Diplomacy & Crisis News

(Own report) - The escalating Catalan secessionist conflict is upsetting Spain, a country hard hit by Berlin's austerity dictate. Spain - occasionally praised in German media as a showcase for an alleged successful austerity policy - is still confronted with enormous social and economic problems, in spite of a modest economic growth. Unemployment and poverty remain at high levels. Crisis policies over the past few years have also increased the economic gap between Spain and the euro zone's centers of prosperity. One still cannot speak of debt reduction - the official objective of Germany's austerity policy within the EU. The poor economic situation, the high debt burden level and the distribution of federal and regional debts are fueling Catalonia's secessionist conflict.

Pernille RIEKER, French Foreign Policy in a Changing World: Practising Grandeur. Palgrave MacMillan, Londres, 2017



Il n'est jamais facile d'écrire avec justesse sur la politique étrangère d'un autre pays. A cet égard il convient de saluer la publication du livre de Pernille Rieker sur la politique étrangère de la France, qui se distingue dans cet exercice pour au moins trois raisons: l'auteur ne sur-théorise pas, et délaisse avec raison ce terrible appauvrissement académique qui consiste à tout réduire à la question agent-structure ; elle évite également les clichés habituels sur le gaullisme, l'ENA, etc., qui marquent encore trop souvent la littérature scientifique anglo-saxonne sur la France ; enfin elle propose un tour d'horizon certes non exhaustif mais pertinent, des grands dossiers de notre diplomatie (Afrique, Russie, Etats-Unis, OTAN, terrorisme...). Si un chapitre à part entière sur l'Europe eut été utile, on ne peut s'empêcher de penser que son absence (l'ouvrage a été achevé avant l'élection d'Emmanuel Macron) est significative. Idem sur l'Asie ou l'Amérique du Sud, rarement présentées à Paris comme des priorités. Tout au plus pourrait-on souhaiter une perspective plus assumée sur les approches de la Méditerrannée et du Proche-Orient (les cas libyen ou syrien sont néanmoins bel et bien discutés).
Mais l'essentiel est ailleurs. Pernille Rieker, dont les travaux au sein du Norvegian Institute of International Affairs font référence, pose des questions justes : Paris a-il  plus de leviers ou au contraire moins de "grandeur", dans un monde globalisé et régionalisé? Comment  la France peut-elle continuer à influencer le monde, plaider pour son exceptionnalisme, compte tenu de ressources contraintes qui l'obligent souvent à boxer au-dessus de sa catégorie ? Réponse: par la promotion des valeurs liées à son universalisme, ou perçues comme telles. Elle peut compter pour cela sur plusieurs atouts: un rôle global qui lui confère une légitimité historique, des institutions et une élite administrative fortes, une présence dans les principales institutions internationales, des instruments de projection qui participent aussi bien du hard power (l'outil militaire) que du soft power (diplomatie culturelle).
En opposant la puissance matérielle à la puissance symbolique, et en croyant davantage à la seconde qu'à la première, la chercheuse lance un vrai débat, qui rejoint celui sur lesintérêts opposés aux valeurs dans l'action extérieure. On pourrait lui objecter que c'est le discours français qui était en panne, plutôt que l'outil matériel (comme l'ont montré les récentes opérations militaires, au Mali, en Centrafrique, en Libye...). C'est le message symbolique qui n'était plus perçu, alors même que la puissance structurelle demeure (l'image de la France dans le Sud, notamment s'est considérablement brouillée dans les dernières années). On  peut aussi estimer que puissance symbolique et puissance matérielle se rejoignent dans la pratique concrète, car une diplomatie d'influence digne de ce nom a un coût, et croire qu'on peut la décréter "à moyens constants" est une dangereuse illusion. Mais l'important était de briser le tabou et de poser la question.
En liant le destin de la France comme puissance d'influence à sa capacité à réinventer l'universalisme, Pernille Rieker ouvre encore un chantier important, valable également d'ailleurs pour le Royaume-Uni, l'Allemagne, même les Etats-Unis, et le monde occidental en général.
Après plusieurs discours de politique étrangère du nouveau président, et les premières indications sur la tonalité de ce que pourrait être un "macronisme de politique étrangère", les questions posées dans l'ouvrage apparaissent plus pertinentes encore. Comme si la nouvelle équipe au pouvoir, elle aussi, se posait la question de la pérennité de l'influence française, avec déjà quelques éléments de réponse, proches des hypothèses de Pernille Rieker. La réinvention du message universaliste est un souci visible à Paris, qui semble passer par la promotion du multilatéralisme ("multilateralism is the new universalism", pour reprendre une structure de phrase à la mode). La reconquête de l'influence telle que proposée se fait en trois temps: 1- dégager des marges de manœuvre budgétaires et montrer une crédibilité sérieuse dans la remise en ordre de la gestion intérieure ; 2- relancer le projet européen, meilleure garantie de notre rôle dans le monde ; 3- enfin, à partir de ce socle, proposer ensuite un agenda international. On retrouve bien la dialectique entre puissance symbolique et puissance matérielle, discutée dans le livre. Mais on retrouve aussi les mises en garde sous-jacentes qu'implique ce travail: le système international, comme régional, est bien là, avec ses acteurs et ses contraintes. La France ne pourra, seule, réinventer le multilatéralisme ni imposer le dialogue, si elle n'est pas suivie par d'autres sur ce terrain. Un Donald Trump à la Maison Blanche, une Angela Merkel maintenue mais affaiblie, une Grande-Bretagne qui doute, une Europe orientale qui se crispe, ne seront pas pour aider.
La France "compte toujours", pour répondre à une question posée jadis par un ouvrage antérieur. Et Pernille Rieker le prouve, en s'y intéressant au point de lui consacrer un livre. Mais la "pratique de la grandeur" devra suivre une voie parsemée d'embûches.

Le mouvement de protestation contre le franc CFA s'étend en Afrique francophone. Des manifestations réunissant plusieurs centaines de manifestants mais aussi des conférences publiques, dans les capitales africaines et à Paris, réclament la fin de cette monnaie issue de la colonisation. Il est temps (...) / Afrique, France, Sénégal, Économie, État, Finance, Monnaie, Mouvement de contestation, Francophonie - La valise diplomatique

(Photo: Nigeria Electricity Hub)

After five quarters, Nigeria has edged out of a recession as GDP expanded by 0.55 percent in the second quarter, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. The growth is fragile, which the government concedes, and there are not many rosy predictions from experts and pundits of a trend line continuing upward.

The Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP), announced in April, could lend a potential conduit, though. “Nigeria will be on its way to sustainable growth in the medium-term if it successfully implements the ERGP,” said Gloria Joseph-Raji, Senior World Bank economist. Potential growth may be based on increased oil production, agriculture, infrastructure and additional foreign-currency reserves.

Nigeria, the continent’s most populous country with nearly 200 million citizens, is awash in energy riches: it is the continent’s largest oil producer churning out about 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day and has the second largest oil reserves in Africa of about 37 billion barrels, trailing Libya which tallies an estimated 48 billion barrels. The nation holds the largest gas reserves in Africa – ninth globally – with 180 trillion cubic feet (tcf) with Algeria second totaling 160 tcf. With such immense supply, and comparatively lower consumption levels, the nation is the fourth largest exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) globally. The reserves present plenty of room for natural gas expansion, but rapid growth has been restricted by a lack of new infrastructure, violence and to viably capture flared gas.

Tapping the resources has left the nation saddled by the drop in oil prices and previously decreasing oil production, also partly due to militants in the oil rich southern Niger Delta forcing companies to scale back operations. The current price for a barrel of Brent crude oil sits around $55/barrel, less than half the price of $115/barrel in June 2014 (in the latest round of oil instability, the price bottomed in early 2016 to under $30/barrel). This is a tough burden to guard against as the oil and gas industry constitutes around 70 percent of Nigeria’s government revenue and over 90 percent of exports.

Nigeria’s economy has been diversifying, though, and the oil and gas industry’s contribution to its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which was rebased in April, is actually the lowest in OPEC. The National Bureau of Statistics found the industry contributed about 10.45 percent to real GDP in the third quarter. Compared to Angola, Africa’s second largest oil producer, oil production and its supporting activities contribute about 45 percent of the nation’s GDP and in Saudi Arabia, the largest producer in all OPEC, 48 percent of GDP is accounted for by the industry. In 2016, Nigeria’s GDP grew to 405 billion USD, the largest in Africa, but with a GDP per capita of 2,178 USD in 2016, trailing Sudan’s 2,415 USD, according to the World Bank.

Millions of Nigerians Remain in the Dark

With such abundant natural gas, and geography to exploit solar, among other sources, electricity access has remained low, yet increasing the past years. Estimates still range from 75 million to nearly 100 million people not having access to electricity, and of that a disproportionate amount of those with access are located in urban areas. Where electricity is present, there is well accepted knowledge that poor service, losses and the widespread lack of reliability and consistent access is unacceptable. There is large scale use of diesel generators, which can have negative health and environmental effects, as well as increase the cost of business and local goods, to make up for the shortfalls. Furthermore, the International Energy Agency estimates that 115 million people rely on traditional biomass as their main sources of energy – mostly wood, charcoal and waste – to meet basic needs, such as cooking and heating.

The Federal Ministry of Power, Works and Housing publishes updated power data on its website frequently. As of September 19, the data displayed generation peaked at 4,518 megawatts (MW), generation capability was 6,989 MW, but distribution capacity was 4,600 MW leaving potential new power to be stranded, and peak demand forecast was 17,720 MW. In a speech September 21, Federal Minister of the aforementioned ministry, Babatunde Raji Fashola, stated generation peaked at 7,001MW. Regardless of the discrepancy in peak generation information, there is an immense gap from the peak supply and peak demand.

In order for future electricity to reach end-users, and reliably, vast investment is needed by generation companies (gencos) and distribution companies (discos) for new plants, transformers, repairs, improvements, expansion and protection against theft. Nigeria began to privatize its power industry in 2013 under President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration under the auspices of the Energy Sector Reform Act of 2005, and 60 percent share of the twelve discos are privatized, so it is vital to harness that source of capital. According to Mr. Fashola, government’s role, both federal and local, now is to implement the laws, voice policies and take actions that help the private sector play its part effectively.

Lack of electricity and energy overall can lead to unstable situations, often accompanied by higher unemployment in growing young populations. Situations similar to these have been cited as potential Boko Haram recruiting grounds. That in itself can be seen as a need to stimulate access, but, of course, is not an answer in its own to prevent the scourge of terrorism.

Infrastructure Insufficient but Investment and Possibilities Continue

The acting Director General of the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC), Mr. Chidi Izuwa, has pegged the total amount of funds required to provide quality infrastructure in Nigeria over the next six years at about 100 billion USD. Of that sum, 60 billion USD would be required for the oil and gas sector and about 20 billion USD to bring the power sector up to speed.

One such project to help overcome the electricity shortage and power sector funding is the huge 3,050 MW Mambilla hydropower project, including transmission, with a price tag of 5.8 billion USD. The project has been in discussion since the 1970s with various obstacles. A new attempt to resuscitate the project has come about with an agreement with a Chinese consortium, led by the Chinese Export-Import Bank, and approved by the Federal Executive Council, presided over by President Muhammadu Buhari. An anticipated completion date was announced for 2024. Based on the multiple efforts and the last attempt being cancelled in 2013, the question is will this deal for the ambitious project actually come to fruition and shovels in the ground. The project is also expected to help Nigeria meet its Paris climate agreement commitment.

In addition, further investment is evident with Shoreline, a Nigerian company, recently completing a 300 million USD agreement with a Shell subsidiary to develop gas infrastructure around Lagos. Shoreline wants to bring its natural gas to the growing business hub and residential communities.

Solar energy is in its infancy in Nigeria. There have been multiple utility scale solar projects moving beyond concept stage and signing power purchase agreement (PPAs), but none have yet to reach commercial operations. Starting in 2015, ten PPAs were signed by the government-owned Nigeria Bulk Electricity Trading (NBET). In sum of potential projects, more than 1,000 MW could be operational. There have been additional pledges by companies that could reach more than 4,000 MW. It is only a matter of time before solar does come online with the administration’s focus of solar energy and necessary financial structuring being negotiated.

Policy is Catching Up

The Nigeria Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) issued a feed-in tariff in 2015, making the market more attractive for investors. One of the aims was to stimulate more than 2,000 MW of renewable generation by 2020. As another part of the scheme, discos need to source at least 50 percent of their procurement from renewable energy. The remaining 50 percent needs to be sourced from the NBET – which needs improved financial capability itself to support the electricity market.

NERC has also issued mini-grid regulations this past August to allow people to provide their own power from 1 kilowatt-1 MW. Mini-grids can play an important role reaching those in rural communities without access to electricity. In addition, an important step taken by President Buhari in March was the formation of the Board and management of the Rural Electrification Agency to facilitate access and advocate for solar options. There are a multitude of multi-national organizations, such as the World Bank, that have mini-grid/off-grid programs in other nations with electricity shortages that could act as a multiplier with investment.

The Power Sector Recovery Program involves producing more power, reducing system losses, increasing financial viability, completion of transmission projects, increasing access to electricity and implementation of more meters.

Future Remains Bright with Right Commitment

Vast opportunity continues to lay ahead for Nigeria with its increasingly educated population, the largest internet penetration in Africa, a developing tech sector, financial structure and various entrepreneurial companies sprouting up. Appropriate further policy can lead the nation on a sustainable course of development and address many of the current pressing needs, despite political wrangling and disagreements. In addition to energy, important areas to keep a focus on will be agriculture, transport, infrastructure, education, transparency, stymying corruption and evolving technology. A solid grasp of these plus Nigerians ingenuity and passion will be a path to success with appropriate support from office holders.

The post Unleashing Nigeria’s Energy Potential? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n°3/2017). Marie-Hélène Schwoob propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Jean-Marc Chaumet et Thierry Pouch, La Chine au risque de la dépendance alimentaire (Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2017, 216 pages).

Jean-Marc Chaumet et Thierry Pouch brossent un tableau des problématiques de sécurité alimentaire auxquelles la Chine est aujourd’hui confrontée, et exposent en détail les causes de cette insécurité (évolution de la demande alimentaire chinoise, manque de ressources en terres et en eau, problématiques liées au foncier…), ainsi que les politiques mises en place par le gouvernement pour tenter d’apporter des réponses à ce qui reste encore aujourd’hui une priorité stratégique pour le pays : assurer un taux d’autosuffisance alimentaire minimal pour sa population.

Les deux premiers chapitres, qui plongent dans l’histoire de la Chine depuis la période des Royaumes combattants jusqu’au Grand Bond en avant, retracent la naissance et le développement de cette vision particulière que porte la Chine sur la sécurité alimentaire de son territoire. De l’utilisation de l’arme alimentaire par les royaumes jusqu’aux famines qui ont très durement frappé le pays – pour la famine du Grand Bond en avant (1958-1961), les pertes sont estimées entre 10 et 50 millions de morts –, l’histoire éclaire la volonté des dirigeants chinois d’aujourd’hui à prendre au sérieux cette question de la sécurité alimentaire, et à mettre tout en œuvre pour éviter d’engager le pays sur un modèle de dépendance aux importations de produits agricoles et alimentaires, à l’instar du Royaume-Uni ou du Japon.

Le livre s’attache également à démonter certaines idées reçues, s’affranchissant par exemple de la séparation généralement établie entre période maoïste et période dengiste, ou encore étudiant avec attention les chiffres réels du land grabbing, qui suscitent les craintes de « post-impérialisme » chinois en Afrique. Les auteurs font également des mentions très intéressantes du point de vue chinois sur les questions de sécurité alimentaire. Ils citent les travaux de nombreux universitaires ou relatent les débats sur la question des importations, qui malgré des réticences certaines, se sont récemment imposées comme inévitables pour l’approvisionnement de la population chinoise et la protection des ressources du territoire, déjà fortement dégradées par un productivisme forcené.

Le livre lie de manière passionnante ces questions agricoles internes à l’histoire de la pensée économique et à l’évolution actuelle de la géopolitique mondiale de l’alimentation. La thèse selon laquelle la Chine, qui aspire à être une puissance hégémonique, serait contrainte dans son accession à ce statut (voire menacée de déclin) par sa dépendance croissante aux importations alimentaires, peut faire débat dans un contexte où sa balance commerciale reste très fortement excédentaire, et où de nombreux autres facteurs de déclin économique entrent en compte. Il est cependant certain que, comme le soulignent les auteurs, cette dépendance alimentaire constitue une puissante force de rappel pour le pays, mais aussi à l’extérieur de ses frontières, pour la Chine comme pour d’autres pays. La Chine, du fait des quantités massives de produits agricoles qu’elle importe désormais, façonne et défait l’économie de territoires entiers hors de ses frontières. En éclairant l’impact majeur des politiques chinoises sur les tendances haussières et baissières des marchés internationaux agricoles, cet ouvrage pose une pierre fondamentale pour la compréhension de la géopolitique de la sécurité alimentaire mondiale.

Marie-Hélène Schwoob

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

 

The terrorist threat has changed since 9/11 and the United States must develop a strategy for this new phase in the war on terrorism.

Speaking at a panel this week in New York City, retired Marine Corps Brigadier General Stephen Cheney emphasized the link between energy security and U.S. national security.

“Our nation’s concept of energy security was defined in the American mind by the two oil crises of the ’70s…where our country found its economy literally held hostage by hostile foreign powers over decisions that our leaders made in international affairs,” he said. “To ensure that nothing like that ever happens again—that should be our goal in building energy security.”

General Cheney is the CEO of the American Security Project (ASP), which presented the panel in partnership with the Foreign Policy Association. He spoke alongside two of his colleagues at ASP, Navy Vice Admiral Lee Gunn and Air Force Lieutenant General Norman Seip, both retired. The panel was an Official Affiliate Event of 2017 Climate Week NYC.

While the Department of Defense (DoD) remains the single largest consumer of fossil fuel in the world, the military faces an array of strategic and tactical concerns that have propelled it to become a leader in energy innovation. Threats include, for instance, fuel price volatility, the vulnerability of fuel convoys to attack, and the susceptibility to disruption of the commercial power supplies that installations rely on.

DoD’s energy usage is divided between installation energy (about 25%) and operational energy (about 75%). The Army is the largest installation energy user, while the Air Force is the largest operational energy user. DoD is required by law to obtain 25% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2025, and it has committed to install one gigawatt each of renewable generating capacity from the Army, Navy and Air Force Installations by 2025.

Lieutenant General Seip highlighted programs in each of the services that address energy security on the operational level, including the Navy’s Great Green Fleet; the Marines’ Ground Renewable Expeditionary Energy Network System (GREENS) and Solar Portable Alternative Communications Energy System (SPACES); the Army’s flagship Net Zero Initiative; and the Air Force Energy Flight Plan.

“The good news is that alternative energy type of biofuels are getting to be cost-competitive,” he stressed. “It’s got to be drop-in, it’s got to be scalable, it’s got to have the same performance…and it has to be cost-competitive.”

DoD recognizes climate change itself as a threat to national security. Vice Admiral Gunn described climate change as a strategic challenge, using three terms—“threat multiplier,” “catalyst for conflict,” and “accelerant of instability”—that are employed by ASP and by CNA, where Gunn serves as president of the Institute for Public Research.

On the tactical side, he noted that “more than thirty bases around the country, but also around the world, are subject to the threats of changing climate,” including sea level rise and extreme weather conditions.

The panelists stressed the focus on long-term planning in the military, in contrast to political preoccupation with election cycles. “We must see energy security as a long-term process, not as a moment that’s frozen in time,” said Brigadier General Cheney. “Some policies get billed on security today while harming our future security.”

Vice Admiral Gunn noted progress and enthusiasm on the the local and state level in the absence of Trump administration leadership. But he warned that “China, the EU and even Saudi Arabia have national energy strategies. The United States does not and never has.” On research, development and deployment of renewables, he continued, “We’re number three and falling back every day in terms of national dedication to this…There’s no leadership on this…It’s going to be very damaging to our country.”

The post Energy Security Is a Matter of National Security Say Retired Military Leaders appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Own report) - To secure its influence in Central Asia in rivalry to Russia and China, Berlin is taking new initiatives toward Uzbekistan, the most populous country in the region. Among the five post-Soviet Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan has been Germany's key partner for the past 25 years, even hosting a Bundeswehr base over an extended period of time. Now the German government seeks to reinforce it position in Uzbekistan by expanding economic relations. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in office since one year, is initiating a neo-liberal policy in his country. At the same time, Russia's rise in influence in the economic and military sectors, alongside China's greatly enhanced economic advances has put Germany under pressure. If Germany does not want to lose ground in Central Asia, it must act quickly.

Dans la profusion des publications — essais parfois polémiques, enquêtes journalistiques, vulgarisation de la recherche historique, sociologique ou géopolitique — consacrées au phénomène que, de façon plus ou moins rigoureuse, on désigne sous l'expression « terrorisme djihadiste », peu aident à (...) / Proche-Orient, Idées, Islam, Religion, Société, Terrorisme, Violence - 2017/10

L'idéologie dominante s'appuie sur des notions si communément admises qu'elles finissent par se dispenser de toute mise en perspective. Tel est le cas de la « mobilité ». / France, Capitalisme, Idéologie, Migrations, Société, Transports, Travail, Ville, Néolibéralisme - (...) / France, Capitalisme, Idéologie, Migrations, Société, Transports, Travail, Ville, Néolibéralisme - 2015/01

Prisée des touristes pour ses plages et ses safaris, la côte kényane subit depuis plusieurs mois une vague d'attentats meurtriers. Des crimes imputables au terrorisme islamiste, venu de la Somalie voisine ? Cette explication, trop aisée, masque les fractures politiques et sociales qui déchirent le (...) / Afrique, Corne de l'Afrique, Kenya, Somalie, Économie, Inégalités, Islam, Minorité nationale, Droits des minorités, Parti politique, Politique, Terrorisme, Tourisme, Fondamentalisme - 2014/10

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n°3/2017). Jean-Yves Haine propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Seth A. Johnston, How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016, 272 p.).

L’ouvrage de Seth Johnston se focalise sur la dimension institutionnelle de l’Alliance atlantique. Son hypothèse initiale, basée sur la théorie institutionnelle, et en particulier sa version dite historique de Peter Hall, estime que ces institutions ont joué un rôle important dans l’évolution et l’adaptation de l’Alliance. Même s’il n’est pas question d’ignorer le poids des intérêts nationaux, la force de la Realpolitik ou les nécessités imposées par les menaces stratégiques.

Pour étayer sa thèse, l’auteur définit tout d’abord des moments critiques, des périodes carrefours où la force de la Realpolitik s’efface au profit des volontés politiques, où les choix l’emportent sur la nécessité. Puis il met en lumière les différents moyens utilisés par l’institution pour gagner de l’influence : la définition de l’agenda, le choix et le lieu des réunions, le partage de l’information, la maîtrise du consensus, la sélection des experts et l’orientation de leurs études, le blocage ou ­l’obstruction bureaucratique… : autant d’outils qui permettent aux officiels d’orienter l’avenir, la trajectoire et la stratégie de l’Alliance.

L’auteur illustre cette influence de plusieurs cas historiques. Ainsi la guerre de Corée entraîna-t-elle une militarisation de l’Alliance, qui devait passer par le réarmement allemand. Celui-ci n’était pas nécessairement « atlantique » ; la voie européenne fut explorée, du plan Pleven à l’échec de la CED. Ces années furent mises à profit par les officiels de l’OTAN, notamment Charles Spofford au sein du Conseil, pour préparer l’Alliance à accueillir une Allemagne remilitarisée, jeter les bases d’une intégration militaire et d’une administration civile, et modifier sa stratégie dans le sens d’une défense de l’avant. Toutefois, entre le vœu exprimé par le secrétaire d’État Acheson, en septembre 1950, de « ­donner des dents » à l’Alliance, et le résultat de 1954, l’influence de l’institution resta secondaire.

La fin de la guerre froide fut une autre étape cruciale dans ­l’évolution de l’Alliance. Le règlement de la confrontation Est-Ouest offrait de ­nombreuses options diplomatiques: une sécurité européenne intégrée à l’UE, une Allemagne réunifiée mais neutre, une architecture de type OSCE renforcée, une Alliance politique avec un retrait militaire américain… Toutes ces voies furent négligées au profit de la préférence américaine pour le maintien de l’Alliance avec une Allemagne unie en son sein. Tel fut le choix fondamental opéré par l’administration Bush, telle fut la configuration de l’Alliance au lendemain de la guerre froide. Les acteurs institutionnels n’ont guère modifié ce choix.

Le grand mérite de cet ouvrage est de souligner le rôle des officiels dans l’adaptation de l’OTAN, du plan Spofford au rapport Harmel, des bons offices de l’ambassadeur de Staercke à l’influence de Solana. Reste que les nécessités de la géo­politique et la force des intérêts nationaux demeurent le guide essentiel pour comprendre l’histoire – certes exceptionnellement longue par rapport à l’âge moyen et la mortalité des alliances militaires – de l’Alliance atlantique. L’autonomie et l’influence de l’organisation existent mais restent faibles par rapport à la volonté des États, notamment le plus puissant d’entre eux, les États-Unis. L’administration Trump risque d’en apporter une illustration significative.

Jean-Yves Haine

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

(Own report) - With the Alternative for Germany (AfD), an extreme right wing party will enter the German Bundestag for the first time since the 1950s. With 13 percent of the vote, the AfD has successfully mobilized an extreme right-wing potential that, according to a sociological study, has always existed within the German population. All parties in the Bundestag openly repudiate the AfD. However, this only obscures the fact that the AfD's program, particularly on the important issues of foreign and military policy, show remarkable parallels to the political objectives of almost all other parties in the Bundestag. Like the CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD and the Greens, the AfD sees Germany as a global "policy-making power," whose armed forces should be massively upgraded and made more operational. Whereas, the mainstream parties in the Bundestag are relying on the EU as the instrument for German global policy, the AfD favors a national course for Germany exercising global power. This course would probably take effect should the EU disintegrate due to the growing internal dissentions or if more and more countries opt to exit.

M. Faure Gnassingbé sera-t-il candidat à sa propre succession lors de l'élection présidentielle togolaise de 2015 ? Son départ constitue l'un des enjeux du dialogue entamé mi-mai par tous les partis politiques. / France, Togo, Armée, Élections, Relations Nord-Sud, Politique, Violence, Mafia, Afrique de (...) / France, Togo, Armée, Élections, Relations Nord-Sud, Politique, Violence, Mafia, Afrique de l'Ouest, Diplomatie, Corruption, Relations bilatérales - 2014/06

L'escalade n'a pas provoqué l'effondrement de la République démocratique du Vietnam, bien que les Etats–Unis, selon leurs propres sources, aient largué près de 100 000 tonnes de bombes. Comment un petit pays agricole a-t-il pu, grâce à sa détermination et à son ingéniosité, résister à la nation (...) / États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Agriculture, Culture, Éducation, Faim, Femmes, Guerre du Vietnam 1959-1975, Impérialisme, Nationalisme, Santé, Société, Autodétermination des peuples, Nord-Vietnam 1945-1976, Mouvement de libération - 1968/03

In his first address to the United Nations, President Donald Trump gave the international community a message consistent with much of his prior rhetoric on international affairs. The President declared that the United Nations, “… was based on the vision that diverse nations could cooperate to protect their sovereignty, preserve their security, and promote their prosperity”, and these three pillars resonated strongly through his remarks. President Trump attempted to walk the tightrope between promoting the sovereignty of all nations while denouncing the behavior of “rogue nations” both domestically and in their international engagements. In a way that seems standard to the President’s domestic observers (but was likely unfamiliar to a body like the United Nations), Mr. Trump simultaneously highlighted the importance of the sovereign rights of each nation while calling for unified global action against nations who behave in ways that cause turmoil and uncertainty for the global community.

This call to collective action is grounded in the belief that well intentioned nations in the world would find it in their individual interest to combat the advances of bad actors. President Trump’s continued promise to put America first was followed by the assumption that the leaders of other nations will, and should, follow the same approach on behalf of their citizens. To further this argument, the President highlighted remarks made by President Truman, who argued that the United Nations draws its capacity from the strength of individual members who are willing to pool their strength collectively for the betterment of all. While this approach seems common sense, it is only useful to the extent that other nations share the President’s subjective approach to right action and views on what constitutes good governance.

President Trump was unwavering in his assessment that the primary threat to global security, “… is a small group of rogue regimes that violate every principle on which the United Nations is based.” The President called for international action against three bad actors in particular- North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela, noting that the governments in each of those three nations fostered horrible outcomes both for their own people and for the international community.

In a similar way, President Trump slammed Iran for, “speak(ing) openly of mass murder, vowing death to America, (and) destruction of Israel.” He also criticized the Iranian regime as a, “corrupt dictatorship behind the false guise of democracy” that sponsored terror groups that destabilize the Middle East in particular and the entire world more generally. After arguing the case that Iran is a bad actor and destabilizing force in the world, Mr. Trump castigated the Iran nuclear deal as, “an embarrassment to the United States”, and insisted that we would be hearing about the deal’s fate under his administration in short order.

While the case for collective action appears strong in the instance of North Korea and Iran, the call for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela seems to be at odds with the President’s message of sovereignty.  Make no doubt- socialism is a failed ideology, and President Trump rightly targeted the economic system as one that has spread poverty and oppression everywhere that it has been implemented. Mr. Trump also accurately suggested that it is in large part a consequence of this attempt to collectivize Venezuela’s economy that the nation’s democracy has collapsed into an increasingly dictatorial state of affairs.

Those arguments are separate, however, from the notion that Venezuela is a threat to the international order as a consequence of its economic mismanagement. To the extent that Venezuela made a genuine democratic choice to go down the path of socialism by electing Hugo Chavez to the nation’s top office in 1999, it seems suspect to violate that nation’s sovereignty on the grounds that such a decision has proven to have devastating consequences for the Venezuelan people.  While President Trump held back from again mentioning a military option in the Latin American nation, he did mark a return to full democracy as a key objective for the United Nations to pursue. Depending on the form that this objective takes, it could prove to be one of the more troubling policies put forth by the Trump administration.

In addition to his comments on the immediate state of international affairs, President Trump commented on the state of the United Nations as an institution. Against the backdrop of praise for the body’s potential to do good in the world, Mr. Trump highlighted that, “… the United Nations must reform if it is to be an effective partner in confronting threats to sovereignty, security, and prosperity”, and that, “too often the focus of (the United Nations) has not been on results, but on bureaucracy and process.” On top of these reforms, the President noted that, “The United States is one out of 193 countries in the United Nations, and yet we pay 22% of the entire budget”, and that as a consequence of the United Nations’ failures on some of President Trump’s ambitions, the United States is getting out far less than it puts into the international body.

It is also worth noting that despite the strong rhetoric directed at some trouble makers, Trump refused to offer the same sort of harsh commentary towards China and Russia for their controversial foreign policies. The President only mentioned those two nations on a single occasion, when he expressed disappointment at Russian territorial expansion into Ukraine and China’s expansionism in the South China Sea. Along this same line of reasoning, Mr. Trump was quick to point to humanitarian failings by America’s rivals while refusing to extend that argument to Saudi Arabia and other American allies that have authoritarian governments with abysmal human rights records. This cognitive dissidence is troubling, especially in light of the President’s approach to collective action by sovereign mechanisms.

Taken as a whole, the value of President Trump’s speech at the United Nations is dependent on the extent to which other nations find themselves in agreement with the President’s preferred outcomes to today’s global security challenges. Mr. Trump called for collective action against rogue regimes, yet he highlighted the importance of each individual nation’s autonomy and sovereignty in a way that his recent predecessors would not have dared to endorse. This unique balance is, then, reliant on President Trump’s ability to bring other world leaders to his perspective- it will find success or failure on his ability to make a truly good deal for the American people on the world stage. “Our respect for sovereignty is also a call to action”, President Trump said towards the end of his remarks. That claim is uniquely capable of summarizing Mr. Trumps comments to the General Assembly, and the extent to which that assumption holds will play a substantial role in the future of the Trump Foreign policy.

—

Peter Scaturro- Assistant Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

The post Our Respect for Sovereignty is also a Call to Action appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n°3/2017). Norbert Gaillard propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Klaus Schwab, La quatrième révolution industrielle (Dunod, 2017, 208 p.).

Klaus Schwab, fondateur et président du Forum économique mondial, analyse ici en profondeur la quatrième révolution industrielle, qui commence à transformer nos sociétés. La thèse de l’auteur est que les multiples innovations apparues depuis le début du siècle sont constitutives d’une nouvelle révolution industrielle. Il avance trois arguments pour étayer son point de vue : la rapidité du phénomène, son ampleur et son impact.

La matrice de cette quatrième révolution industrielle est la puissance de l’intelligence augmentée qui permet un accroissement sans précédent des capacités de production. Les conséquences sont évidentes : le travailleur insuffisamment qualifié est le perdant de cette mutation. À l’inverse, le détenteur de capital (financier, humain ou techno­logique) ressort gagnant. Klaus Schwab entrevoit deux obstacles à l’accomplissement de cette nouvelle révolution : l’inadaptation du système politique, économique et social, et l’absence de récit collectif expliquant les opportunités du monde en gestation.

L’étude de l’impact de ces changements technologiques occupe l’essentiel du livre. Cinq grands domaines sont passés en revue : l’économie et le monde de l’entreprise, d’une part ; l’État, la société et l’individu, d’autre part.

Les bouleversements économiques à attendre sont de taille : disparition de certains emplois (professionnels du télémarketing, conseillers fiscaux, secrétaires), plus grande autonomie des travailleurs et généralisation de la notion de « mission ». Une précarisation accrue est à craindre. Les entreprises auront les moyens d’augmenter leur production et leur productivité. Les stratégies de plateforme assureront une valorisation des biens et des services proposés. En contrepartie, il faudra investir massivement dans la sécurisation des données afin de lutter contre les cyberattaques.

Les États, quant à eux, gagneront en efficacité grâce à une nouvelle gouvernance numérique mais les défis sont nombreux. Le principal est sans doute la montée en puissance de micro-pouvoirs. Le meilleur (démocratisation et pluralisme) pourrait côtoyer le pire (cyberguerre et propagande antidémocratique). Ces chocs technologiques sont susceptibles de cristalliser des tensions politico-religieuses et d’aggraver les inégalités sociales. Les classes moyennes risquent d’ailleurs de se sentir déclassées dans une société toujours plus connectée, productive et transparente. L’individu améliorera son accès à l’information et au savoir mais perdra une partie de son empathie et de sa capacité à se concentrer. Cependant, c’est la recherche en matière génétique qui pose les questions éthiques et philosophiques les plus épineuses : les concepts d’identité et d’individu auront-ils encore un sens dans une génération ?

Les annexes sont tout aussi passionnantes. Sélectionnant 23 mutations majeures (telles que les technologies implantables, l’internet des objets, la maison connectée, la voiture autonome, l’intelligence artificielle dans le milieu professionnel, l’impression 3D, les neuro­technologies), Schwab présente systématiquement les enjeux ainsi que les effets positifs et négatifs attendus.

Cet ouvrage vaut le détour : clair, ­instructif, il n’occulte pas les diffi­cultés que pose la quatrième ­révolution industrielle.

Norbert Gaillard

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

 

The official phase of “Zapad-2017”, the biggest Russian-Belarusian military exercise this year, started on September 14, 2017. Yet, this event has been analysed by security pundits for months. There were many speculations about how this exercise will change the regional dynamics and security situation. The aim of this article is to put “Zapad-2017” into a larger perspective. How do the Russian armed forces train and what is the purpose of those drills? What has changed since the previous “Zapad” exercise which took place in 2013? What is to watch during “Zapad-2017”?

Here are ten things every Foreign Policy Blogs reader should know:

1) Russians train as they fight. This is a crucial element of the Russian exercising posture. In practical terms, this means that the Russian drills are based on a real threat assessment. The scenarios are realistic. They cover the opponents that exist and the military capabilities which match the reality.

2) Since 2013 Russia has been directly engaged in two major conventional military conflicts in the vicinity of NATO. Both in the cases of Ukraine and Syria, Russian forces continue to test their military capabilities, chain of command, procedures and level of interoperability on the battlefield. Those military operations have helped the Russian armed forces gain solid battlefield experience in a conventional conflict. “Zapad-2017” is yet another chance to verify the lessons learnt from both wars and eliminate existing gaps.

3) The Russian operational engagement gives us some initial sense of the elements which might be exercised. Based on the observation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict one can expect the following components: use of drones or UAVs to exercise constant real-time surveillance, swift targeting by concentrated artillery fire with advanced munition as well as offensive electronic warfare capabilities.

4) “Zapad-2017” is of particular importance for the Russian Western and Southern Military Districts. They have become a top priority in the Russian military modernisation program since at least 2012. In practical terms this means that the units in both districts have received the most modern and technologically-advanced equipment, which will be put to the test in “Zapad-2017”.

5) Another key element of the modernisation of both military districts is the creation of the highly sophisticated Anti-Access/Area Denial systems (A2/AD). They encompass the necessary air power, maritime capabilities (including offensive mining), offensive and defensive missile systems (including Iskander, Bastion, Kalibr and S-400), offensive electronic warfare and cyber capabilities. The militarisation of the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea led to the creation of the so-called A2/AD bubbles right on NATO borders. Their main goal is to limit NATO’s freedom of manoeuvring. In “Zapad-2017” one shall expect that those systems will not only be exercised, but in fact (and what is even more important) their level of integration will be verified.

6) The nuclear component is something of particular importance to watch during “Zapad-2017”. Russia often merges the conventional and nuclear dimensions into one scenario. In fact, such an approach allows Russia to test its escalation dominance in a potential conflict. This is exactly what NATO does not do as such a policy fuels unpredictability and enhances a lack of confidence. In a broader context, the Russian approach also aims at intimidating European societies.

7) Since 2013 Russia has significantly changed its combined exercising posture. The “whole of nation” approach to drills was reintroduced. In reality it means that the whole public administration – on both national and regional levels – prepares for a large-scale conflict. The non-military units and agencies train simultaneously with the Russian armed forces. The “whole of nation’ approach helps to integrate the military and non-military systems and enhances their interoperability.

8) Russia also reinstated the practice of organising the so-called snap exercises. Those drills come with no prior notification and are predominantly large in scale. They often happen in NATO’s direct vicinity. They are very hard to trace and could potentially serve as a preparation to the start of a military conflict. There is no doubt that snap exercises confirm Russia’s strategic political and military unpredictability as they increase the level of uncertainty and the risk of miscalculation.

9) Russia’s exercising policy can also be characterised by a lack of transparency. Russia often does not give advanced notice of its exercises which is a standard procedure in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Russia repeatedly splits its large scale exercises, as in the case of “Zapad-2017”, into smaller ones. This tactics allows it to avoid the necessity of notification and invitation of foreign observers. In fact the Russian armed forces often act contrary to the spirit of the OSCE instruments and use the existing “loopholes”, especially in the Vienna Document.

10) At the same time, Russia uses exercises like “Zapad-2017” to verify the effectiveness of its propaganda machinery. In the media sphere Russia often artificially boosts the number of troops and equipment that will take part in the exercise in order to test the reaction of NATO allies, neighbouring states (especially Ukraine, Georgia, Sweden and Finland) and European societies. In fact, in the case of the “Zapad-2017” Russia wanted to create an impression that this exercise is the only game in town. In fact, it is not. Other operations – including the Russian military engagement in Ukraine and Syria, the Russian hybrid activities in Western and Central Europe or in the Western Balkans – continue.

This article was originally published by “New Eastern Europe”.

All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institution he represents.

The post Ten Things You Need to Know about Russian Military Exercises appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Own report) - Berlin's long-standing support for the Kurdish Autonomous Region has helped lay the groundwork for the referendum on the secession of Iraq's Kurdish-speaking regions, scheduled to be held on Monday. For decades, the Barzani clan, which controls the regional government, has maintained good relations with leading German politicians of the CDU and CSU parties. Since 2005, Berlin has systematically sponsored the autonomous region - through economic aid and establishing German institutions. Most recently, Germany was even training and upgrading the Kurdish Peshmerga into a powerful military force - officially to strengthen an ally in the war against IS. However, today the Peshmerga could use its German weapons for the secession of its region, if necessary, imposing it by armed force. In plain sight of the Bundeswehr, and under cover of the war against the IS, the Peshmerga has been carrying out so-called ethnic cleansing in towns, previously outside the Kurdish Autonomous Region to secure the desired pro-Kurdish majority in the upcoming referendum. Up to now, Berlin has voiced no objections to the date of the secession referendum.

People fly “Estelada” flags (Catalan separatist flag) during a pro-independence rally in Barcelona, Spain June 11, 2017. (REUTERS/Albert Gea)

National governments in federally unified states rarely allow for a national legal process to break up its own Federation. The legality of the upcoming referendum on Catalonia’s independence from Spain did not meet the legal requirements it needed to in order to depart from Spain, but if they declare independence, the Spanish courts may no longer have the presumed jurisdiction to stop a separation.

Catalonia was always a strong contender for independence due to its economic strength as a region, the historical divide via culture and language to the rest of Spain, and the existence of the EU that gives more of a weighed representation to regional governments in national forums. With the possible fracturing of the EU, the recent referendum might be the last best opportunity to separate from Spain for the Catalan people, or at least may give Catalonia a stronger position in a federated Spanish state.

A case in Canada in the Supreme Court of that country set to legitimize Quebec’s separation from the rest of Canada many years ago. The requirements were not met to separate Quebec from Canada constitutionally at the time. While cultural differences are recognized by most people who have spent anytime in Quebec, financially Quebec was heavily linked to the rest of Canada. With Catalans citing the amount of tax dollars going to Madrid’s central government as one of the catalysts for separation, Quebec and even the Canadian province of Alberta may take a separation of Catalonia from Spain as a sign of the times for their own provinces. The impression of a unified community in one region having to financially support the rest of Spain links pocket book issues with that of culture.

In Canada, the largest and most industrially developed province that is the home of the national capital, Ontario, has what many claim as the largest sub-sovereign debt in the world. This means Ontario as an independent province has more debt than any other regional government in the world, and more than many nation states and large US states like California and New York. With Quebec and other provinces moving ahead economically, the view is that Canada’s main economic hub is deteriorating.

With economic interdependence turning into an economic burden, places like Catalonia and Quebec may be able to remove some of the shared debt that comes with being in a federated state by shedding the very governments that have accumulated the majority of the national debt. While financial situations are not a sole cause of leaving a state, it does point to an opportunity for independence. In Ontario, recent corruption trials involving the current government also does not help show a positive trend to Quebec, Alberta or the rest of Canada.

Scotland’s fight against being removed from the EU post-Brexit or Quebec leaving Canada depends heavily on economic independence as much as cultural and political independence. With those regions being such a large part of the UK and Canada respectively, it is hard to imagine either country existing without the other. When the vision is that those regions can exist on their own without the need or ties to the capital, the recipe for independence comes as it has in Catalonia. A lesson for federal states is to remember that bad policy can lead to the end of the current incarnations of a state, and that measured policies may suit a federation better than radical policy moves that are established mostly just to keep one’s job in politics. These issues should be presented clearly in the upcoming referendum vote or any others in the future.

The post An Independent Catalonia May Promote Worldwide Independence Movements appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.