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Figures for the 2018 Afghan budget are in the public realm and show that, despite government attempts to clean up its finances, Afghanistan’s Members of Parliament (MPs) were, once again, ‘given’ projects to persuade them to vote the budget through. The draft budget presented to parliament in November 2017 had been almost balanced; the one passed in January 2018 has a deficit of more than 200 million dollars. Even so, says AAN Co-Director Kate Clark, all is not lost. There are still many good elements in what was passed. Significantly, it is much more transparent than previous years, so citizens can see detailed spending plans for 2018 and data for earlier years. It shows, for instance, that Paktia province has been getting six times the per capita funding of neighbouring Ghazni province.

The way the national budget of Afghanistan has been determined over the last ten years was described by Integrity Watch Afghanistan in 2017, as “riddled with incompetence, corruption, and collusion among the Executive and the National Assembly.” The budget for this financial year – 2018/1397 – was supposed to change all that. It was ambitious, aiming to be transparent and accountable, to cut down on waste and opportunities for graft, focus resources on where they were needed and on government ministries and agencies that had spent money effectively, and to be realistic and balanced. In the words of Deputy Finance Minister, Khaled Payenda, speaking at a workshop attended by AAN in December 2017, its aims were “to disclose issues, create a debate on constraining [expenditure], and do some fixing.” What that meant, in practice, as AAN reported after the draft budget was presented to parliament on 8 November 2017 were some major reforms. Now we now that the budget only made it through parliament after a deal with MPs.

This dispatch assesses the 2018 budget:

• How the draft budget was different from earlier budgets;
• The passage of the budget through parliament
• What changes were made to get MPs’ approval;
• Reactions to the approved budget;
• Whether the 2018 budget ended up any better than earlier budgets;
• What else needs to happen to make sure the 2018 budget is the start of financial reforms, not the end of them.

What was in the draft budget?

For the first time, the Afghan national budget was written to ‘international standards’. (1) It disclosed far more information on 2018, earlier years and future projections, with detail at the level of ministry, project and province. The Ministry of Finance had tried to be realistic in terms both of Afghanistan’s revenue and spending. The budget recognised both the scale of Afghan dependence on foreign aid – uniquely large in the world (2) – and that this aid money is in decline. It sought to avoid Afghanistan falling off what it called a ‘fiscal cliff’ after 2020, when donor money is set to fall by almost half. (3) The budget also shifted away from using the previous year’s budget targets for budgeting to using the previous year’s estimated actual expenditure. Because targets are rarely met, this had meant inflated costs continuing from year to year. The new measurement was aimed at making the budget more credible.

The draft budget also tried to focus on the Afghan state’s chronic failure to spend its development budget (money for public investments and other development projects). The recurrent budget – money for running costs, including salaries – tends to get fully spent, but on average, only around half of the development budget gets spent each year (AAN reported this problem in 2012). Looked at another way, the Afghan state spends 75 dollars deploying every 25 dollars of actual development spending, a very poor rate indeed. The Ministry of Finance had hoped that various reforms in the 2018 budget would result in an execution rate of at least 95 per cent, with the knowledge that, as Deputy Finance Minister Khaled Payenda and former World Bank Afghanistan Country Manager Bill Byrd wrote in a piece for AAN in 2017, this “would help create jobs, build infrastructure, stimulate economic growth and over time generate more revenues for the government.”

The reforms in the draft budget included:

• Shifting money from under-performing to performing ministries;
• Ending automatic carry-overs of unspent funds for unfinished development projects from year to year, a practice which fosters inefficiency, delay and opportunities for graft; instead, instilling a ‘use it or lose it’ approach (4);
• Establishing the principle that if ministries wanted to propose new projects, they had to fund them from savings.

Such measures, the draft budget document said, were aimed at “lowering corruption and making the budget a much more effective tool for national development.”

Although the draft 2018 budget was better than those of previous years, it was far from perfect. There was only a minor reduction (eight per cent) in the use of contingency code budgeting, for example. Contingency funds, easily shifted to other uses and therefore vulnerable to bargaining, rent-seeking and corruption, still amounted to more than 50 billion Afghanis (more than 700m USD) in the draft budget.

Also, despite a serious portfolio review, with the Ministry of Finance using past disbursement performance to restructure or cancel some projects, not all the badly-performing ones were weeded out. Integrity Watch pointed to the many projects in the draft budget which had “amount and locations… not fixed, or programs whose individual components are not defined.” If there is room for manoeuvre as to where money is spent on a particular project, it is left vulnerable to political influence during its implementation, Integrity Watch said, because it enables “politicians to pressure a minister to allocate resources to their neighborhoods, or ministers to allocate resources to politicians as a form of patronage, after the enactment of the national budget by the parliament.” Integrity Watch found that 38 per cent of projects in the draft budget were prone to political influence, a fall from 50 per cent of the previous year’s budget, but said:

Although there has been some improvement in reducing vulnerability to political influence in development projects in the 1397 budget, it still leaves a lot of room for abuse. The majority of Members of Parliament (MPs) compel ministers to meet them throughout the year to pressure them to accept their projects and to give away contracts to their relatives and friends. Instead of addressing the issue, the [National Unity Government] has regulated this patronage by asking MPs to meet executive officials on a specific day of the week. (5)

Parliament and the budget

As AAN commented when the draft budget was presented to parliament, getting it past the MPs was always going to be tough. The constitution gives them important blocking powers. They can also put pressure on individual candidate ministers, who have to get MPs’ votes of confidence to be appointed (a procedure which took place most recently, on 4 December 2017) and on ministers, whom they can summon to parliament and give votes of no confidence, in a procedure known as estizah. The consequence of these powers has been a persistent record of deal-making on budgets.

In 2017, for example, the budget was only passed after the Ministry of Finance agreed to allow each MP to have ‘their’ projects included in the budget (cited in this report). These projects, which also featured in earlier budgets, are widely known as ‘the MPs’ projects’ and in 2016 and 2017 appeared in an annex to the national budget. When the Ministry of Finance started drafting the 2018 budget, it faced this historical legacy – two billion dollars’ worth of ‘development projects’ which had been introduced under parliamentary pressure in earlier years and agreed by the government without specific funding sources (more on which later). These had, said Finance Minister Eklil Hakimi, made the budget “unreliable and bogus.” One of the Ministry of Finance’s strategies was to end the practice of having an annex of projects. Rather, it brought all that it thought worthwhile and could be funded into the main budget document. “Our biggest struggle,” Deputy Minister Payenda told AAN, “was to reduce the number of projects.”

On 13 December 2017, MPs voted on the draft budget and rejected it (for the ninth consecutive year). They cited the ‘inadequate’ development budget for their constituencies in 2018 compared to 2017 and the way development projects which had not been implemented in 2017 were dropped. They pointed to the large amounts of money still being allocated to the offices of the president (Afs 3.43b/49m USD) and the chief executive (Afs 678m/9.8m USD). They also said the budget document was too complicated.

There were ongoing meetings between MPs and officials and the Minister of Finance responded officially to parliament on 30 December 2017 by explaining that the budget was written according to international standards and that it was realistic, taking into account that while domestic revenues had increased, the share of the budget covered by donors had declined.

MPs were adamant that they needed those development projects back in the planned expenditure, to show their constituents that their representatives were working for them. In some sense, this is legitimate, although one would want to look at whether projects were representative of the MPs’ provinces as a whole, or only benefited their district or indeed village.

Faced with questions about where the money to pay for the projects would come from, one MP who was at the workshop referred to earlier said it would be “very difficult for us to convince our people, the nation, civic society with regard to [the unamended] budget… We have heavy, hard work ahead.” His solution was for the “international community” to provide more funds. He also warned that if it and the Ministry of Finance were not “flexible,” it would “create a lot of mistrust.”

The budget was revised and presented again to parliament on 17 January at a plenary session. MPs passed it by 122 to 30 votes. It has now been published (read it here, in Dari and in English here). The scale of the additions are clear. Afghanistan has ended up with a deficit of more than two hundred million dollars. 

What was in the approved budget? New and re-instated projects 

The budget gives a list of ‘new projects’, which appear to be projects which did not appear in the budgets of earlier years: some were in the draft budget; others only appeared in the revised budget. However, they add up to just 5.6bAfs/84m US, so do not entirely explain the overall increase in expenditure. Other new projects, mostly schools and clinics which the Ministry of Finance told AAN it added to the approved budget (more on these below), also do not completely explain the new expenditure – they added up to costing 31m USD. Rather, the bulk of the increased spending appears to be made up of projects which had been approved in earlier years and which the Ministry of Finance had rejected from the draft budget and which it reinstated after the MPs’ outcry. The approved budget document is not explicit about which development projects have been ‘reinstated’, but Finance Minister Hakimi told MPs that 80 per cent of the development projects from fiscal years 1395 and 1396 had been added to the amended 2018 budget. (6) Naser Timory from Integrity Watch Afghanistan, calling them the “the MPs projects,” described them as “bogus.”

Of most concern to parliamentarians had been road-building. The cost of the roads that previous budgets had agreed to amounted to four times the total amount of the government’s discretionary funds. Because that is unaffordable and roads are not a government priority, the draft budget had featured almost no road-building from discretionary funds. However, the budget approved by parliament saw the reinstatement of all the road-building projects that had already been surveyed and procurement procedures finalised. (7) Chairman of the Wolesi Jirga Finance and Budget Commission Amir Khan Yar and member of the Wolesi Jirga Finance and Budget Commission MP Sediq Ahmad Usmani told MPs that projects whose procurement procedures had not been finalized would be given priority in next year’s budget. (8)

The result is a slew of underperforming projects brought back into the budget, fewer than in previous years, but, still, bad enough. Notably, those MPs who voted against the budget complained only about its ‘imbalance’, that not enough development projects from their areas had been included in the final list.

Returning briefly to the 200 small-scale projects introduced into the approved budget, the Ministry of Finance is happy about these. Deputy Minister Payenda told AAN that, under the previous system, the various ministries had proposed projects, but only drew up the list of locations after the budget had been approved by MPs, a system that was prone to misuse and political influence. For example, last year, he said the government decided to build 52 new mosques around the country; 16 ended up in one province, which had a very strong MP with good contacts. This year the ministry had tried to be more systematic:

“This year, we had requests from different ministries for over 1400 projects, costing more than half a billion dollars. We could not fund them all, so we set criteria, and the president tasked us with setting up a committee and prioritizing public health and education, and we also looked also at the geographical location. We said we have this much money – 30 million dollars – and selected 233 projects, mainly schools and clinics.”.

Altogether, the new and reinstated projects have created a budget deficit of 14 billion Afghanis (roughly 209m USD). The approved budget document says:

… in 1397 there is AFN25 billion deficit from which an amount of AFN10 billion will be funded from 1396 cash balances, AFN908 million from loans but for the AFN14 billion remaining amount is left without any specific funding source. (9)

One might ask why the MPs were so keen to get unfunded projects onto the books. Development projects in Afghanistan can be subject to a number of scams – and it is worth stressing here, as Integrity Watch’s Timory does, that this is not limited to the MPs’ projects. As soon as a project has an approved budget and number, one official said, people can start selling contracts and sub-contracts on it. Any MPs and corrupt officials who had already ‘auctioned off’ rights to contracts for projects that had been agreed in earlier years, which they then saw excluded from the draft 2018 budget, would have been under a lot of pressure to get them reinstated. Timory said it was the projects ‘belonging to’ the strongest, best-connected MPs, not the strongest projects, which would actually see money spent on them. There are many stages in a project which have ‘rent-seeking opportunities’, including: the feasibility study, design, procurement, contract and sub-contract management, monitoring and evaluation, and invoicing, when a ‘facilitation payment’ may be required for a payment to be released to the contractor.

“From beginning to end,” one official said, “there are multiple opportunities to steal. It’s one reason why not much gets constructed.” Other reasons for the poor execution rate of Afghanistan’s development budget centre on unrealistic or non-credible budgeting or planning, as Bill Byrd of the US Institute of Peace and Deputy Minister Payenda wrote as AAN guest authors in 2017:

Although a common perception is that poor budget execution is due to low capacity in implementation of projects, in reality, budget execution issues in Afghanistan are more complex. One of the main reasons for low budget execution is the quality of project preparation. Currently, many projects get pushed into the budget that are poorly prepared, or in some cases are not prepared at all and in reality are little more than vague concepts. Also, no matter how well-designed and prepared, a project cannot achieve spending targets if the plan is not realistic.  

They added: 

Hence improving the front end of the budget process is important, including ensuring that the projects in the budget are fully costed, with a realistic spending timetable.

Worth mentioning are two other elements in the approved budget which were improvements. Firstly, there was a reigning in of the ‘special operations budget’, which is part of contingency funding. A government agency or ministry with such a budget does not have to give any sort of account for expenditure to the supreme audit of the Ministry of Finance. Last year, ten ministries or state bodies were given this type of budget which they could spend as they pleased. Under pressure from MPs – it was one of their twelve demands said Payenda – this was reduced to three: the defence and interior ministries and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) (with some room for transferring expenditure between codes given also to the National Security Council). Those no longer getting operative budgets are the Tribal and Border Affairs Ministry and the Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG), the Ministry of State for Parliamentary Affairs, the Supreme Court, the Directorate of Kuchi Affairs and the Attorney General’s Office.

Secondly, in terms of new information and analysis presented, a section appears in the approved budget which compares provincial spending. It is fascinating. It reveals, for example, that Ghazni has received less than a sixth of the per capita spending which neighbouring Paktia has seen over the last eight years – 313 USD compared to 50 USD. The budget document itself says, “This demonstrates a level of inequality that the Government will need to address in future budgets.” The top five receivers of per capita government spending have been: Paktia, Nimruz, Kandahar, Helmand and Nuristan. The bottom five were: Ghazni, Ghor, Faryab, Badghis and Sar-e Pul. The approved budget document goes on to say:

The top five and bottom five provinces in per capita Government spending by province have been quite stable in terms of their relative level compared to all other provinces over the last eight years. The rest, a majority, have seen a relatively high level of volatility in Government spending in their provinces. Some have seen one-off increases in a year associated with major projects, while the on-going security situation has meant that some provinces have moved back and forth between secure and insecure. 

This volatility reflects the relatively centralized nature of Government in Afghanistan over the period. There are no independent sub-national administrations and there has been no development of inter-governmental transfers to provinces aimed at fiscal equalization that are common in most countries.

Reactions to the Approved Budget 

The Afghan media reported on parliament passing the budget with few details and little comment (see for example, TOLO News and the Afghanistan Times; Pajwok reported the hike in ‘development spending’ approvingly. It was left to Integrity Watch’s executive director, Sayed Ikram Afzali, to describe parliament’s role as “distortive” and failing to “reflect the interest of the Afghan people.” Accusing MPs of rejecting the budget as a way to “negotiate their personal benefits,” he said parliament had “misused its oversight authority in the budget process.”

Given that donors’ money still makes up a large proportion of Afghanistan’s revenues, the donors have been remarkably quiet about all this. AAN could only find statements issued by the European Union mission and UNAMA (not a donor). Both ignored the deal-making. A day before the MPs’ vote in January, the European Union mission, speaking as a ‘strong supporter of democracy’, said, “A vote on a national budget is one of these pivotal moments when the pact between the citizens, their elected representatives and the Government can be renewed.” No comment was made after the vote, when the ‘pact’, in effect, excluded citizens’ interests. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Tadamichi Yamamoto, described the budget as having been “finalized after extensive collaboration between the executive and legislative branches of Afghanistan’s government, and following important civil society discussions.” He praised Afghanistan’s “commitment… to accountability and to its self-reliance strategy” and its “positive, realistic and concrete efforts to meet its financial reform obligations.”

Was the approved 2018 budget any better than previous ones?

After last year’s budget (2017), 70 million dollars’ worth of additional projects were introduced to get MPs’ approval. The deal-making this year, on the face of it, looks even worse, given the 200 million dollar deficit. However, because the Ministry of Finance had pre-emptively cut many bogus projects during their portfolio review, the eventual outcome is not as dire as it appears. Looking at the figures for 2017, the planned expenditure was 438 billion Afghanis, of which it is estimated that the government will have spent 381 billion. The new budget expenditure is 385 billion Afghanis, making a decrease in the ‘non-credible’ budget of 12 per cent. Importantly, the 2018 budget still envisages an increase in actual expenditure of seven per cent. This budget, in fiscal terms, is not contractionary and has reduced, to some extent, the room for corruption.

In other areas, the improvements are clearer. Measured in terms of Deputy Minister Payenda’s aims of ‘disclose, constrain and fix’, one can say that there is much fuller disclosure in the 2018 budget. Concerned citizens can see where money is being spent or supposed to be spent. Some constraint also made it through to the finished document, including, significantly, the removal of automatic carryovers and the ‘fiscal cliff’, the reduction in half of donor money between 2020 and 2021, being embedded in future revenue calculations.

What needs to happen next? 

Whether 2018 is the start of reforms or just a blip in ‘business as normal’ will start to become evident at the mid-year point when the Ministry of Finance is due to review all projects with “a full-scale supplementary budget process in mid-1397” with the aim of “finding efficiency savings in the operating budget and allocating more resources to high performing development programs.” Ministries and agencies will be instructed to prepare new policy proposals in line with national priorities, fully costed and with economic evaluations. Priorities for the supplementary budget are, according to the budget document: infrastructure, agriculture, urban development, and culture and development. Deputy Minister Payenda admitted, however, that it was “really difficult to do major changes in mid-year.”

At the end of the year, we will also be able to see what Payenda chose as the key indicator of the government’s performance, the development budget execution rate:

Compare the plan with the execution. In the past, there was huge variance…. Have we reduced the gap? Look not just at the headline figures though, but also at the details. For example, if we planned to build 200 schools around country, look at if they were built and whether they were in their intended locations. Last year, the development budget execution rate was 67 per cent. If that figure is higher, we are doing better and the 2018 [budget] was more credible.

If this year’s budget is to be just the first step towards increasingly aligning the annual budget with national priorities and reducing the space for those wanting to appropriate resources, more and deeper reforms will need to feature in next year’s budget.

Work remains to be done on restructuring or cancelling development projects which are not performing. This means another serious review of projects, both those paid for with discretionary funds (which the government controls), such as the MPs’ projects, and the far larger, non-discretionary funds (which are earmarked by donors). The rules governing the latter, such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and other donor preference funds, are also resulting in blockages and inefficiencies. Under these funding mechanisms, once a project is approved, it gets a sub-account from which funds cannot be moved, even, as one person familiar with the process said, if a project is poorly designed or not being implemented:

For year after year, the money stays locked into that sub-account instead of being moved to some other place where it could be useful. This is also why you say so many ‘extensions’ in the ARTF portfolio; instead of just admitting that they are programmes that aren’t working out and re-allocating the funds to something more successful, they get extended over and over again or even brought into a ‘Phase 2’ to hide the fact that Phase 1 was a failure. This issue of ARTF rigidity is not just about locking away money; it is also about not building things that the country needs. In the past the Ministry of Finance has been party to this: even when projects weren’t working, they would still disburse ‘studies’, nonsense design reviews and other meaningless programmes that achieve nothing, but go to favoured firms.

Another way to improve budgeting would be something that Integrity Watch has been advocating for a long time: popular consultation on development whereby, instead of MPs and government officials deciding what gets built (where politics can skew decisions), local people get a chance to say what they need. “We have offered support in establishing ‘participatory budgeting’,” Nasser Timory told AAN. “They never came back to us. Let’s start with one province, see how we can engage the people and start making this a people’s budget, not an elites’ or politicians’ budget.” (Read about this in more detail, here.)

Contingency budgets – and note the scale of them, 700 million US dollars, which dwarfs the MPs’ deal-making – need to be slashed and rationalised. If MPs saw this being done they just might be happier seeing their own opportunities for graft reduced. Some contingency funding is necessary because of genuinely unforeseen circumstances. But in reality, much exists to create opportunities for making money illicitly or because systems are not working. Deputy Minister Payenda gave a couple of examples of the latter. Maintaining roads, he said, should not need contingency funding. The Ministry of Finance was now working with the Ministry of Public Works to get a better system for planning its maintenance schedule, so that it could be paid for out of normal funds. With the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, and with paying pensions, the Ministry of Finance is helping establish biometric systems, so that the government can know the exact number and identities of beneficiaries and the total money required, with benefits paid directly into individuals’ bank accounts.

Integrity Watch’s Timory says that getting a biometric data base of civil servants should reduce leakages from the operating budget. With the police, local police and army, this is already happening after pressure from the United States military, either directly or with other donors. Actions included withholding funds for salaries until ministries verified that individual police officers and soldiers did exist and were getting the salaries due to them. The motive here was to drive ghost soldiers and police from the ranks (ie those which only exist on paper, while others pocket their wages), in the face of the Taleban insurgency (see here and here for details). The problem of ‘ghosts’, including ‘ghost’ pensioners, teachers and others is thought to be widespread. However, not all ministries are reliant on a powerful, highly motivated player like the US military who can help leverage change. Reformers elsewhere with no strong backer – either from higher up in government or a foreign donor – can find themselves isolated and vulnerable to threats from those stealing systematically from the nation’s budget.

Conclusion

More support to budget reforms from donors would be helpful, with honest appraisals about bad practice on all sides. More scrutiny and better reporting from the media and focussed demands from citizens and civil society could also encourage greater accountability. Civil society, for example, could push for annual outcome reporting of all big projects and ‘MPs’ projects’ – how was money spent, what was achieved. They could demand ministry-specific annual reports detailing how projects had been delivered and giving reasons for budget execution rates. People from Ghazni and the other provinces languishing at the bottom of the per capita spending table could rightly take up their relative neglect by central government to those in charge. The increase in transparency in this year’s budget gives citizens, the media and donors information, evidence and tools to demand answers from the government. Given that MPs have proved unable to hold the executive to account over the country’s budget, pressure from these other quarters to support reforms and reformers will be needed.

 

Edited by Sari Kouvo

 

(1) International Standards are a set of rules that indicate good practice as reached through consensus by world experts. The 2018 Afghan budget used the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) system for financial statements. The GFS was developed by the International Monetary Fund in conjunction with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), European Union and United Nations) and sets the standards on how government revenue, spending, assets and liabilities are classified and reported. This is primarily to help ensure that GDP figures across countries are comparable through the linked standard for the System of National Accounts.

The budget was also informed by certain Public Expenditure Financial and Accountability (PEFA) performance indicators like medium term budgeting, classification standards, and disclosures. PEFA is the standard used most often around the world and basically grades every component of a government’s public finance system between D (bad) and A (good).

(2) Afghanistan, said the World Bank in 2016, “is unique worldwide in its extraordinary dependence on foreign aid.” It quoted a 2013 figure of aid amounting to 45 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The dependence on foreign aid has declined and the government’s own generated revenues have increased, but Afghanistan is still far ahead of other countries when it comes to aid financing government services and to its percentage of GDP.

(3) An earlier reduction in aid – from record highs – was seen as the US ‘civilian surge’ finished. American aid funds channelled through USAID alone shrank from 4.5 to 1.8 billion dollars between 2010 and 2012 (see here).

(4) This approach has been criticised in other contexts, when for example, the drive to spend funds at the end of the financial year so as not to lose out on matched funds the following year leads to inappropriate spending and waste. For the moment, that is the lesser risk in Afghanistan.

(5) ‘Pork-barrelling’ is also familiar in other countries, including the United States.

(6) It looks like details of these can be found in a table “Sub Projects Details of Development Projects: Details of Projects (1396 and 1397)” at the end of the approved budget. However, it is not entirely clear.

(7) Any road project that had already been contracted for reappeared in the approved budget. However, if the contracts were for only a section of the planned road, that was all that was reinstated.

(8) Hakimi told MPs that, while 80 per cent of development projects from fiscal years 1395 and 1396 had been included in the amended 2018 budget, the remaining 20 per cent that had not been reinstated – rural road building projects whose design and procurement processes had not been completed – would be included later in the budget of the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development after discussion with the World Bank. (The World Bank told AAN they did not know what this referred to.) Hakimi was deploying something of a sleight of hand. The contracted road-building projects did amount to 80 per cent, in terms of numbers, of the MPs’ projects. In terms of cost, though, they added up to only 20 per cent of the supposed expenditure.

(9) The Ministry of Finance had presented parliament with an almost balanced budget in November 2017 (the small deficit was financed from cash balances and some minor concessional borrowing).

 

 

 

 

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Iranian Fadjr 3 Artillery Rocket System

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For the first time ever, the EU COSME Programme is awarding grants to clusters partnering in the defence and security sector.

Two transnational defence-related cluster partnerships, whose members have been working with EDA, informed the Agency that they have started negotiation of a grant agreement in view of being awarded COSME funding under a European Commission’s call for proposals, managed by the Executive Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (EASME):

• the “ALLIANCE” (Alliance for International Business Development of Advanced Materials and CoNnectivity for DefenCe and SEcurity Market), whose strategic and technical director is the French defence-related cluster SAFE and is coordinated by the TECHTERA (French Cluster on advanced materials and composites). Other partners are OTIR 2020 (Italian Cluster on technical textiles), CITTA STUDI (Italian Cluster on technical textiles), NIDV (Netherlands Cluster on Defense and Security), SIIT (Italian Cluster on Defense and Security), SCS (French Cluster on ICT and Cyber Security);
• the “EU KETS4DUAL-USE” (EUropean Key Enabling Technologies for Dual-Use worldwide), led by OPTITEC, French photonics & imaging cluster active in the defence sector, partnering with the Estonian Defence Industry Association, CenSec (Denmark) and Minalogic (France).

The European Defence Agency (EDA) has played a precursor and facilitating role:

• in 2016, an EDA preliminary study explored the potential of the EU COSME Programme for defence and was the first to make a clear case for defence-related clusters’ eligibility under this EU funding programme;
• since its start, this study has involved a number of clusters, included the two winning consortia, and showcased their participation on EDA’s “COSME platform”;
• the Commission’s call for proposals makes explicit reference to EDA in order to identify eligible defence clusters;
• EDA organised two matchmaking events addressing this funding opportunity in 2017; several members of the above-mentioned consortia have attended;
• EDA’s recently released “European Funding Gateway” lists COSME grants as opportunities for the defence sector.

 

For more information:

• European Funding Gateway for Defence
• COSME platform
• Industry portal

 

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Registration for the upcoming Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) Info & Brokerage Day 2018, scheduled to take place in Brussels on 12 April 2018, is now open HERE.  

Representatives from industry, research entities and other defence stakeholders interested in receiving detailed information related to the recently published 2018 PADR calls for proposals, and in networking with potential consortia partners have until 5 April 2018 (5pm Brussels time) to register.

EDA and Commission experts will provide attendants with first-hand explanations on the 2018 PADR topics as well as the rules and conditions for participation in the calls for proposals. Furthermore, in the afternoon, a brokerage session with b2b meetings will allow participants to exchange views with potential future consortia partners.

Details about the calls and participation conditions can be found here.

The Preparatory Action on Defence Research is funded by the European Union.

 

More information:

• 2018 Calls for proposals on Preparatory Action on Defence Research published - Info & Brokerage Day on 12 April (EDA webnews, 15 March 2018)
• Preparatory Action on Defence Research (EDA project page)
• PADR Info & Brokerage Day (EDA event page)
• European Commission financial decision on PADR 2018 

 

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Russian Fagot Anti-Tank Guided Missile

Canadian LAV 700 Armored Personnel Carrier

After a cold winter, spring has finally arrived. By 1 Hamal 1397, in every corner of Kabul city, greenhouses are being reopened with a variety of trees and flowers on sale. AAN team would link to wish all our readers and friends a blessed and peaceful year. We wanted to brighten up your day (further) with some beautiful photos of flowers and greenery in Kabul city.

Read about Nawruz dishes, spring-themed poetry and arguments for and against the ‘lawfulness’ of Nawruz in Islam here.

(Pashto)

نوی کال مو مبارک شه

دافغانستان د تحلیلګرانو شبکه ټولو هیوادوالو ته د نوی ۱۳۹۷ لمریز کال مبارکی وايی او هیله لری چي دا کال به په هیواد کی د سولي او د ملت د هوساینی کال وي.

(Dari)

سال نو تان مبارک

شبکه تحلیلگران افغانستان سال نو ۱۳۹۷ خورشیدی را به تمامی هموطنان تبریک و تهنیت عرض نموده و سال صلح و صفا برای افغانستان عزیز آرزو  میدارد.

The Afghanistan Analysts Network wishes happy New Year for all its Afghan readers, friends and colleagues. AAN team wishes 1397 a peaceful and a blessed year for all Afghans.

Wheat growing ready to be harvested to make samanak, a kind of sweetmeal cooked once a year to celebrate Nawruz. Some families sing this song, while stirring the mixture, usually cooked for all of a day or a night:

Samanak dar jush ma kapcha zanem

digaran dar khob ma dabcha zanem

samanak nazr-e bahar ast

samanak sal-e yak bar ast

dokhtarha gerdesh khatar ast

sal-e digar ya nassib

 

Samanak is boiling and we stir it with spoons

The others are sleeping, we make our ladles resound

Samanak is the offering of spring

Samanak comes once a year

The girls are sitting around it

One more year of good luck (1)

 

Springtime is also associated with flowers. We visited this greenhouse in Kabul which Nurullah had just re-opened. With winter ending and the soil warming up and hopefully well watered after rain and snow, it is the time for Kabulis, lucky enough to have gardens, to plant flowers and trees. Prices for plants range from 200 Afs to 5000 Afs (USD 3-70), depending on the type of flower. “I grew up with flowers,” he told AAN. “My father is a farmer and I learned how to plant flowers from him.” It is, he said, a lovely business, “These beautiful blossoms and colourful flowers give me energy.”

 

Some Kabulis also want to buy grass. Naser brings in turf from outside the city and sells it in the capital for 30 USD a truckload. “Hamal [the first month of the Afghan calendar, 21 March–20 April],” he said, “is the month when people buy grass for their gardens.”

 

Apparently, too, a seller of goldfish told us, at the beginning of the year, people refurbish their homes and some people “love to have goldfish in their homes.”

Whatever you are doing this Nawruz, we hope it is just the start of a happy and peaceful year.

 

(1) In 2014, we gave readers more details about this special Nawruz dish:

Samanak is made in a very special ceremony and lots of effort: ten to 15 days are required to prepare it. First, families buy some top-quality wheat (the amount depending on the size of the family) and clean it well. Then they soak it in water for a few days until it gradually germinates and white roots become visible. The wheat is taken out of the water, laid on a tray and then covered with a white, clean piece of cloth. The tray is placed in a room with normal temperature where nobody has access or can see it. One member of the family takes responsibility for watering it daily, and that person should be in a state of ritual purity when touching the wheat. It is believed that if an unclean hand touches it or if it is accessible to anyone else, it will become mildewed or spoiled.  

In ten to 15 days, the wheat grows sufficiently to produce thick white roots and above them green blades. Then all the women and girls of the household (sometimes men or boys too) and often some neighbours, gather round the tray containing the germinated wheat. Everyone makes a wish in their hearts and starts to cut the green blades with scissors. If the number of blades he or she cuts is odd, it is believed that person’s wish will come true that year.

The wheat sprouts are cut until only the roots remain. Then the roots are further cut in seven pieces and these are passed one by one through a mincer three times until they release all their water and totally dry up. Once again, the remnants of the wheat roots are soaked in water and pressed in the machine so that all of their ‘sweet water’ comes out. The roots, now dry, are set apart, but not thrown away with ordinary rubbish. The water produced by the roots is in turn put in a very big pot (in Dari, pots are listed according to their capacity as yaksira, dosira, etc. Sir is a measurement unit, usually of about seven kilogrammes).

 Then flour, depending on the amount of sweet water, is added to the pot and mixed well. A fireplace is prepared and the pot – in the old days, at least – put on a fire of wood, its contents stirred continuously with a long spoon. Samanak takes a long time to cook, usually a whole day or night. In the past, the night time was preferred so that the all-family task of stirring the samanak could be accompanied by singing and dancing throughout

 During the cooking of the samanak, everyone takes part in stirring and mixing until it is ready. Sometimes the dish can become so thick that people use a long wooden stick instead of a spoon to stir. While cooking, they add whole walnuts to give it a brown hue. When the colour is achieved and the samanak cooked to the consistency of a pudding, they take it off the fire and put pieces of charcoal on the pot’s lid for one or two hours. After this, the samanak is finally ready, and is distributed among all who participated in preparing it as well as to visiting neighbours, relatives and friends. Go get your bowls ready!

 

 

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Russian RPG-28 Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher

In early February 2018, US forces conducted airstrikes in Afghanistan’s north-eastern province of Badakhshan, supposedly targeting ‘support structures’ of the ‘East Turkistan Islamic Movement’ (ETIM), allegedly a group of Uyghur extremists hailing from China’s far west said to be focused on attacking the Chinese state. (1) United States Forces – Afghanistan claimed the strikes targeted direct cross-border threats to China and Tajikistan emanating from the ETIM in Badakhshan. AAN guest co-authors Ted Callahan (*) and Franz J. Marty (**) show that such US claims are questionable, as there is no evidence that the few Uyghur extremists in Badakhshan, about whom there is only scarce and ambiguous information, pose any direct cross-border threat.

Latest Airstrikes in Badakhshan

On 6 February 2018, US Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) command stated that “over the past 96 hours” air assets operating under its authority had conducted “a series of precision [air] strikes” in the north-eastern province of Badakhshan. While US airstrikes in Badakhshan were not unprecedented (2), the intensity of the latest airstrikes was unusual and USFOR-A touted them as a demonstration of the stepped-up US air campaign in Afghanistan and its expansion to the northern parts of the country. (3)

The authors were unable to determine how many airstrikes were conducted and what exactly they hit. USFOR-A as well as the Afghan Ministry of Defence declined to comment. (4) US Air Force Major General James B Hecker, Deputy Commander-Air for USFOR-A, confirmed that a US B-52 conducted three strikes on three separate targets in Badakhshan on 4 February 2018, all in the same sortie, without giving exact locations. (5) However, there were reports of additional US and Afghan airstrikes in Badakhshan around the end of January and beginning of February (see below).

USFOR-A vaguely referred to having targeted “Taliban fighting positions” and “Taliban training facilities” that allegedly also supported “operations conducted by ETIM in the border region with China and Tajikistan,” “ETIM training camps” and “support networks,” “defensive fighting positions that [USFOR-A] have previously witnessed the Taliban and ETIM to utilize,” “other fighting positions” and “stolen Afghan National Army vehicles that were in the process of being converted to vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.” (6) But Major General Hecker later backtracked on the claim that they had hit the ETIM, saying USFOR-A “didn’t actually strike ETIM terrorists when we were doing this. We were strictly striking the training camps that both the Taliban as well as the ETIM use.”

Information (albeit not definitively confirmed) from various sources, including on the ground in Badakhshan, indicated the following strikes, locations and targets:

• On 15 January, some reports claim Afghan Airforce A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft conducted airstrikes, hitting insurgent positions in Khostak, a reported safe haven for foreign fighters in Jurm district, as well as in the area of Dara Khol in Yamgan district;
• On the night of 30-31 January, USFOR-A allegedly hit a target in Bashand village, located in central Warduj, a district that has been under complete Taleban control since 1 October 2015 and reportedly also hosts a significant foreign fighter presence. “Foreign fighter positions” and a captured Humvee were mentioned as possible targets. Local sources reported that a mosque located close to the home of the Taleban’s deputy provincial shadow governor, Mawlawi Amanuddin, was damaged in the strike;
• On 4 February, a US B-52 hit a target in Hawasah-e Yakhshira (also known as Bazparan locally), located near Chakaran, the district centre of Warduj. According to some accounts, the target was a former Afghan National Army base. This was reportedly the airstrike shown in a video USFOR-A released;
• On 4 February, the same B-52 hit a second target in Abjin, also near Chakaran. According to some accounts, the target was a former Afghan Local Police base and was shown in another video USFOR-A released;
• On 4 February, the same B-52 hit a third target also in Warduj. Details remain unclear; Sar-e Pul-e Ab-e Jal and Zer-e Chenar Chakaran were reported as possible locations;
• On 4 February, but around 20 hours after the US B-52 strikes, the Afghan Air Force reportedly hit a target near Abjin, with some accounts indicating that this strike only damaged some barns and did not cause any casualties;
• On 4 February, the Afghan Air Force reportedly hit more targets in Ab-e Raghuk and Furghamiro, both in the district of Jurm neighbouring Warduj.

While several sources indicated that the strikes destroyed at least two Humvees and other military vehicles and materiel (see here), the same sources also indicated that they caused no or only a few casualties.

US officials, in their prepared remarks and when specifically asked, declined to offer casualty figures. Major General Dawlat Waziri, spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Defence, stated the airstrikes had killed six Uzbek nationals in Warduj. Major Nasratullah Jamshidi, Deputy Public Affairs Officer of the Afghan National Army’s 209th Corps also reported six fatalities, but referred to ‘Tajikistanis’. Asked about Uyghur casualties by the authors on 14 February 2018, Waziri explicitly said there were no reports of such casualties. Furthermore, no other source mentioned any Uyghur casualties.

All this raises questions about US allegations that Uyghur ETIM fighters are present in Badakhshan and that they pose a threat to neighbouring countries.

Presence of Uyghur Extremists in Badakhshan

Until 2014, most claims of foreign militant activity in northern Afghanistan referred to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which had a significant presence in the region during Taleban rule. There were few, if any, reports of Uyghur militancy in the north post-2001, though Uyghurs were sometimes mentioned as one ethnic group among many believed to have fighters in the IMU. A Reuters article from 2014, citing Taleban sources, claimed there were 250 Uyghurs in Nuristan and Kunar (the article made no reference to a Uyghur presence in any other Afghan province), in addition to another 400 in Pakistan. Speaking on background, an active-duty member of the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) with multiple deployments to Afghanistan, including in 2014, stated the number of Uyghurs in Afghanistan in 2014 was never more than 100 at any given time and often less as they frequently moved across the Afghan-Pakistani border to avoid US strikes.

With the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission due to conclude at the end of 2014, concerns appeared to increase among Afghanistan’s neighbours, including China, that foreign militants would take advantage of the expected security vacuum to move into Afghanistan and from there attempt to infiltrate into China or Central Asia. The Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, visited Kabul in early 2014 to discuss security cooperation and was assured by his Afghan counterpart that Afghanistan “would never allow the ETIM to take advantage of the Afghan territory to engage in activities endangering China.”

As far as the co-authors of this report could determine, the only subsequent concrete incident involving Uyghurs in Afghanistan was the extradition of 15 Uyghurs to China in February 2015. But these individuals were reportedly arrested in Kabul City and Kunar, not Badakhshan. Furthermore, alleged links of the extradited men to violent extremists remained vague at best and were, in one case, not even mentioned. (7)

In general, Badakhshan did not host any significant population of foreign fighters until the latter half of 2014 following the displacement of several hundred Central Asian militants from North Waziristan as a result of the Pakistani Army’s Zarb-e Azb Operation launched on 15 June 2014. According to one former high-ranking Taleban member in Badakhshan, in autumn of 2014 the Peshawar Shura issued orders for Taleban groups across the north to receive and settle between 200 and 500 militants, most of whom were non-Afghan Uzbeks and Tajiks, with smaller numbers of Kazakhs and Uyghurs. It is unclear how these militants reached Badakhshan. Some reportedly crossed from Pakistan directly into Badakhshan, despite the more than 600 kilometres separating North Waziristan from Chitral, which borders Badakhshan on the Pakistani side. According to the same JSOC source quoted above, they had been tracking the movement of other such fighters as they came across the border in other places. But those militants started to disperse, travelling mainly by road in small groups, assisted by smugglers experienced in getting through Afghan government checkpoints.

At present, Afghan sources in Badakhshan estimate that there are around 250 foreign fighters and 60 non-combatant family members of such fighters in the province, almost all of them in Warduj and Jurm districts, where the latest airstrikes took place (a handful are allegedly in the district of Raghistan; see also earlier AAN research here). Most of these foreign fighters are apparently from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, but Uyghurs are said to be among them. A former United Nations employee stated that, as of the end of 2016, between 50 and 100 Uyghur extremists were residing in Afghanistan or nearby Pakistani areas. Roughly 75 per cent of those Uyghurs were believed to be in Chitral or neighbouring Badakhshan. This source estimated that there are currently about 70 to 80 Uyghur fighters in Badakhshan itself (the rest of the tracked Uyghurs are reportedly the remaining extremists who were pushed out of Waziristan into Zabul in south-eastern Afghanistan, where many of them were killed in fighting with the Taleban in November 2015, according to the same source). (8)

Reliably identifying and tracking foreign fighters is virtually impossible though. Specific names obtained by sources on the ground could not be corroborated by the former UN employee. Although this might partly be due to constant changes of noms de guerre, the simplest explanation – that information is unreliable, if not incorrect – is also possible. Determining those fighters’ actual origins is equally difficult. For example, while a local source described one militant, Haji Furqan, as perhaps the most important Uyghur commander in Badakhshan, the former UN employee indicated that Furqan is originally from Kazakhstan (but possibly of ethnic Uyghur background).

No reliable information on ETIM

Although Afghan officials and local sources attributed the radicalisation of the insurgency (9) and the dramatic increase in successful insurgent attacks in Badakhshan in 2015 (particularly the capture of the district centres of Warduj on 1 October 2015 and Yamgan on 18 November 2015) to the presence of foreign fighters, there was never any specific mention of Uyghurs, let alone a separate Uyghur group such as the ETIM, being responsible for this shift. The former UN employee mentioned above asserted that whenever the Uyghurs in Badakhshan fight, they do so embedded in Taleban formations, not in exclusively Uyghur units. He also stated that the Uyghurs primarily serve as trainers for other insurgents and that, compared to the about 2,000 Taleban fighters in Badakhshan as estimated by local sources, Uyghur combat power is not a decisive factor on the battlefield.

Hence, allegations about the presence of a Uyghur extremist organisation in Badakhshan (whether ETIM or any other) are questionable. ETIM itself is shrouded in mystery. Though recognised as a terrorist organisation by some nations and organisations (including the US (10) and the United Nations), the situation is not as straightforward as this implies. In fact, the term ETIM is an external designation that was never used by the extremists themselves, who (at least originally) called themselves Shärqi Türkästan Islami Partisi (the East Turkistan Islamic Party or ETIP), which was later listed as an alias of ETIM by the United Nations). Some scholars also point out that reports portraying ETIM as a well-established Uyghur extremist group with links to other international terrorist organisations are dubious. They argue that such reports are based on biased Chinese government information, as there are indications that China deliberately designated any Uyghur opposition movements as ‘terrorist’ (11) and inflated alleged threats in order to garner international support – or at least acquiescence – to repress such groups and Uyghur dissent in general (see also endnote (1)). The US designation of ETIM was allegedly mainly based on the same questionable Chinese and similarly doubtful Central Asian intelligence (for more detail on scepticism about the ETIM, see here and here).

Other sources often cited as evidence of a militant Uyghur organisation are propaganda videos released by a group calling itself the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). According to the former UN employee, the name TIP was originally employed during Taleban rule as an umbrella designation encompassing various Central Asian Islamist movements, including the IMU in Afghanistan and Uyghurs organised under the banner of the ETIP. This incarnation of the TIP broke up during the initial phase of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan in November-December 2001. However, in 2006 some Uyghur groups using the name and logo of the TIP in their online messaging reappeared, which is why the current TIP is regarded as the successor of the ETIP.

Experts cautioned that it is often hard to substantiate where exactly these videos were filmed and whether they accurately depict actual ETIM/TIP capabilities. Furthermore, videos claiming responsibility for specific attacks inside Xinjiang (China) have often been contradicted by facts on the ground (see also here). However, the former UN employee cited above indicated that videos showing the training of fighters appeared genuine and to depict fighters who speak Uyghur Turkic. He added the footage, seemingly originating from Pakistan or Afghanistan, never showed more than two dozen fighters, which – as propaganda videos usually try to boast size and strength – corroborates the assessment that the number of such fighters in the region is relatively low.

Overall, the former UN employee acknowledged that the ETIM is rather a ‘legal’ umbrella term to refer to an array of Uyghur extremists who often and rapidly change the names of their groups.

Despite the terrorist designation, there has not been a single confirmed incident of an attack conducted or planned by the ETIM in or from Afghanistan. For example, while the “UN Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities” (hereafter the UN Sanctions Committee) alleged that ETIM used bases in Afghanistan to launch attacks in China in May 1998 as well as February, March and May 1999, these claims were described as “impossible to confirm through other sources” and as dubious. (12) Perhaps tellingly, the summary of the UN Sanction Committee’s reasons for listing the ETIM as a terrorist group include only one unspecific reference to Afghanistan. Similarly, in the aftermath of their latest airstrikes in Badakhshan, USFOR-A cited only one concrete example: the extradition of just two alleged ETIM members from Kyrgyzstan to China in May 2002 who were accused of plotting to attack the US embassy in Kyrgyzstan; the case had no visible link to Afghanistan. USFOR-A declined to clarify how the attack in Kyrgyzstan was related to their claim that ETIM militants “enjoy support from the Taliban in Badakhshan and throughout the border region.” (13)

Researcher Sean Roberts has also corroborated the apparent lack of substantiated ETIM/TIP activity inside Afghanistan. He compiled a comprehensive list of 45 alleged Uyghur terrorist attacks conducted between 1990 and 2011, none of which had any visible Afghan connection. Additional research by Raffaello Pantucci and Edward Schwarck argued that prior to 2013 and the documented Uyghur involvement in the Syrian civil war, hardly any Uyghur terrorist activity could be confirmed worldwide, and none with a significant link to Afghanistan.

The former UN employee confirmed that ETIM has been fixated on Syria in recent years and most Uyghurs who went to Syria left China for Southeast Asia (where counterfeit identification documents are easier to get) and then travelled via Turkey into Syria. A much smaller number of Uyghurs reportedly left China via the Central Asian states or Pakistan. Despite the changes in Uyghur militancy, mainly driven by the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, there has been no corresponding rise in the number of Uyghur militants in Afghanistan. Nor has there been any evidence of Uyghur militants moving from the Middle East to Afghanistan following the recent ‘defeat’ of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

There is also no credible evidence that Uyghur extremists use Badakhshan as a training ground or a base to plan attacks. In March 2018, the TIP’s media branch, Islam Awazi, posted two videos, one dated December 2017 and the other dated February 2018, (14) showing Uyghurs, along with Afghan insurgents, involved in combat against Afghan forces. Much of the footage does appear to have been filmed in different parts of northern Afghanistan. The authors were able to confirm through local sources in Badakhshan that some segments show combat in Jurm and Warduj districts, and that one of the fighters pictured in the films is the reported Uyghur commander mentioned earlier, Haji Furqan. As in general with such videos, the exact source is unclear and it is difficult to say whether or to what extent it shows actual Uyghur/TIP capabilities and operations; in some sections, the fighting almost appears staged. Compared to TIP videos archived by the SITE Intelligence Group, this video appears to be the first TIP footage from Afghanistan or Pakistan since 2014, which corroborates the assessment that violent jihadist Uyghur activity remains focused on Syria, not Afghanistan. In this regard, it is also noteworthy that the topography and vegetation visible in almost all of the previous TIP propaganda videos from the region strongly suggests they were filmed in the Pakistani tribal areas or in the Afghan provinces of Kunar or Nuristan, not Badakhshan. Furthermore, well-placed sources requesting anonymity asserted there have been no signs of increased activity among Uyghur fighters in Badakhshan during the past two years, suggesting they use the area mainly as a safe haven rather than as a facilitation zone.

No cross-border threats

USFOR-A further claimed that the recent US airstrikes prevented “the planning and rehearsal of terrorist acts near the border with China and Tajikistan” and targeted “the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a terrorist organization operating near the border with China and Tajikistan.” However, there are no past or on-going insurgent or terrorist activities anywhere near the Afghan–Chinese border. The same is true for the immediate vicinity of the Afghan–Tajik border in Badakhshan (the closest the insurgents have got to the Tajik border in Badakhshan was an unsuccessful attempt to advance on the border village of Eshkashem at the beginning of May 2017). The Taleban, who are themselves accused of hosting transnational terrorist groups such as the ETIM, have reassured neighbouring countries on numerous occasions that their goals are limited to Afghanistan and that they will not allow Afghanistan to be used for cross-border attacks (see for example here). However, these claims have not mollified neighbours such as Tajikistan and China.

The short 76 kilometre Afghan–Chinese border runs along an almost impassable mountain range with peaks at 5,698 metres above sea level and is crossable only via two rarely-travelled mountain passes: the Tegermansu, 4,872 metres above sea level, and the Wakhjir, 4,927 metres above sea level, both of which are simple footpaths (the latter crosses a glacier). The border is located at the end of a sparsely populated area known as the Wakhan Corridor (the panhandle of Afghan territory wedged in between Tajikistan to the north and Pakistan to the south, abutting China to the east). The seasonal camps of approximately 600 semi-nomadic Kyrgyz living in the Little Pamir, a high-altitude valley at the end of the Wakhan, are usually a day’s walk or ride from the uninhabited border zone (there are no roads).

Aside from the remoteness and daunting physical geography of the Little Pamir, additional factors would make any attempt to cross into Xinjiang exceedingly difficult for Afghanistan-based insurgents. The only way east through the narrow Wakhan runs through or past dozens of villages inhabited by the Ismaili Wakhi, followers of the Aga Khan who are unlikely to be sympathetic toward Sunni militants. There are also at least three checkpoints manned by the Afghan Border Police. From the end of the only drivable road in the Wakhan, travellers would then have to start a four-day, 100-kilometre trek to the nearest cross-border pass, the Wakhjir, traversing areas patrolled by more border police and local Kyrgyz acting as a frontier constabulary. Finally, Chinese forces closely monitor their side of the border, where they have a nearby military base. They too employ the resident (Chinese) Kyrgyz to keep informal watch over the area, as one European discovered in 2007 when he and his Afghan guide were swiftly arrested by the Chinese after having strayed across the border – possibly the first foreigner to cross it since the British explorer Bill (HW) Tilman in 1947. (15)

In aggregate, these factors explain why there have not been any reports of any insurgent activity in the Wakhan Corridor and along the remote and inaccessible Afghan-Chinese border. The few security incidents that do occur are typically related to drug trafficking and criminality, and happen in the villages along the road, not the seasonal camps near the border. This further strains the credibility of USFOR-A’s claims that the insurgents targeted in the latest airstrikes in Badakhshan had any connection with the AfghanChinese border given that Bashand, the location of the airstrikes closest to the Afghan–Chinese border, is about 300 kilometres away in a straight line.

In contrast to the short Afghan–Chinese border, the 1,357 km Afghan–Tajik border (about 820 km of which is in Badakhshan) is Afghanistan’s second-longest international border after its border with Pakistan. Demarcated by the Panj River rather than a mountain range, the border has two characteristics making it an unlikely thoroughfare for insurgents. First, there is very little infrastructure on the Afghan side, making much of the border in Badakhshan logistically difficult to reach.

Second, like the Wakhan Corridor, the Afghan-Tajik border in Badakhshan is mainly inhabited by Ismailis, whose presence on both sides of the border acts as a sort of cordon sanitaire. Reinforced by the Tajik border police, who patrol most of the border, these Ismaili communities are alert to the presence of any outsiders. Though security on the Afghan side varies because of limited security capacity, difficult topography and a lack of infrastructure, the Tajik side is comparatively well monitored, as they have maintained the Soviet practice of vigilant policing and are especially suspicious of Afghans, mainly due to concerns about narcotics trafficking.

As a result, the few security incidents that occur usually involve clashes with armed smugglers, producing occasional casualties (see latest example from February 2018). However, such incidents pose a criminal – but not a terrorist – cross-border threat, and in any case would have been unaffected by the USFOR-A strikes. Various NGOs and a knowledgeable local source (previously a senior official in the Afghan Border Police) confirmed the absence of insurgent activity along the border. In the border districts of Afghan Badakhshan, such as Raghistan, insurgent presence and activity is limited to the mountainous central regions and not the riverine border areas.

Real, but exaggerated consequences of misperceived cross-border threats

Despite the absence of credible cross-border terrorist threats to neighbouring countries in northern Afghanistan, the official narrative of insecurity espoused by the Afghan government and its neighbours is often paranoid, credulous and replete with greatly exaggerated figures of active insurgents. Such narratives, typically involving a massive insurgent presence in border provinces such as Badakhshan, are often put forth by China and Russia with the apparent collusion of Afghan officials who are regularly quick to hype any supposedly destabilising threat posed by foreign militants. Afghan motives are not difficult to understand: the graver the perceived threat, the more funding they are likely to receive to address it. (16) But why neighbouring countries have come to accept the idea of a serious terrorism threat from Badakhshan is more puzzling.

For example, considerable media attention has focused on increasing Chinese involvement in Badakhshan. Despite official denials from both the Afghan and the Chinese side, there is evidence (including photographs) showing that Chinese forces were – at least during 2016 – conducting joint border patrols with Afghan forces in the Little Pamir. While such patrols were reportedly suspended in late 2016 after they became public, another article indicated that they resumed in 2017. Given the steadfast official denials, the circumstances that led to such joint border patrols remain unclear, but they were likely caused by unwarranted Chinese concerns about illegal border crossings and at least initially were based on informal arrangements between provincial-level officials.

Whatever the nature of this Sino-Afghan cooperation, Chinese patrols in the Wakhan have had no impact on security, according to local Kyrgyz sources. They have mainly been useful in coordinating efforts among Afghan, Chinese and Tajik forces (as the joint patrols include vehicles, they have to enter the Little Pamir via an old Soviet-era track coming from Tajikistan, as the Little Pamir can only be reached on foot or on horseback from the Afghan and Chinese sides; hence, some accounts assert that the patrols also include Tajik forces). However, different sources contradict each other as to whether these patrols are based on an existing border cooperation agreement; as the alleged agreement is not publicly available, this cannot be independently verified.

More recently, there have been reports about the construction of a Chinese-financed Afghan military base inside Badakhshan (which has sometimes been incorrectly portrayed as a Chinese base). As with the joint border patrols, these reports were denied by both Afghan and Chinese officials. However, there is a proposal for a Chinese-financed Afghan National Army mountain brigade that would also include a base. Unlike the joint border patrols, this proposal has not gone beyond the discussion phase and neither the location for a base nor the schedule for its construction have been agreed. This was explicitly confirmed by Major General Waziri, the spokesman of the Afghan Ministry of Defence, in an interview with one of the authors on 14 February 2018, as well as other sources. Hence, reports that “preparations for the construction of [such] a military base (…) have already begun” or that the base would be located in the Wakhan are incorrect, probably as a result of misunderstanding, misquoting poorly formulated official statements or unfounded assumptions. (17)

The idea of a Chinese-financed Afghan National Army mountain brigade in Badakhshan dates back to at least February 2017. According to several sources, there has been no visible progress on this front since then, which casts serious doubt over the plan’s viability. Although China’s supposed willingness to finance an Afghan mountain brigade is a clear indication of how concerned they are about purported cross-border threats, the amount of media attention the issue received misleadingly suggested something along the lines of an international Chinese base akin to the one in Djibouti, rather than mere funding for a base that would be manned by Afghan – not Chinese – soldiers.

Tajikistan, which, given its longer border with Afghanistan, is more vulnerable than China, sometimes expresses its concerns about deteriorating security (see for example here) and on several occasions has closed its official border crossings to Afghanistan. (18) However, such reactions usually have no broader impact, though they can cause serious problems for Afghans in the sparsely-populated border districts who depend on trade with Tajikistan. One explanation may be that Tajik reactions, unlike those of the Chinese, do not garner major headlines or have much effect upon external funding (19). But Tajikistan, though concerned about alleged Tajik extremists in Afghan Badakhshan, appears to assess unlikely cross-border threats more soberly and realistically than either Russia or China.

Conclusion

The impression given by USFOR-A press releases of airstrikes targeting a Uyghur terror organisation threatening to launch cross-border attacks from Badakhshan does not accord with reality and amounts to tilting at windmills. There is no indication that the latest airstrikes wounded or killed any Uyghurs. Furthermore, information about the few Uyghur extremists in Badakhshan, as well as whether they have any affiliation with either the ETIM, TIP or any other group, is scarce and ambiguous. But even if there is some organisational affiliation, given the near-impossibility of any insurgents making their way across the border into China and the absence of insurgent activity along the Afghan–Tajik border in Badakhshan, it is hard to take seriously any claims that they pose a credible cross-border threat.

Why USFOR-A nonetheless chose to adopt the narrative of striking ETIM remains unclear. In an e-mail from the Resolute Support Press Desk to co-author Franz J Marty, dated 13 February 2018, USFOR-A declined to comment. Several diplomatic sources in Kabul mused that it might have been to demonstrate that the US is addressing (empty) concerns of a spill-over from Afghan Badakhshan into western China and Tajikistan to pre-empt any possible Chinese or Russian meddling in Afghanistan. Or it might has been some quid pro quo move to gain Chinese or Russian support in other theatres. More cynically, it may simply have been an attempt to justify striking Taleban targets in a remote area few Americans have ever heard of (and where no US or NATO troops are deployed) by tying it into a narrative of transnational counterterrorism efforts.

Despite USFOR-A describing the latest operations as an expansion of their air campaign to Badakhshan and the north, there have been no reports about further airstrikes in Badakhshan. It therefore remains to be seen whether the latest US airstrikes were an anomaly or indeed the start of a broader campaign across the north.

 

* Dr Ted Callahan is an anthropologist and a Donald R Beall Fellow in the Defense Analysis department at the Naval Postgraduate School. He has travelled extensively in the Tajik, Chinese and Afghan Pamirs, including nearly two years spent living in the Wakhan Corridor carrying out his PhD research. From 2014-17, he was based in Faizabad, Badakhshan as a risk management advisor to the German government.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

** Franz J Marty is a freelance journalist based in Kabul, Afghanistan, and focuses on security and military issues. He has visited Badakhshan (on the Afghan and Tajik sides) several times, including a one-month stay in the Wakhan Corridor. He can be followed @franzjmarty on twitter.

 

Edited by Thomas Ruttig and Sari Kouvo

 

(1) Uyghurs claim to be the original inhabitants of what is today the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in the far west of China, which is sometimes referred to as East Turkistan. Uyghurs, speaking a Turkic language and being predominantly Sunni Muslims, are linguistically, ethnically and culturally distinct from the Han Chinese, the largest of China’s 56 officially recognized ethnic groups (minzu, 民族). The fears of Han Chinese domination, combined with the strictures imposed by the Chinese state, have bred resentment and sometimes violence in Uyghur communities. However, labelling all such violent acts ‘terrorist’ would be an oversimplification, as researchers note that many violent incidents appear “to be spontaneous acts of frustration with authorities, rather than premeditated, politically motivated violence [ie terrorism].” The same researchers also state that disaffected Uyghurs inside Xinjiang and Uyghur jihadists who have left their homeland seem to be distinct groups. This dispatch solely focuses on Uyghur extremists in Afghan Badakhshan and not on Uyghur extremism in other places.

(2) According to one unpublished report, there were only two US airstrikes in Badakhshan during the whole of 2017, but already at least three such strikes alone as of early February 2018. There have also not been many Afghan Air Force strikes in Badakhshan in the past, with the mentioned report only indicating three such strikes during the whole of 2017.

(3) The mentioned communiqué released by USFOR-A stated that “[d]uring these strikes, a U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress dropped 24 precision guided munitions on Taliban fighting positions, setting a record of the most guided munitions ever dropped from a B-52. The aircraft has played a leading role in Air Force operations for decades, and was recently reconfigured with a conventional rotary launcher to increase its reach and lethality.” USFOR-A have significantly increased their air campaign in Afghanistan in the wake of the new US South Asia strategy that was announced in August 2017 (see here).

(4) E-mail reply from Resolute Support Press Desk to co-author Franz J Marty, dated 13 February 2018; Interview with Major General Dawlat Waziri, spokesman of the Afghan Ministry of Defence, conducted by co-author Franz J Marty on 14 February 2018.

(5) The US B-52 Stratofortresses are stationed at Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

(6) USFOR-A press releases dated 6 February 2018 and 8 February 2018; e-mail reply from Resolute Support Press Desk to co-author Franz J Marty, dated 13 February 2018.

(7) Al Jazeera quoted sources as describing one of the extradited men, Israel Ahmet, as a honest businessman. An official of the National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan’s intelligence service, reportedly said that Ahmet “was detained for lacking legal documentation and carrying counterfeit money.” Elsewhere the article states that Ahmet was “flagged as a spy,” though there is no information given that would link him to violent extremist.

(8) The majority of the Central Asian militants displaced from North Waziristan to south-eastern Afghanistan had reportedly joined Mullah Dadullah and the self-declared Islamic State (Daesh) in Zabul province, where most of them were swiftly crushed in fighting with the Taleban in November 2015 (for the fighting in general see here and AAN analysis here and for further information paragraphs 33 and 34 of the Seventh Report of the [UN] Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, dated 5 October 2016, found here).

(9) In one incident in April 2015, insurgents reportedly beheaded at least 28 members of Afghan government forces after they had been taken prisoner (see here).

(10) On 3 September 2002, the US State Department added the ETIM to the list of “foreign individuals and entities that commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism” and whose “financial support network” can therefore be targeted under Executive Order 13224. The ETIM is not designated by the US as a Foreign Terrorist Organizations; ie it is designated as a terrorist organisation that is subject to sanctions, which are, however, less strict than sanctions against Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

(11) In fact, after the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, when China began to push for the designation of the ETIM as a terrorist organisation, it indicated an amalgamate of over 40 “Eastern Turkistan” organisations that “have engaged themselves in terrorist violence to varying degrees, both overtly and covertly,” but the same Chinese report mentions that only eight of them (one of which is ETIM) “openly advocate violence in their political platforms.”

(12) These examples all pre-date the US-led intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and would have little, if any impact on the current situation. In this regard, allegations that ETIM militants had fought alongside al-Qaida and the Taleban during the initial phase of the US-led intervention in 2001 are ambiguous (see here and here).

(13) E-mail reply from Resolute Support Press Desk to co-author Franz J Marty, 13 February 2018.

(14) The mentioned videos were obtained by the co-authors; they are no longer online.

(15) See HW Tilman, “Two Mountains and a River”, Cambridge University Press, 1949. Tilman was also arrested as a ‘spy’.

(16) For example, a New York Times article from late 2014 noted that, given Chinese security concerns, “the Afghans have sensed an opportunity to secure a new, rich benefactor.” And indeed in October 2014 Afghan President Ashraf Ghani returned from China on his first official trip abroad as president with a pledge of 330 million US dollars in aid to the end of 2017 (in the previous 13 years, China had given a total of 250 million US dollars in aid to Afghanistan).

(17) For example, an AFP report stating that the alleged base will be built in the Wakhan does not give any specific source for this location but seems to speculate that because of the joint patrols and the temporary presence of Chinese patrol troops in the Wakhan, a ‘Chinese’ base will also be constructed there. Even if a Chinese-financed base should actually be constructed (which is, as explained in the main text, uncertain), it is unlikely that it will be in the Wakhan, as Major General Waziri and other sources confirmed that the base would be for a unit of the Afghan National Army (which has no presence in the Wakhan) and not the Afghan Border Police (which has a small presence in the Wakhan). Other unconfirmed reports suggested Zebak district, among others, as a possible location.

(18) For example, at the end of December 2017/beginning of January 2018, Tajikistan (at least partially) closed its main border crossing in Panj-e Poyon (in the Tajiki province of Khatlon) with Sher Khan Bandar (Afghanistan, province of Kunduz) (see here for the closure; and here for the re-opening) (it could not be determined, whether the closure also included other Afghan-Tajik border crossings). In general, Tajik border closings sometimes appear rather random with unclear or questionable reasons.

(19) Tajikistan is considered the poorest of the former Soviet Republics. As an example of its reliance on outside funding in security matters, reports from September 2016 indicated that China financed the construction of new border guard bases and outposts.

Belarusian MZKT-79291 Special Wheeled Chassis

Russian ZiL-135 Special Wheeled Chassis

The European Defence Agency (EDA) today, 15 March, published the three 2018 calls for proposals for the EU’s Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR).

The work programme includes 3 topics:

• European high-performance, trustable (re)configurable system-on-a-chip or system-in-package components for defence applications;
• European high power laser effector;
• Strategic technology foresight, tackling the issue of the critical defence technological dependencies for the EU.

Details about the calls and participation conditions can be found here. 

The Preparatory Action on Defence Research is funded by the European Union. On 9 March 2018, the European Commission adopted the decision on the “work programme for 2018 and on the financing of the 'Preparatory action on Defence research', and authorising the use of unit costs under the preparatory action ”.

 
Info & Brokerage Day on 12 April

After a first successful edition in 2017, EDA and the European Commission will organise a second Information Day & Brokerage Event on the PADR on 12 April 2018 in Brussels. 

Registration will be possible via this webpage as of 21 March 2018.

The event aims at providing industry, research entities and other interested defence stakeholders with first-hand information on the 2018 PADR calls for proposals published on 15 March 2018.

EDA and Commission experts will provide attendants with detailed explanations on the 2018 PADR topics as well as the rules and conditions for participation in the calls for proposals. Furthermore, in the afternoon, a brokerage session with b2b meetings will allow participants to exchange views with potential future consortia partners. 

 

More information: 

• Preparatory Action on Defence Research (EDA project page)
• PADR Info & Brokerage Day (EDA event page)
• European Commission financial decision on PADR 2018 

 

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP