Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Briefing Paper

Bonn, 1. September 2025. Deutschland und die Europäische Union verfolgen ehrgeizige Strategien zur Dekarbonisierung ihrer Gesellschaften, mit Wasserstoff als Energieträger und Rohstoff für industrielle Prozesse. Im Einklang mit den Klimazielen muss der verwendete Wasserstoff in kohlenstoffarmen Verfahren hergestellt werden. Idealerweise ist dies grüner Wasserstoff, der durch Elektrolyse unter ausschließlicher Verwendung erneuerbarer Energien gewonnen wird. In dem lange vorherrschenden optimistischen Diskurs wäre die globale Versorgung mit Energieträgern künftig nicht mehr an die vorhandenen Öl-, Gas- oder Kohlevorkommen gebunden. Vielmehr könnte Wasserstoff überall dort hergestellt werden, wo ein gutes Potenzial für Wind-, Solar- oder Geothermie besteht. Dies würde neue Möglichkeiten für Länder mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen eröffnen. Die in den Strategien festgelegten Ziele sind sehr ehrgeizig. In der Wasserstoffstrategie von 2023 rechnet Deutschland für 2030 mit einer Elektrolyseurkapazität von 10 GW. Da dies nicht ausreichen würde, um die erforderlichen Mengen an H2 zu produzieren, könnten Importe 50 % bis 70 % des gesamten Wasserstoffbedarfs decken.

Fünf Jahre nach Veröffentlichung der Wasserstoffstrategien ist die Euphorie der Enttäuschung gewichen. In Deutschland waren bis zum ersten Quartal 2025 nur 170 MW Elektrolysekapazität installiert worden, und das Ziel von 10 GW bis 2030 gilt als nicht mehr erreichbar. Aus internationaler Sicht ist die Lage nicht besser. Laut der Internationalen Energieagentur haben derzeit nur etwa 7 % aller weltweiten Wasserstoffprojekte eine endgültige Investitionsentscheidung durchlaufen und werden daher wahrscheinlich umgesetzt.

In den letzten Monaten gab es zahlreiche Berichte über gestrichene H2-Projekte. Dies betrifft alle Elemente der Lieferkette: Im Juli 2025 stoppte das spanische Energieunternehmen REPSOL ein 200-MW-Projekt in einer Raffinerie in Puertollano, eines der größten geplanten H2-Projekte in Europa. Monate zuvor hatten Equinor (Norwegen) und RWE (Deutschland) ihre gemeinsamen Pläne für eine Wasserstoffpipeline durch die Nordsee annulliert. Diese Pipeline hätte eine zuverlässige Versorgung von Industriekunden in Deutschland und Europa mit Wasserstoff ermöglicht. Kürzlich lehnte der zweitgrößte Stahlproduzent der Welt, ArcelorMittal, ein Angebot der deutschen Regierung ab, mehr als eine Milliarde Euro an Subventionen für die Dekarbonisierung von zwei Stahlwerken zu beziehen. Das Unternehmen sieht die langfristige Versorgung mit Wasserstoff als unsicher an und befürchtet, dass grüne Technologien ihm einen Wettbewerbsnachteil gegenüber internationalen Konkurrenten verschaffen könnten.

Es gibt viele Gründe für die strukturelle Krise beim Ausbau der Wasserstoffwirtschaft. Besorgniserregend ist, dass die beteiligten Unternehmen nicht nur weiche Faktoren (wie unklare Vorschriften) anführen, die bei entsprechenden politischen Willen schnell überwunden werden könnten. Vielmehr argumentieren sie mit den wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen der H2-Wertschöpfungsketten: Wasserstoff ist nach wie vor deutlich teurer als fossile Brennstoffe wie Erdgas. Potenzielle Kunden sind nicht bereit oder in der Lage, für Wasserstoff deutlich höhere Preise zu zahlen als für weniger klimafreundliche Alternativen. Darüber hinaus sind mehrere Elemente der Wasserstoffversorgungsketten technologisch noch nicht ausgereift, wie beispielsweise das Cracken von Ammoniak, um den Transport von H2 in Form eines besser geeigneten Derivats zu ermöglichen.

Trotz all dieser Schwierigkeiten gehen wir davon aus, dass H2 eine Zukunft hat und sich ein Wasserstoffmarkt entwickeln wird, sobald die Umsetzungslücke überwunden werden kann. Die meisten Länder fühlen sich an ihre Klimaschutzverpflichtungen gebunden, und einige Sektoren können ohne Wasserstoff als Energieträger oder Rohstoff kaum dekarbonisiert werden. Darüber hinaus wird die angewandte technische Forschung fortgesetzt, mit dem Potenzial, den Wasserstoffausbau wieder auf die Tagesordnung zu setzen.

Wie sollten Länder mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen und die internationale Zusammenarbeit auf den aktuellen „Wasserstoff-Limbo“ reagieren? Eine abwartende Haltung würde unnötig Zeit kosten. Sinnvoll ist, die Umsetzung von H2-Projekten fortzusetzen und sich dabei auf H2-basierte Lösungen für Herausforderungen der nachhaltigen Entwicklung zu konzentrieren. Zwei Beispiele: 1) Wasserstoff kann zur Dekarbonisierung der Düngemittelindustrie beitragen. Eine dezentrale Düngemittelproduktion auf Basis von emissionsarmem Wasserstoff kann die Ernährungssicherheit in Afrika unterstützen, Treibhausgasemissionen reduzieren und zur Weiterentwicklung der Wasserstofftechnologien beitragen. 2) Als Alternative zur Elektrolyse kann Wasserstoff aus Abwasser gewonnen werden, z. B. durch Fermentation. Dadurch können Umweltbelastungen (z. B. die Eutrophierung von Gewässern) und Gesundheitsrisiken im Zusammenhang mit städtischen Abwässern verringert werden.

Werden verschiedene Entwicklungsziele gleichzeitig verfolgt, verlieren die Kostenunterschiede zwischen Wasserstoff und konventionellen Technologien an Bedeutung. Die skizzierten alternativen Technologien sollten in Forschungspartnerschaften mit dem Globalen Süden entwickelt werden; als wichtiger Bestandteil einer multilateralen Wasserstoffstrategie zur Bewältigung globaler Herausforderungen.

Die Unterstützung des Wiederaufbaus in der Ukraine hat sich seit dem Frühjahr 2022 als wichtiges Element der deutschen Ukraine-Politik herausgebildet. Aufseiten der Bundesregierung hat die Unterstützung des Wiederaufbaus – auch als wesentlicher Teil der zivilen Kriegsunterstützung für das Land – eine hohe Priorität, insbesondere für das in vielen Aspekten federführend tätige BMZ. Gleichzeitig geht das deutsche Engagement für den Wiederaufbau in der Ukraine weit über die Unterstützung durch die Bundesregierung hinaus. Von zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen hin zu Städten und Gemeinden gibt es eine große Solidarität mit der ukrainischen Gesellschaft und ihrem unbändigen Willen, das Land gegen die russische Aggression zu verteidigen und schnellstmöglich wieder aufzubauen. Vom weiteren Verlauf des Krieges wird abhängen, wie sich der Wiederaufbau und damit auch seine Unterstützung von Partnern wie Deutschland zukünftig gestalten wird. Unabhängig von den nächsten Kriegsmonaten ist jedoch bereits jetzt klar, dass der Wiederaufbau der Ukraine langfristige internationale Unterstützung über mehrere Jahre erfordern wird. Der Beitrag zeichnet die bisherigen Debatten und Weichenstellungen zum Wiederaufbau der Ukraine systematisch nach und untersucht, wie Deutschland und die Europäische Union den Wiederaufbau bisher unterstützt haben. In einer Bewertung dieses Engagements wird auch ein Blick auf die Herausforderungen und möglichen Grenzen des deutschen und internationalen Engagements geworfen.

Why do business allies (not) defect from authoritarian regimes? An emerging scholarship shows that connected businesses face high political risk, and the autocrat can financially pressure business allies during economic crises. And yet, despite their disruptive power, the business elite rarely switch to opposition. I argue that this unexpected loyalty does not always stem from credible power-sharing. The more material quid pro quo the business elite engage in with the dictator, the less they can credibly threaten the dictator with defection. I present a bargaining game between the dictatorship and its business allies and test it using a country-year-level dataset of 76 countries for 1992–2019. The results indicate that higher degrees of patrimonial co-optation lower the risk of business opposition. This effect is partly mediated through the government’s control over the media landscape. These findings suggest that even informal, non-institutional tools of co-optation can effectively deter defection.

Russia considers multilateralism to be an instrument for promoting and managing multipolarity. It regards the UN as an important component of the international system and would like to see it reflect a multipolar world order, which in Russia’s rhetoric is marked by the dominance of principles of sovereignty and non-interference. This shapes Russia’s approach to the UN development pillar, where it seeks to advance its geopolitical interests, including countering Western influence.
Financially, Russia remains a marginal player in the UN development pillar. Between 2018 and 2022, it was the smallest contributor to UN development activities among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) and ranked 23rd among all UN member states. In terms of international professional staff, the share of Russian nationals in the UN system has remained below 1 per cent over the past five years, with the majority concentrated in the UN Secretariat. However, its diplomatic missions – particularly in New York and Geneva – are relatively well-staffed and are recognised for their diplomatic skills and expertise.
Lacking prominent material weight, Russia leverages diplomatic and rhetorical tools to project its power. It portrays itself as an “anti-colonial leader” and champion of the Global South. Russia positions itself as an advocate of an alternative approach to development cooperation, affirming in its rhetoric that developing countries have the right to independently choose their model of socio-economic development without external influence or pressure. In line with this, it rejects the imposition of what it argues are Western liberal values on developing states – which it equates with conditionality in development assistance and infringement on sovereignty – and presents itself as a defender of what in Russian discourse are referred to as “traditional values”, which are usually in opposition to individualism and progressivism.
Although Russia’s arguments resonate among Global South states – because they tap into legitimate grievances – there are cases in which its rhetoric appears instrumental and does not match its practices.
While Russia’s material capacity to project its power and position itself as an alternative development partner is limited, its diplomatic efforts, rhetoric and ability to capitalise on the grievances of the Global South as well as Western double standards amid global power shifts position it as a noticeable actor in UN development work, suggesting it should not be prematurely disregarded based on its modest role as a donor.
Main takeaways:
• Strategic use of UN development pillar: Russia engages in UN development work as a platform to advance its broader geopolitical objectives and its view of the international system, including positioning itself rhetorically as a counterweight to Western influence. While already politicised to some extent, this further reinforces the role of UN development work as a stage for power politics.
• Diplomatic leverage: Although Russia’s material weight in UN development pillar is modest, it uses diplomatic channels and discursive engagement in decision-making processes across UN entities and fora to pursue its interests.
• Anti-colonial narratives and normative contestation: Russia rhetorically appeals to the grievances of the Global South and challenges Western-driven norms and approaches to development. It promotes the vision of a multipolar world order with Moscow as one of the poles of power.

1. Nature-based Solutions (NbS) have been gaining prominence across the Rio Conventions primarily as a means of addressing climate change with co-benefits for nature and humans. However, they have also faced significant criticism for enabling greenwashing, encouraging market-driven approaches and not addressing the root causes of environmental degradation. Some critics argue that NbS divert attention from urgent transformative actions such as decarbonisation and systemic economic reforms.

2. We present the case for a broader framework, centred around the concept of Integrated Nature-Climate Action (INCA), which extends beyond NbS to drive the structural changes essential for tackling climate change, biodiversity loss and desertification, while delivering positive outcomes such as supporting livelihoods, addressing inequities and upholding the rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities. We provide examples of INCAs with significant, tractable benefits for people and nature, including the removal of environmentally harmful subsidies, land rights recognition and circular economic transitions.

3. We argue that the wide range of actors mobilised by INCAs would increase the finance available to fill the deficit for climate and biodiversity action. While tracking the impact of these actions could be challenging, existing United Nations (UN) initiatives could provide models for ensuring the integrity of INCA. A clear definition and set of standards must also be agreed upon to avoid the pitfalls that plague NbS. Careful oversight from stakeholders and rightsholders is vital to ensure legitimacy and that the uptake of INCA does not favour one outcome over others.

4. Policy implications: Moving beyond NbS to pursue an inclusive INCA concept can help address the systemic drivers of the global polycrisis. With synergies between the Rio Conventions expected to be a key focus of the upcoming Conference of the Parties for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP30), there is a clear policy window to broaden the scope of interventions relevant to all three conventions and engage a more diverse array of actors to support enhanced coordination. This is essential for transitioning towards a regenerative economic system that works for people and the planet.

Population growth due to immigration is often portrayed as a problem rather than a success. This is deeply problematic, not least because Sweden – like Germany – depends on immigration to meet its growing labour market needs

Migration wird in Deutschland oft verzerrt und polarisiert diskutiert – dabei ist sie dringend notwendig. Und das Leugnen dieser Realität behindert weiterhin die Entwicklung einer kohärenten nationalen Strategie.

Calls for development policy to place greater emphasis on national self-interest are growing louder in many donor countries, including Germany. There are indeed good reasons to dovetail Germany’s international policies more effectively. Synergies between develop-ment cooperation (DC), foreign trade promotion and research partnerships have not been harnessed systematically to date, yet they could serve the interests of both Germany and its partner countries alike. Moreover, Germany is facing geopolitical competition from actors who have long been using their DC proactively to pursue strategic interests.
We advocate adopting a development policy that pursues German and European interests in those areas in which they are compatible with development policy objectives. Instead of focusing on the interests of individual companies, it is important to identify long-term ‘win-win’ potential, for example through a more strategic approach to planning DC offers that involves the private sector and ministries more actively prior to intergovernmental negotiations with the partner countries.
At the same time, we warn against subordinating DC to foreign economic policy objectives. Conditions such as tied aid provisions that link financial cooperation to business contracts for German/EU companies are expensive, inefficient and counterproductive in development terms. In addition, this approach would risk losing sight of Germany’s overarching interest in solutions to global problems, such as peacebuilding and climate and biodiversity protection.
We set out five guidelines for a development policy strategy that takes due consideration of Germany’s own interests without harming the partner countries:
1. Avoid strict tied aid provisions. These would be inefficient in development terms and would be of little benefit to German companies. As an export nation, Germany should comply with freedom of contract rules.
2. Pursue the interests of German society as a whole where they align with DC objectives. We distinguish between Germany’s global interests and those of individual companies. DC projects should align economic interests with the common good in the partner country.
3. Develop offers strategically prior to intergovernmental negotiations. The most effective synergies are generated if the private sector and other ministries are involved in preparing DC initiatives at an early stage. To do so, Germany needs to define joint national goals, coordinate ministerial instruments to achieve these goals and evaluate contributions by the private sector in advance.
4. Create strategic partnerships that serve as models. Germany has established a number of bilateral partnerships, especially on energy, raw material security and migration. None of these is exemplary in terms of effective interministerial coordination, private sector involvement or demons-trable benefits for both of the countries involved. At least one flagship project in each of the areas mentioned would make Germany attractive as a credible partner.
5. Expand minilateral formats with European states and influential third countries. Triangular and quadrilateral cooperation with ‘global partners’ and donor countries that share the same or similar interests can help advance Germany’s interests in international development for the common good.

The international landscape in mid-2025 is characterized by a retreat from liberal institutionalism, exemplified by the United States' withdrawal from the Sustainable Development Goals and its adoption of transactional, power-based international relations, as well as its potential withdrawal from some multilateral bodies. In this context, this paper argues that traditional models of universal multilateralism are increasingly untenable, and that new forms of collective action grounded in shared interests and normative alignment are both necessary and feasible. This paper revisits and applies the historically rooted concept of “like-minded internationalism,” arguing for its renewed relevance under current geopolitical conditions.

In its 80th year, the UN faces a significant crisis. Severe funding shortfalls are forcing the organisation to make cuts. However, the focus should not be solely on cost savings. Reform presents an opportunity to address unresolved challenges and to restructure the UN both institutionally and politically.

Motivation: In recent years, foreign aid donors have tried to becomemore transparent, often by sharing information digitally. However,the politicization of individual aid projects has resulted in biasedreporting, raising doubts about the legitimacy of aid in general. Wetherefore examine whether increased transparency leads to greatergovernment effectiveness and public trust. Purpose: Government agencies typically assume that greatertransparency in public administration improves understanding ofbureaucratic actions, thereby fostering trust in the government. Inforeign aid, openness is believed to enhance public confidence andimprove the effectiveness of governments. However, recent publicand political reactions to the disclosure of aid information cast doubton these optimistic assumptions. Approach and methods: Using our sender-mediator-receiver modelof a “fragile transparency loop,” we analyse how communicationbreaks down in German foreign aid. First, we focus on Germany as adonor that shares information through a digital transparency portal,examining the sender side. Second, we investigate the mediator sideby conducting a qualitative content analysis of German online mediaarticles. Third, we examine the receiver side by disaggregating theGerman public into several subgroups. Findings: Our empirical findings suggest that, while donors assumea virtuous transparency loop, the reality can resemble a fragiletransparency loop that is easily disrupted. The government maywithhold information; mediators may spread misinformation; and thepublic may not receive information neutrally. These dynamics explainwhy, despite increasing transparency, donors may not achieve theintended increases in government effectiveness and public trust. Policy implications: Donors should find a balanced approach toforeign aid transparency that upholds democratic accountabilitywhile avoiding information overload. Aid bureaucracies should tailortheir disclosure to serve different audiences, including professionalswith development expertise and the wider public, who may havepreconceptions or be uninformed about foreign aid.

Die Organisation fur Afrikanische Einheit (OAU), heute Afrikanische Union (AU), schloss 1969 eine Fluchtlingskonvention, deren Regelungen zum Teil von jenen der Genfer Fluchtlingskonvention von 1951 abweichen. In der Fluchtlingskonvention der AU wird explizit die politische Natur Gefluchteter anerkannt und eine Begriffsbestimmung vorgenommen, die in den politischen Umwalzungen im Kontext von Kolonialisierung und antikolonialer Kampfe verankert ist. Sie definiert Gefluchtete als Menschen, die vor Ereignissen fliehen, die ihren Ursprung in ≫externer Aggression, Besetzung, [und] auslandischer Beherrschung≪ haben (Artikel 1. 2). Der damalige politische Zeitgeist basierte auf Antikolonialismus, Panafrikanismus und afrikanischer Solidaritat. Er pragte einen entsprechenden Humanitarismus und wirkte sich unmittelbar auf die offenen Fluchtlingspolitiken auf dem Kontinent aus. Dementsprechend nahmen die damals gerade unabhangig gewordenen afrikanischen Staaten Menschen aus den noch nicht befreiten Kolonien des Kontinents auf. Sie forderten und unterstutzten den Widerstand gegenuber der kolonialen Besetzung, indem sie sowohl materielle als auch moralische, militarische, ideologische und politische Unterstutzung boten. Insbesondere nahmen sie Afrikaner:innen auf, die vor den durch diesen Widerstand erzeugten gewaltsamen Gegenreaktionen flohen. Diese Unterstutzung machte eine Unterscheidung zwischen Gefluchteten auf der einen und politischen Aktivist:innen und Kampfer:innen auf der anderen Seite fragwurdig. Den unabhangig gewordenen Landern erschien es deshalb politisch inkoharent und unlogisch, antikoloniale Kampfe zu unterstutzen und zugleich Afrikaner:innen, die vor ebendiesen Kampfen aus ihren Landern flohen, das Asyl zu verweigern.

The global crisis in development cooperation will not be resolved by making exaggerated promises about what it is capable of achieving. Instead, the focus should be on improving people’s living conditions tangibly. Adding all kinds of secondary objectives often means that none of the goals can realistically be reached. Tightening resources are forcing projects to focus on more specific and narrow objectives.

Die weltweite Krise der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit lässt sich nicht durch Maximalversprechen im Hinblick auf die Leistungsfähigkeit dieses Politikfelds lösen. Hauptziel muss die Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen vor Ort bleiben – eine Überfrachtung mit Nebenzielen führt oft nur dazu, dass kein Ziel mehr realistisch erreicht werden kann. Immer knappere Ressourcen zwingen Projekte ohnehin, sich thematisch zu fokussieren.

We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms' participation in international trade through global value chains (GVCs) for six lower middle income MENA countries and territories (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). Our findings add to the literature on “hidden protection” and corruption in the region: trade- and investment policies and regulations are tailored to benefit or protect politically connected firms. Our findings suggest that politically connected firms are more likely to participate in GVCs by 9.8 percentage points and that the intensity of their participation in GVCs increases by 4.1 percentage points. Combining political connections and grand corruption increases firms' participation in GVCs by 13.6 percentage points.

Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) are a rights-based management strategy that grants area-based fishing rights to specific community groups. In Ecuador, following immense mangrove deforestation caused by industrial shrimp farming, TURFs have been implemented through Mangrove Sustainable Use and Custody Agreements (AUSCEMs, for its Spanish acronym), driven by grassroots demands to conserve remaining mangroves and recognize ancestral territorial rights. This article examines the power-laden dynamics of these agreements in the Gulf of Guayaquil, Ecuador through ethnographic research in two fishing communities. We analyze historical and ongoing conflicts and reveal how multi-scalar power—across visible, hidden, and invisible forms—shapes access to and control over mangrove resources, often reinforcing inequalities and epistemic injustices. Our findings highlight how funding inequities, limited tenure security, and rising threats from organized crime compromise community-led conservation. For this management approach to succeed, it is essential to close funding gaps for stewardship and innovation, address security and service disparities, recognize local ecological knowledge, and fully honor ancestral territorial rights to promote equitable, sustainable governance.

Amid rising restrictions on foreign funding, localization—directly funding local groups—is seen as a path to more effective, locally owned aid. This policy brief examines whether donors should shift support from large civil society organizations to grassroots community groups.

The Trump administration is pursuing an explicitly anti-multilateralist policy rooted in national sovereignty, geopolitical calculation, and transactional economics. Conspiracy theories played a significant role in justifying actions like the dismantling of USAID. Global norms, including the SDGs, are cast as threats to U.S. interests precisely because they promote forms of cooperative governance. The withdrawal from international organizations, disregard for established norms (even to the point of military threats), and blunt pressure on other nations—such as the baseless accusations of “genocide” against South Africa—signal a paradigm shift. It redefines the balance between values and interests, privileging short-term political dominance over long-term global cooperation.

Background: Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown policies emerged as pivotal measures to contain viral transmission. Questions arose about whether their implementation challenged access to care, particularly in regions with fragile or less resilient health systems, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Robust evidence on the effect of lockdowns on healthcare access remains sparse, partly due to a lack of suitable data. We addressed this gap and assessed the effect of the COVID-19 lockdown policy on facility-based delivery during the first pandemic wave in Kenya. Methods: We triangulated findings from two independent quantitative analyses, exploiting the fact that lockdowns in Kenya were implemented only in selected counties. First, we used nationally representative repeated cross-sectional surveys from 2018 and 2020, applying a pre-post-test design with independent controls. Second, we analyzed monthly data from the Kenya Health Information System (Jan 2019–Nov 2020) using an interrupted time series (ITSA) with independent controls, with April 2020 set as the interruption point. Results: The controlled pre-post analysis found no significant effect of lockdowns on facility-based delivery in lockdown vs. non-lockdown counties. The ITSA showed an immediate increase of 4.97% (CI: 0.51%, 9.43%) in facility deliveries in lockdown counties, followed by a significant monthly decrease of 0.97% (CI: -1.60%, -0.34%) compared with non-lockdown counties. Conclusion: We found no overall effect of lockdowns on facility-based deliveries. Our results suggest that, when managed well, lockdowns do not necessarily disrupt access to maternal health services—demonstrating elements of resilience even under crisis conditions. These findings underscore the value of context-specific, adaptive strategies to ensure continuity of essential services during health emergencies. Future research should explore localized and socioeconomic factors shaping responses to public health interventions and further examine how resilience can be strengthened at all levels of the health system.