This post originally appear on Encompass Europe.
This is a good moment to reflect on one of the many paradoxes of Brexit: for something that has occurred under so much time pressure, there has always still been a summer break.
That was true in 2017 and 2018 during the Article 50 negotiations and even last year, when Covid and a British government unwilling to add to the transition period might have been cause to break the pause.
So this summer’s hiatus – whether paddleboarding in Cyprus or not – has not been much of a shock, especially with the conclusion of active negotiations on the basic treaties of the EU-UK relationship.
But this is to miss the bigger picture, namely the continuing instability of that relationship.
Brexit was always going to be a long-term process, for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the depth of the entwining of British political, economic and social structures with those of the EU and its member states over the previous half-century was not something that could be unpicked in anything less than a generation.
The depth of that entanglement was long a bugbear of the eurosceptic movement in the UK, particularly those who wanted nothing more than a ‘common market’, but it is only now that the full extent of it has become apparent to most people.
That some of that was actually generally well-thought-of – such as the enrichment of the typical British supermarket shelf with European produce, or no-cost roaming for mobile phones – is neither here nor there, even if it does explain some of the cries of ‘that’s not the Brexit I voted for’.
However, disentanglement is one thing. Much more problematic is the question of what comes in its place.
As has always been the case in post-WWII British European policy, the purpose of the relationship with the rest of the continent has been less than settled. The historic model of a balance of power seemed less than relevant in the wake of the end of the Cold War, even as the tropes of the ‘special relationship’ and ‘global Britain’ have pulled successive generations of politicians towards visions of a much grander role. Europe, and by extension the EU, has been a problem to be managed, rather than an opportunity to be grasped.
Brexit has simply put this issue in a much more prominent position. Yes, the UK wants to move apart from the EU, but without deciding on why it wants to do, or how.
As much as the twin treaties of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade & Cooperation Agreement have set up some parameters, it is striking how much they leave to be decided down the line.
The former’s Irish Protocol remains in a very uncertain place in a period of fluid Northern Irish politics, while the latter’s framework for future cooperation is more hung up on the ever-lengthening transitional and grace periods being applied. As I’ve noted elsewhere, the TCA is more about potential than reality.
Crucially, neither treaty is unambiguously accepted as the definitive basis for relations. This goes beyond the continual (and unjustified) rhetoric of the British government about signing under a degree of duress, to the multiple active elements of the TCA that both sides agreed could be pushed down the line.
This is partly a function of the hurried nature of the negotiations, but more fundamentally it is a result of the negative-sum nature of the withdrawal: no model of leaving the EU would fail to generate costs, so the process has been one of allocation. The only real questions have been how honest everyone would be about those costs and how publics would react when they found out.
Sadly, the answers are respectively “not particularly” and “not very happy at all”. Rhetoric is one thing; empty shelves are another.
All of which suggests that rather than representing the new baseline for EU-UK relations, the current situation is more likely to be a staging post towards further deterioration.
This autumn will see a number of tests of this. While the introduction of UK customs controls has been pushed back once more, the Irish Protocol issues are set to kick back in, along with potential legal challenges by the EU. The cross-cutting impact of Covid on labour and goods supply will also increase pressure.
Even where there are solid reasons to renegotiate parts of the treaties, this is now bound up in the bigger problem of neither side wanting to reopen that they do have in legal terms, both for fear of what else might get reworked and from a strong desire not to repeat the psychodramas of 2016-20.
What is unclear right now is what it will take to stop things worsening even further. Perhaps some joint sense of mission through COP26 this winter, perhaps a new government in London, but the message right now is that this is going to get worse before it gets better.
The post The long way down appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
No mention of drivers having to queue up for petrol, necessitating the army to help.
But he did say, “Isn’t it amazing to be here in person?”
No mention that the cost of heating is about to soar, leaving many vulnerable people cold this winter.
But he did say, “We finally sent the corduroyed communist cosmonaut into orbit where he belongs”. (He was referring to Jeremy Corbyn.)
No mention that with food prices rising and supermarket shelves increasingly empty, many people will struggle to feed themselves.
But he did say, “In Islington – I kid you not I have seen it with my own eyes – they like kids to run races where nobody actually wins.”
No mention that shortage of workers, caused directly by Brexit and compounded by Covid, means many businesses can’t function and shopping for Christmas won’t be early this year; it might not happen at all.
But he did say that Keir Starmer looked like, “a seriously rattled bus conductor pushed this way and that by a Corbynista mob of Sellotape-spectacled sans-culottes.”
No mention that because of Brexit, British farmers are having to destroy huge amounts of unpicked fruit and veg and cull tens of thousands of pigs because EU workers can’t easily come here anymore.
But he did say, “I know that there has been a certain raucus squaukus from the anti-aukus caucus.”
No mention that on the island of Ireland, there is dire concern that the UK government is poised to suspend parts of the Northern Ireland protocol that prevents tensions between the north and south.
But he did say, “If Columbus had listened to captain hindsight he’d be famous for having discovered Tenerife.”
No mention of the dramatic fall in UK exports to the EU, or the customs barriers about to be erected for imports coming to the UK, all because of Brexit.
But he did say, “Build back burger I say.”
Mr Johnson promised his Tory faithful – and the country at large – that Britain would become a:“high-wage, high-skill, high productivity, and yes, thereby low tax economy.”
That will be achieved, he said, with low migration.
No mention that Britain needs migrants because the country has more jobs than Britons to do them – primarily because we have a low birth rate and a rapidly growing older population.
No mention of how businesses and organisations such as the NHS will find enough workers without more migrant labour.
No mention of how Britain will transform itself into a high-skilled, high-wage country without huge investment in training of the British workforce.
No mention of what’s going to happen to the low-skilled, low-paid workers in Britain. Are they just supposed to disappear in the new Britain of high-skilled, high-paid workers?
No mention of how Tory plans to increase the tax burden of the least well-off fits in with a “low tax economy.” Or is it just low tax for the rich?
No mention that a low birth rate, and low migration, will unavoidably result in the country having a smaller population. Is that the goal – population control?
Mr Johnson and his Tories are living in their delusional bubble, insulated from the problems the rest of us have to cope with; problems which the government helped to create.
Click here to view the embedded video.
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The post Boris Johnson and the Tory bubble appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
In the context of the exponential growth of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), the President of the European Parliament has announced a number of measures to contain the spread of epidemic and to safeguard Parliament's core activities.
The current precautionary measures adopted by the European Parliament to contain the spread of COVID-19 do not affect work on legislative priorities. Core activities are reduced, but maintained to ensure that the institution's legislative, budgetary, scrutiny functions are maintained.
The meetings will be with remote participation for Members (being able to view and listen to proceedings, ask for the floor and intervene in the meeting). Other participants are invited to follow the meeting through webstreaming.Following these decisions, the next meetings of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) will take place on 27 and 28 October 2021 (online).
The meeting agenda and documents will be published here.