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In addition to the last Amir of Bukhara’s former garden, on which we reported some days ago, there is another landmark in Kabul that reminds us of this unlucky ruler – his tomb at the Shuhada-ye Salehin cemetery. The Amir, Muhammad Alem Khan, died in Kabul in 1944 and remains buried in Afghanistan despite his last wish for his remains to be transferred to his home city. His country, once Afghanistan’s neighbour to the north, no longer exists. Using little viewed material from both Russia and Central Asia, guest author Vladimir N Plastun (*) and AAN co-director Thomas Ruttig look at how the once-powerful ruler ended up in Kabul: the result of the last round of the great Central Asian game between Soviets, British and local forces, including Afghanistan, and a forgotten competition over who would lead the Muslim world – an AAN long read for the days around the (western) New Year.

You can read part 1 of our short series on Afghanistan and Bukhara (“The Amir of Bukhara’s Forlorn Garden”) by Jolyon Leslie here.

Dreams of khelafat

For a short time, from August 1919 to August 1920, Afghanistan and Bukhara to its immediate north, were the only de facto independent Muslim states not only in Central Asia but worldwide. Neighbouring Iran de jure was independent, too, but had partly been occupied by foreign – British and Russian – troops during World War I. The Ottoman Empire had been dismantled as a result of this war, during which it had allied with the defeated Central Powers, Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Bulgaria. Given this outcome, both rulers – Amir Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan and Amir Sayyed Mir Muhammad Alem Khan of Bukhara – aspired to becoming the new leader of Islam. Both dreamt of a new, large independent Central Asian Muslim empire that would include those areas that had been under Russian and then were – only partly in practice – under Soviet control. Both were hoping to be able to assume the title of the caliph, until then held bythe Ottoman Sultan. But allied troops had occupied the Ottoman capital Istanbul in 1919 and the sultan-caliph had fled abroad.

Both Amirs were thus in competition with each other, without ever publicly claiming the title. This was impossible, as a new caliph had been elected by the parliament of the Turkish Republic under Atatürk, although with strongly curbed powers. In 1924, Turkey formally abolished the caliphate.

Alem Khan in Bukhara had the advantage over the Afghan Amir, given that his capital – bearing the honorific title Bukhara-ye Sharif (the noble Bukhara) – had been famous for centuries as one of the most important centres of Islamic learning worldwide. And importantly, although having been de jure a Russian protectorate since 1868 when it had been forced to give the Czar control over the country’s foreign relations after a military defeat (similar to Afghanistan following the 1879 Gandamak Treaty with Britain), Bukhara saw itself as de facto independent after the 1917 February Revolution that ended Czarism. This event, followed by the takeover of Lenin’s Bolsheviki in October that year and the outbreak of the Civil War between the ‘red’ and the ‘white’ Russians in late 1918, severed all physical connections – ie the rail links – between the beleaguered Russian centre and Central Asia. As a result, Alem Khan had a free hand, as Tajik historian Kamoludin Abdullaev wrote in “Posledniy Mangit” (“The Last Manghit”), to try “to recover the country’s place in the international community of states between revolutionary [Soviet] Turkestan, (1) Afghanistan, which was religiously and ethnically close, British India and Shia Iran.”

In March 1918, Amir Alem’s troops repelled an early Soviet attempt to conquer his country. The latter had the support of the small, homegrown reformist Yash Bukharalilar (Young Bukharan) movement. The Amir was known to be adverse to any modernisation that was not military, and for brutally suppressing all forms not only of opposition but also of non-orthodox thought. A crackdown on the Yash Bukharalilar followed; they then sought refuge with the Soviets.

Amanullah came to power in Afghanistan only two years later, in February 1919, after his father Habibullah was assassinated. In August that year, he proclaimed the re-establishment of his country’s full independence. This followed a short war, the third one with Britain since 1839, at a point where their adversaries had become so war-weary after World War I, they decided to let the Afghans go. Britain also ceased paying subsidies to Afghanistan, forcing Amanullah to impose a tougher tax system that resulted in growing opposition. After the war, he used the title “Ghazi” (victor) which has a religious connotation. Dupree and Poullada wrote that he then started playing with the idea of proclaiming Afghanistan the seat of the khelafatand that “feelers were stretched out” to a number of Islamic countries, via foreign minister Mahmud Tarzi and religious scholars, about whether to proclaim Amanullah the new caliph. (2) In early 1920, according to contemporary British intelligence reports (quoted here, p32), the khutba – the Friday prayer sermon – was read in Kabul “in the name of other Muhammadan rulers as well as in the name of [Amanullah].”

There were also practical ways of boosting Amanullah’s standing as a leader of Islam. When Indian Muslims sold their land and prepared for migration in protest against the British occupation of Istanbul in 1919, he offered them land. By August 1920, some 30,000 of them had crossed into Afghanistan in the so-called Hejrat (migration) movement. Some of them were given land around Jabl ul-Seraj, a town north of Kabul in today’s Parwan province, and seem to have been assimilated by the local population over the decades. A second muhajer colony was planned in Qataghan province in the northeast. Other migrants enlisted into the Afghan army (see here, pp32, 52, 59).

However, the Hejrat Movement’s influx led to severe price rises for foodstuffs and land, and almost broke Afghanistan’s economic back (read here, p58). After some months, Amanullah closed the border and sent many of the Indian emigrées either back or allowed them to move on to Soviet Central Asia.

Amanullah also looked further afar. He “was interested to promote Afghan influence in Sinkiang [today’s Xinjiang, Chinese Turkestan]” according to Andrew DW Forbes, an author on the region. (3) Local Muslim populations were frequently rising up against the Chinese and warlord rule during the first decades of the twentieth century in this region. Afghanistan tried to establish “independent diplomatic links between Kabul and [the Chinese authorities in] Urumchi,” Chinese Turkestan’s capital, and sent a delegation there in the summer of 1922. Forbes wrote: “As a result of this Afghan presence something of an Afghan cult began to develop at Yarkand [a city in southern Xinjiang], and the Chinese authorities in Kashgar [the second city in the province] were disturbed to hear that some local Turkic-speaking peoples were studying Pushtu [sic].” (4)

While, Amanullah was thus able to consolidate his power at home, Alem Khan soon came under new Soviet pressure. His 1919 victory against the Soviets had only given him a respite of two years.

Amir Sayyed Mir Muhammad Alem Khan of Bukhara in a contemporary photograph by Sergei M Prokudin-Gorskii, kept in the US Library of Congress

Historical excourse: Bukhara – Chengiz Khan’s heritage

Muhammad Schaibani, a descendant of Chengiz Khan, is considered to be the founder of the Khanate of Bukhara. He conquered the city in 1506, sending into exile the former ruler, Babur, who went on to establish the Moghul Empire in India and is buried in Kabul (see AAN about his garden here). In the first half of the eighteenth century, the Uzbek tribe of the Manghit established its dynasty there. In contrast to its predecessors, it did not belong to Chengiz Khan’s lineage and its rulers relinquished their traditional title “khan,” choosing “amir” instead – in fact, amir ul-momenin, “leader of the faithful.” This symbolised that they were also religious heads of state. Under the amir was a kush-begi (chief minister) who ran the internal administration of the Emirate. In the absence of the amir, he would run the country.

In the nineteenth century, Bukhara served as a refuge for a number of royal fugitives from Afghanistan, rivals to various Afghan amirs. Abdulrahman Khan (ruled 1880-1901), for example, came there under Amir Sher Ali Khan’s rule (1863-66 and 1868-78), and went on from there to Samarkand, then a Russian protectorate. In 1878, after Sher Ali’s death, he returned and was crowned Amir in Kabul in 1880 after two years of infighting with other contenders. He waged a brutal campaign to unify what today is known as Afghanistan. This brought him the nickname, the “Iron Amir.” (5)

The bilateral relationship between Bukhara and Afghanistan was also burdened by old territorial conflicts. Both ruled parts of Badakhshan on the other side of the Amu Darya river, despite an earlier treaty that proclaimed it the mutual border river. For example, Darwaz, today an Afghan district, was claimed by Bukhara. (6) More significantly, the former independent Uzbek khanates south of the Amu and north of the Hindukush felt much closer to Bukhara than to Afghanistan. But they had already come under the latter’s control under Abdul Rahman’s predecessors in the second half of the nineteenth century (Kunduz in 1859 and Maimana in 1866, for example), then known as Afghan Turkestan. Today, they form Afghanistan’s northern and north-eastern regions. In the mid-eighteenth century, the khutbawas still read in Kunduz in the name of the Amir of Bukhara as a sign of suzereignty, even though Bukhara never physically conquered the region (see here).

Bukhara: population and economy

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Bukhara’s territory comprised most of what is today’s southern and central Uzbekistan, between the Amu and Syr Darya (the Oxus and Iaxartes of old) – the old Mawr an-Nahr (Transoxania) –, and southwestern Tajikistan. With 203,000 square kilometres, it was larger than Syria and not much smaller than the United Kingdom. Its population was between 1.5 and three million people, according to different sources. The major ethnic groups were Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen and Kirghiz. Apart from these, there were smaller groups of Jews, Arabs, Pashtuns (called “Afghans”), ‘Gypsies’ – called Luti, Lori or Ghorbat in Central Asia, and Jat or Jogi in Afghanistan –, Hindus and Persians.

Economically, the emirate was a backward agrarian country, with some sprinkles of home manufacturing. Much of it was desert, allowing for nomadic husbandry, camels and goats, mainly. Along the Zerafshan river that passes by Bukhara and Samarkand there were irrigated oases, mainly producing cotton and grain. Bukhara was famous for its silk production and the ‘Bukhara’ carpets that, however, were mainly produced by the Turkmen in western Bukhara. Many of the country’s riches emanated from the caravan transit trade between Russia, Persia and – through Afghanistan and the Pamirs – India and China. These routes formed parts of the ancient Silk Road.

Apart from Bukhara, there were two more Uzbek-dominated khanates in Central Asia. Khiva – also known as Khwarezm – was located at the lower reaches of the Syr Darya River. It had also been quasi-independent since 1917 but was much less important than Bukhara. Kokand, in the Ferghana valley, which also controlled Tashkent (today’s Uzbek capital), had been annexed by Russia and ceased to exist in 1876. The same was true with the vast steppeareas roamed by nomadic Turkmen and Kirghiz tribes, now Turkestan Gouvernement (province).

Russian protectorate

Bukhara became Russia’s victim during the nineteenth century’s Great Game between Russia and Britian over Central Asia. In 1865, Russian troops occupied Tashkent and laid the basis for the subjugation of all of Turkestan. A year later, the Russian army defeated the troops of Bukhara’s Amir Muzaffar Khan, Alem Khan’s grandfather, in a number of battles over five months. The Russians even captured the Amir’s tent, but Muzaffar managed to escape. He was offered tough conditions for peace, but he managed to drag out the negotiations under various pretexts, in order to gather new troops. In vain – in May 1868, the Russian troops moved further ahead, towards Samarkand, then an independent city-state, and again defeated the Bukharan army, 40,000-men strong, that had also laid claim to the city.

When the Russians occupied the first Bukharan territory, the border fort of Kata-Kurghan, the Amir agreed on the conclusion of a peace treaty that was signed on 23 June 1868. In this treaty, the Amir committed to paying reparations over a sum of 125,000 tela (500,000 roubles; two roubles were equal to one US dollar at that time). He also lost the right to conduct foreign relations with other states. Russian traders were allowed to move freely in Bukhara, to establish their own caravanserais and to acquire real estate. With that, Amir Muzaffar Khan became a vassal of the Russian empire, and the Emirate of Bukhara lost its independence.

At the same time, the Russians compensated Muzaffar by giving him control over Samarkand and another hitherto independent city-state, that of Shahr-e Sabz (read more here). It is famous as the place where Emperor Timur (also known as Tamerlan) is buried, in the famous Gur-e Emir compound.

One of Amir Muzaffar’s sons, Abdul Malek Tura, however, continued the resistance. He was finally defeated and fled to Afghanistan, forshadowing the fate of his uncle, later Amir Alem Khan. He died in Peshawar under British rule. (7)

After Muzaffar Khan’s death in 1885, his son Sayyed Abdul Ahad Bahadur Khan was enthroned on 4 November 1885. He was well educated, spoke Farsi and even some Russian and Arabian. He had visited Russia several times and extensively, including Moscow and St Petersburg, and travelled to Kiev, Odessa, Jekaterinoslav, Baku, Tbilisi, Batumi, Sevastopol and Baghcha Serai in the Crimea, the capital of the former local Tatar khanate. He vacationed almost every summer in Mineralnye Vody in the Caucasus or in Livadia, the Russian emperor’s summer palace outside Yalta, when the emperor’s family was there. Abdul Ahad Khan had the title of a general adjutant at the Russian court, was a general of the Russian cavalry and elected ataman (headman) of the Terek Cossacks, as well as commander of a Cossack regiment based in Orenburg, in today’s northern Kazakhstan. Furthermore, he was addressed as “His Highness.” In 1896 he attended the coronation of Czar Nikolai II.

In 1893, Ahad Khan brought his fourth son, Alem Khan, born in 1880, to the Russian capital, St Petersburg. He acquired land there on which a palace and a garden were built for him, called Del-Keso. He also had a mosque erected, costing half a million roubles. During the Russian-Japanese war of 1905, he donated one million gold roubles for the construction of a war ship, called “the Amir of Bukhara.” Alem Khan was sent to be educated at the Czar’s corps des pages, where, according to Abdullaev, he only “managed, in four years, to acquire basic knowledge of the Russian language and of European cultures.” The father called his son “Alem the Cow,” for his alleged laziness. Frederick M Bailey, however, a British spy who operated in Soviet Central Asia in 1918-19, wrote in his book Mission to Tashkent(1946) that the Amir actually spoke “well-enough French.”

When Amir Abdul Ahad Khan died in the night of 22 to 23 December in 1910 in his home country from a kidney disease, Sayed Mir Alem Khan became his successor on the throne, as the tenth – and last – Manghit Amir of Bukhara. (Central Asia, including Afghanistan, did not know a ruler’s dynastic succession of the eldest son – or child; see the turmoil before Abdul Rahman could take power in Afghanistan. In Bukhara, though, there seemed to be no such turmoil when Alem Khan was enthroned.)

When World War I broke out in 1914, the Amir “needed to prove his loyalty“ to Russia once more (see here) – as the Ottoman caliph had called for jihad against the allied powers, which included Russia. He donated “millions of rubles to the Russian war effort.”

A short intermezzo of independence

After Russia’s 1917 February Revolution, which saw the overthrow of monarchism, the Russian empire was shaken. The new rulers – starting in October 1917, the Bolsheviki – struggled to keep their grip on the Czar’s former possessions, including in Central Asia. Lenin had proclaimed the “peoples’ right to self-determination.” This awakened nationalist ambitions, not only in Bukhara and Khiva but also among different population groups in the region. Dozens of autonomous governments sprang up, from the Ukraine to Central Asia and Siberia. But soon, the centralists (others may call them colonialists) among the Soviets gained the upper hand.

The now again de facto independent rulers of Bukhara and Khiva realised that the fall of the Russian autocracy also threatened their regimes. Threats emerged both from inside and outside their countries, with local reformist opposition groups, supported by the Russian (later Soviet) Communist Party.

Following the advice of his Russian bankers and with their help, Alem Khan transferred parts of his wealth in Russia – first 150 million and later another 32 million Roubles – to banks in France, Germany and India. He had to leave documentation about the transfers behind, however, when he was later forced to flee Bukhara, and he never managed to get hold of the money again.

In early 1918, the oppositional Young Bukharans sent a message to the quasi-autonomous Soviet leadership of the former Russian Gouvernement of Turkestan in Tashkent, headed by the former railway worker Fedor Kolesov, that Bukhara’s local population was ready to revolt. In March, Kolesov himself appeared at the city’s walls at the head of his troops. He demanded that Alem Khan hand over power to the opposition. The Amir rejected the ultimatum. Kolesov’s troops failed in their attempt to storm Bukhara and were beaten back. Alem Khan demanded that all Soviet troops leave the whole of Turkestan.

After the Soviets’ retreat, both sides concluded a peace treaty on 25 March 1918. Tashkent was forced to recognise Bukhara’s full independence. But the Soviet leadership still considered Bukhara part of their realm. This was reflected in Lenin’s letter to Afghanistan’s ruler, Amanullah, dated 27 November 1919, in which he called Afghanistan “the only independent Musulman state in the world.”

Alem Khan, meanwhile, tried to make use of the respite following Kolesov’s defeat to counter the remaining Soviet threat. Hastily, he modernised his army, bought weapons and recruited Afghans and Turks as ordinary soldiers but also as military advisors. Throughout the course of 1918 and 1919, he established three élite guard regiments: a local one; a Turkish; and one “Arabian.” The local regiment included cavalry units and volunteers from Bukhara’s madrassas. Its members were called Sher Bacha Ser-kerde (“the self-sacrificing Lion Boys”; see here). The Turkish regiment consisted of Turkish regular soldiers. They had fled to Bukhara after the Ottoman were defeat by the British in Transcaucasia and Persia in the last year of World War I. There were also former Turkish prisoners of war who had been held in Russia but were released after the 1917 October Revolution. In this regiment, 60 to 70 Afghans also served, together with some 150 mercenaries who were Russian subjects. The “Arab” regiment, contrary to its name, consisted of Turkmen horsemen. The officers’ corps of all three regiments consisted of Turks, considered to be the best in the Emirate’s army.

Meanwhile, the Young Bukharans in exile worked closely with Lenin’s Bolsheviki party and the Comintern. In 1918, a faction of them established a separate Bukharan Communist Party. (8) This was part of the Comintern’s Central Asian bureau’s plan to “revolutionise the East.” This involved supporting revolutionary organisations in the Caucasus, Persia, India, Bukhara, Khiva and Chinese Turkestan (see here, p38-9).

Communism for Afghanistan too – or just a stepping stone to British-India?

For some time at least, according to some sources, Afghanistan was also a direct target of this Soviet policy. Soviet military leader Leon Trotski wrote to the Bolshevik Central Committee in August 1919 (quoted here, p 39) to sanction the establishment of “serious military bases” in Turkestan in order to be prepared for a “uprising to our south.” Abdullaev quoted Mikhail Frunze, the commander of the Soviet troops in Central Asia, suggesting to the Chief Commander of Russian troops in June 1920 to “transfer the scene of military actions and battles into Afghan territory.” This was supposed to happen after the planned seizure of Bukhara.

For that purpose, Abdullaev said, an

[…] Afghan Revolutionary “Party” was quickly formed in Tashkent in case this [Bukhara] plan should be implemented successfully. Deputy Chairman of Turkkommissia [of the Russian Communist Party’s Central Committee] V. V. Kuibyshev set the following tasks for the Afghan Revolutionary Party: to eliminate the existing despotic “system and to inaugurate a People’s Soviet Republic.” All this was proposed under the guise of “friendly” relations between Lenin and Amir Amanullah!

Later, after the fall of Bukhara, other groups emerged. Russian researcher Vladimir Boyko, quoting Russian archival documents, mentioned three (see here). First, a “revolutionary… Afghan party” was set up in the winter of 1920 in Tashkent under the Turkkommissia. In that same year, a republican “Central Committee of Young Afghan Revolutionaries (chairman: Haji Muhammad Yaqub)” was founded in Bukhara, “members of which were Afghan refugees living in Bukhara, Turkestan [and] Russia.” With 55 members led by a Muhammad Ghafar, the group “waited for Soviet instructions in Termez in 1920,” which apparently never came. The Afghan government, according to Boyko, was aware of its existence and demanded their repatriation, however the Bukharan government refused. He added that there is “no material about any practical activity of the committee” and that “its traces disappear already in 1921.” The same went for the third group, a “revolutionary circle” in Herat in 1920/21, that came into being “not without the help of Soviets diplomats and their agents” who attempted to link them up with the circles in Bukhara. Boyko called it “the first and perhaps only attempt of leftist radical organisation on Afghan soil.”

Furthermore, the official participants’ list of the September 1920 Baku “Congress of the Peoples of the East” included 40 Afghan participants. The congress, organised by the Comintern, included communist and non-communist participants from around 20 countries.The 40 Afghans on the list, according to a breakdown of participating ethnic groups, included 12 Jamshidis – a semi-nomadic group living on both sides of the Soviet-Afghan border –  and 11 Hazaras, probably migrant labourers in Russian Central Asia. The remaining 17 were perhaps some of the “192 Persians and Farsis” (maybe, Farsiwans, as Tajik speakers in western Afghanistan are called). The congress’ presidium, composed of representative of the ‘communist faction’ and ‘non-party delegates’ (also sometime called the ‘Muslim faction’) had one Afghan from each, Ag[h]azade from the communists and Azim from the non-party members. (According to a 1983 article in the Central Asian Survey, Aghazade was no Afghan but “an Iranian Communist, a worker in Baku.” See also this AAN article.) The Afghan group’s size was possibly exaggerated by the organisers.

Boyko wrote that the Soviets’ “organisational experiments with the Afghan emigrants [went] miserably” and “the results of these political projects are also not known.” Actually, those Afghan ‘communist’ groups were never mentioned again in any known source, and nothing is known of their fate. Later official Soviet sources used to quote a warning by Lenin that Afghanistan was “not ripe for revolution” and that the USSR should work with the “progressive Amir, Amanullah.”

Instead of targeting Afghanistan, the Comintern’s aim was to use Afghanistan as a stepping stone for fomenting revolution in British-India. The Soviet commissar of war, Leon Trotsky, wrote in 1919 (quoted here): “The international situation is developing so that the way to Paris and London passes via the towns of Afghanistan, Punjab, and Bengal.”Lenin declared in 1920 that “England is our greatest enemy. It is in India that we must strike them hardest.” (9) The plan was to establish clandestine bases, infiltration routes and the delivery of weapons into these regions. Moscow, through the Comintern, had also started supporting the Indian government in exile set up in Kabul in December 1915, then still with German support (more here).

In Lenin’s November 1919 letter to Amanullah (quoted above), Lenin encouraged Amanullah in his pan-Islamic views and at the same time questioned the independence of Bukhara:

At present, flourishing Afghanistan is the only independent Muslim state in the world, and fate gives the Afghan people the great historic task of uniting around itself all enslaved Muslim peoples and leading them on the road to freedom and independence.

Amanullah on the rise

Amanullah’s caliphate dreams seem to have been strongest between when he became Amir on 28 February 1919 and the Third Anglo-Afghan War he started on 3 May the same year. Amanullah embarked on what Boyko called, in a 2004 book, a line of foreign policy based on Pan-Islamism “aiming at the establishment of a Central Asian Con-/Federation consisting of the Khanates of Khiva and Kokand, the Emirate of Bukhara and Afghanistan itself after the fall of the Ottoman empire.” Tajik researcher Abdullaev cited a letter from Amanullah’s mother, Ulya Hazrat, to Amanullah from 1919, saying “Our enemies draw large profit from our family’s [ie Islamic umma’s] differences, topple Muslim governments, and Muslim peoples are paralysed in their iron fangs.” (10)

According to a second article written by Abdullaev, Amanullah was initially interested in recruiting the Basmachi movement for his planned war of independence. This movement had originated in the Ferghana valley, originally a part of the Khanate of Kokand. After the 1917 February Revolution, local nationalists had set up a local government, the so-called ‘Kokand Autonomy’. It was led by the Kazakh Mostafa Chokai (Russian form: Chokaev) who had been a member of the last pre-revolutionary Russian parliament. This government claimed control over all of Russian Turkestan and expected to become a member of a newly organised Russian confederation.

In practice, Chokai’s government barely controlled more than Kokand city and only had a few troops. The Bolsheviki crushed it in a single day, on 11 February 1918. (11) A massacre of the local population followed. The surviving local forces went to the mountains and received support from Uzbek, Kirghiz and Turkmen tribes, forming the Basmachi movement. Composed of around 40 independently operating groups with 20,000 fighters in 1920, it was led by Ergash Bey, a mullah from Kokand. He had been elected the movement’s overall commander at a shura in March 1919 and given the title amir ul-momenin (see here, p43-4). Although Ergash was killed in the summer of 1920, the Basmachi soon controlled large areas in the region. In December 1918, the Basmachi dispatched a delegation to Kabul to raise support. It was received by foreign minister Mahmud Tarzi, the Turkish military advisor, Sami, and even by Amanullah (see here, p66), who, at the time, was not yet Amir but governor of Kabul and in charge of the army and the treasury. They also met Tura, Alem Khan’s uncle who had led the anti-Russian resistance in 1868 and then fled abroad.

Amanullah’s plans to recruit the Basmachi, however, did not come to fruition. He invaded British India with domestic troops, starting in May 1919. When the third Anglo-Afghan war concluded on 8 August 1919 with the peace treaty of Rawalpindi, it re-instated Afghanistan as a fully independent country. After that, Amanullah’s interest for the Basmachi quickly waned and good relations with Soviet Russia took precedence.

Almost immediately after the peace treaty with Britain, an Afghan diplomatic mission led by Muhammad Wali Khan departed for Moscow on their way to participate in the Versailles Peace Conference, in order to assert the country’s newly gained independence. The mission also passed through Bukhara, where it arrived on 6 June 1919 and Wali Khan met the Amir. Wali awarded him a medal and handed over a letter from Amanullah, in which the Afghan ruler explained – apparently replying to a request from Bukhara – that Afghanistan was unable to join the fight against the Bolsheviki. Afghanistan, he argued, was still preoccupied with the British, who continued to hold areas across the Durand Line, which Afghanistan considered its own. Nevertheless, Amanullah sent some support to Bukhara, six cannons and military instructors who joined the army’s general staff and helped to manufacture ammunition. (12)

Similarly, Amanullah kept some limited support for the Basmachi movement. In early December 1919, a ten-member mission led by Afghan army colonel Muhammad Akbar Khan arrived at the headquarters of one of the Basmachi leaders, Madamin Beg (actually Muhammad Amin Ahmadbekov) who operated in the Margilan area of the Ferghana valley, not far from the city of Kokand. The Afghans promised to deliver him 5,000 rifles and to send some 1,000 men to fight the Bolsheviki. In February 1920, a Basmachi delegation from Kokand arrived in Kabul to press for the promised help. But by the early 1920s none of it seemed to have arrived.

In the broader view, Amanullah had to choose between building an independent national state and fostering Islamic solidarity. After calculating the Soviets would be able to defeat the Basmachi and the White Russian contingents, he refrained from actively supporting his rival Bukhara and the insurgents in Ferghana. In doing so, Amanullah also attempted to prevent any British influence in Bukhara.

Afghan-Soviet relations, however, were all but warm. According to Bailey, Nikolai Bravin, the first Soviet ambassador to Kabul, described them as “pompous but without cordiality.” Amanullah even turned Lenin’s Pan-Islamist encouragement against the Soviets from time to time, reminding Lenin, for example, of their joint commitment to safeguard Bukhara and Khiva’s independence. He even wrote to the leaders of socialist Bukhara to establish religious bodies to make sure that the country’s population attended prayer, according to Boyko (p 113).

According to Abdullaev, the British were also keen to avoid any step that could have provided the Soviets with a justification to export the revolution to Afghanistan and India. Support for the Amir of Bukhara and the Basmachis could have been such a step. Britain thus applied its policy of ‘masterly inactivity’ from the Great Game.

The end of the Bukhara Emirate and retreat of Alem Khan

Amanullah’s calculations on Soviet influence in the region proved to be right. The Bolshevik army became substantially stronger in Central Asia, and by April 1920 had defeated the main Basmachi contingents. Elsewhere, they subdued the White Russian generals one by one, who had been in contact with and supported anti-Soviet forces in the whole region, including the Basmachi and Bukhara.

In late August 1920 the Soviets attacked Bukhara again. This time, they conquered the city within a few days. Russian sources say that the Amir’s Turkish regiment, with its Afghan fighters, played a crucial role in their attempts to defend Bukhara. According to Abdullaev, the Amir’s kush-begi Mirza Nezamuddin Urganji (he was from Khiva) tried a counterattack with several thousand fighters, including the Afghans, who had gathered with the Amir in his palace, Setara-ye Mah Hesar (“Moon Star Palace”), a few kilometres to the east of the city on 1 September, but was defeated. On the same day, the Amir ordered the evacuation of the city. Apart from his financial documents, he even had to leave part of his family behind and retreated to Dushanbe in mountainous eastern Bukhara, today’s capital of Tajikistan. There he tried to mobilise resistance against the Soviets. Resistance in Bukhara city continued until 4 September.

As a result of the attack, Bukhara was heavily destroyed. Twenty palaces, 29 mosques, around 100 shops and 3,000 houses were destroyed, according to Abdullaev. On 8 October 1920, the Young Bukharans and their Soviet supporters proclaimed the Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic and concluded a friendship treaty with Soviet Russia. Four years later, in October 1924, the still de jure independent state joined the Soviet federation and was integrated into the Uzbek Socialist Soviet Republic.

Meanwhile, Alem Khan found Amanullah to be less supportive than ever. On 13 September 1920, less then two weeks after Alem Khan was deposed, a Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty was signed. In this treaty, both sides recognised the independence of Bukhara – then of course already of the Soviet-dominated People’s Republic – and Amanullah received Soviet military and other aid in exchange (see also this AAN analysis).

Alem Khan also appealed to the British, but in vain, such as a 21 October 1920 letter to his “brother” King George V, sent via the Bukharan delegation in Kashgar in Chinese Turkestan (still loyal to him) and the British Consul-General there (quoted from Abdullaev):

I hope that in this hour of need Your Majesty will extend to me your kindness and favour and send me from your High Government by way of friendly assistance £100,000 English as a State Loan, also 20,000 rifles with ammunition and 30 guns with ammunition and 10 aeroplanes with necessary equipment. These things may kindly be dispatched to me quickly with my above mentioned officials, and this will make me happy. As to sending me assistance from Your side, you know best how to deal with and fight the Russians, but I shall be very grateful if 2000 armed soldiers can be sent to me quick via [Qarategin]. This will strengthen the bonds of friendship and give expression of our alliance.

But London did not want to complicate relations with Soviet Russia at this point (it had intervened in the Civil War in Russia with troops in the north, the Caucasus and in what today is Turkmenistan. It had then withdrawn them after the defeat of the Whites), fearing Soviet influence in Afghanistan could stoke the Pashtun tribes in India’s North West Frontier Province into uprising. This fear was later laid to rest with the March 1921 British-Soviet trade agreement in which Moscow, gripped by economic crisis, agreed to stop all infiltration into India, but by then it was too late for Alem Khan.

The consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia led to mass emigration, mainly to Afghanistan. Many of today’s Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik communities in northern Afghanistan have their roots in Bukhara and Khiva, on the northern side of the Amu Darya (more detail here).

Destructions in Bukhara after the Soviet capture in 1920. Via Uzbek travel.

Exile in Afghanistan: Alem Khan leaves Bukhara forever

In late February 1921, as the Red Army approached Dushanbe, the biggest town still under Amir Alem Khan’s control, he took the decision to leave his country. On 4 March 1921, he and his entourage crossed the Amu border river in what today is Tajikistan’s Khatlon province into Afghanistan, leaving “noble” Bukhara behind forever, although he did not know this at the time. According to Bailey, hewas accompanied by the former Afghan consul to Tashkent, Muhammad Aslam Khan and his royal household, as well as 300 fighters belonging to Bukhara’s regular, defeated army comprised of 200 Bukharans and 100 Afghans. The rest of the Amir’s surviving forces joined the Basmachi.

Alem Khan arrived in Khanabad, in today’s Kunduz province, then the centre of the Afghan northeastern province of Qataghan. He apparently did so without consent from Kabul. It took Amanullah almost three months, until mid-May 1921, to permit him to proceed to Kabul. This was accompanied by a cordial letter in which he wrote, quoted by Abdullaev: “I and you are united in belief, my mother considers you her son, therefore come to Kabul and visit.”

Upon Alem Khan’s arrival on 17 May 1921, Amanullah provided the displaced Amir and his entourage an honorary residence in the centre of Kabul (see part 1 by Jolyon Leslie) and organised a large reception for him. Apart from two meetings in the first three months, Amanullah avoided personal contact with the deposed Bukharan ruler, according to Abdullaev.

Still, Alem Khan did not give up hope of recapturing Bukhara. He continued to write to the British in India, but, censored by the Afghan government, his letters never arrived. He also unsuccessfully appealed several times to Amanullah, including through the English Ambassador in Kabul, for permission to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca via India.

Meanwhile, when the new government of the Bukharan People’s Republic learned of Amanullah’s invitation to Alem Khan, it sent a letter with three demands, quoted by Abdullaev: “1) to disarm and intern the armed forces in the Amir’s entourage and to hand over the weapons to the people of Bukhara; 2) to bar the former Amir from being present near the Bukharan border and in Kabul; 3) to receive the former Amir as a normal citizen and ban him from gathering any grouping around him.”

Amanullah Khan accepted these demands almost totally. As a result, according to Bailey (p299-300), “The Afghans treated [Alem Khan] as a prisoner and censored all his letters, but allowed him a sum each month for his expenses.” On his trips through the country, he was never allowed to travel further then Jalalabad, in order to make sure he did not escape to British India.

Amanullah had Alem Khan shifted to Qala-ye Fatuh in the Chahrdeh valley some 20 kilometres from what was then Kabul city. This was to keep him away from the diplomatic circles in the capital. In India, according to Abdullaev, the British were not unhappy about this arrangement; there seem to have been deliberations that if Alem Khan arrived, he would not be allowed to stay but settle in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) or the Seychelles. (13) According to Red Army intelligence reports, cited by Abdullaev, the Amir still managed to maintain communication with the Bukharan emigrants that had settled mainly in northern Afghanistan. He tried to find out about the military situation in his country and also attempted to maintain contact with the Basmachi. (14)

The Enver Pasha episode

One of the most remarkable political manoeuvres in those already stormy years temporarily brought new hope to exiled Alem Khan in 1921. This had to do with Enver Pasha, the former Young Turk and Ottoman minister of war (1913-18), who had arrived in the region as an ally of the Soviets. Or so it seemed.

Shortly before the end of World War I, Enver had been exfiltrated from Turkey by the Kaiser’s fleet to Germany. With Germany not able to support him any further after its own defeat and capitulation, he went to Soviet Russia. He arrived with recommendations from Karl Radek, one of the Comintern’s key leaders, who operated in Germany during its post-war upheavels. Enver seemed to have persuaded Radek and other Soviet leaders that he might help them in their aim of ‘revolutionising the East’ and subduing the Basmachi uprising. In September 1920, Enver participated in the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East. In November 1920, he was received by Lenin, who took him up on his offer to be despatched to Central Asia. Enver’s brother Cemal Pasha joined him from Afghanistan, where he had arrived in 1916, likely as a military instructor. In the end, the Soviets did not allow him to go with Enver, according to Turkish historian Suhnaz Yilmaz.

From Moscow, Enver first went back to Germany to buy weapons, then onto the Caucasus in the summer of 1921 and finally to socialist Bukhara, where he  arrived on 8 November. Three days later he left the city, ostensibly on a hunting trip. He was accompanied by then-Bukharan head of state, Osman Khwaja(ev), two more ministers and a 90-strong group. Khwajaev had fallen out with the Soviets, who, despite Bukhara’s (formal) independence, had told him they would maintain a military presence in the country, and requested Afghan help to maintain its independence. (Abdullaev, in contrast, speaks of an attempted coup by Khwajaev, in cooperation with Turkish officers helping to train the Bukharan army.) They then linked up with Basmachi leader Ibrahim Bek, an Uzbek of the Loqay tribe, in the region of Hessar near the border with Afghanistan.

Ibrahim, though, thought they were Soviet spies. He disarmed and detained the group for almost three months (more here). He only released them after he received letters from Amanullah and the Amir of Bukhara who appointed Enver supreme commander of his forces (amer lashkar) and his deputy (naeb amir). Enver’s new titles had been held by Ibrahim Beg so far, so the latter refused to subordinate himself to the newcomer. Soon after, however, at a kurultai (assembly) of the Basmachi leaders, Enver was confirmed in his positions under the influence of representatives of the Amir (more here. The Basmachi forces unified, at least theoretically, into a Lashkar Islam (Army of Islam), with Enver as its leader.

In February 1922, Enver’s troops captured Dushanbe and brought most of Eastern Bukhara under their control. In March 1922, they laid siege to the city of Bukhara but failed to take it. After Soviet purges of ‘nationalists’ in Bukhara in the spring of 1922, the rest of the Young Bukharans joined him. Some 140 Afghan volunteers also joined him, “despite the official policy of Kabul” not to support the Basmachi (as Abdullaev put it). (15) Abdullaev cited an Afghan source, namely a semi-documentary novel by Khalilullah Khalili (later the top poet at the Afghan court), that one of the volunteers was Habibullah Kalakani, who, in 1929, toppled Amanullah and became King Habibullah II for nine months (more in this AAN background).

The Afghan volunteers were apparently headed by Afghan officers and – for religious guidance – by a Panjshiri cleric, Mawlavi Abdul Hai, according to Abdullaev. Enver made him Sheikh ul-Islam, indicating that Abdul Hai was a senior Islamic scholar. (Another source, here, p72, has his name as Abul Khair.)

The volunteers were sent by Muhammad Nader Khan, who would later become Afghanistan’s king (1929-33). He then served as Minister of War and had been sent to Qataghan’s provincial capital, Khanabad, to keep an eye on events beyond the country’s northern border. There he met former Bukharan president, Khwaja(ev), corresponded with Enver and sent weapons and ammunition to the other bank of the river. The letters were later found by the Soviets in Enver’s camp (see here).

In July 1922, in a letter to the Soviet foreign office, Nader Khan allegedly threatened that Afghanistan would annex Bukhara if Soviet activities against its independence did not cease. (16) It is not clear whether that was his private policy or expressed Amanullah’s course (possibly with ‘plausible deniability’).

By this time, Enver had developed his own plan to establish a Turkic empire in the region, with himself at its head. Whether that had been his idea from the start of his Soviet enterprise, or whether the mid-1921 Soviet rapprochement with the new Turkish leader, Kemal Pasha (later Atatürk), a former friend but now Enver’s rival, made him rethink about the Soviets, is still anyone’s guess.

In May 1922, Enver repeated Alem Khan’s earlier ultimatum to the Soviet leadership to withdraw all its forces from Turkestan. But he failed to bring most Basmachi fighters under his command and in practice led only 3,000 out of a total of 16,000 at that point, according to Becker (p304, see FN 7). Ibrahim Beg even “sabotaged Enver’s orders, informed the Red Army about his plans, and openly clashed with his forces”, according to Kirill Nourzhanov, a Kirghiz historian. Enver also alienated Alem Khan by referring to himself as “Amir of Turkestan” and issuing decrees for Bukhara in his own name, using a seal with the inscription “Commander-in-Chief of all the Armies of Islam, Son-in-Law of the Caliph [he was married to a granddaughter of Sultan Abdulmejit I, who ruled from 1839-61] and Representative of the Prophet.”

In the first half of 1922, Alem Khan broke off relations with Enver, depriving him of much-needed financial support. The Soviets, meanwhile, were able to cut off his supply routes from northern Afghanistan in June. They hunted Enver down with what today would be called counterinsurgency units and local militias recruited from among ‘reconciled’ Basmachis. These forces killed him on 4 August 1922 near the village of Ab Dara in Baljuwan district, not far from Dushanbe. It was Eid al-Adha, and Enver had given leave to most of his troops to celebrate. The first newspaper to report Enver’s end was Ettehad-e Islam, published in Mazar-e Sharif, in late October 1922 (quoted here, p200).

Enver’s deputy Haji Bekir Sami (actually Same’) Bey took over as amer-e lashkar. (17) He had been taken prisoner of war as a Turkish officer by Russian troops during World War I, escaped to Bukhara and joined Enver. After Enver’s death in August 1922, he briefly escaped to Afghanistan but returned later that year and fought until July 1923. Then, however, he had to give up under increasing Soviet pressure and left for Afghanistan, for good. There he was assassinated soon after, allegedly by the Turkish secret police.

Before Enver’s death, after an official warning from the Soviets, Amir Amanullah ordered the Afghan volunteers home on 25 July 1922. He gave them 20 days and threatened those who would not comply with the loss of their Afghan citizenship and confiscation of their property (see here, p 136). Nader Khan was demoted for his cooperation with Enver and sent abroad as Afghan minister (ambassador) to Paris. Mawlavi Abdulhai was arrested and imprisoned in Khanabad when back in Afghanistan. The same may have been the case with Habibullah Kalakani, who, according to Khalili’s book, also served time in prison. According to Eden Naby, writing in 2004, Afghan descendants of the soldiers sent by Amanullah in support of the Amir of Bukhara in 1922 are living in and around Bukhara but have lost their original language, Pashto. (18)

At the same time, Amanullah seemed to have supported Alem Khan’s attempts to regain control over the Basmachi movement. In Kabul, a meeting was convened between the Amir and the Basmachi movement’s main leaders in August 1922. (19) It was only after Haji Sami’s disappearance on the Central Asian battlefield in mid-1923, however, that Alem Khan re-appointed Ibrahim Beg as Basmachi supreme commander in July 1923. Real unity never developed, though, and the movement’s diverse groups were defeated one by one by the Soviets. Ibrahim continued his fight for another three years. In 1926, he fled to Afghanistan, where he joined Alem Khan. Thefew other surviving Basmachi leaders did the same by the mid-1920s. Fuzail Maqsum, a Tajik from southern Bukhara, was one of last who gave up in May 1929. Kurshermat (real name: Sher Muhammad) from Ferghana died in Afghan exile.

Further west, Basmachi leader Junaid Khan, a Turkmen from the Yomut tribe, still threatened the city of Khiva in 1926. There, he had been the ruler from February 1916 to January 1920. In 1916 he had toppled the local Khan (and installed a new one as nominal ruler), and, in 1920, similarly to what had happened in Bukhara, he was overthrown by Soviet and local reformist forces, the Young Khivans. And, much like had happened in Bukhara, they established a Khwarezm People’s Soviet Republic. During his rule, Junaid had enjoyed Afghan support. In December 1919, there were 400 regular Afghan soldiers deployed in Merw, according to official British Indian files. When Khwarezm, much like in Bukhara, joined the Soviet Union in 1924 against the will of the Young Khivans, they joined Junaid Khan’s forces. After another defeat in June 1926, Junaid Khan also went to Afghanistan and settled in Herat.

Intermezzo: Habibullah (Kalakani) II

Fate changed again for the Central Asian diaspora in Afghanistan when Habibullah Kalakani overthrew Amanullah in January 1929. He officially supported the Basmachi movement, and Alem Khan quickly capitalised on the political change. He convened a meeting of the main Basmachi leaders in Kabul within the same month. Junaid, Ibrahim Beg and Maqsum’s men all supported the new regime in Kabul and carried the fight back over the Soviet border. Ibrahim, who was quasi-garrison chief in Khanabad, was tasked to liberate Tajikistan (20) by Alem Khan. Maqsum operated from Badakhshan. When pro-Amanullah forces from Soviet Central Asia attacked Basmachi positions inside Afghanistan and even briefly captured Mazar-e Sharif in May 1929, supported by Soviet troops (see here) (21), Maqsum directly worked under Habibullah’s minister of defence, Sayed Hussain.

Afghan support for the Basmachi soon stopped again after Habibullah II’s relatively quick overthrow in October 1929. Nader Shah, as he was then called as King, turned against the Basmachi on Afghan soil after a short period during which Ibrahim was still assistant governor in Mazar-e Sharif. This new political turn was a result of Soviet pressure. This was another heavy blow to the Basmachi, depriving them of their hinterlands. Nader even began pushing them actively back over the Amu Darya border in 1930. (22) There, Junaid Khan led a brief resurgence of the Basmachi movement in 1931. Then, Soviet collectivisation in what is now Turkmenistan created new resistance. He was defeated in 1933 and fled to Iran, where he died in 1936.

Ibrahim Beg was caught by the Soviets in June 1931, transferred to Tashkent, interrogated, tried and condemned to death. He was executed in August 1932.

Amir Alem’s last years: the dream dies

Junaid and Ibrahim’s end was not the last word on the anti-Soviet Bukharan and Basmachi forces, nor on Alem Khan’s ambitions to regain power in Bukhara. Small Basmachi remnants were still active throughout the 1930s and, according to some sources, even into the 1940s. Then, Western sources reported attempts by the Japanese and German intelligence services to re-launch the Basmachi insurgency under the leadership of Alem Khan. This was meant to undermine Soviet resistance against Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa, the attempt to defeat Stalin. Boris Kogan wrote for the Small Wars Journal in 2011 that a “massive cross-border invasion was planned for the summer of 1943, its object being the reinstatement of the Emir in Bukhara.

Available sources do not provide information as to whether Alem Khan was involved in this planning. Elements in the German leadership had contemplated a similar plan for Afghanistan, namely organising an invasion of Afghan forces from Soviet Turkestan (after the envisaged German occupation of the region, which never occurred) in order to bring back Amanullah to power, who, meanwhile, lived in Mussolini’s Italy. According to German files, Amanullah was to be told about the plan only when it had been set in motion (which never happened). (23) Anyway, as Kagan continued about the plan for Bukhara:

It was not to be. Soviet intelligence penetration of the Basmachi organizations of Afghanistan was very thorough. Simultaneously, throughout the 1930’s and 1940’s the British had increased their influence over Afghanistan’s foreign policy. The final nail in the coffin of the insurgency was a series of purges undertaken by the Afghan police against the Central Asian diaspora in 1943, probably at the behest of these two foreign powers, which culminated in the aged Emir being called before the King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah [who had followed Nader Shah after his assassination in 1933], and being ordered to cease and desist in no uncertain terms.

In early 1943, Alem Khan received the news about the defeat of Hitler’s troops in Stalingrad and the Caucasus. This made Germany’s plans for Central Asia and India obsolete, and destroyed his final hope of a return.

View of the tomb of Amir Alem Khan of Bukhara in Kabul. Photo: Vladimir N Plastun

Less than a year later, on 29 April 1944, Alem Khan died in the presence of his wives and children in Kabul. One of his wives, Nazera, who had been born in Faizabad, Badakhshan, is buried with him in the cemetery of Shuhada-ye Salehin in Kabul.

Abdullaev describes the last days of the Amir of Bukhara: “The heavily sick and almost completely blind Alem Khan turned, in the last days [sic] of his life, into an ardent karakul skin merchant and rentier. He also was forced to give up his dreams about [regaining] his wealth, as due to the activities of the Soviet government his deposits [in Western Europe] remained blocked.” In his residence, it was reported, he kept two glass vessels with soil from Bukhara and two flags of his home country, green with a yellow moon, star and the hand of Fatema and two verses from the Quran.” According to contemporary tales, Abdullaev reported, “he loved to sit at the banks of the Kabul River and recite Persian verses about Bukhara the Noble.”

The Amir’s offspring: Back to Bukhara?

According to a Tajik journalist, there are more than 300 progeny of the Amir living in Afghanistan and the US, Germany and Turkey, as well as in Russia. Twelve sons and ten daughters were still alive abroad in 2016, according to Uzbek writer Artur Samari who has collected information about Alem Khan’s family.

According to him, three of his sons had been left behind in Bukhara in 1920. They were sent to be re-educated in the USSR in a home for children of fallen Bolsheviki in Moscow. Alem Khan contacted the Soviet government for them to be released to Afghanistan, but this was denied.

The youngest of the three, Rahim Khan, attempted to escape to his father in Afghanistan before World War II but was arrested at the border and executed. The eldest son, Sultan Murad, who had denounced his father at the age of seven in 1929, graduated from the Workers’ Faculty (a new university designed for the proletariat) and worked in a factory. But, thirsty for knowledge, he learned English, which in those days was sufficient enough to be suspected a British spy. He was arrested as an enemy of the people and later died in jail.

The middle son, Shah Murad, also had to publicly dissociate himself from his father in an open letter published in the Soviet daily Izvestiya (quoted here). He undertook military training and later joined the Kuibyshev Military Academy, where he became a teacher. As a member of the Soviet Army, he participated in World War II and was seriously wounded in 1944. After the war, he returned to the academy as a lieutenant-general and received a professorship. He died in 1985 in Moscow at the age of 75. Most people around him were unaware of his background. Samari interviewed one of his classmates, who told him how Shah Murad – then officially Shah Murad Olimov – was once shown a book with a photo of his father and started crying.

The amir’s son, General Shahmurad Olimov, in a Soviet uniform. Photo c/o Vladimir N Plastun.

Three children belonging to Alem Khan’s last wife, a Tajik from Hesar in what was a part of Bukhara and whom he had married in Kabul, lived in Afghanistan until the Soviet occupation in 1979. One of them, Shukria Rad Alemi, the Amir’s youngest daughter, graduated as one of four women in the first journalism class of Kabul University in 1966 and then worked as a broadcaster in Radio Afghanistan, the Voice of America (VoA) reported in 2002. Her husband was also a journalist. In early 1980, three months after the Soviet invasion,they saw themselves compelled to migrate onwards to Pakistan, and from there through Germany to the US. In 1982, Shukria Rad Alemi joined the VoA and worked as a broadcaster, editor, host and producer for its Dari Service, until 2002 (on an occasional basis, in the later years).Two of the Amir’s sons, Sayed Amer Khan Alemi and Sayed Akbar Alemi, worked for the VoA’s Dari division.

In 2006, Bilal Shams, a Tajik journalist, met Shukria Rad Alemi, who by that time was living in a retirement home in Washington DC, aged 93. He reported that she told him she did not have any contact with her relatives in either Tajikistan or Russia.

Other daughters and relatives continued to live in Afghanistan. Shams met two of Alem Khan’s grandsons, Sayed Azam Azizi Bukhari  – also a journalist by profession but now “in small business” – and Sayed Abdul Rasul Ghafuri Bukhari, in Kabul. They accompanied him to the Amir’s grave. He also met two daughters, 80 year-old Nazakat and 73 year-old Muslima, living with the grandsons; the latter had been born in Afghanistan. According to Shams, all expressed their interest in returning to their home country, now Tajikistan. The grandsons told him that, if there was a possibility, they would like to transfer the remains of the deceased Amir to their homeland, as requested in his will. They said: “Afghanistan is not the homeland for us; our homeland in on the other side of the Panj river [how the Amu is called upstream].” The two women also said they would “very much” like to go back to their homeland.

In 2006, Shams wrote, the grandsons turned to the Embassy of Tajikistan, requesting permission for Alem Khan’s family members to participate in the celebration of the country’s independence day, but they were not received. In 1994, then-Uzbek President Islam Karimov allowed them to visit his country, but they were asked to leave after ten days.

Before he passed away, the former Amir Alem Khan put in his will that the following Farsi language verses be enscribed on his cenotaph:

امیر بی وطن زار و حقیر است گدا گر به وطن میرد – امیر است

[Amir-e be-watan zar o haqir ast 

gada gar ba watan me-ra(wa)d – amir ast

An Amir without a homeland is miserable and insignificant
The beggar if he died in the homeland – is an Amir]

The inscription still can be read on Alem Khan’s white marble sarcophagus on Shuhada-ye Salehin cemetery. There it lies in its one-storey, dilapidated mausoleum under a domed roof, behind an iron grill the friendly custodian opened up for us. The mausoleum is surrounded by more graves belonging to Alem Khan’s family members and former advisors. Afghan elders told one of the authors that old men’s bodies are still brought from Bukhara to be buried here.

Edited by Danielle Moylan

Amir or beggar? Alem Khan’s sarcophagus with his self-chosen inscription in Kabul. Photo: Vladimir N Plastun.

 

(*) Dr (DSc) Vladimir N Plastun is professor for Oriental Studies at Novosibirsk State University. He worked in Afghanistan as Director of the Soviet Cultural Centre in Kabul (1979-80), then as an invited civilian specialist-ethnographer in the Afghan military forces (1987-88) and as correspondent of the Pravda newspaper in Afghanistan (1989-1991). In 2009, during a research trip to Kabul the author located the tomb of the amir with the help of local people.

Translation of Vladimir Plastun’s Russian contributions to this article: Joachim Ludwig.

 

(1) In the capital of Turkestan, Tashkent, a Soviet government had taken over in 1918. But it was cut off from Central Russia by the ‘White Guards’, who controlled the railway connections through what today is northwestern Kazakhstan and the Ural mountains, and could not rely on support from the Soviet leadership under Lenin and Trotsky in Petersburg. It was also challenged by internal strife.

(2) Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, New Delhi, Rama Publishres 1980, p447 and Leon B Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 1919-1929, Cornell University Press 1973, p47.

(3) Andrew D. W. Forbes (1986), Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: a political history of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949. Cambridge, CUP Archive, p376.

(4) This included subjects of Amir Amanullah and of the British Empire. Accoording to Forbes, p69 (see FN 3), there were “numerous Afghan merchants (particularly from Badakhshan) [who] had long resided [in Xinjiang] under British protection.” Contemporary sources, such as the German archaeologist Albert von Le Coq, also observed Pashtun traders from Swat, Bajaur, other areas in British-India, and from Afghanistan proper (Von Land und Leuten in Ostturkestan, Leipzig, Zentralantiquariat der DDR 1982, Reprint of 1928 original, p10 FN 1).

(5) Abdul Rahman’s unification of Afghanistan – in fact the creation of a small empire – was particularly brutal against the Shia Hazaras of quasi-independent central Afghanistan. They lost many of their original areas of settlement that were distributed among Pashtun tribes who had supported Abdulrahman’s conquest. Scores were killed or sold into slavery, and many were forced to flee abroad. The large Hazara community in Quetta and elsewhere in today’s Pakistan are a result of those events.

(6) In Badakhshan, disputed areas were Kulab and Darwāz, north of the Amu Darya that had been conquered by the khanate of Kunduz in the early 19th century. This river had been made the Afghan-Bukharan border in a treaty between Ahmad Shah Abdali (ruled 1747-79) and the Amir of Bukhara, Mahmud Bey (locally: Bi; Wilde has Muhammad Danyal Bi as the then-Bukharan ruler) in 1768. On that occasion, the Amir of Bukhara gifted Ahmad Shah a cloak believed to be have been worn by the Prophet Muhammad, that is kept in a shrine in Kandahar (and which, famously, Taleban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, took out of its silver trunk in 1996 when he was proclaimed Amir-ul-Momenin to bolster his legitimacy; more about the cloak in this AAN dispatch). The treaty, however, did not hold. In 1818, for example, Bulkhara seized Balkh when Afghanistan was mired in a dynastic war of succession between Dost Muhammad and Mahmud Khan (quoted here).

After the 1895 Anglo-Russian treaty that regulated the Afghan northern border, the Amir of Bukhara retreated from trans-Amu (Afghan) Darwaz in 1896. He had already withdrawn from Shighnan and Roshan in 1894 (GP Tate, The Kingdom of Afghanistan: A Historical Sketch, p191).

(7) See AS Morrsion, Russian Rule in Samarkand 1868-1910, Oxford 2008, pp 21-2.

Another of Amir Muzaffar’s sons, the eldest one and heir apparent, Sayyed Abdul Malik Mirza, born 1849, had seized and ruled Karshi, in southern Tajikistan, independently of his father, until 1868. He then had to flee to Afghanistan. Later, he was exiled to Abbottabad in India (now Pakistan) and married (amongst others) one of Amir Muhammed Afzal Khan’s daughters, 1866-67 Amir of Kabul (see here).

(8) Originally, there was a Communist Party of Turkestan, allied with Lenin’s Bolsheviki party, which also had branches in Bukhara, but only members among the Russians living in the Emirate. The Bukharan Communist Party (BCP) was established at the initiative of the Soviet leadership in Tashkent between April and November 1918, when it held its first congress in Tashkent and joined the Comintern. The rest of the Young Bukharans joined the BCP in 1920 after the Amir was dethroned. Its leader, Abdul Qadir Mohiuddin, became socialist Bukhara’s first head of state (source: Seymour Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva 1985-1924, Harvard 1968, p280-1, 303).

(9) It is not clear whether this quote is genuine. But in 1915, Lenin had written (in Socialism and War, quoted here):

If tomorrow, Morocco were to declare war on France, India on England, Persia or China on Russia, and so forth, those would be “just” “defensive” wars, irrespective of who attacked first; and every Socialist would sympathise with the victory of the oppressed, dependent, unequal states against the oppressing, slave-owning, predatory “great” powers.

(10) Vladimir Boyko, Афганистан на начальном этапе независимого развития (1920-е годы): центрально-азиатский контекст внутренней и внешней политики [Afghanistan in the starting phase of its independent development (the 1920s): the Central Asian domestic and foreign policy context], Bishkek 2004, pp 57-87.

(11) Chokaev fled to Georgia (also temporarily independent of Russia) and, from there, in February 1919, he urged the western powers who had gathered for the Versailles peace conference after World War I to occupy Turkestan and support the establishment of an independent Turkestan.

Ergash, in some sources, is called the former commander of the Kokand Autonomy’s police. This is another person, though, locally known as ‘Little Ergash’; Ergash the mullah was also known as ‘big Ergash’. (see Baymirza Hayit, Turkestan im XX Jahrhundert, 1956) The latter’s successor as commander of the movement in 1920 was his rival Madamin Beg, who surrendered and joined the Red Army – temporarily – in the same year. This led to a temporary slump of the movement, which soon gained momentum again.

The best short overview of the Basmachi movement is on the dictionary page of Le Parisien website. It is pointed out that the movement’s roots lay in the 1916 Central Asian revolt against conscription of Muslims for back area services in the Czarist army in World War I. Several later Basmachi leaders participated in that revolt.

(12) Russian sources assert that there were British advisors, too (see here), but Bailey reported that those reports were highly exaggerated and that there were only two Muslim non-commissioned officers in the British-Indian army. One was apparently a Pashtun, named Awal Gul, and one a “Hazara from western Afghanistan”, named Kerbelayi Muhammad. They, who had gone there with a weapons transport sent by the commander of the British troops in Transcaucasia and who the Amir had kept in Bukhara. (Both left with Bailey in December 1919).

(13) Unfortunately, Abdullaev does not provide sources for this detail in the article where he mentioned this.

(14) The Bukharan and other emigrants from the now Soviet areas lived in Afghanistan on provisional papers. According to an estimate of Abdullaev, at the beginning of 1926 there were 42,580 Turkmen emigré families, “225,305 persons overall (…) from Karakum and eastern Bukhara in northwestern Afghanistan. The town of Andkhoy in today’s Faryab province became the centre of Turkmen emigration: “From 1917-1922 more than 30 thousand families moved there for permanent residence.” The number of Uzbek refugees was lower, according to Abdullaev. He quotes the account of a Tajik government commission, noting that 12 thousand Loqays had fled to Afghanistan by the mid-1920s. Only in 1973 were Central Asian refugees allowed to obtain Afghan citizenship (see here).

(15) Sources differ widely about the number of Afghan fighters. The figure of 140 and the information about Abdulhai’s presence derives from a contemporary report by the commander of the Soviet-Bukharan troops at the time, General Nikolai Kakurin. Ali Ahmad, Amanullah’s personal secretary, speaks about 200, led by a Brigadier Fazl Ahmad Khan, in a document written after the fall of the Amanullah government. Ibrahim Bek, after his arrest, spoke of 300 men, led by a certain Ahmad Jan who was the son of the Afghan governor (hakem) of Khanabad, Nader Safar Khan. Fedor Raskolnikov, the Soviet ambassador to Kabul, based on reports from the Soviet consulate in Mazar-e Sharif, speaks of 300 to 2,000 men. These data have been compiled in a Russian-language academic discussion forum and come to the conclusion that there were two groups, first 200 and then 300, led by Anwar Jan. The Tajik historian Ghafur Shermatov elsewhere spoke of 800 men in two groups, first 500, then 300.

(16) Quoted in Ludwig W Adamec, Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century, Tucson 1941, p 69, FN 78.

(17) Alexander Marshall, “Turkfront” in: Tom Everett-Heath (ed), Central Asia: Aspects of transition, London and New York 2003, p 17.

(18) Eden Naby, “The Afghan diaspora: reflections on the imagined country”, in: Central Asia and the Caucasus: Transnationalism and Diaspora, ed by Touraj Atabaki and Sanjyot Mehendale, 2004, p182 (FN 4).

(19) See FN 17.

(20) Tajikistan was founded in 1924 as an autonomous part of the Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR) of Uzbekistan, and upgraded to a full SSR in 1929. This resulted in the former territory of Bukhara being divided between two republics. It remains divided between two independent states, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (following the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991).

(21) This episode is only marginally dealt with in most of the English language literature on Afghanistan. In Russia, now, an entire book has been written about it: Тихонов Ю. Н. Афганская война Сталина. Битва за Центральную Азию. – М.: Яуза, Эксмо, 2008. – 704 с. [Yu. N. Tikhonov, Stalin’s Afghan War: The battle for Central Asia, Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008, 704 pp].

(22) Afghanistan was still the address for regional Islamic uprising forces. When a Turkic movement declared an independent “Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan” (TIRET) during another round of Chinese civil wars in November 1933, it contacted Kabul for help. King Muhammad Zaher Shah sent his congratulations, but did not provide any practical help, even after a TIRET delegation visited Afghanistan in early 1934. There was apparently also Soviet pressure not to support them, as the TIRET was anti-communist. (Forbes, see FN 3, p116)

(23) The plan was conceived in the German foreign ministry by Werner Otto von Hentig, one of the two leaders of the German military-diplomatic mission to Kabul during World War I (see AAN article here), and originally thought to have been implemented in cooperation with Stalin’s Soviet Union, based on the August 1939 so-called Hitler-Stalin Pact. On the Afghan side, Amanullah’s former foreign minister Ghulam Sediq Charkhi who lived in Berlin was supposed to head the Afghan invasion force. However, the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the ‘Amanullah Plan’, in this form, became obsolete after Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, but was still pushed forward by Berlin.) Finally, Hitler seems to have vetoed it. It also needs to be highlighted that Amanullah was to be told of the plan “in the very last moment” as it was all but sure he would participate. See: Kircheisen/Glasneck, Berlin 1968, Türkei und Afghanistan: Brennpunkte der Orientpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, p212ff, a book based on documents from the Nazi German foreign service’s archives. The dismantling of the Axis powers’ presence in Afghanistan in 1943, result of an allied ultimatum after which all German, Italian and Japanese citizens were expelled, also stopped these plans.

 

 

 

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Kabul is a city of secrets. An outsider needs both curiosity and patience to discover the hidden layers that lie behind mud walls or at the end of dusty lanes. This heritage is however at risk from indiscriminate demolitions and new construction, much of which is uncontrolled. The stories behind places also risk being lost, as some of their names indicate; a busy traffic intersection at Chahrrahi-ye Zambaq (Iris crossroads) may have been a tranquil garden; what is now a refuse-clogged drain once supplied fresh water to the neighbourhood of Ju-ye Shir (Sweet water channel) from a distant spring. AAN guest author Jolyon Leslie, who has campaigned for and contributed to safeguarding built heritage, highlights the threats currently facing historic sites in Kabul, both from physical ‘development’ and loss of memory in this AAN Christmas read. 

This dispatch is part 1 of a short series about the last Amir of Bukhara who ended up in Afghan exile in 1921. His country, once Afghanistan’s neighbour to the north, does no longer exist, having been divided between Uzbekistan an Tajikistan in Soviet times. The text is an extended version of ‘Notebook 058: Garden of Exile’ published in 2012 as part of dOCUMENTA 13 art exhibition at Kassel (Germany). Part 2 on 27 December 2018 will look at Amir Alem Khan’s resting place in Kabul and the two countries’ relationship.

Development or destruction?

The brutal changes wrought to the urban landscape over the last decade have obliterated important traces of Kabul’s history, as a tide of money feeds speculative construction, much of which is illegal. Worsening security seems to have little impact on the proliferation of brash multi-storey blocks that now crowd the skyline, often funded from dubious sources. From within their heavily-defended compounds in the central ‘green zone’, Afghan politicians and their diplomatic guests tend to portray this rash of new construction as a sign of development – rather than admitting that it is also a concrete manifestation of the corruption and greed that has dogged many aspects of international engagement in the country since 2002.

A similar disconnect prevails with efforts to safeguard sites or areas of historic significance. Most Afghan politicians are keen to affirm their commitment to preservation of their heritage, but it has proved difficult to enforce controls as long as municipal staff are willing to turn a blind eye to the approach of bulldozers – usually for a small consideration from developers, who might themselves be government officials. As on other issues, the failure to uphold the rule of law tends to be portrayed as a problem of ‘lack of capacity’, although such capacity seems to be in abundance in the lucrative realm of ‘redevelopment’. And with most young Afghans not taught about their culture or heritage in the classroom, awareness as to what they stand to lose is largely absent, presenting a challenge for public campaigns.

City of gardens

There are, however, corners that have thus far escaped the khakbad (dust-devil) of transformation, and hopefully might be safeguarded for future generations. Among these are some of the gardens that were once key to the character of Kabul, and seduced the likes of Babur, the first Mughal, whose memoirs offer a vivid picture of how central these were to court life in the early 16thcentury. A garden bearing his name was re-opened to the public in 2008 following restoration and is now popular for family picnics. (1)

Some distance to the south of Bagh-e Babur lies a less well-known site, approached along dusty tracks bordered by high mud walls over which festoons of white nastaran (dog-roses) hang. On the urban fringe, the landscape here is dotted with qala (family homesteads) with blank defensive outer walls and turrets set among irrigated fields and orchards. One such property, Qala-ye Fatuh seemed on my first visit in 2004 (2) to be abandoned, with its avenues of mature walnut and mulberry trees choked by invasive saplings and weeds. Nature appeared to be taking over the ruins of a scattering of buildings in one corner of the site. Despite this air of neglect, water flowed through open channels and villagers were working on small plots they had reclaimed for cultivation. One of them explained that this is known locally as Bagh-e Padshah-e Bukhara, or the Garden of the Emir of Bukhara.

One of the war-damaged pavilions in the garden. Photo: Jolyon Leslie/2006

Curious as to the history of the garden, I came to learn that Muhammad Alem Khan, emir of Bukhara, lived here in exile for more than twenty years. Unlike Babur, who dealt with being forced from his home in Ferghana (in present-day Uzbekistan) by embarking on a series of ambitious military campaigns that eventually enabled him to control much of India, Alem Khan’s exile was spent in this garden, plotting unsuccessfully to reclaim his throne in Bukhara. The forlorn landscape and ruined buildings there bear mute witness to a little-known aspect of modern Afghan history.

The emir in exile

Alem Khan’s family ruled over the Emirate of Bukhara for a century before its incorporation in 1868 as a protectorate of the Russian Empire. A photograph taken in Bukhara in 1911 shows him resplendent in a blue silk chapan (coat) embroidered with tulips and irises. Having initially viewed the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution as an opportunity to realise his dream of establishing an Islamic caliphate across the region, Alem Khan soon realised that the revolutionaries’ social and economic reforms were at odds with his conservative views. He began to organise resistance, but his forces were no match for the Red Army troops who occupied Bukhara in 1920, causing the emir to flee. After an unsuccessful attempt to mobilise opposition from the east of his country, he accepted an invitation from the Afghan ruler Amanullah Khan to visit Kabul, crossing the frontier in 1921 from Tajikistan.

Painted mural over the fireplace in the residential quarters. Photo: Jolyon Leslie/2006

Little did Alem Khan imagine that this visit would became permanent exile. With his entourage, he was initially quartered close to the royal palace, In Muradkhane, on the north bank of the Kabul river, from where his host monitored his attempts to rally resistance to the Bolsheviks, with whom Amanullah Khan – despite some ups and downs – maintained friendly relations. It may have been the exiled emir’s persistence in seeking foreign support – he made several requests to the British Indian government in the belief that the Soviets represented a common foe – that prompted his re-location to the secluded compound at Qala-ye Fatuh.

This move did not however prevent Alem Khan from maintaining contact with Bukharan rebels. On the defection to the rebel side by Enver Pasha, a former Young Turk and Minister of War of the Ottoman Empire but now in exile and sent by Lenin to contain the rebellion, he was promptly appointed commander-in-chief by the emir and went on to organise raids on occupied Bukhara. Amanullah would have monitored these developments closely, for he too dreamed of a confederation of Central Asian states, but with Afghanistan at its centre. Despite having signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviets, the Afghans quietly supplied arms to the Bukharan and other anti-Soviet rebels in the former Russian province of Turkestan. This support proved to be in vain, for the Red Army had largely suppressed them by 1922, killing Enver in that year. (The insurgency continued for many more years – more about this in part 2 of this series.) Despite this setback, Alem Khan seems not to have wavered from the conviction that he would return to Bukhara and regain his throne.

This belief might have made it easier to cope with the straitened circumstances in which the emir then lived, which were in stark contrast to the splendours of Bukhara. The quarters in Qala-ye Fatuh comprised a series of free-standing buildings ranged around neat flowerbeds and ornamental trees – now completely overgrown. Curiously, the residential spaces are tiny, even by Afghan standards, and one can but wonder how the corpulent emir and his entourage coped. This might be why Alem Khan appears rather disconsolate in a photograph taken in one of these miniature rooms in 1922. (3) The stenciled wall decoration visible in the photograph survives to this day, but the carpet at the emir’s feet is long gone, replaced by drying animal fodder. Over a fireplace in an adjoining room is a mural depicting a bucolic scene of castles beside a lake ringed by rugged mountains, perhaps intended to remind the household of happier times. Only the biplane that soars above this painted landscape seems to point to the future.

It was to the future, and the possibilities of modern technology, that the emir’s host Amanullah looked as he embarked on an ambitious program of reforms. Part of his vision for a modern capital was the creation of a new government enclave in Darulaman, where a foundation stone was laid in 1923. Work on the elevated Secretariat building (that was badly damaged during inter-factional fighting in 1993/4) must have been visible from Qala-ye Fatuh, and might even have reminded the emir of his grand palaces back in Bukhara. (4)

Alem Khan’s fortunes were hostage to Afghanistan’s turbulent politics. Soon after Amanullah’s abdication in 1929, the leader of the rebels who had overthrown him, Habibullah Kalakani, called for Bukhara’s liberation from Soviet occupation. (Find more background about him in this AAN dispatch.) The exiled emir appears in several photographs of public events at the time, and his presence may have lent a degree of legitimacy to Kalakani’s rule in Kabul. It was less than a year before he was in turn overthrown and then executed by Nader Shah, who turned a blind eye to Soviet incursions into northern Afghanistan in pursuit of Bukharan rebels.

Today, Qala-ye Fatuh’s forlorn garden and ruined buildings seem to resonate with the sadness that Alem Khan must have felt as he heard news of the Soviets’ consolidation of their grip on Bukhara. One can imagine how he must have struggled to keep up appearances in the tiny spaces in which he now lived, perhaps pacing up and down the avenues of trees to make sense of what was happening in the world outside of the walled compound. A section of an ornate plaster fireplace, now partly buried in rubble, is a reminder of the elegance of some of the buildings, even though its rusting corrugated-iron roof now hangs over ruined walls like a shroud. Nearby, shafts of bright sunlight penetrate through the shattered wood ceiling of a mosque, inside which painted decoration and inscriptions survive, albeit defaced.

Detail of moulded plaster fireplace in one of the damaged pavilions. Photo: Jolyon Leslie/2011

This destruction is a clue to the next chapter in the history of Qala-ye Fatuh. Its ruined buildings and overgrown landscape are not only the consequence of a natural process of decay, but of destruction caused by mujahedin fighters who, after the fall of the Soviet- backed government in Kabul in 1992, occupied this area. In another twist of history, these mujahedin belonged to the factions who claim to have forced occupying Soviet forces to withdraw from their country in 1989 – a goal that Alem Khan had pursued for his country from this very garden 70 years earlier. (5)

Along with other sites across the fast-changing urban landscape, Qala-ye Fatuh serves as a palimpsest of an important period in Kabul’s history. Since I first visited the garden in 2004, Afghanistan has experienced exceptional urban growth, as families are displaced from insecure rural areas or move to towns and cities in search of a livelihood. With almost a third of Afghans now thought to be urban residents, according to World Bank figures for 2017 there is huge pressure on land, housing and basic services. It is inevitable that investment to keep pace with this growing demand will come at some cost to urban heritage, but more can and should be done to document and, where possible, safeguard, sites like Qala-ye Fatuh that hold the history of the country – and without which future generation of Afghans will be the poorer.

Edited by Sari Kouvo and Thomas Ruttig

 

(1) Implemented by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, whose programme the author managed at the time.

(2) In the course of planning the rehabilitation of Bagh-e Babur, efforts were made to identify other significant walled gardens that survived in and around Kabul.

(3) One of series of photographs taken by Wilhelm Rieck, a German engineer, who was engaged to oversee various construction works in Kabul in the 1920s.

(4) In a curious echo of history, in 2017 President Ashraf Ghani pledged funds for the restoration of the Darulaman palace as part of an ambitious plan for an administrative quarter to be built in much the same area that Amanullah Khan chose for his ‘new Kabul’ – designed in 1921 by French architect Godard but not realised.

(5) A new contingent of ‘guests’ arrived in 1996 in nearby Rishkhor, where an al-Qaeda base was established, only to be obliterated by US missiles two years later. The craters remain to this day.

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Americas

Raytheon is being contracted to support the US Navy with Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) integration and production efforts. Priced at $114 million, the contract provides for continued combat system integration and test services including engineering and training; software and depot maintenance, as well as field engineering services and procurement of spare parts. The AMDR, designated AN/SPY-6(V), will fulfill integrated Air and Missile Defense requirements for multiple ship classes. The AN/SPY-6 is 30 times more sensitive than its predecessor, its additional sensitivity supercharges the vessel’s capabilities in anti-air warfare and ballistic missile defense. Work will be performed at multiple locations throughout the US. They include Marlborough, Massachusetts; Kauai, Hawaii; Portsmouth, Rhode Island; San Diego, California; Fair Lakes, Virginia and Moorestown, New Jersey. The contract includes options which could bring the total value of the order to $357 million and is expected to be completed by December 2019.

Boeing is receiving additional funding to continue research on the MQ-25 Stingray. The contract modification is valued at $90.4 million and is expected to be completed in August 2024. Under the contract, Boeing will perform a number of studies and analysis related to the engineering, manufacturing and development phase of the MQ-25 Stingray. The Stingray will be the Navy’s next ‘Group 5’ aircraft. With its implementation the US Navy seeks to close the gap with between UAS and manned aircraft by adding a system that is designed from the outset to operate within meters or less of large manned aircraft. The UAV will have the capacity to carry 15,000 pounds of fuel and will be used to refuel the F/A-18 Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler, and F-35C fighter jets, extending their range and time in the air significantly. Work will be performed at Boeing’s factory in St. Louis, Missouri.

The US Navy and Army are buying more GQM-163A Coyote target missiles. Orbital Sciences will deliver 14 full-rate production Lot 13 missiles to the Navy and one to the US Army at a cost of $45.5 million. The GQM-163A Coyote supersonic sea skimming target is designed to provide an affordable target to simulate supersonic sea-skimming and other emerging supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. It also supports research in ship-defense systems and fleet training. The supersonic target drone is designed to help Navy ship crews learn to defend themselves against modern anti-ship missiles like the French Exocet and the Russian-made SS-N-22 Sunburn and SS-NX-26 Oniks. The Coyote target missile design integrates a 4-inlet, solid-fuel ducted-rocket ramjet propulsion system into a compact missile airframe 18 feet long and 14 inches in diameter. The non-recoverable target missile achieves cruise speeds of over Mach 2.5, with a range of approximately 60 nautical miles at altitudes of less than 20 feet above the sea surface. Work will be performed in Chandler, Arizona; Camden, Arkansas; Vergennes, Vermont; Lancaster, Pennsylvania and Hollister, California. Performance of the contract is scheduled for completion by December 2022.

Middle East & Africa

The Burkinabe Army is the latest known user of Otokar’s Cobra APC, as reported by Jane’s. Burkina Faso showed off its new armoured vehicles during the country’s Independence Day parade in Manga on December 11. The Cobra family of vehicles has been in service since 1997. The vehicles have a compact profile and are transportable by aircraft, helicopter, truck and rail. The Cobra has an all-welded steel hull with wide, fully opening side and rear doors, allowing rapid exit of the crew when required. The APCs can be fitted with various typed of weapon stations and turrets that can be armed with 40mm grenade launchers and 7.62mm or 12.7mm machine guns. A V8 turbo diesel engine provides 190hp, allowing for a maximum road speed of 70 mph. The vehicle is manned by two crew and can carry a further nine. A source told Jane’s that an unspecified number of Cobras were purchased, some of which were delivered since September. The first batch of five APCs is supporting counter-insurgency operations in the country’s eastern region. Other operators include Algeria, Bahrain, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates.

Europe

Hungary becomes the launch customer of Saab’s Deployable Aircraft Maintenance Facility (DAM). According to the company, DAM is a mobile hangar solution that enables enhanced aircraft maintenance capacity combined with superior protection. DAM provides capability equivalent to stationary maintenance infrastructure, but at a fraction of the cost. The facility requires minimum logistical footprint and maintenance. DAM is highly flexible and can be rapidly deployed, making it suitable for remotely located and dispersed forward bases. DAM is comprised of a robust aluminium frame covered by a high-strength PVC fabric. A range of container assemblies give DAM an enhanced workshop capacity. DAM can be deployed within 48 hours, with assembly done with manpower only. Hungary is currently operating 14 Gripen fighter jets and will receive its new Deployable Aircraft Maintenance Facility sometime in 2019.

France launches a new military imaging satellite. CSO-1 is the first of three identical satellites, which are replacing France’s ageing Helios constellation. The next-generation of satellites is expected to achieve IOC by 2021 and will provide European military and civilian intelligence agencies with 800 very high-resolution black and white, color, and infrared images per day. CSO-1 and CSO-3 (scheduled to launch in 2021), will each perform reconnaissance missions at 800 km altitude; CSO-2 will join its sister satellite in 2020 and will conduct identification missions at an altitude of 480 km. The CSO satellites are a joint product of Airbus Defense and Space and Thales Alenia Space. The constellation is a component of Europe’s €1.75 billion MUSIS, or Multinational Space-based Imaging System.

Asia-Pacific

The Japanese government agrees on a multi-billion defense procurement plan. Released on Tuesday afternoon, the defense plan seeks to buy a number of fighter jets shipborne unmanned aircraft and submarines over the next five-years at a cost of $243 billion. The document, known the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Plan, includes the purchase of 105 additional F-35 Lightning II JSFs, a VTOL UAS for its new multipurpose destroyers and 12 more Kawasaki P-1 maritime surveillance planes. The defense-spending plan will also likely boost Japan’s industry, due to several projects being handled by local companies.

Today’s Video

Watch: Lockheed Delivers First LRASM Anti-Ship-Missiles for B-1B Lancer

AMDR testbed
(click to view full)

The US Navy’s Dual-Band Radar that equips its forthcoming Gerald R. Ford class super-carriers replaces several different radars with a single back-end. Merging Raytheon’s X-band SPY-3 with Lockheed Martin’s S-band VSR allows fewer radar antennas, faster response time, faster adaptation to new situations, one-step upgrades to the radar suite as a whole, and better utilization of the ship’s power, electronics, and bandwidth.

Rather than using that existing Dual-Band Radar design in new surface combatant ships, however, the “Air and Missile Defense Radar” (AMDR) aims to fulfill DG-51 Flight III destroyer needs through a new competition for a similar dual-band radar. It could end up being a big deal for the winning radar manufacturer, and for the fleet. If, and only if, the technical, power, and weight challenges can be mastered at an affordable price.

AMDR: The Program

DDG-77 USS O’Kane
(click to view full)

Faced with a growing array of advanced threats, the US Navy confronted a need for more dual-band naval radars among its top-end surface warships. Both CG (X) and FSC were proposed for cancellation in the FY 2011 defense budget, but the “Air and Missile Defense Radar” (AMDR) is expected to continue as the radar centerpiece for their true successor: the DDG-51 Flight III Arleigh Burke Class.

Rather than extending or modifying the existing Dual Band Radar combination used on its DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class, aimed to fulfill these need through a re-opened competition. The resulting AMDR radar will have 3 components:

• The AMDR-S radar will provide wide-area volume search, tracking, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) discrimination, and missile communications. While top-tier air and missile defense vessels are “blue water” ships by nature, critical naval chokepoints and war scenarios don’t always give commanders a choice. As such AMDR requirements also call for defense against very low observable/very low flyer (VLO/VLF) threats in heavy land, sea, and rain clutter, where S-band has some advantages.

• The AMDR-X radar will provide horizon search, precision tracing, missile communications, and final illumination guidance to targets. It will be available in AMDR sets 13 onward. The first 12 ship sets will use an upgraded version of Northrop Grumman’s in-service SPQ-9B radar instead.

• The back-end Radar Suite Controller (RSC) will perform all coordination, ensuring that the radars work well together.

Design goals explicitly involve hardware and software modularity, future technology, insertion, and open architectures. The limitations of the DDG-51 ship design forced some flexibility all by itself, and the initial specification added that it’s “designed to be scalable to accommodate current and future mission requirements for multiple platforms.”

The 1st DDG 51 Flight III destroyer will be part of the FY 2013 – 2017 multi-year award, beginning with long-lead materials ordered in FY 2015, and built as the 2nd ship ordered in FY 2016 (DDG 123). By the end of the multi-year contract, which was issued in May 2013, the USN can contract for 3 AMDR/Flt III vessels with 14′ diameter AMDR-S radar faceplates, and integrated control involving the smaller rotating AN/SPQ-9B+ X-band radar. If AMDR-S isn’t ready, or other issues arise, the Navy could decide to delay the FLight III changes to FY 2017, or even to move them outside the contract. Even if orders begin on time, Flight III buys are expected to continue trough 2022, and possibly through 2031.

Budget documents to date are all for Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation:

AMDR: Opportunities and Challenges

DDG-1000 w. DBR
(click to view full)

The demand for adjustable size is the key to AMDR’s larger opportunity. If the adjustments can be taken far enough, it could give the Navy an opportunity to add or retrofit AMDR to some of its 60+ serving Arleigh Burke Class ships, DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyers, or later carriers of the CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford Class.

On the smaller end, it’s very nice to have AMDR capabilities available in a common core system for a wider range of vessels. More ships mounting AMDR would reduce fleet-wide maintenance & training investments. It would also mean that each AMDR hardware or software improvement becomes available improve many more ships throughout the fleet.

At the larger end of the scale, it’s good news because the US Navy has determined that it needs a 20’+ diameter AMDR-S radar, in order to completely fulfill expected future ballistic missile defense and air defense needs. AMDR offers them the opportunity to find a suitable ship based on a known and understood core system.

The bad news is that any retrofit, or even installation in new “DDG-51 Flight III” variants, will be more complicated than it appears.

The visible face of a naval radar is only the tip of the iceberg. Most of its weight and space comes from its need for 2 things: power, and cooling. More powerful radars usually need more power to drive them, which can tax the limited 7.5 MW capacity an older ship like the DDG-51 Flight I/II/IIAs. More power also means more cooling much of the time. Power storage, power conversion, and cooling require weight and space. All of which are usually in short supply on a warship. Even if that space exists, the additional equipment and antennas must be installed without unduly affecting the ship’s balance and center of gravity, and hence its seakeeping abilities.

AEGIS operations
(click to view full)

In 2009, the US Congressional Research Services’ “Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress” report update (#RL32109) explained the potential impact:

“Multiple industry sources have briefed CRS on their proposals for modifying the DDG-51 design to include an active-array radar with greater capability than the SPY-1. If the DDG-51 hull is not lengthened, then modifying the DDG-51 design to include an improved radar would require removing the 5-inch gun to make space and weight available for additional equipment needed to support operations with the improved radar. Lengthening the hull might provide enough additional space and weight capacity to permit the 5-inch gun to be retained.75 Supporting equipment to be installed would include an additional electrical generator and additional cooling equipment.76 The best location for the generator might be in one of the ship’s two helicopter hangar spots, which would reduce the ship’s helicopter hangar capacity from two helicopters to one.”

An October 2008 report from the right-wing Heritage Foundation draws on other sources to note that weight shifts can also create issues:

“…SPY-1E [active array] radar could affect the stability of the upgraded Arleigh Burkes because the radar’s phased-array panels weigh more than the panels of the earlier SPY-1 radar, which it will replace. While the SPY-1E’s weight is concentrated more in the panels, freeing more space below deck,[78] this greater weight would be added to the ship’s superstructure. Combined with the DDG-51’s relatively narrow hull width and short length, this could cause stability problems, particularly when sailing in rough weather.”

Obviously, those kinds of trades are less than ideal, but they may be necessary. Whether, how many, and which trades end being necessary, depends on the precise technical details of Raytheon’s offering, and of expected ship changes in Flight III.

AMDR: The Contenders Raytheon

Raytheon on AMDR
click for video

Raytheon won. They went into AMDR with a lot of experience. First of all, they developed both the existing Dual-Band Radar’s Radar Suite Controller, and the accompanying SPY-3 X-band radars that are mounted on DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class battlecruisers and CVN-78 Ford Class supercarriers. The dual X/S band system that will equip the Cobra Judy (USNS Observation Island) Replacement vessel used to track missile launches and tests around the world also comes from Raytheon.

Phased array radars for wide-area air and ballistic missile defense are another strong point. Raytheon builds the AN/TPY-2 X-band radar used by the land-based THAAD missile system, the 280 foot high X-band array on the floating SBX missile defense radar, and the large land-based ballistic missile Upgraded Early Warning Systems like the AN/FPS-108 Cobra Dane and AN/FPS-115 PAVE PAWS. On the S-band side, the firm builds the S-band transmitters for Lockheed’s SPY-1 radar on board existing American destroyers and cruisers. Unsurprisingly, Raytheon personnel who talked to us said that:

“…leveraging concepts, hardware, algorithms and software from our family of radars provides a level of effectiveness, reliability and affordability to our proposed AMDR solution… The challenge for all the competitors will be to deliver a modular design. The requirements demand that the design be scalable without significant redesign… A high power active radar system requires significant space not only for the arrays themselves but also for the power and cooling equipment needed to support its operation. Finding space for additional generators and HVAC plants can be quite challenging for a backfit application. That is why power efficiency is a premium for these systems.”

Lockheed Martin – lost

Lockheed’s AMDR-S
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Lockheed Martin stepped into the competition with several strengths to draw on. Their AN/SPY-1 S-band radar is the main radar used by the US Navy’s current high-end ships: DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers, and CG-47 Ticonderoga class cruisers. Lockheed Martin also makes the AEGIS combat systems that equips these ships, and supplies the advanced VSR S-band radar used in the new Dual Band Radar installations on board Ford class carriers. This strong S-band experience, and status as the supplier of the combat system that any DDG-51 fitting would have to integrate with, gave them leverage at multiple points. Some observers publicly wondered if they had so much leverage that the competition would become a mirage, especially since the US Navy insisted on keeping AEGIS as the combat system.

Nor were they devoid of X-band or ballistic missile defense experience. Their L-Band AN/TPS-59 long range radar has been used in missile intercept tests, and is the only long range 3D Radar in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. It’s related to the AN/TPS-117, which is in widespread service with over 16 countries. Then, too, the firm’s MEADS air defense technology demonstrator’s MFCR radar will integrate an active array dual-band set of X-band and UHF modules, via a common processor for data and signal processing.

It was a strong array of advantages. In the end, however, it wasn’t enough.

Northrop Grumman – lost

NGC on AMDR
click for video

Northrop Grumman was a less obvious contender, despite its leadership position in advanced AESA active array radars for use on aircraft of all types and sizes. They’ve also developed unique software-driven land-based systems like the US Marines’ new Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), which is specifically architected to switch between a wide range of radar performance modes and requirements.

It’s important to note that Northrop Grumman has shipboard radar experience. They’re the prime contractor for the AN/SPQ-9B track-while-scan X-band radar that’s guaranteed to be part of the initial AMDR set, and SPQ-9A/B radars already equip America’s Ticonderoga Class cruisers, Nimitz Class aircraft carriers, America Class escort carriers, Wasp Class LHD amphibs, and San Antonio Class LPD amphibs. AN/SPQ-9Bs can also be found on Australia’s Hobart Class Aegis air warfare destroyers.

On a less visible note, the firm has been working under several CRAD research programs from 2005 to the present, targeted at technology demonstrations, system risk reduction, and new integration techniques for advanced S-band shipboard radars. Finally, the firm has a partnership with Australia’s CEA Technologies, which is developing an advanced AESA X-band (CEAMOUNT) and S-band (CEAFAR) radar set that equips Australia’s upgraded ANZAC class frigates.

What did this team see as important? Beyond an open architecture approach, it was all about the SWaP:

“The ability to scale up to a potential future cruiser or down to a DDG-51 variant is fundamental to the Northrop Grumman radar architecture. Size, weight and power (SWaP) of the radar system are the key drivers… Minimizing the radar impact is key to an affordable surface combatant solution. We are focused on not just the radar technology, but to minimize the ship impact while allowing for scalable growth in the future. We are working closely with various elements in the Navy to address the ship impact of large AESA radars on the entire ship.”

AMDR: Contracts and Key Events FY 2018

Raytheon wins EMD phase; DRS will produce power conversion module; CRS and GAO reports point out issues.

AMDR engagement
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December 21/18: Integration & Production Raytheon is being contracted to support the US Navy with Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) integration and production efforts. Priced at $114 million, the contract provides for continued combat system integration and test services including engineering and training; software and depot maintenance, as well as field engineering services and procurement of spare parts. The AMDR, designated AN/SPY-6(V), will fulfill integrated Air and Missile Defense requirements for multiple ship classes. The AN/SPY-6 is 30 times more sensitive than its predecessor, its additional sensitivity supercharges the vessel’s capabilities in anti-air warfare and ballistic missile defense. Work will be performed at multiple locations throughout the US. They include Marlborough, Massachusetts; Kauai, Hawaii; Portsmouth, Rhode Island; San Diego, California; Fair Lakes, Virginia and Moorestown, New Jersey. The contract includes options which could bring the total value of the order to $357 million and is expected to be completed by December 2019.

December 11/18: Power Units DRS Power & Control Technologies is receiving additional funding to exercise an option to support the Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The contract modification is priced at $13.4 million and provides for the delivery of power conversion modules (PCM) for Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) production ship sets. Efforts covered under this contract include non-recurring engineering work, procurement of long-lead-time materials and of low-rate initial production units for testing. Up to 12 ship sets for the guided missile destroyers can be procured. PCMs support Raytheon’s AN/SPY-6 air and missile defense radar with the right power output. This contract supports DDG-51 Flight III ships. Work will be performed in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and is expected to be complete by April 2022.

October 3/18: LRIP continues The US Navy is ordering more production services for its Air and Missile Defense Radar from Raytheon. The awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee modification covers a number of engineering services and associated costs needed to support the low-rate initial production of the AN/SPY-6 at cost of $22.7 million. The new AMDR is being developed to fulfill integrated Air and Missile Defense requirements for multiple ship classes. The AMDR-S radar will provide wide-area volume search, tracking, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) discrimination, and missile communications; while the AMDR-X will provide horizon search, precision tracing, missile communications, and final illumination guidance to targets. It will equip various types of vessels such as DDG-51s in Flight III configuration and Gerald F. Ford-class aircraft carriers. Work will be performed at Raytheon’s Marlborough facility and is expected to be completed by November 2018.

May 15/18: Navy gets an extra punch Shipbuilder Huntington Ingalls recently announced that the first steps towards constructing the first Flight III Destroyer have been taken. The destroyer ‘Jack Lucas’ will join the Navy’s fleet in 2024. The vessel is modelled after the 73 Arleigh-Burke class destroyers already in service, but it will be a very different, more capable killer than its predecessors. ‘Jack Lucas’ gets its extra punch by adding Raytheon’s newly developed AN/SPY-6 air and missile defense radar. The Flight III is a major overhaul of the guided-missile destroyer. It required a 45 percent redesign of the hull, most of which was done to accommodate the AN/SPY-6 and its formidable power needs. The Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) has been procured through a competition between Raytheon, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. The AMDR-S provides wide-area volume search, tracking, Ballistic Missile Defense discrimination, missile communications and defense against very low observable and very low flyer threats in heavy land, sea, and rain clutter. In addition, the AMDR-X provides horizon search, precision tracing, missile communications, and final illumination guidance to targets. The AN/SPY-6 is 30 times more sensitive than its predecessor, its additional sensitivity supercharges the vessel’s capabilities in anti-air warfare and ballistic missile defense.

FY 2014

Sept 11/14: Sub-contractors. DRS Power & Control Technologies, Inc., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, is being awarded a base $15.7 million firm-fixed-price, time-and-materials contract for DDG 51 Class Power Conversion Modules (PCM) to support AMDR with the right kind of power input. This contract provides for AMDR PCM non-recurring engineering, long-lead-time material buys, low rate initial production units for testing, associated engineering services and support, and up to 12 production ship sets for DDG 51 Flight III Class ships. Just $2.4 million in FY 2014 US Navy RDT&E funding is committed immediately, but options could bring the cumulative value of this contract to $88.9 million.

Work will be performed in Milwaukee, WI, and is expected to be complete by April 2015. This contract was competitively procured using full and open competitive procedures, with proposals solicited via FBO.gov, and 4 offers were received by contract manager US Navy NAVSEA in Washington, DC (N00024-14-C-4200).

July 23/14: Testing. Raytheon announces that their AMDR radar has completed its hardware Preliminary Design Review and Integrated Baseline Review. They look at the capabilities of the system, removal of technology risks so far, and the inherent innovation and flexibility of the design.

Successful completion keeps the program on schedule so far, but remember that this schedule has changed due to challenge delays, and that ship integration issues will present their own hurdle. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon completes key Air & Missile Defense Radar reviews”.

April 17/14: SAR. The Pentagon releases its Dec 31/13 Selected Acquisitions Report. AMDR enters the SAR with a baseline total program cost estimate of $5.8327 billion, based on 22 radars.

SAR baseline

April 8/14: CRS Report. The latest iteration of “Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress” offers a greater focus on the DDG-51 Flight III destroyers, which includes AMDR. Note that CRS reports aren’t made public directly, so it took until May 2014 for public copies to appear.

One big issue for AMDR is capability. The 14′ design expected on Flight III destroyers meets the US Navy’s minimum expectations for missile and air defense roles, but there’s some question whether it will be enough. CRS’ report includes the concept of a dedicated radar ship to augment task groups in high-risk areas. The other option?

“Building the Flight III DDG-51 to a lengthened configuration could make room for additional power-generation and cooling equipment, additional vertical launch system (VLS) missile tubes, and larger growth margins. It might also permit a redesign of the deckhouse to support a larger and more capable version of the AMDR than the 14-foot diameter version currently planned for the Flight III DDG-51. Building the Flight III DDG-51 to a lengthened configuration would increase its development cost and its unit procurement cost.”

There’s also some concern about AMDR’s timeline, and whether the 1st AMDR-S can be fully ready in time to support a ship ordered in FY 2016. AMDR-S entered system development 6 months late due to protests, and software development to integrate both the new S-band radar and the X-band SPQ-9B+ remains a concern (q.v. March 28/13). Ship power generation and cooling could also be an issue, depending on the final design. The good news? Because the Flight III is structured as an optional ECP change within a multi-year contract, the Navy can choose to delay issuing the ECP, shifting the start of Flight III procurement and AMDR orders to FY 2017 or later.

March 31/14: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2013, plus time to compile and publish.

“AMDR entered system development in October of 2013 with all four of its critical technologies approaching full maturity. This was 6 months later than planned, leading to a delay in many of the program’s future events…. Additionally, the delays might also hinder timely delivery of necessary information related to AMDR’s parameters, such as power, cooling, and space requirements needed for ongoing and planned design studies related to [DDG-51 destroyer] Flight III development.”

Despite this, the program is still promising delivery in time for a 2019 fit onto DDG 123. GAO describes AMDR’s components as almost mature, including 2 key technologies. With that said, they’re unhappy that AMDR proceeded to EMD development without fully mature technologies demonstrated in an operational environment, so the program would have a better idea of the required form, fit, and changes to its host ship. AMDR also didn’t complete a Preliminary Design Review before EMD, either, though they did have the competition and evaluations:

“All four of the AMDR’s critical technologies are approaching full maturity and were demonstrated using a [small scale] 1000-element radar array…. two technologies previously identified as the most challenging — digital-beam-forming and transmit-receive modules, have been demonstrated in a relevant environment…. digital-beam-forming is necessary for AMDR’s simultaneous air and ballistic missile defense mission. The AMDR’s transmit-receive modules… use gallium nitride [GaN] technology instead of the legacy gallium arsenide technology for potential efficiency gains. The other two critical technologies are related to software and digital receivers and exciters. Officials stated that software development will require a significant effort. A series of software builds are expected to deliver approximately 1 million lines of code and are designed to apply open system approaches to commercial, off-the-shelf hardware. Integrating the X-band radar will require further software development.”

Feb 25/14: Sub-contractors. General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems announces an contract to continue their AMDR-related with Raytheon. The sub-contract could be worth up to $250.1 million over 10 years, and builds on previous GD-AIS efforts involving AMDR-S Digital Receivers/Exciter (DREX) and Digital Beam Forming (DBF) subsystems. Sources: GD, “General Dynamics Awarded $250 Million Contract to Support U.S. Navy’s Air and Missile Defense Radar Program”.

Jan 10/14: Protest dropped. Defense News:

“Lockheed Martin protested the Navy’s award of the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) contract because we believed the merits of our offering were not properly considered during the evaluation process,” spokesman Keith Little said Jan. 10. “While we believe that we put forward an industry-leading solution, after receiving additional information we have determined it’s in the best interest of the Navy and Lockheed Martin to withdraw our protest.”

The move still leaves Lockheed Martin in charge of the Aegis combat system. Raytheon, who had been responsible for delivering SPY-1 radar transmitters to Lockheed, is now responsible for the entire AMDR S-band radar and dual-band controller, while Northrop Grumman’s AN/SPQ-9B acts as the initial X-band radar. Sources: Defense News, “Lockheed Drops AMDR Protest”.

Oct 22/13: Protest. Lockheed Martin filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), arguing that they “submitted a technically compliant solution at a very affordable price. We do not believe the merits of our offering were properly considered during the evaluation process.” Lawmakers from New Jersey, where Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors is located, had sent a letter to the Navy Secretary a few days ago criticizing the award to Raytheon. The Navy subsequently issues a stop-work order, while the GAO has until the end of January 2014 to give its verdict.

Oct 10/13: EMD. Raytheon Company announces that they’ve won, receiving a $385.7 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for the AMDR-S and Radar Suite Controller’s (RSC) Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase.

The base $157 million contract begins with design work leading to Preliminary Design Review, and will finish with system acceptance of the AMDR-S and RSC engineering development models at the end of testing. AMDR-S is the large S-band radar, while the RSC provides S- and X-band radar resource management, coordination, and an interface to Lockheed Martin’s Aegis combat system. The full contract would produce initial ship sets that will work with Northrop Grumman’s AN/SPQ-9B as their X-band counterpart.

This contract also includes options for low-rate initial production systems, which could bring the cumulative value to $1.6 billion. These options would be exercised after a successful Milestone C decision, which the Pentagon plans to make in FY 2017. Sources: Raytheon, Oct 10/13 release.

Raytheon wins EMD contract

Oct 18/13: CBO Report. The Congressional Budget Office publishes “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2014 Shipbuilding Plan“. With respect to AMDR:

“Adding the AMDR [to the DDG-51 design] so that it could operate effectively would require increasing the amount of electrical power and cooling available on a Flight III. With those changes and associated increases in the ship’s displacement, a DDG-51 Flight III destroyer would cost about $300 million, or about 20 percent, more than a new Flight IIA destroyer, CBO estimates. Thus, the average cost per ship [for Flight III DDG-51s] would be $1.9 billion…. Most of the decrease for the Flight III can be attributed to updated information on the cost of incorporating the AMDR into the Flight III configuration. The cost of the AMDR itself, according to the Navy, has declined steadily through the development program, and the Department of Defense’s Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office concurs in the reduced estimate…. Considerable uncertainty remains in the DDG-51 Flight III program, however.”

FY 2013

Major program shifts.

LMCO’s AMDR concept
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June 3/13: NAVSEA Clarifications. NAVSEA replies to some of our program questions, and clarifies the program’s structure. They clarifiy the GAO’s wording concerning “AMDR initially using an upgraded SPQ-9B radar,” by saying that the initial SPQ-9Bs will be off-the-shelf models, acquired under a separate program. SPQ-9A/B radars already equip America’s Ticonderoga Class cruisers, Nimitz Class aircraft carriers, America Class escort carriers, Wasp Class LHD amphibs, and San Antonio Class LPD amphibs.

The SPQ-9B will still be integrated with AMDR-S, but there are some differences in implementation between it and AMDR-X, hence the additional software required. The result will effectively create DDG-51 FLight III and Flight IIIA ships, as the Navy has no plans to backfit AMDR-X to Flight III ships that get the SPQ-9B.

The remaining question is when a winner will be picked. The GAO said (q.v. March 28/13) that an EMD winner and development award was expected in March 2013, and we’re past that. All NAVSEA would say is that the AMDR program office is still conducting evaluations. They also said that AMDR-X’s acquisition strategy isn’t set yet, which leaves the door open to a divided radar contract.

May 8/13: The US Senate Armed Forces Seapower subcommittee hears testimony [PDF] regarding US Navy shipbuilding programs. An excerpt:

“The Navy is proceeding with the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) program to meet the growing ballistic missile threat by greatly improving radar sensitivity and longer range detection for engagement of increasingly complex threats. This scalable radar is on track for installation on DDG 51 Flight III ships to support joint battle space threat awareness and defense, including BMD, area air defense, and ship self defense. The AMDR radar suite will be capable of providing simultaneous surveillance and engagement support for long range BMD and area air defense. The Navy intends to introduce AMDR on DDG 51 Flight III in Fiscal Year 2016.”

GAO documents have referred to AMDR’s introduction in FY 2019, but procurement buys will begin in FY 2016.

April 26/13: Real Competition? Aviation Week reports on the AMDR program. Beyond the materials in the GAO’s report, discussions with the US Navy offer cause for concern. They quote AMDR program manager Capt. Doug Small as saying that AMDR will be just an evolution of Aegis, providing better performance for “only slight more” weight, power, and coolant demands, and “a fraction of the resources needed to run all of dual-band radar (DBR) or even existing Aegis SPY radars to conduct similar missions.”

The SPY-3/ SPY-4 DBR comparison seems like a pretty big stretch, given that they haven’t picked their AMDR radar yet, much less tested it. Article author Michael Fabey’s concerns, on the other hand, lie in another area:

“….the Navy will have to take great pains to ensure the competitiveness of the AMDR program. The service can ill afford to have this effort be seen as just an extension of the “Aegis Mafia,” often seen as… the automatic property of Lockheed, the combat system’s creator and prime contractor throughout the decades.”

It’s a real dilemma. Commonality with an existing combat system makes cross-fleet upgrades much easier, while lowering overall maintenance and upgrade costs. In Aegis’ case it also leverages work that has been and will be done on Ballistic Missile Defense modes. On the other hand, Aegis’ existing inter-dependencies with Lockheed’s own SPY-1 design are a stumbling block. Can the Navy really deliver AMDR on budget, while swapping in an S-band radar from another company? If they say yes and it’s not actually doable, AMDR will flounder and may fail. If the Navy decides that they can’t risk it, then the whole AMDR-S competition was a waste of time.

An AMDR-S award to Raytheon might still be thinkable if the Navy goes with the lesser standard of fleet combat system commonality, using the Raytheon combat system that drives the 3-ship DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class, and leveraging Raytheon’s combat system and controller work integrating the CVN-78 Ford Class carriers’ Dual-Band Radar.

April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage.

“Missile integration with AMDR-S radar for DDG 51 Flight III ships will include requirements review/updates and analysis, verification; technical documentation, design review and working group SME support, missile/radar integration, missile test hardware procurement, risk assessment, safety, test and evaluation planning, analysis, data collection. Deliverables include interface specs and engineering documents to support AMDR PDRs HW&SW (FY13) and CDRs HW&SW (FY14); EDM testing (FY15), interface specs and engineering documents to support AMDR/ACBNext for DDG 51 Flight III E3 Testing, Analysis and Reports. Missile variants: ESSM Block I; SM-2 Blk IIIB MU2, SM-6 Block I (Current Aegis Configuration).”

Meanwhile, the Cooperative Engagement Capability program plans to spend 2013 working on interfaces that will let it work with AMDR. The Standard and ESSM programs will have related items on their plate, and Flight III destroyers will gain an interesting benefit from a discontinued carrier program. The AN/SPS-74(V) CVN Periscope Detection Radar program was canceled on Dec 17/12, with FY 2012 – 2013 funding directed to develop the algorithms and interface for the AN/SPQ-9B Radar instead.

March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish. Its AMDR section gives a program cost of $6.57 billion total to develop & buy 22 radars. As one might imagine when comparing to last year’s report (q.v. March 30/12), the program’s $9.24 billion cost drop heralds some major shifts in the program.

Instead of using AMDR-X radars, the first 12 AMDR systems will use Northrop Grumman’s existing SPQ-9B radar as their X-band component. According to the Navy, the SPQ-9B radar fits better within the Flight III DDG 51’s sea frame, and “expected power and cooling.” That’s no surprise, given that the “Spook-9” is already set to operate beside the S-band SPY-1D radar on Australia’s smaller Hobart Class destroyers. The bad news is that additional software work will be required to integrate a 2nd radar (SPQ-9B) with the new active S-band radar. AMDR was already on the hook for about 1 million lines of developed code, and software development has bent quite a few DoD project schedules.

The Navy will also have to compromise on radar performance in several areas. The Navy has now settled on a forced scale-down from the 20-foot aperture needed to meet their AMDR specifications, to a 14-foot aperture that’s the largest they can safely fit in the DDG-51 design. On the X-band front, SPQ-9B will eventually be replaced by a new X-band design for the last 10 units (13 – 22), but until AMDR-X arrives, the system won’t perform as well in X-band against the most advanced threats.

Major program shifts

Nov 26/12: NGC. Northrop Grumman announces that their AMDR technology demonstration contract is done. The firm says that they achieved both contract objectives: demonstrating that the critical technology is mature, and advancing the design of the tactical system. Northrop Grumman also successfully completed far field range testing of the AMDR-TD prototype, which reportedly met performance goals and radiated at top power for all waveforms.

FY 2011 – 2012

Functional reviews from contenders. RFP proposals in.

NGC’s AMDR-TD
(click to view full)

Sept 10/12: NGC. Northrop Grumman announces that its AMDR prototype has successfully completed initial range testing. Near Field Range testing validated the AMDR’s digital beam forming performance, tuning techniques, and reliability. Subsequent Far Field Range testing at Northrop Grumman’s radar test site in Baltimore, MD included successful full-power operational demonstrations.

July 31/12: RFP Proposals in. Lockheed Martin announces that it has submitted its “AMDR-S” proposal. Northrop Grumman and Raytheon both confirmed to DID that they also submitted proposals. Lockheed Martin.

April 2/12: NGC. Northrop Grumman announces that they’ve successfully finished AMDR’s System Functional Review (SFR) in late December 2011, and Test Readiness Review (TRR) “several weeks later”. SFR is a multi-disciplined technical review conducted to ensure that the system under review is technically mature enough to proceed into preliminary design. TRR assesses the readiness of the system for testing configuration items.

During the SFR, Northrop Grumman demonstrated digital beamforming and advanced tactical software modes, using its pathfinder early testing radar with a prototype radar suite controller to successfully detect and track airborne targets.

March 30/12: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs” for 2011. AMDR is scheduled to enter system development in October 2012, and the current program envisions $15.837 billion to develop and field 24 radar sets on DDG-51 Flight III destroyers.

Program officials believe that digital beamforming in a radar of AMDR’s size will be the most significant technical challenge, and will likely take the longest time to mature. Unfortunately, that technology is necessary for AMDR’s simultaneous air and ballistic missile defense mission. Meanwhile, a 14-foot version of AMDR-S is the largest radar they can safely fit within the DDG-51 destroyer’s deckhouse, even though it would take a 20-foot diameter aperture to fully meet all of the Navy’s specifications. The Navy is still discussing the precise size for AMDR-S in Flight III ships, and the design is supposed to be scalable up or down in size to fit on smaller or larger ships.

Nov 16/11: Power problem. Jane’s Navy International is reporting that DDG-51 flight III destroyers with the new AMDR radar and hybrid propulsion drives could cost $3-4 billion each.

If that is true, it’s about the same cost as a DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class ship, in return for less performance, more vulnerability, and less future upgrade space. AMDR isn’t a final design yet, so it’s still worthwhile to ask what it could cost to give the Flight IIIs’ radar and combat systems ballistic missile defense capabilities – R&D for the function doesn’t go away when it’s rolled into a separate program. Indeed, if the Flight III cost estimate is true, it raises the question of why that would be a worthwhile use of funds, and re-opens the issue of whether continuing DDG-1000 production and upgrades might make more sense. DoD Buzz.

Sept 19/11: Raytheon. Raytheon touts the performance of its Gallium Nitride AMDR T/R modules, which demonstrated no degradation after more than 1,000 hours of testing. Raytheon is developing a technology demonstrator for the system’s S-band radar and radar suite controller, and says that their testing figures exceed Navy requirements.

June 12/11: Growth problems? Aviation Week reports that AMDR’s key platform may be hitting growth problems. Power, cooling, and weight distribution have always been seen as the most likely stumbling blocks to fitting AMDR on the DDG-51 hull, and:

“As the possible requirements and expectations continue to grow for the proposed DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class Flight III destroyers, so is the concern among defense analysts and contractors that the U.S. Navy may once again be trying to pack too much into one ship… And yet it is the need to field [AMDR] that is driving some of the additional requirements for the Flight IIIs… “Sometimes we get caught up in the glamour of the high technology,” Huntington Ingalls Industries CEO Mike Petters says. “The radars get bounced around. They get changed. Their missions get changed. The technology changes. The challenge is if you let the radars drive the ships, you might not get any ships built.”

June 7/11: Raytheon. Raytheon announces that it has conducted a system requirements review (SRR) for AMDR Phase II beginning May 17/11. Their release does not describe it as successful, offering only the less categorical claim that the “Navy’s feedback throughout the review was favorable,” and pointing out that the firm “matured its design ahead of schedule, surpassing customer expectations.” DID asked Raytheon about this. They said the review was successful, but they wanted to different phrasing for a change.

Raytheon is currently developing a technology demonstrator for AMDR’s S-band radar and radar suite controller, and the firm demonstrated hardware from that pilot array during the review. The SRR also included Raytheon’s understanding of AMDR’s requirements, how its design and architecture meets those requirements, and Raytheon’s its analysis of those requirements, including cost and performance trade studies. A System Functional Review will be held later in 2011.

June 1/11: AMDR Issues. An Aviation Week article looks at AMDR, and adds some cost estimates and perspective on the program.

“AMDR is the brass ring for Navy radar programs… Capt. Doug Small, program officer for Naval Sea Systems Command (Navsea), [says that] “We’re working hard to balance a tough set of requirements for this radar with its costs… BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) targets drive radar sensitivity. There’s no substitute for having detect-and-track [capability] at a long distance… [But] To do simultaneous air defense [and BMD], you have to spend less time doing air defense. It’s a radar resource issue… [Fortunately,] The ability to create multiple beams digitally [digital beamforming] means you spend less time doing certain other functions.” “

The article adds that Lockheed Martin demonstrated S-band digital phased-array antenna beam forming during recent NAVSEA tests of the Advanced Radar Technology Integrated System Test-bed, which combines multifunction S-band active phased-array radars. It’s a joint U.S.-U.K. radar effort spearheaded by Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems, and Lockheed Martin’s VP naval radar programs, Brad Hicks, says the technology is now ready to enter full engineering development.

May 19/11: Raytheon. Raytheon announces that it has produced the first group of S-band transmit/receive (T/R) modules for the U.S. Navy’s AMDR program.

FY 2009 – 2010

Initial studies, tech development contracts.

CG-49: USS Vincennes
(click to view full)

Sept 30/10: US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington Navy Yard, DC solicits bids via the Federal Business Opportunities website, receives 3 offers, and issues 3 technology development contracts for the AMDR S-band radar and its radar suite controller (RSC). AMDR-S will provide volume search, tracking, ballistic missile defense discrimination and missile communications. The RSC will perform all coordination actions to ensure that both radars work together. This approach dovetails with the Pentagon’s focus on competitive prototypes, as a way of reducing long-term risks of failed development and cost overruns.

Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Sudbury, MA received a $112.3 million fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract. Work will be performed in Sudbury, MA (81%), Fairfax, VA (18.3%), and New York, NY (0.7%), and is expected to be complete by September 2012 (N00024-10-C-5340). See also Raytheon.

Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives a $119.2 million fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract. Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (86.2%); Clearwater, FL (5.5%); Fairfax, VA (3.5%); New Brighton, MN (2.5%); Clearfield, UT (1.3%); and Huntsville, AL (1%), and is expected to be complete by September 2012 (N00024-10-C-5358). See also Lockheed Martin.

Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems in Linthicum Heights, MD receives a $120 million fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract. This contract is incrementally funded, with $38.4 million placed on the contract at the time of award. Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, MD (99.4%), and Arvonia, VA (0.6%), and is expected to be complete by September 2012 (N00024-10-C-5359). See also Northrop Grumman.

Tech development contracts

Aug 10/10: An opinion from the Information Dissemination article Happy Thoughts and DDG-1000:

“I love Chris, and I don’t think anyone in the Navy deserved their star more than Jim Syring… but this Navy Times article is just a bit too much happy half-the-story for me. Here is how half the story gets told… The real reason the Navy is dropping the VSR on DDG-1000 is because the Navy intends to put… AMDR on the DDG-1000… because the timeline works out. The thing is the Navy can’t actually say this because there is no official AMDR program yet and the DDG-1000 isn’t supposed to be a ballistic missile defense ship – remember? This story in Navy Times is what it is because when it comes to US Navy shipbuilding, the Navy under CNO Roughead is never completely honest with the American people about what the Navy is doing. Sorry if the truth hurts.”

June 2/10: DDG 1000 loses DBR. As expected, the Pentagon this week certifies that the DDG-1000 destroyer program is vital to national security, and must not be terminated, despite R&D loaded per-ship cost increases that put it over Nunn-McCurdy’s legislated limit. There will be at least one important change, however: the S-band SPY-4 Volume Search Radar will be deleted from the DDG-1000’s DBR.

Performance has met expectations, but cost increases reportedly forced the Navy into a cost/benefit decision. The Navy would not release numbers, but reports indicate possible savings of $100-200 million for each of the planned 3 ships. The X-band SPY-3 has reportedly exceeded technical expectations, and will receive upgrades to give it better volume search capability. The move will save weight and space by removing SPY-4 aperture, power, and cooling systems, and may create an opportunity for Raytheon’s SPY-3 to be upgraded for ballistic missile defense – or replaced by the winner of the BMD-capable AMDR dual-band radar competition.

The full DBR will be retained on the USS Gerald R. Ford [CVN 78] aircraft carrier, as the SPY-4 replaces 2 air search radars and will be the primary air traffic control radar. No decision has been made for CVN 79 onward, however, and AMDR’s potential scalability may make it attractive there as well. Gannett’s Navy Times | US DoD.

No DBR on DDG-1000

Feb 26/10: CRS Report. The US Congressional Research Service lays out what remains of AMDR’s opportunity, in an updated report. From “Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress” :

“The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission calls for procuring two DDG-51s in FY2011 and six more in FY2012-FY2015. The two DDG-51s that the Navy wants to procure in FY2011 received $577.2 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests another $2,922.2 million in procurement funding for the two ships, so as to complete their estimated combined procurement cost of $3,499.2 million. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget also requests $48.0 million in advance procurement funding for the one DDG-51 that the Navy wants to procure in FY2012, and $186.3 million in procurement funding for DDG-1000 program-completion costs. The Navy’s FY2011 budget also proposes terminating the Navy’s planned CG (X) cruiser program as unaffordable. Rather than starting to procure CG (X)s around FY2017, as the Navy had previously envisaged, the Navy is proposing to build an improved version of the DDG-51, called the Flight III version, starting in FY2016. Navy plans thus call for procuring the current version of the DDG-51, called the Flight IIA version, in FY2010-FY2015, followed by procurement of Flight III DDG-51s starting in FY2016. Navy plans appear to call for procuring Flight III DDG- 51s through at least FY2022, and perhaps until FY2031. Flight III DDG-51s are to carry a smaller version of the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) that was to be carried by the CG (X). The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests $228.4 million in research and development funding for the AMDR. Detailed design work on the Flight III DDG-51 reportedly is to begin in FY2012 or FY2013.”

June 26/09: The Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC issues 3 firm fixed-price contracts, covering initial concept studies for the (AMDR) S-band and Radar Suite Controller (RSC) only. Deliverables will include the S-band and radar suite controller conceptual design, systems engineering studies and analyses, and a technology development plan. This contract was competitively procured via the Federal Business Opportunities and Navy Electronic Commerce Online websites, with 3 offers received.

Northrop Grumman receives a $10 million contract. Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, MD, and is expected to be complete by December 2009 (N00024-09-C-5398). See also NGC’s July 28/09 release.

Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ, receives a $10 million contract. Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ, and is expected to be complete by December 2009 (N00024-09-C-5312). See also Lockheed Martin’s July 14/09 release.

Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Sudbury, MA receives a $9.9 million contract. Work will be performed in Sudbury, MA (94%); Fairfax, VA (4%); Bath, ME (3%); Andover, MA (3%); Tewksbury, MA (3%); and East Syracuse, NY (2%), and is expected to be complete by December 2009 (N00024-09-C-5313). See also Raytheon’s Aug 3/09 release.

Initial studies contracts

Additional Readings Background: AMDR

• FBO.gov (# N0002412R5315) – 58 – Synopsis for the AMDR-S/RSC Engineering and Manufacturing Development Contract with LRIP Options. Issued April 16/12, last modification May 14/13.

• USN Electronic Commerce Online – N00024-12-R-5315 AMDR EMD Solicitation.

• GlobalSecurity.org – Solid State SPY Radar/ Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)/ Air & Missile Defense Radar (A&MD Radar)/ Next-Generation Maritime Air & Missile Defense/ Multi-Function Advanced Active Phased-Array Radar.

• Raytheon – Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). Winner.

• Lockheed Martin feature, via WayBack – Lockheed Martin selected to demonstrate designs for next phase of Navy’s Air and Missile Defense Radar program.

• Northrop Grumman, via WayBack – Northrop Grumman Air & Missile Defense Radar (AMDR).

Background: Related Systems

• US Navy – AN/SPQ-9B Radar Set. AMDR’s initial X-band counterpart.

• DID – BMD in Bunches: The USN’s Multi-Year Destroyer Contract, FY 2013 – 2017. The contract includes options for AMDR-equipped destroyers in FY 2016 and FY 2017.

• DID – US Destroyers Get a HED: More Power to Them! Hybrid-Electric drive modifications might be needed, in order to solve the class’ power problems.

Official Reports

• US Congressional Research Services – Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress. April 8/14 update.

• US Congressional Budget Office (Oct 18/13) – An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2014 Shipbuilding Plan.

News & Views

• Aviation Week (June 12/11) – Potential DDG-51 Flight III Growth Alarms. Could have strong implications for AMDR.

• Aviation Week (June 1/11) – AMDR program sets big goals.

• Military & Aerospace Electronics (June 29/09) – Next-generation missile defense radar systems for Navy warships is goal of new study contracts

• Defense News (Feb 2/09) – New Destroyer Emerges in U.S. Plans: Options Mulled As DDG 1000 Hits $6 Billion [dead link]. Includes AMDR coverage.

• DID Spotlight – The US Navy’s Dual Band Radars. Covers the SPY-3/VSR combination aboard the new DDG-1000 Zumwalt class destroyers and CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford class aircraft carriers.

Bulgarian BMP-30 Infantry Fighting Vehicle

Americas

Lockheed Martin is being contracted to build a next-generation missile defense radar system on Hawaii. Awarded by the Missile Defense Agency, the $585 million fixed-price incentive delivery order provides for design, development and delivery of the Homeland Defense Radar – Hawaii (HDR-H). The HDR-H is able to autonomously acquire, track and discriminate incoming ballistic missiles and will increase the overall capability of MDA’s Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System. The radar system is built upon Lockheed’s Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR). LRDR combines proven solid-state radar technologies with proven ballistic missile defense algorithms, all based upon an open architecture platform. The radar provides precision metric data to improve ballistic defense discrimination. The contract is partially funded through FY2018 and FY2019 research development test and evaluation funds, amounting to $51.4 million. Work will be performed at Lockheed’s factory in Moorestown, New Jersey and at the radar site on Oahu, Hawaii. The HDR-H is expected to be completed by December 2023.

BAE Systems is being awarded with a five-year support contract covering the repair of countermeasure systems for various aircraft. The order is priced at $32 million and provides for the repair of 103 items of the ALQ-126B, and two items of the ALE-55 countermeasures systems. The US Navy’s AN/ALQ-126B is designed to secure aircraft communications by generating noise jamming for potential enemy listeners and defeat radar seekers of incoming missiles. The Navy uses the system on some of its aircraft platforms, such as the F/A-18 and E-6B Prowler. The AN/ALE-55 is a towed decoy comprised of an electronic frequency converter (EFC) and a fiber optic towed decoy (FOTD). It can suppress, deceit, and seduce enemy planes, launchers and missiles. Work will be performed in Nashua, New Hampshire; Jacksonville, Florida and Crane, Indiana.

The US Army is buying more Joint-Air-to-Ground missiles. Lockheed Martin is receiving a contract modification valued at $91 million that extends JAGM procurement as part of LRIP 3. The JAGM is an air-to-ground missile that provides advanced line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight capabilities and will eventually replace the Army’s inventory of Hellfire missiles. The missile is designed to engage a variety of targets, including heavy vehicles, patrol craft, bunkers and buildings. The Army expects to achieve JAGM’s IOC in early 2019. Work will be performed at Lockheed’s factory in Orlando, Florida and is expected to be completed by February 2022.

Middle East & Africa

Turkey is requesting the purchase of several Patriot batteries. The potential Foreign Military Sale calls for the delivery of 80 Patriot MIM-104E GEM-T missiles and 60 PAC-3 MSE missiles at a cost of $3.5 billion. The multi-billion deal also provides for four AN/MPQ-65 Radar Sets, four Engagement Control Stations, 10 Antenna Mast Groups, 20 M903 Launching Stations and Electrical Power Plant (EPP) III. The package also covers communications equipment, tools and test equipment, range and test programs, and some other services. PAC-2 GEM-T are optimised to target incoming ballistic missiles. PAC-3 MSE is designed to be a longer range missile that is more agile, and able to counter both tactical ballistic missiles and more conventional threats. Turkey is a NATO member and hosts the TPY-2 radar site which is crucial to the European Phased Adaptive Approach that seeks to protect allies and partners against Iranian ballistic missile threats. Main contractors will be Raytheon and Lockheed Martin.

The government of Kuwait is ordering several engines for its F/A-18E/F Super Hornets from General Electric. Awarded by the Naval Air Systems Command, the Foreign Military Sales contract calls for the procurement of 56 F414-GE-400-1A install engines; four F414-GE-400 spare engines; two spare engine containers and 12 spare engine modules at a cost of $257 million. The F414 is one of the newest and most advanced aircraft engines. It features an axial compressor with 3 fan stages and 7 high-pressure compressor stages, and 1 high-pressure and 1 low-pressure turbine stage. In March 2018 Kuwait agreed to purchase 28 Super Hornets at a cost of $1.2 billion. Work will be performed at GE’s factories in Lynn, Massachusetts; Hooksett, New Hampshire; Rutland, Vermont and Madison, Kentucky. Performance is expected to run through December 2020.

Europe

All of NATO’s 14 Boeing E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft have now been fitted with Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) technology. The majority of work was completed at Boeing’s Manching facility in southern Germany. Efforts covered under the upgrade program focused on a new flight management and flight safety avionics system, and the installation of 50 new ‘black boxes’. GATM allows the E-3A’s to fly in civilian airspace enabling the surveillance planes to operate worldwide. The E-3 is based on Boeing’s 707 family, and its ability to see and direct air operations within hundreds of miles provides vital strategic support. NATO formed its E-3A Component in 1982 and expects to keep the aircraft in service through 2035.

Asia-Pacific

India’s Space Research Organisation launches a new military communication satellite. Gsat-7A was launched from Sriharikota at 4:10pm on Wednesday and will be the Indian Air Force’s exclusive ‘eye in the sky’. The 5000 lbs satellite will link IAF fighter jets, transporters and tankers, AWACS platforms and UAVs and ultimately act as a force multiplier. The IAF expects Gsat-7A to strengthen its net-centric war fighting capability. Gsat-7A is India’s 35th communication satellite. The satellite flies in an eventual geostationary orbit allowing the IAF to expand its communication capabilities and boost some of its network-dependant warfare and drone capabilities.

Today’s Video

Watch: T-38 Talon Flight Over Northern California

Many have praised the parliamentary elections in Herat province in the far west of Afghanistan as second only to the capital Kabul in terms of turnout. There was indeed considerable enthusiasm and determination to vote from those who could get to the polls, but they were a restricted number, mainly those living in the provincial and district centres. In areas controlled or threatened by the Taleban, the vote either did not happen or was troubled. Elsewhere, numerous administrative and technical shortcomings and serious complaints of rigging hindered Heratis from exercising their franchise. AAN researcher Said Reza Kazemi, who observed the poll, reports that the description by provincial authorities that Herat’s election was ‘good’ suggests they must have very low standards.

Reinforced security measures

As election day, 20 October 2018, approached, the Afghan government boosted the strength and presence of its military forces in Herat province. These extraordinary security measures, which lasted for about a day before to a day after the poll, were mostly limited to the provincial capital, Herat city, and district centres because large swathes of territory in the province, particularly areas far from the provincial and district centres, are either contested or partially or completely controlled by the Taleban.

In Herat city, the bolstered security forces were clearly visible. Security forces were stationed at strategic entry points to and key intersections in the provincial capital and checked any suspicious movements. Many other members of the security forces could be seen constantly patrolling in Ranger-type vehicles.Additionally, the Office of the Provincial Police Chief banned the use of motorbikes and rickshaws in the city and the districts leading to it on 18 October. All traffic was banned on election day. As a result, as AAN observed, there were few vehicles in the city and the road leading to it from Guzara and Injil districts on polling day. More vehicles started coming out as the day went on when security measures were somewhat relaxed. The transport ban was a response to a number of small-scale vehicle-borne improvised electronic device (IED) attacks in Herat city in the lead-up to election day. The attacks did not cause many casualties and it is not clear whether or not they were directly linked to the approaching elections (for details, see the author’s pre-election dispatch here).

The Taleban push to disrupt elections in several districts

Although the city of Herat was generally safe around polling day thanks largely to the strengthened security arrangements, conditions were markedly different in several districts. The Taleban, as in previous years, set out to stop as much voting as they could (for a countrywide assessment, see pages 1-6 of this UNAMA report). According to residents and district Independent Election Commission (IEC) officials, the Taleban used a range of measures in several districts of Herat province. They warned local populations not to take part in the elections and threatened to cut off their fingers if they did so. This threat was not carried out, however. Also, as will be detailed below, they abducted figures of influence in various villages in a bid to scare local inhabitants away from the elections (but released them soon afterwards following local mediation), carried out small-scale IED and rocket attacks and used small arms fire, predominantly against polling centres or other nearby compounds and land, rather than people.

However, the Taleban insurgents were unable and unwilling to create a bloodbath. Shedding blood, especially of civilians, destroys whatever local relations they may have gradually established in areas under their influence or control (for a case study of Taleban relations with district residents, read the author’s recent case study on Herat’s Obeh district here and an introduction to the subject here). Examples of how the Taleban operated around elections in five districts of the province give a flavour of their tactics.

In the north-western district of Gulran that borders Turkmenistan in the north and Iran in the west, only one out of seven polling centres opened on election day and, even then, only the centre in the very centre of the district. The IEC official in charge of Gulran told AAN that the Taleban began shelling the district centre from the moment the polling centre opened “early in the morning to around 11 am.” The rockets did not hit the polling centre but amplified a previous Taleban warning to Gulran residents not to participate in the elections. “Nevertheless, polling went on throughout the day in the district centre,” said the official. Although no one was hurt, the Taleban did appear to have affected turnout. Out of around 5,500 registered voters, only about 1,200 cast their votes in Gulran.

The western, mainly desert district of Kohsan through which Herat is connected to Iran via the Islam Qala border crossing is considered a comparatively safe district by Herat standards. There, Taleban insurgents carried out small-scale IED attacks against four polling centres including three schools and one mosque, according to an IEC official based in the district. The attacks injured two people (see this media report), inflicted some physical damage on polling centre buildings and significantly lowered turnout. In one of the polling centres, only 29 people turned out to vote. However, there was much greater voting in the remaining 11 polling centres in Kohsan (15 polling centres in total). All in all, nevertheless, Taleban threats and IED attacks reduced turnout in the district: of around 26,000 registered voters, only about 14,000 people voted.

Security in the central district of Adraskan along the Herat-Kandahar highway was worse, given its adjacency to restive Shindand district and Farah province in the south and Farsi district in the east. According to a UNAMA report (see pages 5 and 6 here), on 19 October 2018, the Taleban “gathered” 45 elders and figures of influence from several villages “with the aim of intimidating the population into not participating in the elections” and released them only after the elections were over in the evening of 20 October. A district IEC official based in Adraskan told AAN that some 25 election employees informed him on 19 October that they would not turn up to work the following day due to Taleban threats. On election day itself, the Taleban fired rockets near to five polling centres. In total, of the six polling centres, only the one in the district centre escaped attack. The attacks injured a soldier and a woman and caused some physical damage. At the end of the elections, of some 6,600 registered voters in Adraskan, only about 1,900 had cast their ballots.

Further south, the insecure district of Shindand, which borders Farah province and has been divided into five smaller districts, also witnessed a patchy, insecure and, in some places, non-existent election, according to a district IEC official who spoke to AAN. In two of the newly-created districts, Pushtkoh and Zerkoh, which are largely under Taleban rule, no election took place. In central Shindand district, all 11 polling centres opened. However, polling in two centres was hampered by skirmishes between the Taleban and Afghan government security forces nearby, which left casualties on both sides. Additionally, at about 08:00 when polling started, the Taleban fired a rocket on Shindand district centre to frighten local residents off the elections. There were no casualties, however. At the end of the day, out of about 8,400 registered voters, only some 5,000 voted in central Shindand district. In the district of Kuhzur, the single designated polling centre managed to open and out of some 1,100 registered voters, only a small group of people consisting of election staff, Afghan government security forces and a few others cast their ballots. In Zavul district, the two designated polling centres opened and out of around 2,600 people who had registered to vote, some 1,000 cast their votes.

That elections were held in troubled Shindand at all came as a surprise, but this has something to do with competing Taleban factions in southern Herat province (read AAN background on the conflict in Shindand here). Local sources in Herat city and Shindand told AAN that followers of the splinter Mullah Rasul group led by Mullah Nangialay allowed elections to be organised in areas under their influence or control (for more on this breakaway Taleban faction, read AAN analysis here). Clashes have continued for several years between Mullah Nangialay’s forces and sympathisers of mainstream Taleban leader Mullah Hibatullah led by Mullah Samad in Shindand. The most recent battle left several members on both factions dead and injured in late November 2018 (see this media report).

The Taleban also threatened the elections in Pashtun Zarghun, a relatively green and fertile, but sparsely populated district in the east of Herat province. A district IEC official told AAN that all 19 designated polling centres opened and of about 18,000 registered voters, about 9,800 people cast their votes. He said that the Taleban, angry at this relatively high turnout, despite their warnings and threats, abducted elders from several villages and only released them following mediation by other local influential figures. Additionally, UNAMA says in its report (see page 6 here) that in Chiworshy village of Pashtun Zargun district, “on 20 October Taliban entered a private company where election materials were stored and burned the materials and the civilian building.”

There were similar security incidents (mostly small-scale rocket and IED attacks) in several other districts: eastern Obeh and northern Kushk-e Kuhna districts (see page 5 here) and northern Kushk-e Rubat Sangi, eastern Karukh and Chesht-e Sharif, western Ghoryan, southern Guzara and central Injil (see here).

Organisational failure across the province

Insecurity was not the only obstacle facing Heratis keen to vote. There was also widespread administrative shambles (for a countrywide assessment, read AAN reporting here , here and here).

The first problem on election day, experienced at least in and around Herat city, was related to access. AAN observed that the transport ban had knock-on effects on both electoral staff and voters. Many IEC employees, who had been mainly recruited from among local school staff, did not manage to arrive at many polling centres on time.

Voters waiting in a long queue to get in Masjid ul-Reza Mosque polling centre to vote. Located in Police District (PD) 3 of Herat city, the entrance to the mosque is surrounded by a concrete blast wall. A young man, echoing the words of several other men who had come to vote in this polling centre, told AAN, “Look at the long queue! It’s frustrating and it’s better that I go because I’ve got other things to do.” Photo: Author/2018

Voters faced a similar challenge. AAN saw large numbers of people walking to and from polling centres in Herat city and the neighbouring district of Injil. Some we spoke to did not know they had to vote in the polling centre at which they had registered; then, if they went to the wrong centre, it was difficult to rectify this mistake because of the transport ban.

Those affected by one of the major administrative failings of this election – the names of some voters who had registered not appearing on the list of the relevant polling centre – also found their attempts to vote exacerbated by the transport ban. Many of those who could not find their names at the centre where they had registered then trailed round several other centres in a sometimes vain attempt to find their names so that they could vote. In the most notorious case of this kind, the IEC sent some voter lists from Bamiyan province to Ghoryan district of Herat (see this media report).

The late arrival of staff and generally slow administration of voting led to large queues of voters forming outside many polling centres. People waited between one and six hours to vote, with some people deciding not to wait or waiting in vain as their polling centre did not open at all. “Look at the long queue! It’s frustrating and it’s better that I go because I’ve got other things to do,” a young man who had approached Masjid ul-Reza polling centre in Police District (PD) 3 told AAN, echoing the words of several other men who came to vote, but then left after seeing the long queue. Some people living nearby, however, paid two or more visits to the polling centre and finally managed to get in and vote when it was less crowded.

Similarly, in Khaja Muhammad Taki High School polling centre in PD 3 and Hatefi High School polling centre in PD 4, many people waited for a long time (an hour or more) to get inside to cast their votes, with some deciding to return home without voting at all. As the day went on, however, queues got shorter, especially from late afternoon onwards.

Such late starts were observed by or reported to AAN all over the province. However, in some places, the delays gave rise to speculation that the administrative chaos was deliberate, a move by the government to disenfranchise voters in particular areas of Herat city and the larger province.

Besides this, there was also chaos inside most polling centres across Herat province, according to various sources. AAN observed:

Voters struggled to find their names on voter lists in the Masjid ul-Reza polling centre because voter lists were either missing or wrong or had been misplaced. A middle-aged man said, “I’ve waited for an hour or so to get inside the polling centre but can’t find my name now that I’m in. They keep sending me to one polling station or another.”

A bustling but problematic polling process in Gawharshad High School polling centre in PD 1 of Herat city. There, a candidate agent told AAN: “Polling began late, voters have to wait for a long time to get in, they find their names with difficulty or don’t at all, biometric devices don’t work and so on. Candidate agents have filled out so many complaint forms that no more is left.” Photo: Author/2018

Confused voters in Gawharshad High School polling centre in PD 1 also struggled to find their names on voter lists amid a large crowd of candidate agents, who were looking for complaint registration forms that had already run out, and a large number of observers; altogether, the orderly administration of the election was hindered as a candidate agent told AAN:

“Polling began late, voters have to wait for a long time to get in, they find their names with difficulty or don’t at all, biometric devices don’t work and so on. Candidate agents have filled out so many complaint forms that no more is left.”

In some polling centres, especially in and around Herat city, polling continued well into the night to let all those standing in queues cast their votes. A candidate agent in Nasaji polling centre in Guzara district told AAN:

“The polling centre finally opened around 1 pm. There was a long queue outside the centre but many people got tired and went back to their houses. When polling began, my colleagues and I coordinated and encouraged people to return to vote. Polling continued well into the night. The candidate we were working for paid for vehicle owners to keep bringing people to vote and then returning them to their houses. We were in the polling centre till about midnight.”

In the districts, a range of similar administrative flaws were reported by the media (see Killid and page 5 of this issue of Hasht-e Sobh daily newspaper). They included delays in opening polling centres; missing, wrong or misplaced voter lists; inadequate numbers of complaint registration forms; biometric voter verification (BVV) devices unavailable, not working, not being charged or IEC staff struggling to operate them and; election materials not provided on time or not provided at all, especially in polling centres located in outlying areas.

The provincial IEC tried to address the inadequacies. According to provincial IEC head Ahmad Shah Qanuni, who spoke to AAN, a 10 to 12-member operational team at the provincial IEC headquarters was busy particularly throughout election day, attempting to resolve the myriad of problems. However, the organisational and technical shortfalls were numerous and simply unmanageable for the provincial IEC. “Technical problems played a greater role in disenfranchising voters in Herat than did insecurity,” was the frank admission of provincial IEC head Qanuni in an interview with AAN. This would appear certainly to be true on election day, itself, although many voters never even got the chance to register because of the Taleban controlling large areas of the province and beyond.

More disenfranchisement due to technical flaws than security incidents

In assessing October’s parliamentary poll, it should be stressed that, months before election day, many Heratis had already been disenfranchised. Out of an estimated one million voters in the province, only around half registered to vote; the shortfall appeared due mostly to security threats and widespread disillusionment with the last fraudulent and controversial presidential elections in 2014 (see the author’s pre-election dispatch here).

The IEC had planned to open 462 polling centres across Herat (see their list here). Prior to election day, it said it would only be able to open 300 of these following an assessment by the Afghan government security institutions (read this AAN dispatch). Then, on election day itself, it opened only 285. On the extra, second day of the elections, the IEC did plan to open the remaining 15 polling centres, but in practice only opened two, one in Kushk-e Rubat Sangi district and the other in Adraskan district (see also this media report). This means that, on the two election days, only 287 polling centres opened in Herat province, 175 polling centres (or almost 40 per cent) fewer than was planned. Only in Herat city and the immediate district of Injil did all designated polling centres open.

About a fifth fewer centres opened in 2018 than in the last parliamentary elections in 2010 when 351 polling centres opened (see their list here) and only 4 per cent of those planned to open failed to do so (see appendix 4 of this report; see also AAN reporting on the 2010 elections in Herat here and here). This is a consequence of the Taleban controlling or influencing more territory than they did eight years ago.

As for the number of people who cast their votes on the two election days, there are no exact figures yet, but available data does indicate that more than 215,000 registered voters did not exercise their franchise. Prior to the elections, the provincial IEC provided AAN with the following voter registration figures (see the author’s pre-election dispatch here):

• Total: 557,720 registered voters
• 308,613 men
• 247,434 women
• 1,673 kuchis (nomads)

After the election, on 28 November 2018, Qanuni, the provincial IEC head, provided the following figures of those who had voted:

• Total: 342,225 voters
• 184,180 men
• 157,190 women
• 855 kuchis

215,495 registered voters, almost 40 per cent (38.64 %), did not vote in Herat province. Individual reasons are not known, but potential voters faced technical shambles, closed polling centres and Taleban threats or were disinclined to vote. Compared to the 2010 parliamentary elections, there was actually little difference: overall 348,145 people (198,483 men, 145,050 women, 4,612 kuchis) voted in 2010; this includes both validated (291,625) and invalidated (56,520) ballots. This is just 5,920 more ballots than those who cast their votes in the recent elections.

Alleged rigging

Allegations of fraud have further undermined the parliamentary elections in Herat. As time has passed since the elections, the number of election complaints has steadily gone up: from 649 on 22 October 2018 (see page 5 here), to 792 on 24 October (see here) and to 999 on 28 November, according to the head of the provincial Election Complaints Commission (ECC), Fareshtah Hesham.

Hesham told AAN the provincial ECC had put the 999 complaints into three categories. The first category involves 649 complaints that have been found by the provincial ECC as “undocumented and therefore rejected.” The fact that there has not been much local reaction to the rejection of these complaints could show that the complaints were not solid. The second category comprises 150 complaints about organisational shortcomings such as late starts, missing or wrong or misplaced voter lists and dysfunctional BVV devices on polling day. These complaints have been referred by the provincial ECC to its headquarters in Kabul, for “these problems emanated from the centre [Kabul],” said Hesham.

The remaining 200 complaints are, in Hesham’s words, “evidence-based and serious.” These complaints relate to alleged cases of election manipulation such as ballot box stuffing, the use of fake tazkeras(national ID cards), campaigning for candidates near and even inside polling centres and general illegal interference by different actors in the electoral process. The provincial ECC investigation of these complaints is still under way.

As a result of the third category of complaints, Hesham said the provincial ECC has quarantined ballot boxes from 61 polling centres across the province for re-counting. These include 18 polling centres in Herat city; all polling centres in Chesht-e Sharif, Kushk-e Kuhna, Gulran, Shindand, Adraskan, Zavul and Farsi districts; and some polling centres in Zendajan, Guzara, Injil, Karukh and Obeh districts. The quarantined polling centres indicate that alleged fraud was perpetrated both in relatively safe and central districts such as Injil and insecure and faraway ones such as Farsi and, in other words, across the entire province.

Local observers told AAN that the recruitment of election staff from among the local population contributed to the fraud. For instance, an observer from Kohsan district told AAN that at least two polling centres in the district were staffed by individuals belonging to one kinship group who supported one of the candidates and purportedly engineered the election in favour of him. In other areas, according to local journalists, candidate agents and provincial IEC and ECC heads that AAN spoke to, various actors including locally-hired IEC staff, elders, commanders and candidate agents interfered in the elections in favour of their chosen candidates. Furthermore, the lack of candidate agents and observers in some polling centres situated in far-flung, insecure areas provided an environment conducive for rigging.

In addition, there are concerns among some local activists that electoral fraud at the central Kabul level could have undermined Herat province’s parliamentary elections even further. Some candidates immediately left Herat for Kabul following the elections, which contributed to speculation among journalists and local activists including observers and civil society representatives that they are allegedly “trying to increase their votes through the electoral bodies or are concerned about election manipulation by the electoral bodies” (see page 5 here). These local activists (see page 5 here) have further alleged that some candidates intentionally declared their victory prematurely by throwing parties in order to make Kabul-level vote manipulation possible later on. The provincial IEC and ECC have tried to assure the populace that due process of law was being followed, but the credibility of this assurance is under question. For example, on 7 December 2018, 25 parliamentary election candidates in Herat called for the complete invalidation of votes in the province, citing what they called “widespread electoral fraud and violations” including by the provincial IEC (see here).

In her interview with AAN, the provincial ECC head Hesham said she fully expected the announcement of preliminary results – which came out on 17 December (1) – would bring to them an even greater number of complaints.

Conclusion: what kind of an election did Herat have?

Enthusiasm by Heratis to take part in the elections was evident from the long queues of voters that formed outside polling centres in various parts of Herat province. Yet, many Heratis could not exercise their franchise, meaning the elections were far from representative of the population across the province. Insecurity primarily caused by the Taleban meant that polling was mostly limited to provincial and district centres; this was largely a vote of Herat’s urban population. That widening urban-rural divide, part of a countrywide pattern (read this AAN dispatch), raises questions as to how representative returning MPs to Afghanistan’s next parliament will be of the population as a whole. A vote constrained by insurgency was then further chipped away at by technical deficiencies. Even in safe areas, not every Herati managed to exercise their franchise.

Those twin problems – insecurity and organisational failure – were reflected in the voting statistics, the 175 polling centres that did not open and the 215,495 registered voters who did not vote. Given that half of Herat’s estimated eligible voters had already not or could not register, the figures look even worse. Actual voter turnout on the day was 342,225, or about a third of the estimated electorate.

These shortcomings were compounded by the 200 serious complaints of election rigging that cast serious doubts on how free and fair Herat’s parliamentary elections were. Although these complaints are still being investigated by the provincial ECC, convincing electoral stakeholders, particularly ‘losing’ candidates, to accept the final results could be a very hard task, given the messiness of these elections. It could have consequences for public order, given the commonplace practice of the ‘ill-used’, but influential, to bring supporters out onto the streets and block roads in and around the city of Herat and elsewhere. More importantly, these problematic parliamentary elections could further undermine public trust not just in the capacity of the electoral institutions but also in Afghanistan’s ‘democratic’ processes more broadly. This is particularly worrying given the approaching 20 April 2019 presidential elections.

Despite all these issues, however, according to the provincial authorities, Herat had a ‘good’ election. Muhammad Asif Rahimi, the outgoing provincial governor, said the elections were “relatively safe.” The Taleban failed to prevent the poll, he said, and the people of Herat, particularly the women, “created an epic by their high turnout” (see page 5 here). In her interview with AAN, the provincial ECC head, Hesham, put it more bluntly, “Compare Herat with Ghazni [province] that had no elections: the elections [in Herat] were good and things went safe and sound (bakhair ter shod).”

The enthusiasm on the part of those voters who could vote has to be acknowledged. Where voters could vote they largely did. However, many could not participate. They were let down by violent insurgents and incompetent authorities and, quite likely, cheats. This poses a serious question: how representative, free and fair can even a ‘good election’ in Afghanistan in current times be?

 

Edited by Danielle Moylan and Kate Clark

 

(1) The IEC announced the preliminary election results for Herat province on 17 December 2018 (see here). 161 candidates (their full list here) campaigned for Herat’s 17 seats in the parliament (five reserved for women). According to the preliminary results, of the 17 leading candidates (the first 12 are men and the last five women), eight are sitting MPs and the remaining nine new faces – who are referred to in bold:

1. Habib ul-Rahman Pedram, 16,796 votes
2. Muhammad Reza Khushak Watandost, 16,140 votes
3. Omar Nasir Mujaddedi, 10,929 votes
4. Haji Muhammad Sadeq Qaderi, 10,171 votes
5. Munavar Shah Bahaduri, 8,324 votes
6. Nesar Ahmad Faizi Ghoryani, 7,612 votes
7. Naqibullah Arwin, 7,306 votes
8. Ghulam Faruq Majruh, 7,004 votes
9. Ustad Hamidullah Hanif, 6,946 votes
10. Haji Shahpur Popal, 6,920 votes
11. Sayyed Azim Kabarzani, 6,582 votes
12. Al-Haj Ghulam Faruq Nazari, 6,263 votes
13. Rahima Jami, 3,686 votes
14. Masuda Karukhi, 2,822 votes
15. Simin Barekzai, 2,323 votes
16. Nahid Ahmadi Farid, 1,959 votes
17. Ustad Shirin Shahabi, 1,737 votes

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Americas

The US Air Force is allocating a large amount of money in maintaining its AH-64E Apache’s LAIRCM countermeasure system. Northrop Grumman is being awarded with a $3.6 billion IDIQ contract supporting the service’s Large Aircraft Infrared Counter Measures (LAIRCM) equipment. This contract covers the delivery of LAIRCM line replaceable units and support equipment, and provides for logistics services; systems and sustaining engineering efforts and other activities. LAIRCM is a is a laser-based countermeasures system that can defend a wide range of aircraft from an infrared missile attack by automatically detecting a missile launch, determining if it is a threat, and activating a high-intensity system of pulsed lasers to track and defeat the threat by confusing its guidance head. The US Army used LAIRCM to protect its Apache gunships while operating against ISIS targets in Northern Iraq and Syria. This contract includes numerous sales to US allies as part of the Foreign Military Sales program. Work will be performed at the company’s facility in Rolling Meadows, Illinois, and is expected to be completed by December 2025.

The US Army is pouring $700 million into its Mobile Protected Firepower acquisition program. BAE Systems and General Dynamics will each deliver 6 prototype vehicles by February 2020. The US Army’s Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) program will provide the service with a new combat vehicle platform that allows US troops to disrupt, breach and break through enemy lines and defensive fortifications. The platform is required to be effective against hard targets such as bunkers, heavy machine gun nests and armored vehicles. UPI suggest that the MPF prototype offered by General Dynamics will be quite similar to the Ajax, developed for the UK; whereas BAE’s prototype could be a version of its M8 Buford Armored Gun System. The acquisition is part of the US Army’s 2015 combat vehicle modernization strategy, which will eventually see for the delivery of 504 vehicles. BAE is receiving $375 million, with work to be performed at its Sterling Heights, Michigan factory. General Dynamics is receiving $335 million, also working at Sterling Heights. The aggressive acquisition schedule wants the first prototypes tested within the next 16 months and expects the first vehicles to be fielded in 2025

Boeing and Embraer are forming a joint-venture on Embraer’s KC-390 multimission aircraft. The two companies announced that they will jointly “promote and develop new markets” for the KC-390. Embraer will have 51% stake in the joint venture, with Boeing owing the rest. This agreement is extending the companies partnership, with Boeing having gained a 80% stake in the Brazilian company’s commercial business in July 2018. A deal which cost Boeing $4.2 billion. The deal is pending approval by the Brazilian government – which holds a “golden share” – Embraer’s shareholders and regulatory agencies.

Middle East & Africa

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is increasing its stocks of Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSMs). Raytheon is being awarded with a cost-only contract that provides for the delivery of ESSMs and spares at a cost of $24.7 million. The ESSM is designed to protect navy ships from incoming missiles and aircraft. The RIM-162 Block 1 features a semi-active radar that is guided by reflected radiation from the ship’s radar. The missile is designed to counter supersonic maneuvering anti-ship missiles. The order includes Foreign Military Sales funds in the amount of $23.8 million. Work will be performed in Raufoss, Norway; Mississauga, Canada; Richmond, Australia. Performance is expected to run through December 2021. The ESSM will equip Saudi Arabia’s new Multi-Mission Surface Combatant (MMSC) ships.

Europe

The UK Royal Navy’s new Sea Venom/ANL missile faces a year-long delay. The missile is being developed under a $630 million contract issued by the UK and French governments. The missile will fulfil the UK’s Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon (Heavy) requirement and will meet France’s national Anti Navire Léger requirement. The Sea Venom will eventually equip the Royal Navy’s Wildcat HMA2 helicopter and the French Navy’s Hélicoptère Interarmées Léger (HIL—Joint Light Helicopter) respectively. The delay means that the Royal Navy’s Wildcats will have to operate without their main anti-ship armament, ultimately limiting their ability to provide British ships – such as the HMS Queen Elizabeth – with an extended anti-ship capability until late 2021. The Sea Venom is a lightweight, subsonic sea-skimming missile guided by an IIR seeker. The missile is designed to counter a wide range of threats such as fast-moving patrol boats, corvettes and coastal targets.

Asia-Pacific

Taiwan’s Wan Chien stand-off cruise missile still doesn’t meet Republic of Korea Air Force requirements. The RoCAF conducted a number of missile tests with its F-CK-1 Ching Kuo Indigenous Defense Fighters earlier this year. During the tests the Wan Chien successfully completed a low-altitude drop, but repeatedly failed to correctly deploy when dropped at high-altitude. When launched at high-altitude the Wan Chien shows an unstable flight profile. This is caused by either a hardware or software error affecting the correct unfolding of the missile’s pop-out wings, leading to a turbulent air intake, delaying ignition of its engine. The Wan Chien can be compared to the US’s AGM-154 JSOW and is currently operational in small numbers. The RoCAF plans to hold a new series of trials sometime next year, pending a comprehensive examination of the missile’s software and hardware. The missile flies to a 150 mile range and allows Taiwan to strike targets on China’s southern-coast.

It is yet unclear when Indonesia will receive its first Su-35 fighter jets from Russia, due to an outstanding contract. Russia’s IRKUT defense contractor cannot start jet production until Jakarta signs a purchasing contract with Moscow. Russia’s ambassador to Indonesia, Lyudmila Georgievna Vorobieva expects to finalise the contract soon, however considering Indonesia’s recent financial troubles it is yet to be seen how soon. Indonesia’s Su-35 acquisition was finalised in February 2018 and sees for the delivery of 11 fighter jets at a cost of $1.14 billion. The Flanker E aircraft will replace the Asian-nation’s ageing fleet of F-5 Tiger IIs, some of which have been in service for almost four decades. The Su-35 is Russia’s most advanced fighter aircraft, which can compete with America’s upgraded ‘teen series’, the JAS-39, the Rafale and the Eurofighter.

Today’s Video

Watch: First Phalanx of Three is being fitted on the UK Aircraft Carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth