European Union

The European Commission refused to comment on whether a bilateral deal between Germany and BioNTech for 30 million additional vaccines is a breach of EU collective purchase agreements - which forbid member states from negotiating separate deals.

Data released on Friday by the EU's earth observation programme, the Copernicus Climate Change Service, showed 2020 as the warmest year ever recorded - at the end of the warmest decade on record. Last year, Europe saw an increase of 0.4 degrees Celsius in comparison with 2019, the previous warmest year. "[This] is yet another reminder of the urgency of ambitious emissions reductions," Carlo Buontempo, Copernicus service director, said.

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

The European Commission secured an additional 200 million doses of the BioNTech-Pfizer vaccine, with the option of an extra 100 million. In total, 600 million doses of this vaccine will be available for member states. The additional doses will be delivered in the second quarter of 2021.  BioNTech-Pfizer and Moderna vaccines are the only jabs authorised in the EU. The EU sealed deals for up to 2.3 billion vaccine doses.

Over the course of a few days in late December, the State Duma passed new laws introducing sweeping new restrictions on political protests, legalising censorship of social media and cementing broad new guidelines under which the government can designate individuals as "foreign agents," The Moscow Times reports. The new laws have already been signed into life by president Vladimir Putin.

Turkey and France were working to normalise ties and talks were going well, Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said Thursday, adding Ankara was ready to improve ties with its Nato ally if Paris showed the same willingness, Ekathimerini writes. Turkey and France have disagreed over conflicts in Syria, Libya, the eastern Mediterranean and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, as well as over the publication of cartoons of the prophet Mohammed in France.

Leave.EU, a pro-Brexit campaign group, has shifted its registration from the UK to EU member state Ireland, in an ironic move designed to let it keep its domain name, The Guardian reports. It is now registered in the name of Sean Power, the CEO of Irish professional services firm BSG, records show. But when The Guardian contacted Power, he voiced surprise and said he had no links to the group.

The Portuguese EU presidency has said it was confident the European Commission would approve its state-rescue of national airline TAP by the end of March, Reuters reports. "The main concern of the plan is to make the firm sustainable," Portuguese finance minister Joao Leao said. The airline needed €2bn in extra funds to survive. It also needed 2,000 job cuts and pay-cuts of 25 percent, Portugal earlier said.

"I never dreamt I would see these things ... and chilling, chilling," Anthony Gardner, the former US ambassador to the EU, said of the pro-Trump mob which stormed the Capitol earlier this week.

China, Iran, and Russia have gloated about the attack on the US Capitol, but for Lithuania's foreign minister, the American republic will bounce back.

European leaders hope Joe Biden will travel to Brussels in the first half of the year - although the timing of any such visit is not yet clear.

European far-right leaders who back outgoing US president Donald Trump condemned the violent mob who stormed the Capitol in Washington - but fell short of pinning blame on the man who incited the rioters.

The head of the European branch of the World Health Organization, Hans Kluge, said on Thursday that the variant of Covid-19, first detected in the UK and already registered in 22 European countries, has triggered "an alarming situation" that requires authorities to strengthen public health measures. In Europe, coronavirus cases have surpassed 25 million, according to a Reuters tally - with several countries reintroducing or extending lockdowns.

Customers in Europe buying products from UK companies are receiving unexpected bills for VAT and customs declarations or finding household names have stopped shipping to the continent, as post-Brexit trading rules bite, the Guardian writes. Since the end of the Brexit transition period, continental customers must both complete a customs declaration for goods imported from the UK and pay national VAT.

After the mob attack on Washington's Capitol Hill, we have to ask ourselves if it would be possible to see such a march on Brussels? The answer is: Yes. Europe is dealing with the same dark forces.

EU-UK relations are changing following Brexit and the deal reached at the end of 2020. Find out what this means for you.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

EU-UK relations are changing following Brexit and the deal reached at the end of 2020. Find out what this means for you.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 267 - Draft report on the 2019-2020 Commission Reports on Albania
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Isabel Santos

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

Abstract

This insightful book analyzes the evolution of the operational tasks and cooperation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL). Exploring the recent expansion of the legal mandates of these decentralized EU agencies and the activities they undertake in practice, David Fernández-Rojo offers a critical assessment of the EU migration agencies. 

The book identifies two key trends in the administration of the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Fernández-Rojo discusses how on one hand the new legal frameworks of FRONTEX, EASO and EUROPOL stress that their operational roles are limited to providing national authorities with technical assistance, while on the other hand these agencies are increasingly involved in guaranteeing the enforcement of EU migration, asylum and border management measures. The book expertly illustrates how FRONTEX, EASO and EUROPOL establish an effective and uniform national implementation of laws and policies, with a focus on their multilateral cooperation in the hotspots established in the aftermath of the refugee crisis.

Examining the de jure and de facto operational powers and cooperation of EU migration agencies, this book will be critical reading for academics and students of law, international relations and political science. Its assessment of the effectiveness of policy implementation will also be beneficial for legal practitioners, policy makers and NGOs.

Critical Acclaim

‘In this detailed and precise guide, the author traces how Europe’s border, police, and asylum agencies are evolving in an interactive system of governance. EU Migration Agencies maps out lines of authority, pathways of power, and unexpected feedback loops.’
– David Scott FitzGerald, University of California, San Diego, US

‘David Fernández-Rojo has produced an excellent and invaluable book on a topic of great importance and complexity, namely the evolution of the operational tasks and cooperation of three key agencies in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: FRONTEX, EASO and EUROPOL. His comparative analysis offers crucial insights to understand central aspects for the future of the European Union such as the Schengen area, the Common European Asylum System or the so-called hotspots.’
– Diego Acosta, University of Bristol, UK

Contents

1. Introduction to Frontex, EASO and Europol as Operational Decentralized Agencies 2. The Establishment and Initial Operational Role of Frontex, EASO and Europol 3. The Reinforced Operational Tasks of Frontex, EASO and Europol and the Impact of their Activities on the Ground 4. Bilateral and Multilateral Operational Cooperation among Frontex, EASO and Europol 5. Limitations to the Reinforced Operational Tasks and Cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol 6. Conclusions and Perspectives: An Integrated Administration of Border Management, Migration and Asylum Matters in the EU Bibliography Index

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PDF version: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic65

The conclusion of the EU-UK Trade & Cooperation Agreement (TCA) over Christmas meant that the end of the transition period a few days later saw the start of a new phase of the relationship between the two parties. Since there are many others who are much better placed to analyse the contents of the TCA (e.g. Steve Peers, Chris Grey, and the entire UK in a Changing Europe massive), I will limit myself here to discussion of just one aspect, namely the structuring of future EU-UK relations within the treaties. As the diagram above indicates, the TCA joins the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) in creating an architecture not solely of commitments but also of continuing change, review and negotiation. Put simply, Brexit is not ‘done’, merely shifted into a new framework. To illustrate the dynamic nature of the relationship, we might usefully consider four distinct areas. Firstly, the TCA /WA creates a number of grace periods. These are agreed non-applications of rules or processes immediately after the end of transition/start of the TCA (i.e. 1 January 2021). In all the cases listed these are functions of the very rushed timetable from end of negotiations to start of implementation and the consequent inability of the UK to put in place replacement systems or processes. Such grace periods should be considered relatively unusual, for the reason just mentioned: international treaties do not normally get done at such breakneck speed and they do not normally involve divergent regulation. This second point matters a lot in enabling a more phased introduction of the TCA model, since the starting point on 1 January was one of complete alignment on EU standards. The variable length of the grace periods is thus a function of the likely speed at which divergence and/or issues might be expected to emerge: higher for food standards (which involves health), lower for rules of origin (where integrated supply chains cannot change speedily). A further should be made on the data adequacy provision in Art.FINPROV.10a, both for its semi-automatic extension and for the particularity of what follows. Unlike the other cases, where the UK will simply start following pre-agreed rules, this will require the EU to make a new unilateral declaration on adequacy for the UK to maintain existing data flows. This does not allow for any negotiation by the UK, only demonstrating its continuing implementation and enforcement of the necessary standards. The Commission did leave this hanging over the UK during the autumn, so it would be naïve to expect it to be without problem this summer. The second category is that of more conventional transitional arrangements. Unlike the grace periods, these allow for temporary situations to apply while more major adaptations can take place. In the case of references to the Court of Justice on citizens’ rights matters, the emphasis is on sunsetting this legal avenue, as free movement of people becomes a more historic right: the anticipation is that eight years should be long enough for any significant issues to have worked their way through to the courts. By contrast, both the rules of origin and fisheries transitions are designed to phase in new arrangements in a more progressive manner than a simple step-change: the adjustments allow for a longer process of change that better reflects the ability of each side to operationalise it. The final transitional arrangement is the limited shelf-life of Title VIII (energy) of the TCA. While it can be extended beyond June 2026, by mutual agreement, the Title also clearly sets out plans for further, specific negotiations, notably to implement a new energy interconnector agreement by the middle of next year. This is best understood as an early case of the two sides identifying specific needs for resolution, but not being able to tie that off straight away: thus Title VIII will grow, rather than shrink, over time, whether within the TCA text or not. The interconnector example is the only specific and scheduled case of the third category: negotiations. The commitment to develop a new framework for mutual recognition of professional qualifications is left hanging in the TCA and there appears to be no sign of any immediate urgency to get this moving. The other case of a commitment to negotiate falls under the fisheries section of the TCA. Annual rounds of discussions will continue using the Common Fisheries Policy framework through the 5.5 year adjustment period, using the TCA’s indications on reducing the EU’s share of access to UK waters. Thereafter, from 2026, the UK will be treated like other fishing states, albeit with one major caveat, namely that the EU can apply tariffs on UK fish if it suffers further reductions in its share (Bryce Stewart explains more). With the exception of the fisheries negotiations, all that has been listed so far has been about bedding into a new relationship, but this is not the end of the structuring of relations. Perhaps most consequential of the four categories is that of review, since these all carry the potential for more major changes to the TCA/WA arrangements. Most fundamentally of all, the TCA carries a general review clause (Art.FINPROV.3), first at the end of 2025 and then every five years thereafter. No limits are placed on that review and so we might expect it to become a convenient point for both sides to (re)consider what they do with each other and how. The timing of that first general review also matters, since it will follow the outcome of the first consent vote on the Northern Irish Protocol, the start of the emergency brake provisions in the UK’s Trade Scheme, and will coincide with the end of the fisheries adjustment period. Each of these might generate significant issues that require more general attention in the general framework. A similar bunching occurs in 2030, when the TCA’s provisions on fish will be specifically reviewed just ahead of the second general review. All of this runs alongside the rolling reviews that the WA’s Joint Committee will be pursuing in its Northern Irish Protocol implementation (as specified in its recent Decisions). As the graphic at the top suggests, it might be expected that the TCA’s Partnership Council also ends up establishing such reviews, as it gears up its work and identifies points of interest. Summary While the signature of the TCA might have brought to a close of the ‘hot’ phase of Brexit, it certainly does not mean that the UK and EU have now entered a stable new relationship. At best, the TCA/WA is a framework within which both parties will have to actively work to establish new norms of interaction and (hopefully) rebuild some of the trust that was lost during the period since 2016. If the cataloguing above appears extensive, then that is because both of the time-constrained nature of the TCA negotiations and because of the continuing uncertainty of the UK about what it wants to do with its new situation. Only with the passage of time will it become evident how that fits with (or changes) the TCA/WA.

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