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Roblox pourrait être la première plateforme de jeux vidéo à être désignée dans le cadre de la loi sur les services numériques de l'Union européenne.

The post La Commission européenne envisage de soumettre les plateformes de jeux à ses règles numériques appeared first on Euractiv FR.

His continued incarceration is a telling example of the erosion of both India’s judicial independence and its democracy.   

Un des paradoxes de l'ère numérique tient à ceci : d'un côté, les grandes plates-formes mondialisent certaines formes culturelles ; de l'autre, elles fractionnent les publics en silos autonomes. Des séries à succès émergent comme des références communes à des populations relativement (…) / États-Unis, Audiovisuel, Fiction

Having overthrown regimes in Latin America and the Middle East, why would Washington draw the line at Asia?

Sánchez durcit le ton et renforce l'opposition de l'Espagne à la guerre contre l'Iran.

The post Pedro Sánchez : « L’Espagne dit non à la guerre » appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Certains tablaient sur une guerre entre Israël et les États-Unis d'une part, et l'Iran d'autre part, un conflit qui se déroulerait à l'intérieur des frontières de l'Iran et d'Israël. Cependant, les frappes iraniennes ont vciblé les pays voisins.

From energy to innovation, Kim Jong Un’s growth strategy is up against structural limits.

The intense U.S. bombing of Iran reveals the limits of Beijing’s relationship with Tehran and the pragmatism of China’s Middle Eastern strategy

Both countries are navigating a geopolitical environment far more turbulent than the one that shaped their post-Cold War outlook.

Chypre accueille deux bases militaires britanniques qui ont déjà été la cible d'opérations liées à l'Iran et au Hezbollah.

The post Une attaque par drone du Hezbollah pourrait constituer une grave menace pour Chypre appeared first on Euractiv FR.

»Multipolarität« ist in der internationalen Politik zu einem zentralen, aber höchst ambivalenten Bezugspunkt von Debatten über die künftige Weltordnung geworden. Verwendet wird der Begriff sowohl deskriptiv, nämlich zur Beschreibung von Machtverschiebungen, als auch normativ, und zwar als Konzept für eine gerechtere internationale Ordnung. Die vergleichende Analyse von sieben Staaten zeigt jedoch, dass selbst in Ländern, die Multipolarität propagieren, kein kohärentes Verständnis davon vorherrscht. Scharfe Trennlinien verlaufen vorwiegend zwischen einerseits den USA, die das Konzept Multipolarität lange als gegen sich gerichtet verstanden haben, andererseits Russland und China, die mit ihm die Infragestellung der US-Hegemonie verbinden. Dabei strebt Russland eine disruptive und gewalttätige Transformation an, China hingegen eine evolutionäre. Andere Staaten wiederum, allen voran Indien und Südafrika, erhoffen sich von Multipolarität in erster Linie erweiterte außenpolitische Spielräume und leiten daraus teilweise eigene Reformvorschläge auf multi­lateraler Ebene ab. Deutschland und die EU müssen sich intensiver mit den unterschied­lichen Interpretationen und Verwendungen des Konzepts Multipolarität auseinandersetzen. Es sollte nicht per se als irrelevant oder antiwestlich abgetan werden, da es wesentliche Erkenntnisse über außenpolitische Anschlussfähigkeiten ermöglicht. Auch birgt die unreflektierte Verwendung des Begriffs Risiken, da er hochgradig politisiert ist und von verschiedenen Akteuren mit zum Teil gegensätzlichen Zielen verknüpft wird. Wichtiger als Grundsatzdiskussionen zu führen ist es, konkrete ordnungs­politische Reformansätze in diversen Politikfeldern zu entwickeln, etwa Handel, Gesundheit, Energie und Klima. Deutschland und die EU sollten die Forderung nach Multipolarität auch als Indikator für Reformbedarf verstehen und über die europäische Ebene Aushandlungsprozesse mit anderen Staaten anstoßen. Hierfür müssen sie zunächst klären, welche Ordnungsvorstellungen sie selbst bevorzugen, um darauf aufbauend passende Partner und Institutionen zu identifizieren.

Air and air-defense capabilities remain Afghanistan’s most vulnerable security component. 

La Côte d'Ivoire, premier producteur mondial de cacao, a divisé de plus de moitié le prix d'achat de "l'or brun" aux planteurs.  Le nouveau prix, 1 200 francs CFA (1,82 euros) est inférieur de près de 60% au montant record de 2 800 francs (4,26 euros) en vigueur depuis octobre, une coupe qui intervient dans un contexte de chute des cours mondiaux et d'une crise de surstockage.

Le M23, qui contrôle cette région riche en coltan, n'a fait aucun commentaire et le nombre de victimes est difficile à vérifier.

Ino Afentouli, Senior Policy Advisor; Head of the Geopolitics and Diplomacy Observatory, ELIAMEP

Barring those directly threatened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and despite the vast financial and military support their countries have provided, the peoples of the EU never felt that this war was “theirs”. And yet, this was the first military conflict in the heart of the continent since the end of World War II. This repression of the threat of war is largely due to the culture of peace that has been cultivated in Europe over the last eight decades—a culture encapsulated in the phrase “Never Again”. It is also the result of the institutional framework designed to ensure that disputes between European nations are resolved peacefully. Today, the nations of Europe find themselves confronted by a second war; though it is not being fought on their own soil, it poses an equally grave threat to their security.

In both the Ukrainian and the Iranian contexts, the nations of Europe are contending with the fallout from conflicts they neither chose nor planned, and over whose trajectory they lack meaningful control. Nonetheless, these are conflicts that will inevitably impact both the peoples and institutions of Europe. In other words, the present juncture is reminiscent of the summer of 1914, when our continent sleepwalked into the First World War. Now, as then, Europe remains unprepared.

The conflict with Iran, to which Greece and Cyprus are the closest European nations, will be protracted and is already escalating into a broader regional struggle. If Turkey, Syria and Lebanon should get involved, whether directly or indirectly, the consequences for us will be dire. The pre-emptive deployment of Greek forces to Cyprus underscores this reality. Even if the institutions to which we belong, the European Union and NATO, were to trigger their collective defence mechanisms, it would signify that our nations are facing a peril of the highest order. Regrettably, should this worst-case scenario materialize, we will be faced with a second European war, this time with the Eastern Mediterranean at its epicentre.

Triantafyllos Karatrantos, Research Associate, ELIAMEP

The ever-evolving regional security environment in the Middle East

The US-Israeli military conflict with Iran is another—and likely the most important critical—chapter in an ongoing reconfiguring of the Middle East’s security architecture and alliances. The process began after the terrorist attack launched against Israel on 7 October 2023 and the rapid succession of military and geopolitical events that followed it. Since October 2023, we have seen the systematic curtailing of Iran’s power, primarily by Israel. Initially through the weakening or overthrow—as in the case of the Assad regime—of the members of the infamous “Axis of Resistance”, the network which had effectively established Iran as a dominant regional actor. The region has changed radically in the period since the initial attacks: the Assad regime has fallen in Syria; Hezbollah, Hamas and various Shiite militias and paramilitary forces that acted as hybrid proxies for Iran have sustained crippling losses; and the Houthis have seen their influence severely diminished.

Iran had previously exploited the power vacuum created by Washington’s substantial disengagement from the region after 2011. This dynamic has now shifted so fundamentally that Tehran has not only lost its regional power; its theocratic regime is currently fighting for its survival.

Furthermore, Iran’s targeting of neighbouring states has failed to drive a wedge between them and the United States; instead, these provocations have pushed countries like Saudi Arabia into adopting a formal stance against Iran.

Israel has emerged with bolstered regional power and influence, appearing ready to resume the momentum of the Abraham Accords, which had stalled in the aftermath of the October 7 attack. However, it remains to be seen how Israel’s relations with the Arab nations will develop from here—most notably with Saudi Arabia, with which a landmark normalization deal was imminent prior to the conflict. Riyadh, alongside other Gulf countries like Qatar, has also seen its regional standing strengthened.

Nevertheless, the regional picture remains complex. Israel’s fraught relationship with Syria and Turkey—the latter of which also seems to be losing some of its previously amassed regional influence—must be taken into account.

Ultimately, the discourse surrounding a new security architecture cannot be finalized without considering the ultimate fate of the Iranian regime and the broader post-conflict landscape for the country. While the threat from Iran’s missile arsenal and proxies could be reduced, and its nuclear ambitions thwarted, we may see growing extremism, or even the emergence of new—or the evolution of existing—Shiite Islamist militant organizations.

Ultimately, the US has made a dynamic return to the Middle East and it remains to be seen how its rivalry with China and Russia will evolve within the region’s new geopolitical context, while it has become increasingly clear that the European Union must now develop its own distinct geopolitical footprint in the region.

Pantelis Ikonomou, Former Inspector, International Atomic Energy Agency; Research Associate, ELIAMEP

The reality about Iran’s nuclear weapons and the war

A list of the factual drivers, not a justification(!), of the actors involved in the Iranian crisis:

• It is widely held that “the capability to acquire nuclear weapons carries as much strategic weight as their actual possession” (for a historical analysis, see my book Global Nuclear Threat, [2019, in Greek], in which the above serves as an epigraph).
• Tehran utilizing its Possible Nuclear Military Capability since 2013 as strategic leverage to advance its international agenda.
• The landmark diplomatic agreement of 2015: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) placed Iran’s nuclear programme under stringent international oversight.
• The implementation of the JCPOA, which widened Iran’s breakout window (the time required to acquire the amount of fissile material required to build a nuclear bomb) from two to ten months, effectively containing the situation,
• Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu adamantly declaring since 2013 that “no deal will be a good deal”.
• US President Trump’s unilaterally withdrawing the US from the JCPOA in 2018 and reinstating sanctions against Iran. This counter-intuitive decision effectively reduced Iran’s breakout window back to a mere two months.
• Tehran ceasing to comply with the terms of the JCPOA in 2019/2020, following a series of targeted assassinations of Iranian politicians, military officers and scientists. Iran obstructing and ultimately barring International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from conducting meaningful oversight of its nuclear programme since then.
• The absence of a credible guarantee since then that Iran is not weaponizing its nuclear programme. Logically, however, had Iran already developed a nuclear capacity, it would have announced it to deter attacks against its territory.
• Israel’s status as an undeclared nuclear-armed state. As it is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is under no obligation to submit to international inspections. Nevertheless, this status affords Israel a decisive strategic edge and underpins its geopolitical standing in the region.
• A fundamental divergence in the objectives of the parties involved in the escalating conflict: For Iran, the goal is to annihilate Israel. For Israel, it is to dismantle the Iranian state. However, for the US, the ultimate goal remains ill-defined. It is likely linked to Trump’s mercurial temperament and narcissistic need to perform on the world stage.
• Trump’s irrational withdrawal from the JCPOA, followed by the impulsive decision to join the Israeli attack on Iran in June 2025—against the explicit counsel of his own national security advisers—points towards an absolute, if unexplained, subservience to Israeli interests. Historically, no American president (Obama, Bush Jr, or Biden) has ever sided with Israel in a war against Iran.
• The historical root cause of the crisis: the pogroms perpetrated by Christian Tsarist Russia in 1881-1906 against 2.5 million Jews; the anti-Semitic campaigns of Stalin’s Soviet Union after World War II; and, finally, the Holocaust in which six million Jews were killed by Hitler’s—likewise Christian—Germany. These events led the global powers, acting through the UN in 1948, to establish a state of a few million Jews in Palestine—a state surrounded by a few hundred million Muslims.
• A pervasive indifference to the existential fallout currently confronting not only world Jewry and the Palestinians of that land, but the entire planet.
• A personal observation from a natural sciences perspective: the tendency towards chaos and disorder, which is the defining characteristic of universal entropy. In this shared journey, power imbalances are driving the collapse of hegemonies and the emergence of unpredictable multipolar shifts. We may also be experiencing the twilight of the American West. Unfortunately, the consequences remain impossible to foresee.

Cette décision a été vivement critiquée par le puissant Parti populaire européen (PPE), de centre-droit.

The post Le Parlement européen reporte à nouveau l’accord commercial entre l’UE et les États-Unis alors que les menaces tarifaires reprennent appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Countries wishing to join the European Union (EU) must meet a set of legal, economic and political requirements. The progress that a candidate country makes to implement EU law and fulfil these requirements is monitored during the ‘accession negotiation’ process. The European Parliament’s approval is needed before a country can join the EU.

Application and accession requirements

Any European country can apply for EU membership if it respects and undertakes to promote the values common to all EU countries, as defined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

Candidate countries must meet specific political and economic criteria, known as the Copenhagen criteria. These include:

• stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and the protection of minorities;
• a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU;
• the ability to take on the obligations that come with EU membership and a commitment to the aims of the political, economic and monetary union.

Accession process

Application stage: A country that wishes to join the EU sends its application to the Council of the European Union, which asks the European Commission to submit an opinion.

Candidate status: If the Commission’s opinion is favourable, the Council may decide to grant the country candidate status. The Council must agree this unanimously.

Negotiations: The Commission carries out a detailed examination of 35 different policy fields (negotiating chapters), together with the candidate country, and either recommends opening negotiations immediately or asks for certain conditions to be met first. The Council then decides (by unanimity) to open negotiations, which take place between the governments of EU countries and the candidate country. Candidate countries may need to undergo a rigorous reform process, with a focus on the functioning of democratic institutions, judicial independence, media pluralism and the fight against corruption and organised crime.

Accession treaty: Once negotiations have been closed, an accession treaty containing the conditions and deadlines of membership is formally drawn up. The treaty is subsequently submitted to the Commission, the Parliament and the Council for approval. Each EU country and the candidate country must ratify (sign)  the accession treaty according to their own procedures.

European Parliament’s role

Parliament monitors the accession process throughout the negotiations with candidate countries. Specifically, the Committee on Foreign Affairs is responsible for coordinating the work on enlargement. The committee regularly exchanges views with the Commissioner responsible for enlargement negotiations, government representatives, experts and civil society actors.

Parliament gives its opinion on the annual Commission reports on individual candidate countries. It adopts resolutions on the accession process and comments on the progress of countries’ reforms.

Parliament also maintains bilateral relations with the parliaments of candidate and potential candidate countries through joint parliamentary committees and inter‑parliamentary meetings which take place once or twice per year.

Parliament’s budgetary powers give it direct influence over the financial aspects of accession, such as the EU funds allocated to support reforms in candidate countries (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance).

Finally, Parliament must give its consent, by an absolute majority vote of more than half of all Members, before a country can join the EU (Article 49 TEU).

EU enlargement developments

As of early 2026, there are nine candidate countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.

Albania and Montenegro have made significant progress on the EU accession path by closing certain negotiating chapters and promoting an anti‑corruption and reform agenda.

In the case of North Macedonia, the opening of the first negotiating chapter depends on constitutional reform, progress on the anti‑corruption agenda and improved relations with neighbouring Bulgaria and Greece.

Ukraine and Moldova were granted candidate status in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine and Moldova successfully completed the examination of their alignment with EU law in 2025. Once all EU countries agree, the negotiating chapters can be opened.

As regards Serbia, political turmoil and reform stagnation have slowed down the negotiations on matters that remained unresolved.

Accession negotiations with Turkey have been on hold since 2018, as the Turkish government has failed to address backsliding on democracy and the rule of law. In May 2025, Parliament said that Turkey’s accession process could not be re-started under the current circumstances as the accession process requires the fundamental values of the Union to be fully respected.

Political instability and institutional challenges inBosnia and Herzegovina have halted the opening of formal negotiations.

In 2024, the EU found that Georgia was backsliding on the rule of law and fundamental rights and therefore conditions to open negotiations had not been met.

Kosovo applied to join the EU in December 2022 but has not been granted candidate status. In May 2025, Parliament called on the five EU countries [CJ1] (Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia) that have not yet recognised Kosovo to do so, so that Kosovo can progress its accession process.

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We will reply in the EU language in which you write to us.

A project to introduce unmanned sites is part of a broader adoption of digital technologies.

Ethiopia unveils its first unmanned, 'smart' police station where citizens can report crimes on automated touch screens.

The U.S. sank an Iranian warship, which was returning home from an India-hosted exercise, off the Sri Lankan coast yesterday. India’s silence in response is deafening.