Ideas on Europe Blog

The sight of more heavy rain outside the window tells me it’s high summer. This means all the important people have gone on holiday to somewhere sunnier, leaving us hoi polloi to discuss politics.

As a result, I’m at my desk when Matt Goodwin’s latest Substack post arrives, heralded as a contribution to ‘silly season’.

The core argument is that talk of rejoining the EU is overblown, because there are lots of things that are problematic about membership.

Since Matt reminds me how many of us all subscribe to his Substack, I’ll assume you’ve read it.

As a first thought, this is classic eurosceptic messaging on the EU and European integration: it’s costly, it’s too intrusive but also not strong enough to sort things out, it’s lethargic and divided and it leaves the door open to millions of people coming here.

These messages don’t just date back to 2016, but to the mid-1990s.

The messages have hung around for two main reasons.

Each of them taps into wider discontents and emotions about politics, about foreigners, about fairness that allow them to leverage more engagement from audiences. Politicians are the least trusted profession in the UK, you say? Well maybe it’s not going to hurt my cause (whatever it is) to trash-talk them then, right? Certainly I can think of would-be populists who rail against the failings of the ‘new elite’ in just this manner.

But the messages also persist because they have something to them.

If I were being sniffy about Matt’s list I could argue that there are various things that are rather particular readings of situations, but actually most of it isn’t that arch.

Let’s take the first of his ‘very good reasons’:

1. It will not be like it was before. The relationship will be harder and the terms will be worse. You will not get special opt-outs on things like Schengen, justice and home affairs. You will not get rebates. You will have to go all-in. And having already left once you will not be as influential as you were before.

“Fair enough” is my main response here.

The EU is in constant evolution, just like the UK, so to pretend one could just make like it’s 22 June 2016 and none of this ever happened is deeply naive. The opt-outs the UK secured during its membership came because it was there as new policy domains were developed: as a new member state it would have to cleave to what the EU already has in place.

And even more than influence is the question of whether the EU and its member states want to go around British involvement once again. If we can flip into increasing support in the few years since the referendum, then we can flop back in equally short order: a new membership wouldn’t settle things definitively, so why return to that psychodrama at all?

We might take from this that the EU is not the land of milk and honey, just as it also not the ‘end of a thousand years of history’: it’s a choice, and one with both costs and benefits.

Moreover, it should also remind us that this choice is not just for the UK alone: the EU has not only a voice but a vote, so for any kind of relationship beyond ignoring each other, there has to be common cause and agreement.

As such, Matt is right to argue that the polling is misleading and would tighten in any active debate on re-accession. Most people don’t actually know or care that much about the EU, so follow cues from others. If re-accession where to close in, then some of those people would discover costs or inconveniences that make them think again about the matter: it’s happened in every other accession to the EU and it’d happen here.

Of course, research on this matter picks up some interesting elements in this. So let’s explore and – to keep in fair – let’s use Matt’s own work here.

First up, Matt did some polling back at the start of this year, looking exactly at the impact on attitudes of reminding people about the kinds of costs he’s listed this week. If you’ve paid for his Substack, you can read the full piece, but the exchange below picks up a key point, namely that even when you do expose people there’s still a majority in favour of rejoining.

tbh, the most remarkable thing about your polling is that, even when made aware of just how tough the re-entry requirements might be, still a majority of respondents want to #rejoin

Looks like Bregret is firmly entrenched and the #Tory lies about #Brexit have been rumbled. pic.twitter.com/wm4mAXUAIH

— Jonny Brogdale (@Govtandpolitics) January 6, 2023

Of course, this is only one side of the equation. Matt (with co-authors) also found in 2020 that the British public had largely priced-in eurosceptic arguments about the EU, whereas pro-integration ideas seemed to have a more substantial effect. Put differently, precisely because everyone knows the old eurosceptic tunes they are less likely to nudge anyone’s views, while the same isn’t the case for their opponents.

This does, however, leave one not-inconsiderable issue: why haven’t pro-integrationists found their voices and their messages?

If the 2016 referendum campaign was striking for how Leave’s messaging was deeply familiar, then it was also striking for how Remain seemed to be casting around for anything equivalent. The same still broadly holds today.

The reasons aren’t entirely clear, but part of it is that pro-integrationists haven’t felt that they needed to make an active case until recently: the weight of the status quo bred a degree of complacency that facts and friction against change would be enough.

Even now, the focus on rationalist arguments about economic costs echo this position. They do not have the emotional heft that helped make eurosceptic ideas carry further.

Moreover, the numerous perceived failings of post-referendum government have bound up popular views with a set of contingent ideas: Brexit is unpopular because the government is unpopular (partly because its Brexit policy didn’t deliver), so what happens when you take the government out of the equation?

If pro-integrationists are to make any progress towards re-accession then they need to find ways of speaking that resonate with a wide constituency over an extended period of time. Whether they’ll secure is still to be seen, but certainly it’ll need longer than a season, silly or not.

The post Goodwin’s ’10 reasons why Britain will not rejoin the EU’: some thoughts appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

by Marko Stojić, Metropolitan University Prague

In recent years, the Western Balkans has experienced a significant decline in democracy. This has been especially pronounced in Serbia, a country that is no longer perceived as a functioning democracy but rather categorized as a partly free ‘electoral autocracy’. At the same time, Serbia has made some strides in its pursuit of EU membership, leading many observers to argue that the EU has become complicit in the erosion of democracy, supporting rather than discouraging this concerning trend.

More strikingly, the European Parliament (EP) – known for its commitment to upholding the EU’s fundamental values – and some transnational parties have also shown a disregard for the democratic decline, both within and beyond the Union. This has been particularly evident within the European People’s Party (EPP) which consistently shielded its former member, the Hungarian Fidesz, until 2021. In an article recently published in the Journal of Common Market Studies, I contend that the EPP has similarly turned a blind eye to the undemocratic practices of its Serbian affiliate, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).

Namely, this transnational party did endorse progressively more critical EP resolutions on Serbia that, for instance, noted in 2023 that ‘the governing majority has steadily undermined some political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations’. However, a closer examination of the amendments tabled by the EPP group and their frequent motions for separate votes to exclude disapproving articles paints a different picture. The leading European party consistently sought to moderate the content of these politically important – although not legally binding – documents, aiming to shield its Serbian affiliate from severe criticism in the EP. The article, therefore, reinforced scholarly arguments that EU actors have considerably contributed to the rise of ‘competitive authoritarianism’ in this region.

Protecting Serbia’s ruling party from criticism

The EPP frequently dismissed the arguments that there was a rollback of democracy in Serbia. It actively worked to remove from the 2021 EP resolution that ‘[The EP] regrets the lack of progress in many areas of Serbia’s reform agenda and the fact that there has even been backsliding on issues that are fundamental for EU accession’. The party vehemently contested articles that highlighted the role of the SNS in the erosion of democracy. For instance, it sought to eliminate references to ‘the ruling party’ from the article noting ‘monopolisation of the media landscape in the country by the ruling party’. Furthermore, the EPP opposed the inclusion of specific examples of high-level corruption, making unsuccessful attempts to vote down references to prominent and unsolved corruption cases involving senior SNS officials, such as ‘Krušik, Jovanjica, and Telekom Srbija’.

Likewise, the EPP’s narratives and official documents consistently overlooked the democratic decline. Party senior officials have rarely, if ever, publicly criticised the SNS for its illiberal practices. Instead, they emphasized Serbia’s readiness for changes and membership in the EU. While the 2021 EPP EU-Western Balkans declaration boasted that ‘we cannot compromise on values and rights’, it disregarded undemocratic tendencies in the countries governed by its affiliates. Its 2022 position paper on the Western Balkans thus praised the initiatives to ‘strengthen the independence and the efficacy of the judiciary’ and create ‘a better level playing field’ for the April 2022 election in Serbia. At the same time, it criticised the Socialist-led governments in Albania for democratic deterioration across three resolutions and called upon the EU to cross-check how democracy works in this country. The logic of partisan allegiance evidently shaped its contrasting approaches to countries led by EPP affiliates and those where EPP members were in the opposition.

When political and economic interests trump principles

Seeking a wider pan-European sway, the EPP strove to protect its Serbian member driven by strategic incentives. Viewing its non-EU allies as potential full members and valuable electoral assets in future EP elections, it had no incentives to excessively criticise the SNS. As one of the few ruling EPP members in this region and a dominant party in Serbia with a significant influence across the post-Yugoslav space, the SNS guaranteed an enduring presence of the EPP in the Western Balkans. An important factor contributing to this dynamic was the close personal relationship between SNS leader Aleksandar Vučić and former CDU leader Angela Merkel. Vučić consistently expressed unwavering admiration for Merkel, considering her as ‘the undisputed leader of Europe’. Crucially, he was a loyal partner in stemming the flow of migrants and preserving regional stability – two fundamental pillars of German Western Balkan policy.

Moreover, most EPP affiliates presumably lacked genuine interest in the issue of democracy in candidate states. Their positions were likely shaped by members more involved in Western Balkan matters – primarily the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union. Reflecting Germany’s vested political and economic interests, characterized by generous state subsidies, weak labour laws, and low wages, these EPP affiliates arguably aimed to downplay criticism of Serbian authorities. Moreover, the repeated attempts of the EPP rapporteur to remove critical remarks about ‘the dominant market position of (state-owned) Telekom Srbija’ and ‘the allegations that the ruling party is using it to increase its influence over the media market’ from the 2023 EP resolution exemplify how broader economic interests may influence the EPP’s lenient stance towards illiberal members.

Remarkable intra-party cohesion and few ideological outliers

The EPP displayed striking cohesion on votes pertaining to Serbian democracy. An overwhelming majority of EPP legislators systematically and consistently toed the party line. The observed voting pattern indicates that the positions of most EPP legislators on this matter were primarily influenced by strategic considerations driven by transnational partisan politics and the necessity to maintain cohesion. The EPP was interested in maintaining influence in the Western Balkans while avoiding alienation of the SNS. This approach took precedence over particular national interests, domestic electoral incentives, or ideological beliefs that might have otherwise inclined individual parties towards a more critical position.

At the same time, dissenting voices within the EPP constituted a small fraction, ranging from one to thirteen MEPs out of 177 legislators. Ideology seems to have predisposed their behaviour as their positions were fundamentally informed by contrasting normative commitments to liberal democratic principles. Notably, the parties that voted against nearly all provisions criticising Serbian authorities were illiberal national conservatives with close ties to Fidesz – the Hungarian Christian Democratic People’s Party and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania. By contrast, most critical were two Dutch EPP Group members – the Christian Democratic Appeal and the Christian Union – committed to the EU as ‘a community of values’ sharing principles of freedom, the rule of law, and democracy.

EU credibility on the wane

The EPP’s reluctance to confront the democratic deterioration in Serbia proved to be detrimental to the EU’s enlargement policy as it further alienated pro-European parties and domestic stakeholders. A marked difference in how the European People’s Party – but also the Party of European Socialists – responded to similar autocratic tendencies in different candidate countries illustrates the lack of consistency among key EU players, damaging the Union’s already undermined credibility in the region. The article also points to transnational parties’ overall inability to be a driving force behind the ‘norm socialisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’ of their affiliates. Finally, ignoring undemocratic tendencies within their ranks may eventually contribute to the decline of democratic norms in these party families themselves.

Marko Stojić works at the Department of International Relations and European Studies, Metropolitan University Prague. His work focuses on party politics in the European Union and the Western Balkans. He is the author of Party Responses to the EU in the Western Balkans: Transformation, Opposition or Defiance?.

The post Partners in Democratic Decline? The European People’s Party and the Serbian Progressive Party appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

 

International Shipping and Emissions: Background

 

Although international shipping accounts for approximately 3% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, its share of global emissions is projected to continue to rise in the coming decades.  

 

Accordingly, international shipping’s current trajectory is incompatible with the Paris Agreement and its 1.5° warming objective. At the 80th session of the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 80), members of the London-based UN agency finalised negotiations around a revised IMO strategy to reduce GHG emissions within international shipping. 

 

On 7 July 2023, the MEPC adopted the IMO 2023 Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships. The strategy establishes the following targets: 

 

• Reduce emissions by 20% (compared to 2008 levels), striving for 30%, by 2030 
• Reduce emissions by 70%, striving for 80%, by 2040 
• Net-zero GHG emissions “by or around, i.e., close to, 2050” 

 

To get there, the IMO will employ a basket of economic and technical measures, leaving the door open for carbon pricing and other tools to be used. Although the 2023 IMO Strategy was not as ambitious as science and many states had called for, it was a multilateral compromise.  

 

Thanks to the UACES microgrant, I saw that compromise being reached firsthand.  

 

My Research Interest in Climate Diplomacy

 

As part of my PhD, I looked at the European Union’s (EU) climate diplomacy with respect to four multilateral negotiations, including the 2018 IMO Initial Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships. For the Initial Strategy negotiation, EU member states supported Pacific Small Island Developing States in driving ambition within the IMO and in ultimately delivering the Initial Strategy. Since then, the EU has pushed forward on its own, with the inclusion of a shipping-related provision within the European Green Deal. Shipping will soon be included within the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS): a cap-and-trade mechanism aimed at reducing GHG emissions. Needless to say, I was very interested in seeing how these developments would shape the 2023 negotiations. 

 

Impact of The UACES Microgrant

 

When I began my PhD in 2019, I had every intention of conducting in-person interviews and participant observation as part of my data collection. Like many other PhD researchers, my plans were turned upside down with the COVID-19 pandemic. I relied heavily on WebEx and Microsoft Teams to speak with officials and diplomats. MEPC 80 was thus one of the first opportunities I had to observe a negotiation in person and interact with delegates. 

 

Going into MEPC 80, I was relatively confident – from an academic perspective – in my understanding of the IMO and multilateral negotiations. I quickly learned that practice and theory are very different things! It is one thing to read about the negotiation process, but observing in person how a compromise comes together is an entirely different matter. I feel privileged to have followed the process. To give a few examples, I observed impassioned interventions and unwavering efforts by Pacific Island States to increase ambition, diplomats huddled during coffee breaks in order to broker a deal on text, and an impressive spirit of camaraderie in the room when the 2023 Strategy was adopted.  

 

I am a much better scholar for having attended MEPC 80 as an academic observer and look forward to applying this rich data to my current research project. 

The post UACES Microgrant Report: Getting to the 2023 IMO Revised GHG Strategy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

EUHealthGov held its third Practitioner Perspective on 19th July 2023. We were delighted to host Elizabeth Kuiper, Associate Director and Head of the Social Europe and Well-being programme at the European Policy Centre (EPC) to discuss the evolving place of health on policy agendas between the COVID-19 pandemic and upcoming changes with a new Commission term and European Parliament elections in 2024.

Against the backdrop of current interconnected challenges spanning the geopolitical context and cost-of-living crises, the profile of health on EU-level agendas has gained more prominence. This has emerged not only via learnings from COVID-19 for public health and EU competence in health, but also via Commission President Von der Leyen’s greater ambitions for health from December 2019, where the previous Commission had seen health famously characterised as a “small thing”.

Elizabeth Kuiper’s experience of working in Brussels since 2010 has taken place alongside this evolving profile of health. Her work with the EPC on health has included highlighting the recent discussions about potential Treaty change and the contrasts between citizens’ calls for, and politicians’ equivocations regarding, more EU-level health competence in connection with marking 30 years of health as a Treaty competence in the Maastricht Treaty. The EPC have also engaged with the current evolutions regarding EU governance and the implications for health, issuing a bold proposal for an Executive Vice President for the Wellbeing Economy.

Elizabeth’s presentation also introduced the EPC’s recent work on examining what the European Health Union means – including as a narrowly-defined concept, or an aspiration. Bringing together a broad coalition of stakeholders (including academics and health representatives), the European Health Union Task Force has enabled the EPC to develop concrete recommendations which will be launched on 12th September 2023.

The EPC’s focus has been on extending the European Health Union beyond the now well-established pillars (including pandemic preparedness and the European Health Data Space) and questions of Treaty competence in recognition of attention this has received in other fora, notably the Conference on the Future of Europe. The directions indicated by this work include extending use of joint procurement to address inequalities and access, particularly for rare diseases; elevating HERA’s status to ensure more independence and autonomy in recognition that perspectives on health may change with the new Commission in 2024; highlighting the need for better implementation of recommendations for addressing the skills gap in the health workforce; and the need to explore more partnerships across the world and work more holistically at the global level in tackling health emergencies.

A recording of this event is available here.

The post Summary: Putting Health on the Agenda: Practitioner Perspectives from Elizabeth Kuiper appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

 

Between March and June 2023, I completed a RENPET-funded research stay at the KU Leuven Faculty of Social Sciences, within the Leuven International and European Studies department” (LINES). By embarking on this residency halfway through my PhD, I sought to get more acquainted with the top-tier research carried out at LINES and gain access to KU Leuven’s outstanding facilities all over Belgium, which include extensive bibliographic resources. 

 

During my stay, I took advantage of the institution’s proximity to Brussels: I conducted interviews with public officials from EU institutions and attended various international academic conferences and research seminars. My residency was very rewarding – and even surpassed my expectations. 

 

A Variety of Experiences

 

Additionally, I had the opportunity to experience KU Leuven’s dynamic academic life, including the Research Day of the Faculty of Social Sciences’ Doctoral Programme. I also delivered a guest lecture with bachelor students from American University, as part of a joint programme involving this institution and KU Leuven. My lecture addressed the evolution of global health governance and the EU’s interaction with it, paying particular attention to the effect of crises like COVID-19. This complemented the programme’s overall focus on the EU’s responses to external shocks.  

 

Closer to the end of my stay, I presented a draft of a book chapter – which will be one of the components of my PhD – at a “LINES session”, in which early-career scholars affiliated with the department discuss their work in progress in an informal setting. I also engaged with LINES researchers and other RENPET members at the 2nd RENPET annual conference, which took place at my home institution (IBEI) in late May-early June. This event allowed me to obtain additional feedback on my research.  

 

My RENPET residency at KU Leuven has been instrumental in propelling my PhD forward. During my stay, I finalized my first PhD article and submitted it to an academic journal, completed the first draft of a co-authored book chapter, and started working on the third component of my PhD – a journal article within a Special Issue to which other LINES and RENPET researchers will also contribute. In more formal terms, my three-month research stay in a prestigious university abroad will render me eligible for an International Mention, an honorary qualification awarded in the Spanish system that will add value to my PhD diploma. 

 

My gratitude goes to…

 

I am very grateful to Dr Kolja Raube (my host at the LINES department) and Dr Katja Biedenkopf (the coordinator of LINES) for warmly welcoming me and assisting me at every step, including in the months prior to my arrival. Special thanks also go out to Charlotte Debeuf (my wonderful office mate), Franziska Petri (my friendly office neighbour and fellow commuter from Brussels), and the rest of professors and colleagues from the LINES department. I would also like to extend my appreciation to Ingrid De Wachter, Greet Louw and Amin Mirabdollah for their kind and resourceful support in various capacities. Finally, I would like to thank UACES and RENPET for their generous sponsorship and for presenting early-career scholars with this valuable opportunity, among many others. 

 

More About the Author

 

Óscar Fernández is a PhD candidate in the program Political Science, Public Policy and International Relations at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, under the supervision of Dr. Robert Kissack. He obtained a predoctoral contract from the H2020 research project ENGAGE (Envisioning a New Governance Architecture for a Global Europe). His fields of interest are the European Union’s external action, global health governance, international security, and conflict management. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Pompeu Fabra University, a Master’s degree in Advanced European and International Studies from the Centre International de Formation Européenne, and a Master’s degree in Internationalization from the University of Barcelona. Prior to joining IBEI, he was senior researcher at the EsadeGeo Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics and junior researcher at the World Health Organization. 

 

 

The RENPET network invites applications from PhD students and Early-Career Researchers (within 5 years of their PhD) working in EU Foreign Policy, EU external relations or related fields to apply for bursaries to support an extended residency (2-3 months) at one of the network institutions. Find out more on the RENPET website. Apply for a residency via the UACES website.  

The post RENPET network residency at KU Leuven appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

A conversation with Scott Arthurson: For our podcast by UACES, the University Association for European Studies, we welcome Scott Arthurson, doctoral student and politics tutor at the University of Melbourne, Australia. 

 

UACES Podcasts · Scott Arthurson on Populism and it’s definitional dilemmas Transcript of the interview is as follows:

 

 

This podcast is inspired by the research you presented at UACES’ Graduate Forum Research Conference in June 2023 and in your presentation, you discussed populism and its definitional dilemmas. One of the angles you explored was populism as an analytical category. For those of us who missed your presentation, could you tell us a bit more about this perspective?  

 

Of course! I borrow this term from Peter Worsley. I mean populism is mostly a category applied by intellectuals to divide up, categorize, and make sense of the world. It is something used to talk about and analyze.  

It’s rarely used as a rallying cry or term of self-identification: these days, it’s rare to find anyone claiming to be a populist, or calling for more populism, especially in Europe. When they do, they are often reacting to others calling them a populist, or criticizing mainstream rhetoric about populism. 

The term also isn’t very grounded in historical examples. There once was a party in the United States in the 1890s, that called themselves Populists. But most scholars of “populism” barely mention them. Instead, populism is used to compare various recent parties and politicians – even when they have very different political goals and methods.  

This makes it different from other contested political concepts like democracy, socialism, liberalism, freedom, equality, or conservatism. While people argue over what these words mean, the argument is more grounded either in movements laying claim to the concepts or in concrete historical examples. 

In contrast, populism is a bit of a catchall label to identify some political illness or pathology. 

Several scholars noted these problems early on – Peter Worsley in 1969, for instance, or Margaret Canovan in 1981. As they said, there’s never been a Populist International. Populism is not an identity, a rallying cry, or a brute fact in the world. It’s something we project onto it. It’s very open to interpretation. That’s what Peter Worsley meant when he called it a purely analytical category. 

Similarly, Canovan points out that the meaning of populism fluctuates depending on who is interpreting it – which is mostly intellectuals, academics, journalists, and so on. 

Even if the concept of populism turns out to be a useful analytical category, it has powerful rhetorical effects and shapes how we think about various political divides in Europe today, such as the tensions between the EU and popular democracy. It is often used to posit lots of different political actors as an Other, as a threat to the existing order.   

 

 

 Part of your research paper outlines how narrow definitions of populism can be problematic. Can you detail why this is? 

 

Good question. The concept of populism has been applied to many different political actors and accumulated a lot of different connotations. It’s been applied to Third World anti-imperial movements, McCarthyism, popular politics and economic policy in Latin America, Margaret Thatcher, Nazism and communism, radical right parties in Europe since the 1980s, and anti-austerity left politics like Occupy Wall Street, Syriza, Bernie Sanders and Podemos. 

It’s been defined as a political strategy manipulating the masses to gain power, as the ideology of the middle class, as a counter-hegemonic discourse, as illiberal democracy, as a thin ideology counterposing a virtuous people to a bad elite, as the endorsement of the cultural-political low over the high, and so on and so on. 

One logical response to this chaos is to narrow down the term’s connotations, to arrive at a definition that accommodates all the different cases. This is what you’d call a minimal definition. On the upside, you get a definition that fits the cases. But there are problems. 

First, you might come to something so narrow that it doesn’t say much. 

The only thing shared by almost all things called populism is they’re some kind of appeal to the popular as a source of value or legitimacy. But this applies to most democratic politics. Yet, strangely, we don’t call it all populist. 

This brings us to the second problem: the things in common between the cases may not be the real reason they bear the same label. Supposing we defined populism as any popular appeal against an elite. 

Now, someone might label something populist partly due to other connotations they associate with the term – for example, that it is dangerous, or anti-pluralist –  even if they can just justify the labelling on the basis of the official definition. 

Worse, the reason may lie mostly outside of the populists themselves. For example, they might all have a similar relationship to the interpreter. Supposing you heard a group of friends calling other groups “enemies”, and you wanted to define what an “enemy” is. Now, you might be able to find some things all these enemies have in common. But the real reason for the label here is the relationship these groups have with their interpreters.

Alternatively, you can define populism by including more necessary connotations but narrowing the cases it applies to. So you might say, like Jan-Werner Muller does, that appealing to the people against an elite is not enough to constitute populism. Rather, populism entails a claim to exclusively represent the people, while really only standing for a fraction of them. Therefore it is not just anti-elitist, but anti-pluralist, anti-democratic, and deceptive. Any so-called populists who don’t meet this definition aren’t really populists at all. 

But this creates new problems. First, it can be arbitrary, and at odds with normal usage. Muller is pretty vague in some of his work about whether the original U.S. Populists are populists at all or the status of a number of left-wing populists. You see this even more with Kurt Weyland’s definition, which excludes some of the most famous cases of populism in Europe. 

Further, such definitions reinforce very specific connotations which in practice get ascribed to anyone people commonly think of as a populist. 

So either way, you aren’t capturing the real usage of the term. You either suppress important connotations, which nonetheless persist in how people think of populism. Or you cut off important cases of populism, which people will keep calling populism anyway. 

 

 

 

You make interesting points there. Building upon this, can you explain why research about populism matters?

 

Narrow definitions are a way of simplifying the world, and imposing particular ideological perspectives.  If our goal is clarification and understanding of a term’s usage, it makes more sense to me to map the various ways it is used, rather than drawing strict boundaries around its meaning. 

This mapping also provides resources for critique – once we understand how a term is really used, we are in a better to assess this usage, it’s effects, and how we might prefer to define it if we do wish to enter the ideological fray. 

In my case, I propose a definition of populism which has a very broad criterion for what all cases of populism have in common, but I combine this with an open-textured criterion relating to how intellectuals fill out the meaning of the term. 

 

 

 

At the Graduate Forum Conference in June, you discussed your research on a panel with two other academics with different specialisms. Did you find presenting your research in this environment particularly useful? Were any insights from the other PhD researchers interesting to you and your research?  

 

I enjoyed it! I thought the other panellists’ papers were really fascinating – and while they were looking at very different subject matter, they crossed over with mine in some interesting and unexpected ways. One paper on abortion laws and women’s rights in Poland, for instance, ended up addressing issues with contested concepts, including democracy, which is something pretty central to my own work. Such crossovers were eye-opening as to how certain problems I need to unpack in my own work are not unique to it, but occur in different ways in different contexts. 

Above all, it was great to have a chance to discuss our work afterwards, share our thoughts and ideas, and share some quite specific feedback on the papers themselves – I think having read each other’s papers was helpful for this. 

 

 

 

Good to hear that you had a good time! You also came quite a long way to the event in Barcelona, as you’re based at the University of Melbourne in Australia. How did you find out about our Graduate Forum Research Conference and did you find it useful for networking? 

 

I was searching online for conferences in Europe relevant to my studies. I wanted to get over to Europe, partly to meet more academics in my field, and to spend more time in the European context, since it’s the main focus for parts of my thesis. The UACES was one of two conferences I attended on this trip. I also took the opportunity to do some further travelling and see some people I know here. 

It’s always good to meet people in your field. Part of this is making professional contacts and meeting future collaborators. But what I value most is the chance for intellectual discussions and relationships with people interested in similar questions and topics. That helps to challenge, refine, and reshape your ideas and how you express them – and to bring them back to a shared frame of reference. Ultimately, if we’re studying politics or European Studies we want our ideas to connect to real issues, and I think dialogue helps us to do this. 

I met some lovely people, learnt a lot, and had some great discussions at the conference. I hope to stay in touch with some of the other researchers I met there. 

 

 

 

Thank you so much, Scott, for telling us more about your research and the conference. It was a pleasure meeting you. I recall you are a doctoral student and politics tutor at the University of Melbourne, Australia. 

The post Populism and it’s Definitional Dilemmas appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

 

I am incredibly grateful to have been awarded the prestigious UACES scholarship. As a Ph.D. candidate in political science, this incredible opportunity has allowed me to embark on an exciting journey to the heart of European politics to conduct fieldwork research.

The capital of Belgium and the de-facto capital of the European Union, Brussels served as an ideal setting for my research. I was immediately struck by the rich history and cosmopolitan atmosphere of the vibrant city. With its numerous EU institutions, policymakers, and international organizations, conducting fieldwork in Brussels presented a unique opportunity to explore the captivating realm of European politics.

With the support of the UACES scholarship, I spent 7 weeks researching in Brussels from the 27th of March to the 14th of May 2023. The scholarship covered my transport, accommodation, and food expenses, providing me with a remarkable opportunity to conduct research for my thesis on the European Union’s capacity as an autonomous actor in international affairs, with a particular focus on its involvement in the Iranian nuclear crisis.

 

The Why of This Trip

The primary objective of my research trip was to conduct in-depth interviews with key stakeholders and experts within EU institutions. Engaging in direct conversations with policymakers, advisors, and scholars allowed me to gain a comprehensive understanding of the EU’s strategies, positions, and interactions with other international actors in the context of international conflict resolution. These interviews form the cornerstone of my thesis and provide invaluable firsthand insights into the EU’s role, actions, and decision-making processes during the Iranian nuclear crisis.

 

Conducting Interviews and Networking

Thanks to the UACES scholarship, I had the privilege of conducting interviews with EU officials in prominent institutions, including the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Parliament. These enlightening conversations offered unique perspectives on the EU’s involvement in the Iranian nuclear crisis, providing a crucial empirical foundation for my thesis. Analyzing the rich data collected during my interviews, I hope to contribute to the academic discourse on the EU’s international actorness and autonomy.

Moreover, this research trip facilitated valuable collaborations and networking opportunities. I was honored to be a visiting researcher at both Kent University’s Brussels School of International Studies and at the Université libre de Bruxelles. These research stays not only provided me with essential resources such as libraries, internet facilities, and academic working spaces, but also connected me with respected researchers and experts specializing in the Iranian nuclear crisis and European politics. The guidance and support from these esteemed host institutions significantly enhanced the quality and depth of my research, fostering an environment of intellectual exchange and interdisciplinary engagement

 

Concluding the Benefits

As my fieldwork research in Brussels drew to a close, I felt a deep sense of gratitude and accomplishment. The UACES scholarship not only provided the means for me to conduct in-depth interviews but also enabled me to immerse myself in the vibrant political landscape of the European Union. The knowledge and insights gained from this research trip will undoubtedly shape my future academic pursuits and significantly contribute to my thesis research, shedding light on the EU’s role in the Iranian nuclear crisis and its broader actorness in international affairs.

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A UACES Microgrant Report

 

Europe has been facing a decade of crises. From the financial and refugee crises of the early and mid-2010s, to the Covid pandemic opening the new decade and the looming threat of climate change. These are some of the recurrent topics at the CES 29th International Conference of Europeanists, hosted by the University of Iceland in Reykjavik. The theme of the event, Europe’s Past, Present and Future: Utopias and Dystopias, invited multidisciplinary reflections about the successes and failures of European integration, as well as finding a way forward.

 

Hungary and Poland and their stance toward Russia

Arguably, Europe finds itself at a crossroads. Democracy has been in steady decline in multiple countries, nationalist and populist narratives have been dominating the political discourse and shifting priorities on pan-continental cooperation, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has once again brought war on European soil. My research focuses on the European Union, and in the paper I presented at the conference, I discussed the effect of democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland on the EU’s response to Russia’s war of aggression. Analysing the diverging responses of these two member states’ governments highlights the pitfalls and contradictions of their ideologies. Hungary, for example, has remained aligned with Russia, spreading Russian disinformation and validating narratives of a perceived Western responsibility in the conflict, despite itself being a NATO and EU member. Poland, on the contrary, has staunchly condemned Russia and provided an unmatched level of aid to Ukraine, urging its Western allies to up their efforts accordingly. Nevertheless, the leading PiS party and government continue to erode democracy at home and have instrumentalised the conflict to claim that EU institutions are weak and serving Russian interests in an attempt to justify their rejection of supranational oversight.

 

“In Europe, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit”

These are only some of the paradoxes of nationalism as seen in Hungary, Poland, Russia, and on the rise in other European countries, which was itself a central theme of the CES conference. In the opening keynote speech, the President of Iceland Guðni Th. Jóhannesson offered some enlightening remarks on the topic “In Europe, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit. Presidents and Academics, Nationalism and Objectivity.” As an academic turned head of state, President Jóhannesson provided his personal account about the need to reconcile national interests, unity and pride, with the objectivity of academic rigour and both the freedom and duty to be critical of past mistakes.

 

UACES Microgrant

Thanks to the UACES microgrant, I was able to attend three days of panels and discussion which greatly nurtured my own research, as well as being able to present my paper and receive feedback from esteemed academics and fellow early-career researchers. With both, the invasion of Ukraine and the rule of law crisis being popular topics across multiple disciplines, this was an exceptional opportunity that would not have been possible without the support of UACES. I am confident that what I have learned and the connections I have made will enrich my research and will help inform my future teaching endeavours. For that I am very grateful.

 

 

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Andrew Gunn

The UK Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) has returned following revisions, but how has it changed? Are we any nearer to solving the wicked problem of measuring university teaching? And why did England, which already has mature quality assurance arrangements, need to introduce the TEF in the first place?

 

New Framework

This September will see universities in England receive new Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) ratings. The TEF is a national scheme designed to assess universities for ‘excellence’ in teaching, learning and student outcomes for undergraduate level education.  It confers Olympic-medal-inspired awards of gold, silver, or bronze— which the UK government sees as a way of incentivising universities to deliver excellence in the areas that matter most to students.

For the last few years, the TEF – which produced its first set of results seven years ago – has been on hiatus. During this time, the framework has been revised and methodological work has been undertaken to develop new ways of measuring university teaching.

With this work complete, in January, all higher education providers with over 500 students were required to enter the scheme. This involves a written submission which is considered alongside a set of indicators, which includes responses to the National Student Survey and metrics on student continuation and completion. This evidence is assessed by TEF panels, comprised of academics with leadership responsibilities and students with experience of representing their peers.

New features for this round of the TEF include an independent student submission, designed to provide insights into what it is like to be a student at a particular provider. Although this component is optional, 204 student submissions from 228 participating institutions were received.

Another change is a clearer distinction between student experience and student outcomes in the framework. To reflect this, in addition to all providers receiving one overall Olympic-medal style award they will also receive two underpinning ratings – one for student outcomes and another for student experience – to signal where a provider excels in one aspect.

 

Time for Transparency

The TEF can be seen as a response to a range of calls for universities to be subject to greater transparency. What if quality assurance is not enough? What if we don’t just want to assure or enhance quality but measure performance and compare a university with another? These drivers account for the UK government’s decision to introduce the TEF, and its continued commitment to the scheme in the face of sustained criticism. The TEF can therefore be viewed as more of a transparency tool than a quality assessment.

We can see a movement in the last two decades calling for more information on how well universities perform. Rather than assuring quality, this is about assessing and comparing performance. We need to know how things are, not what we think they should be. In other words, we need to know how well universities perform in the game, not what the rules of the game are.

This trend can be seen in the work of Dirk Van Damme, then Head of the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation at the OECD, who wrote in 2009 about the need for new ‘transparency-enhancing regulatory systems’.

Reflecting on the effects of the Bologna Process at that time, Van Damme talked of the need for:

“a system which provides information on the essential dimensions of programme and institutional diversity in higher education, not driven by ex ante types of regulatory divisions, but on evidence-based ex post documentation. The number of dimensions should be sufficient to allow for a fair assessment of institutions and programmes, but not too many, allowing easy consumption of the information and avoiding information overload.” (Van Damme, 2009 p. 51)

Greater transparency was required, Van Damme argued, as quality assurance and accreditation systems “cannot fully satisfy the demand for transparency” as they do not present information to the public in a single format they can easily absorb.

 

Teaching and Transparency

Signally the quality of universities is, of course, a role now fulfilled by the rankings that are widely reported in the media. However, even if we set aside the methodological issues, there is a problem with using rankings – they are largely concerned with research. The absence of teaching in rankings creates a rationale for new transparency tools focusing on university teaching. And if we want to know about university teaching, do we also need to measure learning and student outcomes?

However, as van der Wende and Westerheijden (2009) point out, we are immediately confronted with the longstanding problem: “there are, in fact, no widely accepted methods for measuring teaching quality” and it “is even more difficult, it seems, to generate data based on measures of the value added during the educational process”.

Over the last two decades work has been undertaken to address this problem. Those following European endeavours in this area will recall the OECD’s abandoned Assessment of Higher Education Learning Outcomes (AHELO) project. The failure of this project reminds us that measuring what students have ‘learned’ or ‘gained’ is no easier than measuring teaching quality.

 

The TEF and Transparency

The TEF can been seen as an English response to the calls for greater transparency, and an attempt to address the ‘wicked problem’ of measuring university teaching and learning. As my book Teaching Excellence? Universities in an age of student consumerism identifies, comparisons can be drawn between the difficulties encountered by AHELO and the development of ‘Learning Gain’ metrics for the TEF.

The book charts the development of the TEF from its announcement in 2015, through its various revisions, to its current iteration. This story provides insights into the methodological work undertaken to measure university teaching. Several new metrics were developed and piloted, including: graduate earnings, teaching intensity to measure contact time, and learning gain to assess the ‘journey travelled’ by students. Of note is why some of the new metrics did not make the grade and do not feature in the revised scheme.

Teaching Excellence? Universities in an age of student consumerism also looks at the role of the TEF in providing information to applicants in the more liberalised market. Here, the UK government originally envisaged the TEF as helping consumers to make an informed choice on where to study. For example, universities rated gold would attract more students.

However, as the book explores, the limitations of the TEF as a measure of teaching quality also hamper its ability to inform choice. Moreover, reducing the performance of a whole university to one medal rating is questionable, and comparing institutions – even within one country with the same quality arrangements – is difficult.

The story of the TEF is of value as it contributes to the debate on how to measure teaching and learning in higher education. The lessons learnt from the TEF, including the aspects that did not work, provide a benchmark for scholars and other systems to learn from.

 

Andrew Gunn is a Lecturer at the University of Manchester (UK) and the author of Teaching Excellence? Universities in an age of student consumerism published by SAGE.

 

References:

Van Damme, D. (2009). The search for transparency: Convergence and diversity in the Bologna Process. In van Vught, F. (Ed.). Mapping the higher education landscape. Towards a European classification on higher education, (pp.39-55), Springer.

Van der Wende, M., & Westerheijden, D. (2009). Rankings and classifications: The need for a multidimensional approach. In van Vught, F. (Ed.). Mapping the higher education landscape. Towards a European classification of higher education, (pp.71-86), Springer.

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A mild detour for me before the summer holidays kick in: the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Part of the wider logic of ‘taking back control’ was the need to unshackle the UK from other constraints on its freedom to do as it will, in order to address situations it faces. Just as leaving the EU was framed as becoming a more nimble and flexible international partner, so too has the status of the ECHR long been a sore point when it comes to managing migration, asylum and deportations.

The long saga of the Rwanda policy (Note to self: must make a graphic to try an unpick the logic) has only reinvigorated this latter point. Tory backbenchers talk about ‘leaving the ECHR’ now, just as they have done for some time, to allow the government to implement its democratically-agreed policy.

The graphic below takes such comments at face value. It explains how a state ‘leaves the ECHR’ (basically, you write a letter and wait six months), but also the various consequences.

The aim here is to highlight the interconnected nature of laws and of treaties: obligations towards the ECHR aren’t only found in the ECHR treaty itself.

None of what’s here is particularly new: Steve Peers wrote extensively about this within weeks of the TCA’s sign-off in early 2021, for example.

“That’s not what they meant”

When I posted this yesterday, the response was interesting, in that various people came back to argue that none of this was really about ‘leaving the ECHR’ (despite that being literally what was being said), but about ‘leaving the Court’.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is created by the ECHR Convention to adjudicate on cases relating to provisions (Article 19, fact fans). A simple explanation would be that the ECtHR is the ECHR equivalent of the European Court of Justice in the EU, i.e. the final arbiter of the relevant provisions. That means those resident within ECHR signatories can ultimately take their cases up to Strasbourg for a ruling, which national courts then have to abide by.

In the UK case, there was a long period when that was pretty much the only way people could rely on ECHR provisions, because successive British governments hadn’t wanted to incorporate the Convention into domestic law. You still had the protection of the various provisions, but you had to make a lot of effort to enforce them.

This changed with the Human Rights Act 1998, which essentially gave people access to ECHR remedies from domestic courts. But doesn’t change the basic nature of British membership of the ECHR.

Which brings us back to the critique mentioned.

Maybe backbenchers want to bin the Human Rights Act. That they can certainly do, but it wouldn’t stop those pesky activists securing remedies and rulings from the ECtHR, so it’s not really a solution to their basic problem.

Maybe, as one person argued, it’s literally about the UK not being part of the ECtHR, while still being in the ECHR.

Without wanting to go all Donald Tusk, this is cherry-picking in its purest form.

The ECHR Convention only provides for complete denunciation (Article 58): you leave a bit, you leave completely. If the UK wanted to try for not having the ECtHR provisions apply to it, then it would have to secure a formal renegotiation of the Convention and the approval of the other members.

[Spoiler: those members aren’t going to agree to this]

In short, none of these paths are viable: being in the ECHR is like being pregnant – you either are or you aren’t.

Rule Britannia

The underlying tone in all of this debate is very much akin to that found in the Brexit debates: why can’t we just do what we want to?

The notion of the UK as a great nation, not to be told what to do, is a strong and pervasive one. But it also leads us to think that just because we want to do things in a particular way, others must let us.

One of the big takeaways I have from the past decade has been that international politics is about the clash of what everybody wants and that no one gets to decide things by themselves.

You want to make international arrangements? You need to get your international partners to agree.

You want to make a choice about something with an international dimension? You need to accept that others will react to that.

Which isn’t to say that ECHR membership is good or bad; just that it requires us to understand what that means and how it works.

PDF: bit.ly/UshGraphic122

 

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A conversation with Luca Augé: For our podcast by UACES, the University Association for European Studies, we welcome Luca Augé, Ph.D. Candidate at the Centre for Research on the English-Speaking World at Université Sorbonne Nouvelle, in Paris.

 

UACES Podcasts · Luca Augé on Boris Johnson, Brexit and the Conservative Party: end of a love story?

 

Transcript of the interview is as follows:

 

 

On 15 June 2023, the House of Commons Privileges Committee found that former Prime Minister Boris Johnson “deliberately misled the House” in regards to the so-called partygate scandals. What happened exactly and why does this matter?

 

The events of the last few days are actually part of a longer and older unfolding political drama. Since 2021, British media have uncovered around 15 parties that were attended by members of the Conservative government including then Prime Minister Boris Johnson during the different Covid-19 lockdowns in the UK. This was in breach with the public health regulations at the time and several individuals like Johnson himself were fined for being present at these parties.

As the public outcry at the time was widespread, a parliamentary inquiry was set up in order to look at the claims made by Johnson before MPs that he believed these parties to be lawful. After months of investigation, the final report was of the inquiry was published on 15 June 2023 and found that indeed Johnson had misled Parliament by making inaccurate claims. This matters as a former Prime Minister and elected Member of Parliament of the governing Conservative Party is found by a cross-party Committee to have lied to Parliament. It has clearly wide-ranging political and democratic consequences.

 

 

How did Johnson, the Conservative Party and the current Prime Minister Rishi Sunak react?

 

This is where things get complicated. Johnson could have accepted the findings of the report and Prime Minister Rishi Sunak could have suspended Johnson or asked his party to endorse the findings of the report, but none of this happened.

Even before the report was published, Johnson announced his resignation as Member of Parliament and called in a statement the inquiry a “kangaroo court”. He even initially pushed his remaining allies to vote against the report before calling it off.

The conclusions of the report also impacted directly the Conservative Party. Two Johnson allies resigned as MPs triggering potentially dangerous by-elections for the party. Several others reacted in support of Johnson accusing instead the Committee itself. When Parliament voted on the report on 20 June, only 7 Conservative MPs officially voted against the report, but 224 Conservative MPs so around a two thirds of the party didn’t participate.

This stance is interestingly reflected by the Conservative Party leader and current Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. Sunak also didn’t participate in the vote and didn’t publicly express any opinion on the matter. Such a move might be surprising for someone who promised “integrity, professionalism and accountability at every level” on the very day he became Prime Minister and who could have used the report to assert this as one of his priorities. Instead, his stance can be understood as an attempt to calm things down within the Conservative Party by not frontally discrediting Johnson.

 

 

Sunak was Johnson’s Chancellor of the Exchequer from 2020 to 2022 and has tried to depart from Johnson’s legacy in government since becoming Prime Minister. Where does this leave the government and the UK in terms of policy-making?

 

You’re right. Sunak immediately tried to open a new era of government away from the more turbulent Johnson Premiership and the much shorter Truss Premiership. Already in terms of character, Sunak is more pragmatic and cautious than Johnson. In terms of governance, Sunak also worked upon closing some of the ongoing issues than started under Johnson. He signed the Windsor Agreement that stabilised the previously rather tense relationship with the European Union and has trusted Hunt as Chancellor to support the struggling British economy.

Under Sunak, the UK government is more subtle than under his predecessors. However, the Conservative Party on which he relies to govern continues to unfold in intra-party divisions and tensions. This will be problematic in the wake of the upcoming General Election scheduled for within the next 18 months and is already increasing the probability of the Conservative Party being pushed into the opposition.

 

 

You haven’t mentioned Brexit which was completed more than 2 years ago. With Johnson’s resignation and Sunak’s more pragmatic style does Brexit still play a role in British politics?

 

As shown since the 2016 referendum, Brexit still plays role in British politics and especially within the Conservative Party. In his resignation statement, Johnson said that there was supposedly “a witch hunt under way, to take revenge for Brexit and ultimately to reverse the 2016 referendum result” and called upon Sunak to “show how we are making the most of Brexit”. For Johnson and his allies, Brexit continues to be a rallying issue that structures their approach of political and institutional dynamics. Sunak, even if he signed the Windsor Agreement and went back on his decision to massively revoke retained EU law,  has no plans to question the Brexit mantra that dominates the Conservative Party since 2016.

Johnson’s resignation and the debate around the inquiry report showed again how divided the Conservative Party is. It also interestingly showed how even if Johnson is personally sidelined, his influence continues to a certain extent over parts of the party and his realisation of Brexit remains a unchangeable status quo for the Conservative Party even under more pragmatic Prime Ministers like Sunak. The question, of course, is how much of this will hold while the party is losing ground and might join the opposition benches.

 

Let’s see indeed how things unfold in British politics until the next General Election in 2024. Many thanks, Luca, for this update on British politics and the Conservative Party. I recall you are a PhD candidate at the Université Sorbonne Nouvelle in Paris. And I trust we keep in touch. Thank you.

 

 

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This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum 2023 (8-9 June, at IBEI, Barcelona). 

 

In the past decade two EU member states– Hungary and Poland– have experienced a process of rule of law backsliding which both threatens the state of democracy at home and the decision making and legitimacy of the European Union as a whole. The rule of law or autocracy crisis that has since engulfed the EU has been characterised by scholars as “existential”  Following the blueprint of Putinism, the governments of Hungary and Poland have systemically annihilated checks and balances by restricting judicial independence, freedom of expression, minority rights and independent scrutiny.  

In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, bringing war to Europe once more and putting the EU’s unity and cooperation to the test. In the face of Russian aggression, the response of Hungary and Poland has been diametrically opposed, but equally damaging to the rule of law in the EU.  

 

Doubling Down: the Hungarian Reaction 

On one hand, Hungary has embraced its position as Russia’s closest ally. Viktor Orbán has long been considered e a “Trojan horse” as he promotes Putin’s interests within Western institutions. Moreover, the war of aggression has not deterred continued cooperation between the two countries: the Hungarian government leverages its veto powers in the Council to defend Russian interests, namely by blocking sanctions, or watering down aid packages towards Ukraine.  

Conversely, the need for unanimity in matters related to the EU’s response to the invasion has granted Hungary a powerful bargaining chip to avoid supranational oversight into its domestic rule of law issues and to obtain the (partial) deployment of EU funds despite its failure to meet the necessary requirements with regards to the respect of EU values. As such, Hungary has been able to hold decision-making hostage and weaken the action of the EU on both fronts, while simultaneously continuing its erosion of its domestic checks and balances. 

 

Poland’s Contradictory Narratives 

On the other hand, Poland has become the strongest advocate for a united response against Russia. Relations with the Kremlin have been tense since the end of the Cold War and were further exacerbated by the PiS government, in spite of its closeness with Hungary and its use of backsliding techniques which closely resemble Putin’s own systemic state capture. Having been proven right about Russia’s danger, Poland has now placed itself as a world leader in defence of Ukraine, earning a lot of goodwill on the international stage.  

As a result, the EU has let the Polish government off the hook and been much less strict towards Poland than it has to Hungary. Nevertheless, positive steps towards cooperation in one area should not raise hopes for systemic compliance with EU values. Indeed, in the shadow of the war, the government continues its crusade against free judges, recently passing a piece of legislation nicknamed “Lex Tusk.” This new provision, which is outwardly meant to contrast Russian influence, could be used to prevent opposition candidates like former European Council president Donald Tusk from running for election. Interestingly, this method is not dissimilar from that used by Putin to exclude Alexey Navalny from the 2018 Russian elections.  

 

A Challenge and an Opportunity? 

After years of negotiating and compromising, the EU faces yet another juggling act: keeping its resident autocrats at bay while navigating the pressure of war at its footsteps. However, this crisis could also offer an opportunity to strike at a time in which both Hungary and Poland are in dire need of support from the Union: Hungary is dependent on EU funds to keep its economy afloat, while Poland also seeks reassurance on the security front.  

At this time, keeping EU values on the agenda could be crucial. The activation of the so-called Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation with respect to Hungary and the latest infringement proceedings launched by the Commission against Poland in response to Lex Tusk are welcome displays of strength and commitment towards democracy. But while a degree of optimism is warranted, it is paramount that EU institutions hold their ground to finally enforce their values. 

 

Fighting Two Crises at Once 

The paradox of Hungary and Poland’s different responses to Russia’s belligerent turn is perhaps not surprising, but it serves as a moment of reckoning for the Union. The respective aspiring autocrats rely on the benefits of EU membership for their survival, even though their actions undermine it from within. The multiple contradictions shown by each government highlight the need for strong leadership from the EU to keep its values of democracy and respect for the rule of law at the forefront, and not let rogue governments hold decision-making hostage. Now is the time to be tough on autocrats in and outside their borders and fulfil the EU’s potential as a defender and promoter of democracy. 

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This is an extended version of a blog originally posted with UK in a Changing Europe by Simon Usherwood and David Moloney.

The conclusion of the Windsor Framework has rightly been taken as a moment for UK-EU relations to reset. As part of that, belated notice has fallen on the review clause of the Trade & Cooperation Agreement (TCA). The provision sets up five-yearly reviews of this cornerstone treaty between the two parties and has been seen by some in the UK as a place to engage in wholesale renegotiation of relations. By contrast, the EU is pointing towards a much more technical exercise, while others still point to the potential for further tensions.

We argue here that given the vagueness of the provision, what actually happens is primarily a function of what the two parties decide to make of it and as a result there is much still to be settled. If the review is to produce anything of substance, then both Brussels and London need to agree on a process and a realistic set of objectives.

 

The context

Article 776 of the TCA is short and to the point:

“The Parties shall jointly review the implementation of this Agreement and supplementing agreements and any matters related thereto five years after the entry into force of this Agreement and every five years thereafter.”

It’s a provision that can be found in a number of other agreements concluded by the EU in recent years, such as with New Zealand on data exchange for law enforcement or with the US on Passenger Name Records. It differs from provisional application provisions (like for the EU-Canada trade deal) that were historically more common in that the agreement is in full effect and there’s no explicit mention of having to pass a hurdle to move to a permanent arrangement. As such, it’s also not quite the same as the six-yearly review in the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement, where specific options are listed, including deciding to terminate it all.

Notably, international law on treaties is silent on such reviews. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is the standard benchmark in such matters, sets out how contracting parties can invalidate, terminate, withdraw from or suspend a treaty, but leaves it to case-by-case choices on reviews.

Instead, it’s best understood as a primarily technical process, largely reflecting the increasingly technical nature of provisions and the need for the joining up of numerous national systems and processes. Note that it speaks about reviewing the ‘implementation’, rather than the TCA itself. The terse and generic formulation does not explicitly engage any of the numerous bodies created by the TCA nor require any formal approval or even acknowledgement by the two parties.

Indeed, this is best underlined by the question of timing. While many in the UK have suggested that the five year period would be concluded by 30 December 2025 or 1 May 2026 (five years since the provisional or full application respectively), the EU has more recently suggested that the latter date would be the start of any review. Given that the UK has not pushed back on this, the latter timetable is more than likely to prevail, especially since various parts of the TCA have still yet to come into effect.

However, a technical process does not preclude political engagement alongside it. None of the other cases mentioned have covered nearly so much as the TCA does, nor were any of them produced under such pressure of time and politicisation. Which is to suggest that there are three logical paths that might be followed from 2025 into 2026.

Three pathways

The minimalist model is the most obvious, given the comments just made. If it followed the pattern of other agreements, the two parties would engage in no more than a technical check on implementation, underpinned by reports from the various sectoral committees, with a view to addressing any emergent issues and to refining processes.

This approach would be kept away from politicians, except in some final approval through the TCA’s Partnership Council, possibly accompanied by some declarations about actions to attend to whatever procedural or bureaucratic barriers inhibit the implementation of the treaty as it stands.

The attraction here is that it fits closely with much of modern international treaty management: no new negotiations or big political displays to coordinate, just technocratic optimisation by the people actually doing the work. If we assume that any new agreements – within or outside the TCA itself – would run on their own timetable, then this periodic check helps ensure more general ticking over of the machinery, albeit without offering an opportunity for more structural reform.

Such reform is however one of the major reasons the review is now receiving attention in the UK. The possibility of a new Labour government from the next general election has prompted calls for a root-and-branch recasting of relations. The review might, in this maximalist view, become the moment on which that turns.

The May 2026 start would come some 18 months into a new UK government, giving them time to organise themselves around a new mandate and to get going on the rest of their manifesto programme. With some practical demonstration of British good faith and a clearer picture of how an opposition Conservative party moves on the issue, the EU might be persuaded that the TCA review be rolled into a wider reconsideration of relations.

This would require both sides to establish specific mandates to negotiate. In the EU’s case, that would need the approval of member states and widespread consultation. If the ambition were to stretch to discussing participation in the EU’s single market, then the status and operation of the Northern Ireland Protocol could also come under inspection, meaning London would have to work closely with Belfast, where the (non-)existence of the Executive might become yet more relevant.

Such procedural hurdles are matched by the political risks. The EU knows well from the failed decade of negotiations with the Swiss over recasting their relations that even where there are clear logics of organisation or of trade, this does not automatically produce mutually-acceptable outcomes. The memory of the negotiations with the UK of both the Withdrawal Agreement and the TCA itself will also linger long in Brussels, where it was noted that these were difficult not only because of the Prime Minister but also because the UK has its own interests and preferences. To take a more recent example of this, talks on rejoining the EU’s Horizon research programme – flagged as an easy win back at the signing of the Windsor Framework this spring – have become bogged down in questions of finance.

If neither a very limited nor a full-on approach feel satisfactory, then a mixed model might seem to square the circle.

Rather than starting with an explicit intention of recasting relations, the framing would instead be one of a desire for broad reflection on how the UK and EU work together. Here the TCA review would become part of the evaluation of what does and doesn’t work and what might be the steps to address that. The door would be left open to negotiations or treaty amendments, but pushed down the line.

2025 and 2026 would therefore see increased contact between the parties, at both political and technical levels, with joint working groups drawing in consultation from relevant groups to produce options for consideration. By removing any initial obligation to particular outcomes, this might encourage engagement from a wider range of participants and improve the chances of producing more stable and resilient systems.

However, that same flexibility and open-ended approach risks creating a permanent instability, where each side speaks of wanting to improve things but without both being able to agree on how to do it. With the constant cycle of national elections in EU member states, quite aside from the vagaries of British politics, the lack of ability to be confident about holding a consensus long enough to translate it into a firm commitment of some kind points to potentially destabilising a relationship that has only just started to find its feet.

What matters

Ultimately, the review clause is an empty vessel, waiting to be used as the UK and EU see best, so far as they can agree on what that actually means. Unless and until they achieve a consensus on an approach, then even the minimalist model might look over-articulated.

So what will determine whether and how the two sides find a common understanding?

Firstly, the position of whatever British government is in office will be crucial. Is there a clear and reasonable strategy behind its European policy? Is it ready to invest sufficient political capital on an issue that most voters aren’t that interested in to overcome any domestic opposition, including from those on the other side of the Commons? If there is any doubt in EU minds on these points, then there is very little interest in doing anything more than the bare minimum.

Secondly, the EU itself matters. While the post-Brexit period has seen a big push towards strengthening international trade partnerships and while the invasion of Ukraine has stimulated cooperation on security, that might not still be the case in 2026, especially if all of the obvious actions have already been taken. Member states have many other policy priorities to work on, so is a return to working with the UK important enough to merit the effort?

And finally, we have to consider the TCA itself. At this stage, it is impossible to make a balanced judgement about its operation, especially given that various parts of it have yet to start operating at all. If the next three years end up with a piling up of problems (as we are starting to see with rules of origin on car batteries, for example) then pressure for a more involved review might build. Conversely, as market operators and politicians adjust to the much calmer post-Johnson world of working together, a low-key approach may prevail.

However it plays out, the bigger message is that it’s only by working together that the two are going to be able to make mutually-acceptable and durable decisions.

The post What could the review of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement actually be like? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

 

This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum 2023 (8-9 June, at IBEI, Barcelona).

 

The European Union’s (EU) innovation policies are characterized by their evolutionary dynamics and remain a subject of substantial scholarly attention. A report of the European Parliamentary Research Service (2016) explains that initially, innovation was primarily associated with the establishment of a research-related policy, which later became connected to industrial policies. The first action plan that aimed to promote innovation at the European level was only adopted 1996. This plan was specifically developed to address the ‘European paradox,’ which refers to Europe’s limited ability to transform scientific advancements into successful industrial and commercial outcomes.  

Subsequently, policy recognition of the role of technological innovation has increased, being spurred by rising concerns about Europe’s technological leadership and technological sovereignty. Yet, despite seemingly greater policy attention, in 2012 Lipkova observed that the EU lags behind the world’s leading innovators – the United States, Japan and South Korea. A more recent 2021 analytical report, prepared for the European Parliament, cautioned that Europe faces challenges in commercialising scientific research achievements. According to the report’s global comparative perspective, non-European enterprises are responsible for the bulk of currently successful business models and products. 

 

Fostering Innovation

The EU’s commitment to fostering and promoting innovation has now become a cornerstone of its economic and social policies, driving growth and development. However, understanding the conceptual strengths and weaknesses of pan-European innovation policy requires re-engagement with classical scholarship. Joseph Schumpeter’s seminal work on the theorization of the dynamics of economic change– as a result of long-term technological change and attendant productivity enhancement– is particularly relevant. His concept of ‘creative destruction’ is noteworthy as it captures the process by which new innovations and ideas displace established ones, leading to the destruction of old industries and the creation of new ones. However, despite its merits, Schumpeter’s classical analysis has been criticised for placing technology in a ‘black box’ – i.e., neglecting to theorise it comprehensively. While acknowledging the importance of innovation and technological capabilities for productivity growth, Neo-Schumpeterian scholars argue for a more systemic and broader contextual understanding of the innovation process. Inspired by this approach, this discussion will explore the the relevance of neo-Schumpeterian analytical perspectives on understanding the evolution of European innovation policy. 

 

Smart Specialization Strategy (S3)

One of the key mechanisms through which the EU has sought to promote innovation is the Smart Specialization Strategy (S3), which aims to identify and build on the unique strengths and competitive advantages of different regions within Europe. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), governments adopt the S3 to create policies that are responsive to market signals. This approach enables governments to harness the skills, resources, and competencies of the enterprise sector, thereby fostering innovation and creating new comparative advantages. 

Since its conceptualisation in 2009, the S3 has played a significant role in shaping the EU’s regional cohesion and innovation policy. Dominique Foray (2018), an eminent theorist of the strategy, explains that each region is distinguished by its capacities, requirements, and possibilities. The scholar argues in favour of a particular type of regional specialisation: one that capitalises on regional assets or potentials, rather than a strategy that disperses Research & Development (R&D) funding thinly across a number of frontier technologies and research sectors. According to Foray, David and Hall (2009), if European regions attempt to create similar programs in an imitative manner, this could result in an overabundance of duplicated Research & Development and educational investment, ultimately reducing ‘the potential for complementarities within the European knowledge base.’  

While existing literature on S3’s strategy suggest that it is grounded in a Schumpeterian emphasis on innovation and economic growth, the mechanism for innovation aligns more closely with neo-Schumpeterian perspectives on the critical roles of technological change and knowledge creation as key drivers of economic growth and development. As a result, the S3 strategy makes several significant contributions to European innovation policy.  

 

The Benefits of the S3 strategy

Firstly, shifting the focus from individual entrepreneurs to regional strengths, S3 re-scales the innovation process from a Schumpeterian entrepreneurial micro-scale or a pan-European policy landscape to the scalar construct of European regions. This encourages regions to focus on their key advantages in order to develop innovative solutions that can create new economic opportunities. The S3 framework also highlights the systemic nature of innovation as a process within Regional Innovation Systems (RIS), while emphasising the need for policy efforts to promote RIS. Moreover, the strategy acknowledges the complex and dynamic nature of innovation by stressing the importance of fostering diverse interactions among various RIS stakeholders.  

Furthermore, collaboration is highlighted as an important mode of interaction among the innovation system’s actors– universities, research institutes, and businesses– as it facilitates the development and implementation of innovative solutions to regional challenges. Emphasising the role of knowledge and learning in the innovation process, the strategy valuably recognises the importance of continuous knowledge exchange among stakeholders. Finally, by embracing a symbiotic connection between the key concepts of the S3 strategy, European regions can enhance their competitiveness and innovation in the global market. Adopting this strategic approach enables all actors involved in an innovation system to leverage their strengths and work together more effectively. 

 

Conclusion

This article accentuates the significance of neo-Schumpeterian analytical perspectives for understanding the evolution of European innovation policy. The Smart Specialisation Strategy (S3) has become attuned to the regional diversity of the European innovation landscape, as well as to the diversity of RIS stakeholders and their interactions. In recognising and developing regional strengths and capacities, the S3 policy aligns with neo-Schumpeterian approaches to innovation, thereby emphasising the symbiotic nature of key RIS characteristics. In summary, the S3 framework provides a useful lens for understanding the evolution of European innovation policy and the importance of RIS in driving economic development forward. 

 

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This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum 2023 (8-9 June, at IBEI, Barcelona). 

 

The Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) was “a citizens-focused, bottom-up exercise for Europeans to have their say on what they expect from the European Union”. Although organised by the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council, other actors were invited to participate in the CoFoE to  “reach every corner of the EU” and “bring Europe closer to the citizens”.  Notably, local and regional authorities (LRAs) were involved.  

The latter, as the participatory democracy research shows, are in a better position to involve citizens in the decision-making process than their European counterparts, which could contribute to the success of the CoFoE.  Yet, this depends on whether the LRAs decided to get involved in the Conference. In this article, I will evaluate the involvement of LRAs in the conference, based on research conducted among Polish local and regional authorities. 

 

Local and Regional Authorities: The Polish Picture

The study aimed to determine if LRAs: (1) informed the citizens about the CoFoE; (2) organised events within CoFoE’s framework and (3) took part in the events organised by other entities. Consisting of 179 selected LRAs, the study population was divided into three categories: (1) LRAs “institutionally involved at the EU level” (through the Committee of the Regions, Regional Office in Brussels or CoFoE’s plenary); (2) LRAs from the chosen Region (Pomorskie Region) and (3) LRAs of the capital cities of the regions. Regarding levels of involvement in the CoFoE conference, I expected  the LRAs gathered in the first category to be most active as they have direct ties with the EU institutions. 

The results demonstrate a lack of involvement by most LRAs with the CoFoE. Of 179 LRAs, only 26 have undertaken at least one activity (of mentioned above) regarding the CoFoE. This means that 85% of the study population did not get involved. For LRAs “institutionally involved at the EU level”, 19 out of 35 can be classified as active. Furthermore, only 8% of LRAs from the Pomorskie Region, and only 4 of 18 capital cities participated in any CoFoE activities.  

 

EU Institutional Involvement and CoFoE: a Reality?

At first sight it is evident that LRAs involved with “institutional involvement at the EU level” determined a higher rate of engagement within the CoFoE. Yet, this engagement is based significantly on the actions of the 15 regional authorities as participants. If excluded from the “institutional involvement” category, only 5 active authorities would be left. In Poland, it seems that regional authorities have adopted the role of the LRAs “involved” at the EU level, but this is incorrect. A CoR, Regional Office or CoFoE plenary does not mark an involvement with the EU at an institutional level. 

Another conclusion that we can draw from the results is that the CoFoE failed to “reach every corner of the EU” – at least in Poland. For instance, out of 80 rural municipalities in the study population, only 1 can be classified as active. None of the 19 urban-rural municipalities got involved. And in the case of the urban municipalities, 7 out of 43 took at least one action. As highlighted earlier, the CoFoE did not even manage to engage the vast part of the “institutionally involved” LRAs. Therefore, more than one initiative (even as big as the CoFoE) is required to break institutional habits. 

 

Changing Outlooks: Europe through the Regions?

I would like to conclude this article by pointing to another reason to engage with this topic:  the CoFoE’s new logic  in favour of LRAs’ involvement at the EU level. Up to the Conference, the CoFoE’s approach was based on the “Europe with the Regions” model which focused on the authorities alone, and implicitly assumed that it would lead to the involvement of the citizens (which proved not to be the case). On the contrary, the CoFoE’s model explicitly demanded from the LRAs to engage the people. This approach follows the European Commission’s  2022 initiative called “Building Europe with Local Councillors”. Could we be heading for “Europe through the Regions”? That is for the future research to determine. 

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by Karin Leijon, Uppsala University

The judicial dialogue between the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and national courts in the preliminary ruling procedure (Article 267 TFEU) is regarded as crucial for the functioning of the EU legal system because it aims to ensure a uniform application of EU law in all member states. The procedure allows (and sometimes requires) national courts that are unsure about how to interpret the EU legal provision in a case to submit a question to the CJEU and ask the supranational court to provide a preliminary ruling on the matter.

Why national courts either engage in the procedure or refrain from doing so is important for understanding the driving forces of EU legal integration. In my recently published JCMS article, I explore the circumstances under which national judges rely on different considerations, such formal rules, personal preferences and professional norms, when making decisions in the preliminary ruling procedure. I find that the judges’ motives for action vary depending on the prescriptive clarity of EU legal frameworks but not exactly how we would have expected it to. I further show that judges find themselves to be bound to follow both formal EU law and non-written professional norms regarding how judges “should” behave when interacting with the supreme EU court. This suggests that if we want national courts to be more active in the preliminary ruling procedure, professional norms are an important tool.

Logics of human action and prescriptive clarity of legal frameworks

Under what circumstances are we acting based on calculations of expected consequences, and under what circumstances are our actions following from what formal (and informal) rules prescribe as appropriate?  One answer to this perennial question in social science research is that how actors choose to behave and make decisions will vary depending on the prescriptive clarity of legal frameworks. We expect that if legal frameworks have a high degree of clarity, meaning that they are precise, consistent, and binding, then these frameworks will provide actors with clear behavioural guidance. A legal framework that has a high degree of prescriptive clarity makes it more likely for an actor to follow the rule-bound logic of appropriateness than the logic of expected consequences when making decisions. In contrast, when legal frameworks are unclear, actors are expected to make decisions based on the logic of consequences. The low clarity of the legal framework makes space for discretionary action, making it possible for actors to pursue their (self-) interests.

National judges’ key choices: Whether to request preliminary rulings and whether to include statements in the request

First, the judges were asked about their reasons for (or for not) requesting a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. This decision-making situation is regulated by relatively clear legal framework and the judges are therefore expected to express rule-bound motives for action, for example that a request was made because the interpretation of EU law was considered contested and that it then follows from EU law (Article 267) that a request should be made. Second, the judges were asked about their reasons for (or for not) including a statement in the request for a preliminary ruling expressing how they believe that the legal case at hand should be resolved. This decision-making situation is regulated by relatively unclear legal framework, suggesting that judges do not express rule-bound motives for action. Instead, judges are assumed to base their decisions on consequentialist considerations such as deciding to include a statement in the request for a preliminary ruling as a way to influence the CJEU’s interpretation of EU law.

Swedish judges’ motives for action: A mix of considerations

The responses from the interviewed Swedish judges partly support the expectations regarding how clear or unclear legal frameworks matter for judges’ decision making. Contrary to expectations, when EU legal frameworks are clear, the judges did not only consider those frameworks. Instead, they expressed that they also considered professional norms and expected outcomes. For example, some of the judges stated that they decided to refer cases to CJEU to avoid the blame for unpopular decisions, a typical consequentialist motive:

“In our case, for example, it was a scapegoat function really, very clear, one could say. (Q: How do you mean?) It’s not we who are setting aside Swedish law, but it’s actually the European Court of Justice that says that we have to do it—’Look, our hands are tied’—it’s a pretty good feature [of the EU legal system]” (High court judge)

When the clarity of the EU framework is low the judges mainly motivate their decision by invoking professional norms and not consequentialist considerations. Approximately half of the respondents said that they did not state their views in the requests because they found such opinions to be incompatible with the national courts’ role within the EU legal system. The respondents perceived that the expression of opinions undermined their impartiality, as illustrated by the following quote:

“The [national] court should not state its position on the matter because the legal process continues. You have to be impartial until the final decision is made; it’s a basic judicial norm (High court judge).”

Some of the other motives Swedish judges expressed, such as a fear of being criticized and lack of knowledge of EU law are in line with the results from previous work on Dutch, Italian, Croatian and Slovenian judges.

A matter of clarity of both EU legal frameworks and professional norms

The main takeaway of the study is that to understand the actions of national judges in the preliminary ruling procedure we must take into account how not only the clarity of EU legal frameworks but also how presence and clarity of informal norms of appropriate professional conduct may influence the judges’ decisions-making.

This finding led to the following reformulation of expectations regarding clarity of rules and national judges. When legal frameworks are unclear, the uncertainty of the situation leads judges to ask themselves, ‘What is the basis of my professional identity?’ rather than ‘What is the best decision given my personal preferences?’. That is, the lack of clear legal rules makes judges unsure about the discretion they have in a given situation. Instead of consequentialist considerations, judges rely on norms related to their professional role, (such as being impartial). In contrast, when formal rules are clear, then national judges are able to determine which aspects of the procedure, if any, are not regulated. Based on this information, judges can identify the level of discretion they have. That is, judges are aware of what parts of the decision-making process are not guided by formal rules, and in these instances, they may base their decisions on any type of consideration, including consequentialist ones regarding preferred outcomes (such as avoiding blame).

These propositions should be tested in other member states to shed further light on what drives the actions of national judges in EU legal integration.

Dr. Karin Leijon is a researcher at the Department of Government, Uppsala University. You can find her academic profile here. Follow Dr. Karin Leijon on Twitter @koritchi and Uppsala University Department of Government @UU_PoliSci.

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Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research,  we welcome Dr Malin Stegmann-McCallion again, from the University of Karlstad. Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

In January, you gave us an outline on the Swedish Council Presidency, making good use of the “official Spotify playlist” of Swedish songs. So, how would you sum up the last six months?

I would start with quoting one of the most famous songs on that list:

“You’re in the mood for dance, and when you get the chance, you are the dancing queen!”

Let’s apply it to last week’s news around the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. Here I believe we see ourselves a little like the Dancing Queen: of course, we didn’t do a solo, but the Swedish Presidency were able to steer all dancing partners in the right movement, as the agreement reached by all will form the basis of negotiations that the Spanish Presidency can now start with the European Parliament.

I am also slightly more optimistic about our – actually everyone’s – future, especially with regard to the EU’s Fit for 55 climate package, with its focus on decreasing our negative environmental footprints. During the Swedish Presidency, the Council, together with the European Parliament, has reached agreements on renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable aviation fuels to name but a few.

 

That sounds like a reasonably successful Presidency. How much of it is due to the legendary Swedish “culture of consensus”?

Let’s wait for the researchers to do their job. After each previous Presidency, my fellow academics have written more in-depth analyses and I am already very much looking forward to be reading these. We will then see what where the dancing was successful where it could be improved.

 

The last time you spoke to us, you also briefly referred to the domestic truce that is traditionally held during a Presidency, and how difficult it could be this time with a government relying on the support from a Eurosceptic Party, the “Sweden Democrats”.

That’s right. The leader of the Sweden Democrats, in a debate article published by the Aftonbladet newspaper on May 2nd, argued that ‘there are great reasons to evaluate Swedish EU membership’; it is, he continues, ‘no longer an issue of what we can do for EU but what the EU can do for us’ referring to the ‘membership fee’ the country pays.

This was later followed up in another article published in Svenska Dagbladet on May 15th in which the Sweden Democrats state that ‘Sweden should prepare to leave the Union’, not necessarily right away, but because ‘the better our preparedness to leave, the more we will gain in future negotiations’. In this perspective, they say, we should explore how Brexit ‘could have been done better’.

 

That’s a strongly Eurosceptic rhetoric!

It is. At the same time, you should keep in mind that the Swedish general public is today at its most positive and supportive of EU membership since we joined in 1995.

Let me take off my political scientist hat and share my thoughts simply as a well-informed citizen. I would like to ask the Swedish EU presidency team if the domestic quietness has been part of the balancing act in relation to domestic politics. Because this has really been a ‘quiet’ Presidency, and I think it could have been more visible. Holding the presidency is always a chance to explore how we as a member state can influence EU politics, how EU politics influences our daily lives positively, but also to remind citizens that the EU is not something that is distant to us.

I am not saying that as a political system the EU is perfect, no political system is, but we are living in democracies, and I think with an outward glance at political systems elsewhere, living in a democracy is the least worst option. Just as we discuss what is not working within a political system, we should talk about what is working well, and how we today have to work together to reach solutions to common problems/issues/concerns in our societies.

So myself, I am still positive and happy (enough) with how Sweden has handled its EU presidency role.

 

Can we have one last reference to the playlist?

Of course!

And now it’s time for me to get out So tonight I’m gonna dance again To the morning give it all I can…

Well, at least until June next year, when the European elections will offer the chance to see whether and how our 2023 Presidency has impacted the popular discussions on EU membership and policy.

 

Many thanks, Malin, for having been with us at the beginning and at the end of the Swedish Council Presidency dance. I recall you are a professor at the University of Karlstad. Entretien réalisé par Laurence Aubron.

 

 

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Every Monday, a member of the international academic association ‘UACES’ will address a current topic linked to their research, we welcome Dr Karolina Czerska-Shaw from the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland. Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

One of your research areas is migration, and the Russian aggression on Ukraine has triggered a forced migration of unprecedented scale in your country. How has Poland responded to this challenge?

Remarkably well. Perhaps it was the speed at which it happened. It may have also been the proximity of the conflict, just next door. It may have been the fact that over 1.5 million Ukrainians were already residing in Poland, and now account for roughly 80% of the foreign-born population in Poland. Or the fact that the people who were arriving in Polish cities were mostly women and children as well as the elderly, fulfilling a sort of “ideal-type refugee” image.

It’s probably all of the above factors that contributed to the unprecedented civic mobilisation in Poland, which has been praised for its speed, effectiveness, grass-roots nature, and longevity.

 

Has this mobilisation changed over time?

In the first weeks, it is accurate to state that ‘everyone did everything’.

At Krakow or Warsaw train station, amongst others, you would find a hodgepodge of volunteers; from scouts, ladies serving warm soup, volunteer paramedics, to random people holding signs stating that they could accommodate people in their homes.

Amongst this turmoil it was hard to see where the local or regional authorities were, although most often they were there, organising ad hoc registration points and providing information. This ad hoc system of non-systematicness worked, to an extent, because there was a mass mobilisation of very diverse actors: from private individuals to grassroots movements, national and international institutions and NGOs, religious groups, businesses, cultural and educational institutions, and local and regional authorities.

Yet this initial adrenaline rush wore off, and we saw a significant decline in volunteerism after about 3 to 6 months. Those groups that carried on formalised themselves into foundations to keep up with demand and to legitimise their finances. This is also when we saw a specialisation of help. Some organisations focused on psychological support; others specialised in providing housing options. Others are still focused on sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine. This specialisation was in part channeled through cooperation with international NGOs as well as United Nations bodies like UNICEF, UNHCR, and the IOM. While the cooperation of local NGOs and big international donors was very much needed and often produced positive results, this cooperation was not without its difficulties and sore points.

What does this landscape of mobilisation look like today, in the summer of 2023?

It’s different. The number of people hosted in private homes has come down to a trickle, the material aid has in large part been rerouted to Ukraine, and organisations have diversified their activities. This is the moment when the next, critical stage is upon us, that of adaptation of both the host society and incomers. Now is the time to deal with the effects of trauma, educational challenges, as well as critical housing shortages, and growing tensions within society.

While there are some remarkably good practices within local communities, cultural spaces, NGOs, and businesses, it is a drop of water in the ocean of what is needed in this next phase, which may last years. Yet it is also the time when big international organisations are starting to pull out and with them some longer-term funding schemes.

Does that mean that we have reached a critical moment?

Yes, Poland is in the difficult context of record-high inflation, a deep sense of geo-political insecurity, and looming parliamentary elections. While according to a public survey conducted in December 2022, 79% of Poles think that Poland should still accept refugees from Ukraine, downward trends can already be traced, particularly when it comes to anxieties about access to social and public services.

Overall, however, it can be observed that civil society has been successfully activated, gained valuable collective experience and accumulated social capital as a result. Together with the extension of the EU Temporary Protection Directive until August 2024, which represents an unusually proud moment in EU asylum policy, this is a good basis for the time to come.

 

I recall you are professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow.

 

Entretien réalisé par Laurence Aubron.

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Photo credit: South African Radio Astronomy Observatory (SARAO)

Anna-Lena Rüland, Nicolas Rüffin, Katharina Cramer, Prosper Ngabonziza, Manoj Saxena, Stefan Skupien

Science diplomacy, broadly defined as all activities at the intersection of science policy and international relations, has become somewhat of a buzzword during the last 10 years. Initially coined and put on the international agenda by prominent US-American policymakers and institutions, it has by now gained popularity across the globe and made its way into the scholarly discourse. Yet, so far, much of the literature on the topic has sidelined the science diplomacy practices, capacities and experiences of the Global South. This has only begun to change quite recently, reflecting a broader trend to better describe and understand the role of the Global South in international relations. In line with this trend and as part of a special issue on science diplomacy in the Global South, we – a research team spread over three continents – analyzed the interests of Southern emerging powers in a distinctive science diplomacy setting, namely in what we dub ‘intergovernmental science organizations’ (IGSOs).

 

IGSOs as a science diplomacy arena

What are IGSOs and why are they an important science diplomacy arena for Southern actors? Essentially, IGSOs resemble international organizations (IOs) like the United Nations. They are founded on intergovernmental treaties, have executive bodies and a council, in which governmental and scientific representatives negotiate all matters of fundamental importance to the organization. Just like other IOs dominate the issue areas that they oversee, IGSOs form central nodes in the fabric of the scientific fields and communities that they serve. At the same time, they are of high interest to policymakers because while IGSOs often have hefty price tags, they promise considerable political prestige for the involved countries, not least because IGSOs are seen as critical in addressing many pressing global challenges. In recent decades, some emerging powers of the Global South have joined several existing IGSOs in the Global North and have helped establish new ones in the Global South. Although the Global South is increasingly visible in the global IGSO landscape, we know surprisingly little about its role and interests in IGSOs. In a recently published study, we addressed this blind spot by comparing Southern participation in four different IGSOs, each characterized by a unique configuration of member countries, institutional set-up and research field. Specifically, we focused on:

1. The European Organization for Nuclear Research,
2. The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor,
3. The Square Kilometer Array, and
4. The African Light Source Project.

In each case, we concentrated on the participation of one particular Southern emerging power and examined which interests it pursues in the IGSO under investigation. We also addressed the question under which conditions emerging powers of the Global South are likely to achieve their objectives in IGSOs. In doing so, we used a broad institutional perspective and a pragmatic conceptualization of science diplomacy.

 

Southern emerging powers in IGSOs

In our study, we found that Southern emerging powers pursue a multitude of scientific and political objectives in and through IGSOs. Most of these interests resemble those that established science nations of the Global North aim to advance through and in IGSOs. Specifically, our comparative analysis showed that the key priority for most emerging powers of the Global South is to strengthen their science and technology capacities through IGSOs. Moreover, some Southern emerging powers get involved in IGSOs to (re-)establish connections between their political and scientific communities as well as their global counterparts. Finally, participating in IGSOs allows countries of the Global South to strengthen their burgeoning reputation as regional science and technology powers and to settle regional political and scientific rivalries.

Our analysis further revealed that emerging powers of the Global South are likely to achieve their objectives in IGSOs if four, in some cases five, conditions are met. These conditions relate to a country’s scientific community, domestic politics, industrial capacities, geographic location and an IGSO’s institutional maturity.

The institutional maturity of an IGSO conditions which interests countries of the Global South can pursue because in established IGOSs like CERN, founding members, typically from the Global North, have successfully cemented their institutional rights and privileges. Countries of the Global South are rarely among the founding members of matured IGSOs because when these were set up after World War Two few countries of the Global South had the economic or scientific capacity to participate. As a result, Southern actors often lack the institutional rights and privileges to shape important decisions in established IGSOs.

To get involved in mature IGSOs but also to found new IGSOs, an active and outspoken scientific community is often needed. Such a community is crucial because it can strengthen a country’s reputation in science and technology as it gets involved in an IGSO on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, a well-connected scientific community can lobby local and foreign policymakers as well as scientists to support the establishment of an IGSO. Continuous domestic political support and long-term national contributions, in-cash and in-kind, are equally important for countries of the Global South to attain their political and scientific objectives in IGSOs because such contributions signal commitment to other members and can be leveraged during diplomatic negotiations. However, given that many countries of the Global South face more acute political, economic, and human resource constraints than countries of the Global North, it can be difficult for them to provide the necessary in-cash and in-kind contributions for IGSOs. For similar reasons, there are only few countries of the Global South that have the industrial capacities to take on substantial contracts for the large infrastructures that many IGSOs rely on. In contrast to these scientific, industrial, and political capacities which are needed for almost all IGSOs, a country’s geographic location only comes into play if an IGSO has specific climatic or environmental requirements. This is typically the case for IGSOs in the field of astronomy.

 

Lessons learned

North-South asymmetries continue to shape IGSOs, particularly those with a high degree of institutional maturity. Given the great economic, scientific and human capital requirements of IGSOs – be they matured or not – only few Southern actors can afford to participate in this type of science diplomacy arena. What further complicates matters is that, much like other IOs – or almost any formal organization for that matter – IGSOs generally resist change.

Yet not all is lost for IGSO newcomers. Our analysis indicates that there are two strategies that could help diplomats and scientists of Southern emerging powers mitigate North-South asymmetries in IGSOs. First, it may prove useful for countries of the Global South to adjust their science diplomacy objectives to the institutional maturity of an IGSO. To do so, they are well advised to map out their objectives before getting involved in an IGSO. For instance, if a Southern country’s goal is to take up a leadership position, then it should seek to join an IGSO as early as possible, ideally as a founding member, as this will endow them with the necessary institutional privileges and rights to actively shape an IGSO. Should a Southern country’s objective be less ambitious, for example because it ‘only’ wants to strengthen its science and technology capacities, it may suffice for it to get involved in an IGSO at a later stage. Second, it could prove useful for Southern actors to invest strategically into IGSOs instead of taking a scattergun approach to IGSO funding. In practice, this means that countries of the Global South should fund IGSOs in research areas that are of high interest to them or in which they have a competitive advantage. This also increases chances that they can meet the political and economic commitments to an IGSO.

It goes without saying that our study only provides a small snapshot of Southern science diplomacy. To get a more holistic understanding of Southern science diplomacy, additional studies on, from and with the Global South are needed. We call on the science diplomacy community to contribute to this emerging line of research and underline its potential to turn science diplomacy into a more inclusive field of study that recognizes its multiple and diverse foundations.

 

About the authors:

Anna-Lena Rüland, PhD researcher at Leiden University

Nicolas Rüffin, Research fellow at the University of Bonn

Katharina Cramer, Senior fellow at the University of Bonn

Prosper Ngabonziza, Assistant Professor at Louisiana State University

Manoj Saxena, Visiting researcher at King’s College London

Stefan Skupien, Visiting researcher at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center

 

 

References:

Büyüktanir Karacan D and Ruffini P-B (2023) Science Diplomacy in the Global South – An Introduction. Science and Public Policy. Online first. https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scad028

Rüland A-L, Rüffin N, Cramer K, et al. (2023) Science Diplomacy from the Global South: The Case of Intergovernmental Science Organizations. Science and Public Policy. Online first. https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scad024

N.i. (2021) Hidden in Plain Sight. Nature Reviews Physics 3(11): 721-721.

SESAME (2004) Foundation of a Synchrotron Light Source in the Middle East. Available at: https://www.sesame.org.jo/about-us/historical-highlights/2004-foundation-of-a-synchrotron-light-source-in-the-middle-east (accessed 28 June 2023).

 

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the biggest security challenge to confront Europe in decades. In the face of the crisis, there were unprecedented calls for solidarity with Ukraine, but also a renewed effort to enact a common foreign and security policy that is both strategic and forward-looking. Ultimately, this breach of international law raises a diverse set of security questions ranging from economic to climate to traditional, but it also raises questions of ontological security. These questions are reflected in the way the conflict was framed by the media. Germany’s decision to reverse decades-old policies of non-delivery of weapons to conflict zones was framed through references to World War II. The term ‘Finlandization’ was resurrected to the disappointment of the Finnish government. Questions of Russian identity, post-Soviet trauma, national myth, and Europeanization were once again linked to formerly occupied EU states. That these framings are part of media discourse is not surprising, but similar framings have also been part of national narratives of the war in Ukraine.

 

Ontological Security

Indeed, a year after the invasion, language about ontological security is clearly visible. Even as there is a growing split about the so-called “Zeitenwende” and its ramifications for foreign policy, questions about shame, guilt, and anxiety are crowded in the conversation about arming Ukraine. While the foundational myths of the European Union are being revisited, the Baltic states are also actively lobbying for a re-evaluation of the memory architecture of Europe. Ireland, Sweden, and Finland have had policies of military non-alignment – whether ideological or pragmatic – tested and in some places reversed. Most visible of all are stories of the past, whether the Winter War in Finland or the Soviet Occupation in Estonia, which are part of the political discourse on the contemporary war. The activation of these discourses impacts what is sayable and doable for policymakers and is deeply tied to ontological security concerns. Thus, understanding how ontological stress is addressed through discourse is a valuable tool in uncovering the broader picture of the war.

 

Shifting Narratives

But the narration of the war in Ukraine is not static and does not necessarily reflect the events on the ground. The ‘main characters’ of the war have shifted in some retellings, including the placement of the US and NATO in the role of security guarantor of Europe. Similarly, the setting of the war has shifted from Ukraine to Europe’s eastern flank, to Europe, and in some cases to a global battle. The temporal bounds of the war have changed as well, and these differ based on the lived experience of each state. In France, the war began on February 24, 2022, but in Estonia, this war represents the next link in a long and unbroken chain of Russian imperialism. These differences have consequences for EU cooperation, but they also reflect efforts to manage ontological stress by maintaining a coherent and actionable story.

 

In my dissertation, I analyse the narrative changes of four EU member states: Estonia, Finland, Germany, and Ireland. The primary data for analysis are the narratives themselves. I specifically look at how state representatives perform these narratives in international spaces, and what these narratives say about the state’s role in the world, the role of the EU, and the kind of world we live in. In the first year of the present conflict (February 2022 – February 2023) several narrative threads were activated and deactivated in specific state discourses that could indicate ontological security questions. These moments of change are the primary objects of study, but to understand them I need both historical and contemporary context.

 

My Fieldwork in Finland and Estonia

I was awarded a UACES travel grant to conduct the first legs of my fieldwork in Finland and Estonia in May 2023. I began in Finland on May 5 with two goals. First, I wanted to visit sites of memory that play a role in current Finnish political debate. These included, among other things, the Helsinki Museum, the Statue of Peace and the Fortress of Suomenlinna. Since the Winter War has played such an important role in Finland’s vicarious identification with Ukraine, it was important to get the context of that war and how it is currently being activated in this context. Following this, I conducted 11 interviews with various military, security, and foreign policymakers and experts in Helsinki and Jyväskylä. These were semi-structured interviews that focused primarily on the moments of change I identified in the data. In addition to the interviews I conducted in Helsinki, I attended a research conference with the Finnish Political Science Association and used this as an opportunity to gather feedback from the academic community about the core arguments of my research.

 

The research in Finland revealed several interesting points. First, the debate around military non-alignment/neutrality in Finnish history is also one about identity vs. imposition, a point that was made in several instances since the Soviet Union collapsed. The war in Ukraine and the decision to join NATO have invited this discussion anew. Moreover, the ‘Never Alone’ narrative that is part of the language architecture of the EU does not necessarily coalesce with the Finnish national experience of being left to fend for itself in the Winter War, which causes a bit of narrative tension. Finally, the security imaginaries in Europe are shifting, and Finland’s are shifting as well, but what has emerged is a newfound recognition and, more significantly, the international performance of Finland’s role as a border state. All of this ties into questions of maintaining coherence in the Finnish autobiographical narrative and the reproduction of an understandable social space.

 

Following my fieldwork in Finland, I traveled to Estonia, where the research was similar but the narratives around the war are very different. I visited sites of memory in Tallinn, Tartu, and Narva including two controversial statues: the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn and the former site of a Soviet T-34 tank that was removed last year. Both these sites have been flashpoints for ethnic Russians living in Estonia. Moreover, I visited the Occupation Museum, the Narva Museum, the Estonia Ethnographic Museum, and the War Museum. Finally, I conducted nine interviews with policymakers, politicians, historians, and security experts.

 

As with Finland, the interviews in Estonia gave me a good deal of insight into the moments of change I had already identified in the data. The question of ontological security in Estonia is an interesting one in part because Estonia has arguably gained self-esteem because of the events of the past year; unlike Germany or France, Estonia’s security calculations were proven correct. The emphasis on resilience and preparation for conventional threats from Russia, which were out of step when the general focus was on the war on terror, are now part of the strategic calculations of the EU as a whole. Indeed, as many experts told me, the conversation about Russia as a fundamental existential threat has never really faded from domestic discourse, even when it was suppressed internationally during the EU and NATO accession talks. Nonetheless, the international discourse about the war activates many other ontological security pillars in Estonia, such as overall EU remembrance practices, the importance of resistance and the role of the Forest Brethren in resisting Soviet occupation, and the ‘Never Alone’ narrative, which plays an entirely different role in Estonian political life than it does in Finland.

 

Benefit of the Travel Grant

The UACES grant gave me the opportunity to gather these critical insights and made me aware of many aspects of these cases that I would otherwise have missed. My interviews also connected me to academic networks in Estonia and Finland which will guide this research for years to come. I will present this research at the British International Studies Association conference in Glasgow in June and at the UACES conference in Belfast in September.

 

 

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