European Union

Tartu Vangla
Principles of Community law
The Estonian legislation imposing an absolute bar on a prison officer remaining in employment when his or her hearing acuity does not meet minimum standards of sound perception without allowing it to be ascertained whether that officer is capable of performing his or her duties is contrary to EU law

by Magdalena König This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2021 (17-18 June, online)

 

Counter-terrorism policy has never been such a prominent policy area in EU enlargement as it currently is. In recent years, the EU has put security policy, and in particular counter-terrorism policy, high on the agenda of the accession processes of the South East European EU membership candidates Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, and the potential candidates Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In this contribution, I sketch out three trends and practices that define the EU’s approach to counter-terrorism, an increasingly important policy area of enlargement: regional cooperation, externalisation of internal policies, and prioritisation of preventive counter-terrorism strategies over hard measures.

 

Not a new, but an increasingly highlighted enlargement topic

Even though counter-terrorism has never been as prominent for EU enlargement as it is currently, it is not a new topic within the field of enlargement. Indeed, counter-terrorism cooperation has previously been relevant to enlargement. For example, during the negotiations with Turkey, Croatia, Bulgaria or Romania, as well as in relations with non-EU states such as Ukraine or Moldova. However, with the ongoing enlargement towards South East Europe, counter-terrorism policy has changed – the scope of engagement on the topic has widened and a variety of levels of governance have become involved.

Since the departure of foreign terrorist fighters from South East Europe to Syria and Iraq as of 2011, the EU has put more emphasis on counter-terrorism in accession negotiations. The Commission’s 2018 Western Balkans strategy puts a particular emphasis on home affairs. Meanwhile, counter-terrorism and the prevention and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE) are part of one of six flagship enlargement initiatives. While the Commission’s Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 2014-2020 had already assigned significant funds to counter-terrorism and P/CVE projects, the new IPA 2021-2027 will reflect the increasing focus on counter-terrorism policy by providing even more funding for related activities. Moreover, the 2018 Joint Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism for the Western Balkans is becoming increasingly part of the enlargement assessment. It is included in chapter 24 on justice, freedom and security, which is a prioritized chapter since a reform in 2012.

 

Three trends and practices

The EU’s priorities and practices regarding counter-terrorism policy in South East Europe show certain trends. Firstly, regional cooperation is a guiding principle of enlargement, beyond the realm of counter-terrorism. In the area of counter-terrorism, regional cooperation is particularly pursued with reference to terrorism being a mobile activity that crosses borders, ethnic lines and political differences. Moreover, the underlying assumption is that the challenges which the South East European states face with regards to terrorism and extremism are comparable. The Commission does not cease to highlight that rather than pursuing progress in counter-terrorism policy bilaterally, it prefers using a regional approach because of the “good neighbourly relations” that should be promoted through the enlargement process. An expression of this approach is the 2018 Joint Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism for the Western Balkans which was developed from several high-level counter-terrorism dialogues between SEE and EU representatives. The Joint Action Plan was negotiated on a regional level between both, SEE and EU representatives. Another important instrument reflecting this approach is the regional network of national Countering Violent Extremism coordinators in South East Europe. The network is chaired by the EU’s regional counter-terrorism advisor who is based in Sarajevo and was appointed specifically for South East Europe. The EU asked the South East European governments to appoint a national Countering Violent Extremism coordinator as a single contact point to participate in this network and to coordinate on policies with states in the region.

Secondly, in relation to counter-terrorism and P/CVE in enlargement, the EU has externalised some of its internal policies in these areas. Not surprisingly given the nature of the enlargement framework, the aim is to introduce EU-minded policies and practices in these policy areas. Therefore, there is a strong coherence between the EU’s internal and external counter-terrorism policies, in particular in relation to South East Europe. A good example of this approach is the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), a Commission-led network of practitioners working on (de)radicalisation. It is sought to be replicated in a two-fold way in the region. The Commission aims at integrating the South East European states into the EU-wide RAN as well as, in the long run, implementing a regional version of RAN. This again reflects the preference for regional cooperation in the EU’s strategy.

Thirdly, what is broadly referred to as counter-terrorism cooperation is clearly prioritising P/CVE activities, or so-called soft measures, over hard measures such as police work and law enforcement. While the EU engages in both dimensions of this work in South East Europe, more attention is given to P/CVE than to counter-terrorism activities. This is also underlined by the EU’s current priority topics of counter-terrorism policy: the prevention of radicalisation and the return and de-radicalisation of foreign terrorist fighters and their families. With this focus on P/CVE activities the EU has treated projects employing a so-called whole-of-society approach preferentially. This means that in its activities, the EU supports the use of a P/CVE approach which brings together a broad range of local authorities and institutions, such as doctors, psychologists, social workers, teachers, etc.

Given the relative novelty of enlargement focused on counter-terrorism, it will be crucial to accompany the integration in this policy field with academic analysis. For example, a question that arises from the three patterns sketched above is, what role does counter-terrorism play in the overall political integration of EU enlargement?

 

 

 

Magdalena König is a PhD researcher at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. Her research interests include EU enlargement, counter-terrorism politics, and the politics of prevention of radicalization. In her PhD research, she examines the role of preventive approaches to counter-terrorism within the ongoing EU enlargement towards South East Europe. Magdalena has a BA in European Studies from Maastricht University and a MA in Peace Research from the University of Tübingen.

 

Institutional  website: https://www.rug.nl/staff/m.c.koenig/

Twitter: @koenig_mc 

 

 

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

 

 

 

The post Regional cooperation, externalization, and prevention: trends and practices of EU counter-terrorism in EU enlargement appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

The Department for Communities in Northern Ireland
DISC
The UK legislation on Universal Credit, which deprives of that benefit Union citizens who have a right to reside on the basis of the scheme established in the context of Brexit but who do not satisfy all of the conditions of Directive 2004/38, is compatible with the principle of equal treatment guaranteed by EU law

FBF
Law governing the institutions
Les orientations sur les modalités de gouvernance et de surveillance des produits bancaires de détail de l’Autorité bancaire européenne sont valides

Ministrstvo za obrambo
Freedom of movement for persons
The Court of Justice provides guidance on the instances in which the Directive concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time does not apply to activities carried out by military personnel

by Salvatore FP Barillà This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2021 (17-18 June, online)

 

In the context of trade policy, economic capacity and market size are often considered central analytical factors. It is assumed that the larger the market size of a state, the more likely it will be to engage in a dispute with the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This assumption is especially prominent for disputes between global powers and developing countries.

 

Nonetheless, materialistic theories do not seem to fully address the situation of EU-China trade disputes in the WTO. When considering the EU and China, two of the largest market economies and two global powers, the expectation is that they should both have requested the establishment of a panel in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) on a number of occasions. Nonetheless, when looking at the cases initiated by the two actors, this expectation is not empirically accurate.

 

The EU is the second most prolific user of the DSM after the United States (US) in terms of initiation of disputes with 104 cases as complainant, while China has only 21. Why?

Traditional drivers used to analyse the reasons why states engage in trade disputes in the WTO suggest a more intensive use of the DSM by China. Like the EU, China is one of the world’s largest economies. China has the legal capacity to engage in a dispute, like the EU, so what explains this discrepancy in the available data if traditional materialistic explanations fail to do so?

 

My research aims to prove the causal relationship between domestic ideas and governments’ decisions to request the establishment of a WTO panel. I argue that the EU and China are representative of different ideas, namely programmatic beliefs. My research proposes that if a government whose programmatic beliefs are centred on mediation and arbitration , then the government will follow its programmatic beliefs. On the contrary, if a government whose programmatic beliefs are based on the preference of judicial remedies requests the establishment of a panel, then the government will be following its programmatic beliefs.

The EU is expected to favour the establishment of a panel to mediation. In this sense, the EU will interpret material factors (like economic capacity, or market size) as conducting the decision towards the establishment of a panel. China is expected to prefer mediation over the establishment of a panel. Attempts of mediation in official documents, as well as in media records, will be analysed as evidence.

 

Chinese ideas of dispute settlement are based on the Confucian tradition of win-win relationships, 關係 (guan xi), in which the preservation of the relationship with the other party is essential to the positive outcome of the dispute. The concept of legal tradition is broader than the mere corpus of laws and political acts that are part of a state’s legislation. It embraces principles, traditions and practices of the state. In this sense, it seems fair to claim that legal traditions are part of a state’s culture and might play a role in a government’s behaviour. Furthermore, the administration of conflict resolution was originally given to family elders (heads of families or clans). This type of local conflict resolution served as a way of preventing other conflicts among citizens. There was no procedural law because the public official would decide the outcome of disputes. Public administration was not separated from the judiciary body. This lack of separation of powers in China.

 

European and Western ideas, which have been absorbed by the WTO, are based on a dialectical vision of disputes, in which one party wins and the other loses. This dialectical vision of the dispute is also due to the fact that traditionally in the West, legal institutions have been seen more keenly as the main institutions to turn to in order to solve a conflict. In this sense, it can be argued that the WTO itself was built on the Western idea of judicial remedy.

 

Norms, or, better, programmatic beliefs can guide, inspire, or justify governments’ decisions to act in a specific way.

 

This brief overview shows how the investigation of ideas, or, more specifically, programmatic beliefs can provide explanations for governments’ decisions to request the establishment of a panel in the WTO. In particular, this overview shows how the EU’s programmatic beliefs would suggest a more intensive use of the DSM. On the contrary, Chinese programmatic beliefs would imply a less frequent use of the WTO’s judicial body. My research aims to provide empirical evidence confirming these theoretical propositions by analysing EU-China disputes in the WTO DSM.

 

 

 

Salvatore FP Barillà is a PhD candidate in Politics at the School of Social and Political Science of the University of Edinburgh. He holds a combined bachelor and master’s degree in Law from LUISS university, and a double master’s degree in European Studies and International Relations from LUISS university and China Foreign Affairs University. He is interested in International Political Economy, International Trade and Investment Law, and EU-China studies.

 

Institutional  website: https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/staff/salvatore-fp-barilla

Twitter: @sfpbarilla

 

 

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

 

 

The post The study of ideas in EU-China disputes in the WTO appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Perhaps the most striking thing about the breaking of the story about the unexpectedly large size of the UK’s financial liabilities under the Withdrawal Agreement last week was that it generated so little attention.

The consolidated EU accounts for 2020 were published on 9 July, but it took a ‘tip-off‘ to RTE to get them checking the text. Number 10 said it ‘didn’t recognise the figure’, but then that was it.

So little for something that had been flagged in 2016 as one of the hardest issues to crack in the then-upcoming negotiations.

In practice, finances were dealt with relatively early and relatively simply: the WA set out (Arts.135-148) the rules for deciding what was and wasn’t included, plus a schedule for payments.

But no figures. Precisely to avoid getting anyone’s backs up. And because until the money’s spent, no-one actually knew how much it would be.

Which didn’t stop the UK trying to work out the bill.

The graphic below sets out those estimates, as well as highlighting the huge potential for misjudging totals. The Commons Library briefing on all this is excellent as a guide.

The short answer to the mismatch between the UK estimates and the Commission’s first calculation (which is unlikely to move much) is that both the basic calculations on contributions and RAL were shifted by Covid and the associated economic slump, which also affected valuations of other assets and liabilities.

Number 10 might not have recognised the total, but they also haven’t gone hard on rebutting it, which suggests this is one fight that they are not going to push on.

UPDATE: The UK government’s report on the 2020 budget reiterates the March OBR estimate, but doesn’t challenge the more recent Commission valuation.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic87

The post Financial Settlement News appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

by Preksha Shree Chhetri This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2021 (17-18 June, online)

 

On 20 May 2021, the European Parliament voted to freeze the ratification of the much-hyped EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) (Reuters, 2021). The bilateral deal had been agreed in principle between the EU and China in December 2020, putting an end to seven long years of negotiation (Europa, 2020). The ratification of the CAI would have been significant in two ways – the first and obvious way would be by providing fresh prospects for economic benefits and opportunities to both sides and second, the ratification would signify the impuissance of the EU’s recent hard-liner approach towards China. However, the freezing of the CAI by a large majority of votes in the European Parliament suggests that the EU’s toughening stance on China is not just mere posturing but a well-backed policy option. Transformations in the EU’s approach towards China over the last few years is the primary focus of this blog.

The EU and China became strategic partners in 2003 and have reached several milestones, mostly on the economic front, in their relationship since. Over the years, many important agreements between them have faced backlash from disillusioned human rights activists from both within and outside Europe, only to wane out after a few days. The ideological differences between the EU and China are well known and so are the many permanent bones of contention between the two strategic partners. Issues related to human rights and the arms embargo in China, and the EU’s refusal to grant Market Economy Status to China (The Bricspost, 2016) have been constant irritants in the partnership. However, none of these irritants interfered with progress in other areas, especially regarding economic engagements. Their economic ambitions have often overshadowed their differences, paving the way for a cordial and strategic partnership. In addition, the EU-China alliance has a very robust institutional architecture. While strong economic relations facilitated cooperation in newer areas, the institutional architecture made sure that dialogue in more difficult areas continued. This system had been working perfectly until recently.

One of the biggest known discords between the EU and China was in 2008, when Beijing cancelled the EU-China summit in retaliation against the meeting between European leaders and Tibet’s exiled political and spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama (Euractive, 2008). Though this was the only time that the annual summit between the two strategic partners suffered a formal fall out, partnership in other fronts remained unchallenged. For instance, on the economic front,  the EU exported €78.4 billion worth of goods to China in 2008, a rise of 9 per cent compared to 2007, and imported €248 billion worth of Chinese goods (Europa, 2009). In fact, during the following annual summit in Prague, the two sides signed important cooperative agreements, such as the Joint Statement on Europe-China Clean Energy Center, the EU-China Science and Technology Partnership Scheme, and the EU-China SMEs Cooperation Point of Consensus (Council of the European Union, 2009).

For many years, the EU-China relations were what Fox and Godement (2009) rightly described as “unconditional engagement” – a policy which gave China access to all the economic and other benefits of cooperation with Europe while asking for little in return. The EU’s response to China’s domestic as well as regional manoeuvres has been highly divisive amongst various stakeholders. While activist and scholars are generally vocal about their criticisms about Beijing’s policy decisions, political leadership and the industrialist community usually opt to stay mum. For instance, in 2019 Volkswagen’s then CEO Herbert Diess feigned ignorance when asked about the detention camps holding thousands of Muslims in Xinjiang in order to protect the company’s investments in the area. (The Washington Post, 2019). In July 2020, amidst pressing crisis in Hong Kong over the New Security Law introduced by Beijing, Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel’s initial response triggered a lot of criticisms when she insisted on the need to maintain dialogue with China (Business Insider, 2020) and publicly stated that Germany would not involve itself in the Hong Kong issue (DW, 2020).

In the past year, incidents of blindly siding with Beijing have become less frequent and we have seen a considerable rise in the number of critical voices from within both political parties as well as from the business community. In fact, the EU as an institution markedly changed its approach towards China when it termed China a ‘systemic rival’ in the latest policy paper (2020). This along with the European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen’s call for a geopolitical Europe (European Parliament, 2020) and French President Emmanuel Macron’s ‘European Awakening’ (France24, 2019), created a lot of stir around the EU’s changing debate on its relationship with China. In addition, owing to China’s wolf warrior diplomacy during the global pandemic and its 5G ventures turning sour in Europe, the change in the EU’s perception of China was rather visible, and for the first time, it was somewhat united. However, just as the scholarly community was forming theories around the EU’s new China policy, the CAI agreement was finalized between the two sides.

Given the EU and China’s thriving trade ties and their highly intermingled economic network, an investment agreement between the two is both, desirable and feasible. However, the deal came at a time when many capitals in Europe were raising growing concerns about Chinese investments ( The Diplomat, 2018) as well as its expansionist tendencies (Hindustan Times, 2020). Moreover, an agreement on a deal as complex and significant as the CAI during a global health crisis sends an indirect message to the world that the EU is only focused on business and has no intentions of transforming its tough dialogue on China into tangible policy change.

Successful ratification of the CAI would have meant that China’s presence in Europe would not only be unassailable, but China would also gain renewed prospects for expansion. However, owing to Beijing’s decision to impose sanctions on ten EU lawmakers, the deal failed to get ratification from the European Parliament (FMPRC, 2021). The European Parliament’s action compels one to question whether the EU is after all quite serious about putting its foot down when necessary and redesigning its China policy.

 

 

Preksha Shree Chhetri is a PhD scholar at the Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi and a Research Assistant at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi. She is also the recipient of the Huayu Enrichment Language Scholarship granted by the Ministry of Education, Taiwan. Her research interests include, EU-China relations, EU-Taiwan relations, EU-India relations, global climate change negotiations, BRI and EU in Central Asia and Africa.

 

 

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

 

 

The post EU-China Strategic Partnership is at a Low but is it at its Lowest or is the Downward Spiral Only Beginning? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Length of video : 60'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Length of video : 139'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

In the context of the exponential growth of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), the President of the European Parliament has announced a number of measures to contain the spread of epidemic and to safeguard Parliament's core activities.

The current precautionary measures adopted by the European Parliament to contain the spread of COVID-19 do not affect work on legislative priorities. Core activities are reduced, but maintained to ensure that the institution's legislative, budgetary, scrutiny functions are maintained.

The meetings will be with remote participation for Members (being able to view and listen to proceedings, ask for the floor and intervene in the meeting). Other participants are invited to follow the meeting through webstreaming.

Following these decisions, the next meeting of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) will take place on 9 September 2021 (online).
The meeting agenda and documents will be published here.

SEDE meetings' calendar 2021
EP calendar 2021
Press release: Sahel: Security situation from the African perspective - 12 April 2021
Press release: MEPs quizzed the head of the IAEA about nuclear non-proliferation - 16 March 2021
Press release: Exchange of views with the NATO Secretary General - 15 March 2021
Press release: Instability in the Central African Republic - 24 February 2021
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Length of video : 124'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Length of video : 4'04''

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Length of video : 6'31''

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Length of video : 53'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Length of video : 14'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

MEPs outline how the EU should strengthen crisis prevention, preparedness and response when addressing future serious cross-border health threats.
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

MEPs outline how the EU should strengthen crisis prevention, preparedness and response when addressing future serious cross-border health threats.
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Length of video : 165'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP