Ideas on Europe Blog

In 2015, the Turkish government and the European Commission officially started a process for the modernization and expansion of the Customs Union between the European Union (EU) and Turkey (hereafter called “CU-EUT”). The CU-EUT entered into force 25 years ago on December 31st, 1995. While it provides a far-reaching trade integration for industrial goods, lately both the EU and Turkey have stressed deficiencies in the implementation of the agreement and have discussed extending trade liberalization to new areas like services, agriculture and public procurement. In December 2016, the European Commission asked the European Council for a mandate to launch negotiations with Turkey. However, so far, the European Council has refused to approve the mandate and has suspended any preparatory work for the reform of the CU-EUT over concerns about the democratic development and human rights situation in Turkey. Consultations about the opening of negotiation talks are still ongoing.

Amidst the recent political tensions between the EU and Turkey, we look back and analyze how successful the CU-EUT has been in spurring trade flows between Turkey and the EU.

 

Reassessing the CU-EUT trade effects

Previous studies have mostly drawn an underwhelming picture of trade creation within the CU-EUT. Many academic papers do not find evidence for a significant and relevant trade-enhancing effect. For the preparation of the opening of negotiation talks the European Commission also requested two external studies which reach sobering conclusions regarding the effect of the CU-EUT on bilateral trade flows: while the World Bank finds no statistically significant effect, BKP, Panteia, and AESA identify an overall negative impact of the CU-EUT on two-way goods trade. In order to provide a thorough reassessment of the CU-EUT effects on trade between the EU and Turkey, we apply the latest developments in the quantification of regional trade agreements and rely on a database of international and internal trade flows in the manufacturing sector between 1988 and 2006. In contrast to previous research, we find a statistically significant and strongly positive impact of the CU-EUT. Compared to trade flows under the Ankara Agreement which had been in place before, the CU-EUT has increased manufacturing trade between the EU and Turkey by 60%. We also show that deviations from the best practices in evaluating trade policies can explain why previous studies were often unable to find a significant and economically large effect.

 

The effects on trade between Turkey and non-EU countries

The implementation of the CU-EUT committed Turkey to align to the EU’s customs tariffs and rules, to its commercial policy vis-à-vis third countries, as well as to the EU’s acquis in the areas covered by the CU-EUT. This alignment resulted in a decrease of Turkey´s import tariffs and provided an impetus for reforming Turkey´s customs procedures and internal technical legislation. Besides the immediate effects on Turkish trade flows with the EU, these improvements may also foster Turkey´s trade with other partner countries. Based on recent contributions in the empirical trade literature, we are able to estimate these third-country trade effects. Our results indicate that the reductions in bilateral trade frictions between Turkey and non-EU countries after the entry into force of the CU-EUT have increased trade flows by 28%. Thus, the CU-EUT has significantly fostered Turkish trade not only with EU member countries but also with all other trading partners.

One heavily debated feature of the CU-EUT is its asymmetric structure as to the external commercial policy. The CU-EUT requires Turkey to recognize all trade policies taken by the EU vis-à-vis third countries, such as the signing of a free trade agreement or a change in the EU´s common external tariff. At the same time, as Turkey is not a member of the EU, it neither receives automatic reciprocal access to these outside markets nor is it permitted to participate in the negotiations of trade liberalizations with them. Under this set up the CU-EUT may have asymmetric third-country effects on Turkish im- and exports. Indeed, we find that Turkish imports from non-EU countries increase more strongly than its exports as a consequence of the CU-EUT. Nevertheless, the results also indicate that Turkish exporters benefit from the CU-EUT by gaining market access to non-EU countries.

 

Do some member countries and sectors benefit more from the CU-EUT?

Policymakers are often interested in the specific trade effects for a single member country or sector. Although economic theory suggests that generally countries gain from trade liberalization, recently many political debates about free trade agreements have raised concerns about “one-way trade deals” and challenged that they bring prosperity to the individual nations. Therefore, we also examine heterogeneous impacts of the CU-EUT for each pair of member countries within the customs union as well as for various manufacturing sectors. Estimating country- and sector-specific effects reveals substantial heterogeneity in both dimensions. The largest effects are found for trade between Turkey and Ireland, Portugal, Belgium as well as Finland, while the positive impact of the CU-EUT is lowest for Italy, Austria, and Germany as Turkey´s trading partners. As regards sectoral differences, trade has increased the most in Machinery and Wood, whereas the smallest coefficients are estimated for Minerals, Chemicals and Food.

At the same time, the heterogeneity analysis also demonstrates that the positive CU-EUT trade effects are far-reaching. We find that for almost all country pairs and sectors the CU-EUT has significantly promoted trade flows. Exceptions are Turkish imports from Italy, Denmark, and Austria as well as trade in the Metals sector. We also combine the two dimensions of heterogeneity, allowing for different ex- and import effects in each sector and country, and estimate in total almost 1001 different coefficients for the CU-EUT. Two thirds of these coefficients are significantly positive which demonstrates the widespread benefits from the customs union at a highly disaggregated level. Overall, our results highlight that both the EU and Turkey gained considerably from the CU-EUT in terms of trade creation.

 

Renegotiating the CU-EUT

The small trade effects in some sectors indicate a potential for additional liberalization of manufacturing trade in an upcoming renegotiation of the CU-EUT. Furthermore, the CU-EUT cannot be considered an exceedingly deep agreement in terms of covered provisions since it misses, inter alia, liberalization in primary agriculture, services, public procurement, and investment. There is still room for more far-reaching commitments which may stimulate trade flows between the EU and Turkey even more. Our analysis reveals that deep trade liberalization beyond a mere free trade agreement is a worthwhile endeavour. In that sense, an upcoming modernization of bilateral trade relations should not easily jeopardize the benefits arising from a customs union.

 

This blog is based on our article ”A Tale of (almost) 1001 Coefficients: The Deep and Heterogeneous Effects of the EU‐Turkey Customs Union”.

 

 

Mario Larch is professor of empirical economics at the University of Bayreuth. He is also a scientific advisor at CEPII, research professor of the ifo institute, external fellow of GEP, and CESifo research network fellow. His research focusses on theoretical and empirical international trade and econometrics.

 

 

 

 

Aiko Schmeißer is a PhD student at the Berlin School of Economics. He has worked on research projects in labor economics, international trade, and political economy.

Twitter: @AikoSchmeisser

 

 

 

Joschka Wanner is an assistant professor of quantitative economics at the University of Potsdam and external researcher at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. He works on econometric challenges in the estimation of trade flow determinants, as well as on international environmental agreements and environmental policy in a global context.

Twitter: @JoschkaWanner

The post Revisiting the Trade Effects of the EU-Turkey Customs Union appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The UK’s push for the frictionless market of the Norway option, while accepting only the obligations of the Canada option, was not viable. It was a delusion, either due to ignorance or self-deception.

Photo: James Veysey/Shutterstock/NTB

The UK never had the same vision of the EU as the other Member States. A main reason for the UK’s accession to the EEC in 1973 came down to economic difficulties. It did not wait long to show its distinctness, by demanding a budgetary rebate. Then, it got derogations from the common currency, the cooperation in justice and home affairs and social policy.

Jealous of its sovereignty, it slowed, with others, the coordination of the Member States’ economic and fiscal policies, foreign policies, cooperation on defence, as well as on police and justice and internal security.

During its 47-year membership, the UK helped to develop the single market (SM), to open external trade, to welcome new EU members and to preserve its idea of Europe.

PM May’s key decisions

When the British chose to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum, the UK’s concerns had all been met:

• by increasing the number of States and thus of possible vetoes from 9 to 28, without adjusting the EU’s decision-making
• by getting better control of the EU powers (subsidiarity) and eliminating federalist symbols
• by keeping the single market benefits, despite derogations from the euro, Schengen, and normal budget rules
• by preserving vetoes on foreign and defence decisions, police and judicial cooperation, internal security, and many areas

Brexit leaders promised that the UK would keep the single market’s benefits after leaving, as the EEA/EFTA countries do in the EEA framework (the Norway option). However, as soon as the first quarter of 2017, PM Theresa May took two key decisions:

• She triggered the two-year negotiation (duration fixed by article 50 of the Treaty on European Union) too early, at a time when there was no UK position, no study of options and deep divisions among people in the UK, and within Parliament and Government.

This put the UK negotiators under time pressure, while time was necessary to find a solution to avoid a border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

• She announced UK red lines: no freedom of movement, no Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), no customs union.

This excluded the Norway option for the future. It meant that the result could only be a hard Brexit, similar to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Canada and the EU (the Canada option).

Between Canada and Norway, there are only the cold waters of the Atlantic Ocean.

As I said at the time, between Canada and Norway, there are only the cold waters of the Atlantic Ocean. Trying to get a frictionless market, similar to the Norway option, while accepting only the obligations of the Canada option, was not viable. It was a delusion, either due to ignorance or self-deception.

Red lines

When PM Boris Johnson arrived at N°10, he managed to get a positive vote in the House of Commons on the draft Withdrawal Agreement (WA) negotiated by his predecessor, through slightly modifying provisions on the Irish issue. On this basis, he organised and won the general election.

Finally, the Withdrawal Agreement entered into force in February 2020, three and a half years after the referendum. PM Johnson then promised a hard Brexit and negotiated with the EU a Free Trade Agreement on the Canada option’s model. His negotiating team had only nine months to avoid a cliff edge and the application of WTO rules on 1st January 2021.

What were the red lines of the two negotiating parties?

For PM Johnson, the agreement on future relations with the EU had to fully respect the UK’s national sovereignty: the UK should decide alone its laws and policies, be the only master of its borders (no free movement of persons), its waters (EU fishermen), and its external relations (trade). The future agreement should exclude reference to EU law and to the CJEU, as well as cooperation on foreign policy and defence.

For the EU, the essential red line was to preserve the single market’s credibility.  As EU’s trust had decreased sharply after PM Johnson had tabled a bill violating the Withdrawal Agreement, the EU insisted on associating the Level Playing Field (LPF) conditions on open and fair competition (state aid, social and environmental standards) with a binding arbitration and possible unilateral cross-sector retaliations, should an arbitration ruling not be respected.

Both parties got their red lines respected. A solution for a decreasing access of EU fishermen to British waters during a transition period was also finally found, largely in favour of the EU.

The agreement (Trade and Cooperation Agreement: TCA) was initialled one week before the possible cliff edge. It is based on the respect of the rule of law and on the protection of fundamental rights. It provides for cooperation in many areas, while mentioning others for which unilateral decisions of equivalence or agreed cooperation could be developed.

New year, new realities

Despite the provisional implementation of the TCA, huge changes happened on 1st January 2021:

• Provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement permitting the UK to be treated as an EU member ceased to apply. British citizens lost the right to move freely to the EU 27 to reside, study, work, open a business, retire or have health care. Their (visa free) stay in the EU is limited to three months during any six-month period.
• The UK stopped benefiting from the EU’s single market, customs union (except for Northern Ireland), EU policies and most EU programs.
• As the TCA covers all goods, it should be beneficial to the EU, given its surplus of nearly £ 100 billion with the UK. Trade in goods continues to be tariff-free, but with non-tariff barriers: although not paying customs duties, goods must be checked at the border for their conformity with EU/UK sanitary and phytosanitary rules, norms and standards and rules of origin.
• Trade in services became difficult for British economic actors, not only for financial services’ providers, who lost the EU passport and did not get significant EU decisions of equivalence. While services represent nearly 80% of the UK’s economy, the provisions of the TCA for services are weak, comparable to the Canada-EU agreement. UK firms and individuals lost the right of establishment and to deliver some services in the EU.
• As for the fight against crime, including terrorism, the result is lose-lose, the UK being cut from EU institutions, organs, data bases and mechanisms (Europol, Eurojust, the Arrest Warrant, Schengen data bases, etc…), while keeping the Passenger Name Record and the Prüm cooperation. The EU did not adopt an equivalence decision for general transfer of data.

How to improve UK-EU relations?

The strategic, political and economic Brexit effects, especially for the UK, but also for the EU, will be negative, both in the short and the long term.

It was known before the referendum that Brexit could not lead to positive economic results. It was politically and ideologically driven, not aiming at economic results, but at increasing the UK’s national sovereignty.

The TCA’s aim was to reduce obstacles to trade created by Brexit. A soft Brexit was an illusion, excluded in 2017 by PM May’s red lines, confirmed and hardened by PM Johnson’s policies.

Given this context, what could be done to improve UK-EU relations? Should they, together, try to be less dependent on the external world? Should the EU be more open for closer cooperation with the UK in some areas? Which ones? Will both parties show good will?

 

This text is based on Jean-Claude Piris’ chapter in Handbook on the European Union and Brexit (Edward Elgar, forthcoming 2021), co-edited by EU3D researchers John Erik Fossum and Christopher Lord.

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Something’s bothering me about Brexit.

The main thrust of Johnson’s time in Number 10 has been ‘getting Brexit done’, which I have always taken to mean ‘getting Brexit off the front pages so we can get back to some more interesting/important thing’.

This has manifested itself in Johnson’s lack of engagement with the detail (or even much of the broad sweep) of negotiations for both the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade & Cooperation Agreement, in the lack of desire to get into impact assessments or comprehensive contingency planning/implementation activity, and in the general appeals to looking past whatever problems there are now to the bright, sunlit uplands, etc.

Emblematic in this was the decision after the 2019 general election to banish the very use of the word ‘Brexit’ in government communications, a decision that lasted until late 2020 and the need to ramp up work for the post-transition period required using the vocabulary that everyone else has stuck with.

In short, this government has appeared to have placed a lot of emphasis on moving on and getting away from the dramas of the May years. And the Cameron years, for that matter.

So why then has 2021 been so marked by an antagonistic approach to EU relations by the government?

Whether it’s not recognising the EU’s ambassador, or being holier-than-you on the Art.16 issue, or failing to demonstrably comply with the implementation requirements in Northern Ireland, the government appears to be taking a path of most resistance.

That, in turn, generates more the headlines and comment that it seemed previously to have shunned. Especially as it is the UK that regularly has to make a subsequent u-turn.

So what gives?

Firstly, let’s just think about what some logics of how a UK-EU relationship might work, in theory.

If the UK were to be very positive and friendly, then you’d expect a close relationship, with much effort to make the most of the opportunities presented to work closely and to find common ground.

But if the UK were fundamentally distrusting, then what? Well, the formal relationship would be as thin as possible, with none of the warm words, but you’d still expect that there was a rigorous and scrupulous implementation.

The reason would be that if you don’t trust the other lot, then you want to make sure that you cover your back. That means not leaving any gaps in what you do that could then be used against you, down the line, by them. If you have an agreement, you stick to it, and you make sure they stick to it too. Which means you hold them as close as if you were friends, just to make it harder for them to start pulling fast ones on you.

Again, this is about substantive action, rather than rhetoric: just as the US and USSR waged a war of words from 1945, that did not preclude arms-control treaties (with comprehensive inspection protocols).

Clearly, the EU and UK are not nearly in the same situation as that: armed conflict is no more on the table than are fundamentally different ideologies on the nature of the state and economic organisation. But the point remains that we might expect the practice of relations to be running more smoothly than it has.

Two main thoughts come to mind on why.

The first is the more prosaic explanation. The UK government might feel that having secured the treaties, they have both a pretty robust legal relationship with the EU and a much less interested British public. In that sense, job done. These current issues are minor compared to the high drama of 2017-9 and it’s good to keep the European issue alive to try and show the core constituency the value of having left.

In this view, this is just the rough and tumble of politics, trying to make a bit of local capital where possible. If you score a point, then good for pumping up your voters; if you don’t, then it’s not that serious and it wasn’t as if the EU’s going to just walk away from it all.

The second takes this to a deeper critique of British European policy, one that I’ve made before. In the absence of a strategic intention, the government lacks any clear direction for its dealings with the EU, and so deals with points on a case-by-case basis. Often that generates unintended consequences.

Now this shouldn’t, by itself, generate antagonistic behaviour, but we also know that part of the Johnsonian view of Brexit has been as an opportunity to new things with the country. All that’s lacking is clarity on what those things should be.

In this context, antagonism might make more sense, by preventing the emergence of steady-as-she-goes, pragmatic engagement. If EU relations are sinking back into mundanity, then there’s a risk of creating new path-dependencies that might preclude the bold action that Number 10 wants to take down the line. So keeping as much in the air as possible could be useful, at the strategic level.

What ties together these two ideas is their lack of grounding in the world and a failure to recognise the consequences of actions. Crisis management as a mode of policy-making is not simply a way of dealing with the situation in hand, but is also a product of dealing with it in that way: there is a vicious cycle of production and re-production.

Part of the reason the UK got to leaving was a failure to appreciate the potential consequences of holding a referendum in the first place, and an underestimation of the impact of prior rhetoric.

All of which leads us to wonder whether any lessons from the past have been learnt. On that, we might expect that things will continue to be problematic for as long as it takes for the strategic impasse lasts.

Don’t hold your breath.

The post Why be such a pain? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

There has been much speculation, and a lot of inaccurate gossip, about the EU’s vaccination programme. So, to get to the facts, please refer to this new and clear question and answer website setup by the European Commission to answer your questions. Just click the graphic:

Just click on one of the themes on the European Commission website to find relevant questions and answers on COVID-19 vaccination in the EU, vaccine negotiations and its authorisation process.

I would like to add this: Everything to do with the management of this pandemic, by everyone, every country, the UK, the EU, the USA, is a gamble.

That is not the issue.

The question is which gambles will pay off? And the answer to that we will not know until the end of this.

 SECOND DOSE DELAYS IN THE UK The reason that the UK has had to delay the second dose of the vaccine is because of shortage of vaccines.

If presented with that problem, based on the information I know (which is of course limited) I would probably take the same route: vaccinate as many of the most vulnerable people as possible with the first vaccine, to give them at least some protection.

But I would not pretend that isn’t a gamble, as full protection is only conferred after the second dose, and even then, we still don’t know for how long protection lasts.

• If vaccine protection lasts just 3-6 months, we are in serious trouble.
• If those that are only half vaccinated, or not vaccinated, help the virus to mutate (which scientists warn can happen) then we are in serious trouble.

The last thing we want is for the virus to outpace the vaccines. That’s why we need as many people across the world to be vaccinated as soon as possible.

 DIFFICULT DECISIONS Most of the government’s ‘gambles’ regarding the management of the virus have most certainly not paid off.

We have among the worst numbers of deaths from Covid-19 in the world.

However, I do hope that the government’s gamble in offering a first vaccine to as many vulnerable people as possible, and delaying the second vaccine, will pay off, and in retrospect, turn out to be the right course.

I have great empathy with the scientists and doctors helping to make these difficult decisions, because they don’t know all the answers, but I am sure they are trying to make the best decisions they can with the limited knowledge we have.

 GLOBAL THREATS If the handling of the pandemic is a practice run for how the world is going to tackle global warming, then I think the world is in serious trouble.

Countries should be working together to tackle the pandemic, just as they should to tackle climate change. Currently, it is not happening on the scale and speed necessary.

 GUY VERHOFSTADT MEP Guy Verhofstadt, former Prime Minister of Belgium, has posted strong criticism of the EU Commission’s deliberations in securing vaccines and calling it a ‘fiasco’.

You can read his objections on Facebook.

Good. It shows that the EU is open to democratic criticism, which is always how it should be.

However, on this, I don’t agree with ALL he has said.

CONTRACTUAL ISSUES Guy blames contractual issues for the delay in supplies of vaccines. His solution is for the EU to renegotiate the contracts.

That, in my view, is not necessary and entirely impractical. The EU is already in talks with the drug companies to facilitate and speed up manufacture so that they can fulfil their contractual promises.

Guy also says it was a mistake for the EU to insist that drug companies must accept civil liability for their vaccines.

I would say that was essential, to give Europeans confidence in the vaccines, especially since there is considerable vaccine scepticism across Europe.

The reason for the shortage of vaccines in the EU is because of problems in manufacture, openly admitted by the drug companies. Those problems are being resolved.

If the drug companies had supplied all the vaccines as contractually promised, this would not now be a problem.

There is a worldwide shortage of vaccines, and many countries (poorer ones) don’t have any. This issue is being addressed, but it will take time.

 MANUFACTURING PROBLEMS I am at pains to repeatedly point out that the date that the EU signed contracts with drug companies has absolutely nothing to do with the delay in supplies, according to currently available information.

If the EU had signed their contracts three months earlier, how would that have prevented today’s vaccine manufacturing problems, that could not have been foreseen last summer?

The EU’s contracts were, reportedly, more comprehensive than the UKs, and required drug companies to accept civil liability for their vaccines.

Furthermore, the EU required their European Medicines Agency to give full approval for the vaccines. The EU also secured vaccines at a much lower cost per unit than the UK.

That, of course, all took time, but from all I have researched on this, none of that is the cause of holdups in supply which are entirely down the problems of manufacture, which are not the fault of the EU.

 VACCINE PRICES I would also say that the EU’s insistence that the vaccines must be sourced at reasonable prices was the right move.

The Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine costs the UK government around £3 per jab, according to the BBC, whereas the EU is paying only around £1.80 per jab. South Africa is paying even more for AstraZeneca, at £3.84 a jab.*

Of course, everything I write today, could change tomorrow. It all depends on currently available information. If the information changes, so will my response.

We will only know which strategies turn out to be the right ones much later on.

But, frankly, we have to hope that all strategies being employed help all humans wherever they are in the world.

Until we can defeat Covid-19 across the entire planet, none of us are safe.

Ditto, global warming.

• 2-minute video:

• *Sources: BMJ The Week

• Join the discussion about this article on Facebook:

The post Don’t rely on inaccurate gossip about the EU vaccine strategy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The British approach to the Brexit talks

Another day, another round of Brexit negotiations. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, UK prime minister Boris Johnson has committed to driving a hard bargain of the EU, setting out unrealistic expectations, signalling the UK is prepared for ‘no deal’, launching parallel negotiations with the United States, and adopting a bullish rhetoric towards Brussels. This follows the hard bargaining strategy adopted by his predecessor Theresa May, which involved many of the same strategic: Threats to walk away from the table, Eurosceptic rhetoric, the claim that “no deal is better than a bad deal”, coupled with demands that would never have been met by Brussels.

The failure of hard bargaining might be one of the few valuable lessons from Theresa May’s (mis-)handling of the negotiations on the terms of British withdrawal: Claims to support a ‘no deal’ Brexit were not viewed as credible, unrealistic expectations established red lines which could not be rowed back from, hard-line Eurosceptic rhetoric undermined trust so heavily that the EU sought additional safeguards in the resulting agreement, the failure of which to live up to the promised outcome of the hard-line approach ensured its rejection (three times) in Parliament.

One reason is that hard bargaining only works well when conducted from a position of strength. From a position of weakness, threats do not appear credible, and high demands appear unjustifiable. Without the requisite clout, hard bargaining is either futile, or damaging, depending on the risk to one’s reputation of having one’s approach fail to succeed.

And the UK, to put it bluntly, is the less powerful actor in these negotiations: The EU27 has a far larger combined economy than the UK, greater expertise and bureaucratic capacity when it comes to international negotiations, control of the withdrawal process – through the ability to extend Article 50 or consent to an extension of the transition period – and, perhaps ironically, is more unified in its goals than the UK itself.

The EU is able to withstand a no deal Brexit in a way the UK is not. And the UK has few alternatives to this outcome, since most of the rest of the world opposed Brexit and has promised to prioritise their relations with the EU. The much-vaunted free trade agreement with the US, meanwhile, will come at a hefty cost, and might not pass the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives.

Why, then, does the UK continued to drive a hard bargain in the Brexit negotiations, even as its relative weakness becomes more evident, and the failures associated with hard bargaining begin to stack up?

We argue that a number of sources of British hard bargaining are cultural – that is, they are rooted in the norms of the UK’s political environment and its relations with its European partners which are long-lasting and which continue to impact on how the UK perceives the negotiations, irrespective of its objective bargaining power.

Drawing on interviews conducted in Brussels and London during 2017 and early 2018, we suggest a number of sources of British hard bargaining which are rooted in cultural factors rather than simply in the domestic political environment of the UK.

 

The cultural sources of hard bargaining

To begin with, perceptions are important. British politicians view their country as more powerful than it actually is, a misconception with a lengthy pedigree – consider the Suez Crisis in this respect – and are prone to overestimate the UK’s bargaining capabilities. Discourses of a ‘great global Britain’ and ‘concentric circles’ of British influence reinforce these misperceptions. The predictable result is the adoption of a harder bargaining strategy than is warranted for an actor far weaker than the EU27 combined.

Moreover, British politicians are not used to compromising with Europe. Successive rounds of treaty negotiations – which the UK has stormed in with demands for rebates and opt-outs – have generally resulted in concessions for the British. This is perhaps unsurprising, since the demands of such a powerful member state as the UK have needed to be taken into account during successive moments in the integration process. But it has reinforced the idea that hard bargaining tends to be rewarded.

And then there is the lack of meaningful socialisation. British membership of the EU – as has been noted by many – has been justified on largely instrumental terms. Unlike ‘the six’, or newly democratic nations, membership for the UK meant greater prosperity and greater international influence. The kind of normative bonds necessary for developing a shared worldview, which would have underpinned the search for compromise, were thus never created between the UK and its EU partners.

Then there are aspects of British politics which lend themselves to hard bargaining. For one thing, the Westminster system is more adversarial. Politicians cut their teeth in debating societies and this tradition of uncompromising engagement is carried on in the legislature, with the benches of the British Parliament arranged in opposing fashion. Moreover, single-party majority government is the norm in the UK, and British politicians do not take easily to the kind of compromises required of coalition government.

Ideology is also a factor, notably that held by a number within the governing Conservative party. The ideology of conservatism undergirds hard bargaining in two respects: First, most conservatives tend to be realists when it comes to external relations, and to venerate the demonstration of strength as a precondition for negotiating success in response. Second, conservatives tend to be more individualist, and this competitive worldview lends itself to driving a harder bargain.

 

More of the same?

Hard bargaining is not a rational strategy mandated by the UK’s relative power positions, nor a mere performance for domestic audiences, but is rather rooted in a number of cultural factors specific to the UK and its relationship with Europe, each of which push in the direction of a harder bargaining strategy.

In fact, the cultural sources of hard bargaining in the UK context are somewhat overdetermined, given Britain’s weak socialisation into European norms, its historical experiences of hard bargaining, perceptions of British power and prestige, its conflictual political institutions, and the (present) dominance of right-wing ideologies based on individualism and realist visions of statecraft.

But this does not mean Johnson will be any more successful than was Theresa May in deploying strategies linked to hard bargaining, since he will face the same constraints as May: The UK threat to withstand a no deal Brexit is not credible, Britain stands to lose far more than the EU, and unmeetable demands will ultimately harm the UK more than they will Brussels.

In fact, the upshot of highlighting the cultural sources of hard bargaining is that it exposes the biases ultimately responsible for the choice of a sub-optimal bargaining strategy. But these are deeply rooted. Irrespective of the utility of hard bargaining, expect more of the same in the coming months.

 

This blog draws on the JCMS article Negotiating Brexit: The Cultural Sources of British Hard Bargaining.

 

 

Benjamin Martill, University of Edinburgh

 

 

 

 

Uta Staiger, UCL European Institute

The post The Cultural Sources of British Hard Bargaining appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Map of the Belt and Road Initiative, Eurasian Economic Union and their overlap in Central Asia, prepared by Natalia Leskina

Natalia Leskina

China, Russia and their regional projects intersecting in Central Asia – Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – have been in the limelight recently. Despite the fact that educational component pays an important role in both the EAEU and BRI, the information about their educational initiatives remains scarce. That is why with my colleague Emma Sabzalieva we started our research by asking: how are Russian and Chinese led visions for Eurasian higher education regionalism developing in Central Asia, and to what extent do these visions overlap? how do the Central Asian states approach this presumed role in Eurasian higher education regionalism?

Despite common expectations that the interests of Russia and China in Central Asia are in competition and could lead to confrontation, researchers have found out that instead, they operate harmoniously in the region. This has been explained by “the division of labor”: in other words, Russia’s military power does not confront China’s economic power.

But this explanation does not match the higher education policy area, where similar ideas on a Eurasian higher education area are fostered by Russia and China: both EAEU and BRI include higher education as a complementary to other competences, and the regions are planned to be built in similar ways through the mutual recognition of qualifications, joint degrees, and academic mobility. Both competition and collaboration can be found in the overlap of the EAEU and BRI educational components in Central Asia.

 

Why to use “points of correspondence” instead of collaboration/ competition?

We found out that relations between China and Russia are more nuanced than the collaboration/competition dichotomy. This finding led us to search for concepts that would adequately grasp the regional dynamics at play. In doing so, we turned to the original concepts developed by China, Russia and Central Asian states.

Thus, we introduced the “points of correspondence” concept to describe the current configuration in Eurasia. This concept is derived from the Russian term “sopryazhenie” (сопряжение) and Chinese zui jia qi he dian (最佳契合点) and means “the ongoing pursuit to find ideas and policy tools that best fit one another” without flowing into each other.

At the third Ghent – Russia Colloquium in 2019, Prof. Yang Cheng compared Sino-Russia relations with a family: even if you do not like each other, you are linked and therefore you need to compromise and find a way to live together because of the common duties. This way of thinking is incorporated in the “points of correspondence” that allow both competition and collaboration.

It also shows how the position of Central Asian states allows this co-existence and also is a tool to exert their agency that shapes Eurasian regionalism. At the same time, each of the parties has its own understanding of what “points of correspondence” actually means.

 

“Points of correspondence” as coordination between Russia and China

For Russia “points of correspondence” means “coordinated and parallel development” of the China-led BRI together with the EAEU. In practical terms it implies that Beijing should respect Moscow’s interests in the post-Soviet space, i.e. any integration issues have to be discussed at the regional level instead of bilateral agreements that may seem to be behind Russia’s back.

BRI also seeks connectivity with the regions already in place. But China has a slightly different view on the coordination: it understands the need to show respect for Russia’s interests and to this end is ready to engage in official dialogue, but at the same time Beijing still prefers to handle issues at the bilateral level.

Effectively, in 2019 China and Russia signed a cooperation agreement between the EAEU and BRI following a joint statement four years before. But Beijing still puts great emphasis on bilateral agreements in higher education: in 2017 China had signed bilateral agreements on mutual recognition of qualifications with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The same comes to the allocation of mobility scholarships and participation in the BRI university alliances.

 

“Points of correspondence” as a way of exerting agency by Central Asian states

In general, the Central Asian states welcome both BRI and EAEU, but to a different extent. Kazakhstan has its own vision of a Eurasian higher education area and actively promoted it so far, making wide-ranging propositions from the development of mobility to the recognition of qualifications and a Eurasian university ranking. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan welcome both BRI and EAEU, emphasizing the need for new technologies and innovations to revitalize the economies of the region. Turkmenistan and, until recently, Uzbekistan remain on the most neutral end of this spectrum of responses to the new initiatives.

Instrumentally, Central Asian states engage China and Russia in points of correspondence as a way to balance their ambitions in the region. Simultaneous participation in overlapping regionalisms allows them to choose bilateral or multilateral format, to engage with China’s or Russia’s vision, depending on the issue at stake, and ultimately, to shape the actual regionalism on the ground.

The “points of correspondence” emerging between the EAEU and BRI in Central Asia characterize the development of Eurasian higher education regionalism and add new nuances to the research of education areas beyond Europe. At the same time, our findings raise questions about the extent to which “points of correspondence” could travel beyond this area and factors that contribute to their emergence.

 

 

Our paper is part of Special Issue of Eurasian Geography and Economics on Sino-Russian relations edited by Fabienne Bossuyt and Marcin Kaczmarski. Here you can read our article in full. If you are interested to know how our article came into being, you can read Emma’s blog. This article was presented at the Knowledge Politics and Policies section of the virtual ECPR General Conference in 2020.

 

Natalia Leskina is a doctoral researcher at the Department of International Relations at Ural Federal University, Russia. Her research interest is higher education regionalism with a regional focus on the post-Soviet space.

 

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Introduction

Today’s modern European democracy grants every adult citizen – regardless of race, gender, social status, wealth, or education – the right to vote in the form of universal suffrage. The right to vote (or active suffrage) is not to be taken for granted, as until the second half of the twentieth century not all adults were permitted to vote in Europe. Despite the relative electoral passivity (based on low turnout figures in most European states), the right to vote is the most important tool in the people’s hands to shape the policies of their countries by deciding whom they trust to govern. Suffrage is a powerful mean, which ultimately affects every single person in- and even outside of the given community or state. Therefore, I find it vital to review the principles of both active and passive suffrage, and propose regulations to redefine the characteristics of and the dynamics between voters and candidates.

 

Active suffrage

Today, every adult citizen has equally one vote, which is granted on the single condition of being a citizen of the state and reaching a certain age (usually 18). The adult citizen’s vote defines the fate of the community or state by empowering certain political groups with certain ideologies and policies. The fact that decides whether the individual’s vote leads to prosperity or failure is that how well people can judge the complex and broad range of matters related to governance, which include the subjects of economics, politics, social issues, laws of nature, armed forces, foreign policy, and even history – amongst others. Arguably, the overwhelming majority of the adult citizens do not comprehend even the basics of these subjects, because they are either uneducated or uninterested – often both. Due to the lack of understanding, election campaigns focus on targeting people’s emotions instead of their intellect, as it is easier to manipulate than convincing them. In turn, people vote without knowing the exact programmes and previous results of the contesting political forces, concentrating on catchy campaign promises, sympathy, appearance, race, or religion instead. The result is a blind-leading-blind-society, in which one expert vote stands against ten inexpert votes, and in which the clueless majority rules over expertise and knowledge.

Let me translate my argument to three simple examples, which highlight the enormous shortcomings of universal suffrage. Should one have the intention of driving a car, reaching the legal age limit and possessing a driving licence are mandatory. In order to obtain the right to drive, one must pass a theory exam (including first aid), take driving lessons, and complete the driving exam eventually. The margin of error is very thin, as one has to score almost 100% on each of these exams to succeed. For the purpose of driving safely, one must know and apply numerous rules regarding traffic regulation, operation of vehicle, and first aid perfectly. Should the driving licence be our birth-right as the suffrage is now, everybody, who can afford a car, could sit in and drive as pleases. Let us imagine the disaster it would bring to the roads! The point of going through all the necessary procedures of learning and applying is to avoid disastrous accidents and deaths by providing the right to drive only to those, who can provably drive safely.

Also, should one desire to work in a senior role at any enterprise, the necessary qualifications and experiences are required by the ownership to ensure that the applicant is going to enhance prosperity. Supposing that the director and the managers are not experts, the enterprise is going to stagnate or decline, harming the well-being of all employees. Therefore, only those should be allowed to fill these positions of responsibility, who provably and completely understand the job that has to be done. However, being an expert is only one side of the story. Should the employees be allowed to decide who to nominate as director on a democratic election, less qualified candidates could enter the competition, in which popularity would become a dominant factor instead of expertise. In order to convince the employees, and get elected into the powerful position, the director elects would promise almost anything (e.g. higher wages, more paid holidays, reduced working hours). Employees themselves could stand for election, regardless of education, experience, or general knowledge. It seems to be an equal opportunity for everyone, which sounds incredibly fair, but it is actually not. The immediate results would be loss of revenue and bankruptcy, which is quickly followed by unemployment and poverty. Therefore, it is essential to leave positions of responsibility to proven experts, who are chosen by people with at least a basic knowledge of matters.

The most ordinary example of universal suffrage is the example of family. Let us say that a family of five (mother, father, and their three children) wants to decide on a new form of decision-making by introducing democratic principles. Assuming that only the father and the eldest daughter would like to run for the position, they prepare their programmes, which they intend to present to the other members of the family in order to get elected. Father, knowing the exact figures of revenue and expenses, tries to put together a programme, which is sustainable and reasonable. Whereas, the eldest daughter, knowing nothing of the exact figures, tries to present an appealing deal with lots of promises in order to gain popularity. Father would argue that separating funds for rent, bills, food, and other necessities are more important than spending on sweets, toys, and games. At the end of the debate, mother, being convinced by reason, votes for father, but the children, anticipating more pleasure and treats, vote for the eldest daughter. When the vote is done, the children’s will is going to prevail over their parents’, as the rule of democracy is that everybody has one vote and the majority decides. The result of the vote is three inexpert votes against two expert votes, which means that the election is won by someone, who does not understand anything about how the household should be managed. Should the rent and bills not be paid, the family is out on the street in a short period of time. The eldest daughter could also pass a legislation to refuse attending classes in school, even tough it is in the children’s essential interest, what they do not necessarily understand yet, but their parents do.

As the examples intend to present, most people should not be permitted to get involved into decision-making due to their lack of knowledge; moreover, they themselves are in the need of appropriate leadership. Therefore, the abolishment of universal suffrage and the redistribution of votes are essential to accomplish. The solution is to launch an educational course on state affairs organised and financed by the state. The course could be designed to be as simple as possible, minimising the physical attendance in a few hours each month. The core of the course would be a book – written by experts, not politicians –, covering the basic overview of state affairs. This book must be explained and discussed on the course, whilst read and memorised at home. At the end of the course, the citizen can decide to take an exam and thus earn the right to vote. In order to succeed in passing the exam, the citizen should score at least 91%, which would make them eligible to a certificate, fulfilling the precondition of suffrage. Should one fail, the exam can always be repeated. Should one not pass the exam until the next elections, the citizen is not permitted to vote (the participation on referendums is an exception, as it is not binding legally). The certificate must be renewed before every general election. The preparation course, the learning material, and the exam would cost nothing to the citizens, as it would be covered by the state entirely. Nobody would be deprived from suffrage, because the chance is given to match the basic conditions of knowledge required; therefore, it is up to the citizen’s commitment and determination to learn and earn the right to vote.

 

Passive suffrage

It is important to enlighten the voters, but it is not enough alone to create an enlightened democracy; the preconditions to stand for election (or passive suffrage) must also be redefined, focusing on the topics of expertise, accountability, and campaign regulations.

Our hearts have many desires, which cannot be all expressed for the sake of our well-being; therefore, it is our brains’ duty to control our emotions, filtering them by letting through only the constructive ones. It is almost the same with all different demands and wishes of the different people within a community or state. Their voices must be heard, but should not everything be accomplished, as it is likely to be rather destructive for the well-being of the entire community. Therefore, an enlightened government should endorse only those demands, which are going to benefit the state and the people within. It is imperative and in the interest of every citizen to entrust governance to a provably expert leadership.

However, most politicians are far from being experts. It might be sad, but the harsh truth is that they do not have to be, as there is not a single legislation in any country, which would require candidates to prove their expertise. Candidates have to fulfil only one condition to be elected into office: popularity. Many actors, comedians, and businessmen got elected into high positions due to their popularity (e.g. US) – expertise was irrelevant. The fact that popularity is far more important than expertise and competence reduces trust in democracy on long-term, and causes one of the root causes of the multiple crises we witness today globally (e.g. climate crisis). In my view, an independent committee of experts should approve the candidacy based on expertise and competence (e.g. qualification, experience, language skills) before each election campaign. This way, the wheat can be separated from the chaff before elections, avoiding potential disasters of bad policy-making.

The next step is the regulation of campaigning, which means that the politicians must summarise their campaign promises and publish them. This contract of election would ensure the presentation of a clear programme, which must be accomplished as much as possible. It would be the duty of an accountability committee to supervise that the agreement is fulfilled. Should the elected political force purposefully neglect the fulfilment of their campaign promises, legal consequences are to be implemented. I find this element crucial, as politicians are allowed to promise whatever they want, fooling their voters deliberately, but they are not held accountable for their promises and wrongdoings at the end of their terms. The worst that can happen is that they are not reelected, which is not of any consolation to the deceived.

The regulation of campaigning would also include the restriction of political adverts and the introduction of real debates on exact policies. This would end smear campaigns and dissolve the odd mixture of politics and showmanship, in which cheap manipulation dominates over expertise by using dirty language and fake statements in every political advert or appearance. Also, the blurry and meaningless programmes, and populist lies would disappear once and for all. All elected candidates shall be legally obliged to account for their results in office after their terms – without exception.

 

Conclusion

As a result of politicians purposefully and constantly lying to the voters, people put up with the fact that politicians are not trustworthy or outright liars. Many voters would not even bother to vote, let alone take the time to research each party’s agenda. Many of those that decide to vote, doing it based on half-truths or beliefs instead of facts. The communist-turned-extreme liberal parties of Eastern Europe are one of the best examples of how a dictatorial political party can change its cloak from one day to the other to pose and sell itself as the most liberal one in the new era – and most people bought it. Infamous examples of recent years, such as the deceitful 2015 Greek Bailout Referendum and U-turn in policy of Greece’s Syriza, the deception of Brexit’s Leave campaign, and the breakthrough of Trump’s incompetence, all share one common feature: deliberate and shameless lying to the voters in order to gain popularity, thus power.

Regrettably, deceit is embedded in the fundament of democracy; therefore, the abolishment of this dysfunctional system is vital, and begins with the reformation of suffrage, which has two directions: one from below (active suffrage) and one from above (passive suffrage). The result is a new, revolutionary, enlightened political system, in which the candidates are proven experts and the voters are expected to be aware of the basic consequences of their decisions. In enlightened democracy, political parties and their candidates would have to prepare and present their programmes to a very different type of voter that is not a mere political consumer anymore, but a conscious citizen. As a result, sustainable prosperity, political stability, and general well-being would prevail over corruption and inertia.

In enlightened democracy, active suffrage would not be an unconditional birth-right anymore, but earned by learning. Also, the preconditions of passive suffrage would require one to be a proven expert on the given field, to convince the voters in a civilised manner, and to be accountable for their results at the end of their terms. The success of every other reform that aims to improve our life in a united and enlightened Europe depends on this foundation.

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This week, the government published some commissioned research on the financial impact of Brexit on UK universities. The work looked at the likely impact of changing demand from EU students in response to various changes in fees and finances. The broad picture of the impact was that while numbers would fall markedly, that would be partly offset by the rising tuition fees. In the case of ‘cluster 1’ (Oxford and Cambridge) that would mean an increase in income, but for the rest of the sector, a drop (especially for cluster 3 (roughly, pre-1992s)). This is much as you’d expect, given the relevant international prestige of institutions and their exposure to international markets. But what the analysis is not, is a full estimation of costs of Brexit to HE. Even within the narrow coverage of the report – students – it does not take account of those factors that are not immediately financial in nature, such as social attitudes in sending countries towards the UK, or the soft power gains of exposing students to life here. Likewise, the scoping of foregone benefits from students remaining to work after their study is limited by some significant gaps in what data is to hand. But students are only one vector of Brexit impacts. Even with continuing participation in Horizon Europe, the UK will lose out on research funding opportunities, mostly because of staff deciding to move out of the country. The attractiveness of British HE as a global convenor of research and higher education more generally is compromised by the restriction of access to the EU. All of which suggests that the costs to the sector will be much more considerable than this report outlines. In some senses, this is a similar situation to the City: a reputation as a global centre seems to work against public policy solutions. Instead, the sector can shrug it all off and thrive mightily [sic], just like before. But this is not a case of carrying on regardless. All clusters are contingent and chipping/hacking away has an effect. In extremis, that might mean a failure of the cluster altogether; maybe not immediately, but further down the line, when it is all but impossible to stem the flow. I’d suggest we run a workshop about this, but that’s not really going to cut it.

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In the last decade, a number of European donors, including the EU, has framed their development policy within a human rights-based approach. Donors have also increasingly been willing to sanction their partners for non-compliance with human rights. Recently, the promotion of LGBTI human rights have been subsumed in several donors’ development policies. The EU, for instance, adopted in 2013 Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBTI persons.

The EU’s expansive LGBTI rights frame has, however, been politicized, both within Europe and in beneficiary states. EU heads of delegations have been expelled from the Gambia and Tanzania because they criticized the treatment of LGBTI persons in these countries, and aid has been cut back as a result. In a recent article we shed light on why and how politicization of LGBTI human rights promotion occurs within donor states and in partner countries.

Our findings add nuance to the debate on human rights promotion by showing that it is primarily not the validity of a universal LGBTI human rights norm that is politicized, but rather the way in which this norm is applied in a conditional strategy that causes politicization.

 

Politicization in beneficiary states

In beneficiary states, contestation of LGBTI human rights promotion is based primarily on grounds that it challenges the principle of state sovereignty. The more human rights issues are stringently applied in a conditional strategy, the more such rights norms are exposed to politicization. Postcolonial studies have argued that universal justice and principles developed in the Global North constitute a form of neo-colonial intervention in the Global South. Such efforts may in turn result in an outright rejection of LGBTI human rights among some actors in the Global south, where LGBTI human rights promotion is perceived as the imposition of ‘homocolonialism’.

Adding to this literature, we find a more nuanced applicatory contestation in partner states. Human rights activists from the Global South contest the practice of aid conditionality but also insert themselves as change agents aiming to reshape the policies of international norm promoters. For instance, a coalition of civil society organisations in Uganda managed to influence several donors on how to shape their response to a harshly anti-LGBTI bill that was passed in 2014. While Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark adopted aid-cuts immediately, civil society’s influence on Swedish and UK authorities contributed to shaping their responses in a way that would cause less harm to the LGBTI population on the ground in Uganda.

At the same time, when local human rights activists increasingly cooperate with Northern states, they play into the homophobe pretext of the Ugandan government and their supporters, which politicize the LGBTI human rights norm based on the norm itself.

 

Politicization in donor states

In donor countries, politicization occurs through the application of the LGBTI human rights norm. Domestic civil society groups and parliaments tend to call for an accountability-driven approach towards development partners in order to show to their constituents and voters that they are actively ‘doing something’. EU diplomats, on the other hand, often argue for behind-the-scenes political dialogue with partner authorities. And some member states have historically conditioned interests that may lead them to be more stringent in specific cases at the same time as the EU aims at generalized LGBTI rights policy prescriptions

Our research also shows that there is a marked difference between the positions of domestic audiences in member states despite their similar degree of influence, and also that such pressure is much less visible at the EU level. This has resulted in the Council of the EU taking deliberate steps to depoliticize aspects of LGBTI human rights promotion in response to its contestation, aiming to respond with more context-sensitive solutions. This conciliatory approach has been contested by the European Parliament but the EP’s contestation was not as effective as in member states. Hence, policies are significantly more affected by political pressure from constituents ‘at home’ in the member states, which corresponds to domestic development and LGBTI rights policy priorities.

In sum, our case study of EU-Uganda relations finds that while the application of aid conditionality based upon LGBTI rights depoliticizes development aid within the EU as it makes it seem more accountable to domestic audiences, it politicizes aid externally because of the pressure exerted. In this case, our results indicate that that the promotion of human rights norms is contextual and not necessarily universal – unlike the claims themselves.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article ‘The politicization of LGBTI human rights norms in the EU-Uganda development partnership’

 

 

Johanne Døhlie Saltnes is post-doctoral researcher at ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo. Her research focuses on EU development policy, rights-based approaches to development and EU-Africa relations.

Twitter: @johannesaltnes

 

 

Markus Thiel is associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University, Miami and director of FIU’s Jean Monnet Center of Excellence. Dr. Thiel’s research interests are the political sociology of the EU and European (Union) Politics more generally, as well as Nationalism & Identity Politics.

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Since 2018, Italy and Malta have restricted access to their ports for NGO migrant rescue vessels. While both countries have faced criticism for this policy, it should be noted that since the 1990s, most EU member states have erected barriers along their borders to prevent irregular migration. There is, therefore, a degree of hypocrisy in other EU states portraying Italy and Malta as Europe’s ‘black sheep’ over their approach to the issue.

Tensions within the EU over responsibility for migrants rescued at sea escalated in June 2018 when Italy and Malta effectively closed their ports to NGO migrant rescue vessels. Although the duty to rescue persons in distress at sea is a fundamental rule of international law, it is not clear which state is legally responsible for their disembarkation. In practice, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that the master of a ship is obliged to rescue persons in distress at sea, yet it does not specify the procedures for disembarkation of such persons.

Migratory pressures are not distributed equally across the EU’s member states. Moreover, recent influxes of irregular migrants to the member states located on the EU’s southern borders have resulted in tensions between these states and other member states which are more protected against direct irregular entries. The former have long complained of the Dublin Regulation’s ‘first country of entry’ rule which puts an unfair ‘burden’ on them, as well as of the lack of solidarity from other member states to deal with a situation that is entirely due to their geographical position.

With regard to the Dublin rules, by establishing state responsibility for the processing of an asylum request, the assigned member state is required to grant reception conditions to applicants of international protection including housing, food, clothing, healthcare and education for minors. According to the OECD, the cost for processing and accommodating asylum seekers is estimated to be around ten thousand euros per application for the first year but can be significantly higher if integration support is provided during the asylum phase. Since the practice of providing international protection is costly, states have an incentive to discourage asylum seekers from seeking international protection in their territories and instead encourage them to do so in other EU member states with better conditions.

By accident of geography, member states located on the EU’s external southern borders stand at the forefront of irregular migration flows from Africa and Asia, thus carrying a disproportionate ‘burden’. Italy has become one of the primary host countries of the EU and the EU’s smallest member state, Malta, has had to deal with high per capita irregular arrivals in recent years. It could be argued, therefore, that the less affected member states ‘free-ride’ at the expense of the southern member states when it comes to the distribution of asylum seekers.

Despite widespread criticism of the Italian and Maltese governments’ decision to close their ports to NGO migrant rescue vessels, there is not one European government that currently stands out for its open immigration stance. In practice, all member states are protecting both their internal and external borders from irregular migration.

Hence the hypocrisy of portraying Italy and Malta as Europe’s ‘black sheep’ for having closed their ports when member states of the EU and the Schengen area have constructed almost 1,000 km of walls since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to prevent irregular migration. Ten member states (Spain, Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovenia, the UK, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) have built such border walls, with a sharp increase during the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ involving the creation of seven new barriers. As a result, the EU has gone from just two walls in the 1990s to fifteen by 2017.

Furthermore, following the outbreak of the crisis, several Schengen members resorted to reinstating internal border controls to prevent secondary movements of asylum seekers from other member states.

Table 1: ‘Temporary’ reintroduction of border control at internal borders

Note: Compiled by the author using data from the website of the European Commission

Although the Schengen Borders Code allows for the temporary reintroduction of border controls in the case of serious threat to national security, this was the first time they were reinstated for an extended period. Internal border checks have effectively been prolonged several times since 2015 and are set to expire on 12 November 2019. Rather than being reintroduced in exceptional circumstances, internal controls have become the political norm, justified on the grounds of migration control. This illustrates a lack of solidarity as well as lack of trust among EU member states, where precedence is given to national over shared interests.

Solidarity is one of the critical challenges facing EU asylum and migration policymaking and is becoming increasingly relevant as divisions and distrust persist among member states. As long as the principle of solidarity remains voluntary, it is unlikely that EU member states will pull together and agree on a long-term strategy, particularly one involving reform of the Dublin system to include a permanent relocation mechanism that would help member states facing disproportionate migratory pressure.

So what does the future hold for this policy domain? Will it continue to be dominated by the construction of walls and fences as well as permanent controls at internal borders? And could this lead to the end of Schengen, the most tangible success of European integration? There is a strong likelihood that EU asylum and migration policymaking will continue to be characterised by short-term ad hoc and unilateral measures since most member states perceive no benefits in developing long-term solutions.

This article was first published on the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) blog on European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) on 28 August 2019.

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As we were racing fast to leave 2020 behind, 2021 came as a slap on the face as the COVID-19 mutations promptly popped up in different parts of the World, including in the UK, Brazil and South Africa, which have made the successful vaccination roll out across the globe all the more crucial. While all celebrated the arrival of vaccines for COVID-19, they did not expect the failures in producing and distributing these life-saving vaccines to cause another European Union crisis. Neither friction was envisaged among the EU and the Member States, nor between the United Kingdom and the EU. While the EU’s handling of this crisis highlighted the EU’s weakest spot: slowness, thoroughness and its non-complying MSs. However, its manoeuvrers to take control of the vaccine crisis meant differentiation through non-compliance, indifference to institutional forbearance and extension of substantial and non-ideological material for the Eurosceptics in the EU and the UK.

From the very beginning, the European Commission and MSs have agreed on joint action against COVID-19 at the EU level; later adopted a centralised EU approach to secure supplies and support developing a vaccine.

However, when the AstraZeneca, pharmaceutical company producing the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine, began to suffer from manufacturing problems at one of its European factories and has declared that it will deliver less to the EU than it had planned in the coming months. Thus, the EU’s vaccine target-of 70 per cent of all adults by the summer- was put at grave risk. And from this moment onwards the EU’s common vaccine policy began to go downward spiral.

Chinese Sinopharm vaccine. Photographer: Zhang Yuwei/Xinhua/Getty Images

First, not known for its burden-sharing stance, but infamous for being the most non-compliant member of the EU, Hungary did not disappoint. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban criticised the EU’s vaccination efforts allegedly for being slow and ineffective.  Then broke ranks with the EU by licencing the Russian Sputnik vaccine and authorising the Chinese Sinopharm vaccine, ultimately disregarding the European Medicine Agency, which has not yet approved the use of these vaccines in the EU.

Second, when the EU was still drawing up its response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the mid-2020, the UK was still eligible to join the EU’s vaccine scheme, but the UK government opted out and pursued its vaccine strategy. The UK acted fast and decisively in concluding vaccine deals than the EU had done. We know now that the UK entered into a binding much robust contractual vaccine deal with AstraZeneca three months before the EU concluded its deal with the firm. However, the AstraZeneca’s manufacturing failures intersected the faith of the UK’s and the EU’s success in meeting their vaccine targets.

Following this crossing, the Commission’s rhetoric and positions have astonished those who thought that the EU is always the most cool-headed and sensible one in the room. The Commission first implicitly accused the AstraZeneca of giving preferential treatment to Britain in delivering its vaccine and asked some of the shortfalls to be made up with vaccine allotted for Britain and threatened that if AstraZeneca disagrees, supplies to Britain of other vaccines made in Europe may be affected.

However, it did not end here.

Just after publishing its redacted version of the vaccine contract with AstraZeneca on 28th of January and claiming that supply commitments within the deal are binding, on the same evening, the Commission briefly invoked the article 16 of the Brexit deal’s Northern Ireland protocol;  had they not retreated, border restrictions between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland would have worked as part of the Commission’s efforts to clamp down on vaccine exports from the EU.

There are three interconnected points I like to make.

My first point covers Hungary’s non-compliance with the EU’s common vaccine policy. Professor Frank Schimmelfennig argues that bad-governance countries with lack of the functioning rule of law and weak administrative capacity, like Hungary if they do not like an EU rule or decision, do not have to negotiate with the EU and ask for a formal exemption.  This is because these MSs can always find a way around by non-compliance with that rule or aspects of a common EU policy, just like the Hungarian government did thorough exploiting the EU’s slow progress in vaccine suppliance, and overriding the EU’s EMA–hence the outcome was a differentiation in the EU integration through non-compliance. Therefore, the EU should have been better prepared to have its MSs with the traits highlighted by Schimmelfennig to refuse to comply with the regulation of the EU’s vaccine scheme. Additionally, the EU should have adopted a toolbox for those non-complying MSs to keep every other MSs united. However, what is more, alarming is how Hungary’s position could pave the way for the other MSs, with similar political traits to Hungary, to challenge the EU’s unity and solidarity–thumps-down to the EU.

My other point involves the EU’s attempt to invoke Article 16 of the Brexit deal. One can say that the Commission did this out of desperation since it has been a one long dark year for everyone, but it may have severe repercussions for the EU’s stance on the rule of law. By Institutional forbearance Steven Levitsksy and Daniel Ziblat’], in their now much celebrated book titled, How Democracies Die, means that elected officials cannot exercise legal action that intentionally privileges one group of individuals at the expense of another. This helps to comprehend how Commission’s brief invocation of Article 16 is alarming and what dire consequences it would have on the EU’s stance on the rule of law. Yes, the Commission was privileged to act in this way, but not exercising that legal right could have been more beneficial to the EU and its relationships with the UK. The EU now has set precedence; we do not know which side will invoke Article 16 next and its consequences.

My third point concerns how the EU’s position in the UK and the UK’s relatively successful vaccine scheme may contribute to Euroscepticism in the EU and the UK. Wolfgang Münchau sai:d “{F}or starters, the EU has just provided a hindsight argument in favour of Brexit. The UK would not have proceeded with vaccinations as quickly if it had subjected itself to the same policy.” Thus, the Eurosceptics in the EU did not escape praising Brexit. For instance, although the Hungarian PM Orban does not campaign for Hungary’s exit from the EU since Hungary benefits a greater deal from its membership of the EU both economically and politically, he applauded Brexit for swift vaccines authorisation, which meant he exploited the opportunity well enough for his Eurosceptic audience. Furthermore, I agree with Münchau who also said: “The last thing the EU ever wants to do is give people a rational, non-ideological reason for Euroscepticism.”, which is in line with what Professor Simon Hix  predicts that the UK public will become more Eurosceptic now that it has left the EU, and because the UK is a weaker partner in this relationship. Sadly, the current row between the UK and the EU over Oxford Astra-Zeneca vaccine and the Commission’s unfortunate attempt to invoke Article 16 is supplying the UK tabloids with lots of material feeding into the Eurosceptic sentiment of the UK public, as well as into the political parties’ rhetoric– once again thumps-down to the EU.

Let’s hope the EU will learn its lesson from this vaccine debacle and next time around it will be better prepared and organized to act swiftly and decisively in global emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Failure to do so undermines the entire premises on which this union was conceived and stands.

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The so-called “refugee crisis” revealed the urge to ensure the functioning of the Schengen area and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the need to operationally assist those Member States most affected by the sudden and extraordinary arrival of mixed migratory flows, and the need to effectively and uniformly implement the EU measures adopted in regard to migration, asylum and border management matters. Against this background, the decentralized EU Agencies, Frontex, EASO and Europol, have emerged as key actors, not only in providing emergency operational assistance to the frontline Member States, but also in implementing the hotspot approach. The expansion of the operational role, multilateral cooperation, presence on the ground and institutional significance within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) of Frontex, EASO and Europol, is now unquestionable. Hence, this book entitled “EU Migration Agencies: The Operation and Cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol” comparatively analyzes the evolution of the operational tasks and cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol. Special attention is paid to the expansion of the legal mandates of these AFSJ agencies, the reinforcement of the activities they undertake in practice on the ground and to what extent a gap exists between these two dimensions.

The evolution of the operational tasks of Frontex, EASO and Europol is analyzed and two trends are highlighted. Firstly, while the Regulations of these AFSJ agencies continue to stress that their operational role is limited to providing the competent national authorities with the technical assistance they may require, the tasks of Frontex, EASO, and to a more limited extent, Europol, have an operational nature on the ground. Secondly, Frontex, EASO and Europol are increasingly involved in guaranteeing the effective and uniform implementation of EU migration, asylum and border management measures, as well as ensuring that the concerned Member States do not jeopardize the functioning of the Schengen area or the CEAS. These two emerging trends are discussed in turn.

In this book is pointed out that Frontex, EASO and Europol closely accompany the frontline Member States in the implementation of EU migration, border management and asylum policies. These agencies focus on operationally supporting the competent border, asylum and law enforcement national authorities in effectively implementing EU law. The expansion of EU competences in AFSJ matters has gone hand-in-hand with the reinforcement of their administration, which no longer falls exclusively on the Member States, but rather, on a conundrum of diverse actors, among which Frontex, EASO and Europol play a prominent operational role. The growing integration that the AFSJ is experiencing has led to a Europeanization of its administration. It is necessary to ensure a uniform and effective implementation of EU border management, asylum and migration laws. The long-standing notion of administrative and implementation power in AFSJ matters is therefore progressively shifting. The deepening of the operational powers and cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol is eroding the exclusive procedural autonomy that Member States previously enjoyed, when implementing EU law. These AFSJ agencies increasingly steer and shape the effective and uniform implementation of EU migration, asylum and border management laws and policies at the national level.

Furthermore, the extent of the operational functions of Frontex, EASO and Europol may theoretically range from merely coordinating and providing technical assistance to the Member States, to developing full-fledged enforcement and coercive powers. Since Frontex, EASO and Europol do not have independent executive competences, their tasks can no longer be described as merely technical or supportive. Despite the lack of transparency and the vague legal provisions regulating the activities that Frontex, EASO and Europol undertake in practice on the ground, their tasks do have an operational nature. The issue is that the legal frameworks of Frontex, EASO and Europol lag behind the real operational powers that these agencies exercise on the ground, which creates legal uncertainty.

The reinforcement of the legal mandates and inter-agency operational cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol thus reveal a trend, under which these AFSJ agencies are mandated to increasingly develop operational and implementation activities. The operational and implementation role of Frontex, EASO and Europol has followed a constant and linear progression since their respective establishment. While Europol, due to its still markedly intergovernmental nature, is starting to operationally assist the national law enforcement authorities in their national investigations about illegal migrant smuggling, Frontex and EASO already conduct significant operational tasks on the ground and ensure the implementation of the adopted European measures at the national level. Whereas the current tasks already represent an erosion of the operational powers and implementation prerogatives of the Member States, none of these AFSJ agencies have been bestowed centralized, fully autonomous operational and enforcement powers on the ground.

The reinforcement of the operational tasks and implementation role of Frontex, EASO and Europol is not in itself an issue. What is problematic is the broad formulation of these AFSJ agencies’ legal bases and the lack of transparency surrounding their operational activities and cooperation, rendering the task of determining the degree of discretion they enjoy difficult. The key challenge involves determining the degree of discretion that Frontex, EASO and Europol enjoy and whether the institutional balance in the EU is respected. In this light, and despite the fact that Frontex, EASO and Europol have not been vested with strictly delegated powers, this book followed the CJEU’s non-delegation doctrine as useful guidance to analyze the legality of these AFSJ agencies’ operational functions under EU constitutional law. The CJEU, in Short-Selling, updated and relaxed its initial Meroni doctrine, by no longer confining delegation to clearly defined executive powers, but rather to powers precisely delineated and amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives established by the delegating authority.

Unlike in the case of Short-Selling, the operational powers of Frontex, EASO and Europol are neither circumscribed by well-detailed conditions that limit their discretion, nor clearly detailed in a legal framework or their Regulations. These AFSJ agencies’ operational tasks are not restricted to merely providing technical support to the frontline Member States, but rather, they develop expanding cross-agency operational cooperation and activities on the ground. These agencies’ tasks entail the exercise of discretional prerogatives that are not narrowly delineated or clearly conditioned in any national or EU legal instrument. For instance, Frontex and EASO played a strong recommendatory role in the hotspots, which in principle, is compatible with the non-delegation doctrine, since the concerned Member States are not bound by Frontex and EASO’s recommendations. Nonetheless, the national authorities, subject to extraordinary migratory pressure, may decide to rubber-stamp the recommendations put forward by the agencies. Frontex’s influence over the Greek officials in determining the nationality of the arriving migrants, Europol’s advice and operational support to the national enforcement authorities to dismantle migrant smuggling networks, and EASO’s admissibility assessment of the asylum applications or the detection of vulnerable applicants encompass in practice discretional and political choices. In these cases, the responsibilities of the agencies are blurred, since the national authorities adopt a final decision based on the assessment of the agencies.

Although fully autonomous enforcement and coercive powers are not possible under the current Treaties and would breach the non-delegation doctrine, the ambiguity and lack of transparency surrounding the operational tasks that Frontex, EASO and Europol undertake on the ground challenge the determination of their discretion and whether they actually make policy choices. In the author’s view, the main limitation and control of Frontex, EASO and Europol’s distinctive operational and implementation role comes from the Member States. While it is true that Frontex, EASO and Europol assist the Member States in matters closely linked to their national sovereignty prerogatives, the competent national authorities that vote at the management boards tightly control their recently reinforced operational, implementation and supervisory functions. Only two representatives of the European Commission have voting rights in Frontex and EASO’s management boards and this figure falls to just one representative in the case of Europol. The presence of the European Parliament in Frontex, EASO and Europol’s management boards is non-existent. Member States also exert their influence over the appointment and supervision of the executive directors, who lead the governance, management and daily administration of Frontex, EASO and Europol.

Member States’ reluctance to fully abandon their well-established bilateral practices, share information and operationally cooperate with Frontex, EASO and Europol in core national sovereign matters, like border management, asylum or migration, is especially reflected in these AFSJ agencies’ management boards. The Member States will thus maintain control of the strategic decisions and the daily management of Frontex, EASO and Europol. While centralizing on the executive, decisional and enforcement powers of Frontex, EASO and Europol will ensure a fully effective and harmonized implementation, it is important to bear in mind that these agencies represent an institutional trade-off or a common ground between intergovernmentalism and communitarization in the AFSJ. That is, Member States do not wish to relinquish further sensitive competences to the EU Institutions; but at the same time, they increasingly need supranational operational assistance regarding matters that can only be effectively managed in an integrated manner at the EU level. For this reason, whereas Europol, Frontex and EASO have been conferred upon significant operational tasks, none of these agencies are vested with full decisional, enforcement or coercive powers, which remain as an exclusive competence of the competent national authorities.

Hence, this book makes four main contributions. First, it maps Frontex, EASO and Europol as EU decentralized agencies, which are clearly distinguished by their operational powers and by the possibility to directly assist the competent national authorities on the ground. In particular, the establishment and early operational functions conferred on Frontex, EASO and Europol are studied. Second, it comparatively analyzes the reinforcement of the operational tasks vested on Frontex, EASO and Europol, as well as the extent of their assistance on the ground and influence on the implementation prerogatives of the national authorities in the aftermath of the “refugee crisis”. Third, it explores the bilateral and multilateral inter-agency cooperation between Frontex, EASO and Europol. Specifically, the expanded multilateral and operational cooperation that takes place in the hotspots is studied. Fourth, the limitations to the reinforced operational activities and cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol is analyzed. The constitutionality and legal bases of these AFSJ agencies, as well as the degree of discretion that they enjoy according to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) non-delegation doctrine, is examined. The internal administrative organization and governance of Frontex, EASO and Europol is also studied as to determine the influence and real control that the Member States and civil society may exert over the increasing operational powers these AFSJ agencies have been conferred on.

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It was one year ago today that Britain left the European Union, and one month ago that we also left the EU’s Single Market and customs union.

So far, NOT so good.

Putting up costly and complicated barriers to trade with our most important customers and suppliers in the world is causing enormous headaches and losses for our businesses, without any apparent benefits.

Also today, the government announced that the UK is applying to join a trade bloc thousands of miles away – the Asia-Pacific free trade pact, or CPTPP, of 11 countries.

Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, said:

“One year after our departure from the EU we are forging new partnerships that will bring enormous economic benefits for the people of Britain.”

But in the EU, we already enjoyed comprehensive free trade agreements with three of the big economies in the CPTPP – Canada, Japan and Singapore.

And in any case, our exports to the CPTPP countries only account for around 8% of UK exports – tiny, compared to the 43% of all our exports that go to the EU, more than any other destination in the world by far.

 MISSING THE POINT Anyway, all this misses the point.

Being a member of the European Community was never just about trade. It was always about peace, first and foremost.

And attempting to increase trade with countries thousands of miles away also misses the point.

Most countries do most of their trade with their neighbouring countries – for good, practical reasons.

Also, in a world attempting to tackle global warming, doing more trade with countries thousands of miles away isn’t going to help. It will make the problem much worse.

 BREXIT AND VACCINES Today, some Sunday newspapers are attempting to justify Brexit because of the EU’s failure to secure vaccines in time, compared to Britain’s success.

Supply problems, especially with the AstraZeneca vaccine, have indeed hampered the EU – which was slower than the UK in securing contracts with pharmaceutical companies.

That was a serious mistake, as was the European Commission’s knee-jerk reaction on Friday to invoke Article 16 of the Brexit agreement, which would have put a border on the island of Ireland specifically for vaccine exports.

But within hours, the Commission realised its error and rapidly climbed down from its threat of invoking Article 16 (which, incidentally, Boris Johnson also threatened to invoke just two weeks ago).

If only our government was more willing to promptly acknowledge its errors of governance, that have resulted in over 100,000 Covid-19 deaths, the worst in Europe and close to the world’s worst, and contracts worth hundreds of millions of pounds going to mates of government ministers, without any proper tendering process or accountability, and resulting in the NHS either not getting PPE, or else receiving unusable PPE.

Vaccine supply problems in the EU, although of course a gravely major setback, will be resolved soon.

And as I explained in my feature article yesterday, the EU’s model of purchasing vaccines as a bloc for 27 countries, will probably have to become the model for the planet’s acquirement of vaccines in future global pandemics (as for sure, more are on the way).

The UK is proud to have, so far, vaccinated more people than any other country in Europe.

But as the World Health Organization pointed out yesterday, ‘vaccine nationalism’ will only prolong the pandemic.

Until all the world becomes vaccinated, rather than just richer countries, there is the danger, says WHO Director-General, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, that:

“the faster the virus will take hold, the potential for more variants will emerge, the greater the chance today’s vaccines could become ineffective, and the harder it will be for all countries to recover.”

So, the only way to beat the global pandemic is for countries to work together, not apart, and to ensure that treatments, tests, and vaccines are equitably and widely distributed to all countries world-wide.

 UK NATIONALISM Countries working together is also the way to ensure peace, prosperity, and security for our continent of Europe – the very reason that the European Community was established in the first place.

In the long run, UK nationalism – of any kind – is not going to work. We need to be a part of our European family of nations, and not apart.

No longer having any say in the running and future direction of our continent represents a loss of British sovereignty.

In time, the country will discover that Brexit means going backwards, not forwards. We will need a new democratic opportunity to reconsider Brexit, although that may be some years away.

In the meantime, please share the 8½-minute video embedded below as widely as you can. You might already have seen it, but many haven’t.

The video explains why Britain joined the European Community in the first place. The very same reasons why Britain is likely to want to join the EU again, one day in the future.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• My campaign page on Facebook: Reasons2Rejoin
• And LinkedIn

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• Join the discussion about this article on Facebook:

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By Bjarke Refslund, Aalborg University, Department of Sociology and Social Work

The impact of European Union legislation varies across different policy fields and across countries. Some policy areas like competition rules are highly, and directly affected, while other areas like social policies and labour market policies are only indirectly affected. Moreover, the member states varies in terms of compliance with European legislation. Some scholars and observers argue national policy actors are severely limited in their ability to regulate policy areas strongly influenced by Europeanisation, in particular Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law (what has been called judge-made law. National policy-makers, nevertheless, appear to have more political room for manoeuvre than often portrayed in the literature and in public debates, as I show along with my co-authors Jaehrling, Johnson, Koukiadaki, Larsen and Stiehm in our recent article in JCMS.

In the article, I and my co-authors investigate how public procurement policies have developed over the recent years in Denmark, Germany and the UK in the light of the prominent impact of Europeanisation within this policy field, in particular the 2008 CJEU Rüffert (C346/06)-ruling. Drawing on qualitative data, mainly interviews, from a comparative European project on precarious employment and social dialogue, the results show enduring national policy variation and how national actors, despite legal uncertainty utilise public procurement to endorse their own policy goals. Sometimes the actors directly challenge the case law, or at least utilise the legal uncertainty to further their own national policy agenda.

Public authorities are prominent buyers of goods and services in areas like cleaning and construction, but the procurements spans widely, and at EU level 14 per cent of GDP is spent on public purchase of services, works and supplies according to the EU commission. Following this the role of state, regional and local public entities such as municipalities and hospitals as ‘socially responsible customers’ has been increasingly discussed. In particular how public buyers balance social (like fair wages and working conditions) and economic (low prices which in turn often result in low wages and poor working conditions) implications of public spending. While the role of public procurement has historically been debated, the Rüffert-ruling caused great commotion and uncertainty, as it appeared to severely limited national polities ability to promote social goals with public procurement. However, more recent rulings like the RegioPost ruling combined with the new Procurement Directive has given renewed prominence to the social dimension of public procurement. Nevertheless, in most national settings legal uncertainty remain.

Policy-makers may have different goals with public procurement. For example, some national and local authorities are highly inclined to curb labour market precariousness and securing decent working conditions (and other social goals) when procuring, whereas other policy-makers are more inclined to secure the lowest prices, which in turn may result in poor wages and working condition for the affected workers. The contradictions between these two legitimate goals underlines the inherent discussion of the ‘social dimension’ of European integration, where it has often been argued that the social consequences receive only secondary prominence compared to the economic freedoms in the Single marked as argued by for instance Fritz Scharpf. The tension has been further reflected in recent discussion on the Social dimension in particular the ‘EU social pillars’.

The findings in our research show how both national authorities, but equally important local governments for instance in municipalities, use procurement policies to achieve social goals such as certain wage levels and issues related to working conditions. Hence, some policy-makers are actively promoting social goals with their public procurement policies through labour clauses or legislation enforcing labour clauses that define certain wages and working conditions that suppliers must meet. Our results additionally highlight how political differences are important for how the political actors behave, which has also been shown by other researchers. The results show that governments (local as national) that are dominated by Social democrats or other left-parties are more inclined to apply e.g. labour clauses and promote social goals via public procurement. However, centre-right parties are also actively utilising public procurement to reach social goals, although to a lesser extent.

Although the overall policy implications of Europeanisation are quite similar in the three countries, there is significant variation in the policy trajectories on public procurement. These differences reflect the traditions for wage setting and the historical role of public procurement. Danish legislators at the national level and their German peers in some Länder are more prone to utilise social clauses, whereas their UK peers mainly rely on voluntary agreements. Overall, this illustrates how national policy-makers themselves defines the room for national ‘push-backs’ against Europeanisation for instance through policy innovation and through defining new regulatory measures.

In sum, our article illustrates that despite increasingly Europeanisation of national policies due to the influence of the CJEU, there is still a lot of leeway for national actors to shape policy decisions. These policy decisions may even act against overall Europeanisation. This active contestation is reinforced by the ambiguity of the EU legislation and case-law, which some national actors utilise to promote their own policy goals, whereas others are more reluctant for political reasons or out of fear of the risk of infringing EU law. We also show that public procurement is used as a tool to promote social goals, as in particular the experience from some German Länder and Denmark shows, where the institutional contexts is also more favourable for this than in the UK, where labour clauses remain voluntary. This illustrates overall how the impact of Europeanisation remains uneven across Europe, and how national policy-makers actively challenge Europeanisation, when it runs counter to their own policy goals.

 

This blog draws on the JCMS article Moving in and Out of the Shadow of European Case Law: the Dynamics of Public Procurement in the Post‐Post‐Rüffert Era

 

 

Bjarke Refslund is associate Professor in Industrial Relations and working life studies, Department of Sociology and Social Work, Aalborg University. His research focus on industrial relations, comparative employment relations and political economy and industrial sociology.

 

 

 

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Differentiated integration is a political reality in the European Union. However, public opinion remains divided, both across countries and among individual citizens. This fact highlights important challenges for the workings of the Conference on the Future of Europe.

Prime Ministers Viktor Orbán and Mateusz Morawiecki stood by each other when faced with the EU’s rule of law requirements. Photo: Czarek Sokolowski/AP/NTB

During the recent tense and aggressive debate on the EU budget and the COVID-19 relief fund, Prime Ministers Mateusz Morawiecki (Poland) and Viktor Orbán (Hungary) threatened to veto the budget if the EU did not abolish the fund’s requirements on the rule of law. At this point, it seemed a real possibility that the fund would be set up excluding these two countries. In response, Morawiecki staunchly repeated his (and Orbán’s) long-held belief that such a ‘two-speed’ EU is both undesirable and unnecessary. Possibly, this is because they believe that such “differentiated integration” would relegate their countries to the periphery of the Union.

Differentiation in half of all integrated policy areas

Nevertheless, differentiated integration has indeed become a reality in multiple policy fields. While the number of member states has increased, the Union has become more heterogeneous. The most prominent cases of differentiated integration are, of course, the Schengen agreement and Euro currency, in which not all EU member states participate. More generally, however, we know that almost half of all integrated policy areas contain some form of differentiation (Leuffen et al. 2013).

At the same time, EU matters have become increasingly politicized and affect not only supra-national, but also national elections. We observe a polarization of debates and a higher frequency of referenda on EU policies, as well as a rise of Eurosceptic parties across member states (see, for example, Börzel and Risse 2018 and Schimmelfennig 2018).

Integration gridlock

An extreme consequence of this sort of dissatisfaction is the threat of disintegration. This problem is exemplified by the gridlock during the budgetary negotiations in light of the COVID crisis. The situation exposes the more general dilemma related to differentiated integration.

This is because public support for integration in the South is linked to the demand of moving forward, towards deeper integration. However, the Eastern states block deeper integration because they oppose the linkage of a social deepening to a normative deepening.

The very same states that brought about the gridlock in the first place also oppose differentiated integration.

The solution to this would be differentiated integration as an alternative to uniform deepening. But it is the very same states that brought about this gridlock in the first place that also oppose differentiated integration – at least in what concerns redistribution. This shows how sensitive the issue is. The increasing politicization of the matter makes it even more important to widen our understanding of how citizens feel about differentiated integration.

Divided public

In an article recently published in the Journal of European Public Policy, we use survey data to shed light on how individual-level preferences for differentiated integration are formed. A first look at how public opinion on differentiated integration evolved over time shows that, nowadays, a slim majority of respondents support differentiated integration – specifically, the general idea of a “two-speed Europe”.

There is some fluctuation over time, but public opinion is mostly two-fold: about half of the respondents oppose differentiated integration (DI), the other half supports it. However, support of DI reached a significant low in 2015. This stands in stark contrast to general support for the EU, which increased rather steadily from just below 50% in 2011 to almost 60% in 2017.

North vs South, left vs right

Taking a closer look at the individual level, the data suggest that social dispositions play an important role in citizens’ preferences for differentiated integration. More specifically, when it comes to explaining citizens’ support for differentiated integration, socio-demographic variables seem to matter very little compared to attitudinal variables. This is in contrast to what explains general support for the EU (see i.e. Andersen & Reichert 2009).

For example, we find evidence that support for differentiated integration correlates with liberal economic values. This means that there is support amongst citizens that also support free trade and a market economy, while there is scepticism amongst those with concerns about equality. Additionally, citizens in the political right are more supportive of differentiated integration than citizens in the centre or the left.

At the country level, our analysis reveals important variation in levels of support for differentiated integration across the EU. For example, citizens of the Northern and Eastern member states are more prone to support differentiated integration, and citizens of Southern member states are markedly more prone to oppose it.

Debate on legitimacy

A possible explanation supported by our evidence points to the negative (and still prevalent) repercussions of the Eurozone crisis, which mostly affected the south of Europe. To some citizens, differentiated integration might mean an attempt to dilute EU solidarity and to further divide the more prosperous from the less prosperous states. In other words, their opposition to differentiated integration might pertain to what they believe it implies for their member states.

To some citizens, differentiated integration might mean an attempt to dilute EU solidarity and to further divide the more prosperous from the less prosperous states.

Our findings should be taken seriously by the Conference on the Future of Europe. A substantive amount of EU citizens, especially those with strong preferences for equality (as well as those in the South), seem to think of differentiated integration as a process of discrimination and a threat against EU solidarity. If the attempt is to change their minds, or to reconcile their views with what those in favour of differentiated integration see as the correct way forward for the EU, then public debate must include convincing arguments about why and under which circumstances it is legitimate and fair.

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As we move into the new phase of Brexit – ‘long Brexit’ as I find I’m thinking about it – it’s useful to cast an eye back on one of the more obvious difficulties that the UK government faced during 2020: trying to do two things at once. While this shouldn’t be in the same ballpark as an individual “walking and chewing gum”, there’s good reason to treat it as if it is. At the heart of it is the notion of opportunity costs and finite resources. Doing something (anything) means you can’t do something else, and using your capacities for one purpose ties them up should you want to use them for a different purpose. For a person, that’s very clear: I’m sure we can all think of people who try to juggle too much at once, often resulting in them being unable to properly achieve any one thing. Something’s gonna give, somewhere. With a state, this should be less of an issue. There are many individuals and (relatively) huge resources, with scope to increase these in a way that one person cannot. Indeed, states spend their time doing lots of things simultaneously. But even here, we can notice that in the usual run of things, there are priorities to be made and focus to be made. Governments typically concentrate their efforts on specific things, leaving the rest to tick over. And that gives us a clue as to the issue here. 2020 was not ‘the usual run of things’ but rather a highly atypical coincidence of two huge events: Brexit and Covid. Each alone would have represented a massive challenge for a government. In particular, each has had profound effects across public policy, the economy and society, and so could not be contained within the usual structures of government. Moreover, in each case there was a necessity to translate policy decisions into effective action by economic and social agents: businesses needed to change processes for importing and exporting to the EU; everyone needed to work to reduce transmission of the virus. This, in of itself, need not have been a problem, since the kind of policy and implementation in each case did not necessarily have to pull in different directions. Working for home is not incompatible with working out EORI numbers, for example. But problems of interaction did still occur. Firstly, the need for the highest-levels of government to be closely involved in both Covid response and negotiations on the future relationship meant that neither one had the undivided attention of those concerned. I won’t speak of the Covid side of things, but it was certainly evident that Number 10 took a somewhat erratic path through the negotiations. Notwithstanding their model of backloading the process to increase pressure on the EU to make concessions, the decision to introduce the Internal Market Bill reads like the product of a hastily-assembled gambit that wasn’t thought through at anything like sufficient length. Likewise, the historic unwillingness of Boris Johnson to get across the fine print cannot have been aided by the need to deal with the sharp rise of Covid cases in December, leaving him unable to provide anything more than emotional support to the negotiators in the room and making any political breakthrough in his discussions with Ursula Von Der Leyen or Charles Michel more convoluted. Secondly, the political choices made during 2020 increased the difficulty of the next steps. Central in this was the decision not to seek an extension to the transition period ahead of the June deadline: While it made sense in terms of the narrative of ‘getting Brexit done’, it ensured that the hot end of negotiations would occur during the already-anticipated second wave, and that there would be the economic disruption of the post-transition arrangements stuck on top of the economic disruption of Covid. Thirdly, the overlapping of the two events means that we enter 2021 with the conditions for increased dissatisfaction with the outcome of negotiations (again, I can’t speak on Covid, other than to note the relatively poor comparative performance on cases and deaths). Already in 2020 we saw the dangers of such disconnection and discontent: the rhetoric of the meaninglessness of the Withdrawal Agreement, followed by that Internal Market Bill, was the feeding ground for those who wish to propagate a framing of being stabbed in the back. The prospect of a UK Dolchstoßlegende opens up the prospect of not only continuing instability in EU-UK relations, but also scope for instability around the Johnson administration; an administration that has never looked the most robust, even with its big majority. The absence of scrutiny, let alone involvement in the formulation of the Trade & Cooperation Agreement means that the political threshold to reopen – or reject – it is relatively low. This might well have been a problem even without Covid – the ‘renegotiation’ of the Withdrawal Agreement by Johnson is a case in point – but again it is plausible to argue that riding both horses at once exacerbated the issue. Of course, we can’t always chose when things happen, but maybe when we can we should bear in mind that the more we can focus on one thing at a time, the better for all involved.

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Introduction

 

The European Union is undoubtedly one of the greatest examples of inter-state co-operations that have ever existed. However, despite its stunning achievements in the last half a century, the EU had become the sick man of the world by the twenty-first century. The symptoms of her illness are the obvious and many crises we have witnessed on the surface since 2008; however, it is only the tip of the iceberg. Beneath, the roots of these crises (e.g. financial, immigration, economic, foreign affairs) are partly structural, but predominantly ideological. After the Second World War, extreme liberalism emerged as the most attractive ideology in Western Europe, and gained absolute dominance in the whole of Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Compared to the exclusion and terror of extreme nationalism and Bolshevism, extreme liberalism was cheered as an inclusive ideology, which was supposed to be able to promote openness and pluralism. However, it was clear soon enough that the political Left (often disguised as Centre or mainstream) is en bloc unable and unwilling to offer real solutions to those problems affect the people the most, which led to the rapid loss of its credibility.

 

The ultimate reason behind the rise of populism (both on Left and Right) and the cementation of illiberalism is the utter failure of extreme liberal governance. Radicals on the Right had set the Russian and Turkish illiberal democracies as an example to follow, attempting to get ever closer to govern with catchy promises. Despite the relative attention gained by radical political forces, the overwhelming majority of the European people are dissatisfied with the political elite’s incompetent crisis management in general. More specifically, the people desperately seek a third way, which is neither liberal nor conservative, but trustworthy, expert, and decisive. Therefore, the time is ripe to offer such an alternative by reforming our mindset and resetting our priorities.

 

The most severe crisis of Europe is the sinking of European identity into oblivion. In order to successfully challenge political extremism on both poles, we must rediscover our spiritual and moral origins, and live in accordance with them, translating and fitting their values into our modern era. The return to the real European values and heritage is the primary precondition of reforming the European Union into an enlightened and united superstate.

 

The pillars of European identity

 

By conquering the whole of the Mediterranean, from Hispania to Asia Minor and from Northern Africa to Gaul, the Roman Republic – and its successor the Roman Empire – created a solid legal and political entity, which was capable to host, preserve, and further develop the Hellenistic culture dominated the known world at the time. As the consequence of Roman military victory, the eastern Greek-Hellenistic civilisation could spread into the western basin of the Mediterranean Sea without obstruction, allowing the cultural transformation of the Roman Empire under the influence of Hellenism. It is not a surprise that the Romans admired the culture of the ancient Greek city states, as their cultural and intellectual superiority have laid down the foundation of civilisation already centuries before. By learning, applying, and constantly developing various sciences known already in the great empires of the Middle East, the Greek city states – especially Athens – lit the fire of civilisation in the darkness of barbarism.

 

The emergence of the Graeco-Roman civilisation was interpreted in Rome as the cultural triumph of the militarily conquered Greece over Rome. As a result of their openness, and solving the challenge of living in the intersection of numerous cultures, realising that they live in symbiosis with each other, the Romans could further develop a value system, upon which European culture was born and raised. To the contrary of the Greek city states, Rome never isolated itself, but was open to learn, and form the foreign elements of other cultures to its own image, for openness did not mean the loss of identity; moreover, it helped them to express their intellect even better. Rome understood that connectivity is crucial for a civilisation to grow and flourish, and applied this mindset on a high level and to a great effect, which enabled the Latin city state to be the centre of a civilisation. The Graeco-Roman (or classical) civilisation, completed by the Judaeo-Christian tradition, gave us that intellectual heritage, which is the foundation of the entire European culture and value system.

 

Due to the purposeful destruction of the original Jesus-like Christianity by the Catholic Church, the concept of Judaeo-Christian heritage might need some explanation. The difference between Christianity as an underground movement and as the religious institution created by the Catholic Church could not be bigger. Based on the Bible, moreover on Jesus’ words, it is obvious that the latter has nothing to do with the former. From times of the Apostles until the institutionalisation of Christian communities, Christianity was the embodiment of Jesus’ teachings. Being faithful to their principles and values, Christians truly cared for each other and for anyone in need, whilst waiting enthusiastically for the promised return of their Lord. There was love amongst them, which proved their faith real. They also understood and recognised their Hebrew-Jewish roots. Abraham, Isaac, Jacob (Israel), Joseph, Moses, Aaron, Joshua, David, Solomon, and all the prophets – amongst many others – were Hebrew-Jewish. Jesus himself was born from Jewish parents in the Jewish city of Nazareth. Christianity roots back to the Torah and to the numerous prophecies talking about Jesus as the Messiah in great lengths and specifics. Christianity is inseparable from Judaism; in fact, the latter gave birth to the former. Jesus transformed the Old Covenant into a newer and thus different alliance, in which the salvation of the individual became the core message (New Covenant or New Testament).

 

This Jesus-like Christianity, together with its Judaic self is another fundamental pillar of European identity. The Judaeo-Christian heritage and the Graeco-Roman culture are yet to break into the public’s interest and attention, but I am certain that it cannot be delayed for much longer. It is clear that from time to time they always came back to the stage of European culture and politics – even when faced certain persecution.

 

The adversaries and allies of European identity

 

In the end days and after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, the Catholic Church has gained an immense ideological power and influence, which resulted in the systematic exploitation of the society, the rapid spread of anti-Semitism, merciless terror, and the death of intellect in Europe. Philosophy, art, literature, and science did not exist anymore, only in the narrow and dumb narration of the Church. Instead, torture, murder, and public execution were all part of the daily routine in the Church’s business.

 

The first real intellectual challenge to this plagued ideological system emerged in the era of Renaissance (rebirth), which was the attempt to resurrect the Graeco-Roman culture. The rediscovery of classical Greek philosophy and Roman Humanitas inspired many to develop the idea of humanism (as they called it), which was recognisable in art, architecture, politics, science, and literature. Experienced primarily in the Italian city states between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, this era is mainly famous for its geniuses (e.g. Bruno, Da Vinci, Dante, Galilei, Machiavelli, Michelangelo, Petrarch), who could present an alternative to the Church’s rotten spirituality, expressing the virtues of the long-forgotten antic world. Despite the harassment and persecution, extraordinary talents and uplifting ideas were born and flourishing, proving that Europe did not cease to be the world’s grey matter. Whilst Renaissance tried to reach back to Graeco-Roman antiquity, and reinstate its ideas and culture, Reformation aimed to search the roots of real Christianity – as once taught by Jesus –, reforming the sick Catholic Church. Reformation – initiated by monk Martin Luther in the sixteenth century – was an absolute direct hit in the Church’s dark heart, unlike arts and sciences, which were more of gentle and indirect expressions of the desire for something else than Catholicism. Although, both Renaissance and Reformation were constructive forces, which fought valiantly to resuscitate the values of the Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian world; overpowered, they ultimately failed to complete their missions.

 

It was not until the unfolding of the Enlightenment movement that the Catholic Church began to lose its power significantly, when feudalism started to crumble and eventually collapsed. The Glorious Revolution in Great Britain was the first remarkable act to open political and economic institutions, which would include not only a narrow circle of the elite, but broader segments of the society too. Along colonial expansion, international trade, creation of financial markets, and the accumulation of capital, the Glorious Revolution established fundamental conditions to the Industrial Revolution, ending feudalism in Great Britain. Even more exceptional was the storm brought by the French Revolution a century later. Influenced by the achievements of the Enlightenment movement, and their manifestation in the birth of the United States of America and in the Industrial Revolution, the ideology of classical liberalism implemented the principles of social contract, constitutional state, democratic governance, and basic human rights. The achievements of Enlightenment are the liberation of intellect, the prosperity of science, technological advancement, rule of law, general liberty, improved working conditions, emancipation, broadening suffrage, and general well-being.

 

Conservatism, supported by the aristocracy and clergy, tried to reinvent itself as enlightened absolutism in order to forcefully regain its power – without lasting success. Later, conservatives gave their full support to extreme nationalist political forces, such as the Nazis in Germany, the fascists in Italy, and the autocratic governments of Hungary, Poland, and the alliance of Little Entente. Whilst nationalism in the nineteenth century was moderate, democratic, and even liberal, extreme nationalism of the twentieth century was violent, aggressive, and oppressive. Originally, liberal nationalists primarily fought for the creation of nation-states independent from dynastic feudalism, broad range of autonomy for ethnic minorities, and the inclusion of every single person in the state as citizens, but conservative extreme nationalism was focused on destruction.

 

Classical liberalism did not face extreme nationalism as its only adversary, but Bolshevism from the Left as well. Both ideological extremities did their absolute best to crush any moderate political ideologies in between. After the defeat of extreme nationalism in the Second World War, Western Europe was strongly influenced and gradually conquered by American extreme liberalism, whilst in Eastern Europe, millions of people suffered under Bolshevik terror. Extreme liberalism in the West and Bolshevism in the East reproached every form of nationalist consciousness; therefore, even the thought of patriotism disappeared from the identity of those generations.

 

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, extreme liberalism has been the absolute dominant ideology in Europe. Extreme liberalism has influenced people in the West since the generation of 1968, unleashing a spirituality, which quickly led to a value system disorder. The symptoms are clearly to be seen in the ardent support of homosexual propaganda – which supports same-sex marriages, child adoption, and genderism –, radical feminism, illegal immigration, multinational companies, and wealthy individuals, whilst ignoring the overwhelming majority of citizens and salaried workers. The value system disorder caused by extreme liberalism is a direct threat to our societies, which is materialising in the forms of anti-social legislation and praise of deviant behaviour. Libertine-ism, excess, consumerism, and numerous perversities combined with the ideology of capitalism created an amoral extreme liberal social, political, and economic system in Europe. Despite its moral erosion, the influence of extreme liberalism had been unchallenged until the financial crisis in 2008, when it became obvious that it is not only ideologically insolvent, but also inexpert, and thus incompetent in governance. The disastrous economic and social consequences have alienated a significant amount of people, who express their dissatisfaction and anger towards the mainstream political parties, marking the beginning of a radical ideological-political turnaround in the member states of the European Union. Exploiting the ordinary people’s desperation, populism began to rise and spread.

 

The essence of populist rhetoric and propaganda is the conscious and calculated manipulation of emotions by twisting and bending the facts or ignoring them altogether. Its language is vulgar, negative, unintelligent, fearsome, intimidating, and hateful, whilst its message is based on this communication and on irresponsible frequent promising, generating false hope deliberately. Populism promises protection, security, and peace to its followers, but in fact, it creates fear and hatred, and builds up a semi-autocratic governmental system. It appears mostly – but not exclusively – on the political Right as a method of extreme nationalists to get closer to governance. The best known examples of populism on the Right are the success of Brexit (from the campaign to quitting) and Trump’s political breakthrough in 2017. Despite the current trend and popularity, populism in itself is going to collapse sooner than later, because it is nothing, but a radical protest ideology, which does not stand on its own feet, but exists only as the opposition of extreme liberalism. For that very reason, populism is nothing, but a political-ideological dead end.

 

Reacting to populism from the Right, Viktor Orbán (Prime Minister of Hungary) declared the ideology of illiberalism, which describes a method of democratic governance, which is not liberal. The main pillars of an illiberal state – according to him – are the values of Christianity and nationalism. Illiberalism is populist in its rhetoric and propaganda, but also different from populism, because when it seizes power, it is somewhat capable of successful governance. Illiberalism, which is also called Christian democracy by Orbán, is the twenty-first century version of extreme nationalism in a resurrected form. Illiberalism preaches conservative values to its followers, steps up as the apparent supporter and protector of Christian religion, and praises national homogeneity and unorthodox economic policy, whilst it is extremely inflexible and exclusionary. Despite standing at different stages, the examples of Putin’s Russia, Erdogan’s Turkey, and Orbán’s Hungary show that in an illiberal state, power concentrates around the self-assigned strong leader. This leader and his party intend to demolish the crucial elements of democracy gradually, silencing the critical press, and make the functioning of non-governmental organisations impossible. Although, the political branches seemingly remain separate and independent, neither the opposition nor the media has any real power to act. The political opponents call it pseudo-democracy or autocracy, whilst the illiberal forces and their allies argue that it is still a democracy, only that is not liberal – thus illiberal.

 

Conclusion

 

My verdict is that neither extreme liberalism nor their extreme nationalist challengers is a desirable alternative to the great many European moderate conservatives and patriots, and moderate socialists and liberals, who are compelled to choose between these two extreme ideologies. European identity must be redefined upon the pillars of Graeco-Roman values (e.g. virtue, honour, valour, restraint, love of justice), Judaeo-Christian heritage (e.g. comradeship, social justice, generosity, solidarity), and the achievements of Enlightenment (e.g. science, expertise, progress), resulting in the idea of enlightened Europism, which is the translation and integration of traditional European values into the modern era of science and technology. It is my proposal as a third alternative, which would hopefully prepare the way for the total political unification of Europe, enabling us to successfully deal with European affairs of the present and future. Once extremism is isolated and vanquished, necessary reforms related to the suffrage, political system, economy, social system, armed forces, and foreign policy can be introduced and implemented. This blog is going to focus on the introduction of these reforms.

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Among the more minor consequences of Brexit has been the opportunity for me to give evidence to Parliament. In the case of talking with the Commons Committee on the Future Relationship with the EU (formerly the Exiting the EU Committee), that has always been a very constructive and engaging experience. Which makes it all the more frustrating to find my evidence quoted quite as much as it is in the Committee’s final report (although do note the various Conservative amendments to expunge references to a single European committee). That report concerns the arrangements for Parliamentary scrutiny of relations with the EU in the wake of both the conclusion of the Trade & Cooperation Agreement and the rolling-up of the Committee itself. The messages of the report are much as one might expect, from a neutral perspective: the UK-EU relationship will be an important one and the effects of managing the TCA are likely to cut across public policy, so it makes sense to review and strengthen scrutiny provisions. One of the points I made – and which the report notes – is that scrutiny comes with the benefit of improving sight of looming issues. More knowledge and understanding of what’s happening will help with avoiding problems in the first place, and managing those that can’t be avoided. That’s something that would presumably be of value to government, whatever its wider views about Parliamentary involvement in public policy: allowing Parliament to interrogate key issues and individuals raises the quality and quantity of evidence available, however you’re making decisions. But the impression given to date is that government seems more intent on take back control to itself than in creating efficient, effective and inclusive ways of making policy. The decision not to extend the Committee’s life for a period to allow for full scrutiny of the TCA itself is Exhibit A here. Brexit is done, so ipso facto there’s no need to talk about it any more. The argument by government that EU issues will be spread across the full range of other committees fails to address the likely outcome that it becomes no-one’s responsibility and there is little scope to deal with more systemic and cross-cutting issues. Sadly, the likely outcome of all of this is that this government will get to have minimal scrutiny of its EU-related decisions, and that only a major failure on those decisions will change matters. But that in turn requires Parliament to maintain its pressure to be able to run an effective system of scrutiny. This report is an excellent step in that direction and it is to be hoped that it results in appropriate action sooner, rather than later. However, with a government that seems intent on ignoring the EU at every possible moment, we might not get our hopes up too high.

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Abstract

This insightful book analyzes the evolution of the operational tasks and cooperation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL). Exploring the recent expansion of the legal mandates of these decentralized EU agencies and the activities they undertake in practice, David Fernández-Rojo offers a critical assessment of the EU migration agencies. 

The book identifies two key trends in the administration of the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Fernández-Rojo discusses how on one hand the new legal frameworks of FRONTEX, EASO and EUROPOL stress that their operational roles are limited to providing national authorities with technical assistance, while on the other hand these agencies are increasingly involved in guaranteeing the enforcement of EU migration, asylum and border management measures. The book expertly illustrates how FRONTEX, EASO and EUROPOL establish an effective and uniform national implementation of laws and policies, with a focus on their multilateral cooperation in the hotspots established in the aftermath of the refugee crisis.

Examining the de jure and de facto operational powers and cooperation of EU migration agencies, this book will be critical reading for academics and students of law, international relations and political science. Its assessment of the effectiveness of policy implementation will also be beneficial for legal practitioners, policy makers and NGOs.

Critical Acclaim

‘In this detailed and precise guide, the author traces how Europe’s border, police, and asylum agencies are evolving in an interactive system of governance. EU Migration Agencies maps out lines of authority, pathways of power, and unexpected feedback loops.’
– David Scott FitzGerald, University of California, San Diego, US

‘David Fernández-Rojo has produced an excellent and invaluable book on a topic of great importance and complexity, namely the evolution of the operational tasks and cooperation of three key agencies in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: FRONTEX, EASO and EUROPOL. His comparative analysis offers crucial insights to understand central aspects for the future of the European Union such as the Schengen area, the Common European Asylum System or the so-called hotspots.’
– Diego Acosta, University of Bristol, UK

Contents

1. Introduction to Frontex, EASO and Europol as Operational Decentralized Agencies 2. The Establishment and Initial Operational Role of Frontex, EASO and Europol 3. The Reinforced Operational Tasks of Frontex, EASO and Europol and the Impact of their Activities on the Ground 4. Bilateral and Multilateral Operational Cooperation among Frontex, EASO and Europol 5. Limitations to the Reinforced Operational Tasks and Cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol 6. Conclusions and Perspectives: An Integrated Administration of Border Management, Migration and Asylum Matters in the EU Bibliography Index

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PDF version: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic65

The conclusion of the EU-UK Trade & Cooperation Agreement (TCA) over Christmas meant that the end of the transition period a few days later saw the start of a new phase of the relationship between the two parties. Since there are many others who are much better placed to analyse the contents of the TCA (e.g. Steve Peers, Chris Grey, and the entire UK in a Changing Europe massive), I will limit myself here to discussion of just one aspect, namely the structuring of future EU-UK relations within the treaties. As the diagram above indicates, the TCA joins the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) in creating an architecture not solely of commitments but also of continuing change, review and negotiation. Put simply, Brexit is not ‘done’, merely shifted into a new framework. To illustrate the dynamic nature of the relationship, we might usefully consider four distinct areas. Firstly, the TCA /WA creates a number of grace periods. These are agreed non-applications of rules or processes immediately after the end of transition/start of the TCA (i.e. 1 January 2021). In all the cases listed these are functions of the very rushed timetable from end of negotiations to start of implementation and the consequent inability of the UK to put in place replacement systems or processes. Such grace periods should be considered relatively unusual, for the reason just mentioned: international treaties do not normally get done at such breakneck speed and they do not normally involve divergent regulation. This second point matters a lot in enabling a more phased introduction of the TCA model, since the starting point on 1 January was one of complete alignment on EU standards. The variable length of the grace periods is thus a function of the likely speed at which divergence and/or issues might be expected to emerge: higher for food standards (which involves health), lower for rules of origin (where integrated supply chains cannot change speedily). A further should be made on the data adequacy provision in Art.FINPROV.10a, both for its semi-automatic extension and for the particularity of what follows. Unlike the other cases, where the UK will simply start following pre-agreed rules, this will require the EU to make a new unilateral declaration on adequacy for the UK to maintain existing data flows. This does not allow for any negotiation by the UK, only demonstrating its continuing implementation and enforcement of the necessary standards. The Commission did leave this hanging over the UK during the autumn, so it would be naïve to expect it to be without problem this summer. The second category is that of more conventional transitional arrangements. Unlike the grace periods, these allow for temporary situations to apply while more major adaptations can take place. In the case of references to the Court of Justice on citizens’ rights matters, the emphasis is on sunsetting this legal avenue, as free movement of people becomes a more historic right: the anticipation is that eight years should be long enough for any significant issues to have worked their way through to the courts. By contrast, both the rules of origin and fisheries transitions are designed to phase in new arrangements in a more progressive manner than a simple step-change: the adjustments allow for a longer process of change that better reflects the ability of each side to operationalise it. The final transitional arrangement is the limited shelf-life of Title VIII (energy) of the TCA. While it can be extended beyond June 2026, by mutual agreement, the Title also clearly sets out plans for further, specific negotiations, notably to implement a new energy interconnector agreement by the middle of next year. This is best understood as an early case of the two sides identifying specific needs for resolution, but not being able to tie that off straight away: thus Title VIII will grow, rather than shrink, over time, whether within the TCA text or not. The interconnector example is the only specific and scheduled case of the third category: negotiations. The commitment to develop a new framework for mutual recognition of professional qualifications is left hanging in the TCA and there appears to be no sign of any immediate urgency to get this moving. The other case of a commitment to negotiate falls under the fisheries section of the TCA. Annual rounds of discussions will continue using the Common Fisheries Policy framework through the 5.5 year adjustment period, using the TCA’s indications on reducing the EU’s share of access to UK waters. Thereafter, from 2026, the UK will be treated like other fishing states, albeit with one major caveat, namely that the EU can apply tariffs on UK fish if it suffers further reductions in its share (Bryce Stewart explains more). With the exception of the fisheries negotiations, all that has been listed so far has been about bedding into a new relationship, but this is not the end of the structuring of relations. Perhaps most consequential of the four categories is that of review, since these all carry the potential for more major changes to the TCA/WA arrangements. Most fundamentally of all, the TCA carries a general review clause (Art.FINPROV.3), first at the end of 2025 and then every five years thereafter. No limits are placed on that review and so we might expect it to become a convenient point for both sides to (re)consider what they do with each other and how. The timing of that first general review also matters, since it will follow the outcome of the first consent vote on the Northern Irish Protocol, the start of the emergency brake provisions in the UK’s Trade Scheme, and will coincide with the end of the fisheries adjustment period. Each of these might generate significant issues that require more general attention in the general framework. A similar bunching occurs in 2030, when the TCA’s provisions on fish will be specifically reviewed just ahead of the second general review. All of this runs alongside the rolling reviews that the WA’s Joint Committee will be pursuing in its Northern Irish Protocol implementation (as specified in its recent Decisions). As the graphic at the top suggests, it might be expected that the TCA’s Partnership Council also ends up establishing such reviews, as it gears up its work and identifies points of interest. Summary While the signature of the TCA might have brought to a close of the ‘hot’ phase of Brexit, it certainly does not mean that the UK and EU have now entered a stable new relationship. At best, the TCA/WA is a framework within which both parties will have to actively work to establish new norms of interaction and (hopefully) rebuild some of the trust that was lost during the period since 2016. If the cataloguing above appears extensive, then that is because both of the time-constrained nature of the TCA negotiations and because of the continuing uncertainty of the UK about what it wants to do with its new situation. Only with the passage of time will it become evident how that fits with (or changes) the TCA/WA.

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