Defence`s Feeds

Americas

• Competitors involved in the upcoming T-X program will have the opportunity to score bonus points according to a draft request for proposals (RFP) by the USAF. The inclusion comes as part of an incentive by the service to push manufacturers to exceed the threshold requirements in certain performance areas. For example, the minimum requirement is for the jet to pull 6.5g in a turn. Exceeding the specification by each 0.1g will earn a bonus point, with a cap at 7.5g. This system will, in theory, edge out low cost bids.

• Two contracts are to be awarded by the USAF in 2017 for a new Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) weapons system, or ground-based strategic deterrent. On Friday, the service released a request for proposals for the replacement of the existing Minutemen III ICBMs as part of the military’s costly modernization of its atomic weapons systems. The next ten years will see up to $350 billion spent on the modernization with some analysts suggesting the costs will run in excess of $1 trillion over 30 years.

Europe

• As part of the European Reassurance Initiative package, Ukraine has received 24 RQ-11B Raven UAV systems from the US. The hand-launched reconnaissance and surveillance tool are being given to help increase and modernize Ukrainian security efforts amid ongoing violence in the country’s eastern regions. More than $600 million has been made available by the US for training and equipment to help Kiev better defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

• Two C-23B+ Super Sherpa transport aircraft due to be inducted into the Estonian Air Force have been dropped by the authorities. The two were offered on a free transfer by the US back in 2014, however are no longer deemed necessary to the service’s needs. First used by the USAF in 1985, Estonia along with Djibouti and the Philippines were offered the aircraft as well, along with several being transferred to Alaska.

• The latest version of the Mi-28NM has been spotted at the Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant, with pictures capturing the attack helicopter on its first hover. In development since 2008, a prototype first flew in 2015 with further tests to continue before delivery to the Russian Defense Ministry later this year. The improved version comes equipped with surveillance radar, an advanced suite of optical-electronic sensors mounted in the new nose turret, and a dual control system which allows the navigator-operator to operate the machine if required.

Asia Pacific

• India has finally inked a deal with Rosoboronexport to modernize ten Ka-28 naval helicopters. Valued at Rs 2,000 crore ($428.8 million), the contract will see the submarine hunting helicopters transported to Russian Helicopters’ facility in Kumertau to be overhauled to extend their life-span over the next five years. Upon return to India, new avionics will be installed.

• Japan is to upgrade their Patriot PAC-3 missile defense system with Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors with upgrades likely to begin next year. With Tokyo set to host the Olympic Games in 2020, the move represents the most significant upgrade to Japan’s missile defense system in a decade. The work will be carried out under license by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) who are expected to upgrade 12 batteries in the first year, another 12 the following year, with four in the subsequent twelve months.

• Kazakhstan has taken possession of their fifth of eight ordered C-295 transport aircraft from Airbus. Two were originally delivered in 2013 with options to increase to eight if necessary. The C-295 has proved a popular choice, with Airbus supplying the aircraft to over 20 international customers.

Today’s Video

The Mil Mi-28 Night Hunter:

Turkey Kirpi 6x6 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle

LGM-30G Minuteman III
(click to view full)

For 50 years, land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) have been part of the US primary strategic deterrence capability, the nuclear-armed triad that also includes submarine-launched ballistic missiles and long range heavy bombers.

Although the main target for the US deterrent – the Soviet Union – imploded in 1991, other threats – such as nuclear-armed rogue states and non-state actors – have emerged. To address these new threats, the US Air Force undertook a major ICBM modernization program.

To carry out this program, the USAF awarded a 15-year ICBM Prime Integration Contract (F42610-98-C-0001) in 1997 to a team led by Northrop Grumman. Since then, the team, which includes Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and ATK, has been carrying out a major modernization of the ICBM system to ensure its readiness.

ICBM Prime Minuteman III launch

The ICBM Prime Integration Contract covers modernization of thousands of missile propulsion, guidance, re-entry, and ground system components. The goal is to extend the US Minuteman III ICBM’s life to 2030.

Some of the larger programs covered by the contract include:

• ICBM Security Modernization Program, which is implementing steps to keep nuclear-tipped ICBMs securely in their silos;

• Safety Enhanced Re-entry Vehicle (SERV) Program, which is fitting Minuteman III ICBMs with the Mk 21 re-entry vehicle from the decommissioned Peacekeeper missile force – a change that will provide US Strategic Command planners with increased targeting flexibility and enhanced safety;

• Propulsion Replacement Program, which is remanufacturing motors to replace Minuteman III’s aging propellant to maintain booster reliability;

• Guidance Replacement Program, which is substituting the NS-50 missile guidance set for aging 1960s vintage guidance electronics, improving flight reliability, system maintainability, and nuclear safety;

• Propulsion System Rocket Engine Life Extension Program, which is replacing engine components originally produced in the 1970s that had a 10-year design life;

• Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting Service Life Extension Program, which is updating ICBM command and control capability;

• Minuteman Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network program, which upgraded communications in all Minuteman III launch control centers and also connected these systems to the Milstar satellite communications system; and

• Improvement to the launch control centers, accomplished through the Environmental Control System program, which is upgrading climate controls to ensure that electronics and ground support systems are maintained at specified pre-set temperatures.

Contracts and Key Events Still Ready.

Numerous contract modifications have been issued under the ICBM Prime Integration Contract (F42610-98-C-0001). Below are contract modifications covered by DID over the years. Unless otherwise noted, the contracts are awarded by Hill Air Force Base in northern Utah to Northrop Grumman Space and Mission Systems in Clearfield, UT.

August 1/16: Two contracts are to be awarded by the USAF in 2017 for a new Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) weapons system, or ground-based strategic deterrent. On Friday, the service released a request for proposals for the replacement of the existing Minutemen III ICBMs as part of the military’s costly modernization of its atomic weapons systems. The next ten years will see up to $350 billion spent on the modernization with some analysts suggesting the costs will run in excess of $1 trillion over 30 years.

June 8/16: The USAF has claimed it is not looking at a road-mobile option for its next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Under the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program the aging Minuteman III ICBM fleet will be replaced. Speaking about the mobile option, a service official said “We want to make sure that as we look at GBSD, we’re building it modular so if changes need to be made in the weapon system you don’t have to open up, let’s say, the software to redo the entire software.”

March 14/11: Lockheed Martin announces it received a $12.5 million contract from Northrop Grumman for refurbishment of re-entry vehicle arming and fuzing assemblies for the Minuteman III. Under the subcontract, Lockheed Martin Space System’s Valley Forge facility in King of Prussia, PA will replace components and refurbish and test the assemblies. The subcontract includes an option for a second year. Under an earlier contract in 2009, Lockheed Martin demonstrated the feasibility of the refurbishment effort. Lockheed Martin is the original equipment manufacturer for the arming and fuzing assembly.

Oct 6/10: Lockheed Martin announces it received a $106 million contract from Northrop Grumman to develop next-generation re-entry field support equipment (RFSE) for the Minuteman III. Under the 58-month contract, Lockheed Martin will design, develop, test, and deliver 2 sets of RFSE, with an additional 10 RFSE sets to be delivered in a follow-on contract. The RFSE will replace the aging Minuteman III Re-entry System Test Set (RSTS). Lockheed Martin will continue to sustain the RSTS, for which it is the original equipment manufacturer, until deployment of the replacement RFSE, which will be used, along with SERV support equipment, to test Mk12A and Mk21 re-entry vehicles.

April 19/10: $33.8 million to provide sustainment support for the Minuteman weapon system. At this time, $31.8 has been obligated.

April 2/10: $15.3 million contract to provide a Minuteman enhancement reliability accelerometer engineering and feasibility study, Phase III, prototype phase. At this time, $10.9 million has been obligated.

Dec 24/09: A $16.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for the exercise of options 12 and 13 for the Propulsion System Rocket Engine Life Extension Program.

Nov 19/09: A $31.1 million contract modification to provide for the Remote Visual Assessment Program in support of the ICBM Security Modernization Program.

Dec 21/06: A $53.1 million fixed-price-incentive-firm and cost-plus-award fee contract modification, exercising option 1 to continue upgrading the Environmental Control System for the Minuteman III ICBM system. Work is expected to be complete October 2008.

Nov 1/06: A $225.2 million cost-plus-fixed fee, cost-plus-incentive fee contract modification to remanufacture Stage 1, 2, and 3 rockets motors and offer product quality assurance test support. The contractor will provide 75 complete booster components sets (one each Stage 1, 2 and 3 motors and an ordnance kit) and 2 product quality assurance test motors.

April 6/06: A $34.8 million cost-plus incentive-fee contract modification to begin to provide for full rate production of Minuteman III Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicles (SERV) on US ICBMs. The scheduled completion date is March 2010.

March 17/06: A $7.7 million fixed price incentive (firm target) award fee, firm-fixed price contract modification for Guidance Replacement Program (GRP) full rate production (FRP) Value Engineering Change Proposal 01-OPIC-030 and 01-IPIC-0009.

March 17/06: A $25 million fixed price incentive firm with award fee contract modification. This contract will provide environmental control system units, deployment activities, and interim contractor support to upgrade the launch facilities and missile alert facilities at the 3 US ICBM missile wings. Work is expected to be complete October 2007.

Jan 19/06: A $225.2 million cost-plus-incentive-fee, cost-plus-award-fee contract modification for ICBM Propulsion Replacement Program. Full Rate Production (FRP) options FRP5, FRP6, and FRP7 restructure modification for 212 stage 1, 2 and 3 rocket motors, production quality assurance, ordnance production, and contractor cost data reports.

Sept 20/05: A $122.7 million cost plus award fee contract modification to exercise option VIII for the ICBM Prime Integrated Contract to support the Minuteman ICBM. Work on the contract will be complete by September 2006.

June 20/05: A $5.9 million cost-plus award-fee contract modification to ensure that US ICBM Reentry Vehicles (which carry nuclear warheads) remain functional until retirement and that an industrial base exists to support replacement follow-on systems. Work is expected to be complete by June 2007.

May 19/05: A $24 million cost-plus award-fee contract modification to provide for ICBM Security Modernization Program Fast Rising B-Plug Low Rate Initial Production; 15 B-Plug Kits and 6 B-Plug Kit Installations will be produced under this contract modification. Work is expected to be complete by September 2007.

Additional Readings

• DID (Nov 19/09) – No Dr. Strangelove Here: USAF Takes Steps to Beef Up ICBM Security

• DID (Dec 21/06) – $53.1M for Minuteman III ECS Upgrades

• DID (Nov 1/06) – $225.2M to Remanufacture Minuteman III Rocket Motors

• DID (April 6/06) – SERV Program for “Safety Enhanced” Nuclear Warhead RVs Enters Full-Rate Production

• DID (March 17/06) – $32.7M to N-G as Part of US ICBM Refurbishment

• DID (Jan 19/06) – US Spends $225.2M for 212 ICBM Rocket Motors

• DID (Sept 20/05) – MX Missiles Deactivated, Minutemen at the Ready (updated)

• DID (June 20/05) – $5.9M to Keep ICBM Warheads Operational

• DID (May 19/05) – $24M for ICBM Security Doors

• DID (April 11/05) – $7M to Upgrade ICBM Readiness Testing

Mi-28N with MMR
(click to view full)

In August 2012, Russian Lt. Gen. Viktor Bondarev pledged that the state would buy 60 Mi-28UB attack and training helicopters by 2020. That would be good news for the VVS, as well as the Rosvertol plant at Rostov on Don.

Russia is slowly modernizing its military, and its attack helicopter force is one of the areas being given priority. New Ka-52 Alligator and Mi-28N Night Hunter machines are beginning to replace the VVS’ 240 or so old Mi-24 gunships, but training has been an issue for the nascent Mi-28 fleet.

The Mi-28 Attack Helicopter Aerobatics video

Flight International’s World Air Forces 2013 places the VVS’ Mi-28N inventory at 51 machines, with another 19 on order. The new Mi-28UB model, introduced in 2013, includes an enlarged cockpit for the instructor, and a larger canopy for the pilot. It can be flown from either the pilot’s cockpit or the second seat, and it retains full attack helicopter functionality.

Implementation of Bondarev’s promise would give Russia 130 Mi-28s by 2020, alongside 140+ Ka-52s. That would more than replace the current Mi-24 Hind fleet, and Russia has also ordered 60+ modernized Mi-35M Hinds to help fill in the gaps.

The Mi-28N is most often compared to the American AH-64, as it shares the same basic heavily-armed attack helicopter layout. The specifications above illustrate some of the basic differences between the 2 machines, but the bigger differences relate to concept of employment, and are reflected in harder to see areas like onboard electronics.

Russia is the largest Mi-28 operator, with 70 machines delivered or on order. Flight International’s World Air Forces 2013 also lists 16 Mi-28s ordered by Kenya, with 5 delivered, and Iraq is reportedly in the process of buying about 30 Mi-28NEs. If a deal is done, the Iraqi helicopters’ configuration may serve as a proxy for assessing the state of the platform’s development.

Rosvertol stated in a June 6/10 investors announcement that Algeria had expressed interest in up to 42 machines, and that became a contract in December 2013. Iraq has also purchased 15, and a Rostvertol report cited serious prospects in Egypt, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

India trialed the Mi-28N against the AH-64D, and chose the American helicopter in 2011. Indian media reported that the AH-64D displayed better maneuverability, more multi-role capability, and better capacity to accept upgrades.

Contracts & Key Events Mi-28UB, 1st flight
(click to view full)

The Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant developed the Mi-28N Night Hunter, and they’ve been produced at the Rosvertol aviation plant since 2005.

August 1/16: The latest version of the Mi-28NM has been spotted at the Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant, with pictures capturing the attack helicopter on its first hover. In development since 2008, a prototype first flew in 2015 with further tests to continue before delivery to the Russian Defense Ministry later this year. The improved version comes equipped with surveillance radar, an advanced suite of optical-electronic sensors mounted in the new nose turret, and a dual control system which allows the navigator-operator to operate the machine if required.

April 26/16: Russia has placed an order for 24 Mi-28UB attack and two 26 transport helicopters. Contracts were signed between Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Berisov and Director General of Russian Helicopters Alexander Mikheyev. The Mi-28 are to be the first procured to come with dual controls and improved flight crew ergonomics. Improvements to the helicopter come as the Russian military aims to improve combat training speeds for crews alongside increasing the helicopter’s operability, safety and combat capabilities.

June 12/14: Rostvertol report. Rosvertol’s 2013 annual report contains a number of interesting details regarding its orders. Deliveries to Russia are confirmed at 14 Mi-28Ns and 1 Mi-28UB. Evidence is conflicting, but the report also cites a 2013 prototype launch for the of Mi-28UB OP-1, and the helicopter and its and its mast mounted radar enclosure are photographed.

Iraq [foreign customer K-8] has its October 2012 order confirmed at 15 machines, and Algeria [foreign customer 012] is confirmed to have ordered 42 Mi-28NE attack helicopters on Dec 26/13. That Mi-28NE order makes them the type’s 2nd export customer after Iraq (15), but they are the largest. Other serious prospects include Egypt [customer 818], Turkmenistan [customer 795], and Uzbekistan [customer 860].

The report adds that Mi-28s have been having problems with increased vibration in the main gearbox. They decided to continue operations with an upgraded set of main gears in the 1st stage. Sources: Rostvertol PLC, “Annual Report ‘Rosvertol’, ZA2013 Year | LiveJournal bmpd [in Russian, incl. photos].

Dec 25/13: Russian Helicopters JSC announces that:

"The Mi-28N Night Hunter combat helicopter, made by Russian Helicopters a subsidiary of Oboronprom and part of State Corporation Rostec, has officially entered into service with the Russian Defence Ministry under an order signed by Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu."

This is a formality. The Russians have of course been flying them for several years now, and the Mi-28N has served as the mount for Russia's Golden Eagles (Berkuty) helicopter aerobatics team since 2012. Sources: Russian Helicopters, "Mi-28N Night Hunter helicopter enters into service with the Russian Defence Ministry".

Aug 10/13: Mi-28UB. Russian Lt. Gen. Viktor Bondarev says that they intend to buy 60 Mi-28UB helicopters by 2020, with a dual training and attack role. The intent is "4-6 [Mi-28UB] helicopters for each unit that has Mi-28N in service," allowing in-unit training while retaining combat power. Source: RIA Novosti, "Russian Air Force to Get 60 Mi-28UB Helicopters by 2020".

Aug 9/13: 1st flight. The Mi-28UB training and attack helicopter conducts its official maiden demonstration flight at the Rostvertol subsidiary in Rostov-on-Don. That plant manufactures Mi-28NE and Mi-35M attack helicopters, as well as Mi-26T super-heavy transport helicopters. The Mi-28UB model is distinguished from the Mi-28N by its dual pilot controls, in order to allow for training.

The Mi-28UB's next destination will be the Zhukovsky airfield near Moscow, for its public unveiling during MAKS 2013. Source: Russian Helicopters JSC Aug 9/13 release.

Dec 26/12: Mi-28NM. A Russian air force (VVS) official says that draft tactical and technical specifications for a modernized Mi-28NM have passed preliminary approval by VVS General Command. A commission on modernization of the Mi-28N had been set up in 2009.

The question is what might be in that modernization. The VK-2500-02 engine could be switched for the VK-2500-03 used in the Ka-52K, which has slightly higher maximum power. There have been some external questions regarding the operational readiness of the type's Arbalets mast-mounted radar, which is seen very rarely on photos of deployed helicopters, so improvements in that area are another possibility. Another obvious improvement area would involve communications technologies, and there's always room for improving an attack helicopter's weapons array. It will be interesting to see what choices they make. Source: RIA.RU [in Russian].

Nov 15/12: Deliveries. Interfax-AVN reports that Russia's Western Military District received 20 Mi-28N helicopters this year, and expects about 20 more in 2013. Deliveries are clearly picking up. Source: Russian Helicopters JSC.

June 2012: Radar. Take-off magazine reports that the helicopter's Arbalets radar may have appeared in pictures for over 7 years, but it's still a work in progress:

"The mast-mounted radar being developed for the Mi-28N by the Ryazan State Instrument-Making Plant cleared a number of test hurdles this spring. In March, the radar's interdepartmental performance tests were completed... April 2013 saw the completion of the radar-equipped Mi-28N's preliminary trials in the Moscow Region and the release of the acceptance report recommending the radar's employment as part of production-standard helicopters of the type. The last hurdle remaining is the joint special flight tests of the helicopter equipped with the radar. Depending on the outcome of the tests, a decision will be made to launch the radar's production.... Concurrently, the radar's export version, designated as N025E, is being developed to equip the Mi-28NE export model..."

Feb 15/11: Grounded. The VVS reportedly grounds its Mi-28 fleet after a crash near Starvopol kills the pilot. Source: Washington Post [dead link].

Additional Readings Background: Helicopter

• Russian Helicopters JSC - Mi-28N

• Take-off (June 2012) - New Mi-28N versions in the pipeline. Also deals with the state of the Arbalets radar.

• DID (July 20/06) - Russia Commits to Multi-Year Buy of 67 Mi-28 Attack Helicopters

• DID - Baby Come Back: Iraq is Buying Russian Weapons Again. Including Mi-28NEs.

Competitors

• DID - Russia’s Ka-52 Alligator Scout-Attack Helicopters

• DID - AH-64E Apache Block III: The Once and Future Attack Helicopter

• DID - Turkey Finally Lands Its Attack Helicopters. The T129 ATAK, formerly the A129 Mangusta.

• DID - Tiger, Tamed? Eurocopter’s New EC665 HAD Helicopters

The US Navy, Marine Corps (USMC) and the Republic of Singapore Armed Forces have concluded the 22nd annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT 2016) exercise at the Changi Naval Base.

The US Naval Air Systems Command (Navair) has conducted a successful demonstration of a flight critical aircraft component, which was built using additive manufacturing (AM) techniques.

The M21 Class patrol boats are being built by Marsun Company, for the Royal Thai Navy (RTN). The patrol boats are intended for deployment in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Thailand.

BAE Systems Australia has selected Evoqua Water Technologies to design and deliver the Chloropac system, which will be installed on Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Anzac-class frigates.

Chinese PF-98 Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher

Common Security and Defence (CSDP) missions and operations are teamwork by nature, involving troops from different contributing Member States, all of them bringing with them and using their own specific equipment and outfit. Although the bulk of the materiel used in such multinational operations is traditionally of military nature and therefore well-known to all of the participating troops, serious issues can arise from civilian, commercially available off-the-shelve electronic products and utensils which are increasingly used by the Armed Forces to complement their purely military toolbox.

 

Such a patchwork of military, dual-use and civilian equipment used by troops from different Member States in a joint operation can entail considerable risks – from hampering the mission’s effectiveness to putting at risk soldiers’ lives.

Against this background, one crucial question arises: How to make sure that different troops coming from different Armed Forces using different types of technical equipment can nevertheless work together efficiently and safely?
Ensuring proper testing and evaluation of critical equipment - be it military or civilian - is part of the answer.

 

Electromagnetic Effects (EME)

That’s why the European Defence Agency (EDA) has taken the initiative to promote more systematic technical testing of CSDP equipment by Member States’ Test Centres and to set up an EU-wide Test and Evaluation Network, the Defence Test and Evaluation Base (DTEB).

One of the areas where Testing & Evaluation (T&E) is particularly crucial is that of Electromagnetic Effects (EME). Indeed, it is not unusual that commercially acquired electronic devices used by Armed Forces generate adverse interferences with its own military equipment or with that used by partner troops in joint missions.

Measures against such harmful and potentially dangerous electromagnetic effects can be seen in our daily experiences. For example, civil cell phones interfere with avionic devices; this is why sending functions of cell phones have to be switched off during flights. The damaging effects of electromagnetic interference pose unacceptable risks especially in military technologies; it is therefore necessary to control such interference and reduce the risks to acceptable levels by testing, evaluating and characterizing the threats. It is also important to set appropriate and updated design standards for emission and susceptibility levels and to test the compliance with those standards.

 

EME Networking in Europe

In order to mitigate the risks of fatal interference, several European nations have developed a network of military test centres, specialised in Electromagnetic Effects, which joined the EDA’s Defence Test and Evaluation Base (DTEB) to examine, amongst others, the hazardous impact of civil equipment on military operations and vice versa. This EU Network of military EME Test Centres (ENTER) conducts joint tests, exchanges results and works on harmonized standards towards enhanced interoperability of multinational forces.

Second round of tests to be launched in September

After having carried out a first, more general inter-laboratory comparison test (so-called ‘Round Robin Testing’), the ENTER group has now decided to launch a follow-up test in autumn 2016 which will entirely focus on current and future Electromagnetic Effects (EME) concerns. The preparatory meeting for this test round will take place end of September at the EDA in Brussels.

National test centres from six EDA member States (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain – the lead nation) will participate in this joint test event.

The objective is to evaluate a series of test methods and procedures in order to verify their accuracy and comparability. This is of great importance to national test centres because if it can be concluded that different methods and procedures applied by Member States’ testers are of identical quality and that they lead to the same results, then it will possible for national test centres to mutually recognize their test results - which means substantial savings of time and resources.

At this stage, ENTER is made up of the national test centres of the six afore-mentioned EDA members but the objective is to continuously expand the group.

“Important to share experiences and qualification methods”

Major Dr Ir Thierry Gilles, is an expert on electromagnetic effects working in the Belgium Laboratory of Electro-Magnetic Applications (LEMA) which is located in the Brussels-based Royal Military Academy. LEMA is a member of ENTER. “Even with a rather small test equipment, our laboratory can contribute to EME qualifications and tests because we are complementary to other EU test facilities in the EME Network. Our strength is for example the close relationship with research topics. This means that future developments can be taken into account for capability investments. This is a valuable contribution to the Network of EME T&E Centres”, Mr Gilles states.

“For example, deminers use firing devices which can be very sensitive to electromagnetic disturbances. Wireless devices are a cause for concern, in particular radio transmitters used in proximity of such life-critical devices. The risk of malfunction, such as a non-detection of a buried mine, or the premature explosion of the detonators must be evaluated”, he stressed. The importance of sharing test results and qualification methods among European Armed Forces is obvious. “It is very important for us to share those kind of experiences and qualification methods with other EU experts in the EME Network to optimise our qualification methods in an interoperable way”, says Mr Gilles.

Thomas Honke, the EDA’s Project Officer for Qualification Test and Evaluation, adds: “The example of electromagnetic effects is only one aspect in the large field of EU Test and Evaluation domains. Those kind of T&E collaborations in the defence sector will help to save lives, especially if shared test methods discover weaknesses of military equipment in a pan-European context. Based on exchanging this information in qualification, test and evaluation expertise networks, EU Member States can develop adequate countermeasures. This is the spirit of our EU Test and Evaluation Networking”.

 

More information:

• European Network on Electro Magnetic Effects Test & Evaluation capabilities Rationalization (ENTER) - EDA project page
• Defence Test and Evaluation Base (DTEB) portal
• EDSTAR portal

There have long been reports that the ongoing delays with the commissioning of the Admiral Gorshkov frigate have to do with defects in its air defense systems. These were thought to be primarily related to problems with integration of the Poliment Redut air defense missile system. The Poliment system was designed to be Russia’s answer to AEGIS, with four phased array antennas that are able to track 16 targets at the same time. The Redut system consists of four or eight vertical launch systems that launch three types of missiles. The 9M100 is the short-range missile, with a range of up to 15km. The 9M96M is the medium-range missile, with a range of 40-50km. Finally, the 9M96 long-range missile is supposed to have a range of up to 150km.

It now appears that the Redut’s problems are much more serious than just integration. A recent report notes that the Ministry of Defense has stopped trials of the system because of continuing problems with the 9M96 long-range missile. Specifically, the missiles appear to fail after three seconds of flight. Some reports indicate that the Redut system works well hitting targets up to 40km away, but fails in the long range. The implication is that the short and medium range missiles work well, but the long range missile does not. Nevertheless, this may be an improvement over previous results, as trials of the Redut system on the Steregushchiy class corvettes in 2014 showed that they were only able to hit targets at distances of up to 15km because the medium-range Furke-2 radar system was not functioning properly.

Instead of further trials, the problems will now be sorted out by an inter-agency commission, a sure sign that the problems are serious and are not expected to be fixed any time soon. The problems stem from issues at the design bureau, which is reportedly not up to the task of designing a missile with the requirements provided by the Defense Ministry. The Fakel machine design bureau, which is developing the missiles is supposedly in relatively poor condition, using technologies and equipment left over from the Soviet period.

Redut systems are supposed to be installed on both the Admiral Gorshkov frigates and the Steregushchiy class corvettes. The corvettes that have been commissioned so far with partial Redut systems that are not able to strike long-distance targets. It looks like the Russian military is now facing a choice regarding how long it is willing to wait to commission the already long-delayed first ship of the Admiral Gorshkov frigate class. So far, the Defense Ministry has not been willing to commission the frigate without a fully functional air defense system, though this may change as the delays grow longer.

 

The United States delivered 24 AeroVironment RQ-11B Raven unmanned aircraft systems to Ukraine on 27 July, the US Embassy in Kiev said. The package included 72 hand-launched Raven intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft and associated equipment, which was transported to

The Minister for Women’s Affairs, Delbar Nazari, has narrowly survived a vote of no confidence in parliament earlier this month. This is the latest in a long series of such motions against ministers that have become a means of carrying out political confrontations by proxy in parliament since a long time. MPs, however, seem to have become tired of this practice themselves lately. AAN senior analyst Thomas Ruttig summarises these latest events (with contributions by Salima Ahmadi, who witnessed the debate in parliament, and Ehsan Qaane).

A group of MPs from the lower house of the Afghan parliament has failed to oust the Minister for Women’s Affairs, Delbar Nazari. She was accused of corruption and professional ineffectiveness. In the end, only 51 out of 125 MPs present supported the motion when the vote took place on 13 July 2016, while 68 rejected it (there were also three blank votes and three votes were ruled invalid). Almost all MPs present would have had to support the motion in order to have the minister sacked. With currently 234 MPs, (1) 118 MPs constitute the required majority. Minister Nazari is an Uzbek from Balkh province and a nominee of the Chief Executive’s camp for the cabinet of the National Unity Government (NUG). Despite her ethnicity, she has no links to the main Uzbek party, Jombesh. (Read a short biography of the minister in footnote 2.)

The constitution (Article 92) gives parliament the right to summon and potentially oust high-ranking government officials who need a vote of confidence to secure their office (ministers or the heads of institutions equivalent to ministries, such as the heads of the Central Bank and the NDS). This procedure is called estezah in Afghan parliamentary terminology (meaning “interpellation,” sometimes wrongly translated as ‘impeachment’).

According to its internal regulations, the lower house (Wolesi Jirga) requires that at least a fifth of its MPs sign an estezah motion. After that, a question-and-answer session (called estejwab, from the word jawab, for “answer”) must be held, followed by a vote. Should an MP lose this vote, he or she must resign from their post and the president should nominate a new candidate (see this AAN dispatch about how the Wolesi Jirga works). This, however, has not always been the case in practice. Former President Hamed Karzai in particular had a record of repeatedly ignoring such parliamentary votes: then Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta, for example, kept his position until January 2010, in spite of receiving a vote of no confidence in May 2007; see here).

The right to carry out estezah was conferred to parliament by the 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ), during which there was strong disagreement between those who supported a centralised presidential system and those who favoured a parliamentary one. The centralist group constituted a narrow majority while those favouring a stronger parliament represented a strong minority of about 45 per cent of the CLJ delegates (read this AAN dispatch: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/flash-to-the-past-long-live-consensus-a-look-back-at-the-2003-constitutional-loya-jirga/). The process of estezah, therefore, was granted as a concession to the minority. And it has backfired.

This series of interpellations – for example, parliament went after eleven ministers in early 2013 alone (see AAN analysis here) and sacked Karzai’s defence and interior ministers in one go in 2012 (see AAN’s analysis here) while there had only been two estezah motions during Ghani’s presidency before the one against Nazari (3) – as well as the former president’s reaction (or lack thereof) to this event put considerable strain on the relationship between the Afghan legislative and executive branches (see this AAN dispatch). It has also had repercussions to this day, as the practice has undermined the position of the cabinet and its members in the political system. Presidents have been able to side-step parliament’s powers by establishing internal, opaque decision-making or advisory bodies, usually referred to as ‘the Palace.’ This has often relegated the cabinet ministers, particularly those described as ‘technocrats’ without their own power-base, into a subordinate position where they have to carry out decisions taken above rather than make their own ones.

Nazari was also probably lucky, as this motion came at a time when both houses of parliament, and particularly the lower house, were deciding on the composition of a joint Wolesi Jirga/Meshrano Jirga commission on electoral reform, an issue long overdue (see AAN’s analysis here and here), which they apparently considered to be more important than the motion against Nazari. (4)

What were the accusations against Nazari?

According to the Secretary of the Wolesi Jirga, MP Erfanullah Erfan, four reasons were given for summoning the minister: 1) accusations of fesad, which cover both administrative and moral corruption; 2) nepotism, ie the appointment of relatives to positions in the ministry, 3) weak management, and 4) her inefficiency as a minister. It is unclear, however, who initiated the motion and how many MPs signed it before it reached the Wolesi Jirga. These documents are not publicly available.

As far as AAN was able to ascertain, there were no concrete accusations or even evidence for any of the charges laid against Nazari in the written motion. This led to some finger-pointing and denials. Two female MPs told AAN that three of their female colleagues – Fawzia Kofi, from Badakhshan province and head of the commission for women’s affairs, Razia Sadat Mangal from Paktia province, and Rubaba Parwani from Kabul province – had been behind the estezah motion. Sadat Mangal acknowledged that she had signed the petition, but said she had not initiated it. (She told AAN it was initiated by Kabul MP Kubra Mustafawi.) Parwani refused to comment, and Kufi was unavailable to AAN for comment. The fact remains, however, that only female MPs took the floor when the motion was debated.

Another emotional point raised against the minister in the debate was an alleged case of rape, which had occurred inside the ministry – although actually under the current minister’s predecessor. Some MPs – including Parwani and Mustafawi – reproached Nazari for hiring the father of the alleged perpetrator (the latter had worked in the ministry himself but was fired after the incident) as her adviser. These allegations failed to mobilise a sufficient number of MPs. The parliament’s administrative board apparently also decided not to follow up on the charges made, although MP Parwani claimed she had submitted documents as “evidence” against Nazari (which a member of the board denied when talking to AAN).

Two MPs close to the main Uzbek party Jombesh, Bashir Ahmad Tahienj from Faryab and Qudratullah Zaki from Takhar, rejected another accusation against the minister when talking to AAN, that Nazari had promoted fellow Uzbeks in her ministry in what would amount to ‘ethnic nepotism.’ Quite the contrary, Tahienj alleged, as Jombesh was in fact unhappy that Nazari had not, in their view, appointed enough Afghan Turks to her ministry: “This was the reason we [Uzbeks] spoke to her so many times: why could she not appoint some Turktabar (5)?” The minister’s brother, however, works as an advisor at the ministry; Nazari insists she needs him as a mahram.

The two MPs further noted, when talking to AAN, that Nazari had told them certain female MPs had turned against her after she had refused to give jobs in the ministry to their relatives. According to Tahienj and Zaki, the minister said those MPs had then threatened ‘to take revenge’ by getting her removed from her post. In the debate, Nazari admitted to shortcomings in her ministry’s work and said the next time she is called in, she would present the ministry’s achievements. She claimed that all her recent appointments had been approved by the president’s office.

On another point, Nazari had also been accused by a number of MPs – including Shakeba Hashemi from Kandahar and Rayhana Azad from Uruzgan – of improper behaviour, undermining the constitution and the country’s judiciary and giving legitimacy to the Taleban. During a press conference (reported by Afghan media here), she had urged the Taleban to “punish perpetrators of violence against women” within their own ranks. The minister stood by her statement, arguing that she had aimed at preventing the Taleban from stoning girls and women accused of ‘moral corruption’ and that she, in the holy month of Ramadan, had wanted to contribute to peace building and ending atrocities against women (here).

Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, the WJ speaker, cut short this debate (as one other MP confirmed to AAN) as the accusation had not been a formal part of the motion against Ms Nazari and urged MPs to vote for the continuation of her term in office.

What was the politicking behind the anti-Nazari motion?

The motion against Minister Nazari had elements both of political infighting between the two camps in the NUG and of longstanding conflicts between different female politicians for influence over the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA). Kufi, Hashemi and Fatima Aziz, who were actively involved in the move against Nazari, belong to the Abdullah camp. Before the NUG was formed, Kufi and Hashimi had apparently harboured aspirations for top MoWA positions themselves, according to some MPs. Furthermore, no male MPs spoke against Nazari in the debate; most votes of no confidence came from female MPs.

The post of Minister for Women’s Affairs (6) has been highly sought by individual female politicians ever since its introduction by the 2001 Bonn conference. This has often caused rifts within the post-Taleban women’s movement and among individual female politicians. This post’s importance is enhanced by the fact that it is seen among Afghan elites as the only clear ‘women’s slot’ in cabinet where, usually, only a small number of women are members (currently four out of 24, far below the 25 per cent quota for women MPs). Starting with the first minister appointed at the Bonn conference, there have been repeated accusations of ethnic or political ‘monopolisation’ of positions in the ministry and/or the exclusion of relevant women’s networks. The current infighting and accusations and counter-accusations among female MPs provide more evidence that there is no unified ‘women’s block’ in parliament pursuing a joint women’s rights agenda.

Nasima Niazi, an MP from Helmand, made another important point. She told AAN that although Minister Nazari was not from her ethnic group and neither did they share the same political views, she had decided not to support the vote to have her ousted, as the estezah sessions had become “subjective“ affairs. She also accused the house of a gender bias, as originally signatures for three estezah motions were collected (the others being against the (male) ministers of trade and commerce and of education), but only the female minister was subjected to it. (Speaker Ibrahimi shifted the blame to the committee of the chairs of the parliamentary commissions (kamita-ye ru’asa) by stating that this is the body responsible for setting the house’s agenda.)

First swallows of spring, or more?

More importantly, Niazi’s complaint against the estezah’s use as a political tool to push parochial (and sometimes unlawful) interests of individual MPs seems to reflect a growing uneasiness about this practice in the Wolesi Jirga. Such complaints, as well as the accusation that the house’s administrative board treats different ministers differently, have been increasing for over a month. In the case of the trade and commerce minister, for example, some MPs who initially signed the motion later withdrew their signatures, one MP told AAN. The plenary also showed no signs, despite repeated demands by some signatories, to start the estezah procedure. Also, the last candidates for the long vacant posts of defence minister and head of the intelligence service (NDS) went though unexpectedly smoothly in parliament in May 2016 (see AAN’s reporting here).

This constitutes a move towards a much-needed ‘normalisation’ and professionalisation of the Afghan parliament’s work. On many occasions, it has acted as a body that is merely a conglomerate of individuals pursuing parochial interests, neglecting to pull together and pass vital legislation for the sake of the nation’s interests (see this AAN analysis). It remains to be seen, however, whether this represents a general shift or, as the Afghan proverb says, is just the arrival of the first swallow before spring has properly sprung.

 

(1) A group of MPs that were boycotting the WJ sessions (see AAN’s reporting here) since mid-May about the TUTAP controversy had one by one returned by June. MP Shinkai Karokhel, who was appointed ambassador to Canada on 13 May 2016, is still attending parliament as her credentials have not been given yet. Two more MPs appointed to governmental posts (Naqibullah Faiq for head of the Afghanistan National Standards Authority in February 2016 and Shukrai Barakzai, appointed ambassador to Norway in February 2016), have not been replaced as this is legally impossible in the last year of the WJ’s tenure. The quorum has not been lowered, though.

(2) Al-Hajj Delbar Nazari, born in 1958, is an Uzbek from Khulm district in Balkh province (formerly part of Samangan).  Although some sources, such as a NPS Samangan provincial profile (not available online anymore) associate her with Jombesh, she told AAN that her nomination came from the CEO team, in particular from Atta Muhammad Nur, the acting governor of her home province Balkh whose rivalry with Dostum is well known. She obtained a degree from the Teachers Training Centre of Balkh (Dar ul-Mu’alemin Balkh). According to her introduction in parliament, she also holds a degree from Balkh University in Dari and English literature and one from the private Kateb University in International Relations (2011). Her own biography posted on the MoWA website includes stints as both teacher and principal at the Naeem Shahid High School in Samangan (ten years), as well as work with Oxfam (three years), German Agro Action (three years), ZOA (a Dutch NGO) and UNICEF (two years, allegedly as head of educational programs in Samangan) and as civic educator for the joint elections management body (JEMB) for the presidential elections in 2004 (no details or order given). From 2005 to 2010, she served as a member of parliament for Samangan. In 2012 and 2013, she worked as “a legal advisor to the first deputy.” Before her appointment as minister, she worked in the Ministry of the Interior’s department for the development of the electronic national ID card (gender section).

(3) Both happened In the second sitting of the 2015 legislative year (7 September to 20 January 2016): On 2 November 2015, then interior minister Nur-ul-Haq Ulumi survived a no-confidence vote (see here) and as did telecommunication minister Abdul Razaq Wahidi on 4 January 2016 (see here).

(4) At that point, the WJ had not been able to nominate its members for the commission, while the MJ had already named its delegates. The WJ finally followed suit on 18 July 2016.

(5) “Turktabar” is a relatively new term, used by some not only for members of Turkic ethnic groups in Afghanistan, ie Uzbeks, Turkmen and Kyrgyz, but also to include the Hazara, Qizilbash and Bayat, claiming that they all belong to a larger, joint ‘Turco-Mongol’ group.

(6) The first Minister of Women’s Affairs was Sima Samar who served in this post from 2001 to early 2003 in the post-Taleban interim and transitional authorities (before the first regular elections). She was followed by Dr Habiba Surabi (2003-04) – when Samar became the head of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) – and, after the 2004 presidential election, Dr Massuda Jalal (October 2004-July 2006). In July 2006, Dr Husn Banu Ghazanfar received the vote of confidence for this position from parliament. She served up to the formation of the NUG cabinet after the 2014 presidential election. The women who served (after 2004) as deputy ministers for policy and vocational affairs were Shafiqa Yarqin, Soraya Sobhrang, Mazari Safa, while Tajwar Kakar, Najiba Sharifi, Maliha Sahak and Muzhgan Mustafawi were deputy ministers for financial and administrative affairs.

 

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