 5th of Rajab (based on the Islamic Hijri calendar, a lunar calendar, that falls behind the Gregorian calendar by about 10 days each year). In 2015, the spring offensive was on 22 April (5 Rajab was on 24 April), in 2014 it was on 12 May (5 Rajab was on 5 May). Next year, if the Taleban stick to the pattern, the announcement can be expected to be around 2 April 2017. The choice of this date was explained again in this year’s announcement, referring to “The fact that the 5th of Rajab ul Murajab year 15 (Hijri Lunar) was the day on which – under the leadership of Khalif Omar al Farooq – the Muslim armies fought and annihilated the vast infidel western army in the Battle of Yarmouk,” while adding the hope that the current operation would, in a similar fashion, result in “strategic victories and cleanse our beloved country from the presence of the remaining foreign invaders and their malignant and corrupt rebel servants.”

The Afghan government, in the meantime, responded in kind, calling the Taleban announcement “a hollow attempt to hide the consecutive defeats and setbacks they sustained during the last year” and “a bid to avenge the losses they suffered on the battlefield.” Ministry of Interior spokesperson Sediqi announced the governments counter-operation: Operation Shafaq, which he said would focus on the leaders of the group and would be one of the largest operations during the year.

 

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Did you know that cooperative projects and programmes run by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and benefiting from EDA added-value are now eligible for VAT exemption?

This important change, which came into effect following the adoption of the revised EDA Council Decision in October 2015, benefits all participants in EDA projects and programmes and can therefore act as an important incentive for enhanced defence cooperation.

In order to provide interested parties with all the necessary details, EDA has now published a “Guide to VAT exemption” explaining all important aspects of the new measure such as its legal basis, conditions and implications, frequently asked questions as well as the practical steps which have to be followed by Member States and EDA to benefit from the exemption.

The “Guide to VAT exemption for EDA ad hoc projects and programmes” is available here.

More information:

• News "VAT Exemption: New Incentive for Defence Cooperation" (4 November 2015)

Speaking this Wednesday (13 April) before the Defence Committee of the German Bundestag in Berlin, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq has called for a profound reassessment of Europe’s common security and defence-related aspirations and endeavours for the future, to make sure the EU has a clear vision on the sort of project it wants for the next decade.

“Europe is being shaped in reaction to crises. We need a positive story, a new narrative for Europe. I am personally convinced that defence and security can become the drivers for the European project”, Mr Domecq said. The EU’s collective level of ambition should include the ability to protect its citizens, to secure its direct neighbourhood (East and South), and to enable and support its partners to become security providers themselves, he stressed. “Protect, secure, enable. This should be at the very heart of the Global Strategy” which High Representative Federica Mogherini is set to present in summer, Mr Domecq stated.

However, he continued, “such a vision needs to be put into motion and will therefore require investment, support of EU instruments, capabilities and a strong industrial base”. As far as military capabilities are concerned, Mr Domecq called for more cooperative programmes. “Member States face the stark choice between cooperating to acquire new capabilities or risk losing them altogether”, he said. “While there are many political declarations calling for more cooperation, the reality is that we face the renationalisation of defence. In the past, we carried out more cooperative programmes than we do today; we used to cooperate more in research and technology; we created instruments such as OCCAR or the European Defence Agency which has a strong European conviction. But today, Member States seem to be shying away from cooperation, there seems to be too much of conservatism in ministries of defence”, he said.

The EDA Chief Executive commended Germany for being “a driving force in Europe”. “I sincerely hope that, with the support of State Secretary Suder and (Lieutenant) General Bühler, as Chairman of the EDA Steering Board of Capability Directors, with whom I work very closely, we will take European defence to a new level, taking advantage of the context of the Global Strategy and potential European Defence White Book. Europe can simply no longer afford to be a free-rider in defence”, Mr Domecq concluded.

More information:

• Full speech of Mr Domecq

Australian Anzac Class Multi-Role Frigate

Since the creation of the European Defence Agency in 2004, support to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and to EU operations has been one of EDA's core missions. Several activities are now ongoing to develop the support of CSDP military and civilian operations or missions as well as EU Battlegroups at the request of Member States.

Typically, CSDP operations and missions are deployed on short notice to manage crisis in remote areas. In some cases, shortfalls on assets and equipment arising from the force generation have led to outsourcing some key services. This has been the case for in-theatre rotary wing medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) in the CSDP military training mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) or the CSDP civilian rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo).

In order to better understand the range of commercially available solutions which could fulfil possible future requirements for in-theatre helicopter MEDEVAC services and associated risks or limitations, EDA is conducting a market survey. It has to be highlighted that the objective of this survey is to identify service providers of ‘turnkey’ solutions and not manufacturers of assets or supply providers. 

Operators are kindly invited to participate to the survey by submitting their answer by 6 May 2016.

More information:

• MEDEVAC market survey information
• Operations support project page

Against the background of Moscow’s historical ties with Syria, Joris Couvreur critically assesses Russia’s recent surprise military intervention in the conflict in Syria, especially with respect to achieving a durable peaceful settlement.

The post Disentangling the Syrian conflict: the Russian card, a game changer? appeared first on European Geostrategy.

The latest response to the situation of refugees in the European Union is the "European Agenda on Migration", which aims to strengthen the common migration and asylum policy. This leaflet provides extracts from relevant supporting analyses prepared by European Parliament’s policy departments for different EP's committees.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP