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A Few Thoughts on Israel at the UN

Foreign Policy Blogs - Wed, 07/10/2015 - 15:59

Netanyahu glowers at the UN (Photo: CNN)

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu recently spoke at the UN General Assembly meeting on behalf of the Jewish state. He spoke at length about Iran (67 mentions by my count), the peace process and PA President Abbas’s comments the previous day before the international body, Syria, ISIS and generally about Israel’s courage and fortitude in the face of a hostile world.

Read the full text of the speech here.

Peace with the Palestinians
On the subject of peace, Bibi expressed his frustration with Abbas for refusing to return to the negotiating table without preconditions. He stated,

“I am prepared to immediately—immediately—resume direct peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority without any preconditions whatsoever. Unfortunately, President Abbas said yesterday that he is not prepared to do this.”

He continued,

“Well, I hope he changes his mind, because I remain committed to a vision of two states for two peoples, in which a demilitarized Palestinian state recognizes the Jewish state” [emphasis mine].

For such an articulate speaker, Netanyahu has a strange blindspot to his own preconditions. The italicized clause above, immediately following his bemoaning Abbas’s unwillingness to negotiate without preconditions, actually lays out two preconditions of its own!

1) That a future Palestinian state will be demilitarized and
2) That it will recognize a Jewish state.

The first point is generally understood (although certainly not universally accepted) to be a starting point for an eventual peace plan. The second point however is extremely controversial, seen by many as a roadblock created by Netanyahu specifically to tie Abbas’s hands and prevent the Palestinian leadership from sitting down at the table in the first place.

Global opinion of these points aside, Netanyahu is literally laying out two preconditions to peace talks, in the same breath that he is scolding Abbas for refusing to set aside his own preconditions.

“I’m prepared to resume peace negotiations without any preconditions. Abbas said he is not prepared to do this. I hope he changes his mind.”

— Benjamin Netanyahu (@netanyahu) October 1, 2015

Dealings with Iran
Speaking to Iran, Netanyahu invoked the awe-inspiring story of survival that is the Jewish people, enduring through millennia versus all odds and against countless enemies. He invoked the Babylonians, the Romans and the Nazis. He then cautioned:

“[The Iranian] regime would be wise to consider this: I stand here today representing Israel, a country 67 years young, but the nation-state of a people nearly 4,000 years old. Yet the empires of Babylon and Rome are not represented in this hall of nations. Neither is the Thousand Year Reich. Those seemingly invincible empires are long gone.”

This is amazing and worth reflection. But the reason I mention it is: the Iranian (Persian) people have been around even longer than the Jews. Does it mean they (or anyone!) will last forever? Of course not. But survival through the ages is a strange point to rub in the noses of a people that are arguably even older.

Resolution Overkill
Later, Netanyahu stated,

“In four years of horrific violence in Syria, more than a quarter of a million people have lost their lives. That’s more than ten times—more than ten times—the number of Israelis and Palestinians combined who have lost their lives in a century of conflict between us. Yet last year, this Assembly adopted 20 resolutions against Israel and just one resolution about the savage slaughter in Syria.”

On this point, I couldn’t agree with him more. In my opinion, one of the gravest sins that the international community has made regarding Israel is attempting to hold the Jewish state to standards which no other nation is held.

It is bad for Israel — it paints them a pariah. It’s bad for the UN — it undermines their role as a just, deliberative body. And perhaps most relevantly, it’s bad for the Palestinians and the peace process — it is easy for Israel to dismiss all judgement when they are so obviously and unfairly being held to unattainable standards. Due to this over-scrutiny, bordering on the absurd, Israel can casually bat away all criticism. Though not every critique is unfair, when seen through the lens of such hypocrisy, Israel can simply say: It’s not us. It’s you. And when reflecting on the overbearing burden of attention paid it, they are right. It isn’t them.

Israel is not perfect, but can anyone really claim them worthy of 21—out of a total of 25!—UN resolutions in a year? With all the atrocities happening in the world, anyone who believes that 85% were perpetrated by Israel is either lying or ill-informed.

Down the Hall, a Deputy Speaks Out
On the same day that Netanyahu addressed his colleagues at the UN, his deputy foreign minister Tzipi Hotovely gave her own address. At a UN meeting of countries who donate to the PA, she took the floor and equated all Palestinians to terrorists. As reported by Haaretz, after speaking about the Jewish right to ascend to the Temple Mount (something that is currently causing riots in the region):

“Hotovely continued with criticism of the Palestinians, saying that while an Israeli child dreams of being an engineer so he can be part of the start-up nation, a Palestinian child dreams of being an engineer so he can prepare explosive devices and perpetrate terror attacks.”

The following speaker was Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh. He informed the body that he had “written [an] address but I don’t plan to give it because I can’t not respond to what we’ve heard from the Israeli representative.”

According to Haaretz:

“The incident became particularly embarrassing when Hotovely interrupted Judeh several times to argue with him. This was contrary to protocol for the meeting, which was not an open discussion but a series of short speeches. One person in the room said that the meeting’s chairman, Norwegian Foreign Minister Borge Brende, had to call Hotovely to order twice.”

For those who are less familiar with the role of a foreign minister in Israel, it is equatable with an American Secretary of State. Currently, the position is being handled by Prime Minister Netanyahu. Hotovely is his deputy.

While I stand by my argument that Israel is vastly, and unfairly, over-scrutinized at the UN, it probably wouldn’t hurt if they rounded up an actual diplomat to represent them before the international body. I’m just saying.

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk

« L’Algérie face aux changements »

Politique étrangère (IFRI) - Tue, 06/10/2015 - 10:21

Le journal La Croix a publié le 2 octobre dernier un article de Jean-Christophe Ploquin, consacré au dossier du numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (3/2015) : « L’Algérie, nouvelle force régionale ? ».

« L’Algérie va-t-elle écrire une nouvelle page de son histoire ? Ce pays pivot du Maghreb va devoir négocier des changements majeurs dans les années à venir. Politiquement, la succession du président Abdelaziz Bouteflika, âgé de 78 ans et qui en est à son 5e mandat, devra être négociée. Économiquement, la rente pétrolière n’est plus garantie avec l’effondrement des prix des hydrocarbures. Diplomatiquement, le splendide non-alignement du pays, cultivé depuis l’indépendance, devient difficile face aux périls qui s’accumulent aux frontières.

Ce sont ces nombreux défis qu’examinent quatre auteurs dans le dossier consacré à l’Algérie par la revue Politique étrangère. Tous pressentent d’inéluctables évolutions mais s’interrogent sur la capacité du pays à les appréhender. »

Pour lire l’article de Jean-Christophe Ploquin dans son intégralité, cliquez ici.

Gouverner le climat ? 20 ans de négociations internationales

Politique étrangère (IFRI) - Fri, 02/10/2015 - 10:08

Cette recension d’ouvrages est issue de Politique étrangère (3/2015). Mathilde Isler propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Stefan Aykut et Amy Dahan, Gouverner le climat ? 20 ans de négociations internationales (Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2015, 752 pages).

La Conférence de Paris doit aboutir à un accord contraignant, avec des engagements concrets de diminution des émissions de gaz à effet de serre (GES), afin de limiter le réchauffement climatique en dessous de 2 °C. Cet ouvrage permet de bien comprendre les tenants et les aboutissants de cet enjeu : pourquoi un accord contraignant ? Quelles positions des différents acteurs face à cet enjeu ? Quelles contraintes au niveau national ? Pourquoi cette limite des 2 °C ? Quel lien entre le monde scientifique et le monde politique ? Quelles sont leurs interactions ?

La négociation climatique n’est pas à part dans la sphère internationale : elle suit les grandes tendances géopolitiques mais elle est un théâtre où les équilibres basculent rapidement. Alors que de petits pays insulaires réussissent à attirer l’attention sur les problématiques qui les touchent à très court terme, certains pays n’hésitent pas, par des positions dogmatiques, à bloquer les négociations (l’Inde, entre autres). Les États-Unis et la Chine, parmi les plus gros émetteurs de GES, sont attendus pour des engagements ambitieux et réalistes, mais doivent composer avec des pressions internes fortes quant à la préservation de leurs intérêts nationaux.

Ce manuel entre en profondeur dans la mécanique de la négociation internationale sur le climat. Plusieurs chapitres sont consacrés à la gouvernance de ses institutions, à ses blocages, à ses opportunités d’évolution. Les auteurs défendent l’idée que le climat devrait être placé au centre du système de négociation internationale, notamment à l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC), pour être défendu à son juste niveau. Et pourtant, l’échec de la création d’une Organisation mondiale de l’environnement qui aurait eu pour but de renforcer et crédibiliser la prise en compte de cette thématique sur la scène internationale, a démontré, lors du sommet Rio+20 en 2012, que le monde n’était pas prêt à mettre l’environnement et les négociations climatiques au cœur de débats qui restent centrés sur l’économie.

Une réflexion très intéressante est également menée par les auteurs sur la question de la temporalité : souvent critiquée pour sa lenteur, la négociation climatique s’inscrit dans le temps long, mais doit également composer avec l’accélération des modes de communication liée aux nouvelles technologies et aux médias. La négociation climatique a été rythmée par des momentum qui ont permis de mettre en lumière certains sujets et d’acter certaines avancées, comme le protocole de Kyoto en 1997 ou la création du Fonds vert en 2010. Chaque COP, chaque année, est une fenêtre d’opportunité pour une progression majeure ou non (Copenhague, 2009) des négociations, et dépend beaucoup du contexte et du rapport des forces en présence. La Conférence de Paris sera-t-elle déterminante pour l’avenir du processus ?

Face au constat d’échec du système de négociations climatiques établi tout au long du livre – malgré de réelles avancées, la situation actuelle semble paralysée –, le dernier chapitre se penche sur la question du changement de paradigme nécessaire pour une véritable lutte contre le changement climatique. Peut-on vraiment faire évoluer nos modes de vie vers plus de durabilité ? Doit-on abandonner le capitalisme pour sauver la planète ? Ces réflexions nous poussent dans nos retranchements. Tout le monde veut le changement, mais qui veut changer ?

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

Remember Rwanda when Discussing Syria and Iraq

Foreign Policy Blogs - Wed, 30/09/2015 - 18:47

Yazidi militia on Sinjar Mountain – Al Jazeera

Rwanda will always be remembered as a genocide that came from the failure of the international community to act. While there was information coming from a Canadian representative to the international community at the time of a severe sectarian conflict brewing in the nation of Rwanda, neither the international community nor former Canadian Prime Minister Chretien responded to their cries for help. The result was that two million people lost their lives, and the international community failed to hold up the standards of justice they committed to at the end of the Second World War.

This week’s discussions at the UN between the Obama Administration and Vladimir Putin are a response to Russia’s decision to put aircraft and soldiers into Syria. Coalition airstrikes have been able to quell some of the pressure on the Kurdish forces facing ISIS and help save some members of the Yazidi community and other minorities in the region from extinction. The reality however is that more help is needed. The lack of a further commitment by the coalition has left the fight in the region at a stalemate without support on the ground and heavy weapons. Russian forces will likely commit to a heavy assault against ISIS, leaving the US as sidekick as opposed to an equal partner in Syria. Russia is seeking to gain the trust of US allies in the region, as the minimal help given to minorities trying to survive has not been able to keep them out of danger.

There have been many theories in Western countries on why there has been a flood of refugees coming to Europe. Some politicians with various political parties have refused to accept the need for proper military support in the refugee’s home countries, as humanitarian aid without protection would be a fruitless endeavor. Without a firm commitment from parties from all political stripes in acknowledging the source and solution to the refugee crisis, the politics of Western elites threatens to ignore another crisis on a mass scale. The lessons learned from ignoring the Rwandan genocide should be paramount. In order to save innocent people, sectarian issues must be understood on many different levels and approached with humanitarian assistance and the use of force when necessary to protect innocent communities. Putting politics before threatened minorities in the Middle East is tantamount to turning a blind eye to the extermination of a whole community so one can win a job in Washington, Brussels or Ottawa. Communities that have existed for thousands of years are being directly threatened and will be wiped out without a serious commitment to preventing another Rwanda.

An example of a group that has been created by minorities from the Middle East in order to help save innocent people in the region is C.Y.C.I. – The Liberation of Christian and Yazidi Children of Iraq. They assist victims of torture and sex slavery by purchasing them back from their captors and bringing them to freedom. This group, based out of Quebec, Canada has recently gained some assistance from the Canadian government after a lot of grassroots support. They have shown that countries like the US and Russia can do more to help, as these individuals have stood firm in not accepting another Rwandan genocide. Their focus is on saving children, young girls and families from some of the most brutal treatment of individuals in human history. Despite a lot of political backlash from opponents, they push on because there is no excuse for another Rwanda. Now with the international community discussing Syria and Iraq, Russia, the US and their allies have an opportunity to not repeat another Rwanda.

No Policy Not an Option in Central Asia

Foreign Policy Blogs - Wed, 30/09/2015 - 18:44

One day after Christmas of 1991, the red star, hammer and sickle were lowered from the Kremlin for the final time.  As the West declared victory over their “Evil Empire”, a new set of countries were born on the banks of the Caspian Sea: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  This region, part of Halford Mackinder’s “great pivot” has been of strategic importance to trade and politics for millennia, but has failed to climb to the top of the political agenda in Washington.

Bailovo, Baku, Azerbaijan by David Davidson @flickr

An Office of Congressional Ethics report leaked to the Washington Post this spring detailed an all-expenses-paid trip taken by a bipartisan group of ten influential congressmen and their staff to Azerbaijan in 2013.  The bill for the two-day conference was picked up by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) by funneling $750,000 to two Houston non-profits: Turquoise Council of Americans and Eurasians (TCAE) and the Assembly of the Friends of Azerbaijan (AFAZ).  Although investigators stated that SOCAR’s involvement in the conference was public knowledge, each congressman claimed not to know that the state-owned company was the benefactor. To make matter worse, all but one congressman failed to report thousands of dollars in gifts received on the trip.  Despite pressure from watchdog groups, the OCE has yet to release the report, but has already made a ruling on the matter, finding that the congressmen involved did not knowingly violate any rules.

But, despite highly questionable junkets by congressmen, central Asian states still find themselves on the outside of the Washington establishment looking in, while signing lucrative contracts with Moscow and Beijing. Last fall, the Caspian 5 (Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) signed a political declaration recognizing the right of only the states littoral to the Caspian Sea to have a military presence on it, a shot across the bow of NATO and the United States.  Already at odds with Russia due to the situation in Ukraine, the declaration also spells trouble for a proposed trans-Caspian pipeline for moving natural gas from fields in the region to the European Union, bypassing current routes through Russia and Iran.  Just as the West sees itself locked out of the region, China has continued fostering lucrative relationships in the area.  In 2013 Chinese Premier Xi Jinping introduced an effort to link China to Turkey via the Central Asian states by increasing infrastructure, cultural exchange, and trade.  The “One Belt One Road” is already well on the way to becoming reality, having created a US$40 billion fund for the project, and slating US$1.65 billion of it for a hydroelectric project in Pakistan.

Why should Central Asia even be on the US’ radar?  For one, the Caspian Sea region is estimated to have 68 billion barrels of oil and 535 trillion cubic feet of natural gas beneath it.  The region’s production is set to increase by about 10% in the next two decades as well.  Under the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea area’s production was consumed exclusively by the USSR, but since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Central Asian states have been seeking to branch out.  Turkmenistan, the region’s largest natural gas exporter, has already inked a deal with China and is projected to increase its sale to the Middle Kingdom threefold by 2020. The country could be a geopolitical asset for the US: both the EU and Ukraine have expressed interest at tapping into Turkmenistan’s gas reserves. For Brussels, the key lies in overcoming Russian opposition to the building of the Trans-Caspian pipeline and deliver Turkmen gas through the so-called Southern Gas Corridor. Ukraine has been suffering under the weight of high gas prices, ever since the scrubbing of a 2006 deal negotiated by Dmitry Firtash to bring in Turkmen gas. Some have even suggested that given the many countries vying for Turkmenistan’s gas, Firtash should be brought to the negotiating table to make sure Europe outrivals China.

In addition to legitimate markets such as petroleum, controlling the area means gaining a better grasp on the market for contraband from East Asia.  Afghanistan, which produces 75% of the world’s heroin and whence 99% of the region’s opiates originate, shares a border of about 1,800 miles with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.  Illicit drug trade from the Golden Triangle passes through China’s Xinjiang before it goes on through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan to consumers throughout the world.

Central Asia remains in play, but not for long.  The policymakers in D.C., who are more than happy to partake in the hospitality and gifts dished out by its strongmen, would do well to acquaint themselves with the immense importance of the region and formulate a policy for engaging with it.  The time to do so is now, lest they be left out in the cold of the Eurasian Steppe.

Dire les relations internationales en France : acteurs et dynamiques


 
Qui anime le débat sur les relations internationales (RI) en France depuis vingt-cinq ans ? Répondre à cette question tient de la gageure, dans la mesure où ni la définition desdites RI, ni le type de sources considérées comme légitimes, ni les attentes qui y sont adressées, ne sont consensuelles. Il y a, par ailleurs, des sous-questions dans la question. Se dégage-t-il un discours français spécifique en matière de RI ? Si oui, celui-ci prend-il les contours d’une pensée unique ou d’une idéologie dominante – et laquelle ? –, ou plutôt ceux d’une « French touch » qui, sans être monolithique, permettrait de tracer les contours d’une sensibilité particulière, ou bien encore d’une mosaïque qui, faute de cohérence, devient illisible depuis l’extérieur ? Le paysage est-il figé sur cette période, ou a-t-il évolué au cours de ces vingt-cinq dernières années ? Enfin, l’analyse des RI en France est-elle propice à l’initiative privée ou, au contraire, au contrôle étatique ?
Ces enjeux ne sont pas neutres pour un pays dont la politique étrangère reste l’une des plus actives de la planète – qu’autant qu’elle sert un membre permanent du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies – et dont l’outil militaire est mis régulièrement à contribution. Ces politiques publiques ainsi mises en œuvre, sont-elles guidées par la seule analyse interne à la machine étatique ? Sont-elles correctement nourries ou assistées par les enseignements d’une réflexion extérieure, libre, indépendante et de qualité ? Et si oui, cette dernière est-elle pluraliste, ou bien y décèle-t-on des biais politiques, des routines, des tabous ?
Retrouvez l'intégralité de l'article dans le n°99-Sept.2015 de la Revue Internationale et Stratégique, "Regards critiques sur vingt-cinq ans de relations internationales" - Sous la direction de Samuel Carcanague, Pim Verschuuren
Sommaire
Dire les relations internationales en France : acteurs et dynamiquesBref état des lieuxLa « non discipline » RILes voix(es ?) non académiquesQuelles attentes ?
Variables et paramètres de l’analyseDu gaullo-mitterrandisme au néo-conservatisme ?Un paysage figé ?Un débat sous tutelle étatique ? 

Will Xi Jinping Yield to U.S. Demands on the Economy?

Foreign Policy - Thu, 24/09/2015 - 09:52
U.S. officials have long prodded China to open its economy and stop meddling with its markets and money. Will Xi finally listen?

Ghani Promises ‘Serious Measures’ Against Afghan Troops Who Sexually Abuse Children

Foreign Policy - Thu, 24/09/2015 - 01:39
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani sought Wednesday to reassure the United States that he does not condone the sexual abuse of boys by his nation’s security forces — a seamy cultural gap that has long been unacknowledged even as it has plagued the war effort. Ghani issued a statement promising to undertake “serious measures” to prevent ...

Why Isn’t Beijing Excited About Xi’s Trip to the United States?

Foreign Policy - Thu, 24/09/2015 - 01:28
The recent stock market turbulence and rising questions about Xi’s competence mean China’s leadership has bigger issues to worry about than cybersecurity or bilateral trade.

The Solipsism of Self-Isolation

Foreign Policy - Thu, 24/09/2015 - 00:26
Decades of marginalizing countries we don't see eye to eye with has gotten the United States nowhere. It's time to engage.

U.S. Stonewalls Putin’s ‘Anti-Terror’ Push at the United Nations

Foreign Policy - Thu, 24/09/2015 - 00:25
Putin wants to secure U.N. approval for his leap into the Middle East by couching it as a broad-front fight against Islamic terrorism. The United States is having none of it.

How To Score a Ticket to the Hottest Event in Saudi: The Hajj

Foreign Policy - Thu, 24/09/2015 - 00:17
The world's 1.6 billion Muslims all are trying to make it Mecca at least once in their lifetimes. Who decides who gets to go?

What Does Xi’s Visit Have To Do With the Seattle Riot of 1886?

Foreign Policy - Thu, 24/09/2015 - 00:08
A popular blogger argues that China's president is flaunting his country's strength to a city which once violently rejected Chinese people.

Bashar al-Assad Had a Great InstaSummer While His People Drowned in the Mediterranean

Foreign Policy - Thu, 24/09/2015 - 00:07
As Syrians died en route to Europe this summer, their dictator Instagrammed like all was well back home.

Exclusive: As Air War Intensifies, Saudi Arabia Launches Charm Offensive Before U.N. Summit

Foreign Policy - Wed, 23/09/2015 - 23:33
With Yemeni civilian deaths mounting, the Saudi government is pulling out all the stops to head off an independent human rights inquiry.

Our Currency, Everyone’s Problem

Foreign Policy - Wed, 23/09/2015 - 22:38
Is the Federal Reserve’s decision to hold interest rates at zero more about the U.S. or the global economy?

渔业管控应成为南海降温的契机

Crisisgroup - Wed, 23/09/2015 - 16:14
长期以来,随着南海的日益军事化,亚太地区稳定与安全的局势变得紧张,而穿梭在这片海域的一艘艘不起眼的渔船所造成的风险却往往更直接、更频繁,也更缺乏管控。然而,如果能加以适当管理,渔业或可为区域协商与合作创造初始环境。

New Chinese Book Says the U.S.-China ‘Feast on Power’ is Winding Down

Crisisgroup - Wed, 23/09/2015 - 12:15
At a time of heightened tensions between the U.S. and China, it comes as little surprise that a new and important book on the bilateral relations, published by a think tank affiliated with the Chinese Foreign Ministry, should have the foreboding title The Twilight of a Feast on Power: The U.S. “Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific” and China’s Countermeasures. Although the book, published in July, largely tracks a familiar narrative of the irreversible decline of the U.S. cast against the unstoppable ascent of China, it also contains a notably nuanced interpretation of Washington’s intentions. The book’s key finding is important: “The objective of the U.S. policy towards China is ‘hedging’ but not ‘containment.’” China’s rise is presenting opportunities, challenges, and uncertainty, it notes, which compel Washington “to take actions to guard against and mold China” as it tries to ensure China’s development benefits rather than threatens American interests. This is a more sober assessment than the usual indignant howls about American containment pervasive among China’s foreign policy analysts a couple years ago and still popular in the nationalist state media. The book, authored by a group of researchers at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)—of whom only one, Ruan Zongze, is named— theorizes that Washington’s “rebalancing” has matured alongside its views of China. Lawrence Jackson—Zuma Press Presidents Hu and Obama toast during a State Dinner in the State Dining Room of the White House, 2011. The Obama administration, like several of its predecessors, initially had high hopes that China would become an active partner in the established system of global governance. But as it became clear that the “China dream” was following a different vision, Washington redefined China as “a potential challenger to U.S. global leadership, military rival, and rules-defying economic competitor,” write Ruan Zongze, Zhao Qinghai, Liu Feitao, Shen Yamei, and Cui Lei. Yet following rounds of ups and downs, the Obama administration ultimately positioned China as “a competitor that is nonetheless modifiable.” According to the book, the bilateral ties were stressed by friction over Asia’s maritime disputes but bolstered by Washington “responding positively”—although not accepting outright—Beijing’s proposition of establishing “a new type of major power relations.” Such “oscillations” were typical of a relationship between “neither enemies nor friends,” say the authors. Viewed from Washington, however, bilateral ties appear to have been in linear deterioration. As Xi Jinping tightens his grip on power, clamps down on civil society, projects China’s formidable economic might in apparent challenge to America’s global influence, and flexes his muscles over China’s maritime claims, more and more voices in the U.S. foreign policy establishment are doubting whether a cooperative relationship is possible. Although they are still in a minority, a growing chorus questions the fundamental wisdom of engagement with Beijing, arguing it has failed to either bring about domestic political liberalization or shape China into a responsible stakeholder in the U.S.-led liberal world order. Mainstream opinion in the two capitals nevertheless seems to be converging on the broad outlook. “Sino-U.S. competition is a reality and will be unavoidable at times, but it can be controlled and managed,” The Twilight concludes Reaching a similar conclusion, after surveying a few hundred attendees of a Washington conference on global security challenges, Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New American Security deduced that “most Washingtonians see growing but manageable competition with China.” But even if both countries are becoming more clear-eyed about the competitive nature of their relationship, their ability to manage the rivalry peacefully will hinge on reconciling yawning divisions on key flashpoints, most notably the maritime disputes that pit China against Japan in the East China Sea, and against several Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea. The Twilight rehashes the prevailing Chinese narrative that Washington has exploited these East Asia security faultlines to hype the “China threat” in order to “control allies and check China.” It argues that the loudly advertised return of U.S. forces to Asia has emboldened certain countries, namely Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, to advance their maritime claims at China’s cost. With the rebalance, the book pronounces, Washington “no doubt threw oil on the fire.” In sharp contrast, the widely-held view in the U.S., and among the aforementioned countries, is that it is China that has ratcheted up tensions. For them, actions such as declaring an East China Sea air defense identification zone, deploying an oil rig to waters disputed with Vietnam, and enlarging reefs in the South China Sea into potential military outposts have pushed frightened neighbors to seek support from Washington. While conceding the U.S. is welcome as a security guarantor by some regional nations, The Twilight’s authors declare Washington’s sway is waning. Faced with domestic woes, distracted by crises in the Middle East and Ukraine, and unable to meet Asian allies’ expectations or secure Southeast Asian nations’ unreserved cooperation, the book says the U.S. rebalance is only delaying its decline in the Asia-Pacific from “the only superpower” to a mere “swing force.” Next to a decaying America, the book portrays a triumphant China, taking its place in history to forge “an Asian community of common destiny.” China’s “new Asian security concept” that promotes “security for all, by all, and of all” is a compelling alternative to U.S. alliances that pursue “absolute security of a single country,” the authors write. China’s “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”—ambitious development plans—will propel the economic takeoff of Asia, Europe, and Africa, it predicts. “Asia has woken up and calls for Asian people to take charge of Asian affairs,” The Twilight provocatively proclaims. Despite the melodramatic triumphalism in the pages, however, one of the authors, Cui Lei, allowed for more subtlety. At the book launch late July in Beijing, he counted some of the Obama administration’s achievements: credible economic recovery, progress on forging a 12-economy Trans-Pacific free trade deal, normalizing relations with Cuba, and reaching an agreement with Iran to thwart its nuclear program. “The U.S. will not realize all of its strategic goals with its rebalance, but that does not mean it is declining.” For years, Beijing’s foreign policy has been partially based on the unspoken assumption that America’s decline in Asia is as inevitable as China’s eventual regional supremacy. Although this new CIIS book does not challenge that narrative, a growing number of China's foreign policy thinkers realize that the sun may not have quite have set for America the superpower; China’s leadership in Asia is far from ordained; and its policy settings need to be adjusted for medium to long-term co-existence rather than unchallenged regional authority.

Unpacking Xi Jinping’s Pet Phrase for U.S.-China Ties

Foreign Policy - Wed, 23/09/2015 - 06:02
A "new model of great power relations" sounds innocent enough. So why won't American policymakers say it?

Global Thinkers: What Is the Way Out in Yemen?

Foreign Policy - Wed, 23/09/2015 - 06:01
FP contributor Elizabeth Dickinson and Yemeni activist Farea al-Muslimi on the reach of Riyadh and how the West could actually help.

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