ELIAMEP

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for November 2024.

Following the elections of November 5 in the United States (US), the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis congratulated US President-elect Donald Trump on his victory, highlighting the longstanding and strategic nature of Greek-American relations, which he states he believes will continue to be strengthened under the new US administration. PM Mitsotakis also extended an invitation to Donald Trump to visit Greece. Moreover, Katerina Sakellaropoulou, President of the Hellenic Republic, sent a congratulatory letter to president-elect Donald Trump, wishing him success in his upcoming term.

Furthermore, six Greek-Americans have been elected to the US House of Representatives in the recent presidential election, evenly representing the Democratic and Republican parties, namely: Chris Pappas (D-NH), Maggie Goodlander (D-NH), Dina Titus (D-NV), Gus Bilirakis (R-FL), Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY), and Mike Haridopolos (R-FL).

On defence matters, on November 14th, the State Department issued a statement approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Greece of F-16 Engine Follow-On Support and related elements of logistics and program support for an estimated cost of $160 million. The principal contractor will be General Electric Aerospace, located in Evendale, OH.

On November 22, political consultations between Greece and the United States of America were held in Washington, D.C. ahead of Greece’s tenure in the United Nations Security Council as a non-permanent member for the 2025-2026 term. The discussions addressed technical issues regarding the United Nations Security Council but also key global challenges such as maritime security, the impact of climate change (particularly on coastal and marine environments), as well as growing risks associated with cyber security, digital resilience and United Nations peacekeeping missions.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

The Media Observatory Report (MORE) is the fruit of systematic monitoring of key Greek and Albania media. 

Each MORE offers a well-balanced mix of political insight and fact-driven analysis on the impact of Albanian media reporting of Greece and Greek media reporting of Albania on issues of common interest. It principally aims to filter out the noise that typically accompanies the media stories on the unresolved bilateral issues. 

3rd issue of MORE  (English).  The third issue is the outcome of a monitoring period between May 2023 – November 2023 and features: – The case of Fredis Beleris – The background, the various aspects of the case and the critical issues at hand – The media coverage and narratives in Greece and Albania

Greece’s integration efforts have been classified as “equality on paper”, highlighting significant gaps in the process of integration of refugees and migrants. Although the actions of the last five years have been crucial regarding labour market inclusion and access to education, persistent gaps, and fragmented implementation hinder the effectiveness of these initiatives. Focusing on the aforementioned vital pillars of integration- i.e., education and access to labour market- this paper will examine the state of the art, highlighting existing gaps and deficiencies, as well as good practices. Concretely, the objective of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, it assesses the current developments and practices, as well as the remaining obstacles; while on the other hand, it draws policy recommendations that will enable Greece to transform its integration policies from “equality on paper” to a more cohesive and effective approach.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Maria Eleni Pantazi Psatha, PhD candidate, KU Leuven, Programme Officer at METAdrasi-Action for Migration and Development.

Introduction

For many years, the reception and management of large migration flows, along with the control of irregular movements and the reinforcement of legal pathways, have been at the forefront of the Greek policy and legislative agenda.[1] However, there has been a shift in focus, with the integration of refugees and migrants into host communities becoming a fundamental pillar of migration policy. Undeniably, there is a strong link between migration and integration policies, while managing the effective integration of refugees and migrants is perceived both as a priority in the state’s migration policy agenda, and within the broader public discourse and opinion.[2]

Over the previous years, the Greek State has introduced and carried out numerous policy initiatives aimed at promoting integration across different aspects of social, political, labour, and economic life.

Over the previous years, the Greek State has introduced and carried out numerous policy initiatives aimed at promoting integration across different aspects of social, political, labour, and economic life. Aligning with the EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion for 2021-2027, which advocates for timely support of applicants and beneficiaries of international protection in the integration process, the adopted Greek National Integration Strategy seeks to facilitate and enhance the integration procedure.

Despite the actions undertaken in the past five years and the efforts to replace the absence of an inclusive integration plan, significant gaps and ambiguities persist, posing challenges to the comprehensive integration of refugees and migrants. Specifically, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)[3], characterises the country’s approach as “equality on paper”, highlighting that while migrants in Greece enjoy basic rights, they lack equal opportunities.[4] The most significant obstacles emerge in the areas of education, and political participation, whereas access to the labour market was characterised as “slightly favourable”.

Therefore, the first section of this policy paper will examine one of the aspects of migrant and refugee integration, and specifically, labour integration. It will provide an overview of recent actions, highlighting both the progress made, and the persisting gaps. Moreover, the following section will explore the situation of educational opportunities and the access to Non-Formal and Formal Education in Greece. Lastly, this paper will present a set of policy recommendations aimed at improving the integration of refugees and migrants, with a focus on labour and educational integration, taking also into consideration climate change, as a factor that can affect the integration process.

Overall, the objective of this brief is twofold: on the one hand, it assesses the current state of integration policies and practices in Greece, while on the other hand, it draws policy recommendations to address gaps and barriers that hinder refugees’ and migrants’ access to education and employment opportunities. 

Labour Integration

…the focus of the Greek migration policy was to manage migration flows,

A significant parameter of refugee and migrant inclusion in the host society is labour integration. Undeniably, at a first stage, reception, housing, and provision of food emerge as priority needs, where most attention was paid by the Greek authorities. However, the economic integration and the employment of refugee and migrant populations becomes a means to regain their autonomy, and rebuild their lives, while also enhancing their social inclusion.[5] In the previous years, the focus of the Greek migration policy was to manage migration flows with an emphasis on border security, whereas the organised reception and integration of refugees and migrants was left aside.

Following the general elections in June 2023, a new set of priorities was introduced: promotion of social cohesion and integration of refugees and migrants, addressing the labour shortages in key sectors through organised legal migration, and enhancement of sustainable reintegration. Although the integration efforts made by the Greek state have been seen as “an equality on paper”, major steps have been made at a legislative and policy level, making the integration process “slightly favourable”.[6] Therefore, this section aims at unfolding the steps that have been made from the Greek state regarding labour integration, while also underlining persisting gaps and impasses.

Based on UNHCR figures on labour integration during the last two years,[7] the majority of respondents (80 per cent) were either not working or were only able to find occasional work. Of those working, 56 per cent were doing so without any type of legal contract, indicating significant levels of labour exploitation. The main three challenges that refugees and migrants face with respect to finding work in Greece are the lack of knowledge of the language, the lack of documentation, and the inability to find legal employment. Moreover, the majority of respondents highlighted that the reason for stopping their job was due to its seasonal character. The figures provided by another study,[8] further corroborate the aforementioned, highlighting also a significant gender-based gap in access to employment, with women being disproportionately affected compared to men. Additionally, the study revealed that while economic integration scored highest in Greece, linguistic and social integration were rated lowest, underscoring the multidimensional nature of the issue. Nationality is also an aspect determining access to the labour market, as per Figure 1.[9] Individuals from Egypt, Turkey, and Iran achieved the highest integration scores, followed by Palestinians, Iraqis, Cameroonians, Syrians, and Afghans.

Complementary, a survey conducted by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 2021-2022, highlighted language barriers, and the lack of proper documentation as the primary challenges to employment.[10] Notably, the majority of participants (35 per cent) who had a job were asylum seekers, and a 33 per cent were beneficiaries of international protection, indicating that employment opportunities often depend on an individual’s legal status.[11] Overall, persistent obstacles, such as the temporary nature of available jobs and the difficulty in securing legal employment, significantly limit opportunities for stability and full integration.

 

Figure 1, Index attachment integration score for the ten largest nationality groups[12].

 

                                                                                                                            Source: IPL 2023.

 

An important legislative development was L. 5078/2023 and particularly Article 192 which amended Article 57 of the Asylum Code, providing that applicants have a right to access the labour market withing sixty days of the lodging of their application and the receipt of the relevant legal documents. It is considered as a crucial development as prior to 2020, asylum seekers had to wait six months to gain access to employment, leading to prolonged delays and uncertainty. The amendment also streamlines processes and enhances efficiency through digitalisation. In addition, Article 193 of the same Law, introduces a new procedure for granting residence permit, which provides access to paid employment and facilitates the regularisation of a substantial number of long-term migrants in Greece. The law further extends the duration of work permits, increases the quota for seasonal workers, reduces the types of residence permits, and simplifies documentary requirements for permit renewals.[13] Another noteworthy addition benefits second-generation migrants, who are eligible for ten-year residence permits, compared to the previous five-year permits, granting full access to the labour market. However, this favourable provision does not extend to beneficiaries of international protection, who without a valid residence permit, remain unable to access the labour market; [14] a disparity that highlights a gap in the inclusiveness of the legislative framework.

Another important legislative development is the new Migration Code which came into effect in January 2020 and amended various legal provisions of the previous Migration and Social Integration Code (L. 4251/2014).[15] The most important innovative provision is for the “long term residence permit” which allows a person to live and work in any country of the European Union.

As a general remark, it is vital to highlight the general labour market conditions in Greece. Despite noticeable improvements in recent years, unemployment rates in Greece remain high, compared to other EU Member States, ranking the country in the second place with 9,3 per cent of unemployment rate.[16] According to the International Migration Outlook,[17] the employment rate for migrants in Greece stands at 62,5 per cent, while the unemployment rate reaches a 14,9 per cent. These figures indicate a relative improvement in labour market conditions, with a greater reduction in unemployment among foreign-born individuals compared to native-born Greeks. Additionally, data from Eurostat’s migrant integration and inclusion visualisation corroborates this trend, showing that Greek nationals maintain higher employment rates than third-country nationals. [18] A particularly noteworthy finding is the temporality of employment contracts, which is significantly more common among non-EU nationals (23,3 per cent) compared to Greek nationals (10,1 per cent). This data, as illustrated in Figure 2 for labour market outcomes in 2023, underscores persistent disparities in employment opportunities and contract stability between migrants and nationals.                                    

 

 Figure 2, Labour Market Outcomes (2023)[19]

                                                                                                                   Source: Eurostat, 2024.

 

From the above it appears that high unemployment rates, combined with additional barriers, such as competition with Greek-speaking candidates, significantly hinder the holistic integration of refugees and migrants into the labour market.[20]  This challenge is particularly pronounced for third-country nationals, whose unemployment rate is even higher. According to the Public Employment Service, as of December 2023, the total number of registered unemployed third-country nationals stood at 126,610, a figure that rose further in January 2024. Interestingly, while public opinion on migration remains mixed, there is a notably positive perception of the economic benefits of labour migration.[21] Concretely, the majority of Greek nationals (71,8 per cent) believes that the departure of many migrants has had negative repercussions on production, particularly in the sectors of tourism and agriculture. Moreover, the acceptance of migrants based on the needs of the national economy is perceived highly positively (62,7 per cent).

In response to these challenges, the recently amended National Integration Strategy[22] focuses on social integration with an emphasis on early action and on the process of pre-integration for those with a refugee background. A key positive aspect of the Strategy is the inclusion of a pre-integration phase, which aims to facilitate smoother integration by teaching the Greek language, familiarising them with the European way of life, and instilling principles

of democracy and human rights. Several promising initiatives have emerged, such as the “Multaka: Intercultural Tours in Athens”, a pilot project which provided the opportunity to refugees and migrants to learn about Greek civilisation and history. While the Strategy focuses heavily on promoting social inclusion, it has faced criticism for its lack of a concrete implementation plan, and specific procedures to translate its objectives into effective actions.[23]

…he adopted legal provisions, while addressing some past barriers to labour integration, remain largely superficial.

As underlined “the objectives and actions proposed per chapter are fragmentary in nature, while there is no deepening and analysis of tools and practices that will be used to achieve them”.[24] The main issue, thus, lies in the fact that the adopted legal provisions, while addressing some past barriers to labour integration, remain largely superficial. As Lodovici points out, “measures to support access to the labour market are not sufficiently developed and are fragmented into projects implemented by NGOs and supported through EU funds”.[25] In other words, access to labour market is feasible solely through the submission of an ERGANI registration certificate by their employer to the National Social Security Entity (EFKA). However, this process can deter employers who may lack the necessary knowledge or support to navigate it, while also posing administrative hurdles for refugees and migrants.[26]

Another criticism apropos the population mentioned in the strategy underlines that focus has been placed on the integration of asylum seekers and refugees, rather than the migrant population. This by itself does not align with the preface that states “that the New National Integration Strategy is based on the new action plan of the European Union and adopts the recommendations for social inclusion”. In contrast it is mentioned that “the New Integration Strategy is addressed to asylum seekers as well as recognised beneficiaries of international protection and is aligned to the legal framework in force”,[27] which excludes to the fullest other categories of people. Thus, the idea of integration for all is not clearly envisaged in the Greek Strategy. Additionally, the progress made by state factors is also missing together with the best practices that have derived from the work of civil society organisations. At this point it is also important to underline the contribution of NGOs and international organizations in advancing the integration of refugees and migrants in Greece through the provision of employability services and vocational trainings.

A survey conducted by NGOs[28] revealed that individuals who participated in the research were beneficiaries of the project partner organisations, meaning they had received support from professionals prior to securing employment. Thus, this demonstrates that NGO support plays a critical role in providing refugees and migrants with access to labour market information and guidance on the necessary steps to gain employment. In any case, “successful integration of refugees needs a whole-of-society approach”.[29] There is also a notable absence of concrete measures addressing the needs of people with disabilities, as well as LGBTQ+ individuals.[30] Incontestably, significant progress has been achieved in improving employment opportunities for refugee and migrant populations; nevertheless, Greece still ranks among the lowest in Europe in terms of establishing an effective policy framework to enhance employability. [31]

…there have been several good practices that have been implemented in the area of integration and particularly labour integration.

Nonetheless, there have been several good practices that have been implemented in the area of integration and particularly labour integration, and often emerge from the collaboration between state actors, international organisations, and civil society organizations. The Hellenic Integration Support for Beneficiaries of International Protection programme (HELIOS), which was launched in 2019 by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) offered a variety of support actions aimed at promoting the independent living of beneficiaries of international protection, including information sessions, work counselling, language courses, and housing. A notable example is the organization of Job Fairs, which facilitate connections between employers from various sectors and refugees or migrants seeking employment. For instance, in July 2024, a Job Fair held on the island of Lesvos saw the participation of 452 individuals, resulting in 219 job offers.[32] Additionally, UNHCR has launched the ADAMA online platform, which plays a crucial role in bridging the gap between refugees looking for jobs in Greece and prospective employers across the country. This initiative not only provides refugees with essential information about the labour market and connects them with employers but also encourages businesses and agencies in the private sector to actively include refugees in their workforce, thereby fostering greater inclusion and diversity in the Greek labour market.

Another important initiative is the introduction of a pilot tool by the Hellenic Manpower Employment Organisation (OAED)- the so-called “Skills Recognition Tool”.[33] Specifically, as the report underlined, one key insight from this initiative is the critical role of collaboration between public institutions and civil society organisations in ensuring the effectiveness of the process.[34] This programme is therefore, aiming at placing approximately 1,000 recognised refugees in Attica and Central Macedonia. Such partnerships are essential for accurately evaluating refugees’ competencies and aligning them with appropriate employment opportunities. However, as of now, there is a lack of publicly available data detailing the progress and outcomes of this pilot program, making it challenging to assess its overall impact.

Furthermore, another factor that has contributed to shaping labour integration, is labour shortages. Concretely, during and after the Covid-19 pandemic, the agricultural, tourism, and construction sectors faced increased shortages, which were addressed by granting exceptional right to work.[35] Yet, labour shortages remain a constant issue up to date, while efforts have been made since the beginning of the year through bilateral agreements with Bangladesh and Egypt. Before examining the aforementioned agreements, it is crucial to mention the system of metaklisi, which focuses on hiring third-country nationals for the purpose of employment- mainly to areas where there was no interest from Greek employees.[36] According to the latest available data (2022-2023) from the Ministry of Migration and Asylum regarding the system of metaklisi,[37] a total of 32,794 of requests were submitted in 2022, out of which 29,130 were accepted. In 2023, the number of requests decreased to 25,945 of which, 20,042 were approved. Nonetheless, this process has been criticised for often allowing informal hirings, without a contract, leading to exploitation.

According to the Hellenic Ministry of Labour, the total number of residence visa quotas for 2023-2024 was 167,925.[38] Of the available posts, 20,000 would be covered through the agreements with Egypt and Bangladesh, and the rest through the system of metaklisi. It is interesting to highlight two points at this stage. Firstly, the number of permitted work permits was set significantly lower than the requests submitted through the Regional Authorities- that were approximately 380,000. While there was an increase in the number of workers allowed in sectors such as hospitality and accommodation- 9,261 compared to 2,811 during 2021-2022- this figure remains far below the 80, 316 employees proposed. Specifically, of the 379,165 requests received for 2023-2024, only 147,925 permits were issued, covering just 39 per cent of the demand. [39] Secondly, limited quotas were allocated for highly skilled workers, reflecting also the relatively low demand within the Greek labour market.[40]

In February 2022, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on migration and mobility was signed with Bangladesh, covering seasonal labour needs. Specifically, the agreement outlines the conditions for entry and temporary residence of Bangladeshi nationals for temporary employment. It provides the issuance of 4,000 temporary residence permits annually, each valid for a duration of five years, under the system of metaklisi.[41] In addition, and for the purpose of covering existing labour shortages, the Memorandum allows for up to 15,000 Bangladeshis already residing undocumented in Greece to be granted temporary long term seasonal visas, enabling them to enter the labour market.

According to the information provided by the Greek authorities, a total of 10,337 Bangladeshis applied for regularisation in 2023, out of whom 3,405 were granted residence permits or legal status. However, 1,009 applications were cancelled for various reasons. As of February 2024, an additional 113 applications were submitted, with approximately 5,910 still pending review. According to the Embassy of Bangladesh, rejected applicants will have the opportunity to re-apply, provided they meet the necessary conditions.[42]

On the other hand, the agreement with Egypt was signed on November 2022 and concerned the entry and residence of 5,000 Egyptian citizens for the purpose of employment in the agricultural sector. The screening and the choice of Egyptian nationals will be made by the state of Egypt, and then forwarded to the Greek consular authorities. The permit cap is set at a level which can be regarded as insufficient to meet the actual needs of the Greek agricultural sector. However, according to the former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, the low cap is intended to allow Greece to assess the agreement’s practical implementation, while ensuring that the country does not become overly dependent on a single source for its labour needs.[43]

The former Minister for Migration and Asylum, announced in June 2024 that an initial list of eligible 2,400 Egyptian seasonal workers had already been compiled.[44] However, specific statistics on the number of Egyptian workers who have arrived in Greece under this MoU is limited and not publicly available.[45] Based on data from ECRE,[46] the recognition rates for international protection among Egyptian applicants in Greece were notably low in recent years. In 2023, the recognition rate stood at 0,9 per cent, which further declined to 0,6 per cent in 2024.

…on the framework of adopting a more inclusive National Integration Strategy, factors such as climate change should also be taken into consideration.

In addition, and on the framework of adopting a more inclusive National Integration Strategy, factors such as climate change should also be taken into consideration since they can critically affect the integration of refugees and migrants into the labour market, and should thus, be included in the Integration Strategy. Specifically, climate change can influence labour integration, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and tourism. [47] Adverse effects like rainfall variability, soil erosion, and extreme weather events may disrupt agricultural production and reduce job opportunities. [48] Contrariwise, a more positive outcome would be the extension of the growing season which will benefit the cultivation of certain crops, leading to the emergence of new opportunities in some areas. Therefore, the link between climate change and labour integration is an aspect that could be incorporated into the Integration Strategy, as it could foster the development of regional responses that proactively address potential impacts of climate change on the integration process. This raises the question of whether existing bilateral agreements could be adapted to anticipate the challenges posed by climate change. An example could be the temporal circular labour migration scheme for communities vulnerable to climate change;[49] Bangladesh for instance, is a country that is severely affected by climate change. Thus, in the already signed MoU the aspect of climate change could also be added, reinforcing economic growth, social welfare, and innovation. Such an initiative would provide opportunities for both countries, reduce pressures on vulnerable communities, and expand avenues for sustainable labor integration.

…despite the strengthening of the institutional and legal framework for migrant integration, the implementation phase remains incomplete and “under construction”. 

Overall, from the above it becomes evident that despite the strengthening of the institutional and legal framework for migrant integration, the implementation phase remains incomplete and “under construction”. The primary issue thus, is not the absence of law, but rather the “inability of the administration to enforce it”.[50] The aforementioned analysis highlights that the question of integration of refugees and migrants into today’s Greek labour market remains largely unchanged over the past decade.[51] Undeniably, there have been notable advancements in employment through the adoption of the Law 5078/2023, the new Migration Code, the signature of the bilateral agreements with Egypt and Bangladesh, the National Integration Strategy, and the collaboration of civil society and international organisations; yet these efforts lack the coherence needed to achieve meaningful outcomes. A cohesive and comprehensive approach is still required, aligning with the needs of the national labour market, as well as emerging factors, such as climate change that could influence labour market needs, ensuring equal opportunities, and focusing on fostering long-term employment.

Non-formal and formal education

Access to education is transformative for refugees and migrants, serving as one of the most critical components of successful integration. Educational attainment and language proficiency are widely recognised as the cornerstones of the integration process, enabling individuals to build independence, enhance employment prospects, and foster social inclusion. [52] Therefore, this section explores the current state of educational opportunities for refugees and migrants in Greece, emphasising persistent challenges and barriers that hinder access and participation. It also highlights existing best practices that have proven effective and should be expanded to ensure a more inclusive and equitable educational framework for these populations.

In contrast with the access to labour market, education for refugees and migrants in Greece is rated as “slightly unfavourable”.

In contrast with the access to labour market, education for refugees and migrants in Greece is rated as “slightly unfavourable”, according to MIPEX. Based on a report from the Greek Council of Refugees, educational access is described as “another hurdle-filled area”.[53] Beyond legal stipulations, it is often the case that administrative challenges, and the absence of inclusive school practices frequently lead to exclusion. Even from a legal standpoint, the education of refugee and migrant children is often framed as an obligation, rather than a right.[54] Under Article 55 of the Asylum Code, asylum-seeking children are required to attend primary and secondary school, on the same basis as Greek nationals.[55] Preparation for entering formal education is also of outmost importance; nevertheless, reception classes, which are essential for easing this transitions, are often delayed due to understaffing and logistical challenges, leaving many children excluded from the educational system.

Based on data provided by Eurostat, “educational attainment is becoming an increasingly important factor, both in the labour market and for individuals, as well as society in general”.[56] Regarding educational attainment distributions in 2023, 41,8 per cent of third-country nationals had less than primary and lower secondary education, 41,8 per cent had upper secondary, and 10,1 per cent tertiary education.[57] Regarding children’s education, there is a lack of official data on enrollment in formal education provided by the Ministry of Education. Available information often pertains to non-formal activities, typically provided by NGOs. However, the Ministry of Education reported an increase in school registrations (16,417 students) and attendance (12,285 students) for 2021-2022.[58] Additionally, regarding the applications for recognition of titles and qualifications awarded by non-Greek Higher Education Institutions, 9,224 and 8,517 applications were submitted to DOATAP in 2022 and 2023 respectively. From those, a total of 11,472 and 8,481 diploma recognition documents were issued for 2022 and 2023.[59]

The programme[60] “All Children in Education” (ACE)[61] implemented by UNICEF from September 2021 to February 2024, assisted a total of 24,057 children not only through the provision of preparatory classes, but also through helping with the enrolment in formal education. By August 2022, approximately 22,000 refugee and migrant children were in Greece, with an estimated 17,000 being of school age, while at the end of 2022, 16,109 of these children had accessed education: 14,844 in formal education and 1,265 in non-formal education. Thus, about 68 per cent of refugee and migrant children attended formal or non-formal education.[62] By the end of 2023, approximately 15,134 refugee and migrant children were enrolled in Greek schools,[63] and by January 2024, 14,222 were actively attending classes.[64] Therefore, this demonstrates a clear increase in enrollment rates, with more refugee and migrant children actively participating in education. This progress underscores the impact of targeted programmes like ACE in promoting access to education.

It is important to note that the aforementioned data are provided by UNICEF and other organisations, since the availability and regency of official, and publicly available data is limited. Notably, Greece ranks second to last among European countries in child related Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) data availability, reaching only a 52 per cent.[65] This significant data impasse poses challenges in accurately assessing and addressing the educational needs of refugee and migrant children, underscoring the necessity for enhanced data collection and transparency to inform effective policymaking.

Adult refugees and asylum seekers are entitled to access several educational programmes offered by state and private agencies, international organisations or NGOS. For example, individuals who have not completed mandatory education can enroll in schools of Second Chance. Also, asylum seekers with a secondary education diploma are eligible to participate in examinations to enter Universities or Higher Technological Institutions or to register in Institutes of Vocational Training (IEK). On the other hand, beneficiaries of international protection are treated in the same way as Greek citizens regarding recognition of foreign certificates and qualifications. In case where documentation is unavailable, Greek authorities are required to facilitate the process. However, there is no official data available on the number of adult refugees and migrants attending formal education.

…understanding and learning the Greek language remains the most significant challenge for refugees and migrants. 

As highlighted earlier, understanding and learning the Greek language remains the most significant challenge for refugees and migrants. The limited availability of state-provided, language courses is often covered by local NGOs in collaboration with international organisations. Notable examples include the HELIOS project which integrates language learning as a component of its broader integration efforts. The Stepping Stone project implemented by a Greek NGO with the support of UNHCR, offering Greek language courses to facilitate communication and integration.

Good practices:

Several good practices are worth mentioning in the context of reinforcing educational integration of refugees and migrants. For instance, Action Two of the National Integration Strategy provides non-formal educational activities, conducted by professionals specialised in teaching Greek as a foreign language. This aspect is either taking place in preparatory classes or as an additional support within the formal educational system, including instruction in basic concepts of the English language. Nonetheless, what remains unclear is which entities will provide the language courses, how people can access them, and other general information. Additionally, the Department of Socio-economic Integration of the Ministry of Migration and Asylum, in collaboration with UNHCR, established a helpdesk for social integration.[66] This helpdesk, among other services, will also respond to requests on the access to Greek language courses and help people- through a new guide accessible in various languages- to take their first steps in the host country.

The Lifelong Learning Centers (LLC)[67] provided by the Ministry of Education and Religion are also another good practice that provides informal education to adults. In the context of a general education curriculum, the Centers offer Greek language courses to adults. This practice is of extreme importance for the promotion of education for adults with a refugee or migrant background and sets a great basis for the promotion of integration and social inclusion. It is also vital to mention that the Social Service through its collaboration with schools and educational authorities facilitates the enrollment of children in schools, even without any official documentation.[68]

Challenges:

From the above, it becomes obvious that a number of initiatives have been undertaken in the last years in order to facilitate the integration of refugees and migrants- both minors and adults- in the educational system of Greece; however, emphasis has been given to preparatory classes and non-formal educational activities rather than to the enrollment and active participation in formal education. These efforts, while promising, highlight gaps in coordination and communication that need to be addressed. Clarifying responsibilities, expanding the availability of language courses, and improving data collection on educational participation are some impasses that require amelioration.

One problem identified during the Greek Ombudsman’s on-site inspections, [69]  is that despite the existence of legal provisions that make education mandatory, there is a number of factors that prevent children from attending school regularly. One key challenge is transportation, as many children leave in remote areas or camps which are far from schools, making regular attendance difficult. Another issue is the inadequacy of resources- such as trained personnel- which usually complicates the inclusion of refugee and migrant children to a formal classroom.[70]

Shortcomings were also identified in some facilities regarding available logistical infrastructure, while the lack of funding from the Ministry of Education was also an important obstacle. These obstacles often lead to higher dropout rates and limited participation in education for refugee and migrant children. Notably, many of these issues were already identified and documented by the Greek Ombudsman as early as 2021, yet they remain largely unresolved. Addressing these systemic challenges is essential to ensuring meaningful access to education for all children.

…more attention has been paid in the preparatory process and the non-formal education activities rather than the inclusion to formal classrooms. 

From the above examination, it becomes obvious that despite the existence of a legal framework that reassures the access to educational activities for refugees and migrants, either minors or adults, in practice, a harmonised approach with common standards and indicators for education quality and content is missing. Specifically, more attention has been paid in the preparatory process and the non-formal education activities rather than the inclusion to formal classrooms. In no case does this undermine the importance of introductory classes that will enable the smoother integration to the Greek educational system. However, more attention needs to be paid from state actors to adopting a unified approach regarding formal education. Additionally, the lack of publicly available data is also hindering the monitoring of the achieved results.

…stronger collaboration between state actors, NGOs, facilities, and international organisations is required.

If we take the example of data offered by a Greek NGO for 2024, from the 1,920 new students that attended non-formal educational activities, only 754 attended formal education. This proves that the gap between non-formal and formal activities is wide, leading to an insufficient educational integration. The persistent impasses and difficulties in accessing formal education led to the conclusion that stronger collaboration between state actors, NGOs, facilities, and international organisations is required in order to provide an organised programme of educational activities for children and adults. 

Policy recommendations 

The aforementioned analysis highlights that Greece has made notable progress in advancing the integration of refugees and migrants, with significant steps, such as the adoption of new legislation to reinforce labour integration, the release of the New Integration Strategy, and the implementation of various educational activities by organisations, public actors, and NGOs. Nevertheless, the ad hoc nature of these policies, and the inconsistencies in strategic planning continue to pose challenges. “The contradictions [of the implemented policies] cause serious impasses, and inefficiencies, which public services and agencies, the local authorities, and NGOs involved are called upon to address”.[71] To achieve effective and sustainable integration, it is imperative to develop a stable and coherent integration policy that addresses the evolving realities of refugee and migrant populations in Greece, including emerging challenges such as climate change. [72]

…the integration process of refugees and migrants is still facing substantial gaps that hinder the creation of an equitable and inclusive society. 

Overall, the integration process of refugees and migrants is still facing substantial gaps that hinder the creation of an equitable and inclusive society. Addressing these challenges requires a commitment to the principles of inclusivity, equity, and adaptability. By embracing a more comprehensive approach and fostering collaboration across all sectors of society, Greece can transform integration from a mere policy goal into concrete outcomes.

1. Adopt a holistic and coherent policy framework that will address the needs and challenges that the refugee and migrant population is facing based on the principle of equal opportunities. While the Greek state has made strides in implementing a more structured legal and policy framework, many actions remain isolated efforts rather than part of a comprehensive strategy. Greece needs to prioritise systematic planning and coordinated efforts across all sectors.
2. Simplify administrative processes and make them more accessible. For example, the Greek Asylum Service’s upgraded information system (Alkyoni II), developed by the Ministry of Migration and Asylum, offers a promising solution by enabling services such as document submission and application registration in multilingual and digital formats, streamlining previously cumbersome processes.
3. Implement a more comprehensive National Integration Strategy that applies to all legally residing third-country nationals and individuals with a migrant background. Though the new National Integration Strategy provides a pre-integration process, it fails to fully incorporate labour integration into its framework. A more cohesive and inclusive approach will not only reduce inequalities but also foster social cohesion and economic development.
4. Shift focus from temporary employment to long-term labour opportunities that align with the evolving needs of the market. Additionally, a needs assessment would also be essential for the evaluation of labour demands, identification of the required skills, and a determination of the duration of work and stay.[73]
5. Incorporate climate change and adaptation in the integration strategy. Labour migration could be perceived as an adaptation strategy to the effects of climate change.in general, migration can be seen as an adaptation strategy regarding mobility due to climate change. Therefore, this could also be implemented in the case of labour integration through bilateral skills partnerships, or circular/seasonal migration schemes. Such initiatives would provide opportunities for both countries, reduce pressures on vulnerable communities, and expand avenues for sustainable labor integration.
6. Enhance collaboration among state agencies, local authorities, the private sector, NGOs, international organizations, and professional associations. Such partnerships can provide targeted support and facilitate the effective integration of refugees and migrants.
7. Reinforce access to formal education., programmes like ACE must be further reinforced, as it has successfully provided both formal and non-formal educational opportunities to children, while also preparing teachers to handle diverse classrooms, resulting in a more harmonised approach to education. Scaling up such programmes and addressing systemic barriers like transportation and teacher training will be crucial for improving access to education for refugee and migrant populations in Greece.
8. Develop individualised and needs-based approach policies focusing on the needs of refugees and migrants. Training in intercultural education and cultural diversity, academic guidance, and financial support are some targeted needs that could be further explored at a national level, taking into consideration the needs and capacities of the country.

 

References

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Georgakopoulos T., ‘The Consequences of Climate Change in Greece’ (DiaNEOsis, 2021) < https://www.dianeosis.org/en/2021/12/the-consequences-of-climate-change-in-greece/ > accessed 15 November 2024.

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Greek Council for Refugees, ‘Access to the Labour Market’ (ECRE, 2024) < Reception Conditions: Access to the Labour Market> accessed 06 November 2024.

Greek Council for Refugees, ‘Do the Human Right Thing: Raising our voice for refugee rights’ (Active Citizens Fund, 2022) < https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/Seeking%20a%20new%20life%20-%20seeking%20employment.pdf > accessed 03 November 2024.

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Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, ‘Press Release’ (Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2024)< https://migration.gov.gr/megali-proseleysi-ton-epi-makron-diamenonton-metanaston-sti-nomimi-apascholisi-symfona-me-to-arthro-193-tis-tropologias-toy-ypoyrgeioy-metanasteysis-kai-asyloy/ > accessed 14 November 2024.

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InfoMigrants, ‘About 3,400 Bangladeshi migrants regularized in Greece in 2023’ (InfoMigrants, 2024) < https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/55362/about-3400-bangladeshi-migrants-regularized-in-greece-in-2023> accessed 10 November 2024.

IOM, ‘Integrating Migration into Environment and Climate Change Interventions: A Toolkit’ (IOM,  2021) <https://eca.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl666/files/mmicd/environment-climate-change-toolkit.pdf > accessed 15 November 2024.

IPA (L. 4636/2019).

Kalogiannidis S., Kalfas D., et al., ‘Integration of Climate Change Strategies into Policy and Planning for Regional Development: A Case Study of Greece (Land, 2024) < https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/13/3/268> accessed 14 November 2024.

Kapsalis A., ‘Mobility and Employment of Refugee Populations in the Greek Region’ (IOM, 2022) <https://greece.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1086/files/documents/MOBILITY%20AND%20EMPLOYMENT_EN_online.pdf> accessed 07 November 2024.

Lodovici M.S., ‘Integration of Refugees in Greece, Hungary and Italy: Comparative analysis’ (European Parliament, 2017).

Migrant Integration Policy Index, ‘Greece-2019’ (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2019) <https://www.mipex.eu/greece> accessed 01 November 2024.

Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, ‘Refugees and Education’ (Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, 2024) < https://www.minedu.gov.gr/tothema-prosfigiko-m> accessed 12 November 2024.

OECD, ‘International Migration Outlook 2024’ (OECD, 2024) https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2024/11/international-migration-outlook-2024_c6f3e803.html  accessed 05 November 2024.

Papadopoulos V., ‘Issues of Integration of Immigrants in Greek Society’ (Institute for Alternative Policies [ENA], 2023),<  https://enainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/ENA_Issues-of-Integration-of-Immigrants_EN-1.pdf > accessed 02 November 2024.

The Greek Ombudsman, ‘The Challenges of Migratory Flows and Refugee Protection: Refugee Conditions and Procedures’ (The Greek Ombudsman, 2024) <https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/news/greece-help-desk-integration-refugees_en> accessed 13 November 2024.

UNHCR, ‘The talent behind the numbers: Introducing Refugees in Greece’ (UNHCR, 2022) <https://reliefweb.int/report/greece/unhcr-greece-introducing-people-behind-numbers-updated-june-2022-enel > accessed 11 November 2024.

UNICEF, ‘All Children in Education: Ensuring a Pathway to Education for Refugee and Migrant Children in Greece’ (UNICEF, 2024) < https://www.unicef.org/greece/en/media/4306/file/%CE%91CE%20Brief%20ENGL.pdf.pdf> accessed 12 November 2024.

UNICEF, ‘Country Office Annual Report 2022: Greece’ (UNICEF, 2022) < https://www.unicef.org/media/135936/file/Greece-2022-COAR.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com > accessed 13 November 2024.

UNICEF, ‘Country Office Annual Report 2023: Greece’ (UNICEF, 2023) < https://www.unicef.org/media/152026/file/Greece-2023-COAR.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com> accessed 13 November 2024.

Wolffhardt A., Carmine Conte and Sinem Yilmaz, ‘The European Benchmark for Refugee Integration: A comparative analysis of the National Internation Evaluation Mechanism in 14 EU Countries’ (Fundacja Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2022) < https://www.migpolgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-European-benchmark-for-refugee-integration.-Evaluation-2-Comprehensive-report.pdf > accessed 11 November 2024.

World Bank Group’s Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice, ‘Support to the Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Greece: Assessing Skills and Work Readiness-Best Practices and Recommendations’ (World Bank Group, 2020), <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099816003082261107/pdf/P17097904da52c05308137080d97c1ffb23.pdf> accessed 08 November 2024. 

 

 

[1] Vassilis Papadopoulos, ‘Issues of Integration of Immigrants in Greek Society’ (Institute for Alternative Policies [ENA], 2023),<  https://enainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/ENA_Issues-of-Integration-of-Immigrants_EN-1.pdf > accessed 02 November 2024.

[2] Amalia Frangiskou, Georgios Kandylis et al., ‘From reception to integration: migrant populations in Greece during and in the aftermath of the crisis’ (National Centre for Social Research-EKKE, 2020) 17, < https://www.ekke.gr/publication_files/from-reception-to-integration-migrant-populations-in-greece-during-and-in-the-aftermath-of-the-crisis > accessed 02 November 2024.

[3] The measurements included in the Migrant Integration Policy Index are the most recent, referring to the period 2019-2020.

[4] Migrant Integration Policy Index, ‘Greece-2019’ (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2019) <https://www.mipex.eu/greece> accessed 01 November 2024.

[5] Greek Council for Refugees, ‘Do the Human Right Thing: Raising our voice for refugee rights’ (Active Citizens Fund, 2022) < https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/Seeking%20a%20new%20life%20-%20seeking%20employment.pdf > accessed 03 November 2024.

[6] Migrant Integration Policy Index (n 4).

[7] An ongoing study commissioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from February 2022 until November 2024- with the latest available data, provides insights and figures on the integration of refugees and migrants. See: https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiNzNhNmJjMzktOGJkMi00MTFkLTliYmUtZmUzMjVlMzhmZmJjIiwidCI6ImU1YzM3OTgxLTY2NjQtNDEzNC04YTBjLTY1NDNkMmFmODBiZSIsImMiOjh9

[8] Marine Casalis, Dominik Hangartner, Alexandra Hartman, Rodrigo Sanchez, ‘Home for Good? Obstacles and Opportunities for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Greece’ (IPL, 2023) 37, < https://reliefweb.int/report/greece/home-good-obstacles-and-opportunities-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-greece > accessed 03 November 2024.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Greek Council for Refugees, (n 5).

[11] Additionally, it is important to mention that based on Article 26 of the Asylum Code, recognised refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries have full and automatic access to the labour market, under the same conditions as nationals, without any obligation to obtain a work permit.

[12] Marine Casalis (n 8) 35.

[13] Eda Gemi and Bledar Feta, ‘Migration Developments in Greece in 2023’ (ELIAMEP, 2024) 21, < https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Working-paper-128-SOPEMI-2.pdf > accessed 03 November 2024.

[14] Specifically, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection do not have the right to receive a three-year permit like recognised refugees. Instead, they obtain a one-year residence permit.

[15] Angeliki Dimitriadi, ‘Looking for seasonal workers: Greece’s search for migrant labor’ (ELIAMEP, 2024), < https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Policy-Paper-164-Dimitriadi-EN-final.pdf > accessed 05 November 2024.

[16] Eurostat, ‘Unemployment by sex and age’ (Eurostat, 2024), <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/UNE_RT_M__custom_4655204/bookmark/table?lang=en&bookmarkId=6870950a-b6ad-4f89-b327-2e1829d16c11 > accessed 05 November 2024.

[17] OECD, ‘International Migration Outlook 2024’ (OECD, 2024) 55, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2024/11/international-migration-outlook-2024_c6f3e803.html  accessed 05 November 2024.

[18]Eurostat, ‘Migrant integration and inclusion dashboard’ (Eurostat, 2024) < https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/dashboard/migrant-integration-inclusion/> accessed 06 November 2024.

[19] Ibid, 213.

[20] Greek Council for Refugees, ‘Access to the Labour Market’ (ECRE, 2024) < Reception Conditions: Access to the Labour Market> accessed 06 November 2024.

[21] DiaNEOsis, ‘What Greeks Believe-Part B’ (DiaNEOsis, 2024) < https://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/TPE2024_Part_B.pdf> accessed 06 November 2024.

[22] Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, ‘National Integration Strategy’ (Ministry of Migration and ASYLUM, 2022) < https://migration.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/NATIONAL-STRATEGY-FINAL.pdf  >accessed 07 November 2024.

[23] Greek Forum of Refugees, ‘Position on the National Integration Strategy’ (Greek Forum of Refugees,2022) < https://refugees.gr/greek-forum-of-refugees-position-on-the-national-integration-strategy/> accessed 07 November 2024.

[24] Apostolis Kapsalis, ‘Mobility and Employment of Refugee Populations in the Greek Region’ (IOM, 2022) <https://greece.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1086/files/documents/MOBILITY%20AND%20EMPLOYMENT_EN_online.pdf> accessed 07 November 2024.

[25] Manuela Samek Lodovici, ‘Integration of Refugees in Greece, Hungary and Italy: Comparative analysis’ (European Parliament, 2017).

[26]Apostolis Kapsalis (n 24).

[27] Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum (n 22) 6.

[28] Greek Council for Refugees, (n 5).

[29] UNHCR, ‘Advancing Refugee Integration in Greece’ (UNHCR, 2023).

[30]Generation 2.0, ‘Comments on the National Integration Strategy’ (Generation 2.0, 2022), <https://g2red.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/sxolia-g2red-gia-ethiniki-stratigiki.pdf> accessed 07 November 2024.

[31] The assessed indicators are the following: a) Access to employment for groups of special concern, b) Administrative barriers to accessing employment, c) Awareness raising about the specific labor market situation of beneficiaries of international protection, d) Assessment of skills, e) Job-seeking counselling and positive action, f) Targeted support for entrepreneurs. (Ibid n 24).

[32]EUAA, ‘Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union’ (EUAA, 2024) 143, < https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2024-06/2024_Asylum_Report_EN.pdf> accessed 08 November 2024.

[33]World Bank Group’s Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice, ‘Support to the Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Greece: Assessing Skills and Work Readiness-Best Practices and Recommendations’ (World Bank Group, 2020), <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099816003082261107/pdf/P17097904da52c05308137080d97c1ffb23.pdf> accessed 08 November 2024.

[34] Ibid, 30.

[35] Article 16 of Law No. 4783/2021 (previously Article 42 of the Legislative Act 1-5-2020) sought to address seasonal needs.

[36] Angeliki Dimitriadi (n 15).

[37] Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, ‘Metaklisi 2022-2023’ (Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2023)< https://migration.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/%CE%A3%CF%84%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B9%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AC-%CE%9C%CE%B5%CF%84%CE%B1%CE%BA%CE%BB%CE%AE%CF%83%CE%B5%CF%89%CE%BD-2022_2023.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com  > accessed 10 November 2024.

[38] Hellenic Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, ‘Government Gazette Issue’ (Ministry of Labour, 2023), < https://migration.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/FEK-2023-Tefxos-B-06844-downloaded-20_12_2023.pdf> accessed 10 November 2024.

[39] Hellenic Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, ‘Press Release on metaklisi for 2023-2024’ (Ministry of Labour, 2023), <https://ypergasias.gov.gr/sto-epipedo-tis-proigoumenis-dietias-oi-metakliseis-ergazomenon-apo-trites-chores-gia-tin-periodo-2023-2024/ > accessed 10 November 2024.

[40] Based on the latest data from the Ministry of Migration and Asylum (September 2024), only 15 residence permits for highly skilled workers (EU Blue Card) were recorded. See more in: https://shorturl.at/GsDAZ  (table 5, page 6).

[41] Angeliki Dimitriadi (n 15).

[42] InfoMigrants, ‘About 3,400 Bangladeshi migrants regularized in Greece in 2023’ (InfoMigrants, 2024) < https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/55362/about-3400-bangladeshi-migrants-regularized-in-greece-in-2023> accessed 10 November 2024.

[43] Hellenic Parliament, ‘Minutes session IV, Standing Committee on National Defense and Foreign Affairs Proceedings, article 40 para. 1’ (Hellenic Parliament).

[44] Angeliki Dimitriadi (n 15) 17.

[45] Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, ‘Press Release on the agreement between Greece and Egypt’ (Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2024)< https://migration.gov.gr/stis-10-ioynioy-xekina-ti-leitoyrgia-tis-i-ilektroniki-platforma-gia-tin-efarmogi-tis-symfonias-elladas-aigyptoy/> accessed 10 November 2024.

[46] Greek Council for Refugees, ‘Statistics’ (ECRE, 2024) < https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/statistics/?utm_source=chatgpt.com> accessed 11 November 2024.

[47] Stavros Kalogiannidis, Dimitrios Kalfas et al., ‘Integration of Climate Change Strategies into Policy and Planning for Regional Development: A Case Study of Greece (Land, 2024) < https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/13/3/268> accessed 14 November 2024.

[48] Thodoris Georgakopoulos, ‘The Consequences of Climate Change in Greece’ (DiaNEOsis, 2021) < https://www.dianeosis.org/en/2021/12/the-consequences-of-climate-change-in-greece/ > accessed 15 November 2024.

[49] IOM, ‘Integrating Migration into Environment and Climate Change Interventions: A Toolkit’ (IOM,  2021) 4, <https://eca.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl666/files/mmicd/environment-climate-change-toolkit.pdf > accessed 15 November 2024.

[50]  Amalia Frangiskou, Georgios Kandylis et al. (n 2) 118.

[51] Alexander Wolffhardt, Carmine Conte and Sinem Yilmaz, ‘The European Benchmark for Refugee Integration: A comparative analysis of the National Internation Evaluation Mechanism in 14 EU Countries’ (Fundacja Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2022) 17, < https://www.migpolgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-European-benchmark-for-refugee-integration.-Evaluation-2-Comprehensive-report.pdf > accessed 11 November 2024.

[52] UNHCR, ‘The talent behind the numbers: Introducing Refugees in Greece’ (UNHCR, 2022) <https://reliefweb.int/report/greece/unhcr-greece-introducing-people-behind-numbers-updated-june-2022-enel > accessed 11 November 2024.

[53] Agapi Chouzouraki, ‘Without papers, there is no life: Legal barriers in access to protection for unaccompanied children in Greece’ (Greek Council for Refugees and Save the Children, 2023) < https://gcr.gr/wp-content/uploads/No_paper_no_life.pdf > accessed 11 November 2024.

[54] IPA (L. 4636/2019).

[55]Greek Council for Refugees, ‘Access to Education; (ECRE, 2024) < https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/reception-conditions/employment-and-education/access-education/> accessed 11 November 2024.

[56] Eurostat, ‘Migrant integration statistics-education’ (Eurostat, 2024) <  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_-_education> accessed 12 November 2024.

[57] Eurostat, ‘Population by educational attainment level, sex, age and citizenship’ (Eurostat, 2024) <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/edat_lfs_9911/default/table?lang=en> accessed 12 November 2024.

[58] Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, ‘Refugees and Education’ (Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, 2024) < https://www.minedu.gov.gr/tothema-prosfigiko-m> accessed 12 November 2024.

[59] DOATAP, ‘Statistical Data’ (DOATAP, 2023) < https://www.doatap.gr/enhmerosh/statistika/> accessed 13 November 2024.

[60] It is important to mention that the ACE programme provided both formal and non-formal education opportunities for refugee and migrant children in Greece and was implemented in collaboration with the Ministry of Migration and Asylum and implemented in collaboration with various partners, and mainly Greek NGOs.

[61] UNICEF, ‘All Children in Education: Ensuring a Pathway to Education for Refugee and Migrant Children in Greece’ (UNICEF, 2024) < https://www.unicef.org/greece/en/media/4306/file/%CE%91CE%20Brief%20ENGL.pdf.pdf> accessed 12 November 2024.

[62] UNICEF, ‘Country Office Annual Report 2022: Greece’ (UNICEF, 2022) < https://www.unicef.org/media/135936/file/Greece-2022-COAR.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com > accessed 13 November 2024.

[63] UNICEF, ‘Country Office Annual Report 2023: Greece’ (UNICEF, 2023) < https://www.unicef.org/media/152026/file/Greece-2023-COAR.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com> accessed 13 November 2024.

[64]Greek Council for Refugees (n 55).

[65] UNICEF (n 61).

[66] The Greek Ombudsman, ‘The Challenges of Migratory Flows and Refugee Protection: Refugee Conditions and Procedures’ (The Greek Ombudsman, 2024) <https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/news/greece-help-desk-integration-refugees_en> accessed 13 November 2024.

[67] See more at: The Lifelong Learning Centers (LLC- ΚΔΒΜ)

[68] Greek Forum for Refugees, ‘Activity Report 2023’ (Greek Forum for Refugees, 2023) 19, < https://gcr.gr/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/PROSFYGES_pepragmena_2023_GR.pdf > accessed 14 November 2024.

[69] The Greek Ombudsman, (n 66) 92.

[70] Here it is important to add that the ACE programme, among other components, also prepared educators for diverse classrooms and helped them integrate refugee and migrant children.

[71] Amalia Frangiskou, Georgios Kandylis et al. (n 2).

[72] By new realities it is meant the consequences of climate change and how it will affect the labour integration of refugees and migrants into the Greek society.

[73] Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, ‘Press Release’ (Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2024)< https://migration.gov.gr/megali-proseleysi-ton-epi-makron-diamenonton-metanaston-sti-nomimi-apascholisi-symfona-me-to-arthro-193-tis-tropologias-toy-ypoyrgeioy-metanasteysis-kai-asyloy/ > accessed 14 November 2024.

• EU cohesion policy is horizontal in nature and works in a complementary and supportive way to other public policies.
• Therefore, actions included in the National and Regional Programmes funded by the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) in Greece must support (national) sectoral and regional policies.
• The aim of this policy paper is to trace the relationship between the Partnership Agreement for the Development Framework (PADF) 2014-2020 and Greece’s climate change adaptation strategy – a top policy priority at national and regional level.
• To this end, it examines the policy initiatives that took shape during the period 2013-2020 and looks for synergies between these processes and the programming of cohesion policy actions for the period 2014-2020 – and, subsequently, the period 2021-2027.
• The conclusion of this exercise is disappointing. On the one hand, years of delays in the formulation of the required plans have resulted in their complete disconnection from the investment programming of the PADF 2014-2020 and 2021-2027. On the other hand, the resulting plans do not produce meaningful policy commitments and lack implementation mechanisms.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by George Andreou, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Assistant Professor at the School of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (in Greek).

 

• The Letta and Draghi reports begin with the same realisation, though they formulate it differently: that the international geopolitical environment has changed dramatically and that the EU must take immediate action as a result.

• The Letta report’s take-home message is that the Single Market must be transformed into something “much more than just a market”. Thus, research, innovation and education need to be integrated into its core, as a “fifth freedom”, and the Single Market extended to include the telecommunications, energy, financial services and defence sectors.

• There is fear at the heart of the Draghi report, fear of the “existential challenge” confronting the EU, which will require an extra €800 billion a year in investment. The report’s proposals are articulated around five major horizontal policies: closing the innovation gap, decarbonising the economy and making it more competitive, strengthening security and the defence sector and reducing dependencies in this area, financing investment, and strengthening EU governance.

• The Letta and Draghi reports agree on both the fields where intervention is required and the form such intervention should take. And while they differ in terms of the competition—and, still more, cohesion—policy they prescribe, they do so constructively while their proposals complement one another.

• In relation to Greece, the proposals made in both reports with respect to the defence industry, to reducing energy costs, and to the provision of generous funding for additional investment through —inter alia—joint borrowing, are of the utmost importance.

• No serious disagreement has been voiced with respect to the proposals made in the Letta and Draghi reports, apart from the predictable German reaction to additional funding and new joint borrowing, coupled with unfounded criticism of the proposals as ‘unfeasible’.

• The “New European Agreement on Competitiveness” adopted in Budapest on 8 November is a critical development, given that it adopts the bulk of the key approaches contained in the Letta and Draghi reports, and sets specific milestones for some, as well.

• The two reports stress that, even if certain recent developments around the world cannot be considered favourable for the EU (political crisis in Germany, economic problems in France, Trump’s election in the US), Europe still has the “weapons” it needs to reverse the situation. And while the Budapest summit decision may not have gone as far as the situation demands, it still adopted the bulk of the proposals made in the two reports, making it crystal clear that the European Union has taken the need to regain the initiative fully on board.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Alekos Kritikos, Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP; Former senior official, European Commission; former Secretary General, Ministry of the Interior.

Introduction 

Looking back at the history of European integration, one quickly realises that its greatest moments were, without exception, preceded by a report highlighting the need for the major changes that followed. The founding of the EEC itself was prefigured by the Spaak report, Lord Cockfield’s white paper formed the basis for decisions on the establishment of the internal market, while the Padoa-Schioppa and Delors reports were precursors for the establishment of the EMU. Of course, the reverse is not necessarily true: not all reports necessarily lead to major change. Thus, for example, the McDougall report, which proposed as early as 1974 that the EEC budget should be raised to 5% of the Community’s GDP, is still waiting in vain —a full half century later—to finally be heeded.

However, there are multiple indications that suggest the Letta[1] and Draghi[2] reports will end up being in the first of these categories. And that is because they came about not as an initiative conceived of by certain inspired circles or individuals, but as a logical consequence of rapid geopolitical developments. As noted at the very start of the Letta report: “The Single Market is a product of an era when both the EU and the world were ‘smaller’” and must now be transformed into something that is “much more than a market”. Mario Draghi, in turn, speaks in rather dramatic tones of an “existential challenge” facing the EU and declares that Europe will lose its very raison d’être if it cannot guarantee prosperity, freedom and democracy to its citizens—values that can only be guaranteed if the bloc becomes more productive and changes radically.

The almost jubilant adoption by the Budapest European Council summit of the bulk of the proposals made in the two reports provides an initial confirmation both of their importance and of the role they are expected to play.

The Letta Report: The Single Market Must Become Much More Than a Market 

…the Single Market must be transformed into something much more than just a market. In this context, [the Letta report] proposes expanding the Single Market to include the telecommunications, energy, defence and financial services sectors.

The proposals included in the report by Enrico Letta, former Prime Minister of Italy (2013-2014), published in April 2024, are bold and at times provocative. The core of his report, summed up in its title, is that the Single Market must be transformed into something much more than just a market. In this context, it proposes expanding the Single Market to include the telecommunications, energy, defence and financial services sectors. 

The report does not restrict itself to expressing views on the workings of the internal market, and also makes proposals regarding most of the areas in which the European Union is active.

It begins with the need to establish a “fifth” freedom. As a central pillar of this strategy, it proposes that research, innovation and education be added to the core of the internal market through the creation of a European Knowledge Commons: a centralized digital platform providing access to publicly-funded research, data sets, and educational resources.

It then sets off in search of ways to finance the Union’s strategic objectives, with the primary goal of mobilising private capital. In this context, the report advocates a key change: creating a Savings and Investment Union to make use of the €33 trillion in private savings in the EU for investment.

…the report proposes to envision a state aid contribution mechanism, requiring Member States to allocate a portion of their national funding to financing pan-European initiatives and investments.

Worried about the distortions to competition caused by the state aid economically powerful states make available to national companies, the report proposes “to balance a stricter enforcement of State aid at national level and the progressive expansion of EU-level funding support” and “to envision a state aid contribution mechanism, requiring Member States to allocate a portion of their national funding to financing pan-European initiatives and investments”. 

The Letta report’s other potentially trailblazing proposal concerns the need to provide substantial support to the European defence industry with funds from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). On this point, while the author does not hide his preference for the issuance of a European defence bond, the report does not actually highlight this course of action, as Mario Draghi would do a few months later.

…European telecommunication companies having an average of 5 million customers, while the corresponding figure in the US is 107 million and in China 467 million.

The Letta report underscores the centrality of both energy and electronic communications to any industrial policy. When the Single Market was created, these sectors were deliberately excluded from its scope, as they were considered too strategic to be removed from national control. However, national control is now proving an obstacle to the development and competitiveness of these sectors at a European and global level. As the report takes pains to stress, fragmentation has resulted in European telecommunication companies having an average of 5 million customers, while the corresponding figure in the US is 107 million and in China 467 million!

Similar arguments can be made regarding the need for a common EU approach to defence. The inadequacy of Europe’s fragmented military industrial complex is becoming increasingly apparent. The report points out that, of all the military equipment sent to Ukraine by European nations since the start of the conflict, 78% was purchased from non-EU producers!

The report pays particular attention to the space industry, a crucial sector for the development of the Single Market. It also points out that how critically important it now is that the European dimension be incorporated into the health sector, particularly in the light of Europe’s demographic decline and the likelihood of crises in the future. At the same time, the report underlines the crucial nature of the transport sector for realising the full potential of the Single Market.

Data showing that people living in regions that are suffering decline often feel compelled to move by the lack of jobs or access to high-quality education and adequate services, lead Enrico Letta to table new and expanded content for the EU’s cohesion policy. Letta thus proposes that, while free movement must continue to be guaranteed, so must the freedom of European citizens to remain in their current place of residence; relocation should be a matter of choice rather than something that is forced upon them. 

As the report highlights, the further development of the Single Market can only be successful if it includes a social dimension that guarantees social justice and cohesion, addresses social inequalities, and ensures inclusive economic growth.

The report also highlights the need to strengthen digital infrastructure and skills, on the grounds that the digital economy is a fundamental tool for allowing citizens and businesses alike to realise the full potential of the Single Market, and for ensuring their freedom to stay where they live.

Furthermore, given that most EU SMEs are active in the services sector, the Letta report also argues that a renewed commitment to removing barriers to their activity is a necessity. According to the European Commission’s own research, around 60% of the barriers in the Single Market for services identified in 2002 still exist today. 

The Letta report concludes by stating that the dynamism and effectiveness of the EU are currently severely hampered by a number of factors, notably an excessive regulatory burden and bureaucracy. For this reason, the report argues, the mechanism for formulating proposals must be improved, with consultation procedures and the Better Regulation toolbox streamlined, impact assessments conducted for proposed amendments before the final decision is taken, and other related measures.

The report concludes by urging “the Single Market to go fast and go far”, moving beyond Europe’s borders.

The report concludes by urging “the Single Market to go fast and go far“, moving beyond Europe’s borders in order to achieve a balance between competitiveness, strategic autonomy and global conditions and to promote strategic partnerships.

Letta’s proposals do not stop there, of course. Rather, the full text renders them specific through a host of innovative and sometimes revolutionary suggestions coupled with exhortations that they be enacted without delay. The implementation of most—if not all—of these proposals is presented as a necessary and sufficient condition for ensuring the competitiveness of a united Europe, promoting its strategic autonomy in the new geopolitical context, and, ultimately, securing its economic and cultural survival. For this reason, the report urged the Council “to delegate to the European Commission the task of drafting a comprehensive Single Market Strategy”, which it went on to do at the informal European Council summit in Budapest (8 November 2024), at which the Commission was invited “to present, by June 2025, a new and comprehensive horizontal strategy on the deepening of the Single Market, including a roadmap with clear timelines and milestones“. This is undoubtedly a very important development which must be credited to the Letta report.

The Draghi Report: Europe is Facing an Existential Challenge

The main, dramatic message of the report prepared by Mario Draghi, former Governor of the European Central Bank (2011-2019), former Prime Minister of Italy (2021-2022), which was made public in September 2024, is that the EU is facing an “existential challenge”. To extricate itself from the low productivity and weak growth which keep it lagging behind the United States and China in the international rankings, Europe needs to invest an additional 800 billion euros per year: representing as much as 5% of EU GDP, this is much higher than even the 1-2% of GDP the Marshall Plan invested in the reconstruction of Europe after World War Two.

Mario Draghi considers the situation to warrant an urgent response. As he points out in the foreword: “We should abandon the illusion that only procrastination can preserve consensus. In fact, procrastination has only produced slower growth, and it has certainly achieved no more consensus.”

Covering almost all the critical spheres in which Europe must act, the Draghi report articulates its proposals around five major horizontal policies which should, it argues, both operate in tandem and complement one another: closing the innovation gap, decarbonisation and making the economy more competitive, increasing security and reducing dependencies, financing investments, and strengthening EU governance.

Covering almost all the critical spheres in which Europe must act, the Draghi report articulates its proposals around five major horizontal policies which should, it argues, both operate in tandem and complement one another: closing the innovation gap, decarbonisation and making the economy more competitive, increasing security and reducing dependencies, financing investments, and strengthening EU governance. Wanting to underscore that his report is complementary to the Letta report, Mario Draghi states that he has not included a separate chapter on the internal market, because this subject has already been dealt with systematically in the Letta report, which also presents the relevant proposals.

It should also be noted that there is no mention of agriculture, because agriculture was the subject of a separate report commissioned from Professor Peter Strohschneider, a figure with whom the European public is largely unfamiliar. The fact that Strohschneider is not a public figure with the international stature of Draghi—or Letta—may be indicative of the (lack of) importance the European Commission leadership assigns to agriculture in relation to all the other sectors examined in the Letta and Draghi reports.

The report’s most prolonged cry of anguish concerns the EU’s failure to keep up in innovation, which Draghi sees as the root cause of the bloc’s low competitiveness and productivity. He sees digital technology, in which Europe currently lags behind, as a key factor in the productivity gap between the EU and the US. The report also estimates that European public spending on Research and Innovation (R&I) is significantly below the levels invested by its competitors. To remedy this, Draghi proposes the creation of a Research and Innovation Union that would lead to the joint formulation of a common European R&I strategy and policy capable of promoting a “European Action Plan for Research and Innovation”. It also recognises the need to establish European academic institutions at the forefront of global research.

Mario Draghi has no qualms about sacrificing many of the EU’s “sacred cows” on the altar of Europe’s future, starting with competition policy, which, he argues, has long been aimed in the wrong direction, focusing on competition between Member States rather than on competition between the EU and the rest of the world. He therefore proposes that those aspects of EU competition policy that relate to mergers, state aid, etc. be radically overhauled, so they no longer impede the bloc’s ability to compete with the US and China. However, his report does not go as far as the Letta report, which proposes the gradual replacement of state aid with European aid. Rather, it attaches greater importance to removing barriers to mergers, which Draghi blames for Europe’s inability to put forth players capable of taking on the global competition.

The Draghi report proposes “updating” the respective policies “to reflect the changing dynamics of trade and innovation”, so the bloc’s cohesion policy keeps up with its efforts to boost innovation and complete the Single Market.

A similar observation could be made about another of the EU’s “sacred cows”: its cohesion policy. The Draghi report proposes “updating” the respective policies “to reflect the changing dynamics of trade and innovation”, so the bloc’s cohesion policy keeps up with its efforts to boost innovation and complete the Single Market. The more sceptical may see this translating into cohesion policy resources being moved away from the original goal of reducing disparities between EU regions and towards more general EU development objectives[3]. For comparison, as mentioned above, Enrico Letta proposes “freedom to stay in one’s own place”, i.e. providing each region with the means to retain its population.

It should be noted, however, that the Draghi report advocates the preservation of the European social model[4], noting that while the EU should aim to draw closer to the US model in terms of productivity and innovation, it should steer clear of the disadvantages of the US social model.

The Draghi report attaches particular importance to the development of a common European policy with regard to the defence industry, and argues that the relevant actions should focus on joint procurement and joint management of industrial defence stocks. It considers that, along with the urgent need to increase overall defence investment, there is also a need for greater cooperation between Member States in the defence industrial sector, as well as for efforts to bolster Research and Innovation. It proposes joint European financing of the defence industry from new EU resources, including Eurobond issues.

As well as calling for the development of the defence industry, the report proposes a new industrial strategy for Europe which calls for the Single Market to be fully implemented and for industrial policy, competition policy and trade policy to be more closely interlinked.

…the EU should, [the report] argues, form a genuine Energy Union, so that those functions of the energy market that are of cross-border significance can be regulated at a centralized European level.

Viewing decarbonisation in terms that extend beyond the environment, as a factor that can also contribute decisively to the competitiveness of the European economy, the Draghi report proposes a strategy which, while eliminating carbon emissions, will also provide Europe with the opportunity to bring down the high cost of its energy, which is a major obstacle to growth, and to play a leading role in clean technologies, while simultaneously becoming more energy secure. At the same time, the EU should, it argues, form a genuine Energy Union, so that those functions of the energy market that are of cross-border significance can be regulated at a centralized European level.

…it proposes extending qualified majority voting to more areas and to consider the possibility of “enhanced cooperation” in areas where it proves hard to pass decisions.

The Draghi report makes bold proposals in relation to the financing of the entire plan for boosting EU competitiveness. Finding that the support the EU can provide for both public and private investment is limited by the size of its budget and by the insufficient mobilisation of private capital, Draghi proposes the creation of a Capital Markets Union to free up private capital. He goes on to propose that the EU should seek to complete its Banking Union in order to boost the financing capacity of the banking sector, and proposes without prevarication that the EU should proceed with regular bond issuances to finance joint investment projects among Member States, thereby contributing to its economic and financial integration.

As mentioned above, the Draghi report estimates that the EU needs to invest an additional €800 billion per year, i.e. up to 5% of its GDP, a percentage which is far higher than even the 1-2% of GDP the Marshall Plan invested in rebuilding Europe after World War Two. It is proposed that the bulk of these funds come from private capital, although a significant portion is still left over to be covered by European public funds. The proposal that these European public funds should come from the joint debt issuance is hugely significant, as such a move mark a further major step towards EU fiscal union.

The Draghi report concludes by underlining the need for a EU new governance, without which the new industrial strategy and the entire project aimed at strengthening European competitiveness cannot succeed. The report proposes that a new ‘competitiveness coordination framework’ be created at EU level in the priority sectors, and opines that a ’28th regime’ is needed to allow companies to opt out of national regulatory frameworks and follow rules that apply across the EU. Finally, it proposes extending qualified majority voting to more areas and to consider the possibility of “enhanced cooperation” in areas where it proves hard to pass decisions.

Similarities and Differences between the two Reports

Even though the Letta and Draghi reports (a) were requested by different bodies (the Letta report by the Spanish and Belgian EU Presidencies, the Draghi report by the European Commission), (b) were compiled by authors with different political backgrounds, and (c) focus on different subject matter (the former on the Single Market, the latter on competitiveness), they converge to such an extent that the value of their findings and—above all—their proposals is rendered virtually self-evident. Indeed, Mario Draghi has said he did not include a chapter on the Single Market in his report because “the Letta report has systematically analysed the key challenges facing the Single Market and provided recommendations”; in practice, however, most of the recommendations on both sides are essentially identical.

Indeed, though formulated differently, both begin with the realisation that the global geopolitical environment has changed dramatically and that the EU must take immediate action to meet what Mario Draghi calls the “existential challenge”. They largely coincide in terms both of their proposed fields of intervention and the interventions they advocate in those fields.

Both agree on the need for drastic intervention in the field of financial services, with Letta proposing a Savings and Investment Union and Draghi favouring a Capital Markets Union.

Both agree on the need for drastic intervention in the field of financial services, with Letta proposing a Savings and Investment Union and Draghi favouring a Capital Markets Union. Their common goal is to mobilise private capital on a grand scale in order to finance the investments Europe needs to make.

The two reports also agree that the main obstacle confronting Europe is the fragmentation of the Single Market, particularly in the energy, telecoms and defence sectors, while both also make concrete proposals for tackling the issue.

Another common goal is eliminating the use of coal for energy production and reducing energy costs. 

Both reports also place considerable emphasis on joint defence procurement and on the strengthening of the European defence industry, which will have to serve as the engine driving the EU’s overall industrial and economic development and the bloc’s efforts to achieve strategic autonomy.

…the reports coincide, too, in attaching great importance to Research and Innovation.

In addition, the reports coincide, too, in attaching great importance to Research and Innovation. Letta views it as a “fifth freedom” in the Single Market, while Draghi considers the EU’s deficiencies in this area to be the primary cause of the growth gap that has opened up between the bloc and the US.

The two reports also contain common references to, and views on, the importance of and need to promote the digital transition, transport networks and Space-related actions, but also the need for meaningful interventions that address both skills gaps and the governance deficit.

Letta and Draghi—the former less daring in his formulations, the latter more direct and on the nail—also agree on the need for new joint borrowing to provide the European public funds required to finance part of the EU’s investment deficit. Draghi estimates the total size of this investment deficit at 800 billion per year. The remaining—larger—part of this deficit will have to be covered by private funds.

It is worth nothing that the two reports differ in terms of the competition policy they prescribe, but do so constructively and with proposals that complement one another.

It is worth nothing that the two reports differ in terms of the competition policy they prescribe, but do so constructively and with proposals that complement one another. The Letta report considers the misuse of state aid to distort competition and therefore proposes, in addition to the stricter enforcement of state aid regulations, the creation of a European State Aid Contribution Mechanism. This mechanism would oblige Member States to contribute part of their national state funding to a common fund for financing pan-European initiatives and investments. And though the Draghi report does not make a comparable proposal, it still attaches considerable importance to the mergers aspect of competition policy, arguing that if European firms are to emerge as international leaders, especially in the tech field, it will require flexibility in relation to the clearing of mergers and to companies acquiring “dominant positions”.

Both reports represent radical departures which, if adopted, will turn European competition policy into a key tool for promoting both the overall development of the EU and its economic and social cohesion.

The two reports are more differentiated when it comes to European cohesion policy.

The two reports are more differentiated when it comes to European cohesion policy. As mentioned above, the Letta report views economic and social cohesion as a crucial element of the new form of Single Market it proposes. The new and broader content it imbues this cohesion with focuses on European citizens’ freedom to remain in the area they call home; it therefore complements—rather than impedes—the four currently guaranteed freedoms of movement: of persons, goods, capital and services. For its part, the Draghi report proposes “updating” cohesion policy so its programmes “reflect the changing dynamics of trade and innovation”. This may translate into cohesion policy resources being redirected towards more general EU growth objectives—as the previous Lisbon and Europe 2020 strategies suggested—and thus into a shift away from the policy’s original objective of reducing disparities between EU regions. (We noted above that this proposal is already finding application in the field of defence—according, at least, to a recent article in the Financial Times.)

What remains to be seen, of course, is whether a strict and above all unilateral adherence to the traditional principles of cohesion policy is the best response to the new challenges. Already, the proposals being put forward by the European Commission’s Committee of Wise Persons on the Future of Cohesion Policy[5] no longer insist on this.

What the Letta and Draghi Reports Mean for Greece

Regarding the significance of the two reports for Greece specifically, over and above their obvious importance for the country as an EU member state, we could focus on the specific proposals for:

• Strengthening the defence industry at European level and developing a common European policy in this field. This could be the precursor to the formation of a genuine common defence policy, with obvious positive impacts for Greece in terms both of defence expenditure and guarantees for the security of its national borders.

• Additional investments of €800 billion per year, which could cover Greece’s investment deficit, which is estimated at €20 billion per year.

• New joint borrowing, which could help maintain the level of European funding to Greece and avoid the falling growth rates that could stem from a possible reduction.

• Decarbonisation and the replacing of coal with “green” and cheaper energy sources, which, in combination with other measures, could reduce energy costs for Greek consumers, who are currently suffering from high energy prices.

The other fields (technology/industrial recovery, climate change, etc.) are very important but, as Tasos Giannitsis[6] believes, they are only of marginal significance for the national choices Greece makes. He argues that “The [Draghi] report should be studied carefully; taking a close and dispassionate look ‘behind the mirror’ will reveal what it entails for Greece, in the form, too, of reactions to its proposals. Reading the various issues the report draws attention to raises questions we can either ignore or address: given our strengths and weaknesses (negative net savings, overconsumption, low levels of investment, poor international ranking in terms of education / the Pisa report, the functioning of the Rule of Law, corruption, our technological infrastructure and state efficiency), do we feel we can rest easy, or should we be concerned?”

The Objections Raised to the two Reports

The Letta and Draghi reports have been welcomed almost universally and with enthusiasm in many quarters, in terms both of their findings and conclusions and of the proposals they make. This positive reception culminated with the adoption of almost all their proposed actions by the informal European Council in Budapest on 8 November 2024, and the incorporation of their formulations into the “Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal”[7].

Objections of varying seriousness were, of course, made. These generally related to the Draghi report, both because of its outspoken proposal for new joint borrowing, and because of the greater visibility it received as a result of its publication being delayed by the European elections, but also because of Mario Draghi’s personality and his (well-earned) reputation as the saviour of the eurozone.

The most negative response to the Draghi report came from Christian Lindner, the now sacked German Finance Minister, who was quick to condemn the proposal for new joint borrowing. Lindner’s criticism was supported by representatives of other “frugal” Member States.

The most negative response to the Draghi report, which was made almost immediately after its publication, came from Christian Lindner, the now sacked German Finance Minister, who was quick to condemn the proposal for new joint borrowing. Lindner’s criticism was supported by representatives of other “frugal” Member States (Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden).

…the most serious dissenting opinion came from the former Prime Minister of Italy, Mario Monti , who, along with the considerable praise he lavished on the Draghi report, also expressed a reservation in relation to its proposed revision of EU competition policy, and its approach to mergers, in particular, which he felt would be detrimental to the great majority of European businesses.

Apart from this reaction, which surprised no one, the most serious dissenting opinion came from the former Prime Minister of Italy, Mario Monti[8], who, along with the considerable praise he lavished on the Draghi report, also expressed a reservation in relation to its proposed revision of EU competition policy, and its approach to mergers, in particular, which he felt would be detrimental to the great majority of European businesses. “Size matters”, Mario Monti notes, “but it is not the only factor (in determining competitiveness), and it would be a shame to weaken one of the very few tools the EU has the authority to wield at a European level, at a time when it is perhaps more important than ever to use it”.

In addition, analysts at Bruegel[9] have opined that, while the Draghi report’s analysis of the EU’s digital weaknesses raises the right issues, it fails to address them adequately with its proposals. They also found the report to contain good ideas for reducing the overall cost of the energy system, but questioned its proposals for reducing the cost of energy-intensive industry on grounds of fairness and of efficiency. They point out that disregarding either budgetary constraints or World Trade Organization rules could easily backfire, making the EU’s frugal Member States even less willing to agree to increasing the EU’s budgetary resources, and thus undermining the Union’s efforts to accelerate decarbonisation around the world and not just in Europe.

…analysts from the Bruegel have expressed the view that Letta’s proposals for public sector investment in Research and Innovation ignore the fact that the level of private sector investment in this area now far exceeds what the public sector could fund.

Furthermore, analysts from the same think tank[10] have expressed the view that Letta’s proposals for public sector investment in Research and Innovation ignore the fact that the level of private sector investment in this area now far exceeds what the public sector could fund, while failing to take it into account that the main driver of R&D funding is the income generated by the commercial exploitation of its findings. 

“New wine in an old bottle”[11] is how the Draghi report is described by those who argue that the EU’s lack of investment and capital in due to the bloc’s long-standing insistence on stability and fiscal discipline, and that decarbonisation will not be possible without critical raw materials and green technologies from China (which is also the most important market for many EU products). They note that “military Keynesianism” (meaning the common defence industrial policy) cannot be implemented in any form, given that the report does not recognise that NATO’s defence shield in Europe implies the purchase in return of armaments from the US. Finally, they also point out that, while the report proposes the largest investment programme in the history of the EU, the social conditions required to ensure that the benefits are shared fairly are absent.

There are also some who, without rejecting the content of the Draghi report, describe it as utopian and unworkable, especially with regard to its proposals for funding and joint borrowing.

There are also some who, without rejecting the content of the Draghi report, describe it as utopian and unworkable, especially with regard to its proposals for funding and joint borrowing. This group includes leading players from Greek industry (one of whom also represents an important branch of European industry), who agree that both the Letta and Draghi reports capture the magnitude and urgency of the stakes for the European Union[12], but consider Draghi’s proposals to be unrealistic. Paradoxically, just a month ago, one of these players was highlighting the positive proposals contained in the report for industrial competitiveness and predicting that many would be well-received by Europe’s struggling industrial sector, primarily because they touch upon the issue of costs[13].

However, as Tasos Giannitsis notes[14]: “Draghi’s proposals were criticised as utopian when they were first made public, especially in so far as they advocate an increase in EU debt and the issuance of European bonds. These objections are familiar and understandable. But whether the Report is utopian or not depends on how one evaluates both the current threats in the three areas it addresses, and the will on the part of European societies to confront them. It also depends on how one views the changes over the last decade in how much weight the EU carries on the international stage.”

The ‘New European Competitiveness Deal’ Adopts the Leta and Draghi Reports

The two reports provide a solid foundation on which we will ambitiously advance our work. We seize their wake-up call. It is imperative that we urgently close the innovation and productivity gap, both with our global competitors and within the EU. We will work in unity and solidarity for the benefit of all EU citizens, businesses and Member States.

The “New European Agreement on Competitiveness”[15] adopted by the informal European Council in Budapest (8 November 2024) is a very important development, as it adopts most of the key approaches contained in the Letta and Draghi reports, setting specific milestones for some, too. As the European Council stresses emphatically in its Declaration: “We welcome [these reports]. They provide a solid foundation on which we will ambitiously advance our work. We seize their wake-up call. It is imperative that we urgently close the innovation and productivity gap, both with our global competitors and within the EU. We will work in unity and solidarity for the benefit of all EU citizens, businesses and Member States.”

Of course, the Deal studiously avoids even mentioning the possibility of joint borrowing. In relation to new sources of funding, it limits itself to “exploring the development of new [financial] instruments”, etc. Of course, with Germany currently in the throes of a major political crisis—not to forget France, with its huge budget deficit—how much further could the Deal have gone at this juncture? Probably for the same reasons, the Deal does not even touch on the proposals the two reports make for radical changes to the bloc’s competition policy, and everything that would entail for the state aid the German government currently lavishes on German businesses.

The Budapest Declaration concludes with “The need for a unified response has never been more compelling”, its dramatic tone probably dictated by Trump’s election in the US, before calling on “all EU institutions, Member States and stakeholders to urgently implement and deliver this New European Competitiveness Deal.” Finally, the European Council pledges to continue to provide further strategic guidance and to review progress regularly over the coming year.

The almost jubilant adoption of the two reports by the 27 leaders, albeit incomplete with its proposals vis-a-vis competition policy and financing left out, is extremely encouraging for the EU’s short- and medium-term prospects. It remains to be seen whether, and how quickly, the two major issues which the New European Deal on Competitiveness fails to address will be added, and whether the agreement will be turned into legally binding and enforceable texts.

Conclusions

The European Council accepting the bulk of the proposals made in the Letta and Draghi reports, and doing so in short order (by EU standards), indicates how important they are for the future of Europe. This assessment is further reinforced by the inclusion of many of their proposals in the action guides which Ursula von der Leyen has handed out to the members of the new European Commission.

It is not only Draghi and Letta who are raising the alarm. In a recent report, the International Monetary Fund itself predicts a further widening of the gap between Europe and the US by the end of the decade. According to the IMF, this is mainly due to low productivity and an ageing population in Europe, coupled with the bloc’s failure to keep up in the spheres of innovation and technology. Indeed, Europe can only muster a growth rate of 1.45% per annum, compared with 2.29% in the US. The report also points out that European productivity in general, and in tech in particular, has stagnated over the last 20 years, while it has increased by 40% in the US (!). The IMF has called on the EU to take action to further integrate the economies of Europe[16].

The two reports show the “weapons” with which the EU can confront, and perhaps reverse, the above trends, defending itself but also launching a counter-attack in the ongoing undeclared tariff and subsidy war between the US and China in which the bloc will inevitably be embroiled, willingly or otherwise.

The two reports show the “weapons” with which the EU can confront, and perhaps reverse, the above trends, defending itself but also launching a counter-attack in the ongoing undeclared tariff and subsidy war between the US and China in which the bloc will inevitably be embroiled, willingly or otherwise.

However, the difficult context in which the EU finds itself having to wage its own ‘war’ must also be taken into account. In Europe today, the advocates of “illiberal democracy” and ethnocentric approaches to critical issues such as immigration, have become dangerously emboldened as they grow in strength. This political landscape, combined with the ‘leadership deficit’ that has emerged due to Germany and France’s current inability to pull the European train behind them, is not conducive to the realisation of Draghi’s proposals, and by extension to the taking of initiatives that will help the EU to survive in the new geopolitical and economic environment.

The difficulties are exacerbated by the recent rift between the European People’s Party (EPP) and the European Socialists, the two pillars on which the EU’s institutional balance and stability rests. A Europe that is divided rather than united is not the best response to the existential dangers it faces.

However, the political crisis and the early elections in Germany also have their positive side. Before the crisis broke out, the start of negotiations for the EU’s multiannual budget for 2028-2034 was expected to be delayed until elections were held in Germany in autumn 2025. Barring any dramatic surprises, the early elections in Germany will allow the Commission to present its proposal faster, and discussions on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, to which the financing of the additional investment proposed by the two reports is linked, to start earlier than expected.

To these adverse circumstances, we must add Trump’s election to as Presidency of the United States and the uncertainties, if not threats, this entails for the EU’s prospects. On the one hand, this development may strengthen and accelerate the bloc’s awakening, confirming Jean Monet’s prophetic comments yet again on the contribution crises have made to European integration. On the other hand, there is always the risk that the losses incurred in the meantime (from the imposition of draconian tariffs on European products, other protectionist measures, the withdrawal of the US defence umbrella, etc.) may precede the “awakening”, and not only halt any recovery efforts underway, but also cause Europe to regress, possibly irreversibly. Which is why how Europe reacts is important, but so is when it reacts.

Still, it is encouraging that—as all the indications show—change is now afoot in Europe.

Still, it is encouraging that—as all the indications show—change is now afoot in Europe. And while the Budapest decision may not have gone as far as the situation demands, it still makes it crystal clear that the European Union has taken the need to regain the initiative fully on board. It remains to be seen whether this momentum can be maintained. Which is certain is that the problems cannot wait a moment longer.

 

[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf

[2] Part A:https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c- f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf Part B: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/ec1409c1-d4b4-4882-8bdd-3519f86bbb92_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness_%20In-depth%20analysis%20and%20recommendations_0.pdf

[3] This approach is already starting to be applied in the field of defence, at least according to an article in the Financial Times (11 November 2024) https://www.ft.com/content/eb0de7f4-5ba1-460a-a83d-1a7302fc1536)

[4] “We‘re still Europe though“, Mario Draghi stressed as he presented his report to the European Parliament.

[5] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/el/pres_00_900

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:2020:FIN:en:PDF

file:///C:/Users/30697/Downloads/forging%20a%20sustainable%20future%20together-KN0623048ENN-4.pdf

[6] https://www.tanea.gr/print/2024/09/14/opinions/i-ekthesi-ntragki-kai-ta-minymata/

[7] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/el/press/press-releases/2024/11/08/the-budapest-declaration/

[8] https://www.kathimerini.gr/world/563302615/mario-monti-poios-tha-xypnisei-ti-synestalmeni-eyropi/

[9] https://www.bruegel.org/newsletter/mario-draghis-eu-competitiveness-report-landmark-plan-was-promised

[10] https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/eu-savers-need-single-market-place-invest

[11] https://www.in.gr/2024/09/28/world/emmoni-tou-ntragki-tin-antagonistikotita-den-tha-vgei-se-kalo-ton-eyropaion-ti-lenei-eidikoi/

[12] https://www.sev.org.gr/deltia_typou/spyros-theodoropoulos-aparaititi-i-synergasia-politeias-epicheiriseon-kai-ergazomenon-gia-na-epitefchthei-to-ependytiko-alma-pou-echei-anagki-i-chora/

[13]https://www.capital.gr/oikonomia/3864923/e-mutilinaios-olokliromeni-kai-emperistatomeni-i-ekthesi-ntragki-thetikes-protaseis-gia-ti-biomixania/

[14] https://www.tanea.gr/print/2024/09/14/opinions/i-ekthesi-ntragki-kai-ta-minymata/

[15] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/el/press/press-releases/2024/11/08/the-budapest-declaration/

[16] Oikonomiki Kathimerini, 27 October 2024

• The key objective of the smart specialisation strategy is to mobilise research and innovation at regional level, focusing on existing potential, enhancing economic diversification and creating a comparative advantage.
• It was implemented at the European level for the first time during the 2014-2020 programming period with the mobilisation and active participation of national and regional authorities in the development and implementation of the strategy at its core.
• The research and development environment in Greece was already unfavourable both due to structural weaknesses and because of the deep economic crisis.
• The country’s institutional framework both in the management of the NSRF in general and in the management of the Smart Specialisation Strategy in particular was the main weakness that prevented the effective implementation of the strategy, with delays and lack of coordination between stakeholders.
• Despite the difficulties, Greece has managed to improve its performance with respect to the European innovation indicators, but has not managed to reach the European average.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by by Pery Bazoti, PhD candidate, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.

 

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for October 2024.

On October 5, 2024, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis held a working breakfast at his residence in Chania with a group of Republican US Senators who participate, among others, in the Committees on Appropriations, Intelligence and Energy of the United States Senate. The meeting was also attended by the Minister of National Defence Nikos Dendias, while the US side was represented by Senators Jerry Moran (Kan.), Susan Collins (ME), John Boozman (AR), John Cornyn (TX), John Hoeven (ND) and the US Ambassador to Athens, George Tsunis. During the meeting, they discussed the excellent level of Greek-American relations and Greek-American defence cooperation, as well as Greece’s role as a pillar of stability and security in the wider region.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini), Greece is rekindling discussions with the US regarding the potential acquisition of four littoral combat ships (LCS) as part of the so-called ‘Blinken package’. Following previous negotiations that faltered due to the aging and defective nature of the offered ships, Athens is seeking alternatives that better meet its needs. The Hellenic Navy insists on acquiring upgraded LCS vessels, specifically the Wichita, Billings, Indianapolis and St Louis, rather than the older Milwaukee, Detroit, Little Rock and Sioux City.

On October 24, 2024, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Mr. Giannis Kefalogiannis, met the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Mr. James C. O’Brien, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Mr. Joshua R. Huck, in the Ministry of National Defence. The Chief of Hellenic National Defence General Staff, General Dimitrios Houpis, also participated in the meeting. During this meeting, common security and regional stability matters were discussed, while the strategic importance of the defensive cooperation between Greece and the United States, as that is defined in the updated Mutual Defence Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) of 2021, was highlighted.

According to the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation (ERT), on October 31, former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo visited Greece and held a meeting with the Greek Prime Minister. As Secretary of State in the first Trump administration, Pompeo had expressed his support for Greece on several occasions with his visit to Chania in 2020 focusing on the US naval base in the Gulf of Souda and his letter on Greece-US strategic cooperation to his then Greek counterpart, Minister Nikos Dendias, in 2020.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

The policy paper “Cybersecurity: how to shield the country’s digital future” summarizes and elaborates on the conclusions of the roundtable discussion organized in March 2024 by the Center for Cyber Resilience of the Delphi Economic Forum, in collaboration with ELIAMEP, with the support of Vodafone Greece and the participation of leading government, political, academic and market representatives.

This paper presents: a) a brief historical review of the evolution and shaping of the cybersecurity architecture at the European Union level, as well as the corresponding efforts to formulate a policy framework in Greece; b) the findings of a public opinion survey on cybersecurity among Greek citizens and businesses operating in Greece, conducted by Metron Analysis; c) a set of policy proposals for strengthening cybersecurity in Greece.

Read the paper here (in Greek).

 

The policy brief outlines the strategic vision and structural reorganisation of the European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen’s second term. Emphasising “Security, Prosperity, and Democracy,” von der Leyen’s Commission 2.0 consolidates power through a streamlined, centralised structure with six Executive Vice-Presidents, aiming for a more responsive and efficient EU. Each Commissioner has been assigned specific, often overlapping, missions focusing on key areas such as the Green Deal, technological sovereignty, and European defence. This centralisation marks a shift toward a more presidential model, raising concerns about governance complexity and missed opportunities for deeper citizen engagement and clearer portfolio distinctions. At the same time, it constitutes the core strategic approach to addressing the EU’s complex priorities.

• Vision: President Ursula von der Leyen prioritises “Security, Prosperity, and Democracy,” aiming for a responsive, flexible, and efficient European Union.

• New Commission Structure: The von der Leyen Commission 2.0 introduces a centralised structure with six Executive Vice-Presidents, removing traditional Vice-Presidents to streamline leadership.

• Mission Letters: Each of the 26 Commissioners-designate received specific missions, with major focuses on the Green Deal, technological sovereignty, industrial sovereignty, and European defence.

• Presidentialisation: The Commission’s structure reflects increased centralisation, reinforcing von der Leyen’s authority and moving towards a presidential model.

• Challenges: Overlapping portfolios (e.g., environment, defence, and competitiveness) create complexity and redundancy across roles.

• Missed Opportunities: The new structure lacks a dedicated focus on EU governance reform and clearer citizen engagement pathways, which could enhance responsiveness to public concerns​.

• Strategic Approach: The persistent overlap of portfolios necessitates a centralised, streamlined structure to improve governance and address the EU’s complex priorities.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Spyros Blavoukos, Professor, Athens University of Economics and Business, Head of the ‘Arian Condellis’ European Programme, ELIAMEP; Dimitrios Kollias, Junior Research Fellow, Programme Manager, Ariane Condellis European Programme, ELIAMEP, Stefanos Spyridon Pappas, Research Assistant, EPACE-EU, ELIAMEP; Lefteris Foivos Vasilopoulos, Research Assistant, EPACE-EU, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Ursula von der Leyen opened the game with a straight ‘Security, Prosperity, Democracy’ flush. The Commission President envisions a Europe that is more responsive to its citizens, grounded in local engagement and characterised by greater flexibility and efficiency. This vision is evident in the President’s initial written addresses to the Commissioners-designate. In the Mission Letters to Commissioners-designate (2024-2029), President von der Leyen establishes the priorities and expectations guiding each portfolio, setting a strategic tone for the responsibilities of each Commissioner and the collaborative goals within the Commission.

These letters draw upon insights and recommendations from landmark reports commissioned by previous administrations of the European executive. These documents include the Draghi Report, addressing the future of European competitiveness; the Strategic Dialogue report on the future of EU Agriculture; and the Letta Report, which focuses on the development of the Single Market. Additionally, the recent Niinistö Report, which will guide Europe’s civilian and defence preparedness, is also referenced. The incoming Commission will leverage these reports to underpin new proposals and initiatives.

The strategic orientation and concrete directives in each Commissioner-designate portfolio will be thoroughly discussed during the European Parliament’s rigorous screening process, scheduled between November 4th and 12th. This process is of high value in democratic and political terms. It will legitimise the Commission and reveal where prospective Commissioners stand on the more sensitive issues of the next five-year agenda.

This policy brief outlines and analyses the revamped structure and key features of the von der Leyen Commission 2.0. More importantly, it offers a comprehensive overview of the mission letters issued to the Commissioners-designate in anticipation of the forthcoming hearings.

The New Structure of von der Leyen’s Commission 2.0

Reshuffling of portfolios for a new Commission term is standard practice, necessary to accommodate the growing number of Commissioners and changing priorities. The 2019–2024 College of Commissioners bore some similarities to previous structures but also introduced notable differences. The Commission was directed by the President alongside Executive Vice-presidents (EVPs) and Vice-presidents (VPs). Each one of them was assigned the task of leading groups of Commissioners who focused on specific strategic pillars with a thematic orientation. Key portfolios, such as the European Green Deal, Promoting the European Way of Life, and Stronger Europe in the World, operated under the leadership of an EVP or VP, who in turn reported directly to the Commission President.

The mission letters addressed to the 2019-2024 College of Commissioners highlighted a clear distinction in structure and roles. Under von der Leyen’s initial leadership model, eight Vice-presidents were entrusted with guiding and coordinating thematic groups of Commissioners, each focused on one of the Commission’s key priorities, with support provided by the Secretariat-General. Every Commissioner was involved in one or more of these groups, with a notable exception: the Commissioner for Budget and Administration, Johannes Hahn, reported directly to the President of the European Commission. Among the eight Vice-presidents, three held the special role of Executive Vice-president, balancing dual responsibilities. These Executive Vice-presidents not only led a specific Commissioners’ Group, but also managed an assigned policy domain, overseeing a Directorate-General within their remit. A unique feature of this structure was that one of the three, First Vice-President Frans Timmermans, assumed the role of chairing the College in the President’s absence.

The von der Leyen Commission 2.0 features an increasingly centripetal organizational structure, reminiscent of presidential systems.

The von der Leyen Commission 2.0 features an increasingly centripetal organizational structure, reminiscent of presidential systems. Vice-presidents are out and the six Executive Vice-presidents (5 + the High Representative, Kaja Kallas) now oversee a select group of Directorates-General and departments, with their influence varying considerably by position. This resulting organizational structure is simpler, eliminating one layer of command and control, i.e. the Vice-presidents. This new organizational architecture is expected to remain irrespective of how the upcoming hearings of the Commissioners-designate play out.

Source: Politico, ‘Who works for whom in the new EU power structure’

 

Mission Letters in Brief

Reviewing the complete set of all twenty-six mission letters is a formidable task, even for EU enthusiasts. For this reason, we have compiled a table of concise overviews of the portfolios and the respective missions of the 2024–2029 Commissioners-designate.

Commissioner Portfolio Mission Teresa Ribera Rodríguez Executive VP for Clean, Just and Competitive Transition Circular Economy, European Green Deal, growth strategy and competition policy
• Clean Industry Deal
• European Climate Law: 90% reduction in emissions till 2040
• Social Climate Fund & Just Transition Fund Henna Virkkunen Executive VP for Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy Cybersecurity, AI, Tech Sovereignty and internal security, border management – frontier technology, EU Digital Norms and Standards Internationally, digital public infrastructure
• Europe’s 2030 Digital Decade Targets
• AI Strategy – AI Factories Initiative
• European Data Union Strategy• European Democracy Shield Stéphane Séjourné Eexecutive VP for Prosperity and Industrial Sovereignty Productivity, Innovation, competitiveness, industrial strategy, horizontal Single Market strategy, research and development, Critical Raw Materials Act
• Clean Industrial Deal
• European Competitiveness Fund
• Competitiveness Coordination Tool Kaja Kallas High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and VP of the European Commission Strengthening security and defence, strategic partnerships, joined-up foreign policy
• Preparation of regular College of Commissioners’ debates on foreign policy issues.
• Modern and joined up FP (new foreign economic policy, external financial instruments) Roxana Mînzatu Executive VP for People, Skills and Preparedness Training and education, Erasmus+, European Sport Model, Quality Jobs roadmap
• European Pillar of Social Rights, New Pact for European Social Dialogue
• EU Anti-poverty Strategy
• European Affordable Housing Plan Raffaele Fitto Executive VP for Cohesion and Reforms Productivity, innovation, competitiveness, Next GenerationEU, resilience and sustainability
• Effective right to stay for every citizen
• European Affordable Housing Plan / New European Bauhaus Initiative
• Climate Adaptation Plan Maroš Šefčovič Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security; Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency Competitiveness, security, sustainability, free and fair trade, World Trade Organization, international negotiations, EU and the G7, new economic security doctrine
• European Economic Security Strategy
• Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships
• EU Customs Authority Valdis Dombrovskis Commissioner for Economy and Productivity; Implementation and Simplification Stability, Growth, NextGenerationEU, European Semester, competitiveness, digital euro
• Stability and Growth Pact
• Recovery and Resilience Facility
• Competitiveness Coordination Tool Dubravka Šuica Commissioner for Mediterranean Mediterranean, demography, external aspects of migration policy, security, crime, terrorism, Southern Neighbourhood
• New Pact for the Mediterranean
• Trans-Mediterranean Energy and Green Tech Cooperation Initiative
• Reconstruction plan for Gaza
• Gulf Strategy Olivér Várhelyi Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare Health and Animal Welfare, European Health Union, modernisation of rules on animal welfare, food safety standards
• Critical Medicines Act
• European Biotech Act
• European Health Data Space Wopke Hoekstra Commissioner for Climate, Net Zero and Clean Growth Climate risks, climate diplomacy, security, ecological transition, emissions trading scheme and taxation
• European Climate Law
• Clean Industrial Deal / European Climate Adaptation Plan
• Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive Andrius Kubilius Commissioner for Defence and Space European Defence Union, space, military mobility, civil-military, EU-NATO strategy
• White Paper on the Future of European Defence
• EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence / EU Space Law
• European Defence Fund / European Defence Industrial Strategy Marta Kos Commissioner for Enlargement Enlargement, EU neighbourhood policy, Ukraine, Turkey, Balkans, Southern Caucasus
• Gradual integration of candidate countries
• Black Sea Strategy Jozef Síkela Commissioner for International Partnerships Clean trade and investment partnerships

• Team Europe approach

• Global Gateway Costas Kadis Commissioner for Fisheries and Oceans Coastal communities, food security, food sovereignty
• Common Fisheries Policy
• EU Ocean Research and Innovation Strategy
• Climate Adaptation Plan Maria Luís Albuquerque Commissioner for Financial Services and the Savings and Investments Union Financing green, social and digital transition, EU as global leader in sustainable finance

•             Banking Union / European Deposit Insurance Scheme

•             European Savings and Investments Union Hadja Lahbib Commissioner for Preparedness and Crisis Management; Equality Civil preparedness, integrated approach to crisis management, international humanitarian law, roadmap for women’s rights, antiracist action, LGBTIQ rights, People with Disability Rights, and rights of minorities
• EU Preparedness Union Strategy / EU Preparedness Law
• European Civil Defence Mechanism
• Gender Equality Strategy
• Anti-racism Strategy
• LGBTIQ Equality Strategy
• Strategy for the Persons with Disabilities Magnus Brunner Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration Internal security, strong common borders, migration, fight again organised crime, cybercrime, improvements of Schengen framework
• European Internal Security Strategy
• EU Visa-Policy Strategy
• Pact on Migration and Asylum Jessika Roswall Commissioner for Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy European Green Deal, water security and resilience, natural world, bioeconomy, global water leadership
• European Water Resilience Strategy
• Climate Adaptation Plan
• New European Bauhaus Piotr Serafin Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration Responsive budget, anti-fraud, modern public administration
• European Competitiveness Fund
• Conditionality Regulation
• European Anti-Fraud Office Dan Jørgensen Commissioner for Energy and Housing Energy Union, sustainable and affordable housing
• European Affordable Housing Plan
• Clean Industrial Deal
• Electrification Action Plan Ekaterina Zaharieva Commissioner for Startups, Research and Innovation Startups, research and development, innovation
• European Innovation Council / European Research Council
• European Innovation Act
• European Research Area Michael McGrath Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, and the Rule of Law Democracy, Justice and Rule of Law, fairness and integrity, single market
• European Democracy Shield
• Rule of Law Report
• Consumer Agenda 2025-2030 Apostolos Tzitzikostas Commissioner for Sustainable Transport and Tourism Resilient and competitive tourism sector, sustainable transport

• Trans-European Transport Corridor

• Single Market for Transport Services

• Comprehensive EU Port Strategy Christophe Hansen Commissioner for Agriculture and Food Food security, rural areas, food sovereignty
• European Water Resilience Strategy
• Vision for Agriculture and Food Glenn Micallef Commissioner for Intergenerational Fairness, Youth, Culture and Sport Strategy on Intergenerational Fairness, youth participation, Culture Compass, European Sport Diplomacy
• Youth Policy Dialogues
• President’s Youth Advisory Board
• EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child

 

The Keywords of the new Commission: Presidentialisation, Overlap and Missed Opportunities

In her re-election speech to the European Parliament and subsequent political guidelines for the 2024-2029 European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen has outlined a strategic framework of action centred around seven key pillars. These define the focal areas of her vision and include:

• A New Plan for Europe’s Sustainable Prosperity and Competitiveness
• A new era for European Defence and Security
• Supporting people, strengthening our societies and our social model
• Sustaining our quality of life: food security, water and nature
• Protecting our democracy, upholding our values
• A global Europe: Leveraging our power and partnerships
• Delivering together and preparing our Union for the future.

In their in-depth analysis of the political guidelines and mission letters Levente Kocsis and Eric Maurice, identify 194 specific commitments made by the President of the Commission. These commitments are broadly organised across the strategic pillars mentioned in the guidelines, as seen in the following graph, in percentage terms. They also align closely with the priorities defined in the Strategic Agenda adopted in June 2024, as well as with those of the European political parties whose support was essential for von der Leyen’s re-election by the Parliament.

Source: EPC, COMPENDIUM EUROPEAN POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS PROGRAMME 24 OCTOBER 2024

When considering the new structure of the Commission (absent of Vice-presidents) in tandem with the study of specific policy areas in each portfolio, three features emerge: increased presidentialisation, continuity of overlapping mandates, and missed opportunities to upgrade policies and streamline Commision’s work.

Presidentialisation

Von der Leyen’s first term has been characterised by a slow but undoubtable shift of power to the Commission’s centre, i.e. a presidentialisation of the institution, that is especially poignant compared to the two previous office holders, namely José Manuel Barroso and Jean-Claude Juncker (Kassim 2021). The initial presidentialist thrust owes much to the first use of the Spitzenkandidaten process in 2014 (Dimitrakopoulos et al. 2024: 8). The multi-faceted and continuous crisis environment, from the global pandemic to the land war at the EU’s doorstep, have created windows of opportunity for the incremental centralisation of power and authority in the hands of the Commission President (Moens et al 2024). Von der Leyen has capitalised on all the above. This trend conflicts with the traditional Commission ethos of purely collegial pluralism, wherein Commissioners are of de facto equal rank and free to exercise independent judgment, as enshrined in the Treaties (Article 17(8) TEU and Articles 234 and 250 TFEU).

Still, there are references in the Treaties that pave the way for a different conceptualisation of the Commission President’s role. Such alternative approaches could be justified by the fact that Commission Presidents are elected first (as President-elect) and exercise considerable control over the subsequent composition of the College (Article 17(7) TEU). Furthermore, after the confirmation of the Commissioners, the President retains full control of the body. Their power to unilaterally compel the resignation of an individual Commissioner, except the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, is proof of this (Article 18(1) TEU). Finally, the Commission President has wide-ranging organisational powers that allow them to exert significant control over individual Commissioners, whether through re-shuffling of portfolios or division of portfolios (Article 17(6) TEU and Article 248 TFEU) (Cotter 2024).

…centralisation may allow for greater effectiveness, especially in a poly- and perma-crisis environment. 

The ongoing centralisation is accompanied by greater politicisation that risks undermining the technocratic nature of the Commission. The fusion of politics and technocracy may be anathema to many, whilst others may see it as a necessary step towards further political integration in the European project. Nevertheless, centralisation may allow for greater effectiveness, especially in a poly- and perma-crisis environment. While acknowledging the legitimacy concerns of such a development, its positive effect may prove catalytic for the association between European demos and the – oft demonised – EU institutional architecture.

Regardless of one’s disposition towards the Commission’s presidentialisation, what appeared to be an unorganized and seemingly improvisational manoeuvre in von der Leyen’s first term now seems baked into her strategy. The Commission’s new structure, with its murky portfolios and downgraded Vice-presidents now limited to a seemingly obedient executive role, hints at a transformation of the Commission from a collegial body into a Presidential office, as Alberto Alemanno argues. This restructuring is designed to drive key priorities forward by simplifying the ‘line of command’. In the new format, Executive Vice-presidents oversee only a select few Directorates-General and departments, with their influence varying significantly across roles. Certain Commissioners—including ‘heavy guns’ like former Vice-presidents Valdis Dombrovskis and Maros Šefčovič but also Piotr Serafin who will handle the EU budget ‘hot potato’ during the Multi-Annual Financial Framework negotiations—will report directly to the President. The new setup clearly indicates a Commission that operates under the strict supervision and guidance of President von der Leyen in most if not all key issues, including economic security and productivity. Thus, the structure of the new Commission is clearly hierarchical, which testifies to its further presidentialisation.

Overlaps

Each new College of Commissioners is typically prefaced by discussions around “overlap,” an issue recognised as fact rather than speculation. After successive enlargements, the number of Commissioners now exceeds the scope of EU competences, raising valid questions about the substantive content of certain portfolios. This presents a structural problem that underlies any discussion about the inevitable overlap of individual portfolios.

Clear examples of overlap include Teresa Ribera Rodríguez, Executive VP for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition and Stéphane Séjourné, Executive VP for Prosperity and Industrial Sovereignty. The authority of Ribera Rodriguez appears somewhat uncertain. Although officially tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Green Deal, her remit includes control over the powerful Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP), the EU body with exclusive competence over competition; this is a policy area currently being transfigured by economic sovereignty concerns. She is tasked, among others, with the Circular Economy (although there is a Commissioner on Circular Economy: Jessika Roswall), the European Green Deal, growth strategy and competition policy, the Clean Industry Deal and the Social Climate Fund & Just Transition Fund. Crucially, Séjourné, responsible for prosperity and industrial sovereignty (and not competitiveness), is also responsible (among others) for Productivity (as opposed to growth strategy), competitiveness, industrial strategy the Clean Industrial Deal, the European Competitiveness Fund and the Competitiveness Coordination Tool.

Furthermore, an even more weirded situation exists between Roxana Mînzatu, Executive VP for People, Skills and Preparedness, in a triple (or more) partial overlap with Executive VP of Cohesion and Reforms Raffaele Fitto; and Commissioners-designate Glenn Micallef, Commissioner for Intergenerational Fairness, Youth, Culture and Sport; and Dan Jørgensen, Commissioner on Energy and Housing. The first focuses on skills and labour gaps, training and education, Erasmus+, the European Sport Model, the Quality Jobs roadmap, the European Pillar of Social Rights, the New Pact for European Social Dialogue, the EU Anti-poverty Strategy and the European Affordable Housing Plan. The second, Raffaele Fitto, also focuses on the European Affordable Housing Plan and New European Bauhaus Initiative, the Climate Adaptation Plan, competitiveness and NextGenerationEU. Glenn Micallef follows with every youth and culture-related topic before going back to Dan Jørgensen and sustainable and affordable housing, specifically the European Affordable Housing Plan and the Clean Industrial Deal (among other things).

Maroš Šefčovič, Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency, has a portfolio that overlaps with the International Partnerships portfolio of Commissioner Jozef Síkela.

Executive Vice-president Henna Virkkunen, overseeing Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy, manages a portfolio that intersects significantly with technology—particularly AI—and the strengthening of external borders, especially in relation to managing migration flows. Her role directly references the Pact on Asylum and Migration and is closely aligned with the operations of Frontex. This creates a reciprocal overlap with Andrius Kubilius, Commissioner for Defence and Space; Magnus Brunner, Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration; and Dubravka Šuica, Commissioner for the Mediterranean, highlighting a cohesive yet complex interrelation across portfolios.

Having already highlighted the overlap between Executive Vice-president Henna Virkkunen and Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, it is essential to address another area of significant overlap—namely, the intersection of foreign policy and defence. Kaja Kallas, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and VP of the European Commission, among others, also operates with a mandate to strengthen security and defence (focusing on Ukraine, European Defence Union, NATO, and sanctions).

Bearing in mind the above discussion, three features characterise the structure of the new College: overlapping hierarchy; significant differences between executive Vice-presidential portfolios; and reporting lines that run in different directions with several Executive Vice-presidents responsible for several Commissioners and von der Leyen being directly responsible for some parts of the Commissioners’ portfolios (Patrin 2024).

Missed Opportunities

The new Commission has missed the opportunity to sharpen its objectives and distribute more clearly defined portfolios.

The new Commission has missed the opportunity to sharpen its objectives and distribute more clearly defined portfolios. An example is that of the Belgian Commissioner-designate, Hadja Lahbib, who is responsible for “preparedness”, encompassing mainly prevention and crisis management. However, her portfolio also includes the promotion of gender equality and the combating of discrimination—two areas of competence notably distinct from her primary crisis-related duties, creating some confusion and raising doubts about the rationale behind this competence allocation. Moreover, considering the portfolio of Olivér Várhelyi, integrating public health policy with animal health could inadvertently undermine the efforts within his primary sector—a potentially shortsighted approach. Health policy is intricately connected to economic drivers such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals and is essential in addressing significant challenges, including demographic shifts, the implications of an ageing population, workforce sustainability, and the potential emergence of future health crises, such as pandemics.

A second missed opportunity regards interaction with European citizens. Although the Mission Letters broadly state that the Commission intends to usher in a new era of dialogue with citizens, this commitment is not clearly reflected in the responsibilities assigned in the mission statements. If the new Commission aims to integrate citizens into its work, this priority should have been explicitly incorporated into the Commission’s structure, ideally through the defined role of at least one Executive Vice-President (Zuleeg and Emmanouilidis, 2024).

Finally, the overarching goal of strengthening EU governance, rendered especially important in response to numerous internal and external challenges and the potential expansion to over 30 member states, is notably absent in the new Commission’s structure. This priority is only lightly touched upon in the general section of the Mission Letters and is not evident in the distribution of major portfolios. Such omissions strongly suggest that governance reform within the EU is not a central focus of the second von der Leyen Commission. 

Conclusion

…a much more centralised, compact and centripetal approach is required. Adopting a more streamlined, hierarchical structure is a strategic decision to enhance proactive and better-coordinated governance within the Commission.

As previously noted, portfolio reshuffling and overlap among Commissioners is not uncommon. On the contrary, it has become the norm. The Treaty-enshrined high number of Commissioners, directly linked with the number of member-states, and the challenge of accommodating all of them in different portfolios remain ongoing concerns. This was a notable feature of the prior political cycle and continues to be so in the new Commission structure. Restructuring and reshuffling have not yet solved the major problem of overlap as evidenced by the priorities of the Commissioners-designate discussed in the first section of this policy brief. The shift toward a more centripetal approach, therefore, may not be an unforeseen or undesirable development, especially given the ambitious and highly complex triptych of ‘Security, Prosperity, Democracy’ put forward by Von der Leyen herself. To achieve these goals, a much more centralised, compact and centripetal approach is required. Given the inevitability of portfolio overlaps, adopting a more streamlined, hierarchical structure is a strategic decision to enhance proactive and better-coordinated governance within the Commission. 

 

References

Cotter, J. (2024) ‘La Commission, c’est moi? The invisible hand of Article 17(6) TEU in the presidentialisation of the European Commission’, 25 September, https://verfassungsblog.de/eu-commission-new-von-der-leyen-president/

Dimitrakopoulos, D., Ceron, M. and Christiansen, Th. (2024) ‘Introduction: The Politicisation of the European Commission’s Presidency’ in Dimitrakopoulos, D., Ceron, M. and Christiansen, Th. (eds) The Politicisation of the European Commission’s Presidency Spitzenkandidaten and Beyond, Palgrave Macmillan.

Draghi, M., 2024. Report on European Competitiveness. Commissioned by the European Commission. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en  [Accessed 31 October 2024].

European Parliament, 2014. Letters by President Sassoli to Commission President-elect von der Leyen Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190930IPR62887/letters-by-president-sassoli-to-commission-president-elect-von-der-leyen [Accessed 31 October 2024].

European Parliament, 2024. Confirmation Hearings Process Overview. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu [Accessed 31 October 2024].

European Union, 2024. Mission Letters to Commissioners-designate (2024-2029). Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/documents_en [Accessed 31 October 2024].

European Council, 2024. Strategic Agenda Adopted by the EU. European Council Meeting, June 2024, Brussels. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_24_3549 [Accessed 31 October 2024].

Fondation Robert Schuman, 2024. Analysis on the Structure of the von der Leyen II Commission. Paris: Fondation Robert Schuman. Available at: https://server.www.robert-schuman.eu/storage/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-764-en.pdf [Accessed 31 October 2024].

Kassim, H. (2021) ‘The European Commission: from collegiality to presidential leadership’, in D. Hodson, U. Puetter, S. Saurugger, and J. Peterson (eds) The Institutions of the European Union (5th edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Kocsis, L. and Maurice, E., 2024. 194 Specific Commitments Analysis in European Politics and Institutions Programme. EPC Compendium on European Politics, European Policy Centre, Brussels.

Letta, E., 2024. Report on the Future of the Single Market. Commissioned by the European Commission. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf  (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Moens, B., Griera, M. and Barigazzi, J (2024) ‘From queen to empress: Inside Ursula von der Leyen’s power grab’, Politico, 19 September, https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-europe-commission-brussels-power/

Niinistö, S. (2024) Safer Together Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness, Report by Sauli Niinistö, former President of the Republic of Finland, In his capacity as Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, European Commission. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b77-8739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Parliament Hearing Committee, 2019. Concerns on Nominees László Trócsányi, Rovana Plumb, and Sylvie Goulard. Internal Report, European Parliament Hearings, Brussels.

Patrin, M. (2024) ‘New Structure, New Priorities – Why the Next Commission May Be More Hierarchical but less Coherent’, 15 October, https://verfassungsblog.de/commissions-new-structure/

Piodi, F. (2007) A Study of the proceedings of the European Convention accompanied by archive documents, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/cardoc/pe_and_job_ce_en.pdf  (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Strategic Dialogue Group, 2024. Report on the Future of EU Agriculture. European Commission, Brussels. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4528 (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Taylor, S. (2014) How jeleva was forced out, POLITICO. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/how-jeleva-was-forced-out  (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

von der Leyen, U., 2024. Political Guidelines for the 2024-2029 European Commission. Brussels: European Commission. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf&trk=public_post_comment-text (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

von der Leyen, U., 2024. Re-election Speech to the European Parliament. European Parliament, Strasbourg, 4 July.

von der Leyen, U. (2019) Misson Letter Margrethe Vestager, European Commission. Available at: https://commissioners.ec.europa.eu/document/download/0146cc5f-761f-48ee-8316-a3e92dc3e7ca_en?filename=mission-letter-margrethe-vestager_2019_en.pdf(Accessed: 01 November 2024).

Zuleeg, F. and Emmanouilidis, J. (2024) Reactions to the next commission, EPC – European Policy Centre. Available at: https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/Reactions-to-the-next-Commission~5d5e58  (Access

Ioannis Armakolas and Alexandra Voudouri, co-authored the article “Relaunching Enlargement: How Will It Affect the Western Balkans?” for the 21st European Institute of the Mediterranean Yearbook, which focuses on the developments and perspectives of European policy in the wider Mediterranean region.

In their paper, the authors highlight the process of redefining the EU’s enlargement strategy in the light of geopolitical changes, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with a focus on the integration of Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans by 2030. They argue that the cycle of indecision can be broken if the EU links the new Growth Plan to critical reforms and negotiating chapters, providing incentives for candidate countries to overcome bilateral differences. Furthermore, according to the authors, a credible roadmap for deeper integration, clarity on the necessary reforms and effective communication to ensure public support are essential for a successful enlargement process.

You can read the article here.

This database provides an inventory and critical appraisal of available estimates and indicators related to irregular migration flows.  The datasets include meta-level information on sources and methodology and a quality assessment based on MIrreM’s criteria.

Siruno, L., Leerkes, A., Badre, A., Bircan, T., Brunovská, E., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Ghio, D., Hendow, M., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J.S., Jovanovic, K., Kierans, D., Mohan, S.S., Nikolova, M., Oruc, N., Ramos, M.P.G., Rössl, L., Sağiroğlu, A.Z., Santos, S., Schütze, T., & Sohst, R.R. (2024) MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Flow Estimates and Indicators. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10813413

This policy paper explores Russia’s use of the Wagner Group in Africa, highlighting how the concept of plausible deniability allows the Kremlin to expand its influence in regions such as Mali and the Central African Republic. By distancing itself from direct responsibility for controversial military actions, Russia is able to exert significant geopolitical control. The paper also examines the continuation of Wagner Group operations following the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and discusses the broader implications of these developments for Africa and the Mediterranean region.

• The Wagner Group’s operations continued after the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, with increased integration into Russia’s Ministry of Defence, signaling Russia’s deeper involvement in the continent’s security dynamics.
• Moscow’s activities in Africa signal a broader strategy to challenge Western influence by supporting local regimes and displacing Western control over critical resources, while securing Russia’s standing as a dominant player in the region’s security and economic landscape.
• Russia has secured access to valuable natural resources through its African interventions, extracting billions in gold and pursuing strategic control over uranium in countries like Niger. These resources likely help fund Russia’s broader geopolitical ambitions, including its war efforts in Ukraine.
• Russia offers “pragmatic engagement” as a substitute for dwindling Western aid in Africa, capitalizing on the gap left by reduced Western support to build influence through military assistance, resource extraction, and infrastructure projects.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Natalia Tellidou, Research Fellow at ELIAMEP’s Mediterranean Programme.

Russia’s Strategic Push into Africa

In 2020, the world witnessed a record 56 unique conflicts, the highest number in a single year since 1946.[1] Over half of these were internationalized civil wars, where external powers sponsor local actors to fight on their behalf. This practice, known as conflict delegation, has become a strategic tool for powerful states looking to extend their influence without direct involvement. As a result, geopolitical tensions have escalated, with proxy wars becoming a common feature of modern conflict.

One of the most prominent players in these proxy wars is Russia, which relies heavily on private military security contractors (PMSCs) like the Wagner Group. These contractors provide a range of services, including intelligence gathering, military training, logistical support, and infrastructure protection. Operating in countries like Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), the Wagner Group has supplied military training and assistance while enabling Russia to maintain plausible deniability. By relying on these contractors, Russia can distance itself from controversial actions, all while securing a foothold in these key regions.

Even after the death of Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group’s operations have continued, underscoring the strategic importance of their mission. Russia has adapted to ensure these activities persist, maintaining its involvement in ongoing conflicts and protecting its interests in Africa (Figure 1). Beyond military influence, Russia reaps significant rewards from these operations, including increased security leverage, access to critical natural resources, and the ability to offer African states an alternative to dwindling Western aid.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

Considering all this, this policy brief will first explore how the Wagner Group became instrumental in providing military support to countries like Mali and the CAR followed by an analysis of the post- Prigozhin period and the operations. Finally, the discussion will focus on what Russia gains from these activities—enhanced security leverage, access to valuable natural resources, and a pragmatic engagement to the diminishing development aid offered by Western countries.

Figure 1: Where and How Wanger Group Has Engaged in Africa. Sources: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, ACLED, Kathrin Buchholz https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa/

Wagner Group in Africa: A Tool for Russia’s Military and Political Ambitions 

 

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability.

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability. Plausible deniability refers to a strategy in which a sponsoring state avoids direct responsibility for its involvement in foreign conflicts[2]. By covertly supporting proxies, as the Wagner Group, the sponsor-state can reap the benefits of a potential victory without facing the risks and costs associated with direct intervention, including defeat or international condemnation. This approach allows the state to distance itself from the consequences of its actions, evading criticism from both international and domestic audiences. As a result, plausible deniability becomes a key incentive for states to engage in proxy wars. By leveraging Wagner’s presence, Russia has been able to support regimes and shape outcomes while distancing itself from the group’s often controversial and illegal activities.

Take Mali, for example. Since December 2021, Wagner has been actively involved in the country’s security landscape, invited by the Malian government, which had grown frustrated with international forces like the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) and French troops. Wagner’s presence was intended to stabilize the country and support the peace process following the 2012 crisis. At its peak, over 2,000 Wagner personnel were stationed in Mali, providing military support, handling air force operations, and securing the ruling elite.

Wagner’s primary objective was to strengthen Mali’s offensive capabilities, particularly in the conflict-ridden northern region. Unlike international forces, Wagner and the Malian government reject population-centric, “soft” approaches to counterinsurgency. Wagner forces are notorious for their violent tactics, especially towards civilians, and they often coerce prisoners and locals into collaborating by providing intelligence or leading them to insurgent hideouts. While the French-backed reconciliation process with northern Tuareg rebels sought a more diplomatic solution, the Malian government—supported by Wagner—favored a military strategy, fueling renewed conflict in the north. Without Wagner, Mali’s armed forces would struggle to challenge insurgent control, and the demand for Wagner’s expertise in training and air force operations continues to grow.

Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability.

Wagner’s impact in Mali is not confined to military efforts alone. Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability. This multifaceted approach extends Russia’s influence far beyond the battlefield.

A similar pattern can be observed in the Central African Republic (CAR). Since January 2018, Wagner—alongside another Russian PMC, Patriot—has provided military training and security in exchange for access to valuable resources like gold, uranium, and diamonds. Wagner has been instrumental in bolstering the regime of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, particularly during a 2020 rebel incursion into Bangui, where the group played a critical role in defending the government. Wagner has since become a cornerstone of Touadéra’s war efforts, helping him reclaim rebel-held territories.

However, Wagner’s involvement in CAR has exacerbated violence and militarization, much like in Mali. Russian mercenaries have instructed local militias to merge with the national army and function as self-defense units. These units, however, soon became rogue, committing widespread human rights abuses against civilians. Wagner’s presence has not only intensified the violence but also fragmented the region’s security environment, further entrenching instability.

In both Mali and the CAR, Wagner’s role extends beyond providing military support—it is about leveraging local grievances, securing valuable resources, and deepening Russia’s influence while operating in the shadows. The group’s activities have serious implications for the stability of these regions and underscore Russia’s strategic use of conflict delegation to assert itself on the global stage. 

Post-Prigozhin Dynamics 

While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience.

Despite the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s operations across Africa have persisted, though not without adjustments. The “Expeditionary Corps,” Wagner’s key operational unit, continued its activities in countries like Sudan, Niger, and Burkina Faso, maintaining its original objectives and utilizing the same resources. While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience. 

In Mali, for instance, after internal disagreements, Wagner reached a new agreement to work directly under the Russian Ministry of Defence. This shift allowed the Ministry to supply Wagner with essential military assets—vehicles, planes, and ammunition—at no cost, reinforcing Wagner’s role in the region. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence has sought additional means of support, including potential collaborations with other groups like Redut, which operate similarly to Wagner.

Following Prigozhin’s mutiny, the Kremlin formally moved Wagner’s African operations under the control of Russian military intelligence, the GRU. This reorganization saw senior Russian officials, including General Averyanov and Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, visiting former Wagner strongholds in Africa in early September. Far from signaling the end of Russia’s involvement, Prigozhin’s death marked a deeper entrenchment of Russian influence in the region. Wagner’s activities have since been rebranded under the Ministry of Defence as the “Africa Corps,” reflecting this increased oversight[3].

Russia’s diplomatic engagement has also expanded. In January 2024, Chad’s junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Déby, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss strengthening bilateral ties. This meeting is particularly significant, as Chad had previously maintained a pro-Western stance. These developments indicate that Russia’s strategy in Africa, spearheaded by the Wagner Group and its successors, remains robust and continues to adapt to evolving geopolitical realities.

Strategic Returns: Russia’s Gains from its African Engagement

Russia’s involvement in Africa through the Wagner Group brings several strategic advantages. First and foremost, it strengthens Russia’s security posture. One clear example is Russia’s ongoing effort to establish a naval base at Port Sudan, which would grant Russia vital access to the Red Sea. Although the agreement has faced setbacks due to United States pressure, Russia remains determined to secure this critical foothold, signaling its broader ambitions in the region.

Secondly, Russia gains access to valuable natural resources. Over the past two years, Russia has reportedly extracted $2.5 billion worth of gold from Africa, with much of this wealth likely funding its war in Ukraine, according to the Blood Gold Report. Russian fighters, many of them former Wagner mercenaries, also took control of the Intahaka gold mine in northern Mali, a strategically significant asset long contested by various armed groups. In Niger, Russia is actively pursuing uranium concessions, aiming to reduce French influence over these critical resources. The broader pattern is clear: Russia seeks to challenge Western dominance over Africa’s minerals and energy reserves, positioning itself as a key player in this global resource competition.

Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid.

Lastly, Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid. With countries like the UK significantly cutting back on foreign aid, many African nations are turning to Russia as a reliable partner. By filling the void left by the West, Russia secures both influence and access to resources, while offering these nations military assistance, infrastructure projects, and less conditional diplomatic engagement. This approach allows Russia to build alliances, exert political influence, and further undermine Western presence in the region.

Implications for Global Security: Russia’s Growing Role in Africa

In conclusion, Russia’s strategy in Africa, executed largely through the Wagner Group and other proxies, represents a multifaceted attempt to enhance its geopolitical influence while undermining the global standing of the United States and its allies. By providing military support, gaining control over vital natural resources, and offering a pragmatic alternative to Western aid, Russia is positioning itself as a dominant force across the continent. 

Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly.

The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin did little to disrupt these plans, as Russia’s operations have not only persisted but have expanded under direct Kremlin oversight. This deepened involvement, combined with its strategic maneuvering in key areas like Mali, the Central African Republic, and Chad, ensures that Russia remains a pivotal player in the Global South. Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly. The stakes are not only regional but have far-reaching consequences for global security and resource access.

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

 

References

‘A Mixed Picture: How Mali Views the Wagner Group’. 2024. 11.10.2024. https://rusi.orghttps://rusi.org

Arduino, Alessandro. 2024. ‘Wagner Group Is Now Africa Corps. What This Means for Russia’s Operations on the Continent’. The Conversation. 14.02.2024. https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-is-now-africa-corps-what-this-means-for-russias-operations-on-the-continent-223253.

Bloomberg.Com. 2024. ‘Russia Raises the Stakes in Tussle Over Africa’, 30.01.2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa.

‘Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare’. n.d. New America. Accessed 11.10.2024. http://newamerica.org/future-security/reports/decoding-wagner-group-analyzing-role-private-military-security-contractors-russian-proxy-warfare/.

Doxsee, Catrina. 2023. ‘How Does the Conflict in Sudan Affect Russia and the Wagner Group?’, April. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-conflict-sudan-affect-russia-and-wagner-group.

Galeotti, Mark. 2016. ‘Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear? How New Is Russia’s “New Way of War”?’ Small Wars & Insurgencies 27 (2): 282–301. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129170.

‘Infographic: Where & How Wagner Group Has Engaged in Africa’. 2023. Statista Daily Data. 24 August 2023. https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa.

Jones, Seth G., Catrina Doxsee, Brian Katz, Eric McQueen, and Joe Moye. 2021. ‘Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies’, July. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies.

Liik, Kadri. 2023. ‘From Russia with Love: How Moscow Courts the Global South’. ECFR. 21.12.2023. https://ecfr.eu/publication/from-russia-with-love-how-moscow-courts-the-global-south/.

‘Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies’. 2023. Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://russianpmcs.csis.org.

Reuters. 2024. ‘Putin Meets Chad Junta Leader as Russia Competes with France in Africa’, 24 January 2024, sec. Africa. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24/.

‘Russia Is Using the Soviet Playbook in the Global South to Challenge the West – and It Is Working | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank’. 2024. 16.05.2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/russia-using-soviet-playbook-global-south-challenge-west-and-it-working.

Saucedo, Natalia. 2023. ‘Russia’s Influence in Mali’. Human Rights Foundation (blog). 11.08.2023. https://hrf.org/russias-influence-in-mali/.

‘Stop Taking the Global South for Granted | Wilson Center’. 2024. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/stop-taking-global-south-granted.

‘The Blood Gold Report’. n.d. Blood Gold Report. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://bloodgoldreport.com/.

‘Wagner in Africa: How the Russian Mercenary Group Has Rebranded’. 2024, 20.02.2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230.

Watts, Stephen, Bryan Frederick, Nathan Chandler, Mark Toukan, Christian Curriden, Erik E. Mueller, Edward Geist, et al. 2023. ‘Proxy Warfare in Strategic Competition: Military Implications’. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA307-3.html.

 

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

Based on 20 countries across Europe, North America and North Africa, this report synthesises key trends and patterns of national policy approaches towards migrant irregularity, highlighting commonalities and differences across various contexts. In particular, this report examines three key research questions: how have irregular migration policies evolved over time and in response to what; what pathways into and out of irregularity have these policies produced or aimed to address; and what challenges have hindered policy implementation. In doing so, the report aims to contextualise irregular migration policy changes, as well as how such policies can channel migrants into or out of irregularity.

 

Hendow, M., Qaisrani, A., Rössl, L., Schütze, T., Kraler, A., Ahmad Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Oruc, N., Mohan, S. S., Triandafyllidou, A., Jauhiainen, J. S., Smolander, S., Toivonen, H., Cyrus, N., Nikolova, M., Desmond, A., Heylin, R., Cacciapaglia, M., Bonizzoni, P., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). Comparing national laws and policies addressing irregular migrants. In MIrreM Working Paper No. 6. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10782561

The Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (the Database) provides an inventory and critical appraisal of country-level estimates of irregular migration stocks in 13 European countries, the United States and Canada for the period 2008 to 2023. It is a deliverable of the MIrreM project, which is a follow-up to Clandestino. Clandestino covered the period 2000-2008.

Kierans, D., Vargas-Silva, C., Ahmad-Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Gonzalez Ramos, M. P., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J., Kraler, A., Leerkes, A., Nikolova, M., Rössl, L., Santos, S., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (Version 2) [Data set]. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13856861

Siruno, L., Leerkes, A., Badre, A., Bircan, T., Brunovská, E., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Ghio, D., Hendow, M., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J.S., Jovanovic, K., Kierans, D., Mohan, S.S., Nikolova, M., Oruc, N., Ramos, M.P.G., Rössl, L., Sağiroğlu, A.Z., Santos, S., Schütze, T., & Sohst, R.R. (2024) MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Flow Estimates and Indicators. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10813413

 

This brief provides an abridged overview of the national policy landscape on irregular migration in Greece, based on a more extensive policy analysis. It also provides an overview of the main types of migrant irregularity that emerge and the pathways into and out of irregularity, including regularisations as relevant. Annexed to this deliverable is also an overview of the mapped legal and policy frameworks.

Nikolova, M. (2024). MIrreM Country Brief on Migration Policy Context – Greece. In MIrreM Report. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.12606423

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for September 2024.

US interest in utilizing Alexandroupoli as a key liquified natural gas (LNG) transportation hub was highlighted by the agreement reached between the American company Venture Global and the Greek company Gastrade on September 17. According to this agreement, Venture Global will store its LNG in 25% of the total capacity of the new floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU). One million metric tons of LNG per year from Venture Global’s terminals in Louisiana will be unloaded at the Alexandroupoli FSRU facilities to be regasified and channeled through the Greek pipelines to the markets of Southeast Europe, thus strengthening the region’s security of supply.

On the defence front, according to Reuters, the Greek government plans to buy Switchblade drones from the United States to further strengthen its armed forces. Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini) reports that the Defense Ministry’s decision to procure US-manufactured Switchblade-type roving ammunition for the Special Warfare Command will soon head to Parliament for approval. The total cost amounts to US$75 million, of which the US will cover US$50 million, with Greece bearing the remaining US$25 million.

Still on the defence front, in an interview with Kathimerini’s Stavros Ioannidis. J.R. McDonald, Lockheed Martin’s Vice President for F-35 Business Development, confirmed that the Greek F-35 program is on track, with the signing of the contract between Lockheed Martin and the US government for the start of production expected to take place next. Greece initially aims to acquire a squadron of 20 fighter jets, with an option to procure an additional 20 F-35s after 2030.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

The climate crisis is a child rights crisis. Children face distinct and heightened risks from the escalating im- pacts of climate change and increase in disasters. As disasters increase in number and severity around the world, children and young people in several countries but also in Greece bear the greatest burdens that can last a lifetime. They are often impacted first and most severely by crisis in their education, livelihoods, health and wellbeing. Girls, women, people with disabilities, displaced children, and families living under the poverty line are especially vulnerable. Disasters threaten all children’s inherent rights guaranteed in the Convention on the Rights of the Child to life, survival, protection, development, participation and free expression. The pres- ent report provides an analysis of the state of climate in Greece; a review of the climate policy and regulatory framework assessing the extent of child sensitivity and inclusivity; a children’s vulnerability mapping of the 13 Regions of Greece; and lastly how climate change affects children in Greece, mainly in the domain of education, overall service provision, mental health and well-being. The key outcomes have been shaped into a set of recommendations to competent Authorities and stakeholders that directly address the critical challenges faced by children in Greece in the aftermath of environmental disasters, exacerbated by climate change.

Key findings & takeaways of the present report:

• 2023 was the warmest year of the last 30 years, and the third driest year since 1991.
• 25 Municipalities declared State of Emergency on the grounds of drought and water stress in the period May-September 2024.
• Existing national policy & regulatory framework on climate change adaptation lacks particular measures and pro- visions for and by children, as well as other social standards.
• Peloponnese, Thessaly and Western Greece are the three Regions of Greece with a higher disaster risks 307,763 children are estimated to be at high risk of being affected by climate change in Greece.
• 80% of teachers that participated in the focus group discussion stated that the schools they work (or have previously worked) at are inadequately equipped to handle extreme weather events.
• Almost 70% of students that participated in the U-Report poll reported that they were not able to attend their class- es due to adverse weather during the last year.
• Increased anxiety, followed by limited greenery and forests were the two most prevalent effects of climate change as reported by young people participating in the U-Report poll.

Authors: George Dikaios, PhD, Research Fellow,ELIAMEP; Persefoni Kerentzi , PhD (c ), Schoolteacher; Vagia Tsoutsi, PhD, Reseacher at Aiginiteio University Hospital Athens; Marianna Terezaki, Research Assistant, ELIAMEP; Socratis Vlachakis, Programme Officer- Climate & Environment, UNICEF.
Advisory committee: Emmanouella Doussis, Professor, NKUA

Read the full report here in pdf.

• The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is currently at a crossroads of a changing world environment which impacts demand (food inflation), supply (energy and input costs) and agri-food trade (geostrategic tensions).
• EU policies have to address the conundrum of having to simultaneously contribute to mitigating climate change and contributing to food security by accepting that both are global problems and require global solutions.
• CAP ongoing policy orientation aims at increasing its environmental performance while retaining its economic and social achievements, but excessive targets set by the Farm to Fork Strategy and the impact of changing market conditions brought tensions in the debate between on food security and climate action with respect to priorities on primary agriculture.
• Higher food costs increasing income inequalities put households in the developed world at a risk of changes in consumer behaviour that are driven by forces exogenous to their tastes and preferences.
• Addressing misperceptions about the role of productivity, science and trade will impact on how the EU assesses, in a more balanced way and addresses its strengths and weaknesses in the field of agriculture.
• Despite clear progress of Greek agriculture in recent years three persistent weaknesses of Greek agriculture relate to an uneven and untargeted distribution of direct payments the underestimation of the role of extensive livestock or the absence of a functioning Farm Advisory System.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Tassos Haniotis, Senior Guest Research Scholar, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and Special Advisor for Sustainable Productivity, Forum for the Future of Agriculture.

Introduction

That the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union is currently at a crossroads is probably an understatement. The Farm to Fork Strategy, part of the Green Deal, is essentially in suspension, at least with respect to achieving its overly ambitious targets. A rapidly changing world environment impacts the demand (food inflation), supply (energy and input costs) and trade of agricultural commodities and food products (geostrategic tensions) altered fundamental assumptions underlying the strategy.

Although this reality seems to have changed little in terms of the policy narrative, the results of successive European elections and the new composition of the European Parliament and national governments add a political dimension to the policy uncertainty. Add to the picture the preparation of the EU next budget, a tiny part of total EU public expenditure that, despite its fixity, is expected to address more priority areas, and the prospects for a rational debate about the future of the CAP look rather dim.

This uncertain future is giving the impression that the CAP is a policy fixed in time and space and incapable of reform.

This uncertain future is giving the impression that the CAP is a policy fixed in time and space and incapable of reform. This is further supported by a rather permanent criticism of the CAP by those not benefiting from the EU budget (most sectors, that is). This paper will argue that this impression does not match the facts. It’s not just the space covered by the CAP (initially just six countries of a net importer, now 27 of the largest food exporter and importer in the world) that has fundamentally changed. It is the structure of the policy itself, and its successes and failures, which differ over time.

A clear understanding of what did not work (especially in the period up to the early 90s), what worked (in the two decades following the establishment of WTO), and the mixed picture that has since emerge in the efforts to expand the reach of the policy to address a wide range of environmental and consumer related issues is required.

A clear understanding of what did not work (especially in the period up to the early 90s), what worked (in the two decades following the establishment of WTO), and the mixed picture that has since emerge in the efforts to expand the reach of the policy to address a wide range of environmental and consumer related issues is required.

Greek agriculture has been an integral part of the CAP process for more than forty years. Yet, in sharp contrast to most EU member states, including those with similar structure in their farming sector, Greece has often failed to exploit the benefits of CAP reforms that these other member states did, whether on trade, farm income, competitiveness or structural adjustment.[2]

Greek agriculture seems to have a disproportionate share of problems associated with the CAP, such as penalties related to implementation issues, the uneven and untargeted distribution of support, the lack of a farm advisory system, or its weak and slow structural adjustment.

Instead, Greek agriculture seems to have a disproportionate share of problems associated with the CAP, such as penalties related to implementation issues, the uneven and untargeted distribution of support, the lack of a farm advisory system, or its weak and slow structural adjustment. More importantly, it systematically appears to be a phase behind in its internal debate about the future of the CAP; when other member states already prepare the ground and their positions about what needs to change with the next CAP reform, often the Greek debate focuses not just on what is needed on the basis of the most recent reform but to a large extent on what was not implemented in the previous reform.[3]

How the above play in the current context will be the focus of this paper. Its aim is not to cover exhaustively and descriptively the details of the policy, as the literature is rich in this area. Rather, the aim is to identify the different set of challenges faced by the CAP in the present context of the EU, outline a few possible scenarios for the future as these emerge from the current debate, and examine the serious challenges and untapped opportunities that Greek agriculture has as one of the biggest financial beneficiaries of the CAP in the EU.

The three distinct CAP phases: introvert, extravert, uncertain

That the EU’s agricultural sector, despite its small size, is still of strategic importance becomes evident by referring to four figures – 1% of the economy and 4% of labour manages 50% of land and supplies 99% of food consumed in the EU. Furthermore, the EU food chain is arguably the most demanding globally in terms of food safety and quality, and highly sophisticated in terms of technology, setting standards worldwide. It is also highly competitive as the EU’s agrifood trade balance demonstrates, with a strong surplus based on value-added products despite being the biggest global food importer.

Even when it comes to its environmental performance, an area where results are lagging behind needs and expectations, concrete progress has turned EU’s agriculture as the only major agriculture worldwide that has managed to “produce more with less”. In China, India, Brazil, US and EU, farm production has increased in both volume and value. Yet only EU emissions have declined, by 24% since 1990 (with a clear slowdown in progress lately), while those of the US have slightly increased, and those of China, India and especially Brazil massively increased.[4]

How come then that the policy behind such results rarely receives any credit? The answer lies in the very structure of the EU institutional setting. The CAP still represents roughly a third of the EU budget, still a very significant share, despite its decline by half compared to the past. The focus therefore easily centres on the high part of a small budget, and not on the insignificant share of the EU budget in total EU public spending – on the 35% of the EU budget and not on the fact that this represents roughly 1% of GDP or 2% of total EU public spending, and the CAP 0.7% of total EU public spending.[5]

Within such an environment the CAP generates ‘subsidy envy’ among other EU policies since, being a big part of a small budget, the CAP remains the only policy with a real EU-wide impact. Consequently, it always attracts criticisms whenever the EU raises its ambition to address emerging policy challenges in a rapidly changing global environment. It is true that criticism to the CAP rightly points to the need to assess how this funding, whatever its size, is spent. However, very often this assessment is not done judging the CAP by its successes and failures with respect to its declared objectives, for example on its distributional impact, but with respect to failures in other policy areas (trade or food safety in the past, environment more recently).

In the absence of sufficient budgetary allocations, such policies tend to expect the partial delivery of their objectives via the CAP. The uncomfortable truth is that available policy tools, whether for agriculture or other policy areas, reflect the space that Member States were willing (or not) to give to the Commission – i.e., short in budgetary terms, long in the decision process. In the past, budgetary constraints acted as an incentive to consider the consistency and coherence of the CAP with other EU policies as a prerequisite for its reforms. The increasing gap between expectations from the policy and perceptions about its performance begs the question of how the big picture of its reform path is assessed now.

The CAP has undergone three distinct periods during its long and parallel to the EU history (the CAP was already part of the Treaty of Rome, though its first implementation started in 1962).

During its first period, which lasted almost three decades (until the MacSharry reform of 1992), the CAP was both introvert in design and defensive the CAP did not turn “victim of its success”, as it is often claimed, but of its initial design.

During its first period, which lasted almost three decades (until the MacSharry reform of 1992), the CAP was both introvert in design and defensive in its narrative, running the full cycle of initial design, implementation, success and failure. Succes because the initially impressive increase in farm productivity and structural adjustment turned the food deficits of the post-war Western Europe into surpluses in most major agricultural commodities. Failure because the CAP did not turn “victim of its success”, as it is often claimed, but of its initial design.

High support prices and a trade regime based on high tariffs and export subsidies helped boost productivity, but at a high cost, both budgetary and as well as political. The high budgetary costs were needed to accommodate these surpluses either in the form of intervention stocks or heavily subsidised exports. The high political costs resulted from the internal Member State infighting between those pushing for and those resisting reform and the international isolation of the CAP, which became the culprit of depressed world market prices.[6]

In its second period, extrovert and offensive period, the CAP shifted from a philosophy of supporting products to one of supporting producers. 

The second period of the CAP, which includes the reforms of 1992, 2000, 2003/04 and 2008, was characterised by the gradual but complete transformation of the policy within the span of less than two decades. More and more isolated at the international scene, the CAP faced the paradox that, in the trade policy debate, experts and policy makers alike saw the CAP as an obstacle in integrating agriculture into the global system of Institutions established by the Breton Woods Agreement (having by that time long forgotten that it was US, and not EU farm policies that kept agriculture out of world rules).[7]

In summary, in this extrovert and offensive period, the CAP shifted from a philosophy of supporting products to one of supporting producers. This was achieved by reducing support prices below world market price levels, abolishing export subsidies, massively decoupling direct payments from production decisions and linking them to some degree of environmental conditionality, introducing and significantly strengthening the agri-environmental nature of Rural Development, constraining the remaining (less than 10% of total payments) product-based support by ceilings based on area or animal payments, and abolishing the twin “sacred cows” of sugar and dairy quotas.

No wonder the above process, still grossly underestimated in its difficulty of designing, deciding and implementing it, allowed the EU to assume gradually a less defensive and finally a more offensive position after the abolition of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the establishment of the World Trade Organisation. No other proof is needed than a look at the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) of the OECD, an indicator measuring the impact of farm policy support measures at farm gate level. The global gradual farm reform process it depicts, reflected in a downward trend of the most distorting policies, becomes almost a horizontal line when the EU is removed from it.[8]

…by the end of this wave of reforms questions started being asked about the best way to address the emerging challenges of the new century.

Although the above is factually not contested, already by the end of this wave of reforms questions started being asked about the best way to address the emerging challenges of the new century, including those of the new decision- making process, co-decision with the European Parliament. Fischler himself, in his introduction to a book on the CAP after his reform, raised the need for new policy instruments addressing a wide range of areas, from volatility, knowledge, environmental responsibility and climate change, to food chain, social balance among farmers and the wider role of rural areas.[9]

…the third period of the CAP was insecure and uncertain.

Developments in the last decade have confirmed the above concerns, leading to the third period of the CAP, characterised by the impression that the CAP is rather immovable, sort of cast-in-stone policy, reflecting a growing reform fatigue in the farming community and by Member States despite efforts by the European Commission and, until recently, by the European Parliament to adapt it to the new, mainly environmental and climate change challenges global agriculture is facing. Understanding what led to this impression is important in assessing what went wrong with the recent CAP reform and its link to the Farm to Fork strategy of the Green Deal, rendering the CAP prospects seemingly insecure and uncertain.

This period has also not been smooth, with exogenous events influencing the mood and the performance of the policy, with the first attempt to address them under co-decision left its mark by identifying a gap between expectations as expressed in proposals and reality as reflected in decisions.[10] A series of exogenous events explain much. One of them, the COVID crisis, demonstrated the resilience of EU’s food system and boosted confidence in it, against all odds and perceptions of “broken food systems”. Yet three other factors acted in the opposite direction.

First, the Paris Agreement shifted attention on the need to prioritise climate action, with agriculture being one of the most affected sectors in terms of impact, contribution and complexity in finding solutions. Second, twice in the past decade a farm price boom and bust revealed major problems in the price transmission of farm prices at the consumer level; the law of price gravity seems nowadays to apply at farm-gate, but not at the shelf! Inflation has rendered food more expensive due to factors that are exogenous to agriculture and has thus put a big question mark to claims that the path to best internalise food systems’ externalities is by increasing the cost of food.[11] Third, geostrategic tensions have added to uncertainty with their direct impact on natural gas prices, and thus on nitrogen fertilisers, and their more indirect on food security concerns.[12]

Therefore, higher food costs, prospects for higher energy costs driven by the green transition, and increasing income inequalities put households in the developed world at a risk of changes in consumer behaviour that are driven by forces that are exogenous to both their existing and the often-desired tastes and preferences. This introduced a clear affordability challenge for food security that has not been witnessed in the history of the EU, and led to a polarisation of the CAP debate on whether food security (as advocated by farm groups) or climate action (prioritised by environmental stakeholders) should be prioritised – a false dilemma as both are interlinked in problem definition as well as in problem solving.

…co-decision between Council and European Parliament affected the manner by which the CAP is managed at EU level. 

To the above one should add also a major institutional change; co-decision between Council and European Parliament affected the manner by which the CAP is managed at EU level. In previous reforms until 2009, the Commission (which had and continues to have the legislative initiative) proposed and the Council negotiated with the Commission the final outcome; the European Parliament was in all effects an observer.

The result is an outcome which is more complex and less ambitious than the initial proposal.

After 2009, at the “second reading” of a proposal, which determines that final outcome, the Commission the becomes the “facilitator”; in essence, it turns into the observer. This change altered the manner by which all Institutions negotiate; the Commission, willing to avoid the second reading, has the tendency to compromise at earlier stages of the process, the Member States, negotiating with the Presidency (another Member State which is trusted less than the Commission) have the tendency to overload their “red lines” and the European Parliament comes with an endless list of amendments. The result is an outcome which is more complex and less ambitious than the initial proposal.

The suspended step of the Farm to Fork: what went wrong?

It is customary that the discussion about the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) starts before the ink dries on the regulations that set its future framework. In the beginning, this is usually limited to a group of policy experts and stakeholders within the “Brussels bubble” as Member States and farmers are busy first understanding and then implementing what was decided (as a rule, quite different and more complex than what was proposed). But the latest CAP reform brought a novelty; massive demonstrations of farmers before the elections for the European Parliament led to the weakening of exactly the CAP part that was supposed to be strengthened, leading the CAP to renege on the conditionality of best practices introduced two decades ago.

The CAP’s ambitious integration into the Green Deal, approved as the the centre-piece of the von der Leyen Commission in 2020, was expected to come through the Farm to Fork Strategy, which aims at  reducing the environmental and climate footprint of the EU food system, strengthen its resilience, ensure food security in the face of climate change and biodiversity loss and lead a global transition towards competitive sustainability “from farm to fork”.[13]

Already in 2018, under the Junker Commission, the then Commissioner for Agriculture Phil Hogan proposed a CAP reform which, by recognising the need to enhance the environmental performance of the CAP, aimed also to make the policy more result-oriented. Based on an extensive Impact Assessment, the proposal outlined ten specific objectives that the CAP needs to serve (three each on the economic, environmental and social dimension of the CAP, one cross cutting on innovation) but let its more flexible implementation through Strategic Plans of its Member States for the 2023-2027 period.

The Farm to Fork Strategy added a series of initiatives upstream and downstream of the food chain, but with respect to primary agriculture and the CAP it essentially delayed the reform process by two years by adding four main EU quantitative targets to be achieved by 2030 as a measure of success of what was decided by the previous the CAP orientation.  Despite the explicit conclusion of the Impact Assessment that such targets did not make sense at EU level as “one size does not fit all”, and the specific needs of Member States need to be addressed based on evidence, the so called “aspirational” and non-binding targets failed to inspire Member States and farmers. Instead, they demonstrated the huge gap between the exuberance in expectations and the reality on the ground.

All targets set were on areas whose orientation was already desired and prioritised. But their setting undermined from the start the prospects for success. The most promoted target, the doubling of the area for organic farming to 25%, went against the conclusion of any analysis (the EU’s outlook for the sector expected the relative figure to be 14% before reform) and any logic of supporting a sector whose growth was based on value-added and not on area.

The target to reduce the use of pesticides by 50% (a figure that has become sort of fixation not just in the EU but at UN level no matter what the problem or the target is) was proposed to be reached by 2030 while the first data would become available by 2028 and the baseline of what they represent is still unknown. The reduction of nutrient losses in the soil (another 50%) exceeded both in both timing and magnitude what FAO considered feasible for European soils (a 40% reduction by 2040). Even the target of a 50% reduction in the use of animal antibiotics (a theme of one of the Workshops of the Impact Assessment) had already been achieved at EU level, thus reducing any incentive for further progress.

With such a mismatch between expectations and reality, it should come as no surprise that anti-EU populists used the opportunity for a comprehensive attack on whatever “Brussels” is meant to represent during the European elections, and with some success. What should come as surprise is that the Commission did not seem to relax what already was considered as “not legally binding”, its quantitative targets, but chose instead to alter the means meant to achieve broader and absolutely necessary objectives. For example, the relaxation, in the guise of simplification, of certain Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions already in place since the 2003 reform has nothing to do with an impact on the cost of production. On the contrary, it saves production costs.

This asymmetry between initial expectations and reality is not just an EU phenomenon; in the EU it was expressed strongly because the EU policy has been the most ambitious in real terms, with UN such initiatives at limited declaration level. But it reflects the difficulty in delivering policy-relevant outcomes addressing environment challenges and covering the food chain (an “holistic, food systems approach”) and the reality of its available policy instruments. In the EU the latter, adapted over time through a series of reforms, were designed to address clearly set Treaty objectives that mainly address the supply side of agriculture, adapted to make production more demand-driven. Such measures are nonetheless unfit to address growing food demand complexities, often characterised by individuals demanding as citizens what they cannot afford as consumers.

Greek agriculture and the CAP: a cow to milk or a policy to apply?

Greek agriculture is fully integrated into EU policies for more than four decades now, and is one of the largest beneficiaries of CAP funds. EU funds supporting Greek agriculture represent one of the highest percentages of GDP among Member States, lagging behind only Bulgaria’s share; 1.7% for the latter in 2021 vs 1.4% for Greece (for comparison, Spain’s share was 0.6%°. Up until recently, CAP funds have accounted for more than half of all EU funds to Greece, but the exceptional Recovery and Resilience Facility changed this by boosting EU funding to all Member States. Yet, in contrast to the objectives set by the CAP, Greek agriculture seems to have struggled to reap the benefits that other Member States with comparable conditions as those faced by Greece did.[14]

One should not underestimate the progress of Greek agriculture in recent years, as evidenced by the increase in agri-food exports, including in value-added products. 

One should not underestimate the progress of Greek agriculture in recent years, as evidenced by the increase in agri-food exports, including in value-added products. That the reversal of the negative trend of Greece’s agri-food deficit happened during the economic crisis is a sign of resilience of the sector; that this trend continues a promising sign for the future. There are also numerous examples of innovative applications of best practices, stemming the full spectrum from organic farming to precision farming. But there is a paradox when one looks into the details of such progress; it is as if the CAP is absent.

In fact, while the implementation of the CAP in Greece would require a separate analysis, three persistent weaknesses of Greek agriculture point to the administration as the root of problems as all three relate to decisions (not) taken by the Ministry of Agriculture. The first major persistent weakness is the uneven and untargeted distribution of direct payments. Successive reforms of the CAP since 2008 allowed Member States to move away from a level of support based on past data, which was consciously chosen in 2003 by the Commission as a necessary step in order to avoid a negative Impact on land prices and farm asset values. Minimising such changes, Greece has systematically avoided assuming an unavoidable political cost to reap the policy benefits of such a move.

This choice directly impacts the second weakness, the role of extensive livestock as such a redistribution would have required a clear demarcation between permanent grazing land and forest areas. Since the budgetary allocation of direct payments is fixed, increasing the support of the livestock would have reduced the support for crops. It would have also allowed Greece to reduce the average level of area support with the integration of more land into the system (something that was possible already in 2008). Instead, it now leaves Greece vulnerable to a future path of further harmonisation of support, while the poor implementation continues to generate a significant level of penalties.[15]

The third major weakness relates to the absence of a functioning Farm Advisory System. A requirement since the 2003 reform, this continues to be weak. It is not that there is an absence of advisers, or lately even a list of certified advisors. A system requires a commonality in the principles applied, an understanding of the implementation challenges of the policies and suggestions that are well integrated into a Strategic Plan with priorities. While the Greek Strategic Plan generally follows the new orientation of the CAP and the Farm to Fork Strategy, it is unclear to which extent and in which directions the measures chosen will impact the structures of Greek agriculture.

What the future brings

…the recent Draghi Report on the competitiveness of the EU left out one of its most competitive sectors, agri-food, while the “Strategic Dialogue” Report that was meant to address challenges and set the ground for the “vision” of the new Commission about EU agriculture and the CAP left competitiveness out.

As a sign of the parallel universes EU Institutions sometimes work the recent Draghi Report on the competitiveness of the EU left out one of its most competitive sectors, agri-food, while the “Strategic Dialogue” Report that was meant to address challenges and set the ground for the “vision” of the new Commission about EU agriculture and the CAP left competitiveness out (and any numbers whatsoever in a 100-page report of one of the most challenging sectors).  Yet facts are more stubborn than any biases. With a world population that is still increasing at faster rates than production in the two most populated continents and with climate change impacting every aspect of agricultural production, the question of where food covering the additional demand needs will be produced and how and with which footprint this will happen is more pertinent than ever.

EU policies have to address the conundrum of having to simultaneously contribute to mitigating climate change and contributing to food security by accepting that both are global problems and require global solutions.

Thus, the capacity of agricultural supply to respond to increasing food security concerns amidst climate change priorities is at increasing risk. EU policies have to address the conundrum of having to simultaneously contribute to mitigating climate change and contributing to food security by accepting that both are global problems and require global solutions. To do so requires a closer look at how new obstacles and longer-term constraints driven by recent developments impact on the expected path of transition towards sustainability. This not some “treason” of high ambitions; rather it represents the reality check to test how these ambitions could be met.

EU agriculture did well in its purely economic and social dimension, as evidenced by increases in its trade balance and farm income. EU agriculture did comparatively much better than other global players when judged by its performance in emissions. To accept this fact does not imply complacency or ignoring the need to improve significantly the the environmental performance of the CAP. Rather, it implies that in attempting to do so, understanding the role of EU agriculture in the global context is a must if climate action and food security are to be addressed as what they are, global in nature.

Addressing this requires re-opening the debate in three priority areas where the EU has to come clear on its stance and future contribution – productivity, science and trade. 

Addressing this requires re-opening the debate in three priority areas where the EU has to come clear on its stance and future contribution – productivity, science and trade. Though imperfect, all three areas are necessary conditions for moving forward. To become also sufficient in addressing the global need to produce more with less, they require addressing misperceptions about them.

…improving soil helps to improve water, air and biodiversity; the opposite is not always true.

Productivity, in contrast to productivism, does not imply ignoring the need to incorporate the environmental footprint in its measurement. On the contrary, it implies identifying and better integrating the full spectrum of alternative practices that, in different conditions, allow output to grow with lower inputs. In this respect, prioritising soil management offers some clear prospects. This is where better data on the performance of practices at regional, and increasing cases at farm level, are available. Soil is also where the CAP has a leverage since most farmland is covered through the provision of direct payments conditional on better practices, and measurable impacts are possible. Furthermore, improving soil helps to improve water, air and biodiversity; the opposite is not always true.

…unlike human or animal health, EU attitudes on plant health continue to address technological progress as a regression 

Unfortunately, soil is also where resistance to science in the EU is evident. Reduction in nutrient losses implies less and better targeted use of both fertilisers and pesticides, and alternatives in the products that are being phased-out. Yet, unlike human or animal health, EU attitudes on plant health continue to address technological progress as a regression – even in Nobel-winning technologies. But while increasingly scientific evidence provides a more balanced assessment of the role of agriculture, including of livestock (from the recognition of the nutritional value of red meat to the very different role of methane when livestock numbers are in steady state as compared to when they have been increasing), negative public perceptions and prejudice about the role of science in agriculture are well entrenched.

…notions about strategic autonomy and sovereignty which potentially constrain trade are considered priorities in a sector such as food, where both aspects are clearly more advanced than in many other EU sectors.

So are negative perceptions about the role of trade. Partly this has to do with the fact that the benefits from trade are often idealised, ignoring that it comes with winners and losers; and the former need to introduce measures that compensate and accompany in transition the latter. The EU is still, more than anything else, a free-trade area which includes such compensation mechanisms (CAP, regional funds); however, agriculture is a late comer to the global trade system, often pressured to ‘give’ so that other sectors ‘take’. Combined with the absence of global rules on safety and environmental footprint, this renders the debate difficult and prone to isolationist ideas. It is interesting in this respect how notions about strategic autonomy and sovereignty which potentially constrain trade are considered priorities in a sector such as food, where both aspects are clearly more advanced than in many other EU sectors (from energy, metals and minerals to microchips).

In conclusion, addressing misperceptions about the role of productivity, science and trade will impact on how the EU assesses, in a more balanced way and addresses its strengths and weaknesses in the field of agriculture. This, in turn, will to a large extent also determine the EU’s capacity to lead based on evidence in the joint challenge to produce more food with less emissions and pollution and adapt its policies accordingly.

[1] Views expressed here are strictly personal, and do not reflect my current affiliation with the above entities or my previous affiliation with the European Commission. My 33-year career with the latter heavily influenced these opinions, which here reflect only information that is in the public domain.

[2] K. Karantininis, A New Paradigm for Greek Agriculture, Palgrave MacMillan, 2017, or more recently https://www.dianeosis.org/2024/09/o-agrotikos-tomeas-stin-ellada/

[3] See https://www.dianeosis.org/2023/07/i-nea-koini-agrotiki-politiki-tis-periodou-2023-2027/ for the manner by which Greece chose to implement the recent CAP reform. As for the manner by which the debate on the CAP usually evolves, the point raised here is based on my experience from over 100 missions in Greece during my career. While introductory interventions at public conferences and meetings habitually would start with an update of what needed to be done in the future, the discussion very soon would turn into what was not done from previous requirements. That implementation is the problem is evidenced by heavy penalties, which in the decade before the economic crisis exceeded 2 billion euros.

[4] https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/IndicatorsEnvironmental/EmissionsFromAgriculture.html and https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/food-security-climate-change-times-covid-19-tassos-haniotis/

[5] https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DashboardIndicators/Financing.html

[6] At the EU level, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark were leading the reform CAP camp, with France and Ireland strongly resisting change. US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were pushing globally for reform, despite also having significant trade distorting policies in place. See for example McCalla A.F. and Josling, T. E., Agricultural Policies in World Markets, New York, 1985.

[7] T. Haniotis, Agriculture in the WTO: A European Union Perspective, Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 32,2(August 2000): 197-202.

[8] https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/agriculture-and-food/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation-2023_b14de474-en

[9] A. Sorrentino, R. Henke and S. Severini (eds), The Common Agricultural Policy after the Fischler Reform, Ashgate, England, 2011.

[10] J; Swinnen (ed), The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy: an imperfect storm, CEPS, Brussels, 2015.

[11] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/food-inflation-blues-tassos-haniotis-qhj6e

[12] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/blissful-linearity-ag-market-outlook-nonlinear-nature-tassos-haniotis-iwqpe

[13] https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-05/f2f_action-plan_2020_strategy-info_en.pdf

[14] For a detailed comparison of Greek agriculture with the EU average and those of other Member States see https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DataPortal/analytical_factsheets.html.

[15] Although technical in nature, the issue of incorrect integration of grazing land into the payment system brought the expected average per hectare payment in Greece from 380 euros per hectare to 580 euros per hectare already in the 2008 “Health Check” Reform. Total funds were not affected, but their  distribution was, negatively affecting the extensive livestock sector.

This policy paper delves into the volatile relationship between Egypt and Turkey, examining its profound implications for the Eastern Mediterranean. Since 2020, Egyptian-Turkish relations have moved cautiously towards rapprochement following a period of intense tension. Central to this relationship is the Libyan conflict, in which both states hold substantial stakes. This study explores the current political forces driving this tentative reconciliation, as well as the ramifications of these developments for the Eastern Mediterranean.

• The Libyan civil war emerged as a proxy conflict between Egypt and Turkey; however, both states have since aligned their positions on the Gaza crisis, reflecting a major shift in their diplomatic approach.
• The significance of Libya’s oil reserves for both states cannot be overstated, as they have prompted a renewed sense of cooperation after a decade of rivalry.
• Despite their significant ideological differences, Egypt and Turkey have ultimately recognized the necessity of strengthening their ties across nearly all areas, including trade and military cooperation.
• After a decade of intense conflict shaped by competing interests and military interventions in Libya, Egypt and Turkey are now contemplating a rapprochement with a view to addressing common security and economic interests.
• If it signals Turkey’s wish to engage with all the countries in the region based on international norms, a rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey could prove to be a critical factor for the achievement of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.
• An opportunity is emerging for Greece to promote regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Bilkent University; Senior Research Fellow, Head, Turkey Programme, ELIAMEP and Electra Nisidou, Research Assistant, Turkey Programme, ELIAMEP. 

Introduction

Volatility is not a recent feature of Egyptian-Turkish relations. Following decades of rather lukewarm relations, in the early 2000s, Turkey and Egypt forged cooperative relations characterized by a boost in economic cooperation, trade, and investment. This era was underpinned by Turkey’s AKP administration’s policy of “zero problems with neighbours”[1] and Egypt’s Mubarak-era emphasis on regional stability. The regional landscape underwent a dramatic transformation in 2011 with the onset of the Arab Spring, which led to the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and the fall of other long-standing regimes across the Arab Middle East.[2] The election of Mohamed Morsi, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, to the Presidency of Egypt in 2012 heralded a new era in Egyptian-Turkish relations. Turkey’s AKP administration, sharing strong ideological affinities with the Muslim Brotherhood, welcomed Morsi’s presidency and sought a strategic relationship with Egypt. However, relations quickly soured following the military coup of 3 July 2013 which ousted Morsi and brought General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to power. Turkey vehemently condemned the coup and refused to recognize El-Sisi’s government; diplomatic relations were suspended.[3] Turkey’s increased support for the Muslim Brotherhood further ratcheted up the tension, which peaked during the Libyan Civil War, in which  Turkey and Egypt found themselves supporting opposing factions: Turkey backed the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, while Egypt supported the Tobruk-based House of Representatives and the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar.

The attempted coup in Turkey of 15 July 2016 marked a new low point in Egyptian-Turkish relations. Initial reactions in Cairo to news of the coup appeared rather positive, reflecting deep-seated animosities linked to the Erdoğan administration’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and its refusal to recognize the El-Sisi government.[4] The failure of the coup not only embarrassed Egyptian media, but it also reignited bilateral tensions. The coup attempt ignited internal debates in Egypt about the role of the military in politics in which comparisons were drawn to Egypt’s own experience. Key obstacles to reconciliation remained, notably Turkey’s non-recognition of the El-Sisi regime and the status of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey. Despite Saudi mediation efforts and Turkey’s normalization of relations with other regional powers including Israel and Russia, mutual distrust and differing political stances continued to obstruct the restoration of diplomatic ties.

The Dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean

The instability of the Eastern Mediterranean has been fuelled by several key factors which primarily revolve around the discovery of significant natural gas reserves in the EEZs of Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. The discovery of Israel’s Leviathan field in 2010, followed by Cyprus’s Aphrodite field and Egypt’s Zohr field, sparked high expectations of regional energy exports. However, instead of fostering cooperation, these discoveries intensified maritime boundary disputes and attracted the attention of major powers and energy companies. Initial optimism about leveraging these resources for regional stability and economic benefit was overshadowed by the challenges of monetization, including the need for further discoveries and regional political consensus. Unilateral actions and non-inclusive approaches further impeded progress.[5] Compounding these issues is the unresolved Cyprus problem, which has long strained Greek-Turkish relations and obstructed regional cooperation. Turkey’s opposition to Cyprus’s maritime boundaries and its interference with drilling operations have exacerbated tensions. The emergence of significant natural gas reserves has raised the stakes, leading Greece to strengthen its strategic alliances. Greece’s EEZ delimitation agreements in 2020 with Italy and Egypt, which were aimed at clarifying maritime boundaries and countering Turkey’s claims, marked a significant shift in its approach.

Turkey’s recent foreign policy shift vis-à-vis the Middle East was made in response to both regional dynamics and domestic insecurities. 

Turkey’s recent foreign policy shift vis-à-vis the Middle East was made in response to both regional dynamics and domestic insecurities. As regional conflicts intensified, particularly in Syria and Libya, Turkey increasingly turned to military interventions and unilateral actions. This shift was driven by heightened threat perceptions, especially following the collapse of the Kurdish peace process and the failed coup attempt in 2016,[6] which exacerbated concerns over regime security. Moreover, Turkey’s rivalry with the Saudi Arabia–UAE axis has fuelled a zero-sum approach to regional power struggles and further embedded its military presence across the Middle East.[7] This reorientation also underscores Turkey’s efforts to balance its relationships with powers like the United States and Russia, despite the challenges of diverging interests. Overall, Turkey’s evolving strategy highlighted a securitized and risk-prone approach, reflecting its broader ambitions, vulnerabilities and feeding into an increasingly volatile regional landscape.[8]

The deterioration in Turkey’s relations with its immediate Arab neighbours, particularly Egypt, has complicated the strategic landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean significantly. Rooted in divergent strategic interests and historical rivalries, the strain between Turkey and Egypt was exacerbated by Turkey’s alignment with pro-Western states, its NATO membership, and its contentious relationship with Israel. These factors placed Turkey at odds with Egypt, which had aligned itself with the Saudi Arabia-UAE axis against Turkish influence in the region. The aftermath of the Arab uprisings, particularly in Libya, saw the two countries supporting opposing factions, which deepened their rivalry. Moreover, Turkey’s broader regional ambitions, shaped by its security imperatives and strategic alliances, fuelled Egypt’s perception of Turkey as a regional adversary. This animosity was further complicated by Turkey’s assertive military actions in Libya and its support for movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt viewed as a direct threat to its own stability and regional influence. As a result, the relationship between Turkey and Egypt remained tense, with little room for reconciliation as both states pursued competing visions of regional leadership.[9]

The Libyan civil war: From proxy conflict to détente

Libya was the country where Egyptian-Turkish confrontation reached the brink of a proxy war. Following the fall of the Muammar Qaddafi regime in 2011, Libya experienced state failure and prolonged instability due to the rise of various militias. By 2014, Libya was divided between two rival administrations, one in Tripoli and one in Tobruk. Egypt’s involvement in the Libyan conflict was driven by strategic interests and ideological opposition. The geographical proximity of Egypt and Libya, coupled with a history of strained relations with Qaddafi, shaped Egypt’s position in the post-Qaddafi era. Under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt remained resolutely opposed to Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which had ties to the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. Instead, Egypt supported the Tobruk-based House of Representatives and the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar with a view to counteracting Islamist influence and securing economic benefits, such as discounted Libyan oil, while also addressing security concerns related to border stability.

However, Turkey’s intervention on behalf of the GNA in early 2020, when the LNA attempted to occupy Tripoli, complicated Egypt’s objectives. Egypt eventually proposed the Cairo Declaration in June 2020, seeking to address the presence of foreign forces—Turkey, in particular–and to avoid direct military confrontation. Egypt’s role in the Libyan conflict was also shaped by its alliance with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, both of which provided Egypt with financial and military aid, aligning Cairo’s policies with their broader regional goals of countering political Islam and containing Turkish influence. Egypt’s strategy involved bolstering Haftar’s military capabilities while simultaneously engaging in diplomatic efforts to limit Turkey’s influence. Despite its assertive stance, Egypt was aware of the potential domestic repercussions and the strain on its economy and was cautious about overextending itself militarily in Libya. This balancing act underscored Egypt’s complex position, as it navigated between immediate security concerns and the broader regional power dynamics involving its Gulf allies.[10]

Turkey’s involvement in Libya also reflected its broader strategy, which sought to expand its influence across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Turkey’s involvement in Libya also reflected its broader strategy, which sought to expand its influence across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Turkey deepened its engagement in Libya beyond military support for the GNA by leveraging soft power through cultural and economic ties, which included reconstruction efforts and infrastructure projects. This economic involvement not only strengthened Turkey’s political leverage, but it also sought to establish long-term Turkish influence in a post-conflict Libya. Turkey’s actions served to counterbalance those of regional rivals, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which acted across the Arab world to oppose Turkish influence. Turkey’s strategic involvement in Libya, including its efforts to assert its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, underscored the complex interplay between regional powers in the conflict, making Libya a crucial battleground for influence in the MENA region.[11]

The Libyan conflict emerged as a significant arena for rivalry between Turkey and Egypt, reflecting their divergent ideologies and strategic interests.

The Libyan conflict emerged as a significant arena for rivalry between Turkey and Egypt, reflecting their divergent ideologies and strategic interests. The rivalry between Turkey and Egypt in Libya also had broader regional implications. The strategic discord contributed to the formation of alliances and treaties aimed at countering each other’s influence. For instance, the Greece-Egypt maritime boundary agreement of 2019, which aimed to secure maritime rights and limit Turkish expansion, was partially a response to Turkey’s assertive actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. In addition, the United States began increasingly to align with Egypt in recognition of Cairo’s role as a stabilizing force and a counterweight to Turkish influence. Libya’s conflict thus served as a focal point for the broader strategic struggle between Turkey and Egypt.[12] However, while the Libyan conflict has not yet been fully resolved, notable progress has been made toward stabilization. This is thanks to the UN-brokered ceasefire in October 2020 between Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Government of National Accord (GNA), which has significantly reduced the violence.

Most of the deposits, as well as the mining and processing facilities, are under the control of the Haftar government, which strengthens his position and may have pushed Turkey to seek a compromise with Egypt.

While military violence has declined, political tensions remain high, however. The Central Bank of Libya, which manages the country’s vast oil revenues, is at the heart of the latest political turmoil. On 26 August 2024, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, the GNA Prime Minister based in Tripoli, fired the governor of the Central Bank, Sadiq al-Kabir. In response to this decision, oil extraction and processing in the eastern part of Libya was frozen.[13] Most of the deposits, as well as the mining and processing facilities, are under the control of the Haftar government, which strengthens his position and may have pushed Turkey to seek a compromise with Egypt. A compromise agreement was brokered by the United Nations, and on 30 September 2024 the Tobruk-based House of Representatives approved the appointment of Naji Mohamed Issa Belqasem as the new head of the Central Bank.

From Conflict to Rapprochement: Current political dynamics

More than a decade after his previous visit, President Erdoğan travelled to Cairo to meet President El-Sisi in February 2024. They discussed enhancing economic cooperation, trade, and investment, while also addressing regional stability, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. Energy cooperation, especially with regard to the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), was a key topic, along with counterterrorism efforts. The meeting aimed to finalize steps toward fully normalizing relations, including restoring ambassadorial exchanges and resuming high-level diplomatic engagements, marking a significant step forward in Egyptian-Turkish relations.

El-Sisi reciprocated with a visit to Ankara in September 2024. Eighteen memoranda of understanding (MoU) were signed covering cooperation in areas including energy, defence, tourism, and finance. During a joint press conference, Erdogan reiterated plans to increase bilateral trade from $5 billion to $15 billion over the next five years. It is worth noting that even after the fall of Morsi and during the Libyan War, trade between Egypt and Turkey was not interrupted; indeed, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries has been crucial for Egypt’s economy, as it has enabled the increased exports critical for generating foreign currency and addressing Egypt’s financing challenges.[14] Despite diplomatic tensions, Egypt has maintained the FTA to preserve access to Turkish markets, support its manufacturing sector, and foster economic recovery. The trade partnership has been more significant than Turkish investment in Egypt, which remains modest compared both to other foreign investments in Egypt and to Turkey’s investment in other countries in the region.[15]

The two leaders also highlighted their shared stance on the Palestinian cause, calling for a ceasefire in Gaza and an end to violence in the West Bank. Turkey has condemned Israel’s actions against Hamas in Gaza, sent aid to Egypt for Palestinians, and praised Cairo’s role in ceasefire negotiations. El-Sisi noted that they also discussed the situation in Libya, where Turkey and Egypt have supported opposing sides, emphasizing that the ongoing conflict cannot be resolved until elections are held, foreign forces and mercenaries withdraw, and the militias disband.[16]

Improved relations between Egypt and Turkey could bring notable benefits to the region, including enhanced stability and opportunities to cooperate in energy development and security. A thaw could enable both states to more effectively address critical issues like maritime disputes and energy monetization, while leveraging their economic and strategic clout to foster regional cohesion. For Turkey, strengthening ties with Egypt might help counterbalance rival influences, particularly from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while Egypt could gain from increased trade and investment opportunities. However, significant ideological differences and historical grievances—exemplified by Turkey’s strained relationship with Israel and divergent views on regional issues—could pose challenges to the sustainability of this rapprochement. Persistent disagreements on key matters, coupled with underlying strategic rivalries, could undermine the potential for a stable and lasting partnership.

The War in Gaza

The Gaza war has posed significant challenges for Egypt, including the risk of a large influx of Palestinians into the Sinai peninsula and severe strains on its fragile economy. The conflict has disrupted Egypt’s revenue streams from natural gas, tourism, and the Suez Canal, exacerbating existing economic issues, despite aid from Gulf states and international creditors. Egypt has actively mediated between Israel and Hamas, seeking a ceasefire and increased humanitarian aid, while preparing for potential refugee inflows and opposing Israeli encroachments. Domestically, Egypt faces the dual threats of rising public discontent over economic hardships and potential instability from a Palestinian influx, underscoring the need for economic and political reforms to ensure long-term stability.[17]

The conflict has also galvanized Egyptian public sentiment, leading to grassroots protests and a boycott of Israeli-linked products, which the government has tightly controlled to prevent broader anti-regime unrest. Despite securing substantial international aid, Egypt’s long-term stability remains uncertain and hinges on essential economic reforms and improved governance. It would be beneficial if the international community supported Egypt’s mediation efforts, opposed forced displacement, and pushed for reforms that could enhance Egypt’s resilience and address internal discontent. The fact that the war in Gaza has cost Egypt financially and that its people are pro-Palestinian, puts it in an extremely difficult position. It seems to be trying to straddle the line between the West and the Islamic world by maintaining a more formal and less bellicose attitude towards the war taking place just over its borders.

At the same time, Turkey’s role in the Gaza war has had a significant influence on its evolving relations with Egypt. As a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause and a vocal critic of Israeli military actions, Turkey has positioned itself as a key advocate for Gaza on the international stage[18]. This stance aligns with Turkey’s broader foreign policy, which emphasizes support for Muslim-majority states and opposition to perceived Western and Israeli aggression in the region. Despite their state-level ideological differences, Turkey’s humanitarian aid to Gaza and vocal criticism of Israeli actions have resonated with Egyptian public sentiment, which is deeply sympathetic to the Palestinians’ plight. While this alignment could have been a point of convergence, it has also highlighted the differing approaches, with Turkey’s more confrontational stance contrasting sharply with Egypt’s more diplomatic and mediating role in the conflict.

Turkey and Egypt have found common ground on the Palestinian issue, which offers a significant opportunity for collaboration. 

Despite their divergent political trajectories and regional rivalries, Turkey and Egypt have found common ground on the Palestinian issue, which offers a significant opportunity for collaboration. Under President Erdoğan, Turkey is seeking to position itself as a leading advocate for Muslim-majority states, using its vocal support for Palestine and critique of Israeli policies to enhance its regional influence. Meanwhile, recalling its historic role as the preeminent Arab power during the Nasser era, Egypt continues to claim a pivotal role in mediating the conflict and addressing humanitarian concerns. This shared commitment to the Palestinian cause highlights a potential avenue for cooperation, as both states navigate their historical legacies and contemporary ambitions. By aligning on this issue, they have an opportunity to bridge their differences and explore collaborative paths.

How could the Egypt-Turkey relationship evolve from here?

Given their shared historical grievances and ideological differences, both states will need to strike a delicate balance between cooperation and competition.

The future of relations between Egypt and Turkey appears to hinge on their ability to navigate overlapping regional interests and domestic challenges. Given their shared historical grievances and ideological differences, both states will need to strike a delicate balance between cooperation and competition. Relations with Israel could significantly impact this dynamic, with Turkey’s vocal criticism of Israeli policies, particularly with regard to Palestine, contrasting with Egypt’s more cautious and pragmatic approach. This divergence could either deepen their rivalry or foster a strategic alignment based on their mutual interest in regional stability. Additionally, both countries will need to address the pressing issue of refugee flows, especially given the potential influx of Palestinians into Egypt’s Sinai peninsula. Effective management of this humanitarian challenge could serve as a critical test for their diplomatic efforts, potentially influencing their willingness to collaborate. If they can align their strategies to address these regional and domestic pressures, there is potential for a thaw in relations, leading to greater regional cohesion and a strategic partnership.

On the trade front, both countries have demonstrated a commitment to strengthening economic ties despite past diplomatic tensions. The recent agreements to increase bilateral trade from $5 billion to $15 billion over the next five years underscore the mutual economic interests driving their relationship. Trade could act as a stabilizing factor, fostering deeper economic interdependence and creating incentives for continued cooperation.

In the energy sector, the discovery of significant natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean presents both opportunities and challenges. Alongside its strategic partnership with Egypt, Turkey’s increasing involvement in regional energy dynamics  could facilitate joint ventures and collaborative projects in this field. However, maritime boundary disputes and competing interests may pose obstacles. The alignment of their energy policies and shared interests in regional energy markets could play a vital role in shaping their bilateral relations.

A coordinated approach to resolving the Libyan crisis could significantly impact the overall relationship between Egypt and Turkey, potentially leading to a more collaborative and strategically-aligned partnership in the region.

Libya remains a critical point of contention but also of potential cooperation. The evolving situation in Libya, with its complex web of alliances and ongoing conflict, has highlighted the strategic importance of this North African country. Turkey and Egypt’s support for different rival factions in Libya has been a source of friction. However, their mutual interest in stabilizing Libya and addressing the broader implications of the conflict, including the management of resources and security, could open avenues for dialogue and joint action. A coordinated approach to resolving the Libyan crisis could significantly impact the overall relationship between Egypt and Turkey, potentially leading to a more collaborative and strategically-aligned partnership in the region.

Conclusions

The evolving relationship between Egypt and Turkey marks a significant shift away from their previous antagonism in a direction which is promising for both cooperation and mutual benefit. Recent diplomatic engagements, including high-level meetings and the signing of major agreements, indicate a thaw in relations that could reshape regional dynamics and influence broader strategic landscapes.

One notable implication of this rapprochement is the role Egypt could potentially serve as a conduit for Turkey’s enhanced involvement in the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Conversely, Turkey’s improved relations with Egypt could help Egypt achieve its broader strategic goals, including its aspirations for closer cooperation with NATO.

Migration is another critical dimension of their evolving relationship. Both Egypt[19] and Turkey[20] face significant pressures from migration flows and the associated humanitarian and economic challenges. The European Union (EU), which has been grappling with migration and refugee management, would benefit from enhanced coordination between Egypt and Turkey, which could help alleviate pressure on EU borders and contribute to regional stability.

Furthermore, a potential convergence of Egyptian and Turkish maritime policies could have important regional implications. Joint efforts in this area, particularly in terms of maritime boundary delimitation and access to resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, would likely also include Cyprus, Libya and Greece.

The ongoing Libyan conflict remains a critical area of contention, but also an opportunity for collaboration. 

The ongoing Libyan conflict remains a critical area of contention, but also an opportunity for collaboration. The two states have a shared interest in stabilizing Libya, and their joint efforts could further solidify their partnership while influencing regional power dynamics. Similarly, their shared commitment to addressing the Gaza conflict, despite differing approaches, highlights further potential areas for cooperative action.

However, several questions and doubts remain with regard to the future of this collaboration. How will Egypt and Turkey reconcile their differing approaches to the Gaza conflict and their respective relationships with Iran and Russia? Turkey’s closer ties with Iran and Russia, driven by strategic interests and energy partnerships, contrast with Egypt’s cautious engagement with these powers, reflecting a broader strategic divergence. Moreover, how might this rapprochement affect their relations with Western powers and Israel? Both countries must navigate complex relationships with these actors, whose interests and policies could be influenced by the shifting dynamics between Cairo and Ankara. Similarly, Israel’s reaction to this rapprochement, given its own strategic interests and security concerns, could further impact the trajectory of Egyptian-Turkish relations.

…a significant opportunity for Greece to promote a trilateral initiative aimed at fostering dialogue and cooperation among Greece, Egypt and Turkey. 

Last but not least, the détente represents a significant opportunity for Greece to promote a trilateral initiative aimed at fostering dialogue and cooperation among Greece, Egypt and Turkey. By advocating for a collaborative approach to regional issues, Greece could create a platform that encourages Egypt and Turkey to engage more constructively with one another. Such an initiative could start by focusing on shared goals, such as achieving a ceasefire in the Middle East and addressing migration challenges. Through such an initiative, Greece could not only improve its relations with both countries, it could also assert its role as a key player in the Eastern Mediterranean. This could help lay the groundwork for a more cohesive and collaborative regional framework and for enhanced regional stability, shifting the strategic landscape towards peace and mutual understanding while simultaneously giving Greece leverage in its own bilateral relations with Turkey and Egypt. 

 

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[1] Gencer Özcan, Policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours, European Institute of the Mediterranean 2012: https://www.iemed.org/publication/policy-of-zero-problems-with-the-neighbours/

[2] Libya emerged as a major crisis hotspot. The first phase of the Libyan Civil War started in February 2011 and lasted eight months, while the second phase started in May 2014 and ended in October 2020. It resulted in the removal of Muammar Gaddafi and marked a shift in regional power dynamics. Pan-Islamism (Arabic: الوحدة الإسلامية) is a political movement that promotes the unification of Muslims within a single Islamic nation or state, often envisioned as a caliphate, or within an international organization governed by Islamic principles. The ensuing political upheavals saw differing ideological currents emerge, notably between Pan-Islamism, championed by Turkey, and Pan-Arabism, historically aligned with Egypt. Pan-Arabism (Arabic: القومية العربية) is a political movement and belief system which advocates for the nationalist notion of cultural and political unity among Arab countries. Its origins go back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when increased literacy sparked a cultural and literary renaissance known as the Nahda (al-nahḍah al-adabiyyah) among Arabs in the Middle East.

[3] Omar Sheira, Turkey-Egypt Relations: Incentives to Normalize, Global Political Trends Center (GPoT), September 2014

[4] Ofir Winter and Gallia Lindenstrauss, Egypt and Turkey following the Failed Coup: The Interrupted Thaw, Institute for National Security Studies, No. 842, August 2016

[5] Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, The Eastern Mediterranean as an Emerging Crisis Zone: Greece and Cyprus in a Volatile Regional Environment, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2021

[6] The Solution Process (Turkish: Çözüm Süreci; Kurdish: Proseya Aştiyê), also known as the Peace Process or the Turkey-PKK Peace Process, aimed to resolve the Kurdish-Turkish conflict which had been ongoing since 1984, resulting in ca. 40,000 casualties and significant economic and social damage to Turkey. Since 1984, there have been more than six peace-making “attempts.”

[7] Military operations in Syria and Iraq against the Kurds; military involvement in Libya supporting the Government of National Accord (GNA) against the forces of Khalifa Haftar; general military preparedness for developments in the region.

[8] Meliha Benli Altunışık, The New Turn in Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Regional and Domestic Insecurities, FFPS – Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2020, ISBN 978-88-9368-137-7

[9] Ibrahim G. Aoudé, Turkey and its Immediate Arab Neighbors in the Twenty-first Century, Pluto Journals, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1-2 (Winter/Spring 2020), pp. 91-108

[10] Yahia H. Zoubir, The Protracted Civil War in Libya: The Role of Outside Powers, Insight Turkey, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Fall 2020), pp. 11-28

[11] Tarek Megerisi, Libya’s Global Civil War, European Council on Foreign Relations (2019)

[12] Sarah Feuer, Yoel Guzansky and Gallia Lindenstrauss, A Violent Theater of Regional Rivals, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2019

[13] Libya is the ninth largest oil producing country in the world and controls 2.9 percent of the world’s oil reserves.

[14] The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Turkey and Egypt was signed on 27 December 2005 and came into effect on 1 March 2007.

[15] Amr Adly, How Egypt and Turkey Trade Amid Tensions, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, Oct. 2021: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/11/how-egypt-and-turkey-trade-amid-tensions?lang=en&center=middle-east

[16] Tuvan Gumrukcu, Egypt’s Sisi makes first presidential visit to Turkey in 12 years, Reuters, Sep. 2024: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypts-sisi-heads-turkey-first-presidential-visit-12-years-2024-09-04/

[17] International Crisis Group, Egypt’s Gaza Dilemmas, Crisis Group Middle East and North Africa Briefing N°91, May 2024

[18] Gallia Lindenstrauss & Rémi Daniel, Turkish-Israeli Relations at a Dangerous Turning

Point, Institute for National Security Studies, No. 1835, May 2024

[19] Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, Nauja Kleist and Hans Lucht, Europe and the refugee situation, Challenges for European Geopolitical Security, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017, p. 45

[20] Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, Nauja Kleist and Hans Lucht, Europe and the refugee situation, Challenges for European Geopolitical Security, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017, pp. 42-43

• Steady but low growth, a relatively high unemployment rate and a steadily shrinking local population highlight the need for a strategic approach through development initiatives.
• The NSRF programmes as well as the overall European cohesion policy constitute an integral part of the national development strategy and in the majority of cases NSRF funding represents the largest share of public development investments.
• The ROP Thessaly 2014-20 aimed to improve parameters in which the region lags behind, such as entrepreneurship and competitiveness, while integrating factors important both at the economic and social level, such as environmental sustainability.
• The delays and obstacles recorded underline the importance of a flexible public administration at the central and regional level that can manage programmes more effectively, as a centralised and highly bureaucratic planning and management system poses significant obstacles to the development of projects.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by by Pery Bazoti, PhD candidate, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.