Defence`s Feeds

Lockheed Martin has successfully carried out a controlled flight test of the US Navy’s long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM) surface-launch variant.

The BAP Carrasco (BOP-171) is an oceanographic and polar research vessel built by Spanish shipbuilding company Construcciones Navales P Freire, for the Peruvian Navy. The vessel was launched in Vigo, Galicia, Spain, in May 2016.

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This blog post provides an overview of a new SSR 2.0 Brief  – Security Sector Reform, Legitimate Politics and SDG 16 – published by the Centre for Security Governance. It also highlights the main policy recommendations discussed by the author, CSG Senior Fellow Geoff Burt.     In spite of a broad international consensus about

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Israeli Nagmachot Heavy Armored Personnel Carrier

The UK Parliament has voted in favour of the Trident renewal programme, which is estimated to cost £40bn, to replace four Vanguard-class submarines that carry nuclear warheads.

General Dynamics' (GD) subsidiary Electric Boat has received an $18.9m contract modification from the US Navy to continue developing the Virginia Payload Module (VPM).

The US Navy Marine Corps (USMC), and the Republic of Singapore Armed Forces have commenced the 22nd annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise.

In April 2016, I published a short article in the Oxford Analytica Daily Brief discussing the role of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet post-Crimea annexation. Here’s the text, as usual with no edits other than restoring some cuts made for space reasons.

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SUBJECT: The growing power of the Russian navy in the Black Sea region.

SIGNIFICANCE: Russia’s annexation of Crimea has reshaped the geopolitical environment in the Black Sea and its neighbourhood. New frigates and submarines are being acquired, and cruise missiles will provide a much extended range. With its strategic options no longer constrained by Ukrainian sovereignty over the Sevastopol base, Moscow can use naval and air forces to dominate the sea and create a forbidding environment for potential adversaries, including NATO.

Impacts

• The deterioration in relations with Turkey could manifest itself in maritime tensions between the two states.
• Access to the Bosphorus may restrain both Russia and Turkey from encroaching on one another’s maritime rights despite hostile rhetoric.
• US and European militaries will review naval capacity and may reinforce Mediterranean patrols to counter the increased Russian presence.

ANALYSIS:

The Black Sea Fleet ranks third in importance for the Russian navy, behind the Northern and Pacific fleets, but ahead of the Baltic Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea Fleet has had four main missions:

• protecting shipping in the Black Sea;
• controlling maritime access to the sea in general and to the Caucasus in particular;
• supporting the navy’s Mediterranean squadron and counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean; and
• maintaining links with the Russian naval base at Tartus in Syria.

The bulk of the fleet is based at Sevastopol in Crimea, as is its land-based air arm.

The Black Sea is of great economic significance to Russia, whose commercial ports — mainly Novorossiysk — carry 30% of its total maritime exports.

For Russia, the sea is an access route to the Mediterranean and to the Atlantic and Indian oceans, and hence important for both economic and geopolitical reasons. The Black Sea Fleet is needed to underpin that access, as well as to deal with potential instability in the Caucasus. It provides logistical support to the Mediterranean squadron which was reconstituted in 2013.

Reviving the fleet

During its post-Soviet history, successive lease agreements of the Sevastopol naval base from the Ukrainian government stipulated that Russia could not base new ships in Crimea.  This clause was intentional, designed for the fleet to rust away.  By 2014, the Moskva cruiser was the only Black Sea Fleet surface ship able to operate out of area for extended periods of time. Even its basing arrangements in Ukraine were such that it had little need to defend the peninsula, since this was Ukrainian territory.

After annexing Crimea, Russia moved quickly to rebuild its forces on the peninsula. The fleet is undergoing a dramatic transformation and is rapidly rebuilding its forces. The Sevastopol base is central to Russian anti-access/area denial efforts in the Black Sea and its airspace. There are several components to the ongoing build-up:

• up to six new Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates;
• two Buyan-M-class missile corvettes;
• six improved Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines;
• Su-30SM interceptors and Su-34 tactical bombers; and
• nuclear-capable Tu-22M3 long-range bombers.

Three of the frigates will be commissioned in 2016, while the others will take some years to complete because Ukrainian-made gas turbines are unavailable. Both the corvettes and two of the six submarines have been commissioned, with the remaining submarines to enter service within two years.

Cruise missiles extend fleet’s reach

The corvettes and submarines will carry the 3M-54 Klub anti-ship system, a supersonic cruise missile allowing the navy to deny access to much of the Black Sea. They will also be armed with the 3M-14 cruise missile designed to attack targets on land at ranges of up to 2,500 kilometres.

The combination of coastal and air defences, maritime aviation and corvette-based groups will free the submarine and frigate force to operate in the Mediterranean.

Amphibious capacity

The Black Sea had been likely to receive one of the two French Mistral helicopter carrier/amphibious assault vessels that Russia ordered in 2010. Since France cancelled the sale in August 2015, there has been no announcement from Moscow about acquiring amphibious ships from elsewhere. Nor is it clear what will happen to the old Alligator- and Ropucha-class landing ships which were instrumental to the occupation of Crimea.

Naval support for Syria campaign

The Russian military intervention in Syria, begun in September 2015, has redefined the mission of the Black Sea Fleet:

Transport

Before Russia aircraft were deployed in Syria to bomb rebel forces, vessels from the fleet were playing a key role in the military supply operation known as the ‘Syrian express’. Initially, older landing ships were used to supply arms and equipment to the Syrian military. Once Russia decided to launch air attacks, the Black Sea Fleet provided the maritime transport.

The conventional wisdom that Russia was incapable of conducting military operations beyond its immediate vicinity was confounded by the successful use of large transport aircraft, naval freighters and even Turkish commercial cargo ships reflagged as Black Sea Fleet vessels.

Missile strikes

The Russian navy provided long-range air defence with the S-300 missile system carried on the flagship Moskva in the first half of the operation. Having a ship-based, long-range air defence system allowed Russia to protect Syrian airspace while avoiding tensions with Israel, which had made it clear it would be unhappy if such weapons went to the Syrian army.

In October 2015, the Russian navy launched 3M-14 cruise missiles against targets in Syria from relatively small vessels in the Caspian Sea. By launching missiles from the Caspian, Russia demonstrated its strike capacity from well inside its air defence perimeter. The cruise missiles were also meant to show NATO military planners and neighbouring states the successful development of a missile capability that would be difficult to neutralise.

Once the Black Sea Fleet acquires vessels armed with 3M-14 cruise missiles, its range will extend to most of Southern and Central Europe and the Middle East.

Russia’s demonstration of new naval strike capabilities continued in December 2015, when Kalibr cruise missiles were launched against targets from a new diesel-powered submarine which was transiting the Mediterranean en route to its permanent base at Sevastopol. This use of hard-to-track platforms further highlighted the threat to Russia’s potential opponents.

New missions for the post-Crimea context

Russia’s annexation of Crimea has remade the geopolitical environment in the Black Sea. Crimea’s geographic position allows the country that controls it to dominate the maritime environment. Sevastopol is by far the best harbor on the sea. By taking Crimea, Russia has ensured that its military will not be constrained by Ukraine. This will allow its navy and air force to dominate the Black Sea, creating a forbidding A2/AD environment that will be difficult for any potential adversary, including NATO, to penetrate.

Given the adversarial nature of Russia’s relationship with the West, the Black Sea Fleet will take on additional missions beyond the Black Sea in the coming years. In addition to continuing to provide sealift for Russian operations in Syria, the BSF’s cruise-missile equipped ships and submarines will have a power projection role in the Mediterranean. Even with a fairly small number of frigates and diesel submarines, the fleet will present a potential threat to other naval forces in the region, even U.S. carrier strike groups.

This does not mean that the Russian Navy should be expected to undertake aggressive actions in the Med. Rather, its objective will be to create conventional deterrence against a Western attack by threatening to use its air and sea capabilities to inflict unacceptably high casualties on enemy naval forces attempting to engage Russian forces in the Black Sea or eastern Mediterranean.

CONCLUSION: In the context of Russia’s adversarial relationship with the West, the fleet is likely to be assigned tasks outside the Black Sea such as sustaining a capable naval force in the eastern Mediterranean and continuing to support the Russian military presence in Syria. The fleet will also deliver conventional deterrence through its implicit capacity to inflict unacceptably high casualties on potential adversaries in the Black Sea or the eastern Mediterranean.

Navantia expands its international presence with the opening of a new commercial delegation in Bergen, Norway, that will be operative from today (20 July).

The Turkish Navy’s newest Milgem Ada-class multi-purpose corvette TCG Burgazada (F-513) was successfully launched at the Istanbul Naval Shipyard Command.

Naval forces from the US, Iraq and Kuwait will conduct their first trilateral exercise, in a bid to jointly address threats that exist in the Arabian Gulf.

The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency has notified Congress of the potential $821m foreign military sale (FMS) of Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) Block IIIB, equipment and support to Japan.

Israeli ACE Assault Rifle

The Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) Canberra-class landing helicopter dock ship HMAS Canberra (L02) has successfully taken aboard a US Marine Corps’ (USMC) MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft for the first time.

CACI International has been selected to continue its support for the modernisation of the US Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SSC) Atlantic's naval tactical command support system (NTCSS), for a period of three years.

The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Government has granted approval for the purchase of a new naval tanker for $493m, Defence Minister Gerry Brownlee has revealed.

No doubt that the recent NATO Summit in Warsaw was partly overshadowed by the uncertainty of the historic Brexit vote. During the week in the lead up to the Summit the political discourse landmark transatlantic arena was much more focused on what a Brexit would mean for Europe than on NATO’s future. Nevertheless the Summit delivered important if not milestone results for NATO.

The decisions for a new persistent rotational presence of Western European and American military units in Poland and the Baltics is a major achievement for Eastern European members threatened by a re-emergent Russia. Although the size and capabilities of the deployed forces, altogether about 4000 troops, are largely symbolic in light of Russia’s overwhelming military advantage in the region, however, the persistent presence of other NATO troops in the region obviously has a significant political value in terms of demonstrating Alliance solidarity. As for the grounding of the decision, it is telling that Germany, long known to be the most reluctant member to take any military steps which might antagonize relationship with Russia, felt obliged to be one of the framework nations of the units first to be deployed in the East. Nevertheless, keeping NATO’s relations with Russia on dual tracks, adding the possibility of dialogue next to deterrence is essential for European security. The first NATO-Russia Council meeting held just days after the Summit was an important first step in this direction.

The decisions pointing to greater NATO involvement in tackling soft security challenges, including terrorism and illegal migration - stemming from the Southern flank are also significant. The relevant activities and missions, especially NATO’s maritime mission in the Aegean Sea in tackling human trafficking could be highly visible examples of the value of NATO towards the citizens of the member states, who are increasingly concerned of the security threats related to uncontrolled migration and terrorist networks with ties to the Middle East. Of course close partnership with the EU in this as well as in other security domains are critical. One can hope that the new arrangements signed between the two Brussels based organizations will prove to bring valuable practical benefits for the member states, and long standing political obstacles will not shallow out the agreement.
Nevertheless, the possible effects of Brexit looms over all the above mentioned issues. As the UK is set to lose its place in the EU’s CSDP, there will be high ambitions in London to remain a leading actor in the European security arena through NATO. Hence we can expect robust commitments towards Allied operations in and outside of Europe, including streaming UK capacities towards NATO previously tied down in CSDP activities. NATO will remain the most important organization through which the UK will be able to institutionally influence political and strategic developments in Europe. One must note that the Brexit did not alter the age old British strategic objective of fostering a balance of power in continental Europe, that is restraining Germany’s power. However, the possible negative economic effects of the Brexit will likely not evade London’s defense budget, which will obviously put a restraint the UK’s ability to invest robustly in defense. Furthermore, the possible brake up of the UK if Scotland or Northern Ireland succeeds would be a significant blow to Britain’s status as a considerable European power.

Brexit has created new conditions for the EU and its common security and defense policy. With the UK leaving the EU CSDP has lost its most potent military power. As a result CSDP will likely focus even more on low end crisis management operations, not as if during the past ten years there would have been robust EU military missions. But the UK’s departure will further weaken Europe’s potential to be a global actor, whether we speak of actual military capabilities or strategic ambitions. With France alone in the EU with a global strategic outlook but with increasing economic and social challenges, Germany’s influence will grow on the future shape of CSDP as well. This would probably mean a more risk averse approach towards possible crisis management operations and a softer approach towards Russia by the EU. Nevertheless, the chances of greater integration within European security and defense have also grown with the UK exit. However, deeper security and defense cooperation are closely tied with the question of the whole future direction of the European Union, which is rather uncertain at the moment.

A sudden disorderly disintegration of the EU could be fatal for NATO as well. The total loss of solidarity and the will to compromise between EU member states would surely spill over on to the security and defense realm. However, this does not mean that further integration is the only viable path, as the democratic will of the vast majority of European citizens cannot be overlooked. It’s not the question of more or less integration as some European leaders have already suggested but where and how – and even more importantly, with what kind of policy objectives. NATO will only have a strong and capable CSDP by its side if the EU has the firm support of its citizens.

Language Undefined Tag: NATOVarga GergelyCSDPUKBREXIT

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