Defense Industry Daily

Americas

• Following Michael Gilmore’s thoughts on the F-35 program, his report has also shed some light on the hotly contested Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) competition. His report goes into detail on how the three offerings for the USMC Humvee replacement faired in tests. While Lockheed Martin and competition winner Oshkosh met protection requirements, Humvee producer AM General fell short. The shortfall resulted in AM General losing out on a contract potentially worth $30 billion, one of the biggest Army contracts in recent times. Lockheed Martin went on to begin a legal proceeding against the award to Oshkosh; however, these were thrown out before the new year.

• Four OH-58 Kiowa Delta helicopters are ready for export to a foreign county after landing at Redtone Arsenal prior to shipping. While details as to where the helicopters are going and at what cost have remained unknown, it is possible that they could be going to Croatia after being deemed Excess Defense Articles. Back in November 2015, the Croatian Defence Ministry announced that it had selected sixteen OH-58D helicopters that the USAF would donate to Croatia. The latest model is primarily operated in an armed reconnaissance role in support of ground troops, and could contribute to the ongoing modernization of the Croatian Armed Forces to participate in NATO operations.

• The life of the A-10 attack jet will be extended until 2022 after it was announced in Secretary for Defense Ash Carter’s 2017 defense budget preview on Tuesday. Lawmakers including former A-10 pilot Rep. Martha McSally and Sen. John McCain who supported the plane’s continuation were pleased with the announcement. The close-air support aircraft will continue to see service in the operations against the Islamic State in the Middle East where it has been supporting ground troops. The deferral of the A-10’s retirement comes as continued delays seem likely for the F-35, which is due to replace the A-10 once it comes into active service. The A-10’s ability to swoop in to heights of 50 feet above ground and engage enemies has been held up as an advantage against the F-35 by supporters.

Middle East North Africa

• Interest in providing aircraft for the Turkish Coast Guard has increased dramatically in the last week with ten more interested parties joining the initial fifteen. The twenty-five bidders are both a mix of domestic and international firms, with the most recent competitors including Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training and the Turkish military-software company Havelsan. Turkey plans to purchase a Beechcraft King Air 350ER for the Coast Guard, but are looking for someone to provide the integration of subsystems into the aircraft for maritime surveillance operations. As well as maritime surveillance, the aircraft will be responsible for conducting border security and search & rescue operations.

Europe

• Both Lithuania and the Czech Republic have inked contracts for new military truck acquisitions as they continue to modernize military gear. Lithuania has signed a $65 million deal with Daimler AG for 340 Unimog trucks as part of plans to increase the size of their land forces, with the establishment of another infantry brigade. The Czech Republic is to acquire 18 N3G-V trucks from local firm Tatra. The purchases are one of several contracts signed by Prague in an effort to be prepared to participate in NATO activities as well as to deal with the flow of refugees through its borders from the Middle East.

• Rheinmetall Defence is to provide a multi-million dollar deal to modernize the skyguard air defense system of an unknown international buyer. The order, worth $427 million, will be delivered between 2017 and 2020. Upgrades will include equipping the missile/gun air defence systems with advanced radar technology. Further more, the system will be outfitted with a new target tracking radar, a latest-generation friend-foe identification system as well as cutting-edge electronic warfare components. The missile launcher will be upgraded with a new state-of-the-art electronic pod, which will enhance the system’s missile capability. Variants of Rheinmetall’s anti-aircraft guns and systems are being used in over thirty countries with Thailand recently signing a contract for four Skyguard systems earlier this year.

Asia Pacific

• Israel Aerospace industries and Korean composite manufacturer Hankuk Carbon are to develop, manufacture and sell a new vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) unmanned air vehicle for South Korea. Initial aims for the UAV will be to develop a system with a 200-300kg maximum take-off weight, and it is hoped that it will have 90% of the work done domestically in Korea. Both companies are also looking into adding shipborne take-off and landing capabilities to IAI/Hankuk’s FE-Panther VTOL UAV, which will be available by the end of 2018.

• India has received the final batch of three Mi-17V-5 military transport helicopters from Russia, bringing the total to 151. The models are the most technically advanced of Rostec Corporation’s Mi-8/17 type including a KNEI-8 avionics suite. The new suite replaces the previously used multiple systems indicators with four large multi-functional that are easy to read and reduce the intensity of pilot’s workload. The completion of the sale comes as both India and Russia continue negotiations for forty-eight more of the helicopters, which are to be used in a variety of operations such as in deserts and mountains, matching the wide variety of environments found in India.

Today’s Video

• The FE-Panter UAV:

Ultra APV demonstrator
(click to view full)

In an age of non-linear warfare, where front lines are nebulous at best and non-existent at worst, one of the biggest casualties is… the concept of unprotected rear echelon vehicles, designed with the idea that they’d never see serious combat. That imperative is being driven home on 2 fronts. One front is operational. The other front is buying trends.

These trends, and their design imperatives, found their way into the USA’s Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program, which aims to replace many of the US military’s 120,000 or so Humvees. The US military’s goal is a 7-10 ton vehicle that’s lighter than its MRAPs and easier to transport aboard ship, while offering substantially better protection ad durability than existing up-armored Humvees. They’d also like a vehicle that can address front-line issues like power generation, in order to recharge all of the batteries troops require for electronic gadgets like night sights, GPS devices, etc.

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. JLTV certainly qualifies, and recent budget planning endorsements have solidifed a future that was looking shaky. Now, can the Army’s program deliver?

JLTV: Program & Risks ONR’s testbed
(click to view full)

The JLTV program began in 2005, with the Army’s recognition that its HMMWV contract would expire in a couple of years, and that a better vehicle was needed to face current threats. The US Army bears overall JLTV responsibility through a Joint Program Office within its Tank, Automotive, and Armament Command (TACOM) in Warren, MI. US Marine Corps participation is centered on a program office under the supervision of the Program Executive Officer Land Systems (PEO LS) Marine Corps at Quantico, VA.

JLTV has benefited from a number of military research programs. They include the Army’s Future Tactical Truck System (FTTS), as well as prototyping efforts on the Ford F350-based Ultra Armored Patrol. Ultra AP was an Office of Naval Research program, involving Badenoch LLC and engineers from the Georgia Institute of Technology’s Georgia Tech Research Institute. JLTV has its own requirements set, and was originally envisaged as having a $160 million Technology Development Phase (TDP) with 2 winners; a higher-level review increased the maximum to 3 winners, but did not increase funding.

Those TDP contracts were supposed to be placed in the 3rd quarter of FY 2008, but weren’t issued until Q1 FY 2009. Winners were subject to armor and ballistic testing, system tests, and live fire testing.

At the end of the TD phase, initial plans called for 2 System Design and Development (SDD) contract awards in Q2 FY 2011, in order to finish the base design and develop the remaining variants. That phase is now called EMD (Engineering & Manufacturing Development), and 3 contracts were issued in August 2012. Col. John Myers, Project Manager for the Army’s Joint Combat Support Services, has always said that that this will be another full and open competition – which means that losers in the TD Phase could conceivably invest, adapt, and win the SDD contract. That’s exactly what happened.

The EMD phase will be followed by a final competition that includes both low and full rate production, and the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Source Selection Authority plans to award a production contract to one winning team in 2015. Final numbers haven’t been determined yet, but the current projected quantity is about 50,000 JLTVs over an 8-year span. The ultimate value could rise to $30-40 billion over more than a decade, giving JLTV the potential to become the world’s largest single land system contract.

The JLTV Family of Vehicles JLTV family comcept
(click to view full)

JLTV is designed to be very modular, which could eventually lead to a dizzying array of variants if the US military wishes. Vehicles must show better performance than the current HMMWV fleet in protection, mobility in dry conditions, and other RFP areas such as power generation; and each category must also be able to tow a trailer with similar capacity. They must be externally transportable in sling mode by CH-47 Chinook or CH-53 Stalion family heavy-lift helicopters, and 2 must be transportable in a C-130 Hercules medium transport aircraft.

Initially, JLTV fell into 3 payload categories for the Technology Development phase, with individual variants in each category to come later.

JLTV Category A. General 4-seat utility vehicle, payload 3,500 pounds. May be thought of as the base vehicle, to be built during the Technology Development (TD) phase.

JLTV Category B. Will be used as the base for most variants. Payload must be 4,000 pounds, desired objective is 4,500. The TD phase will build the 6-seat Infantry Carrier and the C2OTM Command on the move variants. Category B Reconnaissance, Heavy Guns Carrier, TOW ITAS missile carrier, Medium utility, and Ambulance (3 seat + 2 litter) variants will be developed during the SDD phase.

JLTV Category C. The “small truck” class. Payload must be 5,100 pounds. The general shelter carrier and utility variant will be developed during the TD phase; its Hummer M1097 and M1152 analogues are used as mounts for semi-mobile command posts, as equipment carriers, and as light trucks. A larger (3 seat + 4 litter) JLTV ambulance variant will be developed during the SDD phase.

As the US military prepares for a production contract, the types have been set more clearly into 4 initial production variants:

• M1278 JLTV-HGC (Heavy Guns Carrier). From CAT B, accommodates mounted crew-served weapons in a protected gun mount. Some manufacturers claim that their design could comfortably step beyond .50 caliber.

• M1279 JLTV-UTL. Utility/ Cargo light truck variant, from CAT C. Unlike the others, which are all 4-seat vehicles, JLTV-UTL is 2-seat to make more room in back.

• M1280 JLTV-GP. General Purpose vehicle, from CAT A.

• M1281 JLTV-CCWC (Close-Combat Weapons Carrier). From CAT B, an anti-tank/ anti-armor platform that will employ the Army’s TOW-ITAS missile and sight system (called M41 Saber in the USMC), along with direct-fire weapons such as the M2 .50-cal machine gun.

JLTV: Goals and Constraints HMMWV, IEDed
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IED land mines were the #1 killer of American troops in Iraq, and up-armoring flat-bottomed Humvees proved to be an inadequate response. This finally led to the MRAP program at the end of 2006, which will have ordered and produced nearly 16,000 blast-resistant vehicles in less than 3 years. British experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has been similar, with 1/8 of all its casualties inflicted on troops riding in poorly-protected Land Rover Snatch jeeps. Those conditions have prompted several senior officer resignations in protest, including highly placed SAS commanders.

While some countries like Australia and Germany were foresighted enough to develop and field mine-resistant vehicles before 2001, a collective realization is sinking in across the board that up-armoring flat-bottomed vehicles with inadequate carrying capacity, in order to provide a level of protection that is better but still poor, simply will not do. Future patrol vehicles will need to be designed from the outset for blast-resistance against land mines and even car bombs.

There’s no getting around it: JLTV’s requirements will drive up the cost of Army vehicles in combat zones. Smart designs like v-hulls, composite blast pans, crushable composite structures, and improved armors do help – but they come at a cost. They cost money, and they cost weight.

Cougar MRAP et. al.
(click to view full)

The current roster of MRAP vehicles cost around $450,000-$650,000 each, with additional costs for “government furnished equipment” like remote-control turrets, electronics and radios, IED jammers, and other ancillaries. These items can drive an MRAP’s cost to nearly $1 million each, compared to a HMMWV’s $250,000 or so. Given military death benefits of about $500,000 per soldier, however, a full Hummer with all hands lost actually costs $3.25 million – and that’s just the money. There is more to cost than just procurement cost. The question is, will there be more in the budgets to cover the JLTV difference? So far, the response has been to shrink the order until it fits, while attempting to cap costs.

JLTV vehicles will be smaller and lighter than MRAPs, which tends to lower relative cost. On the other hand, they will need to use more innovative design approaches and materials, in order to deliver quality protection. Their “government furnished equipment” costs can be expected to rise in cost over time, because that has been the consistent trend over the last several decades. Final average cost for every fully equipped JLTV could conceivably reach over $700,000, and containing costs under $500,000 is likely to prove very challenging.

The laws of physics also have their say, requiring mass in order to withstand certain levels of explosive power. A military Hummer maxes out at about 12,000 pounds fully loaded. Blast resistant vehicles with MRAP protection levels begin at around 30,000 pounds when empty, and the Cougar 6×6 MRAP depicted in the photo above has a fully loaded Gross Vehicle Weight of 52,000 pounds. On the other hand, Force Protection’s Cougar 6×6 has been hit by huge IED land mine blasts involving several hundred pounds of explosives – and had every single crew member walk away from the resulting wreck.

That outcome was partly the result of design that avoids killers like flat bottoms, which often take several hits from a single mine blast as the explosion is reflected back at the ground and returns to the vehicle, over and over again. Blast-resistant vehicles are also careful about the placement of items that can be blown up into the cabin, and their bottoms avoid nooks and crannies that would act as “blast traps,” catching the force of land mine explosions like a ship’s sail catches wind. Even design has its limits, however; more weight allows heavier construction, more vehicle stability against even a deflected blast’s awesome punch, and a better ratio of protection to usable interior space.

Design a 14,000 – 20,000 pound vehicle with the same mine protection as a Cougar 6×6 is close to a “mission impossible,” though the Army seems to be asking for exactly that outcome. FY 2011 testing has begun to reveal the weaknesses inherent in that approach, as weight is already proving to be an issue for the off-road mobility that the US Marines prize so highly.

Instead, a successful and survivable JLTV program needs to be built around an inevitable set of tradeoffs. Requirements like lower height for shipboard transportability mean reduced v-hull angles, and less room between the hull and the ground when a mine goes off. Those decisions may be more compatible with off-road capability, which benefits from a lower center of gravity – up to a point. On the other hand, a complex suspension might deliver improved off-road mobility, with great clearance underneath, at the cost of extra weight, extra cost, and possibly poorer reliability. In this weight class, interlinked engineering problems make it very difficult to make just one decision.

JLTV: To Be, or Not to Be? Oshkosh M-ATV
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JLTV’s biggest challenge will be to survive as a program. The US Army and Marine Corps both face huge maintenance budget “overhangs” as a result of long and hard equipment use required on the front-lines. Even the current rate of wartime supplemental funding has left both services short of the annual funds required for full maintenance and replacement. To make matters worse, both services have large, high-profile procurement programs (Ground Combat Vehicle, V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor, USMC armored vehicle replacements) that are set to suck up massive development and/or procurement funds. Meanwhile, urgent MRAP and M-ATV “JLTV bridge buy” contracts are filling a similar niche for protected patrol vehicles, and creating a small explosion of related design ideas and in-production technologies. All the while employing a set of companies and workers with powerful local lobbying leverage, amidst an overall budgetary environment in which US military spending is expected to decline.

When seen in that light, the US military’s strategy shift away from initial visions involving large JLTV System Design and Development contracts makes a lot of sense. Instead, a set of relatively small design and development contracts, coupled with options for self-financed projects that have demonstrated success in following rounds, will give the US military its pick of 6-7 different and fully developed JLTV vehicles, all for under $300 million.

Buying the vehicles in quantity will be a different ball game, and planned JLTV numbers have declined steadily. The program’s next challenge will be to get a significant number of JLTV vehicles bought and delivered, amidst a budget environment that has moved from “tightening” to “crisis imminent”.

M-ATV’s off-road mobility, and orders to date for over 8,000 vehicles, give Oshkosh an especially strong fallback position. If JLTV falters for budgetary and technical reasons, the Army’s “bridge buy” M-ATV vehicles are already being kept in the force, alongside some of Navistar’s MaxxPro MRAPs. It wouldn’t be ideal, but those fleets could form the basis of an expeditionary force, while the military goes back to buying modified HMMWVs or other less-protected vehicles.

JLTV: Participants and Platforms BAE/ Navistar’s Valanx
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Unsurprisingly, the JLTV field has displayed a certain degree of design convergence, within a very different set of core approaches to the problem. Since the competition will remain fully open at every step, it’s worth tracking all submissions. Even if a design loses a round, private development work could still make it a winner in the next round.

Government releases initially said that the JLTV program received 7 qualifying submissions in response to its initial Request for Proposal. Phase 1 saw Technology Development contract awards to 3 winners: AM General and General Dynamics’ General Tactical Vehicles joint venture (GTV Eagle), BAE and Navistar (Valanx), and a Lockheed Martin team that features heavy participation from BAE Systems’ Tactical Vehicle Systems division in Sealy, TX.

Phase 2 awarded Engineering & Manufacturing Development contracts to 3 winners: The team of Lockheed and BAE TVS from round 1, AM General for its solo BRV-O entry, and Oshkosh for its privately developed L-ATV.

BAE Systems: Valanx (won TDP, lost EMD) Valanx & trailer
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At one time, the firms that are now part of BAE Systems had owned the world market for blast-resistant vehicles. BAE’s early lack of success in the MRAP competition was a rude shock, but a combination of acquisitions and execution brought them back to the #2 position by competition’s end. BAE firms also have a substantial combat vehicle heritage designing Bradley and CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, M113 tracked armored personnel carriers, Bv family armored all-terrain carriers, and other widely-used combat platforms. The US Army’s FMTV medium trucks offered an outstanding wheeled vehicle production background – except for one small problem. That group within BAE was already working with Lockheed Martin. BAE U.S. Combat Systems drew heavily on its combat vehicle heritage for the JLTV’s “Valanx” design, therefore, and covered its production gap with a strong alliance: Navistar, a huge commercial and military trucking firm who had finished #1 in the USA’s MRAP program. Navistar eventually split from the partnership, toward the end of the TD phase.

The Valanx reflects BAE’s combat vehicle heritage and design approaches. “Chicken tests” were performed for length of operation without oil, as were some other tests not done on normal trucks. MRAP lessons learned re: v-hull angle and materials, spacing between the “v” and ground, and aspects like fireproof spall liners were incorporated. Hull shaping and internal layout were designed to maximize sightlines, including the ability to survey the rear quadrant while sitting in the vehicle, as well as offering improved stowage. With respect to armaments, BAE’s RG-33 is reportedly the only MRAP vehicle in theater that has been equipped with a fully stabilized turret for accurate fire on the move. Their JLTV design’s body rigidity would build on that heritage, allowing the cupola hole to mount and fire substantially larger weapons than a HMMWV could safely carry.

Sightlines and stowage were only some of the user-centric design aspects incorporated into the vehicle. Close examination shows windows that are all the same, which means just one spare type to stock. The hydraulic suspension system will raise and lower the vehicle for off-roading or ship transport, but it can also pick up just one corner to make tire changes easier. The spare tire carrier is an integrated jack, and BAE claims that a “5% female” (female in lowest 5% of Army physical requirements) can change their JLTV’s tire, quickly, if required. Observers may also note the extra space from the tire to the wheel well rims; this allows units to bolt up different size wheel and tire assemblies in order to change the vehicle’s characteristics, lowering ground pressure with MRAP-size tires for off-road activities or heavier loads, or using smaller tires for less weight and more efficient on-road use.

The BAE team chose not to create a hybrid drive vehicle, on the grounds that a conventional drive train would let them meet all requirements at less weight and less cost. Instead, the Valanx’s lightweight independent suspension and drivetrain are made by Arvin Meritor, the US Army’s largest axle supplier. With that said, their Valanx does leverage BAE HybriDrive technologies used in thousands of Orion passenger buses, in order to exceed the military’s electrical power production requirements. A full set of embedded diagnostic and prognostic systems, leveraging several classified and non-classified databuses, will be used to help keep these vehicles running reliably. Navistar JLTV product page | BAE/ Navistar partnership announcement | Feb 2008 JLTV unveiling: BAE | Aviation Week article.

BAE also competed for the M-ATV interim buy, using 2 designs. One design is a lighter, improved version of their Caiman MRAP, which is derived in turn from the Army’s standard FMTV medium trucks. The second submission was a modified Valanx. Both lost to Oshkosh.

GDLS & AM General’s GTV EAGLE (won TDP, lost EMD) GTV’s design
(click to view full)

AM General are the builders of the current Hummer fleet. General Dynamics Land Systems builds M1 Abrams tanks, was a partner with Force Protection to deliver Cougar MRAPs via the Force Dynamics joint venture, and finally bought Force Protection in December 2011. The firm also has very strong systems integration capabilities, and is involved in key radio and electronics programs that will equip America’s future soldiers. GTV is the AM General/ GDLS joint venture for the JLTV, and Eagle is the name for their design.

In 2006, both AM General and General Dynamics were awarded JLTV “Best Technical Approach” trade studies by the Office of Naval Research. Their joint design stresses design maturity and proven components, and includes a “unique modular and scalable trailer that has mobility equal to the JLTV vehicle itself.” GDLS and AM General reportedly invested over $10 million for risk reduction development and maturation of this vehicle and its In-Hub Hybrid Electric Drive system. Their AGMV used a hexagon shaped armored capsule for its uses in mine protection, side blast deflection, and small-arms protection. GTV site | Defense Update Nov 2007 article.

Lockheed Martin & BAE TVS (TD & EMD Winner) LM/ BAE’s UVL Class C
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Lockheed Martin’s 2006 purchase of small British specialist vehicle designer HMT was an interesting shift for the firm, which has not been a major contender for military ground vehicle design. The firm has put a serious effort behind that push, however, leveraging wins for research programs like Future Tactical Truck System, and using their own private development funds. These resources were invested to build, evaluate, and refine its JLTV designs over several prototypes, and thousands of miles of testing – choices that ended up giving this team the best maturity and technical risk rating available: “Excellent/ Very Low Risk”.

Even so, Lockheed Martin knew from the outset that it would need a very serious production partner in order to field a credible design, and a credible bid. It found one early in Armor Holdings, who designed and built the US Army’s FMTV medium truck fleet. This may be the Army’s second largest vehicle fleet, with well over 40,000 trucks delivered to date plus another 2,000 or so derivative Caiman MRAPs. In 2007, a multi-billion dollar deal made Armor Holdings part of BAE “General Tactical Systems” – and created a “firewall” within BAE Systems between its 2 JLTV teams. All FMTV-related expertise remains exclusively at Team Lockheed’s disposal, and has been used to create a fully joint design and volume production plan. Other team members include Alcoa Defense (aluminum materials technology, design), JWF (machining and fabrication), plus Cummins Engine, Allison Transmission, Bosch, Meritor Defense, Lotus Engineering, L3 Combat Propulsion Systems, and Vehma International of America.

Lockheed Martin is a systems design firm at heart, and that approach became a big focus for the JLTV. Within that approach, survivability uses a wide array of techniques, including diverting energy via a v-hull; absorbing energy; visual, noise and infrared signature reduction; and ergonomics and individual reaction analysis. Team spokespeople stressed that a number of these elements are proprietary, and are not obvious from external viewing.

Producibility can easily be set aside in the rush to solve hard engineering problems. As expected given the team’s FMTV background, this was also a focus. The 3rd focus was maintainability and readiness, which is a particular strength of the FMTV truck fleet. Armor Holdings had the FMTV’s proven electronic diagnostic and troubleshooting systems, while Lockheed brought higher-level prognostic approaches derived from projects like its F-35 fighter and its accompanying fleet-wide ALIS system. In the end, their joint commitment and effort was rewarded with a TDP contract. 2006 teaming announcement | Alcoa joins the team | LM Team unveils Category C prototype | LM team Category B testing release.

Phase 2 Engineering & Manufacturing Development: Outside Entries Ocelot unveiled
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As intended, the EMD Phase bids also attracted bids that hadn’t been part of the earlier TD phase.

AM General: BRV-O (Won EMD). The day after the RFP was due, AM General announced that in addition to the GTV Eagle, it had also submitting its own privately-developed BRV-O (Blast Resistant Vehicle – Off road) as an independent bid. The firm has a set of partners, but wouldn’t discuss them, or offer specifics about their vehicle beyond boilerplate like “self-leveling suspension,” “crew capsule and modular armor”, and “C4ISR backbone”.

General Dynamics: Ocelot (???) Force Protection’s Cheetah lost the JLTV TD phase competition, then the M-ATV interim bridge vehicle competition, then faded into oblivion. The firm still has an offering in this weight class, however, thanks to Britain’s Light Protected Patrol Vehicle competition. Instead of entering the Cheetah, Force Protection worked in conjunction with its British partners to invent a modular, 7.5 ton Ocelot vehicle that could give the firm another crack at JLTV.

Orders for British “Foxhounds” pushed the vehicle into production, and JLTV is a tempting target, but General Dynamics bought Force Protection in December 2011. The company could enter the Ocelot as a stand-alone JLTV EMD contender, and compete against its GTV partnership with AM General. The question is whether it will choose to do so – as its partner AM General did. The EMD phase had 7 bidders, which leaves 1 unaccounted for. If Ocelot was that missing contender, it didn’t win, but it has enough of a production base to finance improvements and enter again.

International Saratoga
(click to view full)

Navistar: Saratoga (Lost EMD). Navistar wound up splitting from its Valanx partner BAE Systems to offer its Saratoga design. It looks a lot like some of the v-hulled HMMWV upgrades on the market, but early reports indicate that it doesn’t use a v-hull for underbody blast protection. Navistar launched the Saratoga in October 2011, after conducting its own automotive and blast testing. Their funding as the #1 producer of standard MRAP vehicles would have helped back Saratoga’s development.

Saratoga was reportedly aimed at the HMMWV Recapitalization/ MECV competition, but that went away. As JLTV’s requirements and cost targets have shrunk, however, Navistar apparently decided that a “less is more” solution was smart positioning. An emailed release said that the decision makers at Navistar:

“…believe it is appealing to nations facing uncertain futures and limited budgets… Down the road, there may be an opportunity for Navistar to bid for a JLTV production contract after the EMD phase is complete. We will seriously consider that option.”

Oshkosh: L-ATV (Won EMD). They may have lost the initial JLTV Technology Development competition, but their immediate fallback was a huge success. A reworked M-ATV version of their vehicle won the planned bridge buys to JLTV, using a less high-tech approach. The M-ATV’s 8,000+ orders could easily finance further JLTV research to improve their team’s perceived technical maturity, while providing a potential commonality angle.

Which is exactly what happened, leading to the smaller, privately-developed L-ATV. It includes an updated TAK-4i version of the firm’s widely-used TAK-4 independent suspension system, and can add an optional ProPulse hybrid diesel-electric drive train for power storage and export.

JLTV: Contracts and Key Events FY 2016

Production RFP. AM General BRV-O

February 4/16: Following Michael Gilmore’s thoughts on the F-35 program, his report has also shed some light on the hotly contested Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) competition. His report goes into detail on how the three offerings for the USMC Humvee replacement faired in tests. While Lockheed Martin and competition winner Oshkosh met protection requirements, Humvee producer AM General fell short. The shortfall resulted in AM General losing out on a contract potentially worth $30 billion, one of the biggest Army contracts in recent times. Lockheed Martin went on to begin a legal proceeding against the award to Oshkosh; however, these were thrown out before the new year.

December 17/15: Oshkosh Corporation has been allowed to resume building tactical vehicles for the US Army. The go ahead was given after the company was forced to halt production of 17,000 Light Tactical Vehicles specified on the $6.75 billion contract which was awarded in August. Rival bidder Lockheed Martin had challenged the decision to award Oshkosh Corp the tender, bringing it to the watchdog Government Accountability Office. The GAO dismissed Lockheed’s objections, allowing the production to continue.

FY 2015

Production RFP.

September 09/15: Lockheed is protesting the award to its competitor of the massive JLTV program. The GAO said that the decision on the protest would be made before things start to close up in D.C. for Christmas. AM General, the other firm losing to Oshkosh, opted not to protest.

August 27/15: It should go without saying that yesterday’s Oshkosh award of the JLTV program may well be contested. The Army has yet to debrief Lockheed or AM General, a key step in the process toward a proper GAO protest.

August 26/15: Oshkosh won one of the largest land forces defense contracts ever, taking the $30 billion JLTV contract. The initial order for 17,000 vehicles will start replacing Humvees in fiscal 2016 and really ramp in 2018. Runner ups were Lockheed and AM General.

Dec 12/14: Production RFP. USTACOM releases the 4th and final iteration of its JLTV RFP for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full Rate Production (FRP). This comes right after the 3rd draft, indicating that changes were minimal. Contractors have until February 5, 2015 to send questions, with proposals due by Feb. 10. Communications with parties other than the 3 potential prime contractors will be kept to a minimum. The Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract should last 3 years of LRIP followed by 5 years at full rate. Pricing the years out will depend of whether Multiyear Procurement (MYP) is approved by Congress. Solicitation W56HZV-14-R-0039.

Dec 02/14: 3rd RFP Draft. USTACOM releases the 3rd iteration of its draft JLTV RFP. Communication remains limited to one-on-one meetings with the 3 EMD winners, under an approved Justification and Approval that allows limited competition. There will still be a lot of work ahead even after the final RFP is issued and a contract awarded, as the pursuit of a MYP strategy at the the full rate production stage will require congressional approval.

Source: W56HZV-14-R-0039.

Nov 19/14: Limited User Testing. Limited User Testing (LUT) has been completed by the US Army and Marine Corps between September and October with the prototypes that all 3 EMD participants had provided.

Oct 8/14: 2nd RFP Draft. the US military releases their 2nd Draft RFP for JLTV. It envisions a maximum of 8 years for the production contract & options, using range pricing to determine unit prices for vehicles and kits.

Per H.1.3.1., orders could rise to 16,700 vehicles on a firm-fixed-price basis that changes using agreed yearly cost escalation, with the JLTV mission package mix determined each year from 4 options: M1278 Heavy guns carrier, M1279 Utility/ cargo, M1280 General purpose, M1281 close-combat weapons carrier. They could add up to 97 refurbished JLTV-FoVs to make 16,797, but they need to exercise the refurbished options in Lots 1-5.

The government can also order up to 32 trailers on a firm-fixed-price basis in any increment, and up to 164,697 packaged and installed kits on a firm-fixed-price basis. Sources: TACOM Warren Procurement Network, “2nd DRAFT RFP W56HZV-14-R-0039” | FBO.gov #W56HZV14R0039.

FY 2013 – 2014

Program updates; Test vehicles produced; RFP drafts begin, as initial variants become clearer.

Sept 24/14: The JLTV designs remain staples at shows like AUSA and Modern Day Marine eXpo, as the firm compete to build almost 17,000 vehicles, with the initial production contracts expected in summer 2015 (183 Army and 7 USMC). Will the military go beyond that?

“Overall, the Army aims to purchase about 49,000 of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, while the Marine Corps plans to acquire about 5,500 of the trucks. Both services have pledged their commitment to the program despite facing automatic budget cuts known as sequestration…. estimated the effort to develop and build the vehicles at almost $23 billion, or about $400,000 per truck, according to a 2013 report from the Congressional Research Service. Leaders have maintained each vehicle will cost about $250,000.”

We’ll see. Sources: DoD Buzz, “Army to Start Next JLTV Competition This Fall”.

Sept 5/14: LMCO. The Lockheed Martin Team’s JLTV program successfully completed the government’s Production Readiness Review (PRR) of their Camden, AK Ground Vehicle Assembly facility.

The Camden site has won a a Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award for Manufacturing Excellence before, but Lockheed doesn’t have a history with vehicles, and BAE’s Sealy, TX facility was gutted by Oshkosh’s money-losing bid for FMTV trucks. That makes this kind of approval more important to them than it is to other teams. Sources: LMCO, “U.S. Government Gives Green Light to Lockheed Martin Team’s JLTV Production Plans”.

June 25/14: Draft RFP v1. The government issues its initial draft RFP for JLTV. One advantage to EMD Phase selection: Joint Program Office JLTV will only answer questions or take comments from the 3 EMD contractors, though non-classified materials and answers will be posted and available to anyone. Sources: TACOM Warren Procurement Network, “1st Draft Request for Proposal (RFP), Attachments and Exhibits” | FBO.gov #W56HZV14R0039, “23–Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full Rate Production (FRP) Special Notice – Draft RFP
Solicitation Number”.

Draft RFPs begin

June 18/13: Program update. Despite sequestration, JLTV program officials tell military.com that they’re on track to deliver a low-rate-initial production JLTV award to a single vendor in FY 2015. AM General, Lockheed Martin, and Oshkosh are scheduled to deliver 22 vehicles each for testing in August 2013. They’ll go through off-road and soft soil testing, shipboard and ship to shore tests, and blast testing. Testing will help create a requirements document that will be validated by late FY 2014 – early FY 2015, which in turn paves the way for an RFP. The final step is an open competition, followed by final award.

The official per-unit limit remains at to $250,000 per vehicle, thanks to on-going trade-offs throughout the Technology Development process. On the other hand, by the time the services finish adding communications, manned weapons stations or RWS, and other gear, it’s reasonable to expect a final price around $400,000 – 500,000+.

The wild card? Program managers acknowledge that another year of sequestration cuts would force new choices on the military, which could change the program. That’s very likely to happen, which could turn programs like the USMC’s HMMWV improvement (q.v. Sept 27/12) from complements to competitors. Military.com.

June 10-22/13: Test vehicles. The EMD phase vendors have manufactured their initial testing vehicles for the US government, with formal deliveries scheduled to run through August. The JLTV prototypes will receive additional “mission packages” from their manufacturers or from the government, in order to convert them to specific testing configurations like Heavy Guns Carrier. AM General | Lockheed Martin | Oshkosh Defense.

FY 2012

RFP & responses lead to EMD awards; BAE/Navistar team splits; AM General submits its own bid; USMC’s HMMWV improvement complement. Lockheed/BAE’s lineup
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Sept 27/12: USMC HMMWVs. Military.com reports on the USMC’s internal math, which says they won’t be able to replace 24,000 HMMWVs with 5,500 JLTVs bought around 2017 – 2022.

The rest will need to come from a HMMWV improvement program, without getting into the same “costs as much as buying new” swamp as HMMMWV RECAP. Solution? Start with a clear price limit, and try to figure out what you can afford for that. The interesting thing is that instead of focusing on blast protection, the program seems to aim at restoring vehicle performance, payload, and reliability to the level it was at before before conventional up-armoring. Military.com.

Sept 4/12: Thou Shalt not Protest. Navistar withdraws a GAO protest that it had filed just a few days earlier. According to the company they first filed their protest because of regulatory timing constraints, but after reviewing their debriefing, they decided not to proceed. BAE Systems will not challenge the award, either. Marine Corps Times.

Meanwhile Hardwire LLC announced that it was behind the mystery 7th (failed) bid. The company made blast chimney demonstrations on Humvees a couple of years ago. Defense News.

Aug 24/12: EMD triple award. 3 awards are made for the 27-month Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase, with an estimated completion date of Nov 8/14. The winners will deliver 22 vehicles within 12 to 14 months for further testing and evaluation. TACOM in Warren, MI received 7 bids, and the winners were:

Lockheed Martin Corp. in Grand Prairie, TX wins a $65 million firm-fixed-price contract. Work will be performed in Lockheed Martin’s Grand Prairie, TX facility, and BAE TVS’ Sealy, TX plant (W56HZV-12-C-0262).

AM General LLC in South Bend, IN wins a $63.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for their BRV-O. Work will be performed in Livonia, MI, and Mishawaka, IN (W56HZV-12-C-0258).

Oshkosh Corp. in Oshkosh, WI wins a $55.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for their L-ATV. Work will be performed in Oshkosh, WI (W56HZV-12-C-0264).

The awards vindicate AM General and Oshkosh’s choice to submit their own bids, while TD phase winners BAE (Valanx) and General Dynamics (Eagle) are on their own if they want to continue. Navistar (Saratoga) could also elect to continue with private development, and enter the production competition. The 7th bidder isn’t clear, but General Dynamics may have also bid its Ocelot/Foxhound.

BAE has the most interesting decision, as they remain involved in EMD through their participation in the Lockheed Martin-led team. A win with Lockheed would keep their Texas plant alive and in position to contest the next FMTV medium truck contract, which Oshkosh is now known to have bid at a significant loss. Shareholder dissatisfaction makes a repeat of that strategy unlikely for Oshkosh, which must give BAE hope to recapture the Sealy factory’s cornerstone. Their Valanx is associated with other facilities. Is it better for BAE to hedge its bets with Valanx development, or keep the development money for other things and go all in with Lockheed Martin? See also US Army, belatedly | FBO.gov | AM General | Lockheed Martin | Oshkosh | James Hasik sees industrial considerations in the award, and explains further.

JLTV EMD Phase

March 27/12: RFP bids in. BAE, Lockheed Martin, and Oshkosh announce their JLTV submissions. The due date had originally been March 13/12, but it was extended. The government plans to award up to 3 JLTV EMD contracts in June 2012, for delivery of 22 prototype vehicles and other equipment for testing.

AM General announces the next day that in addition to its joint GTV submission with General Dynamics Land Systems, it will be submitting a design of its own called the BRV-O (Blast Resistant Vehicle – Off road). AM General developed the vehicle itself, and says it has put BRV-O through 300,000 miles of road testing. It also says that it has a number of industrial partners for system integration, etc., but won’t name them.

BAE US Combat Systems’ JLTV team includes Northrop Grumman for systems integration, Arvin Meritor for the suspension, and now Ford for the engine. Their Valanx will use the same Power Stroke 6.7 liter turbocharged diesel that powers Ford’s commercial F-series trucks. BAE describes it as having “class-leading fuel economy and the best horsepower and torque of any engine in its class,” and told DoD Buzz that when Navistar and BAE Systems split, and BAE Systems needed a company to build them an engine, Ford was the obvious answer.

The partnership between General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General has confirmed that they’re bidding a design called the EAGLE. This double-v hull design is not the same as GD MOWAG’s light patrol vehicle offering that used to be based on the HMMWV, and now (EAGLE IV) uses the Duro truck as its base.

Lockheed Martin’s JLTV team includes BAE Tactical Vehicle Systems in Sealy, TX, plus Cummins Engine, Allison Transmission, Bosch, Meritor Defense, Lotus Engineering, L3 Combat Propulsion Systems, and Vehma International of America. Their release touted the weight and cost savings in their revised designs, using a combination of digital engineering analysis, virtual design builds, component tests and physical stress testing. BAE-TVS appears to be positioned as the manufacturing centerpiece, and has capacity after Oshkosh bid below cost to take their FMTV truck contract away.

Navistar has split from BAE Systems, and is offering its Saratoga design, which looks a lot like some of the V-hulled HMMWV upgrades on the market. Navistar launched the vehicle in October 2011, after conducting its own automotive and blast testing. Navistar Defense President Archie Massicotte said that: “The Saratoga is a solid design and now that we have seen the requirements of the JLTV migrate toward our vehicle capabilities, we are in a position to modify the Saratoga to fit those requirements.”

Oshkosh, as predicted, is entering its L-ATV derivative of the popular M-ATV, which has become the US military’s most widely ordered blast-resistant vehicle. Their bid includes their new and improved TAK-4i independent suspension, and an optional Oshkosh ProPulse diesel-electric hybrid powertrain.

Force Protection, which has been absorbed into GD Land Systems, was silent on whether or not it bid its Ocelot.

Bid surprises for some

March 4/12: Not that people doubt the Army’s ability to deliver a JLTV vehicle with HMMWV size and MRAP-level protection for $250,000… but they do. The Army is responding. Lt. Gen. Bill Phillips, principal military deputy to the assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology:

“In July [2011], the Army released the “Decker-Wagner” review of its acquisition processes… Phillips said the Army has already implemented 29 of the 76 recommendations in the report, and will implement a total of 63 of those recommendations total — with the majority complete by the summer… Now, he said, the service is looking at what capabilities a requirement provides, is it feasible in terms of execution on the timeline, and is it affordable.

One beneficiary of the Army’s new acquisition processes is the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. Phillips said the JLTV might have cost the Army close to $500,000 per vehicle if the Army had gone forward with the strategy it had during the technology development phase of the vehicle. Today, he said, as a result of how the Army changed the way it does requirements “we are confident we can bring this vehicle in for less than $250,000.”

Acquisition processes don’t change the laws of physics. Phillips cites the successful MRAP program as a reason for faith, but those vehicles cost over $500,000 each, and were far heavier than JLTV’s goal. The proof will be in the delivery.

Feb 28/12: Col. Dave Bassett, the project manager for Army tactical vehicles, tells the AUSA conference that he has confidence in the coming responses to JLTV. In his opinion:

“Industry, they don’t need another two years to design this vehicle… They are ready now to respond with mature designs to our solicitation.”

Jan 30/12: JLTV EMD RFP. FBO.gov solicitation #W56HZV11R0329:

“The solicitation for the JLTV EMD phase… shall be conducted on a source selection basis utilizing a “tradeoff” process to obtain the best value to the Government. The full and open competitive source selection process will result in an award to up to three firm-fixed price contracts for the EMD(Engineering & Manufacturing Development) phase focusing on fabrication, assembly, integration, testing and test support, and related requirements in accordance with the contract and the JLTV Purchase Description. Each JLTV Contractor shall deliver prototype vehicles, ballistic structures, armor coupons, additional test assets, and contractor furnished kits, trailers and data requirements. Contract award is currently planned for June of 2012. “

The response date in March 13/12. Per the program’s original plan, vendors that were not picked for the initial JLTV development phase can enter vehicles in this competition.

EMD phase RFP

Jan 26/12: Saved by the budget? Preliminary FY 2013 budget materials discuss coming shifts in Pentagon priorities, as the defense department moves to make future cuts. The JLTV ids an exception, however: “HMMWVs – terminated upgrades and focused modernization resources on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle,” in line with recent US Army declarations. Pentagon release | “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices” [PDF]

The US Army declares that it will not pursue offerings of upgraded HMMWVs, and intends to stick with the JLTV program, following an agreement with the Marine Corps. The question, of course, is whether Congress will go along with this decision. Lexington Institute.

Jan 17/12: Testing warnings. The Pentagon releases the FY2011 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The JLTV is included, and tests indicate a couple of warning signs. To sum up: they need roads, reliability has been poor, MRAPs are uncomfortable, and the laws of physics haven’t been repealed.

“During TD testing, all vendor vehicles experienced difficulty with mobility in soft soil due to vehicle weight and other vehicle design factors. In the TD, the reliability of vendor vehicles demonstrated between 71 to 902 Mean Miles Between Operational Mission Failure (MMBOMF) versus the required 3,600 MMBOMF. The Army increased the underbody threat requirement during TD to be equivalent to the protection provided by the [heavier M-ATV] vehicle. The ability to achieve the increased level of protection while also satisfying other JLTV requirements [DID: like, say, mobility in soft soil] is not known.”

Mobility will be an especial issue for the US Marines. The testers also complained about communications integration, and the same visibility and internal layout issues that have bedeviled other blast-resistant designs. BAE’s Valanx was supposedly designed to offset that, but:

“All three JLTV vendor vehicles had problems demonstrating functionality of government furnished command, control, and communication equipment in vehicles… Lack of adequate storage space for ammunition, restricted visibility due to small windows, positioning of window panels, and uncomfortable seats with poor seating arrangements were common problems between vendor prototypes and variants.”

Oct 10/11: NAV Saratoga. Navistar Defense introduces its Saratoga light patrol vehicle at AUSA. It’s initially aimed at the HMMWV Recapitalization/ MECV program, but ends up becoming Navistar’s JLTV offering. Navistar | Aviation Week Ares | Defense Update.

Oct 3/11: JLTV EMD RFP Draft. The latest Army-Marine Corps JLTV solicitation favors existing designs over new, and may lead to the program’s demise in favor of recapitalized and modified HMMWVs.

The $250,000 target cost will be a challenge all by itself, but the new solicitation may actually kill JLTV altogether, by driving both new and existing designs out of the competition. By reducing expected production to just 20,000 vehicles over 8 years (3 LRIP, 5 full-rate), it becomes more difficult for firms to recover costs for new designs. On the other hand, demands to hand over technical data rights, and a plan to re-compete the production contract for the winning vehicle after several years, make it unattractive for firms to place a valuable existing design at risk. US Army TACOM Page | FBO.gov | Defense News | Lexington Institute.

FY 2011

Oshkosh debuts L-ATV; JLTV cut rumors prod Plan Bs. L-ATV
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Sept 13/11: OSK L-ATV. Oshkosh unveils its smaller “L-ATV” protected patrol vehicle, which it describes as fully compliant with all JLTV program specifications. The firm was eliminated from the technical demonstrator contract phase, but the next phase will be re-opened to outside bidders. Oshkosh did the expected thing, and leveraged its M-ATV win to fund development.

The L-ATV will feature the improved TAK-4i independent suspension, which “uses a proprietary technology to deliver 20 inches of independent wheel travel – 25 percent more wheel travel than any vehicle in the U.S. military’s fleets.” It can also raise or lower the vehicle, ensuring transportability in ships and aircraft, while still offering enough height for all-terrain mobility and mine blast protection.

Sept 13/11: JLTV future. The Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee moves to cancel JLTV in their version of the FY 2012 defense bill, which would shift the MECV upgraded HMMWV effort into JLTV’s place. If the curt remains final, which is a long way from happening. AOL Defense.

April 28/11: As the teams prepare for the JTLV Engineering & Manufacturing Development contract awards in early 2012, BAE and Navistar’s Team Valanx adds Northrop Grumman to their consortium.

Northrop Grumman will serve as the C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) lead, responsible for the integration of command and control hardware and software, computers and communications equipment, and sensors and sensor suites for intelligence gathering and force protection. BAE Systems.

Oct 25/10: JLTV future. BAE’s Plan B: v-hulled HMMWVs. At AUSA 2010, BAE Systems announces its “Integrated Smart V,” a lightweight monocoque V-hull HMMWV that reuses a large percentage of existing HMMWV components, including the power train and wheel assemblies. It adds a layered monocoque hull with a V-shaped underbody that totally encapsulates the crew, and BAE line lead Chris Chambers adds that “…using clips attached to the monocoque V-hull, the ISV provides a rigid, uncompromising protection solution at an affordable price.”

BAE’s ISV solution comes as budget cuts make JLTV an attractive target, and the USMC looks for an option that will meet its height requirements for stowage aboard ship. They’re not the only firm to be thinking along those lines – Textron has a “capsulized” HMMWV of its own, and have teamed with another firm that has done work along similar lines: Granite Tactical Vehicles. HMMWV ISV could also offer an emergency HMMWV fleet recapitalization option that would bring new work to BAE’s land systems business, which has been hurt by its loss of FMTV truck production, and by the end of MRAP main production orders. BAE Systems.

FY 2010

Australia contracts; Army strategy leaves JLTV in question; Interest from India. Ocelot modularity
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Aug 17/10: JLTV future. DoD Buzz reports that the US Army’s latest Tactical Vehicle Strategy looks like bad news for the JLTV, with small buys spaced over time to equip deployed units. Bottom line?

“Here’s the basic plan. Overall, the Army will shrink its fleet of HUMVEEs, MRAPs and medium trucks to 244,000 by 2025 from its current 260,000. How? The service will rid itself of 4,000 of the hardest to maintain and most beat up MRAPS by 2025. It will scrap the 28,000-strong M35 fleet and replace it with new FMTVs for a fleet total of 76,000. That will mean a total reduction of 4,000 trucks. The HUMVEE fleet will shrink the most, going from 101,000 to 35,000 by 2025. But there appears to be one big hole in the Army plan. It does not project how many Joint Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicles it will be. The strategy’s answer: TBD.”

See the full Army Tactical Vehicle Strategy [PDF].

Aug 9/10: Australia. The General Tactical Vehicles JV between General Dynamics and AM General in Sterling Heights, MI receives a $9 million cost-share contract for the design and development of 3 JLTV subconfigurations for Australia, and the delivery of 2 JLTV subconfiguration vehicles and 1 companion trailer for government testing.

Work is to be performed in Livonia, MI (47%); Sterling Heights, MI (41%); Muskegon, MI (9%); and South Bend, IN (3%), with an estimated completion date of May 19/11. JLTV bids were solicited on the World Wide Web with 7 bids received by the US Army TACOM Contracting Center in Warren, MI (W56HZV-09-C-0108).

June 23/10: Australia. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Owego, NY receives an $8.5 million cost-plus- fixed-fee contract. They will design and develop 3 JLTV sub-configurations for Australia with right-hand drive, and deliver 2 JLTV sub configurations vehicles and 1 companion trailer for Australian government testing.

Work will be performed in Owego, NY, and the contracted is expected to run until May 19/11. Bids were solicited on the World Wide Web, with 7 bids received by the US Army’s TACOM Contracting Center in Warren, MI (W56HZV-09-C-0109).

June 17/10: Australia. The BAE Land Systems – Navistar – ArvinMeritor team hands over 3 Australian JLTVs in a ceremony at West Point, MS. All 3 types are represented: a Category A General Purpose vehicle, a Category B Command and Control on the Move vehicle and a Category C Utility/cargo variant. The prototypes are very similar to American JLTV models, but include requested Australian modifications and a right-side driver. They will undergo tropical environment, reliability testing, and blast testing in Australia.

BAE Systems is Australia’s largest defense company, employing more than 6,000 people at 100 locations across Australia. BAE Systems.

May 26/10: Australia. Australia’s Overlander Phase 4 will have 3 new competitors. Australia’s Minister for Defence Materiel and Science, Greg Combet, announces that Thales Australia, Force Protection Europe, and General Dynamics Land Systems will each receive 6-month contracts worth up to A$ 9 million each, in order to develop “Protected Mobility Vehicle” prototypes. Those prototypes would compete against any winners from the American/Australian JLTV competition, for a roughly A$ 1 billion, 1,300 vehicle contract.

Force Protection is partnered with England’s Ricardo to develop the modular Ocelot, which is also competing for a similar contract in Britain. Bushmaster MPV manufacturers Thales Australia have designed a smaller vehicle called the Hawkei, named after one of Australia’s Death Adders. Their partners include Boeing Defence Australia, PAC Group, and Israeli armor manufacturer and designer Plasan Sasa. GDLS has several options, including a lighter variant of their RG-31 with Oshkosh’s TAK-4 suspension upgrade, currently serving with the US military in Afghanistan. As noted above, they are also partnered with Humvee manufacturer AMC General for the JLTV competition. Australian DoD | Force Protection | Thales Australia.

Made in Australia option

May 3/10: BAE. The BAE Systems/ Navistar/ ArvinMeritor team announces the handover of 7 JLTV prototypes and 4 companion trailers to the U.S. Army. The mix of vehicles included 2 JLTV Category A General Purpose vehicles, 4 JLTV Category B Infantry Carriers, and 1 Category C Utility Carrier. The team is now focused on completing the build of 3 additional variants and a companion trailer, to be delivered to Australia in June 2010.

Sites participating in this team’s JLTV development include: York, PA; Ontario, San Diego and Santa Clara, CA; Dearborn Heights, Sterling Heights and Troy, MI; Minneapolis, MN; Johnson City, NY; Austin, TX; Nashua, NH; Reston, VA; Melrose Park and Warrenville, IL; Fort Wayne, IN; West Point, MS; Huntsville, AL; and Laurinberg and Aiken, SC. Navistar.

April 28/10: GTV. The General Tactical Vehicles (GTV) team of General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General delivers 7 JLTV prototypes, plus 4 trailers and supporting equipment to the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps for Technology Development (TD) phase testing. The TD phase includes a 12-month test and evaluation process at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, in Aberdeen, MD, and at the Yuma Proving Grounds in Yuma, AZ. The delivery is ahead of schedule, and follows GTV’s previous ahead-of-schedule deliveries of armor samples, ballistic hulls and spare parts.

Don Howe, is the GTV senior program director, and David Caldwell is GTV deputy program director. Howe says that GTV has invested in additional JLTV vehicles and trailers as part of its independent R&D program. GD release.

March 30/10: GAO Report. The US GAO audit office delivers its 8th annual “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs report.

Because the program is at such early stages, the GAO report is more of a quick update than in-depth analysis. The JLTV program completed Preliminary Design Reviews during the summer of 2009, Critical Design Reviews are planned for early fiscal year 2010, and by Q4 FY 2011 (summer), the program expects to begin engineering and manufacturing development. FY 2008-2010 RDTE (Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation) funding is $306.68 million ($16.44 million Army, $143.24 million USMC).

Feb 25/10: LMCO. Lockheed Martin unveils its 4th operational JLTV prototype at the AUSA convention in Ft. Lauderdale, FL. It’s a 2nd variant of the original Infantry Carrier JLTV Category B model, which was unveiled in October 2007. Lockheed Martin’s team introduced their Category C Utility Vehicle in February 2008, and its Category A General Purpose Mobility model in October 2008.

Currently all of the Lockheed Martin JLTV prototypes are in system test, where they have accumulated over 30,000 combined test miles, more than half of which have been conducted off-road. Lockheed Martin.

Nov 4/09: The General Dynamics/ AM General joint venture, General Tactical Vehicles (GTV), announces that they are the first JLTV contractor to complete the JLTV Critical Design Review, adding:

“GTV is transitioning into the vehicle and trailer build and test phase for the JLTV units deliverable to the government in the spring of 2010 under its technology development contract awarded last October.”

Oct 6/09: Australia and… India? Aviation Week’s Ares reports that India is in discussions to join the JLTV program, and Australia has given notice that will continue their participation into the next phase. Meanwhile, the 3 selected vehicle teams are about 1/3 of the way through the existing phase, with Preliminary Design Reviews done and Critical Design Reviews coming up over the next 2 months.

With respect to a potential threat from the existing Oshkosh M-ATV, JLTV program officials state that the programs share 320 mission requirements, but JLTV adds another 580 to create a full Hummer-like family of light tactical vehicles. They see the programs as complementary, which could be true if the 580 additional requirements are dfficult for M-ATV to meet within its existing design. It would take a budget crunch to really test those theories – but one may be coming.

FY 2009

JLTV Tech Dev contracts; GAO denied TD protests; Australia is in; British won’t be buying. Lockheed’s Aussie JLTV
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Sept 30/09: Australian contracts. The US Army and Marine Corps formally awarded Technology Development (TD) contract modifications to each of JLTV’s 3 industry partners in accordance with the Australian Project Arrangement (PA). Under the original US contracts, each of the JLTV industry teams are delivering ballistic testing sample and a number of ballistic hulls for evaluation at Aberdeen Test Center, followed by prototype vehicles and trailers during April/May 2010, for 12 months of Government Testing at Aberdeen Test Center, MD and Yuma Test Center, AZ.

Program leaders on each side include USMC JLTV program manager Lt. Col. Ruben Garza, and Lt. Col. Alistair Dickie of the Australian Army. At present, 2 Australian Co-operative Program Personnel are supporting the JLTV Program Management Office at Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Harrison Township, MI. Australian vehicles will add reliability and performance testing for up to 15,000 miles per vehicle, followed by shipment to Australia for tropical environment testing, and additional reliability and ballistic testing. To this effect, US Army TACOM notes independent modifications made to BAE Systems, General Tactical Vehicles and Lockheed Martin contracts during July and August 2009:

BAE Systems Land & Armaments: Deliver 3 right-side operation JLTV vehicles and one companion trailer: a JLTV-A General Purpose Mobility, a JLTV-B-C2OTM/AU Command Control On-The-Move, a JLTV-C-UTL/AU Utility Vehicle-Shelter Carrier, and a JLTV/T-AU Prototype Companion Trailer.

General Tactical Vehicles (GTV): Design 3 right-side operation JLTV vehicles (Payload categories A, B, and C) and then build 2 (categories B and C), along with one JLTV-T/AU Prototype Companion Trailer.

Lockheed Martin: Design 3 right-side operation JLTV vehicles (Payload categories A, B, and C) and then build 2 (categories B and C), along with one JLTV-T/AU Prototype Companion Trailer.

Australia TD contracts

June 30/09: M-ATV. The US government awards the first big M-ATV delivery order, in order to field 5,244 vehicles in 2009-2010 that will act as a front-line bridge in Afghanistan between the limitations of existing Hummers and MRAPs, and JLTV. The initial $1.056 billion delivery order for 2,244 vehicles goes to Oshkosh, whose design is based on their MTVR medium truck and has a Gross Vehicle Weight of 16.5 tons/ 32,500 pounds. Additional orders follow.

The result could revive Oshkosh’s design for subsequent rounds of the JLTV competition, either as a solo venture or via renewed cooperation with Northrop Grumman. Read “M-ATV: A Win, at Last, for Oshkosh” for more.

March 18/08: Australia. Liberal Party opposition leader Malcolm Turnbull criticizes Australia’s involvement in the JLTV program, drawing a response from the Labor Party government. Turnbull:

“We’ve had another issue that we’ve raised in the Parliament this morning about a new armoured vehicle which should be made in Australia. The Thales company, which makes the Bushmasters in Bendigo, has been making these armoured vehicles in Australia for the Australian Army very successfully and the Government is looking for a new vehicle and it is actually inviting an American company to make a prototype… they say they are committed to jobs and yet every example…”

Australia has already raised its quota of Bushmaster MRAP vehicles several times, and the vehicle has a dedicated niche in Project Overlander. That niche is different from the JLTV’s niche, however, which is why American firms are submitting different vehicles. With respect to LAND 121 (Overlander) Phase 4, Mnister for Defence Joel Fitzgibbon notes that the original announcement had said that local Australian options would also be explored. An RFP to local industry is due in April 2009, and the DoD is expected to present options to the government in late 2009. Malcolm Turnbull interview transcript | Ministerial response.

Feb 26/09: Sub-contractors. ArvinMeritor, Inc. announces that they will be the JLTV drivetrain supplier for the Lockheed Martin team, which includes BAE General Tactical Systems; and for BAE U.S. Combat Systems, who leads the BAE/Navistar team. ArvinMeritor began working on new products and technologies for the JLTV program in 2006, participating in the Nevada Automotive Test Centers (NATC) Combat Tactical Vehicle Technical Demonstrator program.

Their solutions for the JLTV program include the Meritor lightweight, high mobility independent suspensions, an integrated all-wheel drive system, a central tire inflation system, semi-active damping, and MeritorWABCO hydraulic braking systems with electronic stability control.

Feb 26/09: LMCO. Lockheed Martin unveils a 4th JLTV prototype at the AUSA 209 conference; it is a 2nd variant design of the JLTV-B infantry carrier. All of the Lockheed Martin JLTV prototypes are in system tes, and have accumulated over 30,000 combined test miles, more than half of which have been conducted off-road to simulate mission conditions. Lockheed Martin release.

JLTV evaluations
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Feb 17/09: GAO – Protests denied. The US GAO rules on JLTV protests from Northrop Grumman Space and Missile Systems Corporation, and Textron Marine & Land Systems Corporation. The protests are denied, allowing the JLTV program to move forward as the winning contracts are “unfrozen”.

The full decision was released to the public in early March 2009. See the bid evaluation grid at left for the 3 winners, and the 2 protesters. Northrop Grumman’s offering had by far the lowest cost of these 5, at an estimated $32.95 million compared to the overall average of $50.1 million. Their design and technology was considered to have moderate technical risk, however, which can result is escalating future costs once development begins. The winning bidders’ had better technical maturity and integration ratings than Northrop Grumman’s; only fellow protester Textron’s entry was worse, and at an estimated development price of $53.32 million.

Since the “Technical was significantly more important than logistics commonality, which was more important than cost; cost and past performance/small business participation were approximately equal in importance,” in the RFP criteria, the GAO saw no reason to overturn a selection made on that basis. Other areas of protest, including the adequacy of the GD/AMC team’s small business contracting plan, were also deined. Full decision re: file #B-400837 | Full decision, PDF format.

GAO go-ahead

Nov 17/08: No British JLTV. Aviation Week reports that Britain will not be part of the JLTV program via its Operational Utility Vehicle Systems (OUVS) project, even though a joint working group was set up with the JLTV program in Q3 2008. Britan’s minister for defense equipment and support Quenton Davies reportedly said that:

“The JLTV capability is a replacement for Humvee and performs both a utility vehicle and patrol vehicle role. It therefore goes beyond the requirement for OUVS and the two parties have agreed that there is not enough synergy to warrant collaboration on the acquisition of vehicles at this time.”

Britain already has 400 JLTV type patrol vehicles on order: Iveco’s Panther /MLV/ Lince, which is also in servce with or ordered by Italy, Belgium, Croatia, The Czech Republic, Norway, and Spain. It should be entering service in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2009.

The British aren’t coming

Nov 7/08: GAO protest. Northrop Grumman and Oshkosh Defense file a formal protest with the US Congressional Government Accountability Office (GAO), requesting a review of the JLTV evaluation conducted by the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Source Selection Authority (SSA). They claim that the SSA misapplied the stated evaluation criteria, by giving design maturity more weight than advertised; did not make the value of a demonstrator vehicle clear; “relied unreasonably on company self-evaluations of design maturity and failed to conduct an adequate, independent assessment”; and undervalued their lowest cost bid.

The firm further charges that these changes amounted to an “unannounced agency decision to transform the solicitation from a TD (Technology Demonstrator) phase to a defacto System Development and Demonstration (SDD) effort.” That might be a very wise move for the JLTV program, but the government must advise bidders of any material shifts to a program’s criteria or direction during the bid process.

Contract awards are held up until a GAO protest ruling is issued – see Feb 17/09 for resolution. NGC release.

New dawn?
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Oct 29-30/08: JLTV TD contracts. The US Army issues contract releases on DefenseLink, as well as longer articles on Army.mil, as it makes 3 awards. See US Army: Army awards development contracts for JLTV | Army awards three Joint Light Tactical Vehicle technology phase development contracts || Defense News | Defense Update | WIRED Danger Room | Bloomberg | Crain’s Detroit | Milwaukee-Wisconsin Jounral Sentinel re: Oshkosh elimination | South Bend Tribune re: AM General. Also:

Oct 30/08: BAE Systems Land & Armaments-Grounds System Division in Santa Clara, CA won a $40.5 million cost share contract for the JLTV’s 27-month technology development phase. Work will be performed in Santa Clara, CA, Warrenville, IL, Johnson City, NY, and Troy, MI, with an estimated completion date of Jan 31/11. Bids were solicited via the Web, with 7 bids received by the US Army’s Tank & Automotive Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-08-C-0426). BAE release | Navistar release.

Oct 30/08: General Tactical Vehicles in Sterling Heights, MI won a $45.1 million cost share contract for the JLTV’s 27-month technology development phase. As noted above, GTV is a joint venture partnership between AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems. Work will be performed in Livonia, MI, Sterling Heights, MI, Muskegon, MI, and South Bend, IN, with an estimated completion date of Jan 31/11. Bids were solicited via the Web, with 7 bids received by the US Army’s Tank & Automotive Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-08-C-0430). GTV release at: Geeral Dynamics | GTV | AM General.

Oct 30/08: Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY won a $35.9 million cost share contract for the JLTV’s 27-month technology development phase. Work will be performed in Owego, NY, and Sealy, TX, with an estimated completion date of Jan 31/11. Bids were solicited via the Web, with 7 bids received by the US Army’s Tank & Automotive Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-08-C-0431). Work in Sealy, TX involves its core partner, BAE Systems’ Armor Holdings. Lockheed Martin release.

Tech Development Phase

Oct 29/08: Australia in. Australia’s Labor Party Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon announces that the Government has given approval to commence planning for Phase 4 of the multi-billion dollar LAND 121 “Overlander” project. Phase 4 will replace some of the Australian Defence Force’s 4,200 Land Rovers with a fleet of protected light mobility vehicles.

As part of their plan to examine all of their options, Australia has decided to participate in the JLTV’s technology demonstration phase. This is not a total commitment to the JLTV program’s 3 contenders, however; Australia’s DoD will also engage with industry to explore other options. Ministerial Speech | Australian DoD release.

Australia joins

FY 2008 and Earlier

Getting it together. USMC HMMWV, Iraq:
Fill ‘er up!
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August 2008: The US Army and Marine Corps present their synchronized joint wheeled vehicle strategy.

Feb 5/08: JLTV RFP. An RFP for the JLTV’s Technology Development Phase is issued to industry.

Dec 22/07: JLTV ADM. The Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L) signs an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) directing the JLTV Program to move from the Concept Refinement Phase into the Technology Development Phase (TDP) of the DOD System Acquisition Process. Source: CRS.

November 2007: The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB)”…concerned that the Pentagon’s multi-billion dollar procurement plans for a raft of new tactical wheeled vehicles may be laden with excessive redundancy,” directs the Army and Marine Corps to develop and present a strategy by March 31/08. In the same month, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) calls for a similar assessment by July 1/08. The OMB report is extended to that date, in order to synchronize the 2 requests.

Sept 2007: JLTV dis-approval. The Pentagon’s acquisition executive, John Young, dis-approves the JLTV RFP, and directs the US Army and Marines to “go back to the drawing board and develop a robust technology development phase.” Source: CRS.

November 2006: JLTV approval. The US military Joint Chief of Staff’s Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) approves the JLTV program. Source: CRS.

Additional Readings

• US Army TACOM – Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). In light of the GAO protest, see esp. question #40 in the April 9/08 Q&A.

• AM General – BRV-O mini-site

• BAE Systems – The Valanx. The BAE/ Navistar/ Northrop Grumman team.

• General Tactical Vehicles – Official Site. The GDLS/AM General team.

• Lockheed Martin – Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.

• Navistar – International Saratoga.

• Oshkosh Defense – JLTV: Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

Key Background

• US Congressional Research Service (updated Aug 28/08) – Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress. “Some analysts say that unless the Pentagon can convincingly demonstrate that JLTVs are unique vehicles with capabilities not found in HMMWVs, ECV2s, and MRAPs, it will likely be difficult to justify a service-wide “pure fleet” of well over 100,000 JLTVs at the current estimated cost. Army and Marine plans to “mothball” a large portion of the $23 billion-plus MRAP fleet might also prove to be contentious unless JLTVs can provide comparable or superior troop protection.”

• Badenoch LLC – The 7 Forensic Causes of Injury or Death in Military Vehicles. Defensive systems must account in some way for all 7.

• Breach Bang Clear – JLTV and MRAP vs. Reality: Part 1 | Part 2. By Survival Consultants International’s David Woroner. Explains some of the physics involved in explosions, and in penetrating weapons like RPGs. Conditionally in favor of the program, but argues that JLTV will need to be able to add better armor than is currently available, in order to remain viable over the long term. Also notes the maneuverability issue of tracks vs. wheels.

Related Efforts & News

• Badenoch LLC – Ultra AP. A concept vehicle used by the US military to refine its ideas about JLTV. This page includes a number of up-close, in-depth explanations of the vehicle’s innovative design features; they are quite extensive.

• DID – M-ATV: A Win, at Last, for Oshkosh. The $3.3 billion, 5,244 vehicle program will field front-line vehicles designed to bringe the gap between MRAPs and the JLTV. Oshkosh’s winning entry is based on its MTVR medium truck, and has a GWV of 32,500 pounds (16.25 tons).

• DoD Buzz (Sept 27/12) – Marine Humvees get a second life

• The Australian (Oct 23/10) – Innovation saving our soldiers’ lives. Goes into a number of Austrlian R&D efforts aimed at improving vehicle protection.

• Ground Combat Technology (August 2010) – As The JLTV Program Moves Through The Technology-Development, Its Unique Advantages Emerge

• Defense News (Aug 4/08) – DoD’s JLTV Becoming International Effort. Cites interest from Australia, Britain, and other NATO and non-NATO countries. Quotes Army Col. John Mysers: “They have spent time interacting with the Army on requirements. Industry is ready for this… If we are learning enough in the TD phase, we could have an abbreviated SDD phase. We’ll have vehicles that have demonstrated core capabilities… We will have achievable requirements. We told industry in advance of the RFP [request for proposal], ‘This is where you want to focus your efforts and R&D funds.'”

• Defense News (June 16/08) – Lockheed To Unveil Adaptable Vehicle for U.K. Needs. Offers a window into Lockheed’s ground vehicle investments, and into future British needs that will either parallel or merge with JLTV.

• Motley Fool (Jan 10/08) – Who Wants to Be a 70-Billionaire?

• DID (May 5/06) – DefenseTech’s Hybrid Reality Check. Fielding military hybrid vehicles may be more challenging than expected.

• DID (May 24/05) – Shadow Hybrid Vehicle to Become a Power Source. Winner of this RST-V technology demonstration program for a hybrid-powered reconnaissance vehicle that could be carried in a V-22? General Dynamics Land Systems.

Appendix A: Phase 1 Technology Development’s Losing Teams FP’s Cheetah:
Nowhere to run
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With so many contenders, a number of participants were assured of walking away disappointed. Adding these 5 teams to the 3 winners gives 8, but TACOM reports only 7 qualifying bids. The GAO would later clarify somewhat, by saying that there were 8 initial respondents, and 6 teams who were invited to bid. TACOM will not reveal who did not submit a bid, but a fully open EMD system development contract award ensures that any of these teams could conceivably continue investing, and find themselves back in the running.

DID offers all 5 partnerships that stated plans to contend for JLTV TD. We also explain why we’re not likely to see any of them return to the JLTV competition.

Force Protection and DRS. The life-saving performance of Force Protection’s Cougar and Buffalo vehicles in theater triggered the USA’s MRAP vehicle program, and the firm has been working on its lighter Cheetah vehicle for a couple of years. Despite a big jump on its competitors in testing and feedback from the US military, however, Cheetah did not make the final 3. That failure is a huge blow to Force Protection, who also dropped to a distant 3rd place in the USA’s MRAP competition, as orders for their Cougar MRAP vehicles faded toward the end. Force Protection partnership release | Cheetah product page.

The firm’s remaining hope was that Cheetah’s developed and tested status would lead to “interim bridge buys,” to fill the USMC and Army’s M-ATV needs for lighter blast-resistant vehicles between now and 2014. To that end, they brought the Cheetah within their Force Dynamics joint venture with GDLS. The M-ATV effort also failed, which doomed the Cheetah.

Force Protection formally wrote off its investment in the Cheetah, and no longer publicizes it as an offering. The company’s acquisition by General Dynamics removed the firm from any list of future contenders.

Blackwater and Raytheon. This was the most interesting partnership on a corporate level. Blackwater’s contract security forces have their own array of equipment; some is bought off the shelf, but the firm has quickly turned its field experience into a range of fielded designs for everything from protective vests, to blast-resistant vehicles, to a surveillance blimp. This JLTV design was reportedly based on a cut-down version of their Grizzly mine-resistant vehicle, with Raytheon acting as the electronics integrator.

A win for Blackwater (now Xe) would have had seismic implications, creating the potential for controversy on a political level, and invidious comparisons from a military procurement standpoint. The effective dissolution of Blackwater’s equipment group, and massive changes to the company, ensure that they won’t be back later on. Defense News report | Tactical Life feature | Blackwater USA vehicles video.

Team Boeing. Boeing seems like an unlikely contender for a vehicle program, but their key roles in the US Army’s Future Combat Systems program and Britain’s FRES armored vehicle program do give them credibility. Their main JLTV partner was Textron, whose comparatively lightweight M1117 Guardian ASV armored cars failed the extra-tough MRAP competition tests – but have been ordered by the hundreds in separate contracts to equip American military police and some foreign forces. Other JLTV partners included Boeing’s Future Combat System prime partner SAIC, Ford (engine options and power train), MillenWorks (offroad racing and rapid prototyping heritage, LTV design was reportedly the base), and Carlson Technology (maintenance and pit stop engineering experts). Their design featured a hybrid engine, and a full electric drive train that doesn’t need to be mechanically coupled to the engine. Boeing release.

The JLTV competition has changed significantly since then. Boeing would have to make wholesale changes to their design in order to compete, and they’ve shown no public interest in doing that.

KMW/ L-3’s F2USA
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KMW and L-3. Germany’s KMW is a global military vehicle leader, with products that include everything from Dingo 2 mine-resistant vehicles, to tiny air-portable Wiesel tracked infantry enhancement vehicles, to Leopard 2 tanks. KMW offered its new F2 wheeled vehicle family as a JLTV contender, using L-3 as its American partner and electronics integrator.

The F2 builds on KMWs Fennek reconnaissance vehicle design, which has been adopted by several European armies, and has seen combat use by Dutch and German forces. Fennek’s strengths include a low detection profile across the spectrum, very good mobility, long range, and excellent self sufficiency. Fennek’s mine protection is not seen as a similar strength, though the F2 presumably included additional protection. KMW partnership announcement | F2 family product page.

Unlike its fellows in this section, the Fennek remains a well-regarded, established product in the global defense space. It’s also a high-end product, designed for advanced reconnaissance missions. JLTV’s new price targets aren’t a fit for the Fennek.

NGC/ Oshkosh concept
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Northrop Grumman and Oshkosh. Oshkosh produces the US Marines’ MTVR medium truck, and the Army’s FHTV heavy trucks. The firm struck 3 different MRAP partnerships (PVI’s Alpha, Thales Australia’s Bushmaster, i3/Ceradyne’s Bull) – then struck out in the competition, while its competitor Navistar vaulted into the #1 spot. Northrop Grumman led this partnership, which leveraged Oshkosh’s vehicle manufacturing experience, its MTVR trucks’ TAK-4 off-road suspension, and its heavy truck work with ProPulse(TM) hybrid drive technology

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Guest article by Sebastian Sobolev and Aleksandar D. Jovovic

Some years back, global defense companies flocked to the Indian defense market in search of opportunities that could offset declining home budgets. India’s attractiveness as a market was understandable: the country was embarked on an ambitious military modernization program to mitigate perceived threats from neighboring Pakistan and to compete with China in the maritime, air and land domains.

These initiatives ballooned military procurement accounts, which grew at an annual rate of 14% between 2005 and 2010. Yet contractors soon found themselves frustrated by opaque bureaucratic procurement processes, onerous domestic offset and work share requirements, and seemingly endless delays. With the emergence of a new government, what’s ahead for India?

The Indian Market: Structure, Inertia & Movement

India has made attempts to reform its procurement processes in the past; can contractors, foreign and domestic, expect anything different this time? The real battle may center on the competitive nature of India’s domestic defense firms, with the outcomes impacting opportunities for global defense providers. If Western defense suppliers are to compete in the Indian market, they would be well-served to understand the roots of the Indian procurement process, its current trajectory, and the potential opportunities that recent reforms may create.

Development of defense industrial capacity has been a key priority for India since the Nehru administration. Investment in the sector was seen as a means of spurring economic development, providing regional employment, and avoiding dependence on either Cold War bloc. Because development of this sector was a strategic economic and security priority, it was always centrally controlled, a structure that persists today. The choice of whether to import, co-produce, or indigenously develop a defense capability is made at the political level of the executive and Defense Ministry bureaucracies. Much of the decision-making authority beyond that lies with the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which governs the R&D and production activities of the state-controlled defense industries (DPSUs).

This structure also governs how foreign suppliers interact with indigenous industries. It imposes offset obligations, mandates technology transfer requirements, and, up until recently, it dictated which local institution a foreign supplier had to partner with on a given project. Waiving this last requirement has the potential to improve the business environment for foreign companies in India by introducing an element of competition into the indigenous industrial base. This will be particularly meaningful if India’s vibrant private sector is invited to the table.

As the initial cycle of great expectations deflated, some firms chose to shift their focus away from the Indian market entirely. Others settled in for the long haul, trading their rushed marketing campaigns for patience, and working to better understand what programs and requirements were real and enduring.

As downward budgetary pressure persists in the United States and Europe, companies continue to look abroad for growth opportunities, and the size of India’s defense budget and the scope of its modernization ambitions have again drawn attention. In the midst of this, India has experienced a transformational election, bringing to power a new and dynamic leadership armed with a strong parliamentary majority and public mandate for change.

Almost immediately, India extended its prohibitive FDI restrictions on the defense sector from 27% to 49%. Soon after, the Modi government took the radical step of decoupling the high profile corruption investigation of AgustaWestland from the firm’s ongoing support and supplier activities, as well as allowing the company to continue – with some restrictions – to place bids on upcoming rotorcraft programs. But clues on the trajectory of the defense market may be most evident in India’s domestic competitive landscape, rather than high profile developments involving foreign firms.

The Public – Private Divide IAF’s 748M Avro
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India’s private firms have been angling for a greater defense market share, with a few wins in areas such as shipbuilding. But even here, complex efforts such as the P-75 submarine program have been channeled to teams of foreign and Indian public sector shipyards.

The upcoming Avro transport aircraft replacement is the next test opportunity for foreign technology players and India’s private sector. However, in true statist fashion, the private sector was promised this program by decree, rather than real competition with the public sector’s HAL and others.

Other privately-owned firms have trumpeted their greater play in the defense sector. The Tata Sons conglomerate included defense in its major investment drive, while Larsen and Toubro announced a $400 million expansion in naval shipbuilding, and have set a target of growing their defense business fourfold. Mumbai-based Mahindra, which has boasted a modest defense footprint in land vehicles and naval subsystems since India’s independence, is investing in radar and aerospace production.

Shifts in favor of India’s private sector have yet to materialize, however, putting considerable onus on the new government and its implementation – rather that regulation – of the defense procurement portfolio.

Foreign providers face similar quandaries: the Avro replacement program is also illustrative in this regard. The government had admirable ambitions to source this (foreign-designed) platform competitively, but its approach to the competition bears the hallmarks of centralized control that have defined the procurement process. The government dictated the terms, limiting suppliers and imposing considerable requirements for domestic industrial participation. The result was a dearth of interest from foreign suppliers, as well as complaints from local Indian partners that the small batch of aircraft to be made in India rendered required investments uneconomical. As of this writing, they have yet to receive a bid, and the competition has been extended. Barring a sudden turnaround, the program appears to be headed for cancellation and re-competition.

Another critical airborne program has suffered similar fates in the past. India’s Light Utility Helicopter program (LUH), the replacement of the revered but dated Chetak and Cheetah fleets, has now been cancelled twice. This program could shape up to be a true competition between the private and public sectors, in each case paired with foreign partners in a “buy and make Indian” program, requiring local assembly and content. Rather than simply assign this effort to one or the other side, India’s procurement officials may create a true competition. Indeed, the public sector HAL has been positioning and developing in-house IP for some time, via its Druhv and indigenous LUH programs.

Ultimately, the driver of true competition, as well as commensurate foreign engagement, lies in the severe capacity constraints faced by India’s public sector defense industry – first and foremost by the aforementioned HAL.

Recent history does contain some bright spots for American suppliers doing business in India. Despite the loss of the $12 billion Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition to Dassault, Boeing has exported several high-end platforms to India, including the P-8i maritime surveillance aircraft and the forthcoming AH-64E Apache attack helicopter. Interestingly, the Apache is being sold with no expectation of co-production or technology transfer. Lockheed’s C-130 franchise has done well for itself in India, with repeat sales of its J-series Super Hercules. In this case, India’s private sector has embedded itself in the supply chain, with a Tata-Lockheed Martin JV supplying aerostructure components that include the center wing box.

Conclusion C-130J-30 departs
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Ultimately, the real question in India is the extent of true domestic competition for defense funding. Will the new government open the market sufficiently to allow the private sector to compete and win, resulting in greater non-public sector investment in R&D and production capabilities? The circumstances seem favorable: this government is more committed to competition, has a more instinctive understanding of for-profit industry, and harbors greater awareness of the severe capacity constraints of the traditional public sector undertakings.

It is through this prism that global industry should consider its opportunities. The desire for more indigenous development and production will continue in an avowedly nationalist government. Nevertheless, global defense firms may be able to develop deeper and more fruitful partnerships with emerging private sector defense firms in India, perhaps even leading to greater exports of Indian content – much praised, but rarely experienced to date.

While higher FDI limits, greater flexibility in domestic industrial partnerships, and recent Western successes in exporting to India’s defense market are legitimate causes for optimism for foreign suppliers, aspects of India’s procurement process are likely to shed their bureaucratic and centrally-controlled past very slowly. India’s modernization ambitions are likely to continue drawing attention from Western contractors, but success in India will remain a longer-term proposition than the conventional wisdom of years past had suggested.

Avascent is the leading strategy and management consulting firm serving clients operating in government-driven markets. Sebastian Sobolev is a Project Manager, and Aleksandar D. Jovovic is a Principal. Use these links to reveal their emails and contact them.
Updates

February 4/16: India has received the final batch of three Mi-17V-5 military transport helicopters from Russia, bringing the total to 151. The models are the most technically advanced of Rostec Corporation’s Mi-8/17 type including a KNEI-8 avionics suite. The new suite replaces the previously used multiple systems indicators with four large multi-functional that are easy to read and reduce the intensity of pilot’s workload. The completion of the sale comes as both India and Russia continue negotiations for forty-eight more of the helicopters, which are to be used in a variety of operations such as in deserts and mountains, matching the wide variety of environments found in India.

January 28/16: The Indian government has released a new policy paper outlining a revision to its current procurement structures. The Defence Procurement Policy 2016 (DPP-2016) aims to make the country’s defence industry more lucrative and reduce delays by eliminating repetitive procedures to the process. A new category that has been given the highest priority in how India gains its weapons has also been created named the Indigenous Design, Development and Manufacturing (IDDM). At present, the categories designated from highest to lowest priority are Make India, Buy and Make (India), Buy and Make Global, and Buy Global. However some commentators have said that the new category may confuse matters further as it seems to be a hybrid category of the Make and Buy categories, resulting in different interpretations of under which category a prototype will be developed.

August 6/15: With Indian defense exports slowly climbing, Tata Motors has delivered 585 military logistics vehicles to the UN mission in Mali, MINUSMA. The Indian firm also won a contract with the Indian government in July to supply over 1,200 6×6 trucks to the Indian Army. The delivery to MINUSMA took approximately five months and will equip Mali’s neighbors.

Additional Readings Global Programs

• DID – India Selects Airbus A330 MRTT in Aerial Tanker Competition.

• DID – India Refurbishing its AN-32 Transport Fleet. In Ukraine.

• DID FOCUS – Surya’s Chariots: India’s AWACS Programs.

• DID – India & Israel’s Barak-8 SAM Development Project(s).

• DID – C-17s for India: 10 Aircraft by 2015.

• DID – India Buys C-130J-30 Hercules for Special Forces.

• DID FOCUS – Procurement Nadir: India’s Murky, Messed-Up Howitzer Competitions.

• DID FOCUS – India’s Light Helicopter Contract Hits Turbulence, Stalls. Again.

• DID – India’s Light Transport Competition: Follow Avros to Exit.

• DID – India’s Mid-Tier Maritime Patrol Aircraft Competitions.

• DID – An MRAP for India. BAE joint venture with Mahindra didn’t work, folded, but Mahindra can sell Casspir derivative.

• DID – P-8i: India’s Navy Picks Its Future High-End Maritime Patrol Aircraft.

• DID – India’s Fighter Upgrades: Mirage 2000s Finally Get a Deal.

• DID FOCUS – India’s M-MRCA Fighter Competition.

• DID FOCUS – India’s Project 75 SSKs: Too Late to Save the Submarine Force?

• DID – Upgrades At Last: Keeping India’s U209 Subs Afloat.

• DID FOCUS – LCA Tejas: An Indian Fighter – With Foreign Help.

• DID – May day: India’s New Basic & Intermediate Flight Trainers.

• DID – Hawks Fly Away With India’s Jet Trainer v2 Competition.

• DID – Israel Sells Heron UAVs to India.

• DID – India Buys GPS-Guided “Cans of Whup-Ass”. WCMD cluster bombs for its Jaguars.

Overarching Issues

• DID – India’s DRDO Rethinking the Way it Does Business. Updated in 2010, some readings updated to 2012.

• DID – Anti-Submarine Weakness: India Has a Problem.

• DID – Indian Naval Air Defenses: Another Avoidable Crisis.

Russian Cooperation

• DID – India Moves to Boost Anti-Tank Capabilities. Shells, laser-guided weapons, and missiles.

• DID FOCUS – PAK-FA/FGFA/T50: India, Russia Cooperate on 5th-Gen Fighter.

• DID – India’s Fighter Modernization: Add MiG-29s to the List.

• DID – MTA: HAL and Irkut’s Joint Tactical Transport Project.

• DID – India Ordering, Modernizing SU-30MKIs.

• DID FOCUS – India’s Nuclear Submarine Projects. Including a Russian lease.

• DID FOCUS – INS Vikramaditya: India’s New Carrier.

Americas

• A recent report from the Pentagon’s top weapons tester has raised serious questions over the F-35 program’s “unrealistic test schedule”. Michael Gilmore’s annual F-35 report released on Monday follows a recently leaked memo from December 2015 that highlighted issues over the jet’s software development. The report flags these testing issues as potentially delaying the operational evaluation by up to a year, with flight testing not likely to be completed until at least January 2018. It had been initially hoped that testing would be completed by August 2017, after program re-baselining in 2012. As a result of these delays, Gilmore also warned against current block buying of the fighter with 250 planned to be locked-in before the (Initial Operational Test and Evaluation) IOT&E. At present, 150 fully operational jets have been delivered by Lockheed and will all require extensive modification to the Block 3F standard once development concludes.

• Ahead of the Pentagon’s February 9 official budget release, Defense Secretary Ash Carter mapped out his spending priorities on Tuesday. Among the plans include a $13 billion plan in funding for a new submarine to carry nuclear ballistic missiles over the next five years. This would be broken down into $4 billion towards research and development of new submarines, with $9 billion spent on procurement funding. The Navy may also see twelve more Super Hornet’s procured to make up for shortages caused by delays to Lockheed’s F-35 program, and longer-than-expected repair times for current Boeing F/A-18 jets. The budget also outlines a total 322 F-35s across its A, B and C models but following the recommendations in Michael Gilmore’s most recent report, this could be more wishful thinking than the eventual reality.

Middle East North Africa

• Last weekend’s expected signing of a deal for Kuwait to purchase twenty-eight Eurofighter jets has been put off. Italian Ministry of Defense officials cited “procedural” delays on Kuwait’s behalf, and that no clear date had been set. It had been expected that the deal would close quickly after some initial delays over pilot training had pushed an agreement into 2016. News of the deal came as Kuwait’s initial plan to purchase F-18 Super Hornets from Boeing was scrapped after their frustration over congressional delays in gaining approval for the sale. The loss of the sale to the Eurofighter has put into question the security of some jobs at Boeing’s St. Louis plant. The plant specializes in the manufacture of the Super Hornet, and were set to start production of the $3 billion deal before the change.

• The UAE is to acquire more of the Finnish Patria AMVs 8×8 armored wheeled vehicles. With a first batch ordered by the Emirates in 2008, Patria will provide forty more of the AMVs in a contract worth $41 million with options to purchase a further fifty. Construction of the hulls has been outsourced to Polish partner Rosomak SA, and they will be fitted with additional armor and mine protection, along with remote weapon stations armed with 12.7 mm machine guns or 40 mm automatic grenade launchers. The Patria AMV has been used in Afghanistan, Chad and is also participating in ongoing Saudi-led operations in Yemen. UAE involvement in the country has included daily air strikes along with a ground presence that has included claims of having hired Colombian mercenaries to fight there.

Europe

• The UK Ministry of Defence has signed contracts in the amount of $1.58 billion for a new military training fleet. Under the UK Military Flight Training System (UKMFS), approximately half the sum will go to Affinity Flying Services who will provide the aircraft that will be used at different stages of the training. Affinity, which is a joint venture between Kellogg Brown and Root Ltd and Elbit Systems UK, will provide three aircraft types as well as their maintenance and support. The remaining funds have been awarded to Lockheed Martin and Babcock, who have been selected to deliver all of the ground based training equipment and infrastructure to support the delivery of the fixed wing training capability. When fully operation in 2019, student pilots will learn initially on the Grob 120TP “Prefect” before going on to take part in either Multi-Engine Pilot Training on the Embraer “Phenom” 100 or Basic Flying Training on the Beechcraft “Texan” T-6C.

• French procurement agency DGA announced the finalizing of an order with Lockheed Martin for four C-130 aircraft. The models to be delivered are two standard C-130J transports, and two KC-130Js equipped for in-flight refueling of helicopters. While the exact figure of the deal is unknown, the core value of the deal is around $355 million, slightly more than the $340 million set aside in the revised multiyear defense budget for acquiring four C-130s. The orders will plug a growing capability gap in the French military caused by the Airbus A400M program. Development of the multi-purpose A400M has seen delays in delivery as Airbus looks to fix technical problems over inflight helicopter refueling capabilities, and for paratroopers to be able to jump from the side door.

Africa

• Equatorial Guinea will receive two C295 transport aircraft after officials visited Airbus’ plant in Seville last week. The planes will add to the central African nations rather modest fleet of mostly Russian made transport and fighter aircraft. The first, due in September of this year, will be used primarily for personnel transportation, medical assistance and evacuations. The second will be configured to operate on surveillance missions over the country’s territory and coastal waters. The C295 is becoming a popular selection for many militaries in Africa, with Ghana, Algeria and Egypt just a few who operate or have ordered the plane. Airbus sees sales of at least fifty C295s going to the continent over the next decade.

Asia Pacific

• The Malaysian Army’s purchase of six MD 530G Scout Attack Helicopters will include a custom weapons package including a complete missions management system not found on previous models. This will include a stores management system and helmet mounted cuing system for integrated target identification and tracking, and allows laser-guided rocket and Hellfire capability. With increased range over other models, the helicopters will be stationed with the Eastern Sabah Security Command. In 2013, a three week insurgency and standoff erupted in Sabah after Fillipino militants landed in the area making territorial claims as the Sultanate of Sulu.

Today’s Video

• Following the recent sale to Malaysia, a look at MD Helicopters latest MD530G Scout Attack Helicopter:

Italian Eurofighters
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The multi-national Eurofighter Typhoon has been described as the aerodynamic apotheosis of lessons learned from the twin engine “teen series” fighters that began with the F-14 and F-15, continued with the emergence of the F/A-18 Hornet, and extended through to the most recent F/A-18 Super Hornet variants. Aerodynamically, it’s a half generation ahead of all of these examples, and planned evolutions will place the Eurofighter near or beyond parity in electronic systems and weapons.

The 1998 production agreement among its 4 member countries involved 620 aircraft, built with progressively improved capabilities over 3 contract “tranches”. By the end of Tranche 2, however, welfare state programs and debt burdens had made it difficult to afford the 236 fighters remaining in the 4-nation Eurofighter agreement. A 2009 compromise was found in the EUR 9 billion “Tranche 3A” buy, and the program has renewed its efforts to secure serious export sales. Their success will affect the platform’s production line in the near term, and its modernization plans beyond that.

Eurofighter: Design & Evolution Eurofighter, Spain
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The Eurofighter program emerged out of a long and conflicting set of multinational efforts to design a new European fighter. By 1983, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain had coalesced around the Future European Fighter Aircraft (FEFA) program. That partnership lasted only until 1985, as differences with France over carrier compatibility, weight limits, and French insistence on the lead industrial role, ended their partnership. Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain established Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH in 1986 to manage the Eurofighter project, while France went its own way and developed their Rafale fighter.

Both projects went on to develop clipped delta, canard-equipped twin-engine fighters, whose “radar shaping” designs significantly lowered their radar signature compared to earlier fighters like the Mirage F1, Tornado, or F/A-18A-D Hornet. Even so, it would be a misnomer to call these European jets stealth aircraft. The standard term is a “4+ generation” fighter, distinguishing them from “5th generation” aircraft like the American F-22A Raptor and Indo-Russian PAK-FA.

While the Rafale’s development emphasized weapon load and multi-role capabilities, squeezed budgets and ample fleets of strike aircraft led Eurofighter’s partner nations to focus on the air superiority role. An excellent aerodynamic design, very good thrust-to-weight ratio, and fast slew-and-point capability was fused with a very integrated set of electronic sensor and defensive systems, including a pilot-friendly cockpit design that offered the first use of voice commands in a fighter. This made Eurofighter’s Typhoon very capable in its chosen aerial role, able to compete with or best serving opponents short of the American F-22A.

Typhoons even proved capable of armed supercruise during 2011 Libyan operations, but this was only possible with low-drag “4 + 2” air-to-air missile configurations, at high altitudes, to Mach 1.2.

PIRATE IRST:
B-2, ICU
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For air-to-air combat, the Eurofighter currently relies on long range detection using its mechanically-scanned, phased array ECR-90 CAPTOR radar and PIRATE IRST(Infra-Red Search & Track) system, coupled with a good array of advanced air-to-air weapons. Non-British Eurofighters will also have a 27mm Mauser cannon on board, considered by many observers to be the best fighter cannon on the market.

On defense, the Typhoon’s Praetorian (formerly EuroDASS) self-protection suite is designed for 360 degree coverage, with high automation. The Defensive Aids Computer (DAC) controls a package that includes Towed Radar Decoys, a Missile Approach Warner (MAW), wingtip ECM pods, and a Countermeasures Dispensing System (CMDS). They are integrated with each other, and with the Eurofighter’s radar and IRST.

Unfortunately for the consortium, this aerial combat strength ended up being the flip side of their biggest weakness. Initial “Tranche 1” machines were severely hobbled on the export market by their poor ground attack capabilities, a serious weakness in a world of multi-role fighters. When combined with the plane’s $100+ million cost, the result has been a slew of lost export competitions. Dassault’s Rafale, which had gaps of its own, could not capitalize on that failing, and is still looking for its first export win. Embarrassingly, the Eurofighter has usually lost to modernized, multi-role versions of the very F-16s and F-15s it was meant to supplant. That, in turn, has affected both prices and the pace of upgrades.

A list of current weapons may help snap the plane’s evolution into clearer focus:

As the list above notes, the Tranche 2 fighters that began delivery to member countries in 2008 have added precision ground attack capabilities under programs like P1E, but still fall well short of the full capabilities and weapon arrays offered by competitors like the American F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-15E Strike Eagle. Their lack of a helmet-mounted display (HMD) compounded this issue, preventing the Typhoon from taking full advantage of its new air-to-air missiles, and detracting from their ground attack capabilities. A BAE “Striker” HMSS Helmet-Mounted Display is in low-rate production now, but it didn’t become operational until 2011.

Tranche 3 Eurofighters will reportedly be based on the Tranche 2 standard, with provisions for dorsal conformal fuel tanks (CFTs) that can extend range while creating minimal drag. The other big change involves upgraded power systems and electronics that can more easily support future growth and upgrades. The weapon bus can handle fiber optic cabling, onboard computing is upgraded, and a high speed data network improves sharing with weapons or other platforms. The most important upgrade remains a CAPTOR “E-Scan” Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar to replace the ECR-90. Industry is developing it for a 2015 delivery date, but there doesn’t seem to be a contract framework in place. The lack of an AESA radar leaves the Eurofighter a generation behind its American counterparts in radar technology, and until it catches up, it’s likely to suffer in export competitions.

F-35A Lightning II
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Even as these upgrades are being discussed, however, the Eurofighter’s export window as a leading-edge fighter choice is closing. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is aerodynamically inferior, but it offers a stealth fighter with a tested AESA radar, a wider array of sensors, and sensor fusion at an even higher level. By the end of this decade, 5th generation projects like the Russo-Indian PAK-FA will also become viable choices for some export targets.

Successful upgrades can keep the Eurofighter Typhoon competitive, even in that environment, if its production line lasts long enough. The key word will be “competitive.” As an example, see this comparison of the Eurofighter vs. Saab’s single-engine contemporary, the 4+ generation JAS-39 Gripen. Saab already has a development contract for an ES-05 Raven AESA radar, and is significantly ahead in weapons integration:

Eurofighter: What’s Next? A Weak Core Eurofighter 2020
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Tranche 3 aircraft are expected to deliver a few important new capabilities, including an AESA radar and Conformal Fuel Tanks. At present, however, only Tranche 3 Eurofighters are designed to add CFTs. The biggest question at present is whether Tranche 3A aircraft will be the only CFT-capable Typhoons. The status of core countries’ Tranche 3B orders is very unclear, but Britain and Germany have already firmly ruled out further buys, and it appears likely that Tranche 3A will be the last production order from the original member countries.

In 2011, Eurofighter’s CEO placed the end of production at 2015, barring a major export win like India or Japan, or a Tranche 3B purchase from the consortium partners. By 2014, that date had been revised to 2017/18, but 2015 still marks the point that parts of the supply chain will begin to stop.

This will leave core countries with smaller fleets, for 2 reasons. One is limited orders. The other is Typhoon fleets that won’t serve in parallel. UK Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy has said that he expects the RAF to operate on the basis of a Typhoon fleet of 120 aircraft. By the time the last jets of the 3A tranche come into service, between 2015 and 2020, the first batch of Tranche 1 Typhoons would be approaching the end of their life. This is likely to be true in other partner countries as well. A 2009 Der Spiegel article illustrates some of the issues in Germany, for instance:

“The German air force didn’t get the first jets until July 2006. It now has 38 Eurofighters. But 14 of them have been sent back for repairs. Some of them still suffer instrument failure during flights. Of the six single-seat aircraft at the Neuburg air base only four are fit for service on average. That’s just enough to provide day and night cover for Germany’s airspace. The defense ministry recently admitted to budget committee members that the approved sum of [EUR] 14.7 billion would only be enough to pay for 143 Eurofighters. Parliament would have to approve an additional [EUR] 3 billion if the air force was to get the planned 180 aircraft…”

Upgrade Lifeline? IPA7 tests KEPD-350s
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At the same time, remaining aircraft in these existing fleets offer strong opportunities for piecemeal upgrades, from moves to give Tranche 1 planes precision ground attack capabilities, to helmet-mounted sights, AESA radar retrofits, and even thrust-vectoring engines to create super-maneuverability. Conformal fuel tanks (CFTs) could also become possible, if Eurofighter devises an appropriate upgrade process. It would be logical to make that part of a life-extension structural refit, which would help existing customers keep expensive investments in service for longer. Key export order competitors like the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, F-15 Strike Eagle, F-35 Lightning II, JAS-39 Gripen, Rafale, and Russian SU-30MKx/SU-35 already field every one of these capabilities – but none currently field all of them.

Weapon upgrades are absolutely expected. Expansion of the Typhoon’s ground attack weapon choices is an ongoing process. MBDA’s medium-range stealthy Storm Shadow cruise missile is in testing for full integration by 2015, reportedly thanks to Saudi Arabia and Oman. Taurus’ similar KEPD 350 will undergo partial testing at the same time. Saudi Arabia also reportedly wants to add the French Damocles surveillance and targeting pod, which makes sense because the Israeli LITENING-III runs up against their boycott.

Storm Shadow
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In the air, 2017 is expected to mark full integration of the long-range Meteor air-to-air missile.

Over the medium term, planned weapons reportedly include Diehl’s medium-range PILUM and HOSBO glide bombs, short-range MBDA Brimstone light strike missiles, and possibly their longer-range SPEAR-3 successors. Raytheon’s AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles have been discussed, and they would fix a critical deficiency for an important mission. So, too, would anti-ship missiles, which all of its competitors already carry. None of these items come with a schedule, however.

National budgets will play a role in the pace of these upgrades, as they have throughout the Eurofighter’s history. The question, for current and future customers, is timing. Until integration is done, the absence of key capabilities like long-range precision strike and anti-radar missiles will continue to hobble the Typhoon’s positioning as a fully multi-role aircraft.

What has changed now is the consortium’s seriousness about winning exports, along with a dawning understanding that most of these upgrades are now basic requirements for serious players. The question is whether this understanding came too late.

Exports Required Eurofighter Display
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Export wins will be necessary in order to finance the full range of timely improvements, and keep the line open past 2017/18. An August 30/09 Financial Mail article reported that Eurofighter GmbH was hoping for sales of 300 Eurofighter Typhoon to 10 export countries by 2020, but that will be very challenging.

The Eurofighter’s cost of $100-140 million each is already creating tough sledding against F-35 stealth fighters whose production quantities will eventually create prices in the $100 million range, and F/A-18 Super Hornets or JAS-39E/F Gripens that can be sold for around $60-70 million. With existing operators interested in selling some of their aircraft, even an export win or 2 may not change the Eurofighter’s overall production numbers.

The Tranche 3A release from Eurofighter cited active export campaigns in Switzerland, India, Japan, Romania, Greece, and Turkey, while “exploring possible opportunities” in South Korea, Bulgaria, Croatia, et. al. Romania (F-16s) and Turkey (F-35A) never went ahead with a real competition. Subsequent losses in Brazil (JAS-39E/F Gripen), India (Rafale, unfinalized), Japan (F-35A), South Korea (F-35A), Switzerland (JAS-39E Gripen, canceled by referendum), and the UAE (TBD, q.v. Dec 19/13 entry) have hurt.

Greece, which canceled an order for 30-60 Eurofighters in 2005, and bought F-16s instead, still had plans for an additional next-generation fighter buy to counter Turkey’s planned purchase of 100 F-35As. With Greek finances in tatters, however, don’t hold your breath.

After that, Eurofighter’s options narrow sharply. On the bright side, the Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar all have fighter competitions in progress, and successful sales to Saudi Arabia and Oman help the Typhoon’s chances within the Gulf Cooperation Council.

With Japan and South Korea out, the once-promising Asian market has few options left for Eurofighter. A MiG-29N replacement competition in Malaysia has run into trouble due to finances, and they are exploring leasing deals. That will be a tough win for Eurofighter. In Europe, Eastern European countries like Bulgaria and Croatia would normally be problematic sales due to the Eurofighter’s costs, but Germany is pushing hard, and offering umbrella maintenance agreements and training packages. Even if they succeed, however, the end result is just a handful of sales.

Typhoon at Sea? Naval variant, cutaway
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India was pitched with very explicit offers to have their needs and investments drive the Typhoon’s future enhancements, and significant roles for Indian industry. At Aero India 2011, Eurofighter and BAE even unveiled an initial internally-funded design for a navalized Eurofighter than can operate from aircraft carriers. In a direct nod to potential Indian sales, they touted the plane as being able to take off from “ski jump” carriers without catapults – a design that describes all of India’s current and planned carriers, as well as the initial design for Britain’s own Queen Elizabeth Class. Eurofighter GmbH describes the goal as 95% commonality with land-based aircraft, and required changes as “limited… include a new, stronger landing gear, a modified arrestor hook and localised strengthening on some fuselage sections near the landing gear, as well as updates the EJ200 engines,” which could include thrust-vectoring as well as structural reinforcement.

It didn’t help. India picked the French Rafale, which already has a carrier-capable version, as their future M-MRCA medium fighter. The Indian Navy is currently flying MiG-29Ks as its naval fighters, and plans to add Indian-designed LCA Naval light jets.

Britain could have been a long-shot backup option, but they’re planning to use the F-35B from future carriers, which won’t be fitted with steam catapults and arrester wires after all.

Brazil might have been a future option, on the assumption that they will replace their aircraft carrier at some point. Unfortunately for Eurofighter, Brazil picked Saab’s JAS-39E/F Gripen as their future air force fighter, and Saab also has plans for a naval variant.

That leaves a carrier-capable Eurofighter variant without a plausible future customer.

Eurofighter: Industrial Structure & Orders IPA7 over Manching
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Technically, the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) is the customer for the Eurofighter project. Eurofighter GmbH is the contractor, with joint ownership by all of the key industrial partners: BAE Systems, EADS, and Finmeccanica. Overall, Eurofighter GmbH cites a total of 100,000 supported jobs in 400 companies across Europe.

Aircraft production work shares were designed to correspond to the number of aircraft ordered under the 1998 Umbrella Contract:

• 37.5% UK (232). BAE Systems: Front fuselage including foreplanes, canopy, dorsal spine, tail fin, inboard flaperons, rear fuselage section.

• 30.0% Germany (180) EADS Deutschland: Main center fuselage. Airbus spinout Premium AEROTEC is the main sub-contractor.

• 19.5% Italy (121). Alenia Aeronautica: Left wing, outboard flaperons, rear fuselage sections

• 13.0% Spain (87). EADS CASA: Right wing, leading edge slats

The Eurofighter’s 2 EJ200 turbofans deliver 20,000 pounds thrust each in reheat mode, and are manufactured by the EUROJET partnership of Avio (Italy), ITP (Spain), MTU Aero Engines (Germany) and Rolls-Royce (UK).

The Euroradar consortium supplies the ECR-90 CAPTOR radar, and is developing the “E-Scan” AESA successor for introduction by 2015. It is led by Finmeccanica subsidiary SELEX Sensors and Airborne Systems in Edinburgh, UK (formerly BAE Systems Avionics), and also includes EADS and Spain’s Indra.

The Eurofighter contract was designed to protect the fairness of each participants’ agreed manufacturing work shares, by making it very expensive to back out of committed orders. On the other hand, European defense spending continues to decline due to pressure from welfare state commitments and debt burdens, even as European military operational deployments and their costs have increased. Hence the fractious contract negotiations around Tranche 3, and also the investigation of foreign sell-offs by the member countries.

In June 2009, the partners took a diplomatic way out, splitting Tranche 3 into 2 parts. At the end of July 2009, the 4 partner nations placed a EUR 9 billion Tranche 3A order, which will keep production going for several more years. The table below summarizes the Eurofighter’s evolving production plans, from the original 1985 plan to the 1998 agreement, and then planned and actual orders for each production tranche.

Note that 24 of Britain’s Tranche 2 aircraft have been diverted to Saudi Arabia, in order to satisfy Saudi demands for early delivery. In response, Britain ordered 24 more Tranche 3 aircraft as replacements. In practice, this means that Britain has ordered only 16 of its originally planned 88 Tranche 3 Eurofighters – and high-level statements indicate that Tranche 3A agreement absolves Britain of the need to place any further Eurofighter orders. Other reports explain the gap by claiming that the other 48 British Tranche 3 aircraft will go to Saudi Arabia, meaning that all of Saudi Arabia’s 72 planes will have been siphoned off from British orders.

Maintenance contracts to keep the fleets in service involve a small core of multi-national contracts for key systems and general service, followed by a number of national umbrella contracts to address other areas, and then a set of national maintenance agreements that are less comprehensive. See the chart below for tracking of the main support contracts currently underway:

Contracts & Key Events New dawn, or twilight?
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DID coverage focuses on purchases related to consortium aircraft buys under Tranche 3, platform improvement efforts, international opportunities, and sales. See the “Additional Readings” section for coverage of the comprehensive support contracts for the various countries, and of the Saudi and Austrian export deals.

2014 – 2016

Germany confirms no Tranche 3B, but how much will they have to pay?; German maintenance costs an issue; Eurofighter needs new orders, soon. with Brimstones

February 3/16: Last weekend’s expected signing of a deal for Kuwait to purchase twenty-eight Eurofighter jets has been put off. Italian Ministry of Defense officials cited “procedural” delays on Kuwait’s behalf, and that no clear date had been set. It had been expected that the deal would close quickly after some initial delays over pilot training had pushed an agreement into 2016. News of the deal came as Kuwait’s initial plan to purchase F-18 Super Hornets from Boeing was scrapped after their frustration over congressional delays in gaining approval for the sale. The loss of the sale to the Eurofighter has put into question the security of some jobs at Boeing’s St. Louis plant. The plant specializes in the manufacture of the Super Hornet, and were set to start production of the $3 billion deal before the change.

January 28/16: After delays in gaining approval from the US to buy new F-18 Super Hornets, Kuwait instead looks set to sign contracts for twenty-eight Eurofighter Typhoon jets to replace their older F-18s. An official in the Italian Ministry of Defense said minister Roberta Pinotti would visit Kuwait on Sunday to sign papers finalizing the deal estimated to be worth $8.7 billion. Talks had been ongoing since November with issues over pilot training delaying the deal, but should be completed within eighteen months. The switch in allegiance will no doubt annoy manufacturer Boeing, and may see renewed frustrations over the lengthy congressional approval process for foreign military sales.

December 14/15: Kuwait’s purchase of 28 Eurofighter jets from Finmeccanica is set to experience further delays, as contracts may not be signed until 2016. The CEO of Finmeccanica expressed concerns last week, saying that he did not expect a sale to be agreed upon before December 25. The $9 billion purchase has been delayed repeatedly since a memorandum of agreement was signed in September. Reasons for the delay have apparently arisen due to disagreements over pilot training and the dispatching of specialized personnel. On December 1, the Kuwaiti government requested parliament to release a supplementary budget of $20.4 billion to fund military weapon purchases over the next ten years.

November 30/15: A $9 billion Eurofighter sale to Kuwait has been delayed. Italian defense company Finmeccanica announced that problems with pilot training and the dispatching of specialized personnel has resulted in the deal being postponed until mid-December. An initial memorandum of agreement for 28 fighters was signed in September and it was hoped contracts would have been signed by November. Kuwait is one of several Gulf nations currently driving to acquire high-tech aircraft and weaponry to protect themselves from neighbouring Iran as well as internal threats in the region.

November 13/15: BAE Systems is slowing Eurofighter production in order to sustain production lines out past 2018, in addition to cutting jobs on the fighter’s UK production line. The decision reflects the company’s orderbook, covering production orders which conclude in 2018 and an expected uptick in production as a result of an order for 28 Eurofighters by Kuwait, following an agreement between the Italian and Kuwaiti governments earlier this year; however a finalized deal has yet to materialize.

October 19/15: In further bad news for the German Eurofighter program, a malfunction with the aircraft’s external fuel tank grounded [German] the fleet from flying with the additional fuel pod attached, reducing the ability of the fighters to operate at longer distances. One of the German contingent of Eurofighters deployed to the Baltic region saw one of its fuel tanks fall off last week, leading to the grounding. This follows news earlier this week that the German government has temporarily suspended deliveries of new Eurofighters, citing manufacturing defects. German press also reports [German] that the EUR1 billion ($1.27 billion) contract to develop the CAPTOR-E radar system for the fighter, signed in November 2014, is now delayed by five months, as well as being above budget.

October 14/15: Germany’s Defence Ministry has halted deliveries of Eurofighter Typhoon fighters following the discovery of a technical fault with the Airbus-manufactured jets. The technical problem is thought centered around the connection between the aircraft’s vertical stabiliser and the fuselage. This is the second time quality control measures for the European fighter have caused problems, with manufacturing defects in September 2014 [German] also leading to a suspension of deliveries. In both cases BAE Systems was the consortium member responsible for manufacture of the defective parts; however this latest problem is not thought to pose any immediate flight safety issues for operators of the aircraft.

September 14/15: Kuwait is buying 28 Eurofighters through the Italian government, following an order for a dozen of the aircraft in December 2012. The order is the first in three years for the multinational Eurofighter, with the Eurofighter consortium’s partner company Alenia Aermacchi reportedly having led the marketing campaign in the Gulf state. Oman similarly ordered twelve of the multi-role fighters in December 2012, with the aircraft already in operation with six national air forces.

Dec 12/14: Weapons. BAE announces that the 1st Brimstone trial onto a Typhoon was completed, following a June 19/14 award to study integration between the missile and the aircraft. The firm says that “6 Brimstone missiles were fitted to the aircraft, each wing carrying a launcher with three missiles. Training missiles were used for the purposes of the trial and demonstrated that the weapon can be fitted to the aircraft.” Of course that’s not the toughest part in such an endeavor, and full integration is not expected before 2018.

November 2014: Weapons. The 1st release of a Storm Shadow cruise missile was performed successfully by the Italian IPA2 test aircraft, following initial tests in August. Now that inert drop tests and store release trials were performed, Phase 3 will involve environmental data gathering, followed by additional flights to assess handling qualities.

BAE Systems was also able to test the installation of a Storm Shadow onto a RAF Typhoon. Source: Eurofighter.

Captor-E concept
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Nov 19/14: Sensors. NATO’s Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) finally signs a EUR 1 billion/ GBP 800 million / $1.273 billion contract with Eurofighter Jadgflugzeug GmbH to finish and integrate Euroradar’s Captor E-Scan movable AESA radar (q.v. March 22/12, July 30/12, Nov 15/13, Oct 17/14), whose absence is currently a big disadvantage compared to every other top-tier fighter on the market. This deal was supposed to be done by the end of 2012, and the delay has been costly, but better late than never.

Captor-E is touted as having an unspecified “very large” antenna size that’s expected to be comparable to F-15s (APG-82v1) and F-22As (APG-77). That means more raw power for performance, and more T/R modules available for specialized functions; though materials, build quality, and the number of the T/R modules will all modify final performance statistics. Instead of using a fixed mounting like American fighters and the French Rafale, Eurofighter’s Captor-E will be mounted on a movable plate for an extremely Wide Field of Regard (WFoR). The current contract release appears to have expanded the touted FoR from about 120 to 200 degrees, thanks to the combination of mechanical movement and electronic beam steering. Eurofighter sees that capability as very useful for fire-and-evade dogfighting maneuvers that use the Eurofighter’s speed and maneuverability to their fullest, without breaking the launching fighter’s radar lock. The tradeoff is paid in poorer reliability and higher maintenance costs, compared to a fixed AESA array.

The contract value for Finmeccanica alone will be EUR 400 million, as the leader of the Euroradar consortium. Finmeccanica-Selex ES will produce the new radar at its facilities in Edinburgh, UK and Nerviano (Milan), Italy while Finmeccanica-Alenia Aermacchi’s Turin, Italy site will be responsible for the navigation systems during the integration phase. Airbus DS in Germany, and Spain’s Indra, round out the consortium. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, “Eurofighter And NETMA Sign One Billion Euro Radar Contract” | UK MoD, “€1 billion contract to develop cutting-edge radar for Typhoon” | Airbus Group, “New radar ensures superiority of the Eurofighter” | Finmeccanica Selex ES, “€1 billion contract signed between the Eurofighter consortium and the inter-governmental agency NETMA” | Defense News, “Action Pending on AESA Radar for Typhoon”.

CAPTOR-E AESA Radar

Flying low…
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Oct 17/14: P1E. BAE Systems announces that deliveries of Eurofighter Typhoon Phase 1 Enhancement upgrades have created 17 P1Eb standard aircraft in service with the RAF. A further 18 are to be delivered by April 1/15, under a EUR 1.2 billion program that will eventually convert all 67 Tranche 2 Typhoons in RAF service; BAE offers a useful summary of key features.

Now that the UK has completed testing and undertaken initial fielding, the upgrade package will also become a proven installation option for other Eurofighter Tranche 2 customers, beginning in 2015. Meanwhile, future P2E and P3E upgrades are being planned, but the biggest wild card and competitive disadvantage remains:

“Eurofighter is still waiting for the partner nations to sign a production contract for the introduction of the Captor-E [AESA radar]…. A program source confirmed that the signing of the deal had slipped to the end of 2014, and “the staffing process within some partner nations is taking more time than originally planned.” “Germany is still sorting out some details,” a second source said.”

Sources: BAE Systems, “Royal Air force now flying their most advanced fighter jets ever” | Defense News, “British RAF Now Flying Improved Typhoon Aircraft”.

Sept 30/14: Defects. Germany suspends their remaining 32 Eurofighter deliveries, pending resolution of a manufacturing defect and negotiations re: what to do about it. They also sharply cut the estimated number of safe flying hours in each of their 108 delivered Eurofighters to just 1,500, and Austria and Britain are apparently taking similar measures. The timing is terrible, coming on the heels of revelations that budget cuts have forced the German armed forces into deep disrepair, with most of its key equipment unready for war.

BAE Systems and Britain’s RAF reportedly discovered that some of the rivet holes in the rear fuselage of the jet were drilled in ways that could introduce splinters and cracks into the rear fuselage, giving it less ability to resist wear and tear. That section is built by BAE, and tests are underway to get a more precise estimate of the effect on the fighter’s safe lifespan.

Meanwhile, the problem isn’t an immediate safety issue, and the Luftwaffe won’t hit even this low hours limit until 2018, so the planes aren’t grounded. Exports to Oman and Saudi Arabia are expected to continue.

Note that 1,500 flight hours is a ridiculously short life span, even for fighter jets whose forecasts in a capable military amount to just 150-300 hours per plane per year. Base figures of 5,000 – 8,000 are expected, with deep repair and refurbishment extending some airframes to around 10,000. The original official limit of 3,000 hours was itself just half of the Eurofighter Typhoon’s 6,000 hour design life, with the expectation that hard flight data would extend the official limit as experience offered greater certainty. It’s a very German approach, but the introduction of a big uncertainty is pushing estimates the other way for now. Sources: German Bundeswehr, “Eurofighter: Flugbetrieb der Luftwaffe aktuell nicht von industrieller Flugstundenreduzierung betroffen” | Der Spiegel, “Desolate Bundeswehr-Ausrustung: Hersteller warnt vor Mangeln am “Eurofighter” | Defense-Aerospace, “Eurofighter: Air Force Flight Operations Currently Not Affected By Flight Hours Reduction” | Agence France Presse, “Germany ‘erring on side of safety’ regarding Eurofighter defect” | Reuters, “UPDATE 2-Manufacturing flaw halts some Eurofighter deliveries” | Reuters, “Austria says Eurofighter has part problem” | SwissInfo, “Austria says Eurofighter has part problem, some deliveries halted” | Russia Today, “Eurofighter hull hitch: Germany halves fighter flying hours” || Der Spiegel, “Marodes Material: Bundeswehr erfullt Nato-Anforderungen derzeit nicht” (re: massive disrepair in armed forces) | Deutsche Welle, “Bundeswehr struggles with faulty defense equipment”.

Manufacturing defect could shrink fighter lifespan

Aug 5/14: Weapons. Italy’s Alenia Aermacchi has confirmed that the 1st phase of tests for Storm Shadow long-range cruise missile integration (q.v. July 26/13, Nov 20/13) is complete.

They add that the fighter will be able to carry 2 Storm Shadows and up to 8 air-to-air missiles. That’s a good load for fighting your way in and out, which is useful to customers like Saudi Arabia and Oman who are paying for the work. The ability to add drop-tanks would be another valuable load-out, extending the Storm Shadow’s reach. Countries like Britain would find that exceedingly useful, but weight and aerodynamics make this combination a more challenging load-out. Perhaps Tranche 3 upgrades and Conformal Fuel Tanks (q.v. May 13/14) can offer this capability in a more elegant way. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, “Success For Italian Eurofighter Storm Shadow Trials”.

July 16/14: HMD. BAE unveils its Striker II Helmet-Mounted Display (HMD), which builds on the original Striker system flying with Eurofighter and Gripen fleets.

The new system removes the need for night vision goggles, integrating a center-mounted ISIE-11 sensor based on Intevac Photonics’ patented electron bombarded active pixel sensor (EBAPS) advanced imaging sensor technology. The result is brighter and lighter than standard HMD/NVG combinations. the system is fully digital, and new hybrid opto-inertial technology is designed to reduce jitter and other syncing issues as the HMD tries to stay aligned with the pilot’s head movement and display its symbology. Sources: BAE Systems, “BAE Systems Unveils Digital Striker II Helmet-Mounted Display System with Superior Tracking, Night Vision Capabilities”.

June 19/14: Weapons. BAE announces an initial GBP 5 million study contract from the British Ministry of Defence, to conduct initial integration studies for the dual-mode radar/laser guided Brimstone 2 short-range light strike missile. Brimstone is already operational on Britain’s Tornado GR4 strike fighters, and this is an expected development that will improve the Typhoon’s capabilities for close air support against land targets and swarming motorboats.

Initial wind tunnel tests are already underway at Warton, Lancashire, and the study also intends to explore a common launcher for future derivatives like the 75+ km SPEAR 3 light strike missile. The target date for Brimstone 2 integration is 2018. Sources: BAE, “UK Study Contract Awarded to integrate Brimstone 2 onto Typhoon”.

June 10/14: Crash. A Spanish Eurofighter Typhoon crashed just before landing at Moron de la Frontera AB, killing the pilot. The pilot was an experienced flyer with 600 flight hours in the type, and the cause is under investigation.

It’s the first Spanish Air Force plane to go down, though a consortium prototype and a Saudi Eurofighter have crashed in Spain within the last decade. Sources: The Local – Spain, “Eurofighter jet exploded shortly after 2pm shortly after take-off for a routine practice mission” | Reuters, “UPDATE 2-Eurofighter jet crashes at Spanish base, killing pilot” | UK Daily Mail, “Eurofighter jet crashes just short of southern Spain airbase runway killing pilot”.

Spanish crash

June 9/14: Weapons. The Eurofighter’s weak weapons array has come back to bite it again, this time in Malaysia and Qatar. In “response” to this demand for “maritime attack capabilities,” which all of its competitors already possess in full:

“Peter Maute, the head of combat aircraft sales at Airbus Defence, said the Boeing Harpoon and MBDA’s Marte and Sea Brimstone missiles were being considered as possibilities…. work on the weapons was done by Eurofighter in its development simulator but that full integration would have to await a customer. Qatar and Malaysia are known to have stipulated a maritime-strike capability for their next purchase of combat jets.”

One hears “discussion,” study” and “plan” a lot, with respect to key Typhoon capabilities. In a competitive market, that doesn’t substitute for action. If you await a customer, you’ll be watching them buy something else: F-16s with Penguin Mk3s, F-15s with SLAM-ERs, JAS-39 Gripens with RBS-15s, Rafales with Exocets, Russian jets with Kh-31/ Kh-35s, or Super Hornets with Harpoon and SLAM-ER anti-ship and land strike missiles. It’s also doubtful that most customers would consider the short-range Brimstone missiles to be a “maritime attack capability,” unless one confines potential targets to small boats. Sources: Defense News, “Eurofighter Studying Missiles To Give Typhoon Maritime Attack Capability”.

May 21/14: P1Eb. Eurofighter GmbH formally unveils the Phase 1 Enhancements B package in Berlin at the ILA 2014 airshow. It’s essentially the EP2 capabilities (q.v. Oct 30/13) of enhancements to the existing radar for Meteor missile compatibility, DASS defensive system improvements, MIDS/Link-16 interoperability updates, as well as Flight Control System (FCS) and the Utility Control System (UCS) improvements. Plus Storm Shadow cruise missiles, which weren’t announced in EP2 because payments are coming from outside the core group. Storm Shadows should be integrated by 2015, but full Meteor long-range air-to-air missile integration isn’t scheduled until 2017.

The FCS/UCS upgrades will inprove compatibility with future civil airspace requirements, and also allow the pilot to switch seamlessly between air-to-air and air-to-ground modes.

Overall, there’s less here than meets the eye. The Eurofighter’s aerial performance is very good, and they have a reputation for implementing very good pilot interfaces. With the exception of Meteor, however, comparable or better capabilities are already fielded in competitive aircraft like the F-15. This is more of a partial catch-up than a paradigm shift in anything. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, “Eurofighter Unveils ‘Paradigm Shift’ In Capability At Berlin Air Show”.

May 13/14: CFTs. BAE Systems has begun wind tunnel tests for conformal fuel tank designs, based on a “geometrically perfect 1/12th scale model” of the Tranche 3. The CFTs are created using additive manufacturing, then attached and removed for the tests.

CFTs are one of the big changes inherent in the Tranche 3 aircraft, which will form a small portion of the core partners’ Typhoon fleets. Removing drag-creating fuel tanks from underwing hardpoints is a big plus, but a great deal depends on good design. Boeing and Northrop Grumman managed to craft CFTs that added 3,500 pounds of fuel to the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, while creating nearly zero drag at sub-sonic speeds. Even those CFTs impose a trans-sonic penalty, which will be an issue for Super Hornets, but the Eurofighter has such a good power to weight ratio that a minor trans-sonic penalty won’t matter. Sources: BAE, “British Engineers test new configuration of fighter jets in high speed wind tunnel”.

April 30/14: Germany – Costs. Germany’s Bundesrechnunghof (Federal Court of Auditors) publishes a supplementary annex to its 2013 report, and the Eurofighter is one of their subjects. The press release goes over known ground by saying that the EUR 11.5 billion budget will buy just 140 planes, instead of 180. What’s new is an acknowledgement that Eurofighter maintenance costs continue to increase, driven by added need for support and spares, and that life-cycle costs are expected to be roughly double the 1997 estimate of EUR 30 billion.

2011 and 2012 reportedly had the Eurofighter fleet consuming about 1/3 of the air force’s maintenance budgets, even though the fleet was smaller than planned and didn’t reach its maximum flight hours. By 2020, the fleet is expected to rise from 86 to 140, and flight hours would roughly triple to 28,400 per year. A comparative graph in the full report shows the rising operating & maintenance costs from the F-4F Phantom, to the Tornado fleet, to the Eurofighter fleet. The United States has seen similar trends as it fielded each new generation of fighters, but the Tornado is known to be a maintenance problem, and the Eurofighter still graphs significantly above it.

The Bundesrechnunghof adds that even Germany’s Ministry of Defence doesn’t seem to know the full cost, and explains the Ministry’s rationalizations for not knowing. Other countries seem to manage such things, somehow. Perhaps the Germans could visit those countries and find out. Sources: German FCA, 2014 Pressemitteilung 04 – Bemerkungen 2013, weitere Prüfungsergebnisse [Press release] | “2013 Bemerkungen – Weitere Prufungsergebnisse – Nr. 09 “Kostentransparenz beim EUROFIGHTER herstellen” [Eurofighter summary, incl. link to full report] | Langfassung der Bemerkung Nr. 09 [Full report, PDF].

German costs

Feb 27/14: Pessimism, or Realism? Airbus CEO Tom Enders doesn’t sound very sunny about Eurofighter’s future:

“Enders said he’s also “not very optimistic” about securing further deals for the Eurofighter combat jet…. “We do hope we can still score one or two other successes in exports,” he said. “But we also have to prepare for a scenario — due to lack of export orders plus cancellations from others — that we’ll have to ramp down production of this otherwise very impressive aircraft sooner rather than later.”

Sooner would be an end of production in 2017, which means that preparations within the supply chain would begin sometime in 2015. Sources: Bloomberg BusinessWeek, “Airbus CEO Says Turkish Delay in Taking A400M Threatens Ramp-Up”.

Feb 25/14: Germany. The Handelsblatt business daily says that Airbus is demanding EUR 800 – 900 million in compensation for Germany’s Tranche 3B cancellation. Britain finessed its absence from Tranche 3B by substituting Saudi jets, which were bought under a direct government-to-government deal with Britain, but the other partners aren’t able to do that.

That’s a steep price. Negotiations are expected, but even if Germany ends up paying in full per their original contract, it will still be a small percentage of what they would have paid to buy 37 new Typhoons. Obvious options involve some shifting of payments into R&D or upgrade work, or a refundable “export loan” whose repayment depends on reaching a certain number of fighter exports.

The larger question for Eurofighter GmbH is whether financially fragile Italy and Spain take the same approach as Germany, or stand by their Tranche 3B orders. Sources: Sky News Australia, “Airbus ‘wants money’ for scrapped jets” | Frankfurter Allgemeine Wirtschaft, “Airbus will Entschadigung fur abbestellte Eurofighter”.

Feb 20/14: Germany. German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen removes 2 senior procurement officials: Stephane Beemelmans and Detlef Selhausen. Part of the issue involves Eurofighters, specifically, a EUR 55 million euro (~$75 million) settlement to Germany’s MTU in lieu of EUR 340 million for Eurofighter Tranche 3B engine work. Not bad, but Bundestag budget committee approval is required for contracts over EUR 25 million, and the payment was authorized without that. Relationships with these individuals were already tense, so that was the end of the road. Sources: Defense News, “Germany Plans Procurement Overhaul After Program Missteps” | Der Spiegel, “Rustungsprojekt “Eurofighter”: Verteidigungsministerium gab Millionensumme ohne Bundestagsvotum frei” | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Wie von der Leyen aufräumen will”.

Feb 19/14: Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia finalizes their contract for 72 fighters, agreeing on price escalation terms to upgrade the fighters bought under the Salaam program toward Tranche 3 standard (q.v. Feb 21/13, Aug 1/13, Dec 19/13). BAE was very involved in the process, but because the underlying agreement is actually with the British government, the amendment must also be negotiated between the governments involved.

BAE had continued Eurofighter deliveries during the long negotiations, which meant rising amounts of cash committed without booking any profits. Clearing this issue up frees BAE to deploy its cash reserves more freely, while also removing a source of uncertainty for potential Gulf Cooperation Council customers.

The firm describes the settlement as “broadly consistent with the Group’s prior trading outlook for 2013.” That outlook (q.v. Dec 19/13) estimated a 6-7 pence earnings per share drop without any agreement, or about GBP 250 million (~ $410 million) maximum, based on total shares revealed in a recent transaction. That’s on top of the original GBP 4.43 billion pounds/ $7.4 billion. Sources: BAE Systems, “Agreement on Salam Price Escalation” and “Feb 20/14 Transaction in Own Shares” | Reuters, “UPDATE 2-BAE Systems agrees pricing on Saudi Eurofighter deal”.

Saudi finalization

Feb 19/14: Germany. News reports are describing a German decision to cancel 37 Eurofighters, based on Deputy Defense Minister Stephane Beemelmans’ testimony before their the parliamentary defense committee. That isn’t quite true.

What it means is that Germany doesn’t intend to pay for a Tranche 3B, which would have included 37 fighters to finish their agreed purchases. A Tranche 3B offer was reportedly extended to the core countries by Eurofighter on June 9/10, but Europe’s financial woes have left the core partners uninterested. Indeed, Germany ended their plans for a Tranche 3B order back in 2011 (q.v. Oct 21/11). 2014 was supposed to be a year of decision for the core countries, but with Germany and Britain on the sidelines, Spain or Italy become that much more difficult to convince.

The wording of the July 31/09 Tranche 3A agreement, and of the broader Eurofighter partnership agreements, determine how much the decision costs Germany in cancellation fees. Britain found a way to disclaim any Tranche 3B buy the moment the Tranche 3A contract was signed, but they appear to have done so by shifting Saudi exports under their own account, which avoids any penalties.

Unless Eurofighter GmbH finds additional orders somewhere, the production line will begin shifting toward upgrades and maintenance only in 2015 (q.v. Jan 25/11). Sources: Reuters, “Germany cancels delivery of last 37 Eurofighter jets: source” | Handelsblatt, “Deutschland bestellt 37 Eurofighter wieder ab”.

Feb 9/14: Italy. The center-left Democratic Party is reportedly preparing a policy document that would cut F-35 buys from the current reduced plan for 90 F-35A/Bs to around 45 planes, while trying to make Italy invest in Eurofighter’s Tranche 3B buy.

Significant reductions in planned buys by Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, etc. will all hit Italy’s own F-35 Final Assembly and Check-Out plant. Part of the party’s push despite this incentive is ideological, reflecting a bias that’s in favor of European defense programs and less friendly toward the USA. Part of it reflects a level of general uneasiness with F-35 costs, capabilities, and delivery dates. Sources: Defense News, “Italian Lawmakers Consider New Cuts to JSF Purchase”.

Jan 15/14: Testing. Test flights with the KEPD 350 cruise missile begin from at Manching Military Air Systems Center, north of Munich. They’re technically part of the Storm Shadow integration program, thought the KPED 350 won’t be fully integrated, and will include flutter tests, air data system large store interference assessment and aerodynamic data gathering. Sources: Eurofighter, “Eurofighter Typhoon: Flight tests with Taurus KEPD 350 missile started”.

2013

Saudis abandon local assembly; Competitions in Denmark, South Korea; Problems in Germany?; Testing begins for Storm Shadow & KEPD 350 missiles; Tranche 3 flies; 400th delivered; New CEO has a big job ahead. Saudi Eurofighters
(click to view full)

Dec 19/13: Low Rents of Arabia. A BAE investors release suggests that the UAE “have advised that they have elected not to proceed with [Eurofighter] proposals at this time,” and adds that negotiations with the Saudis over Tranche 3 upgrades to their Al-Yamamah buy of 72 planes may be deadlocked.

The UAE’s decision is a very big blow to the Eurofighter’s future in the Gulf. A UAE buy offered the prospect of sustaining production for several years beyond 2018 by making Eurofighter the GCC’s de facto standard fighter, just as key competitions in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar were coming up. If the UAE goes back to the Rafale instead, their fellow Mirage 2000 operator Qatar becomes a much harder target for Eurofighter, and the standardization momentum that was bringing unlikely customers like Bahrain to the table evaporates.

The British government tried to use diplomacy on Eurofighter’s behalf, but they may have done more damage than good. None of the Gulf Cooperation Council were pleased with Britain’s failure to support the Syrian rebels. They were even less pleased when Britain’s government pushed hard for an Iranian nuclear deal that most of them regard as both catastrophically stupid and directly threatening. In contrast, France has played a leading role in pushing the Syrian issue, and was a very public dissenter regarding the Iranian deal. Sources: BAE, “BAE Systems – Status of prospective business in the UAE and Salam pricing discussions” | The Telegraph, “Blow for Britain and BAE Systems as UAE rules out Eurofighter deal” | The Telegraph, “David Cameron’s Typhoon debacle a sign of Britain’s declining Arabian influence”.

UAE loss

Dec 9/13: Tranche 3. British Single Seat aircraft #116 conducts the 1st Eurofighter Tranche 3 flight, with pilot Nat Makepeace at the controls. The biggest differences from earlier versions include a structure that can mount dorsal conformal fuel tanks; and a modified nose with a new internal structure, power, cooling and electronics for the future E-Scan AESA radar.

Another development aircraft has been modified to take an E-Scan development radar for testing purposes. It’s currently being prepared at Warton, UK, ahead of its coming 1st flight. Eurofighter GmbH, “Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3 Takes to the Skies” | BAE Systems, “Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3 Takes to the Skies”.

1st Tranche 3 flight

Dec 4/13: #400. The 400th Eurofighter Typhoon has been delivered. The single-seat fighter in question was handed over to the German Air Force at Cassidian’s Military Air Systems Center, located in Manching, Southern Germany. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, “Eurofighter Typhoon Marks Delivery of 400th Aircraft”.

#400

Nov 27/13: Testing. Flight tests of the Storm Shadow missile (q.v. Nov 20/13) begin from Alenia Aermacchi’s Flight Test Centre at Decimomannu Air Base, in Sardinia, Italy. Sources: Eurofighter, “Eurofighter Typhoon: Flight tests with Storm Shadow missile started”.

Nov 22/13: Industrial. BAE and Finmeccanica’s Selex ES announce a teaming agreement to provide Electronic Warfare Operational Support (EWOS) for future Eurofighter Typhoon customers, “and the Eurofighter Typhoon core programme where appropriate.”

Electronic warfare is often a pretty “black box”, as-is affair, but its importance makes it something that customers want to be able to modify for local threats and local needs. Technology has made that ideal easier, as software-defined digital systems are fielded. The flip side is that full export customer access to key items like threat libraries and operational modes creates a greater attack surface area for the core countries’ enemies to steal secrets. Under this agreement, the partners pledge to provide willing customers with a “sovereign” EWOS capability. That word is usually associated with full ability to maintain and modify a system, but absent further details, use of the word alone isn’t something to rely on.

Selex ES SVP Electronic Warfare, Chris Bushell, adds that the partners have “agreed to also look at non-Typhoon EW support solutions where there is mutual benefit to doing so.” Sources: BAE, “Boosting Eurofighter Typhoon Electronic Warfare Support”.

Nov 20/13: Weapons. At the Dubai Air Show, Eurofighter GmbH commits to full integration of the stealthy, medium range GPS/IIR guided Storm Shadow cruise missile by 2015. Storm Shadows are already used by Eurofighter customers in Britain, Italy, and Saudi Arabia (q.v. July 26/13). Ground tests are complete, and flight tests will begin using the IPA2 test aircraft upgraded to the P1E equipment standard.

The similar KEPD 350 missile in service with Germany and Spain won’t be fully qualified, but it will be flight tested at the same time on the IPA7 test aircraft. That will cut time and costs if a customer decides to spend the money and pay for full integration. Sources: Eurofighter, “Flight tests for Storm Shadow and Taurus stand-off precision missiles announced”.

Nov 15/13: CAPTOR-E AESA. The Eurofighter’s new AESA radar has finished its 4-nation program review at Cassidian’s site in Ulm, Germany, with antenna, repositioner, and Antenna Power Supply and Control Unit results that meet the theoretical design.

Next, the antenna sub-system will go to Selex Edinburgh for integration and test with receiver and processor. Final integration of the Captor-E radar into Eurofighter test plane IPA5 is planned in springtime 2014. Source: EADS Cassidian, Nov 15/13 release.

Nov 12/13: Bahrain. Flight International quotes Col. Salah Al-Mansoor from the Royal Bahraini Air Force’s planning headquarters, who says that Bahrain will be upgrading its 21-plane F-16 fleet to roughly F-16V status from 2014-2018, under a deal whose initial outline is already agreed with Lockheed Martin. Bahrain would represent the 3rd such F-16 upgrade, after Taiwan and South Korea. Major upgrades under the Common Capability Integration Program will reportedly include an AESA radar (NGC APG-80 or SABR, or Raytheon RACR), new cockpit displays, the Link-16/MIDS datalink, software upgrades, and Lockheed’s AN/AAQ-33 Sniper surveillance and targeting pod. Al-Mansoor also mentions GPS-guided JDAMs, an upgrade to AIM-9X short range air-to-air missiles, and “the D-model version of Raytheon’s AIM-120 AMRAAM”. That last is unlikely; the AIM-120D isn’t approved for export, and is still working toward Initial Operational Capability in the USA.

Col. Al-Mansoor says that the kingdom is considering a follow-on order of new F-16s, adding that “We must analyse and determine the cost of the future force structure.” The RBAF’s 16 F-5E/F fighters need replacement, and a winner is expected to be announced in January 2014 at the Bahrain international air show. BAE’s Eurofighter remains the front-runner, but the same outlay that would buy just 12 Eurofighters would net Bahrain around 20-22 F-16E/F Block 60s or similar F-16V equivalents, with all of these upgrades already baked in.

Questions remain. Can Bahrain buy new F-16s and Eurofighters, given the need to aid countries like Egypt and pacify its own restive population? Is the F-16 CCIP + Eurofighters their best Plan B, or could they decide to operate an all-F-16 future fleet of upgraded and new fighters, offering lower short and long-term force structure costs, and commonalities with the nearby UAE? Finally, what about Gulf monarchs’ growing wariness concerning US intentions and support? How will that play into Bahrain’s decisions? Flight International, “Bahrain to launch F-16 upgrade in 2014”.

Nov 4/13: Tranche 3. The 1st Tranche 3 Typhoon (BS116), has successfully completed engine ground runs at Warton, UK, from green screen checks through Stage C checks of the engine’s integration with all onboard systems. 1st flight is expected to take place before the end of 2013 – and does, in December. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, Nov 4/13 release.

Oct 30/13: EP2. The NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) signs a development contract with Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH for Evolution Package 2. It includes enhancements to the existing radar, DASS defensive system, and MIDS/Link-16 system, as well as Flight Control System (FCS) and the Utility Control System (UCS) improvements to inprove compatibility with future civil airspace requirements. MBDA’s Storm Shadow cruise missile isn’t mentioned (q.v. July 26/13).

Development is supposed to be done by the end of 2015. Earlier reports (q.v. July 30/12) suggested that the radar enhancements may involve a new AESA system, but current sources indicate that EP2 this just adds Meteor missile capability to the existing Captor-M radar (q.v. June 18/13). Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, Oct 30/13 | AIN, “Eurofighter Signs New Contract, Describes AESA Radar Status”.

EP2 development

Oct 28/13: P1E. The Eurofighter Typhoon Phase 1 Enhancements (P1E) program has finished flight testing in Manching, Germany and Getafe, Spain, and will be ready for installation and retrofit on existing Tranche 2 aircraft by the end of 2013.

P1E implements full Air-to-Surface capability, with full integration of a Laser Designator Pod (RAFAEL LITENING III), full smart bomb integration (Paveway laser-guided, and dual-mode Paveway IV/ EGBU-16 GPS and laser), Helmet Mounted Sight System upgrades for ground attack use, Mode 5 Identification Friend or Foe, improved Radios and Direct Voice Input, Digital integration of Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles (full IRIS-T integration with HMSS for high off-boresight shots, and allowing future AIM-9X integration), and an updated MIDS/Link-16 Datalink for wider interoperability. All of these enhancements will come factory-installed in Tranche 3 aircraft. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, Oct 28/13 | Aviation Week, “Partners Chart Course For Eurofighter Typhoon Enhancements”.

Tranche 2 P1E upgrades approved

Aug 19-20/13: South Korea. Conflicting messaging from DAPA and contractors give a somewhat muddled picture, but the upshot is that Eurofighter was disqualified on a questionable technicality, and the F-35 for budgetary reasons, apparently leaving the F-15SE as the de facto winner. That was reversed in late September, when South Korea’s government decided to cancel the competition and start over. In effect, they’ve signaled that it isn’t really a competition, they want the F-35. Which is confirmed in November, when the F-35 is picked as a sole-source winner. Read “South Korea’s Reboots F-X Multi-Role Fighter Buy, Wants 5th Gen” for full coverage.

Loss in Korea

Aug 7/13: Bahrain. BAE Systems says that Bahrain “has expressed an interest in Typhoon and the British government are leading very early discussions”. That’s new, and the motivation is interesting.

Bahrain’s King Hamad al-Khalifa reportedly told British Prime Minister David Cameron that they were interested in buying Eurofighter jets to “create a cohesive defence system between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)” nations. Saudi Arabia is the linchpin of the GCC, and Oman is a respected member. This is a clear dividend from their purchases, and the king’s comment may also be good news for prospective sales in the UAE (40-60 jets), Kuwait, and Qatar. At the same time, every one of these sales is expected to be hotly contested, with competition in place or expected from Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, Lockheed Martin’s F-16E/F, and Saab’s JAS-39E/F Gripen. Reuters.

Aug 1/13: Saudi Arabia. BAE’s 2013 Half-Year Results says that deliveries have resumed, with the Saudi fleet up to 28 fighters, construction beginning on new facilities, and pilot training in-country progressing:

“Four Typhoon aircraft were delivered in the first half, adding to the initial phase of 24 Typhoon aircraft deliveries between 2009 and the end of 2011…. A [GBP] 0.3bn contract was signed in March for the construction of airfield facilities at King Fahd Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Discussions on the provision of maintenance and upgrade facilities in-Kingdom, and further capability enhancement of the Typhoon aircraft remain ongoing. Under an order received at the end of 2012 to deliver training to the RSAF, the first graduation ceremony of cadets from the King Faisal Air Academy was held in May [2013].”

With respect to finalizing terms for Tranche 3 upgrades, BAE’s accompanying presentation cites “good progress,” and says “Significant trading bias to second half anticipated.” Translation: we expect a deal before the end of the year. That will need to be taken care of before BAE can talk about further sales, though they do cite a “KSA B2” opportunity as one of their top prospects. Half-Year Results statement [PDF] and presentation [PDF] | Daily Mail.

July 26/13: Storm Shadow. AIN reports that key Tornado upgrades may end up being funded by Saudi Arabia and Oman. RAF assistant chief of the air staff AVM Ed Stringer says that “Storm Shadow will be on the Typhoon sooner than you think.” From “Middle East Customers Funding Eurofighter Upgrades”:

“…further indication that some key upgrades to the combat jet are being funded by Saudi Arabia and possibly Oman. The four original partner nations have proved reluctant to collectively fund in the near term enhancements… such as integration of the MBDA Storm Shadow cruise missile. The four partners have also so far failed to approve full development of the Captor-E AESA radar by the Euroradar consortium…. “Other Typhoon customers are involved [in providing] funding profile,” [RAF Air Vice Marshal Ed Stringer] added…. During a briefing at the IDEX show in Abu Dhabi earlier this year, a BAE Systems official said that the Storm Shadow would enter flight-test on the Typhoon this year because this is a requirement of the Royal Saudi Air Force.”

The RSAF already uses Storm Shadow missiles on their Tornado strike fighters.

July 7/13: Germany. Der Spiegel takes a strafing run at the Eurofighter program in Germany, pointing out both its budget overruns, and citing recent documents that discuss safety and quality issues with the planes. Germany and the other Eurofighter partners are expected to make their Tranche 3B decisions sometime in 2014, so the articles feed into a live political debate as an election approaches.

On the budgetary front, the Bundestag approved EUR 14.7 billion for 180 fighters, but Der Spiegel says that EUR 14.5 billion has already been spent on just 108 machines. The current Bundeswehr estimate is reportedly EUR 16.8 billion for 143 fighters (Tranche 1 through 3A) by 2018. That would average out to EUR 117.5 million/ $157 million per plane.

The 2nd issue involves quality control problems. On Oct 1/08, the military did not extend the Manching, Bavaria plant’s license to remain a Bundeswehr aviation site. Aircraft were still accepted after more detailed inspections, but that could leave the government liable in the event of a crash on German soil. Later, on April 18/13, an auditor from the Bundesamt fur Ausrustung, Informationstechnik und Nutzung der Bundeswehr (BAAINBw) in Koblenz cited the ejection seats as a fleet-wide problem area. Der Spiegel alleges that German quality control and inspections have suffered as a result of austerity measures and military “reforms,” but it isn’t the first time this has been publicly cited as an issue. In August 2010, an RSAF Lt. Col. and member of the Saudi Royal family was killed in a 2-seat Typhoon crash near Moron, Spain, when his parachute separated from the harness. His Spanish counterpart ejected safely. The accident led the RAF to modify its fleet’s ejection seat harnesses. Der Spiegel re: budgets [in German] | Der Spiegel re: reliability [in German] | Reuters.

Program problems

July 5/13: South Korea. DAPA suspends bidding on its fighter competition, after none of the entries (Eurofighter, F-15SE, F-35A) could meet South Korea’s industrial demands, and performance specifications, and budget limits. Something clearly has to be rethought, if South Korea wants those fighters. If they don’t drop the number bought, then either the budget must be increased, or cost-adding elements like industrial offsets need to be revised, or the performance specifications need to be relaxed and new competitors contemplated. Yonhap | Yonhap follow-on.

July 2/13: P1E Weapons. BAE announces that they have finished initial Paveway IV GPS/laser guided bomb trials with a Eurofighter, as part of the Phase 1 Enhancement Programme that will give Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 2 planes independent precision strike capabilities. Other elements of the program include the LITENING laser designation & surveillance pod, and EGBU-16 Enhanced Paveway laser/GPS guided bomb. BAE Systems.

June 20/13: Qatar. AFP says that the Middle Eastern Emirate intends to launch its RFP for 24-36 fighters “soon.” They own a fleet of Mirage 2000-5s, which recently flew to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya.

French President Hollande will visit Doha for high-level economic talks on June 22, and France has close ties with the Emirate, but the Qataris aren’t waiting around. They reportedly spent time in May 2013 evaluating the Eurofighter Tornado with the RAF, and will soon host a Eurofighter team in-country for flight trials. Boeing also remains in the mix. Agence France Presse.

June 19/13: Industrial. New Eurofighter GmbH CEO and former Airbus Military head Alberto Gutierrez seems to understand what his firm needs to do. Now, can he do it? He tells Reuters:

“In this market, where we are, there is competition and we have to keep on going, finding out whatever improvement is available to catch up, to make the product cheaper and a way of getting into decisions leaner and faster…”

All true. The problem is, he has just admitted that his plane is behind competitors in key areas, too expensive, and hobbled by an industrial structure that doesn’t foster either lean costs or fast action. Fixing even 1 of those problems is a serious challenge. Fixing all 3 in time to land new orders, before the plane goes out of production, while keeping governments from derailing improvement plans, starts edging toward “Mission: Impossible” territory.

June 18/13: Weapons. Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH signs a full weapon system integration contract with the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) for MBDA’s Meteor long-range air-to-air missile. This will reportedly include 2-way datalink integration, which will offer parity with the JAS-39 Gripen and an advantage over the Dassault Rafale.

Germany became the last of the 6 core Meteor partners (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden) to sign a contract for missile stocks, on May 31/13. The NETMA contract completes the other coverage loop, and means that MBDA now has contracts to integrate its missile onto all 3 originally-envisaged platforms: the Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, and Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen.

BAE had done some preliminary work (q.v. June 20/11, July 11/12) in Britain, which led to an unguided test firing (Dec 6/12). That was an excellent set of 1st steps to cut integration time for everyone, but that isn’t the same as full integration. Further design and test work on the missile system will continue at Alenia Aermacchi, BAE Systems, and EADS Cassidian… which doesn’t seem like a very efficient way to conduct things.

What the releases don’t say is when integration will be complete. Eurofighter GmbH has now confirmed the date as 2017. That’s about 3 years later than Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen (2014), and later than original Eurofighter forecasts of mid-2015, and but a year earlier than the French Rafale (2018). Eurofighter | MBDA | UK MoD | Aviation Week.

Full Meteor air-air missile integration contract

June 7/13: Engine. EUROJET Turbo GmbH celebrates the delivery of its 1000th EJ200 production engine, of over 1,500 orders places so far. This one was assembled at ITP for Spain, and the firm touts 789 engines in service so far on operational Eurofighter Typhoons. To date, the engines have accumulated over 390,000 flying hours. Eurojet [MS Word] | Eurofighter.

1,000th EJ200

May 23/13: South Korea. EADS Cassidian reportedly announces that they would invest $2 billion in the K-FX fighter development project, and help market the plane internationally, if the Eurofighter is chosen for F-X-3. Investments would include a maintenance repair and overhaul (MRO) facility that could extend to the KF-X, and an aerospace software center.

It isn’t a bad idea for EADS. Barring multiple orders from new sources, it’s very unlikely that the Eurofighter will still be in production by 2022. Upgrades and maintenance will continue for some time, but the C-203 KF-X design could offer EADS a new option to sell, with a fundamental design that can improve toward stealth fighter status. The question is whether South Korea wants to go forward. Yonhap News.

April 5/13: South Korea. An un-named military official tells the government’s Yonhap News Agency that after 2 years of discussions and negotiations with DAPA, EADS has changed its industrial offer. Instead of having the first 10 made in Europe, the next 24 made using Korean components, and the last 26 assembled in Korea, EADS has offered to build just 12 in Europe, with the other 48 Tranche 3 planes at KAI in South Korea.

The news report is imprecise, leaving the question of structural manufacturing vs. kit assembly unaddressed. It also fails to address how EADS can promote the idea of 20,000 South Korean aerospace jobs for a 5-year period, when the company also says that building the Typhoon for the much larger orders of the core country participants created just 10,000 jobs in Europe. On its face, the statement seems less than plausible, but it does point to the likelihood of significant structural manufacturing in Korea. Yonhap.

April 4/13: South Korea. The ROKAF has picked Taurus’ KEPD 350 long range cruise missile for their future fighter force. They’ll have to pay extra to integrate it with their F-16s and F-15Ks. The proposed F-15SE Silent Eagle is different enough that it will probably require added testing, so Eurofighter may garner a slight advantage from German & Spanish plans to add the KEPD 350 to Eurofighter by 2015. Read “Korea’s F-X Multi-Role Fighter Buys: Phases 2 & 3” for full coverage.

March 26/13: Tranche 3. The Tranche 3 Instrumented Production Aircraft 8 test plane has joined all major structural pieces, and moves on to the next production station on the final assembly line in Manching. Work is now focused on hydraulics, defensive aids, test flight instrumentation, and electrical systems with over 110 km of complex special cabling.

IPA8 will play an important role testing and integrating new features like the AESA radar, new weapons, etc. EADS Cassidian.

March 13/13: Denmark. The Danes pick up their fighter competition as promised, following their announced hiatus in April 2010. Invited bidders include the same set of Lockheed Martin (F-35A), Boeing (Super Hornet), and Saab (JAS-39E/F) – plus EADS (Eurofighter), who had withdrawn from the Danish competition in 2007. The goal of a 2014 F-16 replacement decision has been moved a bit farther back, and now involves a recommendation by the end of 2014, and a selection by June 2015.

The Flyvevabnet are reported to have 30 operational F-16s, with 15 more in reserve, out of an original order of 58. Past statements indicate that they’re looking to buy around 25 fighters as replacements, but there are reports of a range from 24-32, depending on price. Danish Forsvarsministeriet [in Danish] | Eurofighter GmbH | Saab | JSF Nieuws.

Feb 21/13: Saudi Arabia. BAE’s end of year investor presentation [PDF] discusses changes in Saudi Arabia, including a contract amendment that formally abandons Saudi plans for a final assembly line in-country. That insistence had been holding up deliveries, and the remaining 48 aircraft will begin arriving in 2013. Meanwhile, work to “expand the multi-role capabilities” of Saudi Typhoons continues, as do negotiations to continue expanding those capabilities toward Tranche 3 levels.

Pricing remains an issue several years after the contract, and the next stage of support contracts is also in long negotiations:

“Under the Saudi British Defence Co-operation Programme (SBDCP), orders totalling £3.4bn were awarded for support through to 2016, including the provision of manpower, logistics and training to the RSAF…. The initial three-year Typhoon support contract finished at the end of June and two subsequent six-month extensions have been secured. Discussions continue with the customer on the next five years of support. Discussions on Typhoon price escalation with the Saudi Arabian government remain ongoing. Negotiations are also ongoing for the provision of maintenance and upgrade facilities in-Kingdom, and further capability enhancement of the aircraft.”

Feb 11/13: DACT distilled. A veteran Eurofighter test pilot doesn’t see the logic behind Lockheed Martin test pilot Bill Flynn’s recent claim that an F-35 will beat any 4+ generation aircraft, including the Eurofighter Typhoon:

“The F-35 thrust to weight ratio is way lower [than Eurofighter] and its energy-manoeuvrability diagrams match those of the F/A-18…. starting from medium altitude and above, there is no story with a similarly loaded Typhoon…. [F-35] Transonic acceleration is… better than in an F/A-18 or F-16, but mainly due to its low drag characteristics than to its powerplant. That means that immediately after the transonic regime, the F-35 would stop accelerating and struggle forever to reach a non operationally suitable Mach 1.6…. The Typhoon will continue to accelerate supersonic with an impressive steady pull, giving more range to its BVR (Beyond Visual Range) armament…. Angle-of-attack is remarkably high in the F-35, as it is for all the twin tailed aircraft, but of course it can not be exploited in the supersonic regime, where the limiting load factor is achieved at low values…. Excessive energy bleeding rates would operationally limit the F-35 well before its ultimate AoA is reached.”

Both Britain and Italy will eventually find out for sure, as they will soon have both types in service. Italy will be the best test, as its F-35As are more capable dogfighters than Britain’s F-35Bs. About 2 months earlier, the Aviationist had canvassed Italian pilots, who fly both the F-16 and the Eurofighter, for their opinion concerning those 2 platforms:

“During more or less a decade of service with the Italian Air Force, the F-16 has been extensively used to train Typhoon pilots in WVR engagements. According to the Italian pilots, the F-16 matches the F-2000 under 10,000 feet. But above FL100 the Typhoon becomes quite difficult to beat since its superior aerodynamics give the Eurofighter can out maneuver the Viper at every engagement.”

Sources: The Aviationist, “No way an F-35 will ever match a Typhoon fighter jet in aerial combat” Eurofighter test pilot says” | and “How does the F-16 perform against its adversaries in dogfight?”

vs. F-35 & F-16

2012

EUR 2 billion support deal; Oman buys 12; India loss. Eurofighter & Paveways
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Dec 21/12: Oman. It isn’t Christmas over there, but the RAFO is getting a present anyway. The Sultanate signs a GBP 2.5 billion (about $4.057 billion) deal with Britain for 12 Eurofighters, and 8 Hawk LIFT advanced trainers. This makes them the Eurofighter Typhoon’s 3rd export customer, a status they share with their neighbor Saudi Arabia. The deal includes in-service support, and deliveries are expected to begin in 2017.

See “Oman’s Air Force Upgrades: From Jaguars to F-16s & Eurofighters” for full coverage.

Oman buys 12

Dec 6/12: Weapons. 1st firing of MBDA’s Meteor long range air-air missile from a Eurofighter Typhoon. It’s part of Britain’s Future Enhancements Flight Test Programme, and builds on BAE’s unpowered trials to verify safe separation. The flight trials were conducted with integrated support from QinetiQ and MBDA. BAE | Eurofighter.

Nov 29/12: UK Updates. BAE Systems has finished upgrading 43 RAF Eurofighters under the Retrofit 2 program, which began as its own effort but was subsumed into the wider Typhoon Availability Service (TAS) contract. Their Tranche 1 Block 5 standard installs the PIRATE forward looking infra-red (FLIR) system, improves air-to-air capability; and adds precision strike by using a combination of Paveway II family laser-guided bombs, and RAFAEL’s LITENING-III surveillance and laser designator pod. Eurofighter GmbH.

Nov 6/12: UAE. British Prime Minister David Cameron issues a joint communique with the UAE. The 2 countries will improve their defense ties, with specific commitments that include:

“Deepen our defence ties by; continuing the development of our joint plans for the security of the UAE and wider Gulf region; increasing our joint exercises and training; and by investing in the British military presence in the UAE.

Establish a defence industrial partnership that involves close collaboration around Typhoon and a number of new technologies.”

The Eurofighter is competing with France’s Rafale for a 60-plane buy, and these sorts of agreements are normal under the circumstances. It’s also normal for specific defense deals to depend on the customer’s final choice, though the joint communique includes economic relations beyond defense. UK PM | Reuters.

Nov 6/12: Flight costs. From Britain’s House of Commons:

Mr Ellwood: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the average hourly cost was of flying the Typhoon fighter (a) with and (b) without fuel costs. [126215]

Mr Dunne [holding answer 1 November 2012]: The standard marginal flying hour cost for a Typhoon is £3,875, including the cost of fuel. Excluding fuel costs the figure reduces to approximately £2,670.”

Even GBP 3,875 (about $6,200) is considerably cheaper than published American fighter costs per flight hour. The comparable F-15 Eagle family is generally quoted as being in the $17,000 – $30,500 range. The difference has less to do with the respective machines, and more to do with differing approaches to calculating those costs, especially in one’s choice of what to include. A standard calculation method would be informative, but it doesn’t exist.

RAF flight costs

HEA
click for video

Oct 16/12: HMD. Eurofighter GmbH touts the new “Head Equipment Assembly (HEA), developed by BAE Systems’ Electronic Systems, [which] comprises the aircrew helmet and all the sub-system elements needed to display a real world overlaid picture on the helmet visor.” The accompanying video has a Typhoon pilot explaining why this is so powerful, and expressing his belief that it’s impossible to beat an enemy if they have a system like this and you don’t. “Once you’ve had this helmet on, you don’t ever want to be without it.”

All well and good, but American fighters have had these capabilities for almost a decade now. A fact that they have used to their advantage in international competitions against the Typhoon, and against other fighters like the French Rafale that lack an accompanying HMD.

Why HMDs matter

July 2012: Japan. The Japanese Ministry of Defense releases its “Defense of Japan 2012” White Paper. Among other things, it explains exactly why the F-35 won. All 3 contenders fulfilled all mandatory requirements, but the F-35 was rated as the overall winner based on the 2nd stage evaluation of capability, industrial participation, cost, and support.

Part of the problem is that Japan simply accepted Lockheed Martin’s paper performance and cost promises at face value, in the absence of data. Even then, the Typhoon was seen as the most fuel-efficient plane, and its bid had the best industrial benefits for Japan. On the other hand, EADS and BAE had trouble meeting Japan’s purchase cost targets while giving Japanese firms all of that work, and picking EADS/BAE would have meant deviating from Japan’s strongly American industrial links and equipment infrastructure. The Eurofighter Typhoon also had a compatibility problem with the JASDF’s KC-767 aerial tankers, who don’t carry hose-and-drogue refueling pods. KC-767 retrofits would have been required, driving up the program’s expense. Read “Japan’s Next Fighters, From F-X Competition to F-35 Buys” for full coverage.

Luftwaffen
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July 30/12: Eurofighter vs. F-22. Combat Aircraft leaks some results from the 2012 Red Flag exercises. WIRED Danger Room:

“In mid-June… [8] Typhoons arrived at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska for an American-led Red Flag exercise involving more than 100 aircraft from Germany, the U.S. Air Force and Army, NATO, Japan, Australia and Poland. Eight times during the two-week war game, individual German Typhoons flew against single F-22s… The results were a surprise to the Germans and presumably the Americans, too. “We were evenly matched,” Maj. Marc Gruene told Combat Aircraft’s Jamie Hunter. The key, Gruene said, is to get as close as possible to the F-22 … and stay there. “As soon as you get to the [close-in] merge … the Typhoon doesn’t necessarily have to fear the F-22,” Gruene said.”

That’s interesting, and an impressive testament to the Eurofighter’s design and ergonomics. On the other hand, let’s acknowledge that it isn’t exactly easy to “get to the merge” against an opponent who is invisible to your radar at range, moving up to 50% faster than you are, and able to see you just fine on their own radar.

vs. F-22

July 30/12: AESA. NETMA(NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency) has reportedly issued an RFP to Eurofighter GmbH for the development of an E-Scan Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar. Eurofighter CEO, Enzo Casolini says the 2015 target remains, per announcements in June 2011:

“The timescale is to answer the RFP by October this year and to have an agreement with the nations by the end of the year. The target is to have a contract by the middle of next year and to have an E-Scan entering into service by 2015.”

See: Arabian Aerospace.

July 11/12: Weapons. BAE describes cockpit assessment trials for the long-range Meteor air-to-air missile. They took pilots from “each of the Eurofighter nations,” and put them through a range of scenarios in a modified simulator. That led to a series of recommendations for the final cockpit design.

On the one hand, getting the user interface really right pays big dividends in combat. On the other hand, the fact they’re doing these exercises a good indication of how early they are in the process. It also points to how much more is involved in this sort of thing, beyond just hanging a new missile on a pylon. BAE Systems.

July 10/12: Gulf opportunities. Reports from Farnborough shed some light on potential Eurofighter Typhoon sales to Oman, Qatar, and the UAE.

Dassault has been sounding quite confident about the Rafale’s ultimate prospects in the UAE, but BAE Systems’ business development director Alan Garwood told Reuters that he believed the UAE’s interest is “real and genuine,” adding that they “could tell by the questions they were asking us that they were serious.” BAE is still working with the British government to put together a package for 60 planes. With the loss in India, and the near-certain demise of Tranche 3B, the UAE represents the fighter’s largest near-term opportunity. Oman is a higher-odds opportunity, and Garwood said that:

“We’ll start formal negotiations [for 12 jets] with Oman towards the end of August [2012] I would imagine. The two governments have targeted it for completion this year and we want it done this year as well… I see no reason why we shouldn’t be able to do that.”

With respect to Qatar, he would say only that: “We are talking to the Qataris quite a bit.” That’s normal in a competition like this, which is reported to include Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, Lockheed’s F-35A Lightning II, and Saab’s JAS-39E/F Gripen. Reuters | WSJ’s The Source blog.

July 9/12: Upgrades at last? At the opening of the Farnborough defense exhibition, British Prime Minister David Cameron discusses the Eurofighter’s future:

“Typhoon’s growth potential is huge and the four partner nations, Italy, Germany, Spain and the UK have agreed the next steps required to further exploit this. The integration of the METEOR missile, an Electronically Scanned Radar, enhancements of the Defensive Aids System, further development of the air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities and integration of new weapons.”

With Tranche 3B fading away, and India out as a big export win, upgrades like these are the only way to keep part of the manufacturing base going for much longer, and are also its best hope for landing significant export orders. The question is when some of these upgrade “agreements” will become signed contracts with actual dollars behind them. Read “Eurofighter’s Upgrades: Enough? In Time?” for more.

March 30/12: “Contract 1”. Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH signs a major 5-year contract with NATO’s Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA), to support the fleet of Typhoon jets across the 4 Eurofighter core nations: Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. The overall contract total is not disclosed, but is estimated to be around EUR 2 billion (currently $2.66 billion).

BAE estimates its share of the total at GBP 446 million (about EUR 533 million). Finmeccanica estimates its share of the total at “more than EUR 500 million.” EADS declined to give figures.

“Contract 1” replaces previous Integrated Logistics Support (PC1-11) contracts and a number of sustainment contracts, covering items like day-to-day support, studies, and customer queries and investigations. It also includes continued development, testing, and upgrade work on the fighters’ systems. Replaced contracts will morph into Contract 1 over a period of time, but they will not include any of the major support contracts announced by various member countries in 2009. Eurofighter GmbH | BAE | Finmeccanica | Defense News.

“Contract 1” for support

March 30/12: #321. A Finmeccanica release notes that so far, the consortium has delivered 321 Eurofighter Typhoons to customer nations.

March 22/12: AESA – just a sim. EADS Cassidian touts the benefits of an “E-Scan” AESA radar for the Eurofighter, and touts its operation of the largest assembly line in Europe for the individual transmit/ receive modules that make up those radars.

The German BWB’s 2-year study, using IABG GmbH’s MILSIM (man-in-the-loop simulator), is nice enough. What it isn’t, is a development and production contract. American F-15 Strike Eagles, F-16s, and F/A-18E/F Super Hornets are offered with AESA radars right now. France’s Dassault just received the 1st RBE2-AA AESA radar for its Rafale production line. Saab is well underway developing its own ES-05 Raven AESA radar for the JAS-39E/F Gripen NG, which will join the Eurofighter’s notional AESA design in using a pivoting plate approach. They’re doing so in conjunction with Finmeccanica’s SELEX Galileo, the current leader of the Euroradar consortium. Unless the Eurofighter consortium and its governments get moving soon, their fighter will begin to find itself at a severe disadvantage in international competitions.

Jan 31/12: India loss. Dassault’s Rafale is picked as the “L-1” lowest bidder for India’s 126-aircraft M-MRCA deal, even after the complex life-cycle cost and industrial calculations are thrown in. Some reports place its cost as $5 million lower per plane. Next steps include the negotiation of a contract, in parallel with parliamentary approval and budgeting.

Until a contract is actually signed, however, India’s procurement history reminds us that even a “close” deal is just 1 step above a vague intention. The contract may take a while. Even the French government sees a deal as only an 80% probability within 6-9 months. The budgeting is likely to be even trickier. The IAF’s exclusion of cost considerations in picking its finalists means that the only question now is: how far over the stated budget will a full Rafale buy go? Some reports place the deal’s cost at around $15 billion – an increase of up to 50% from previous estimates. If economic downturns or squeezed defense budgets make those outlays a big enough issue, early enough in the process, it could have the effect of re-opening the competition. British PM David Cameron has expressed an intent to change India’s mind, and both Saab and Boeing are still positioned within India, in order to be ready for a renewed opportunity.

Eurofighter’s problem is that it’s hard to see how it might succeed in a competition that was re-opened for financial reasons. Dassault | President Sarkozy [in French] | Economic Times of India, see also their timeline | Indian Express | Rediff (thanks for using our descriptions, sans attribution) | Times of India || Aviation Week | BBC | UK’s The Guardian | Reuters report and expert roundup.

India loss

2011

HMD at last; Tranche 3 sub-system contracts; German cuts to 3B plans; Competitions in Bulgaria, India, Japan (loss), South Korea, UAE; Opportunities in Indonesia & Turkey?; AESA by 2015?; Paveway IV and EGBU-16 bomb tests; PILUM glide bomb; Naval Eurofighter; Negative British NAO report; 100,000 flying hours. Eurofighter over Dubai
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Dec 20/11: Japan loss. Japan’s Ministry of Defense announces that Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II has won the F-X competitive bid process for 42 planes, beating the Eurofighter and Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet International. As F-4 replacements, the F-35As will have an air defense role, but Japan does have a large cadre of dedicated F-15Js to perform that mission. Conclusion? Their undeclared role is as strike fighters.

Note that there’s still an F-XX program in the future, aimed at replacing Japan’s F-15Js. Numbers as high as 100+ planes have been floated, but that will depend on both economic straits, and local geopolitical threats. Read “Japan’s Next Fighters, From F-X Competition to F-35 Buys” for full coverage.

Japan loss

Nov 16/11: UAE. The UAE is either engaged in the mother of all hardball negotiations, or the potential Rafale sale is crashing. Critical comments at the highest levels are accompanying the invite to Eurofighter, strengthening the belief that the Typhoon is more than just a stalking horse to lower the French bid.

The question is, how big is the opportunity? Reports have surfaced that the UAE may be about to cut its planned new jet order, regardless of its choice, and buy more of its unique F-16E/F Block 60s. Read “Derailed Denouement in Dubai: What’s Up With the UAE’s Fighter Deal?” for a snapshot.

Nov 13/11: UAE. Flight International reports that the UAE must have liked their October briefings re: Eurofighter’s capabilities, because they’ve asked Eurofighter GmbH for an RFP bid to replace their current fleet of Mirage 2000-9s. The UAE has been in negotiations to buy Rafale planes for several years now, but hasn’t been able to clinch a deal.

It’s hard to tell if the UAE is just looking to add pressure and get a better price from Dassault, or if their interest is serious. One sign that they might be serious is the fact that they’ve also received classified technical briefings regarding the F-15E Strike Eagle and F/A-18 Super Hornet, but haven’t asked for RFP bids from the Americans. Flight International believes that this may be a prelude to consideration of the stealth-enhanced F-15SE Silent Eagle or F/A-18 Super Hornet International for the UAE’s planned 2018-2025 fighter modernization. The obvious 3rd contender there is Lockheed Martin’s F-35.

Nov 12/11: Eurofighter GmbH touts their Dubai flying display, complete with a graphic showing their impressive flight plan.

They also tout a range of technologies that they hadn’t advertised much before, including thrust-vectoring engine nozzles, an AESA radar, and MBDA’s Marte anti-ship missile. The release appears to blur the line between concepts/plans, and field-ready equipment.

Oct 21/11: Germany & Tranche 3B. Germany announces further defense cuts, which include a proviso that their Eurofighter orders will end at Tranche 3A, instead of adding another 37 planes in a Tranche 3B.

With Britain also saying that Tranche 3Ais the end, and the governments of Spain and Italy under severe financial strain, it appears less and less likely that there will be a Tranche 3B. The question is how to escape termination costs. Negotiations can be expected, but one option is to count future exports as re-sales of scheduled orders from existing partner countries. Aviation Week.

Aug 18/11: Sub-contractors. Finmeccanica’s SELEX Galileo contracts with BAE Systems Manufacturing at Hillend in Fife, in GBP 20+ million procurement and electronic manufacturing services contract related to Tranche 3A’s Captor radars. Work at the Hillend facility will run from 2011-2013.

BAE’s release adds that the facility has won over GBP 165 million in Captor and Typhoon DASS orders, over the last 12 years.

July 20/11: South Korea. As South Korea’s DAPA eases the criteria to try and foster more competition, DAPA’s Col. Wi Jong-seong says that “Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi expressed its intent to compete in the fighter jet procurement project early this year.” The report quotes him as saying that Sukhoi’s T-50 PAK-FA will be up against Boeing’s stealth-enhanced F-15SE Silent Eagle, Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II, and the Eurofighter Typhoon. Assuming we don’t have an FX-II competition repeat, where all competitors but one drop out.

At this point, FX-III is being touted as a 60 jet buy of high-end fighters, with a budget of 8.29 trillion won ($7.86 billion). Eurofighter reportedly offered a better deal than the F-15K in F-X-2, but lost. The firm recently proposed to phase in Korean assembly for Phase III, with the 1st 10 made in Europe, the next 24 using Korean components, and the last 26 assembled in Korea. Korea Times.

June 27/11: Weapons. Diehl BGT and Israel’s RAFAEL unveil a new weapon for Eurofighter at the 2011 Paris Air Show. The PILUM long-range glide bomb concept has a range variously reported as 100-160 km/ 62 – 99.5 miles, but it’s a developmental weapon, so exact figures remain to be proven. PILUM uses RAFAEL Spice’s combination of GPS/INS and imaging infrared guidance, within Diehl’s HOSBO modular glide bomb system. HOSBO is a steamlined glide bomb that can carry a modular payload, including warheads of various sizes and types, even warheads designed to disrupt electronics. This JSOW Block III competitor will be able to attack defended targets, vehicles, ships, or even smaller targets. It will be integrated on Germany’s Tornado and Eurofighter aircraft. Will the Saudis, who fly both types, want any? Diehl BGT release | Jerusalem Post.

June 24/11: HMD. A Reuters report offers an update on progress with the Eurofighter’s BAE “Striker”/ HMSS helmet-mounted displays. HMDs are now considered a standard feature for fighter jets, as they’re required in order to take full advantage of new short range air-to-air missiles, and boost ground attack capabilities.

British RAF pilots tested the first helmets in summer 2010. So far, about 50 total helmets have been delivered to Italy, Germany, Spain and UK, at a delivery rate of about 8 per month, but none are being used over Libya. They’re expected to become operational in the RAF by the end of 2011.

June 22/11: AESA. After a year of preliminary industry funding, Eurofighter GmbH and Euroradar agree to continue development, and announce 2015 as the target date for entry into service of a Typhoon with the new “E-Scan” AESA radar. A later date wasn’t really feasible, given the delivery schedules involved in critical competitions like India’s M-MRCA. Indeed, even a 2015 date could be a disadvantage as the Eurofighter competes with France’s Rafale, which has begun testing its own RBE2-AA. The firm does say that:

“The new AESA array, larger than the ones available to our competitors thanks to the Typhoon’s voluminous radome, will be fitted on a repositioner that will provide a wider field of regard when compared to those installed or scheduled for introduction on other fighters. The new radar will offer customers the freedom to retrofit their existing Typhoons when required.”

E-Scan AESA date announced

June 20/11: Weapons. Eurofighter IPA1 has completed the first of a series of Meteor missile trials, beginning with safe separation across the flight envelope on the Aberporth range in Britain. Eurofighter GmbH.

May 17/11: Leadership. EADS Cassidian Spain has appointed 56 year old Luis Hernández Vozmediano as their new Head of the Eurofighter program. He has spent virtually his entire professional career at EADS, and has been heavily involved in Britain’s A330 Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA), and the related American KC-X pursuit. Eurofighter GmbH.

May 11/11: Turkey. Eurofighter has courted Turkey for a long time, despite Turkey’s political & industrial commitment to the F-35 program. Hurriyet reports growing interest in a fighter split-buy, to reduce dependence on the USA.

Naturally, Italy’s government is pushing Turkey to solve that problem by joining the Eurofighter consortium. Turkey might also pick a hi-low approach, and join South Korea and Indonesia in KF-X instead. The real wild card? Turkey’s current account deficit is hitting levels that worry some observers. High levels have been predictors of Turkish economic crises in the past.

April 27/11: India. Fulfilling long-standing rumors that it had gained a leading position in India’s M-MRCA future fighter competition, Eurofighter is confirmed as one of 2 finalists, alongside Dassault’s Rafale. Read “India’s M-MRCA Fighter Competition” for full coverage.

April 2011: Weapons. EADS Cassidian Spain achieves the first 1,000 pound EGBU-16 Enhanced Paveway II precision guided munition release. The EGBU-16 is the selected dual mode bomb for Germany, Spain and Italy, whereas the locally-developed Paveway IV is the dual mode choice for the UK. Eurofighter GmbH.

March 7/11: Weapons. The first ever Eurofighter release of a Paveway IV dual guidance bomb takes place from development aircraft IPA6, in an hour long test flight over the Aberporth Range in Wales. BAE Systems | Eurofighter GmbH, incl photo.

March 10/11: Indonesia? The Times reports that more of Britain’s fighters could be leaving the force, if Indonesia’s interest in up to 24 Typhoons pans out. That could be politically challenging, though. Britain has led the way into attacks on Libya for bombing its civilians, but Indonesia has used its BAE Hawk light attack jets against its own insurgencies, and in East Timor. That triggered a defense export ban 12 years ago. Indonesia continues to operate a large fleet of Hawk jets, but it has since filled its high end air superiority slot with a handful of Sukhoi’s SU-27/30 Flanker family fighters – a cheaper choice with similar capabilities.

The UK MoD says it has “no current plans” to export Typhoons to Indonesia, but that means little to nothing when the statement is carefully parsed. If Indonesia really is interested in adding Typhoons, one option might be to re-export 24 RAF Tranche 1 aircraft that haven’t been given precision ground attack modifications. The Times [subscription-only] | Agence France Presse | The Guardian | UPI.

March 2/11: Britain’s reluctance to invest in additional Typhoon fighters is partly explained by the findings of an NAO report, which notes that:

“The cost of the Typhoon project has risen substantially. Despite the MOD’s now buying 72 fewer aircraft (down from 232 to 160, a reduction of 30 per cent), the forecast development and production cost has risen by 20 per cent to [GBP] 20.2 billion. This is a 75 per cent increase in the unit cost of each aircraft. The cost of supporting each aircraft has also risen by a third above that originally expected. The MOD now estimates that, by the time the aircraft leaves service, some [GBP] 37 billion will have been spent.”

There are concerns that the report might affect the jet’s chances in India. Meanwhile, a report in The Register highlights the importance of paying attention to Tranche buy totals, in an atmosphere of declining budgets. Note that the retirement of the RAF’s Tranche 1 jets will happen long before they reach their service life design limits, raising the possibility of resale:

“Probably the most dismal figure we are given is that the RAF will actually put into service just 107 Typhoons. At the moment it has received 70: the last of the 160 planes ordered by the UK will be delivered in 2015. But, we are told, “by 2019” all the Tranche 1 jets (which were still being delivered to the RAF at the start of 2008) will be “retired” – that is, thrown away. We’ll pay for 160 jets (actually we’ll pay for 232), but we’ll only ever get a fleet of 107.”

UK NAO report

March 2/11: During high level visits, British officials continue to press the case for the Eurofighter as Japan’s future F-X fighter, over offerings from Boeing (F/A-18E/F Super Hornet or F-15SE Silent Eagle) or Lockheed Martin (F-35A/B/C). One interesting wrinkle is that reconnaissance capabilities could become an important requirement, a move that would give the F-35 family an edge. BAE et. al. are fighting an uphill fight, but they’re not alone: in January 2011, the European Business Council in Japan launched a defense and security committee to promote defense-related business cooperation. Asahi Shimbun | Japan Times | L.A. Times.

Naval concept
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Feb 21/11: Aero India 2011 sees Eurofighter and BAE unveil an interesting wrinkle: an initial design for a navalized Eurofighter than can operate from aircraft carriers, based on an internally-funded set of studies and simulations. In a direct nod to potential Indian sales, they tout the plane as being able to take off from “ski jump” carriers without catapults – a design that describes all of India’s current and planned carriers, as well as the initial design for Britain’s own Queen Elizabeth Class.

Eurofighter GmbH describes the goal as 95% commonality with land-based aircraft, and required changes as “limited… include a new, stronger landing gear, a modified arrestor hook and localised strengthening on some fuselage sections near the landing gear, as well as updates the EJ200 engines,” which could include thrust-vectoring in flight.

India is currently planning to use MiG-29Ks as its naval fighters, but it’s currently the type’s only customer, and the Typhoon is seen as a leading contender in its M-MRCA competition for land based aircraft. Britain is planning to use the F-35C from its future carrier, but further cost increases or delays for the multinational program could open an opportunity for a jet type that the RAF already flies. Eurofighter GmbH.

Naval concept unveiled

Feb 4/11: Bulgaria RFI. Bulgaria issues another fighter replacement RFI, soliciting information from Boeing (F/A-18E/F), Dassault (Rafale, Mirage 2000), EADS (Eurofighter), Lockheed Martin (F-16), and Saab (JAS-39 Gripen) re: 8 new and/or second-hand fighter jets, to replace its existing fleet of 12 MiG-21s.

Bulgaria issued a similar RFI in 2006, for 20 jets, but the global economic crash, and Bulgaria’s own issues in trying to pay for past defense purchases, forced a hold. The Defense Ministry has taken pains to emphasize that this is just an exploratory request, and is not the start of a purchase tender. Nevertheless, November 2010 saw the formation of a National Steering Committee and an Integrated Project Team, to draft preliminary fighter replacement operational, technical, and tactical requirements. That followed October 2010 remarks by Bulgaria’s Defense Minister Anyu Angelov, who discussed spending BGN 1 billion (around $725 million) for the purchase of an uncertain number of new fighter jets to replace its MiG-21s, while modernizing its fleet of 16 MiG-29A air superiority jets. Sofia News Agency.

Feb 3/11: Upgrades. The first Spanish single-seat instrumented production aircraft version 4 (IPA4) completes 500 hours of flight at the EADS Cassidian Spain facility at Getafe, near Madrid. After a functional upgrade from its original Tranche 1 air superiority standard to Tranche 2, this aircraft is testing new technology including a Link-16 MIDS system, as well as integration trials and the launching of precision air-to-ground weapons.

The UK has already upgraded a number of its Eurofighters along similar lines, and added advanced LITENING targeting pods. Eurofighter GmbH believes that this Spanish IPA4 platform may serve as a model for the possible upgrade of the Tranche 1 fleets currently in service with Eurofighter customer nations. That’s the good news. The bad news is that an upgrade program of this type may also be seen as an alternative to ordering the final Tranche 3B set of Eurofighters. Eurofighter GmbH.

Jan 28/11: Sub-contractors. Premium AEROTEC’s Varel, Germany plant has successfully started assembling structural components for the Eurofighter. EADS Cassidian announces that Varel’s first 3/2b Eurofighter fuselage section, a 3m section that mates with the wings, has been delivered to the Augsburg plant, where the entire fuselage center section will be assembled.

Premium AEROTEC is a spin-off of the former Airbus sites in Nordenham and Varel and the former EADS site in Augsburg. It began operations on Jan 1/09, and in addition to various Airbus passenger aircraft components, it manufactures the fuselage center section for all Eurofighter aircraft, including the 4 program partners (United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Germany) and export customers Austria and Saudi Arabia. This makes Premium AEROTEC GmbH, with over 6,000 employees and 2009 revenues of EUR 1.1 billion, the largest supplier of structures for the Eurofighter. The company has production plants in Augsburg, Bremen, Nordenham and Varel in Germany; and in Ghimbav, Brasov County, Romania. Premium AEROTEC | EADS Cassidian.

Jan 25/11: Eurofighter GmbH’s CEO sees 2011 as a pivotal year, in order to avoid the end of production in 2015. India’s M-MRCA competition, and hopes of a Tranche 3B from its consortium countries, are the key underpinnings.

Britain has been very clear that there will be no Tranche 3B buy there, and the austerity programs underway (voluntarily or otherwise) in Germany, Italy, and Spain make a Tranche 3B buy extremely unlikely.

100k milestone @ Moron
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Jan 25/11: Eurofighter GmbH announces that the multinational operational fleet of Eurofighter Typhoons in service since the second half of 2003 achieved 100,000 flying hours in January 2011.

As aircraft are delivered and air forces declared their Typhoons to be operational, usage has accelerated. The first 5,000 flying hours was achieved by November 2005, and 10,000 hours was reached in August 2006. May 2007 included the 20,000 hour milestone, and by August 2008 the Typhoon had surpassed 50,000 hours. According to the firm, global operational fleets currently have more than 260 aircraft in service, with 6 squadrons in the UK (4 in Coningsby, 1 in Leuchars and 1 in Mount Pleasant, Falkland Islands); 4 squadrons in Italy (2 in Grosseto and 2 in Gioia del Colle); 3 squadrons in Germany (Laage, Neuburg and Nörvenich), as well as 1 each in Spain, Austria and in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

At present, all 148 Tranche 1 aircraft have been delivered, and Tranche 2 production is in full swing.

100,000 fleet flight hours

Jan 4/11: HMD. BAE announces that its “Helmet Mounted Symbology System” (HMSS) is scheduled to enter service with the RAF in 2011, giving Britain’s Eurofighters the same helmet mounted sighting capability already enjoyed by pilots of competing aircraft, via systems like the Israeli/American JHMCS.

The HMSS does add some advanced wrinkles. A Eurofighter pilot can now look at multiple targets, lock-on to them, and prioritize them by voice-command. This will work even for targets over the shoulder, or targets picked up by the radar but located underneath the aircraft.

HMD at last

2009 – 2010

EUR 9 billion Tranche 3A deal; Tranche 3A sub-system contracts; Tranche 3B offer on table; Private work toward a “CAPTOR-E” AESA radar. CAPTOR-E
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Oct 5/10: Sub-contractors. Finmeccanica subsidiary SELEX Galileo announces a EUR 242 million (about $333.5 million) contract for 88 Captor-M mechanically scanned phased array radars, as part of the Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3A buy. Deliveries would begin in 2012.

The CAPTOR-M is the Eurofighter’ standard radar. Contracts are in progress to develop and field new CAPTOR-E Active Electronically Scanned Array radars for future buys or retrofits, vid. the July 20/10 entry. SELEX Galileo [PDF] | Defense News.

Sept 7/10: Sub-contractors. Finmeccanica subsidiary SELEX Galileo announces [PDF] a EUR 400 million sub-contract from BAE Systems, to supply Tranche 3A fighters with the Praetorian Defensive Aids Sub System (DASS), delivered to the same standard as the Tranche 2 fighters. SELEX Galileo leads the EuroDASS Consortium of Elettronica, Indra Sistemas, EADS and SELEX Galileo, which shares the production of more than 20 major Line Replaceable Items (LRIs) that make up the system. First deliveries are expected in mid-2012.

The Praetorian DASS includes Electronic Support Measures (ESM) to find hostile radars, active Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) to confuse them, and Missile Approach Warning (MAW) systems, tied into an array of defensive subsystems that include chaff, flares, and towed decoy options.

Aug 19/10: Sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman announces a contract from EADS Military Air Systems business unit to deliver 88 inertial measurement units (IMU) for Tranche 3A of the Eurofighter Typhoon. The IMU system is the sole sensor which measures the motion of the aircraft and continuously provides motion data to the flight control computer. In a secondary function, the IMU provides backup navigation data.

The IMUs, which provide motion data for the aircraft, will be built by the company’s German navigation systems subsidiary, Northrop Grumman LITEF, which also provided IMUs for Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 of the aircraft. More than 400 Northrop Grumman LITEF IMUs have been delivered and are already in service on Eurofighters in Germany, Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, Austria and Saudi Arabia

July 20/10: AESA. Eurofighter GmbH and Euroradar announce that they have begun full scale development of an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar to serve in the Eurofighter, with a target in-service date of 2015. The Eurofighter/Euroradar groups have been conducting preliminary AESA development and flight testing since 2007, and Selex Galileo is already working towards integrating an AESA array with the UK’s Eurofighter (vid. Feb 19/10 entry).

Full-scale development of a CAPTOR AESA successor is a new step that could become a factor in Tranche 3B discussions, or later 3A upgrades. Still, SELEX Galileo CEO Steve Mogford says move represents a standalone offer, and is not linked to the proposed Tranche 3B production phase. The Euroradar consortium has reportedly proposed retaining as much “back-end” CAPTOR equipment as possible, as part of delivering the proposed E-Captor AESA system. The consortium also plans to make CAPTOR-E a mechanically scanned AESA radar, rather than mounting it in a fixed position as American fighters have done. This will expand the AESA radar’s slightly narrower cone, and also make it easier for the aircraft to use “launch and break away” tactics against aerial opponents that are beyond visual range. Eurofighter GmbH | Flight International | Microwave Journal.

June 9/10: Tranche 3B offer. At the ILA Air Show in Berlin, Germany, Reuters relays word from a Eurofighter GmbH spokesman that it has submitted a Tranche 3B offer to the partner nations for 124 more Eurofighters, finishing the planned Tranche 3. Defense industry sources at the Berlin Air Show said the offer was around EUR 10 billion.

To date, Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain have so far taken delivery of a combined 222 Eurofighter Typhoons, out of 473 ordered. Eurofighter says a production decision is needed within a year, in order to avoid the beginning of a supplier shutdown and a production gap. The member countries will face a choice between declining defense budgets, versus the likely need to pay some cancellation costs if there is no Tranche 3B.

Feb 19/10: Finmeccanica subsidiary SELEX Galileo announces [PDF] a GBP 19 million contract from Britain’s defense ministry to install a first of type, multi-function, wide field of regard AESA radar on a British Eurofighter as a technology demonstration program.

The AESA TDP will focus on Day/Night All Weather targeting, high resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), air to air targeting, and communications. It’s designed to raise the technology readiness levels of the enabling hardware, de-risk the capability and demonstrate maturity of concept. Following ground and antenna range testing, the radar is planned to fly on a Royal Air Force Typhoon around 2013.

Future weapons array?
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July 31/09: NETMA (NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency), Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH and EUROJET Turbo GmbH signed the Tranche 3A contract, a EUR 9 billion (about $12.96 billion) order for 112 aircraft and 241 EJ200 engines (224 engines to equip 112 planes, plus 17 spares). This new contract also sets the baseline for subsequent support contracts.

BAE cites a work value of GBP 2 billion (EUR 2.35 billion), Finmeccanica cites EUR 3 billion worth of work from Tranche 3A, divided between subsidiaries in Italy (EUR 1.6 billion) and the UK (EUR 1.4 billion). Rolls Royce values its 37% share in the EUROJET order at GBP 300 million (EUR 352 million). The EJ200 includes advanced integrated Health Monitoring, and is already supported by availability-based contracting terms. Eurofighter GmbH | UK MoD | BAE Systems | EADS | Finmeccanica | Rolls Royce | BBC | Deutsche Welle | Financial Times | Hamburg Local | Reuters says last buy for Britain | London Telegraph | Times Online | UPI Asia.

Tranche 3A

Additional Readings

Readers with corrections or information to contribute are encouraged to contact editor Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

• Eurofighter GmbH. Official site.

• Eurojet Turbo GmbH.

• SELEX Galileo – CAPTOR-M radar [PDF].

• Eurofighter GmbH – Eurofighter Typhoon Helmet. Includes Quicktime video.

Official Reports

• German Bundesrechnunghof (April 30/14) – Press release [in German] | Eurofighter summary, incl. link to full report: 2013 Bemerkungen – Weitere Prufungsergebnisse – Nr. 09 “Kostentransparenz beim EUROFIGHTER herstellen [in German] | Full Report: Langfassung der Bemerkung Nr. 09 [PDF, in German].

• UK National Audit Office (March 2/11) – Management of the Typhoon Project. See also The Register.

News & Views

• The Aviationist (Feb 11/13) – No way an F-35 will ever match a Typhoon fighter jet in aerial combat.

• The Aviationist (Dec 10/12) – How does the F-16 perform against its adversaries in dogfight? “….above FL100 the Typhoon becomes quite difficult to beat since its superior aerodynamics give the Eurofighter can out maneuver the Viper at every engagement.”

• Smithsonian Air & Space (May 21/12) – Under the Eurofighter’s Hood: Europe’s frontline fighter is a marvel of technology.

• Aviation Week Ares (March 1/10) – JSF – Mid Year Check. Includes a detailed anecdote covering serious aerodynamic issues with the Typhoon, which delayed its entry into service until 2005, when its automatic low-speed recovery system was qualified.

• Defense et Securite Internationale (May 2006) – Rafale et Typhoon: Les Europeens auraient-ils tort d’avoir… raison? [PDF, in French].

Other Eurofighter Contracts

• DID – The 2006 Saudi Shopping Spree: Eurofighter Flies Off With Saudi Contract.

• DID – Eurofighter’s Rough Ride in Austria.

• DID – UK’s Eurofighters Fly To Availability-Based Contracting .

• DID – Spain’s Moron Maintenance: EUR 150M to EADS for Typhoons.

• DID – Eurofighter GmbH Signs EUR 600M+, 5-year Support Contract for Italy.

• DID – BAE Wins Big PBL Support Contracts for European & Saudi Eurofighters.

• DID (July 5/05) – $1.5B for Eurofighter Electronic Warfare Suite. Part of Tranche 2 production.

tag: typhoonfocus, eurofighterfocus

Americas

• The upgrade program of the Chinook CH-47F looks to be shortly approved after a successful meeting at the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council. All that is required for the project to be green lit, is a signed decision memorandum that will allow the service to release a request for proposals for its “Block II” upgrade program. While little is known of the exact upgrades that will be part of the program, it is believed that changes will be made to the electrical system, transmission and rotor system, as well as increasing the helicopter payload by 4,000 pounds to 54,000.

• Engine makers Pratt & Whitney will make engines for the F-35 program. Details of the agreement have yet to be finalized, but two contracts will be issued to produce 167 engines to power Lockheed Martin’s latest jet within the next month. Further details of the deals have yet to be realized, but sources close to the deal revealed that the production of the engines alongside engineering support, spare parts and program management, would be worth more than $3 billion to Pratt, a unit of United Technologies Corporation. The USAF said that the latest contracts will help drive down costs of the program which makes it affordable for customers.

• Tomahawk cruise missiles could get a lot more destructive if a new development program is successful. Researchers from Energetic Materials Research and Engineering have been successfully utilizing residual fuel left inside a missile during impact and turning it into a fuel-air explosive that can contribute to the blast created by the missile’s warhead. At present the team are looking to find the best way to implode the fuel tank to generate a cloud of fuel that will mix with surrounding air to ignite into an intense, high-temperature explosion. If successful, the add on to the missile could increase the Tomahawks payload without any need to change the dynamics of the warhead.

Middle East North Africa

• Britain’s largest warships may have problems docking at some Royal Navy bases according to a question answered in parliament. It’s been revealed that the HMS Jufair in Bahrain would be unable to support Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers when they come into operational capability in 2020. Armed Forces Minister Penny Mordaunt stated that while the aircraft carriers would be able to access facilities while at anchor in the vicinity of the Mina Salman port, it would not be able to berth directly alongside the support facility itself due to draught constraints.

Europe

• Increased Swedish-Finn defense ties may see the latter purchase Gripen fighters replacing the Air Force’s F/A-18 C/D Hornet aircraft, which are scheduled to be retired between 2025 and 2030. While both governments have remained tight lipped about any particular deal, the increase in bilateral ties may see Sweden’s Gripen gain an advantage as a potential choice for the Finish HX-program. Both nations follow neutrality clauses which prevent them from joining NATO, but they are looking build the basis for a stronger regional military-security alliance with NATO-neighbors Denmark, Norway, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.

Asia Pacific

• After some delays, Afghanistan has finally received delivery of four A-19 Super Tucanos. The light attack aircraft are equipped with the capacity to fire guided and unguided rockets. The Brazilian manufactured jet will be used to carry out advanced training, border surveillance and internal security missions. Pilots and maintenance crew for the aircraft underwent training at Moody Air Force Base in Georgia in late 2015. On December 7, two of the students went missing from the base prompting a search. One of the airmen was recently located while the other remains unaccounted for.

• The visit of Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Sri Lanka did not result in a purchase of JF-17 fighters. A Sri Lankan Air Force spokesperson said that while the fighter is still being considered, among others, a deal was never going to be signed alongside Sharif’s visit to Colombo. The JF-17 still seems to be the top choice for Sri Lanka which is looking to replace the Israeli Kfri jet currently in use.

• An earlier Defense News report that Taiwan may procure refurbished AV-8 Harrier Jump Jets from the USMC has been refuted by Taipei. A potential sale would have been facilitated through the Excess Defense Articles program as the USMC replaced the jets with the F-35B stealth fighters. Despite this, the Taiwan defense ministry denied that they would be looking to buy the aircraft, stating that the fighter is outdated and that performance is inconsistent with future needs.

Today’s Video

• A SpaceX Falcon 9 crashing after a mishap landing on a sea platform.:

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Block IV Cutaway
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Block IV Tomahawk is the current generation of the Tomahawk family of cruise missiles. The BGM-109 Tomahawk family began life in the 1980s as sub-sonic, low-flying nuclear strike weapons, before being developed into long-range RGM/UGM-109 conventional attack missiles. They’re most frequently launched from submarines and surface ships, and have been the US Navy’s preferred option for initial air strikes in Iraq, Libya, et. al. Britain has also bought Tomahawk missiles, and launches them exclusively from submarines.

Block IV is the latest variant. It adds innovative technologies that improve combat flexibility, while dramatically reducing the costs to buy, operate, and support these missiles. That’s why the Block IV program, under US Navy PMA-280, has been one of the USA’s defense acquisition success stories over the last decade.

xGM-109: Missile & Launcher Types TLAM operation
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Tomahawk missiles have become the US Navy’s major land strike missile. The USA has bought more than 4,000 over the years, and March 2011 saw the 2,000th GM-109 Tomahawk fired in combat, from USS Barry [DDG 52]. The missile typically flies at 50 – 100 feet above ground using terrain-following radar, and navigates to its targets using a combination of GPS/INS, computer matching of the land’s radar-mapped contours to the missile’s internal maps (TERCOM), and final matching of the target scene (DSMAC). Once on target the missile can fly a direct horizontal attack mode, trigger preprogrammed detonation above the target, or use a pop-up and dive maneuver. CEP is often described as being about 10 meters.

There are 3 fielded variants.

The xGM-109C/D Block III missiles will serve in the US Navy until FY 2020, and can be fitted with either a 1,000 pound unitary conventional warhead (xGM-109C), or a conventional submunitions warhead with hundreds of smaller bomblets (xGM-109D). The Tomahawk Block III has a 750 nautical mile range. Unfortunately, mission planning requires 80 hours of work.

The xGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV achieved Initial Operating Capability in 2004, and current Pentagon plans will end purchases in 2015. Block IV reportedly increases missile range to 900 nautical miles, but it only uses the unitary warhead. Mission planning has been cut from 80 hours to just 1 hour, which makes a big difference to combat usage. The missile also has a 2-way UHF SATCOM datalink that allows the missile to be redirected in flight, or commanded to loiter over an area and wait for instructions from a Fleet HQ’s Maritime Operations Center.

Submarine Launch 109 UGM-109 launch
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Submarine-launched UGM-109 missiles are more expensive than their ship launched RGM-109 VLS counterparts, because the submarines’ launch mechanism is more involved and more strenuous. UGM-109 “all-up-round” storage and interface canisters come in 2 types: CLS and TTL. CLS canisters launch UGM-109s from vertical launch tubes installed on many of America’s Los Angeles Class (SSN 719 on), all Virginia Class, and all SSGN Ohio Class submarines. TTL canisters are used to launch Tomahawk missiles from a submarine’s torpedo tubes, which is Britain’s preferred method.

In both cases, a Tomahawk launches “wet”, unlike most anti-ship missiles. The canister remains in the vertical-launch or torpedo tube, while the missile is ejected. Once the UGM-109 has reached a safe distance from the submarine, its rocket booster ignites underwater to power it airborne. That booster falls away just before the missile ignites its jet engine. If the submarine needs to “clear the tube” for torpedoes, anti-ships missiles, mines, UUVs, etc., TTL canisters can be ejected into the sea after launch, as a separate evolution. In contrast, CLS vertical-launch canisters are only removed portside, when the submarine comes into base for servicing and reloading.

Tomahawk: The 2019 Evolution LRASM-A Concept
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There was a plan to develop a successor to the retired xGM-109B ship-killer by 2015, as an interim capability for the US Navy’s Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) program. That was shelved in the FY 2014 budget, as the Navy opted to drop the interim capability. Instead, they’re moving ahead with OASuW’s main xGM-84 Harpoon missile replacement program for air and sea launch. The LRASM derivative of Lockheed Martin’s subsonic but stealthy AGM-158B JASSM-ER is the initial air-launched missile, but there will be competition for air and naval missiles beyond FY 2019.

Raytheon has partnered with Norway’s Kongsberg to offer the stealthy, and accurate JSM for the air-launched OASuW, and their entry has the unique ability to fit inside the F-35C’s weapon bays. They could also offer Kongsberg’s NSM counterpart in the naval realm, but that would leave Tomahawk in the cold. Or would it?

The key to the next set of Tomahawk improvements is actually a warranty. The missile has a 15-year warranty and a 30-year service life, so 2019 will begin a recertification cycle for the fleet that could last until 2030. Threats continue to evolve, so why not add some missile upgrades while they’re back in the shop anyway? The US Navy already has a specifications sheet of possible improvements, and they’ve done a number of capability studies.

Raytheon is investing almost $40 million of its own funds in parallel, and they’re still talking to the Navy about that final package, which will break down into 3 broad categories.

MI concept

Anti-Access/ Area Denial Communications Suite. Saddam Hussein had a sophisticated anti-aircraft system, but he didn’t have the kind of high-end jamming and emissions triangulation capabilities expected of future opponents. The challenge is twofold: keep the enemy from cutting off your communications, and keep your communications from alerting the enemy.

One option that has been mentioned in public involves adding a Line Of Sight datalink capability. The flip side of that move would involve training and tactics changes that push missile control farther down the command chain. That may be necessary, but is the US Navy comfortable doing that? There’s more to these A2/AD-CS discussions than just picking technologies.

Autonomy. The Tomahawk is already an autonomous weapon, in the sense that it can be fired at pre-planned fixed targets and left alone. To remain relevant, it needs to add dynamic terminal autonomy: the ability to acquire targets on its own and hit them, even if the target is moving or has moved. It would also be useful to expand the missile’s navigation autonomy, by offering backups for hardened SASSM M-code GPS.

Both kinds of upgrades are being contemplated. Early tests that aren’t autonomous involve Rapid In-flight Target Update, which allows units that have a lock on a target to transmit rapid final scene updates for the missile’s DSMAC guidance. This is still done via Fleet HQ as Standard Operational Procedure, but that’s enough to hit moving targets in some circumstances. Ships would become vulnerable to Tomahawk strikes if the targeting platform can survive their defenses, and the same is true for land-based air defense systems that can repeatedly move to new fixed locations.

Raytheon and the Navy are looking for more, with a focus on mature technologies to cut down program risk. An ESM system for noticing and geolocating emissions has already begun testing. Raytheon personnel stress its quality, to the point that Navigation via Signals of Opportunity (NAVSOP) might be possible as a backup to GPS. During the attack run, ESM can allow the Tomahawk to home in on an active enemy ship or air defense radars, or even on other intercepted signals. That begins to add autonomous moving target capability, and the firm plans to take the next step by flight testing a dual-mode ESM/ active radar seeker system before the end of 2014. Finally, passive visual spectrum (camera or imaging infrared) guidance has also become popular for long-range strike missiles, because it doesn’t give the missile’s location away by creating electro-magnetic emissions. Raytheon has confirmed that CCD/IIR upgrades are also under consideration for Tomahawk, but stressed that no final decisions have been made about a future guidance package.

Core Strengthening. All of these capabilities are great, but they demand more computer processing power, more memory, more onboard power, etc. The missile’s core will need redesigns, in order to keep up.

Raytheon had to develop a Multi-Function Modular Processor to handle those computing needs. Other efforts will look to add new technology, like the Joint Multiple Effects Warhead System (JMEWS) warhead to allow mid-flight reprogramming, and improve performance against reinforced targets like bunkers. Still other attempts will take advantage of existing upgrades. As an example of the latter, Block III introduced the ability to throttle the missile’s Williams F107-WR-402 turbofan, and Raytheon has been expanding its usefulness over time. It’s a capability that’s obviously handy for adjusting the missile’s time of arrival, or extending range, but the firm has recently been testing a “high speed dash” mode. It’s still subsonic, but it represents some impressive flying that close to the ground.

The Missing Link Saab S340-AEW
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Even after all of these upgrades, the Tomahawk is still a 1970s design that relies on low altitude to hide from radar. That isn’t really subject to change, even though downward-looking radars are proliferating on small AWACS planes and aerostat blimps, and radars in modern ships and air defense systems are taking big steps forward.

All of the Tomahawk’s proposed technologies are well and good, and they will expand the missile’s usefulness substantially. Adding them to thousands of existing missiles is very cost effective, and makes a great deal of sense. As budget crunches force the Navy to re-examine every aspect of their programs, however, the Navy will have to make decisions about the cost, capability profile, and limitations of every weapon in their arsenal. Raytheon is trying to position Tomahawk as best they can, but the final decisions will lie elsewhere.

Contracts & Key Events 45 min. documentary
(click for video)

Unless stated otherwise, US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contracts to Raytheon in Tucson, AZ. In general, these contracts aren’t competitively procured, pursuant to the “only 1 responsible supplier” exemption in 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1).

Key subcontractors include Lockheed Martin in Valley Forge, PA (Weapon Control System element), QinetiQ North America in San Jose, CA (Command and Control element), and Boeing Inc. in St. Louis, MO (Command and Control element).

FY 2016

January 19/16: Tomahawk cruise missiles could get a lot more destructive if a new development program is successful. Researchers from Energetic Materials Research and Engineering have been successfully utilizing residual fuel left inside a missile during impact and turning it into a fuel-air explosive that can contribute to the blast created by the missile’s warhead. At present the team are looking to find the best way to implode the fuel tank to generate a cloud of fuel that will mix with surrounding air to ignite into an intense, high-temperature explosion. If successful, the add on to the missile could increase the Tomahawks payload without any need to change the dynamics of the warhead.

January 15/16: Testing of a new sensor on the Tomahawk missile has been successful. Raytheon owned T-39 test aircraft carried out a number trials over a three week period engaging moving targets on land and at sea. The development of the sensor was part of company funded, independent R&D looking to enhance the current Tomahawk long-range precision strike/land attack role. Since 2005, Raytheon has been investing in increasing the missile’s seeker capabilities and effectiveness in varying environments.

October 7/15: Raytheon has demonstrated how a Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile can be used to assess battlefield damage, loiter and then attack a target following analysis of the data it provided to operators. The test demonstrated how the missile could be launched from one location, travel to a second area of operations and communicate via a UHF SATCOM link with a third location half-way around the world, before striking a target. The Block IV Tomahawk demonstrated flexible mission planning capabilities in flight during previous testing in August, with this latest round of testing also demonstrating that multiple missiles could be coordinated from a single control point.

FY 2015

August 6/15: Raytheon’s Block IV Tomahawk cruise missile demonstrated mission planning capability during flight tests announced on Wednesday. The upgraded software allowed planners to adapt the missile’s mission profile on the fly, with this new capability now set to be rolled-out across the fleet of Tomahawks in service. The Block IV missile demonstrated similar capabilities in March 2014, when the missile received information in-flight and re-targeted itself to strike a moving vehicle.

Oct 11/14: American A2/AD. Rep. Randy Forces [R-VA-4] sends a letter to Army Chief of Staff Gen. Odierno on the eve of the AUSA conference, pushing for the Army to set up a modern version of its Coastal Artillery: long-range, land-based anti-ship missiles that would be forward-based in friendly countries to endanger Chinese vessels and shipping. Missiles like LRASM and the longer-ranged but less stealthy AGM-109 Tomahawk are obvious candidates for this sort of thing, significantly outranging competitors like Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile or Boeing’s SLAM-ER. The RAND study that Forbes refers to actually posited using shorter-range missiles like NSM, but its maps also showed the number of deployment sites required for effective coverage.

The idea would be a nice turnabout on China’s Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy, and a Philippine deployment would produce a very tangible benefit all by itself, at low cost. On the other hand, Rep. Forbes probably underestimates the difficulty of getting many countries beyond the Philippines to accept an inherently provocative deployment whose use is technically beyond their control. Recent American waffling around the world suggests an even less palatable conclusion: the penalty for saying yes would be immediate, without any assurance that the weapons would actually be used to help the accepting country if push came to shove.

Contrast with the Russian approach. They just sell SS-N-26 shore batteries to interested countries, helping customers to create the same barrier under their own control, without the offsetting political challenges. India’s derivative PJ-10 BrahMos missile may also wind up being used this way, if India can get its act together on the export front. Sources: RAND, “Employing Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles in the Western Pacific” | Breaking Defense, “Army Should Build Ship-Killer Missiles: Rep. Randy Forbes”.

FY 2014

Final dive
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Sept 24/14: Orders. Raytheon in Tucson, AZ receives a $251.1 million firm-fixed-price contract for 231 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round missiles for the U.S. Navy (211: 147 vertical launch systems and 64 capsule launch systems / $224.5 million/ 89.4%) and the United Kingdom (20 torpedo tube launch systems / $26.7 million/ 10.6% – q.v. July 1/14 DSCA request). All funds are committed immediately, using foreign funds and FY 2013 & 2014 US Navy weapon budgets.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32%); Camden, AR (11%); Ogden, UT (8%); Anniston, AL (4%); Minneapolis, MN (4%); Glenrothes, Scotland (4%); Ft. Wayne, IN (4%); Spanish Fork, UT (3%); Ontario, CA (3%); Vergennes, VT (3%); El Segundo, CA (2%); Berryville, AR (2%); Westminster, CO (2%); Middletown, CT (2%); Walled Lake, MI (2%); Huntsville, AL (1%); Dallas, TX (1%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various locations inside and outside the continental United States (11.8%); work is expected to be complete in August 2016.

This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 by US Navy NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-14-C-0075).

US/UK order

July 31/14: Raytheon in Tucson, AZ, receives an $8.7 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification for Tomahawk Depot Missile maintenance, including inventory management for the US Navy and the United Kingdom, and direct fleet support for resolving technical issues with forward deployed, in-theater weapons.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%); Camden, AR (36%); and various other continental United States locations (4%); and is expected to be complete in March 2015. Funds will be obligated on individual delivery orders as they are issued by US Navy NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-13-D-0002).

Sept 9/14: Testing. Raytheon touts a recent pair of live warhead test firings from the USS Hampton [SSN 767: UGM-109] and USS Lake Champlain [CG 57: AGM-109], demonstrating “enhanced flex retargeting” and improved flight performance. Sources: Raytheon, “Tomahawk enhancements showcased in back-to-back flight tests”.

July 17/14: Political. The Senate Appropriations Committee approves a $489.6 billion base FY 2015 budget, plus $59.7 billion in supplemental funding. If they get their way, xGM-109 Tomahawk Block IV production would continue at full rate, with $82 million in extra funding. It has been set to end with a 100 missiles, but the added funds would drive it toward the standard annual buy of 180-200.

The budget still has to be voted on in the whole Senate, then reconciled in committee with the House of Representatives’ defense budget, then signed into law by the President. Sources: DID, “FY15 US Defense Budget Finally Complete with War Funding”.

July 1/14: UK request. The US DSCA announces Britain’s formal request for up to 65 UGM-109 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round missiles plus containers, engineering support, test equipment, operational flight test support, communications equipment, technical assistance, personnel training/equipment, spare and repair parts, and other support. The estimated cost is up to $140 million. DSCA adds that:

“The UK needs these missiles to replenish those expended in support of coalition operations.”

Which is to say, over Libya. The principal contractor will be Raytheon Missile Systems Company in Tucson, AZ, and Britain doesn’t need any more contractors on site from Raytheon or from the US government. Sources: US DSCA #14-30, “United Kingdom – Tomahawk Block IV Torpedo Launched Land-Attack Missiles”.

DSCA request: UK (140)

April 28/14: Testing. Raytheon announces a successful captive-carry test flight, using a small T-39 Saberliner business jet fitted with their passive ESM seeker. The jet flew at subsonic speed and at varying altitudes, while the “passive seeker and multi-function processor successfully received numerous electronic signals from tactical targets in a complex, high density electromagnetic environment.”

This test brings the Raytheon-funded multi-mission processor to Technology Readiness Level 6. The next step for the company-funded effort is an active seeker test, which will combine the processor with ESM and active radar. That combination would likely form the core of future Tomahawk upgrades. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon tests new guidance system for Tomahawk cruise missile”.

April 17/14: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/13 Selected Acquisitions Report [PDF]. It makes early termination official, and explains the savings:

“Program costs decreased $1,832.1 million (25.8%) from $7,109.0 million to $5,276.9 million, due primarily to a decrease of 1,161 TACTOM missiles from 4,951 to 3,790 (-$1,249.2 million) and associated schedule, engineering, and estimating allocations

• (-$586.2 million).”

Note that SecNav Mabus’ comments regarding 4,000 GM-109s in stock (q.v. April 13/14) appear to have been in error. Many have been used over the years.

Termination

April 13/14: Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus sees an inventory of 4,000 Tomahawks that “will carry us through any eventuality that we can foresee,” but Raytheon wants to avoid shutting down their line and cutting the chain to more than 100 suppliers in 24 states. Their lobbying is helped by the fact that the USA’s byzantine procurement and budgeting processes add some strategic risk. News that the Navy was even thinking of a next-generation replacement reportedly came as a surprise to Raytheon in January 2014. Which means that it’s entirely imaginable to have a 20 year wait between the last Tomahawk delivery, and a comparable new operational missile.

On the other hand, every defense production line shuts down eventually, and a dollar spent on Tomahawks can’t buy new ships, fighters, air defense missiles, etc. Rather than waging a frontal assault that tries to keep missile orders coming, Raytheon is reportedly looking to accelerate the combined xGM-109 recertification/ upgrade process by a few years, so it picks up where Tomahawk production leaves off. Raytheon senior program manager Chris Sprinkle says that Raytheon has invested $30 million of their own funds in R&D for upgrades, and plans to invest another $8 million or so. Sources: Arizona Daily Star, “Proposed halt of Tomahawk missile buys raises concerns at Raytheon”.

March 4/14: FY15 Budget. The Navy unveils a preliminary budget request briefing. It doesn’t break down individual programs into dollars, but it does offer planned purchase numbers for the Navy’s biggest programs from FY 2014 – 2019.

The plan confirms 196 Tactical Tomahawk missiles in FY 2014, and proposes to end production with 100 missiles ordered in FY 2015. Source: US Dept. of the Navy, PB15 Press Briefing [PDF].

Feb 19/14: Datalink test. A Tomahawk Block IV missile is launched from the USS Sterett [DDG 104] on a loitering fire test:

“… [the missile] flew a preprogrammed route while receiving updates from a simulated maritime operations center and from advanced off-board sensors updating the missile’s target location. Throughout the flight, the missile maintained communications with all the command and control assets and provided updates on its location before hitting the target.”

Raytheon told DID that this is the first of many tests involving “off-board sensors”, though 2014 will also see a number of flight tests using new on-board ESM and radar sensors. Many will be captive-carry tests, using one of the US Navy’s T-39 Sabreliner modified business jets. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon, U.S. Navy test Tomahawk Block IV’s latest communications upgrades”.

Feb 14/14: Upgrades. Tomahawk program manager Capt. Joe Mauser tells Defense Tech that they’re working on a new Joint Multiple Effects Warhead System (JMEWS) warhead for the Block IV, in order to improve performance against reinforced targets like bunkers.

At the same time, Raytheon is working on a new active & passive dual seeker (q.v. Oct 7/13). Raytheon has been elbowed aside from the OASuW program, which is currently owned by Lockheed Martin’s stealthy LRASM-B. A low-cost upgrade that accomplishes some of OASuW’s goals offers Raytheon the opportunity to get some funds, keep their missile relevant for years to come, and position themselves as a weaker Plan B if further budget cuts remove their competitor. Sources: DefenseTech, “Navy Wants Its Tomahawks to Bust More Bunkers”.

Jan 14/14: #3,000. Raytheon announces that they’ve delivered the 3,000th Tomahawk Block IV missile, as part of FY 2012’s FRP-9 production contract. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon delivers 3000th Tomahawk Block IV to US Navy”.

#3,000

Oct 7/13: ESM multi-mode. Raytheon announces a successful field test of a new multi-mode seeker technology that would add an advanced Electronic Support Measure (ESM) antenna and processor to the Block IV Tomahawk missile. Raytheon told DID that the system is based on the firm’s own technology, rather than being a direct offshoot of the attempt to add AARGM technology to the Tomahawk (q.v. April 27/12).

Raytheon is correct that the current Tomahawk is an open architecture ‘truck’ capable of integrating new payloads and sensors, and an ESM seeker is a helpful addition to recent improvements like the 2-way datalink. ESM would turn the missile into a radar and communications killer that could deal directly with enemy air defenses, and could begin to engage some kinds of moving targets. The challenge is that the missile still needs to survive long enough to hit its target, and the Tomahawk’s low-level flight isn’t enough to protect it from the kind of advanced air defenses that would make you want to use unmanned ESM missiles. Its best use case might be against enemy ships. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon demonstrates new seeker technology for Tomahawk Block IV missile”.

FY 2012 – 2013

Launch.
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April 17/13: UK. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Britain’s request to import follow-on support and keep their UGM-109 Tomahawk Weapon Systems (TWS) ready for use. Work can include missile modifications, maintenance, spare and repair parts, system and test equipment, engineering support, communications equipment, technical assistance, personnel training/equipment, and other related elements of logistics support.

The estimated cost is up to $170 million, but actual costs will be negotiated in a series of contracts. The principal contractors will be Raytheon Missile Systems Company in Tucson, AZ; Lockheed Martin in Manassas, VA, Valley Forge, PA, and Marlton, NJ; Boeing in St. Louis, MO; BAE North America in San Diego, CA; COMGLOBAL in San Jose, CA; and SAIC in Springfield, VA and Patuxent River, MD. Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of 1 U.S. Government and 2 contractor representatives to the United Kingdom for the duration of this case.

DSCA: UK support request

April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage.

News for the Tomahawk program is mixed. The OASuW Harpoon replacement program canceled plans for an interim solution based on the xGM-109 family, even as it plans to award Technology Development contracts in FY 2013. Raytheon will need to consider its competitive options carefully, as OASuW could grow to be a huge opportunity.

Within the existing Tomahawk program, yearly budgets are rising even though the number of missiles per year remains constant at 196. This is pushing flyaway cost for new missiles from $956,000 in FY 2013 to about $1.2 million. The extra funds are going to 2 areas: obsolescence replacement/ diminishing manufacturing sources, and restoration of planned missile improvements. The former category includes such key components as the Williams turbojet engine and the satellite datalink, and is important enough that FY 2011 – 2011 contract savings are being applied to address it. Improvements will begin with missile communications that will work even in jamming-rich or otherwise hostile environments.

March 11/13: UK. A $6.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 4 torpedo tube launched (TTL) Tomahawk Block IV all-up-round missiles for the government of the United Kingdom under the Foreign Military Sales Program. All funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32.6%); Camden, AR (13%); Ogden, UT (10.5%); Dallas, TX (3.5%); Minneapolis, Minn. (3.3%); Glenrothes, Scotland (3.3%); Spanish Fork, UT (3.1%); El Segundo, CA (3%); Walled Lake, MI (2.6%); Anniston, AL (2.5%); Ft. Wayne, IN (2.3%); Ontario, Canada (2.2%); Vergennes, VT (2.1%); Berryville, AR (1.8%); Westminster, CO (1.6%); Largo, FL (1.5%); Middletown, CT (1.3%); Huntsville, AL (1.2%); Clearwater, FL (0.8%); Moorpark, CA (0.8%); El Monte, CA (0.6%); Salt Lake City, UT (0.6%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various continental U.S. (CONUS) and outside CONUS locations (5.6%); and is expected to be completed in February 2015 (N00019-12-C-2000).

4 for Britain

March 7/13: Support. A $12.8 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for services in support of Tomahawk missile depot maintenance, including direct fleet support for resolving technical issues with forward deployed, in-theater weapons and inventory management for the US Navy and the United Kingdom.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (70%); Camden, AR (24%); Commerce Township, MI (4%); Indianapolis, IN (1%); and various other continental U.S. (CONUS) and outside CONUS locations (1%) until February 2014. $2.4 million is committed immediately, of which $2.3 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-13-D-0002).

Jan 17/13: DOT&E testing. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The Tomahawk gets high marks. It continues to meet its standards, and remains operationally effective and suitable (maintainable).

The one thing Pentagon OT&E would like to see is restored flight testing of the Block III model, until it goes out of service in FY 2020.

Dec 18/12: CCLS. A $45 million firm-fixed-price contract modification from the USN for 120 Tomahawk Block IV Composite Capsule Launching Systems (CCLS), which are used to launch UGM-109s from vertical submarine tubes. All contract funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (24.61%); Lincoln, NB (23.17%); Camden, AR (12.48%); Rocket Center, WVA (10.3%); Carpentersville, IL (8.74%); Joplin, MO (6.63%); Hopkinton, MA (4.76%); Huntsville, AR (4.37%); Alamitos, CA (2.05%); Torrance, CA (1.47%); Downers Grove, IL (0.75%); and Brooksville, FL (0.67%), and is expected to be complete in July 2015 (N00019-12-C-2000).

Dec 17/12: 252 missiles. A $254.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising a US Navy option for 252 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round (AUR) missiles: 132 RGM-109s designed to launch from strike-length Mk.41 cells on surface ships, and 120 UGM-109 CLS missiles that are fired from different vertical launch tubes installed on American submarines.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32%); Camden, AR (11%); Ogden, UT (8%); Anniston, AL (4%); Minneapolis, MN (4%); Ft. Wayne, IN (4%); Glenrothes, Scotland (4%); Dallas, TX (4%); Spanish Fork, UT (3%); Vergennes, VT (3%); Walled Lake, MI (2%); Berryville, AR (2%); El Segundo, CA (2%); Westminster, CO (2%); Middletown, CT (2%); Huntsville, AL (1%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various locations in the continental United States and outside the continental United States (11.8%); and is expected to be completed in August 2015. See also Raytheon.

FY 2013: 252

Sept 3/12: OASuW. Aviation Week offers a look into the Tomahawk’s potential future. In June 2012, the US Navy announced a sole-source contract to Raytheon to develop the interim Offensive Anti-Surface Weapon (OASuW) by modifying a Tomahawk Block IV missiles with new sensors and data links. The missile is expected to enter service by 2015… but it’s likely to face competition from Lockheed Martin’s LRASM-A, among others.

Full OASuW Technology Development awards are expected to begin in FY 2013, after a Q2 Milestone A decision. The technical Development phase runs from FY 2013 – FY 2017, to an expected total of $557.2 million. Initial Operational Capability is currently set for 2024.

July 12/12: CCLS. A $45.9 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, buying 123 Tomahawk Block IV Composite Capsule Launching Systems (CCLS) for the US Navy.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (24.61%); Lincoln, NB (23.17%); Camden, AR (12.48%); Rocket Center, WVA (10.3%); Carpentersville, IL (8.74%); Joplin, MO (6.63%); Hopkinton, MA (4.76%); Huntsville, AR (4.37%); Alamitos, CA (2.05%); Torrance, CA (1.47%); Downers Grove, IL (0.75%); and Brooksville, FL (0.67%), and is expected to be complete in July 2014 (N00019-12-C-2000).

June 7/12: 361 missiles. A $337.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for 361 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round missiles for the Navy. This includes 238 RGM-109E missiles that are launched from strike-length Mk.41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells on surface ships, and 123 UGM-109E missiles that are launched from submarines equipped with the Capsule Launch System (CLS).

Raytheon’s release says that the buy includes replenishment of weapons used during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in Libya, as well as the FY 2012 buy.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32%); Camden, AR (11%); Ogden, UT (8%); Anniston, AL (4%); Minneapolis, MN (4%); Fort Wayne, IN (4%); Glenrothes, Scotland, UK (4%); Dallas, TX (4%); Spanish Fork, UT (3%); Vergennes, VT (3%); Walled Lake, MI (2%); Berryville, AR (2%); El Segundo, CA (2%); Westminster, CO (2%); Middletown, CT (2%); Huntsville, AL (1%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various locations inside and outside the continental United States (11.8%), and is expected to be complete in August 2014 (N00019-12-C-2000).

FY 2012 + Libya replacement: 361

April 27/12: New sensors? FBO.gov:

“The Naval Air Systems Command intends to negotiate and award a sole source order under Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) N00019-11-G-0014, pricing arrangement cost-plus-fixed-fee, for engineering services necessary to support a study to assess the possibility of integrating, onto the Block IV Tomahawk weapon, Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) technologies.”

The AGM-88E AARGM uses GPS to navigate to the target’s vicinity, then finds targets that are moving or have moved using a combination of emission-locating ESM and an active millimeter wave radar seeker. AARGM is meant to destroy enemy air defense systems, but a system for a missile of this size would also be able to target enemies like ships. ATK received a $452,000 contract on Aug 22/12.

xGM-109E Block IV TLAMs: A Program Success Story Fly.
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Block IV missiles offer a number of improvements over previous versions: the missile’s purchase cost drops by almost half, to about $750,000, while lowering its future maintenance costs, and upgrading its capabilities.

Capt. Bob Novak, who was the Tomahawk All-Up-Round (PMA-280) program manager until August 2005, began leading the Tomahawk AUR program team in 2002 during a critical time in the development of the Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile. Under his leadership the program awarded the Navy’s first-ever weapons multi-year contract, and was estimated to have reduced the cost per missile from Block III to Block IV by almost 50%, saving $1 billion over planned lifetime costs while upgrading the missile’s capabilities. While reducing the Block IV Tactical Tomahawk’s purchase costs, improved design and manufacturing also reduced maintenance/ recertification requirements from once every 8 years for Block III missiles to once every 15 years.

PMA-280 was honored with several prominent awards, including the Secretary of Defense Value Engineering Award, the Daedalian Award, and the Ed Heinemann Award.

Boom.
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One important new capability that Block IV Tomahawk brings to the US Navy’s Sea Strike doctrine is derived from the missile’s 2-way satellite data link, which enables the missile to respond to changing battlefield conditions. The strike controller can “flex” the missile in flight to preprogrammed alternate targets, redirect it to a new target, or even have it loiter over the battlefield awaiting a more critical target. Block IV Tomahawks can also transmit battle damage indication imagery and missile health and status messages via the satellite data link, allowing firing platforms to execute missions in real time.

Global Positioning System-only missions are also possible in addition to the missile’s previous terrain-mapping guidance mode, thanks to an improved anti-jam GPS receiver for enhanced mission performance.

The majority of Tomahawk cruise missiles are currently launched by Navy surface vessels, such as the Ticonderoga Class (CG-47) cruisers and Arleigh Burke Class (DDG-51) destroyers. The later series of Improved Los Angeles Class (SSN-688I) and the newest Virginia Class (SSN-744) attack submarines are also armed with 12 dedicated Tomahawk launch tubes, while earlier Los Angeles boats and the newest Seawolf Class (SSN-21) have to sacrifice some of their stored torpedoes to carry and launch Tomahawks through their torpedo tubes. But the USA’s premier Tomahawk carrier vehicle in future will be the Ohio Class SSGN stealth strike subs, with launch capacity for an astounding 154 Tactical Tomahawks each.

Additional Readings & Sources

DID would like to thank Raytheon Tomahawk Program Director Roy Donelson, and Growth Program Manager Chris Sprinkle, for their assistance with this article. Any mistakes are our own damn fault. Readers with corrections or information to contribute are encouraged to contact editor Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

Weapon & Program Background

• US NAVAIR – Tactical Tomahawk

• Raytheon – Tomahawk Cruise Missile. See also their 2012 paper on the missile’s evolution from Block III: “Tomahawk: Serving the U.S. and Allied Warfighter“.

• Globalsecurity.org – BGM-109 Tomahawk

• DoN Acquisition One Source – Reducing Cost/Schedule for TOMAHAWK All-Up-Round Program

• Air Power Australia – Tomahawk Cruise Missile Variants: BGM/RGM/AGM-109 Tomahawk/TASM/TLAM/GCLM/MRASM. Last updated 2012.

• DID – Naval Swiss Army Knife: MK 41 Vertical Missile Launch Systems (VLS). Strike-length cells are required to fire Tomahawks.

News & Views

• DID – LRASM Missiles: Reaching for a Long-Range Punch. Covers the USN’s OASuW program, whose sea-launched component has already affected the Tomahawk program. The current plan is based around air and sea-launched adaptations of Lockheed Martin’s AGM-158B JASSM-ER.

• FAS Strategic Security Blog (March 18/13) – US Navy Instruction Confirms Retirement of Nuclear Tomahawk Cruise Missile. The xGM-109B Tomahawk Block II.

• Defense Daily (Nov 29/07) – Navy Seeks New Uses For Tomahawks. Covers a number of program developments, including the potential for thermobaric warheads.

• Naval Air Station Patuxent River Tester Magazine (April 12/07) – Submarine-launched Tomahawk IV flight test a success

• Naval Air Station Patuxent River Tester Magazine (Dec 14/06) – Tomahawk IV in West Coast Test. “The test successfully demonstrated the Tomahawk Strike Network. The Tomahawk Strike Network (TSN) is a unique aspect of the Block IV system. Utilized in this test, TSN is a communications network that provides secure connectivity among all of the participants in a strike plan. Those participants include the Block IV missile(s), the strike controller, and the missile controller. Messages are generated, sent, and received inside the network, and are monitored by a channel controller. TSN allows the strike controller to retarget the missile in flight, monitor the health and status of the missile in flight, and collect images along the route.”

• Naval Air Station Patuxent River Tester Magazine (Aug 10/05) – Tomahawk program marks historic milestone. Capt. Rick McQueen became the 1st program manager for the newly formed Tomahawk Weapons System Program Office (PMA-280), as the Navy’s All-Up-Round (PMA-280) and Cruise Missile Weapons Systems (PMA-282) groups merged.

• Naval Air Station Patuxent River Tester Magazine (Oct 7/04) – New Tomahawk ready for warfighter. Block IV was accepted by the USN on Sept 29/04.

Americas

• Raytheon has been given an $85 million contract to supply Griffin A & B Block II/III missiles to the USAF. Delivery of the missiles is expected to be January 31, 2017. The missiles are the two variants of the AGM-176 Griffin mini-missile. The Griffin A is an unpowered precision munition that can be dropped from a rear cargo door, or a door-mounted launcher of an aircraft, while the rocket-powered Griffin B can be employed as an air-to-surface or surface-to-surface missile. Both are currently being used on a variety of weapons platforms including LCS vessels, C-130 aircraft and UAVs.

• The foreign military sales approval process has been described as “tortuous” by the US Navy Secretary, Ray Mabus. Mabus made calls for continual streamlining of the approval process which he claimed frustrated all parties involved. The announcement comes amid frustrations felt by companies such as Boeing over large purchase orders by the governments of Kuwait and Qatar. Kuwait and Boeing are currently awaiting approval of a $3 billion deal for twenty-eight F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter jets which Mabus viewed as symptomatic of a larger problem in place.

• All variants of the F-35 fighter jet are to get design overhauls since the discovery that the fuel tanks could over-pressurize in certain flight profiles; 154 F-35s have been delivered to date. Lockheed Martin has already received contracts to implement fixes on F-35A and F-35B, and are currently putting together a proposal for engineering works on the F-35C. Fuel tank ruptures have potentially devastating consequences, especially for fast moving aircraft such as the F-35s, with the potential to cost millions of dollars worth of damage.

Europe

• Belgium’s government is looking to buy the Patriot air defense system as part of its new strategic defense plan. The plan, if approved by the parliamentary defense select committee, could potentially see over $600 million used to purchase a battery of the system. Defence minister Steven Vandeput said the system would be used not only as part of Belgium’s defense from ballistic missile threats, but could be utilized by other NATO allies in places where such a system is most needed such as on the Turkish-Syrian border. The announcement comes alongside the news that Poland may also install the system in their country in a procurement that could reach $5 billion.

• Running contrary to earlier reports, Serbia’s up and coming defense shopping list will not include the S-300 system. With limitations to its current budgets, the system was not part of discussions with Russian officials who visited Belgrade for a defense and trade summit last week. Instead, requests to buy MiG-29 fighters, the short-range Tor missile system and medium-range Pantsir-S1 systems have been made. Keeping their budget in mind, it’s been reported that these will be supplied from refurbished existing stocks rather than fresh off the production line. News that they were looking to buy the long-range S-300 system was seen as a counter-measure to recent plans for NATO to establish its own missile defense shield in Croatia.

Asia Pacific

• The suspense surrounding India’s Rafale jet acquisition continues. With plans seemingly already in place for the deal to be finalized, India is looking to negotiate a new option to the existing deal to buy thirty-six fighters from Dassault. A visit to New Delhi by French defense minister Jean-Yves Le Drian last week was initially seen as a final dotting of i’s and crossing of t’s on negotiations ahead of President Hollande’s visit next week. The Indian government seems to be more confident that the $9.1 million deal will be ready for the visit, claiming the contract to be “politically ready”.

• China will receive its first batch of Su-35 fighters by the fourth quarter of this year with completion due in the next three years. It’s unknown how many will be delivered in 2016, but twenty-four fighters have been ordered in total at a cost of $2 billion. Beijing is the first foreign customer of the latest multi-role jet, although there have been fears that the purchase is only being made in order to reverse engineer key technologies for China’s own indigenous fighters.

• Japanese Air Self-Defense Force aircraft has failed to detect nuclear material over North Korea. Since the apparent hydrogen bomb test by the DPRK earlier this month, the Japanese have been conducting environmental tests to monitor radiation levels near where the testing took place. Earlier monitoring posts had also failed to detect any such material which prompted Tokyo to send four T-4 training aircraft and one C-130 to collect further air samples.

Today’s Video

• Japanese sniffer aircraft sent to DPRK:

Americas

• The US Navy successfully tested a Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block II from the SeaRAM anti-ship missile defense system for the first time. SeaRAM, used on the Independence class of Littoral Combat Ships, successfully detected, tracked and engaged an inbound threat, and fired a RAM Block II that successfully intercepted the target. The SeaRam system utilized Raytheon’s Phalanx Close-In Weapon System for the test which is a rapid-fire, computer-controlled radar and 20mm gun system that acquires, tracks and destroys enemy threats that have penetrated all other ship defense systems. The two systems combined can also be found on the Navy’s destroyers.

Europe

• The Belgian government has approved a plan to modernize its airforce by 2030, but at a cost of a reduction in personnel. $10 billion will be made available for upgrades to equipment and machinery, however it will necessitate a decrease in the military and civilian workforce from 32,000 to 25,000. While no preferences have been made as to what will be bought, the investment will see thirty-four fighter bombers bought to replace the fifty-six aging F-16s in service. This will go alongside two new frigates, six minesweepers and two new UAVs. Brussels is also considering participation in the Tanker Aircraft Program.

• United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) is to supply fifty more of their Su-35 fighters to the Russian Army. When delivered, this will bring the number of the jets in operation by the Russians to ninety-eight. The deal is estimated to be worth between $787-800 million. UAC subsidiary Sukhoi, who manufactures the jets, looks to have a busy 2016 ahead as the order from the defense ministry adds to a recent agreement to export twelve Su-32 bombers to Algeria.

• There are unconfirmed reports that Serbia may purchase MiG-35 warplanes from Russia as part of a wider defense package for the country. The rumours come as Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin is visiting Belgrade to take part in a meeting of the Serbia-Russia Intergovernmental Committee for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation which ended yesterday. Serbia’s recent economic recovery has been praised tentatively by the IMF as it looks to increase foreign trade with Russia, a potential growing partner. Serbia is anxious to increase its defensive capabilities at a time when neighbouring NATO members are modernizing their militaries.

• The delivery of four Phoenix 30 UAVs to the Romanian Army has been completed. Developed by UAV Solutions, the rotorcraft also come equipped with the company’s Dragon View combined electro-optical/infrared stabilized camera, a ground control system, spares and ground support equipment. The sale was approved under the US Foreign Military Sales program. Romania is also one of fifteen NATO member states participating in the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance program. The program will see five RQ-4 Global Hawk acquired from Northrop Grumman, and operated by NATO on behalf of the members.

Asia Pacific

• Swiss defense company Rheinmetall is to supply four Oerlikon Skyguard 3 systems to the Royal Thai Army. This is the first purchase the kingdom has made from Rheinmetall. The order includes four fire control systems and up to eight 35mm Oerlikon GDF 007 twin guns, the company’s Ahead airburst ammunition and additional support services. The system uses air surveillance, target acquisition, calculation of the derivative-action values, and the control of two Oerlikon 35 mm anti-aircraft guns and can quickly be deployed to bring down fast moving, small targets.

• Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is making final preparations for their HAL Tejas lightweight fighter debut at the Bahrain Air Show next week. With plans to impress the experts and pick up a few potential customers along the way, HAL’s display apparently “significantly surpasses any aerobatics display the fighter has presented earlier”. The company plans to have gained final operating clearance (FOC) by mid-2016, and has also annouced that it is to test fire the Rafael Derby beyond-visual-range missile (BVRAAM) in March. The Israeli made missile has been bought as a stopgap arrangement as India grapples to make BVR missile Astra, which is still in development, operational.

• Remington has completed its $40.1 million delivery of M4 carbine rifles to the Philippine Army ahead of schedule. Over 56,000 of the rifles have been delivered in total, and will replace the antiquated 1960s era variant of the M-16 currently in use by the PA. Prior to distribution, a third of the new arms will undergo mandatory ballistic testing while the M-16s will be distributed to reservists.

Today’s Video

• A look at South Korea’s plans to develop stealth UAVs:

An M4 – or is it?
(click to view full)

The 5.56mm M-16 has been the USA’s primary battle rifle since the Vietnam war, undergoing changes into progressive versions like the M16A4 widely fielded by the US Marine Corps, “Commando” carbine versions, etc. The M4 Carbine is the latest member of the M16 family, offering a shorter weapon more suited to close-quarters battle, or to units who would find a full-length rifle too bulky.

In 2006 an Army solicitation for competitive procurement of 5.56mm carbine designs was withdrawn, once sole-source incumbent Colt dropped its prices. The DoD’s Inspector General weighed in with a critical report, but the Army dissented, defending its practices as a sound negotiating approach that saved the taxpayers money. As it turns out, there’s a sequel. A major sequel that has only grown bigger with time.

The M4/M16 family is both praised and criticized for its current performance in the field. In recent years, the M4 finished dead last in a sandstorm reliability test, against 3 competitors that include a convertible M4 variant. Worse, the 4th place M4 had over 3.5x more jams than the 3rd place finisher. Was that a blip in M4 buys, or a breaking point? The Army moved forward with an “Individual Carbine” competition, but as the results started to show the M4 again lagging – even with ammunition changed to a round specially formulated to make the M4 shine – the Army abruptly stopped the process once again, stating that the performance superiority of the competing gun was not better to a degree making it worthwhile. The Army stated after the tests that only a result that was twice as good as the existing gun’s performance would signify an actionable performance difference.

More recently, the Marines have considered adding
various after-market upgrades to the platform in order to increase accuracy, learning from the private sector and competitive shooting circuit what appears to be providing the best bang.

The M4 Carbine M203 on M4 Carbine
(click to view full)

It seemed like a routine request. Order more M4 carbines for US forces in the FY 2007 supplemental, FY 2008 budget, and FY 2008 supplemental funding bills. It has turned into anything but a routine exercise, however – with serving soldiers, journalists, and Senators casting a very critical eye on the effort and the rifle, and demanding open competition. With requests amounting to $375 million for weapons and $150 million in accessories, they say, the Army’s proposal amounts to an effort to replace the M16 as the USA’s primary battle rifle – using specifications that are around 15 years old, without a competition, and without considering whether better 5.56 mm alternatives might be available off the shelf.

The M4 offers a collapsible buttstock, flat-top upper receiver assembly, a U-shaped handle-rear sight assembly that could be removed, and assortment of mounting rails for easy customization with a variety of sight, flashlight, grenade launchers, shotgun attachments, etc. It achieves approximately 85% commonality with the M16, and has become a popular weapon. It has a reputation for lightness, customizability, and, compared to its most frequent rival the AK-47, a reputation for accuracy as well. The carbine’s reputation for fast-point close-quarters fire remains its most prominent feature, however. After Action Reviews done by the Marines after the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed that urban warfare scenarios made employment of the M16A2 difficult in some situations; Marines were picking up short AK-47s with folding butt-stocks, or scrounging pistols for use inside buildings.

Like its predecessor the M16, the M4 also has a reputation as an excellent weapon – if you can maintain it. Failure to maintain the weapon meticulously can lead to jams, especially in sandy or dusty environments. Kalashnikovs may not have a reputation for accuracy, or lightness – but they do have a well-earned reputation for being able to take amazing amounts of abuse, without maintenance, and still fire reliably. The Israeli “Galil” applied these lessons in 5.56mm caliber, and earned a similar reputation. Colt’s M16 and M4 have never done so.

The original order for the M4 Carbine in the mid-1990s was a small-scale order, for a specifically requested derivative of the Army’s primary battle rifle, to equip units who would otherwise have relied on less accurate 9mm submachine guns. As such, its direct development and sole-source contract status raised little fuss. Subsequent contracts also raised little scrutiny.

So, what changed?

1. Extended combat in dusty, sandy environments that highlighted the weapon’s weak points as well as its comparative strengths, leading to escalating volumes of complaints;
2. The emergence of alternatives that preserve those strengths, while addressing those weak points;
3. The scale of the current request for funding.

Nobody Loves Me but My Mother – and She Could Be Jivin’ Too… XM29 OICW Prototype
(click to view full)

There have been sporadic attempts to field more modern weapons during its tenure, including the unwieldy 20-or-so pound, 2 barrel, “someone watched Predator too many times” XM-29 OICW, and more recently the aborted contract for the G36-derived XM-8 weapon family from Heckler & Koch. Still, the M4’s designers could never sing B.B. King’s famous tune.

The M16/M4 family has achieved a great deal of success, and garnered many positive reviews for its features and performance. Even its critics acknowledge that it has many positive attributes. The M4 has also attracted criticism – and at least 1 comprehensive fix.

According to briefing documents obtained by Gannett’s Army Times magazine:

“USMC officials said the M4 malfunctioned three times more often than the M16A4 during an assessment conducted in late summer 2002 for Marine Corps Systems Command at Quantico, VA. Malfunctions were broken down into several categories, including “magazine,” “failure to chamber,” “failure to fire,” “failure to extract” and “worn or broken part,” according to the briefing documents. During the comparison, the M4 failed 186 times across those categories over the course of 69,000 rounds fired. The M16A4 failed 61 times during the testing.

The Army conducted a more recent reliability test between October 2005 and April 2006, which included 10 new M16s and 10 new M4s… On average, the new M16s and M4s fired approximately 5,000 rounds between stoppages, according to an Army official who asked that his name not be released.”

In a subsequent letter to the magazine, M4 manufacturer Colt argued that the US Army had disagreed with the USMC study, then added that the Army and Colt had worked to make modifications thereafter in order to address problems found.

Gannett’s Army Times magazine also obtained a copy of Project Manager Soldier’s Weapons Assessment Team’s July 31, 2003, report:

“The executive summary said that M16s and M4s “functioned reliably” in the combat zone as long as “soldiers conducted daily operator maintenance and applied a light coat of lubricant.”

Soldiers had their own comments, however, which were also included in the report and relayed in the magazine article. 3rd ID soldier:

“I know it fires very well and accurate [when] clean. But sometimes it needs to fire dirty well too.”

25th Infantry Division soldier:

“The M4 Weapon in the deserts of Iraq and Afghanistan was quick to malfunction when a little sand got in the weapon. Trying to keep it clean, sand free was impossible while on patrols or firefights.”

82nd Airborne Division soldier:

“The M4 is overall an excellent weapon, however the flaw of its sensitivity to dirt and powder residue needs to be corrected. True to fact, cleaning will help. Daily assigned tasks, and nonregular hours in tactical situations do not always warrant the necessary time required for effective cleaning.”

75th Ranger Regiment member, SOCOM:

“Even with the dust cover closed and magazine in the well, sand gets all inside; on and around the bolt. It still fires, but after a while the sand works its way all through the gun and jams start.”

The 507th Maintenance Company, ambushed outside Nasariyah in 2003 during the opening days of the ground invasion of Iraq, might concur with all of the above. The post-incident report released by the US Army had this to say:

“Dusty, desert conditions do require vigilance in weapons maintenance… However, it is imperative to remember that at the time of the attack, the 507th had spent more than two days on the move, with little rest and time to conduct vehicle repair and recovery operations.”

Even without those extenuating circumstances, however, there have been problems. A December 2006 survey, conducted on behalf of the Army by CNA Corp., conducted over 2,600 interviews with Soldiers returning from combat duty. The M4 received a number of strong requests from M-16 users, who liked its smaller profile. Among M4 users, however, 19% of said they experienced stoppages in combat – and almost 20% of those said they were “unable to engage the target with that weapon during a significant portion of or the entire firefight after performing immediate or remedial action to clear the stoppage.” The report adds that “Those who attached accessories to their weapon were more likely to experience stoppages, regardless of how the accessories were attached [including via official means like rail mounts].” Since “accessories” can include items like night sights, flashlights, etc., their use is not expected to go away any time soon.

US Army Ranger Capt. Nate Self, whose M4 jammed into uselessness during a 2002 firefight after their MH-47 Chinook was shot down in Afghanistan’s Shah-i-kot Mountains, offers another case. He won a Silver Star that day – with another soldier’s gun – and his comments in the Army Times article appear to agree that there is a problem with the current M4 design and specifications.

M4 SOPMOD
(click to view full)

SOCOM appears to agree as well. While US Special Operations Command is moving ahead on their own SCAR rifle program with FN Herstal, they’re also significant users of the M4 Carbine’s SOPMOD version. By the time Capt. Self was fighting of al-Qaeda/Taliban enemies in Afghanistan with a broken weapon, Dellta Force had already turned to Heckler & Koch for a fix that would preserve the M4 but remove its problems. One of which is heat build-up and gas from its operating mechanism that dries out some lubricants, and helps open the way for sand damage.

In response, H&K replaced Colt’s “gas-tube” system with a short-stroke piston system that eliminates carbon blow-back into the chamber, and also reduces the heat problem created by the super-hot gases used to cycle the M4. Other changes were made to the magazine, barrel, etc. The final product was an M4 with a new upper receiver and magazine, plus H&K’s 4-rail system of standard “Picatinny Rails” on the top, bottom, and both sides for easy addition of anything a Special Operator might require.

HK416, labeled
(click to view full)

In exhaustive tests with the help of Delta Force, the upgraded weapon was subjected to mud and dust without maintenance, and fired day after day. Despite this treatment, the rifle showed problems in only 1 of 15,000 rounds – fully 3 times the reliability shown by the M4 in US Army studies. The H&K 416 was declared ready in 2004.

A rifle with everything they loved about the M4, and the fire-no-matter-what toughness of the Kalashnikov, was exactly what the Deltas ordered. SOCOM bought the first 500 weapons right off the assembly line, and its units have been using the weapon in combat ever since. Other Western Special Forces units who liked the M4 Carbine have also purchased HK416s, though H&K declines to name specific countries. US Major Chaz Bowser, who has played a leading role in SOSOCM’s SCAR rifle design program:

HK416: Desert Testing
(click to view full)

“One thing I valued about being the weapons developer for Special Operations is that I could go to Iraq or Afghanistan or anywhere with whatever weapons I wanted to carry. As soon as the H&K 416 was available, it got stuffed into my kit bag and, through test after test, it became my primary carry weapon as a long gun. I had already gotten the data from folks carrying it before me and had determined that it would be foolish to risk my life with a lesser system.”

Actually, they don’t even have to buy the whole gun. Christian Lowe of Military.com reports that:

“In a routine acquisition notice March 23 [2007], a U.S. Special Forces battalion based in Okinawa announced that it is buying 84 upper receiver assemblies for the HK416 to modify their M4 carbines… According to the solicitation for the new upper receiver assemblies, the 416 “allows Soldiers to replace the existing M4 upper receiver with an HK proprietary gas system that does not introduce propellant gases and the associated carbon fouling back into the weapon’s interior. This reduces operator cleaning time, and increases the reliability of the M4 Carbine, particularly in an environment in which sand and dust are prevalent.”

But the US Army won’t consider even this partial replacement option. The Army position was reiterated in a release on April 2/07:

“The M4 Carbine is the Army’s primary individual combat rifle for Infantry, Ranger, and Special Operations forces. Since its introduction in 1991, the M4 carbine has proven its worth on the battlefield because it is accurate, easy to shoot and maintain. The M4’s collapsible stock and shortened barrel make it ideal for Soldiers operating in vehicles or within the confines associated with urban terrain. The M4 has been improved numerous times and employs the most current technology available on any rifle/carbine in general use today.

The M4 is the highest-rated weapon by Soldiers in combat, according to the Directorate of Combat Development, Ft. Benning, Ga. In December 2006, the Center for Naval Analysis conducted a “Soldiers’ Perspective on Small Arms in Combat” survey. Their poll of over 2,600 Soldiers reported overwhelming satisfaction with the M4. The survey included serviceability and usefulness in completing assigned missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

The Cry for Competition: How Much Is That HK In the Window? HK416s
(click to view full)

The HK416 isn’t the only alternative out there by any means – but it has been a catalytic alternative. In an analogous situation, limited USMC deployment of mine-resistant vehicles like Force Protection’s Cougar and Buffalo in Iraq, and the contrast between v-hulled casualties and Hummer casualties, led to a cascade that now looks set to remove the Hummer from a front-line combat role. The technology to deal with insurgencies that used land-mines has been proven for over 30 years – but awareness of that fact didn’t rise within the US military and among its political overseers until an obvious counter-example was fielded. One that demonstrated proven alternatives to the limited options people had previous been shown. Likewise, the use of the high-commonality HK416 has served to sharpen awareness that the M4 might not be the best option on offer for US forces.

Couple that with a major buy that looks set to re-equip large sections of the US military with a new battle rifle, and the question “what if we can do better?” starts to take on real resonance. The Army’s $375 million sole-source carbine procurement, on the basis of specifications that have not been changed to reflect these realities, is starting to raise hackles – and attract a wide spectrum of opponents.

Gannett’s Army Times quoted former Army vice chief of staff Gen. Jack Keane (ret.), who tried at the end of his tenure to update the USA’s infantry rifle with the XM-8 project, as saying:

“We are not saying the [M4 and M16 are] bad,” said “The issue for me is do our soldiers have the best rifle in their hands… The fact of the matter is that technology changes every 10 or 15 years and we should be changing with it. And that has not been our case. We have been sitting on this thing for far too long.”

An aide to Sen. Tom Coburn [R-OK] agreed, and added that the substantial price reduction created by the mere threat of an open competition in 2006 was evidence that Colt had been using its sole-source status to overcharge the government. The Senator has sent a formal letter to the Secretary of the Army requesting an open competition in order to ensure both the best deal, and the best off-the shelf rifle that incorporates modern improvements. The winner could well be Colt, said Coburn’s aide – but they should have to prove it, and earn it. “This is supposed to be a battle rifle.” He said. “We’re supposed to have a rifle that just doesn’t jam.” Impossible, of course – but one that jams far less often, and requires far less maintenance to avoid jams, while offering all of the M4’s compactness and add-on ease… that would represent a significant step forward.

Ironically, even Colt may have a better system ready to go. In a letter to Army Times magazine, Colt COO James R. Battaglini (US Marine Corps Maj. Gen., ret.) said:

“The gas piston system in the H&K 416 is not a new system. Rifles were being designed with these systems in the 1920’s. Colt proposed a piston operated weapon to the Army in the early 1960’s. Today Colt Defense has the ability and expertise to manufacture in great numbers piston system carbines of exceptional quality should the U.S. military services initiate a combat requirement for this type of weapon”

Unfortunately, fighting the Army for improvements is no easy task. Colt CEO William Keys, who is also a retired USMC General, explained out to Army Times that Colt has to build what the US Army asks for, to the Army’s exact specifications:

“If we have a change that we think would help the gun, we go to the Army… which is not an easy process, by the way. We spent 20 years trying to get [an extractor] spring changed. They just said ‘well, this works good enough.’ “

Sen. Coburn’s letter to Secretary of the Army Peter Green took a dim view of this entire situation:

“I am concerned about the Army’s plans to procure nearly a half a million new rifles outside the any competitive procurement process… There is nothing more important to a soldier than their rifle, and there is simply no excuse for not providing our soldiers with the best weapon – not just a weapon that is “good enough”… In the years following the Army’s requirements document [DID: for the M4 in the early 1990s], a number of manufacturers have researched, tested, and fielded weapons which, by all accounts, appear to provide significantly improved reliability. To fail to allow a free and open competition of these operational weapons is unacceptable… I believe the Army needs to rapidly revise its rifle and carbine requirements. Free and open competition will give our troops the best rifle in the world…”

The positions were, and are, clear. The US Army says the M4 isn’t broken, and adds that an Army-wide fix would cost $1 billion. Critics contend that these costs may be exaggerated given some of the potential solutions, and add that an army already planning to spend $525 million to re-equip the force with M4s has a moral and financial imperative to see if a better rifle exists. Meanwhile, calls about the M16/M4 had been coming in from Oklahoma, and other Senators and representatives had also been hearing from constituents on this matter.

By 2007, a second letter from the Senate was likely if the Army dug in its heels – and that letter would have had far more signatures at the bottom. In the end, however, legislative tactics forced the Army’s hand. The issue finally came to a head when Sen. Coburn [R-OK] exercised his ability as a Senator to block nomination of the proposed new Secretary of the Army, until the US Army relented and agreed to testing at the Army’s Aberdeen Test Center in Maryland. Secretary Geren was confirmed shortly thereafter, in July 2007.

The tests were conducted. The M4 finished last. The Army declared that performance to be acceptable. By 2010, however, there were noises about an “Individual Carbine Competition”, which became a full solicitation. A number of firms are lining up to provide new designs for the Army’s next-generation carbine, including Colt. Some of them even offer alternate caliber options that could make a real difference to lethality at range, a serious need in environments like Afghanistan. By August 2011, known competitors and designs included:

• Colt: CM901 multicaliber rifle (5.56mm through 7.62mm)
  
• ADCOR: B.E.A.R. Elite (5.56mm)
  
• FN USA: SCAR-16 (5.56mm)
  
• HK USA: HK416 (5.56mm).
  
• Remington: Adaptive Combat Rifle multi-caliber (5.56mm, 6.5mm Grendel, or 6.8mm)

Smith & Wesson was also reported to be entering the competition, but eventually decided not to take part.

The bigger question is whether this competition, like the ones before it, will ultimately prove to be an expensive mirage. As of April 2013, in the words of the old magic 8-ball, “signs point to yes.” Though one could also use “outlook not so good.”

Any Last Words? G36s: Norwegian
Telemark battalion
by Torgeir Haugaard
(click to view full)

Sgt. Charles Perales of Fort Bragg, NC had this to say in a letter reprinted by Defense News:

“My unit – B Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment – was deployed to Afghanistan from April 2005 to March 2006. While there, we were attached to Special Forces at Camp Tillman on the Afghan border… I saw first-hand what happens when your weapon jams up because of the harsh environments we have to call home there. An 18B weapons sergeant was shot in the face due directly to his weapon jamming. I just can’t believe that after things like this happen, the Army is still buying more M4s.

Why not rotate them like we used to before the war? All rapid-deploying units used to get the new M4, the support units would get the excess M16s and so on. I’m not saying they need to outfit the whole Army with a new weapon, but why not start phasing it in? …Soldiers’ lives are on the line. Why is it a hassle to make an improvement that could save lives?

The M4 isn’t a bad weapon; it just needs improvements. It’s about time people stop fighting to keep things the same and start moving toward a better weapon system.”

The last word will be left to SOCOM’s Major Chaz Bowser:

“We buy new laptop computers every few years across the gamut, so couldn’t we do the same with our single most important piece of military equipment? … Waiting for a leap-ahead technology based on a kinetic energy weapon platform is a waste of time and money, so we need to look at what is out there now… What the Army needs is a weapon that is now ready for prime-time and not a developmental system… The requirement comes from the field, not from an office in some garrison activity, not from some consultant and definitely not from a vendor.

Let’s do this quickly without all the bureaucracy typically associated with change. Find someone in our ranks who can make a decision – who hasn’t floated a retirement resume with a gun company – and make the decision now. Just look how fast we were all issued the ‘highly coveted’ black beret or the digital uniform. Find that recipe card, change out the word ‘Velcro’ with ‘battle rifle’ and that may be a start to finding a solution [DID: which, he acknowledges, could be Colt’s M4 if that’s what the competition shows]. Our men and women deserve much better than we are giving them, and shame on us.”

Updates: The Tests, Reactions, and Subsequent Developments FY 2012 – 2016

Army looks to cancel Individual Carbine; USMC won’t join IC; Smith & Wesson out – will sell their innovations to law enforcement and civilians. Remington ACR
(click for video)

January 13/16: Remington has completed its $40.1 million delivery of M4 carbine rifles to the Philippine Army ahead of schedule. Over 56,000 of the rifles have been delivered in total, and will replace the antiquated 1960s era variant of the M-16 currently in use by the PA. Prior to distribution, a third of the new arms will undergo mandatory ballistic testing while the M-16s will be distributed to reservists.

March 16/15: The Army released a Sources Sought notice (W15QKN-15-X-7820), looking for one vendor that can bundle together a series of aftermarket improvements to the M4A1 carbine. The package, to be called the M4A1+, includes increased accuracy, rails, mounting surfaces, neutral, non-black, color, coatings, backup sites and a kitchen sink full of other, smaller improvements.

Feb 18/15: The Marines are considering adding
various after-market upgrades to the platform in order to increase accuracy, learning from the private sector and competitive shooting circuit what appears to be providing the best bang.

June 14/13: The Army excuses their decision to cancel the Individual Carbie competition by saying that none of the candidates met their criteria of 3,592 mean rounds between stoppages, using the new M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round. As a point of comparison, the original requirement for the M4 was 600.

The Army’s PEO Soldier says that SOCOM’s M4A1 achieved 1,691 MRBS, but refuses to release the results of the trials and provide a basis for relative comparison. Military.com.

May 2/13: Military.com reports that the Individual Carbine’s Phase II firing tests are done, but the US Army is about to cancel the Individual Carbine competition, and direct its tiny $49.6 million in FY 2014 to other things. The original plan involved 3 Phase III contracts, and soldier user tests that would include a total of 800,000 rounds fired.

Overall, the budget for new carbines is $300 million through 2018, and the decision on how to proceed reportedly rests with Secretary of the Army John McHugh. This paragraph sums it up best:

“Gun makers involved in the competition said they have heard nothing from the Army about Phase III of the competition. Competitors didn’t want to be named in this story but said they would not be surprised if the effort was canceled because they never believed the Army was serious about replacing the M4 family.”

March 19/13: Inspector General. In testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the Pentagon’s Inspector General says they’ll audit the Individual Carbine program, as “DoD may not have an established need for this weapon nor developed performance requirements… such as accuracy, reliability, and lethality”.

Aside from the presumptuousness in the wake of incidents like Wanat, they’re also absolutely wrong on a factual level – the IC competition has had those standards for 3 years now. Source.

Aug 1/12: Political. Sen. Tom Coburn [R-OK] delivers a floor speech about the M4 and the Army’s failure to replace it. He reminds the Senate about the dust testing in which the M4 came in last, and points out that the average rifle age is 26 years, compared to 12 years in Germany, or 8 years for US Special Forces. The Army has been able to rush MRAP competitions for much more expensive equipment, but:

…secretary of Army Guerin… assured me that we would have a new competition for a new rifle for our troops. That was 2007. Here we are, six years later, and the army is now telling us we’re going to have a new competition in 2014… Because the guys that are responsible for making the decision on purchasing the rifles are not the guys that are out there on the line. Because if they were, we would have already had this competition…

On July 13, 2008, in the battle of Winot [sic] in Afghanistan, 200 Taliban troops attacked the U.S. troops at a remote outpost in Eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban were able to break through our lines… Believe it or not, do you know what killed most of us? Our own rifles. Practically every one of our dead was found with his m-16 torn down next to him where he had been trying to fix it. That’s occurring now. Except it’s not getting any press.

…You know, a lot of people do a lot of things for our country, but nobody does for our country what the soldier on the frontline does – nobody. Mr. secretary of the Army. This is a moral question. Get the rifle competition going. Members of congress, members of the senate who are on the armed services committee don’t allow this to continue to happen.

Nov 17/11: USMC sticking with M16A4 & M27 IAR. Military.com reports that the USMC has considered the HK416-derived M27 IAR as a future individual weapon, but decided to stick with improvements to the M16A4 rifle for that role.

It also means that the Marines won’t be adopting the winner of the Army’s Individual Carbine competition, which lowers the odds of having IC turn into a contract for a new weapon. HK might still walk away a winner in the USMC, though. The M27 IARs are being evaluated as future substitutes for FN’s M249 5.56mm light machine gun, and have been fielded to Afghanistan in a combat trial.

Nov 10/11: Smith & Wesson out. Military Times’ Gear Scout reports that Smith & Wesson won’t be competing in the Individual Carbine:

“I talked to David Holt, S&W’s VP of Military Programs who confirmed [the M&P4] was S&W’s entry into the U.S. Army’s individual carbine competition. He explained the company’s decision not to compete in the Army’s search for a new carbine… cited the program’s long acquisition timeline as one of the factors that made it difficult for Smith and Wesson to assume the risk of joining the carbine fray… They’ve put a lot of hours into the project and are very proud of the reliability improvement’s [sic] they’ve made over the M4 design. So, the carbine will likely end up for sale on the commercial LE/Gov market…”

FY 2009 – 2011

M4s and M249s fail at the Battle of Wanat; Key “Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer” report leads to caliber questions; SOCOM cancels FN’s 5.56mm SCAR-L; US Army going through the competition motions, slowly, and giving mixed signals. B.E.A.R. in detail
click for video

Aug 8/11: ADCOR. Military.com covers ADCOR’s announced interest in the IC competition, and its B.E.A.R. design. It’s a gas piston system with some clever features for keeping dust out, a free floating barrel, an adjustable cyclical rate, faster and simpler cleaning, and a “forward charging handle” that lets the soldier clear a jammed weapon with their off hand (also present in Remington’s ACR). Military.com | ADCOR page.

June 21/11: Data Rights Issue. Daniel E. Watters of The Gun Zone explains how the Army got here, the deal with Colt, and the difficulty they’ll have getting a new weapon in the Individual Carbine competition. Read “Colt M4 Data Rights & The Individual Carbine Competition.”

June 14/11: M4. FBO.gov releases Presolicitation W56HZV-10-R-0593, covering 70,000 – 100,000 M4 and M4A1 carbines over 5 years. The Government expects to order 25-30% in each of years 1 and 2, and 13-17% in each of years 3 through 5. They’re certainly serious about the M4, if not about its replacement.

The contractor(s) winning the best value competition will also be required to provide ancillary equipment as specified by the contract, and will be paid only for produced items, not for setup and manufacturing costs. Bidding is restricted to firms in the U.S. & its territories, and the carbines will be produced in accordance with the M4/M4A1 Technical Data Package (TDP) and the license agreement between the U.S. Government and Colt Defense, LLC. That TDP is restricted/ export controlled, and requires submission of a Non-Disclosure Agreement. The TDPs will not be available until an NDA is submitted, and an FBO.gov solicitation is issued. Read “Colt M4 Data Rights & The Individual Carbine Competition” for an analysis of how the Army reached this point, and what it could mean in practice.

June 14/11: Competition. Defense Procurement news reports that the US Army still has a 2-track strategy (vid. March 10/10 entry). One is the IC competition. The other involves competing the M4 design, now that the Army and not Colt owns the data rights. Colt has reportedly reacted to the announced Army plans by ramping up their lobbying efforts, so Congress can pressure the Army to keep the program with them.

May 25/11: Lobbying. An Associated Press article lays out the hired lobbyists and political backers for some of the Individual Carbine contenders, while discussing possible offerings. See also Fox News‘ coverage. Contenders, and their lobbyists, include:

Colt:
CM901 multicaliber rifle (5.56mm – 7.62mm)
Roger Smith, a former deputy assistant Navy secretary @ $120,000 a year
Rep. Rosa DeLauro [D-CT, Appropriations]. Rep. John Larson [D-CT], Sen. Joe Liberman [I-CT, retiring].

FN Herstal:
SCAR-L 5.56mm.
American Business Development Group @ $120,000/ year.
Sen. Lindsey Graham [R-SC, SASC], Joe Wilson [R-SC, HASC].

HK USA:
HK416 5.56mm.
Parted ways with Greenberg Traurig in 2009, and with Mark Barnes and Associates in early 2010. No replacement mentioned.

Remington:
Adaptive Combat Rifle multi-caliber (5.56mm or 6.8mm).
$500,000 over last 2 years to Winborn Solutions, and Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
Sen. Chuck Schumer [D-NY]

Smith & Wesson:
(M&P4, will not be entering the competition)
Greenberg Traurig @ $360,000/ year

April 18/11: Competition. In published responses to questions from industry over Draft RFP W15QKN-11-R-F003, the US Army has laid out a schedule for its “Individual Carbine”. The RFP is expected in May 2011, with Phase 1 evaluations from July to October 2011, and Phase 2 evaluations extending to July 2012. The contracts, if any, would be awarded in October 2012, followed by even more evaluations of the remaining contenders, lasting until March 2013.

While there is no caliber or mechanical type requirement, the Army may not choose to do anything, in the end. It is openly espousing a “dual path” strategy to upgrade existing M4s, even as it launches this competition. Given a long past history of declaring that new designs don’t offer enough benefits over existing M4s to justify a purchase, outside observers can be forgiven any skepticism they may have over the Army’s determination to field anything else when all is said and done. PROCNET Q&A responses | PEO Soldier | Gannett’s Army Times | Aviation Week Ares.

Jan 31/11: Competition. The US Army issues Draft RFP W15QKN-11-R-F003 for an “Individual Carbine.” In practice, the solicitation announces an Industry Day on March 30/11, and offerors are directed to NOT submit proposals at this time. Interested parties are advised that only firms within the Small Arms Industry will be granted admittance at the Doubletree Hotel Washington DC – Crystal City, and that ITAR export control procedures are in effect.

Col. Doug Tamilio, the service’s project manager for soldier weapons, reportedly said in a statement that “We’re challenging industry to develop the next-generation carbine and we’re looking forward to the results.” On the other hand, there have been previous industry days (vid. 2008), and other next-generation carbines have been shelved in the past, on the nebulous ground of not being enough of an improvement over the M4. FedBizOpps | Wall St. Journal.

SCAR-L top, SCAR-H
(click to view full)

June 25/10: FN SCAR. Military.com reports that SOCOM has decided to cancel further 5.56mm SCAR-L Mk.16 rifle purchases on cost and efficiency grounds, and will probably recall the 850 fielded weapons, rather than continue to support them. SOCOM will be adding to their stock of 750 7.62mm SCAR-H Mk.17 riles, however, and will field an extended SCAR-H Mk.20 with sharpshooter enhancements.

SOCOM cancels 5.56mm SCAR-L

March 10/10: Competition. In testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, senior Army officers state that [PDF]:

“We are currently taking a dual approach to improve the current weapon, the M4, as we move forward with a new carbine requirement. The Project Manager (PM) released a market survey in January 2010, seeking the best industry has to offer for improvements to the current M4. The PM expects to release an RFP soon to compete the upgrade program. Additionally, the Army will conduct a full and open competition to address a new requirement for an individual carbine. Once the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approves the new requirement, the PM will initiate the competition with the release of an RFP for comments from industry. This is the first step in conducting the competition. The Army is working with the other Services in these programs to ensure their requirements are included in our process and they are always invited to participate in the programs’ development and production.”

Jan 12/10: HK. Heckler & Kock announces that they will begin producing civilian variants of the HK416 and the 7.62mm HK417 in a new HK manufacturing facility in Newington, New Hampshire. It’s co-located within an existing 70,000 square foot facility, and would create an American manufacturing base from which to offer military HK416s as well. EVP Wayne Weber of Heckler & Koch USA:

“It is our intention for all U.S. made HK products to equal the quality and reliability of the products made in Germany… By establishing American-based manufacturing, we can compliment our German production and ensure that HK can be more competitive in the U.S. and comply with government contracts requiring U.S. manufacturing. HK products made in the USA will be fully compliant with federal solicitations giving preference to domestically produced products.”

USMC M240B,
Afghanistan
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Nov 30/09: Report. US Army TRADOC releases a paper by Major Thomas P. Ehrhart of the Command and General Staff College titled “Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer” [PDF]. It points out that American forces are routinely engaged in Afghan firefights beyond 300 meters, where their weapons are less effective than their opponents. Excerpts:

“Comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about [50%] of engagements occur past 300 meters. The enemy tactics are to engage United States forces from high ground with medium and heavy weapons, often including mortars, knowing that we are restricted by our equipment limitations and the inability of our overburdened soldiers to maneuver at elevations exceeding 6000 feet. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain.

There are several ways to extend the lethality of the infantry. A more effective 5.56-mm bullet can be designed which provides enhanced terminal performance out to 500 meters. A better option to increase incapacitation is to adopt a larger caliber cartridge, which will function using components of the M16/M4. The 2006 study by the Joint Service Wound Ballistics – Integrated Product Team discovered that the ideal caliber seems to be between 6.5 and 7-mm. This was also the general conclusion of all military ballistics studies since the end of World War I.

The reorganization of the infantry squad in 1960 eliminated the M1D sniper rifle and resulted in the loss of the precision mid-range capability of the infantry squad… All 5.56-mm weapons are most effective when employed within 200 meters due to velocity limitations. Once contact is made, the fight is limited to machine gunners, mortars and designated marksmen. In the table of organization for a light infantry company8 only the six -M240B 7.62-mm machine guns, two- 60-mm mortars and nine designated marksman armed with either 7.62-mm M14 rifles or accurized 5.56-mm M16A4’s rifles are able to effectively engage the enemy. These weapons systems represent 19 percent of the company’s firepower. This means that 81 percent of the company has little effect on the fight. This is unacceptable.”

Reclaiming the Infantry Half-Kilometer

Oct 12/09: Field. The Associated Press reports that M4 carbine and M249 SAW light machine gun failures contributed to the debacle at Wanat, Afghanistan, in which an American outpost was overrun by the Taliban, and to another situation at nearby Kamdesh. An excerpt:

“[Douglas Cubbison of the Army Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, KS] study is based on an earlier Army investigation and interviews with Soldiers who survived the attack at Wanat… The Soldiers said their weapons were meticulously cared for and routinely inspected by commanders. But still the weapons had breakdowns… Cubbison acknowledges the high rates of fire during the two-hour battle may have led to the failures. But he says numerous problems occurred relatively early in the engagement.”

Defense Tech adds that:

“Basically, the most damning conclusions are compiled in the recommendations section of the report. There are a few instanced specified in the report of an M4 fouling, and one where the M4 fouled and the Soldier picked up a SAW and that was jammed up as well… Staff Sergeant Phillips poured out fire, as recalled by another Engineer Specialist loading for him, [SSG Phillips] went through three rifles using them until they jammed.”

Debacle at Wanat

FY 2007 – 2008

Army holds test – M4 last by far. M4, EDT-III
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Sept 17/08: Competition. Military.com’s Christian Lowe reports that that the Army issued a solicitation to industry in August 2008, asking companies to submit proposals that would demonstrate “…improvements in individual weapon performance in the areas of accuracy and dispersion… reliability and durability in all environments, modularity and terminal performance.”

The intervening years have seen a number of new carbine designs hit the market, as well as a number of “personal defense weapons” that attempt to deliver carbine-class firepower in a weapon only slightly larger than a pistol. Most use calibers other than 5.56mm or 9mm, however, which has prevented their adoption for use by pilots, vehicle crew, and other specialists who need an extremely compact weapon. The Army solicitation also asks for ideas on a “subcompact” variant that would fit in this category.

The article quoted Richard Audette, project manager for Soldier weapons at the US Army’s Picatinny Arsenal. The Army is currently working on its carbine requirements document, and is trying to write it in a way that does not exclude other calibers:

“We’re at the point now where we’re going to go out and compete… We’re looking for anyone that has a world-class carbine… We’re interested in any new technologies out there… We want to know about everything that’s out there, regardless of caliber… If you’ve got a 6.8 [mm caliber weapon], we’re interested in that and seeing what that brings to the table.”

What the Army will insist upon, however, is production capacity. Colt can churn out 10,000 M4s per month, and in June 2009 the M4s blueprints will no longer be a Colt exclusive. Experience with ongoing M16 orders suggests that this will expand production capacity, and drive down prices. In contrast, manufacturers of weapons in promising new calibers like 6.8mm have not received large military orders to ramp up their production capacity to the same levels. Producibility is certainly a valid concern. It must be part of any fair and reasonable competition. It can also be abused to become a back door method of ratifying existing decisions, while adopting the veneer of competition. Which will it be in this case? Only time will tell.

July 11/08: Demonstration. Military.com reports that about 30 legislative aides signed up to attend a July 11 demonstration at Marine Corps Base Quantico. Congressional and industry sources report that the event feature the standard 5.56mm M4 carbine, plus the FN SCAR Mk17 7.62mm (SCAR MK16 is the 5.56mm version that was tested by the Army), – and a modified “M4-style MURG (Modified Upper Receiver Group)” rifle capable of firing a new 6.8mm special purpose cartridge round, among others. Attendees included FN-USA, HK, LWRC who offers receiver group switchouts like HK’s and adds a 6.8mm version, Barrett (REC-7 6.8mm), and Bushmaster. All reportedly avoided commercial sales pitches, and stuck to facts and demonstrations.

Complaints persist from troops on the front lines regarding the current 5.56mm round/riling combination’s lethality. The ballistic characteristics of calibers around 6.8mm have yet to feature a breakthrough military purchase in the face of 5.56mm standardization, but these calibers are gaining growing recognition for their balance of size (can be used with M16 magazines), light weight, and knock-down power.

Participants reportedly had the opportunity to observe the effects of different caliber rounds in translucent ballistic jelly, which simulates human tissue, and to fire the weapons involved. Sens. James Coburn [R-OK] and Ken Salazar [D-CO] remain very active in this area, but the number of participants suggests that their efforts may be gaining traction in spite the Army. Military.com | American Mohist.

Late December 2007: Test results. DID obtains some exact results from the Army’s testing. The Army has now done 3 dust tests. In the late 2006/Jan 2007 report “Baseline Reliability and Dust Assessment for the M4, M16, and M249,” the M4 jammed 9,836 times – 1 jam every 6 rounds. In a May 2007 “Extreme Dust Test II”, with no competitors, the M4 had 1 jam every 88 rounds, using heavy lubrication. In the November 2007 “Extreme Dust Test III”, as DID has discussed, the competing rifles were subject to significantly more maintenance and lubrication than elite American forces like Delta used in their weapon selection process, or indeed in HK’s own field testing of its HK416s prior to shipment.

We’ll begin with the Army’s overall results, from its own release:

“Even with extreme dust test III’s 98.6 percent success rate there was a total of 863 class 1 and 2 weapon/magazine stoppages with 19 class 3 stoppages. During extreme dust test II conducted during the summer, there were 296 total class 1 and 2 stoppages and 11 class 3 stoppages.

A class 1 stoppage is one a Soldier can clear within 10 seconds; a class 2 stoppage is one a Soldier can clear, but requires more than 10 seconds; and, class 3 is a stoppage that requires an armorer to clear.”

DID will simply point out that 10 seconds can be a rather fatally long time when people are shooting at you, and at your friends. So, what happens when the Extreme Dust Test III stoppages are broken out by weapon?

The M4 Carbine is the Army’s existing weapon.

• 882 jams, 1 jam every 68 rounds, again using heavy lubrication. In addition all 10 of the M4 barrels needed to be replaced, and a number of their parts were replaced during the test. None of the cold hammer forged HK416 and XM-8 barrels needed replacement.

The HK416 is a modified M4 carbine, which can be and has been converted from existing rifles. Used by US Special Forces.

• 233 jams, 1 jam every 257 rounds, 3.77x more reliable than the M4.

FN SCAR is US special Forces’ new weapon, designed by SOSOCM. It just went into production in late 2007.

• 226 jams, 1 jam every 265 rounds, 3.85x more reliable than the M4

XM-8 is a developmental rifle. It’s an advanced version of HK’s G36, a rifle in wide use by many NATO armies. The US Army cancelled the XM-8 weapons family 2 years ago.

• 127 jams, I jam every 472 rounds, 6.95x more reliable than the M4.

The failure of M4 barrels at 6,000 rounds confirms SOCOM objections that date back to the Feb 23/01 report “M4A1 5.56mm Carbine and Related Systems Deficiencies and Solutions,” which ended up concluding that “M4A1 Carbine… does not meet the requirements of SOF.” The barrel replacement also increases the rifle’s life cycle costs when compared with the 10,000 round advertised barrel life, as additional barrels are sold to the Army for $240 each. A longer, heavier M16 barrel, which is a competed production weapon, cost $100 by comparison. While the dust test is indeed an extreme test, the 10,000 round requirement is under “all conditions” – not just ideal conditions.

Dec 18/07: The US Army publishes “M-4 Carbine Has High Soldier Confidence Despite Test.” Not exactly a headline to inspire confidence, as the Army acknowledges that the M4 Carbine finished last among the 4 contenders – but amazingly, asserts that the rifle is just fine and shows no interest in buying even the HK416’s parts swap-out into the existing M4:

“After being exposed to the heavy dusting, 10 of each weapon fired 6,000 rounds apiece. They were fired in 50 120-round cycles. Each was then wiped and re-lubricated at the 600 round mark. After 1,200 rounds were fired from each weapon, they were fully cleaned and re-lubricated… “While the M-4 finished fourth out of four, 98 percent of all the rounds fired from it went off down range as they were supposed to do,” Brig. Gen. [Mark] Brown [commander of Program Executive Office Soldier and the Natick Soldier Systems Center] said. “However, the three other candidates did perform better at about a 99 percent rate or better, which is a mathematically statistically significant difference, but not an operationally statistical difference.”… The Army has put an option on an existing contract for 64,450 M4s, according to the general.”

“A mathematically statistically significant difference, but not an operationally statistical difference.” Statistically, 99% is a 100% improvement over 98%. Operationally, I jam every 68 rounds is almost one jam for every 2 30-round magazines. Whereas one jam in 257 rounds would only happen about once in 8 30-round magazines. Readers are left to contemplate the operational significance of those probabilities in a sustained, serious firefight.

4-Rifle test: M4 finishes dead last

June 29/07: Testing. A document circulated on Capitol Hill asking for testing includes these excerpts:

“The Army has claimed “83% reported confidence that the M4 will not suffer major breakage or failure that necessitates repair before further use” – A soldier should be 100% confident that his weapon will not break the next time he fires it… Since the M16 was introduced in Vietnam the answer has always been “It’s the soldiers’ fault”… The Special Operations Command has the most proficient soldiers in the world, they shoot the most and they operate in the most difficult environments – In 2001 SOCOM was highly critical of the reliability of the M4, and they chose to adopt a new weapon – the SCAR. Our Tier 1 units – like Delta Force, and Seal Team 6 have all abandoned the M4 for other weapons that is [sic] significantly more reliable.”

M4 Carbine Contracts Announced to Date M4 carbine, firing
(click to view full)

The following contracts concern the M4 Carbine and its variants directly; other than spare parts or magazines, all other related contracts for accessories etc. were excluded. We also excluded M16 contracts that did not also include M4s.

No announced DefenseLINK contracts have fit these criteria since February 2009, though some sole-source orders may be found in other venues. The FBO.gov June 14/11 presolicitation may lead to additional announced orders.

March 6/14: US Army Contracting Command at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ awards $16.3 million in contracts as a firm-fixed-price, multi-year contract for M4 rifle bolts under the M4 product improvement program. Each request will be competed between Colt Defense LLC in West Hartford, CT (W15QKN-14-D-0027) and FN Manufacturing LLC in Columbia, SC (W15QKN-14-D-0026), though 6 bids were received. The contract runs until Feb 28/18.

Jan 7/13: Colt Defense LLC in West Hartford, CT receives $14 million firm-fixed-price contract for the M4 Product Improvement Program replacement barrel and front sight assembly. Work location will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Dec 30/16. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 6 bids received by the US Army Contracting Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-13-D-0040).

Dec 19/12: From FBO.gov, amended solicitation #W15QKN-13-R-0039, originally issued Nov 27/12:

“…requirement for up to a total of 350,000 Replacement Bolts used in the conversion of the M4 Carbine to the M4A1 Carbine. To meet continuous requirements for FY13 through FY17, the United States Government intends to award one or more four-year IDIQ contracts with Firm Fixed Price (FFP) orders based on Other Than Full and Open competition… Competition for this requirement shall be other than full and open, and limited to the United States and its territories, island possessions and protectorates, in accordance with the license agreement between the US Government and Colt Defense LLC, limiting distribution of the Technical Data Package (TDP). The authority to limit competition is in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii)(A), only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. FAR 6.302-1(a)(2) applies when supplies or services required by the agency are available from only one responsible source, or for DoD, NASA and the Coast Guard, from only one or a limited number of responsible sources, and no other type of supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.

The maximum contract ceiling price for the total anticipated contract award is $21,350,000.00. The maximum quantity of units is

350,000. The anticipated award date for this action is 3rd Quarter of Fiscal Year 2013.”

Nov 16/12: The GAO dismisses Colt’s protest.

Oct 9/12: Colt protests again. For the 2nd time in 5 months, Colt lodges a protest of the US Army’s efforts to upgrade its M4 carbines to M4A1s. This protest is aimed at the amended Sept 21/12 solicitation. Military.com.

July 24/12: Colt Protests, Wins. The US Government Accountability Office’s ruling forces the US Army to rework the original M4A1 upgrade competition that Remington had won (q.v. April 25/12 entry), so vendors in the competitive range could re-submit. Colt protested both Remington Defense’s win, and the miscalculation of royalties Colt would receive.

More than 6,000 soldiers in the 101st Airborne have already received the rifles, but the Army will need to resolve these protests if it wishes to begin installing conversion kits in summer 2013. The M4A1 includes a heavier barrel, a full automatic trigger assembly, and ambidextrous fire controls. A free-float forward rail, which improves accuracy is widely available on civilian guns, might receive a contract by the end of 2014. What’s conspicuous by its absence is a more reliable firing system. Col. Scott Armstrong of PM Soldier Weapons:

“There were 11 [vendors] that competed in that; they went through nearly a year of testing…. None of the offerers completed the first phase or outperformed the current bolt and bolt carrier group on the M4A1 configuration. Areas that the competitors really fell short in were reliability, durability as well as high temperature and low temperature conditions. The M4A1 bolt outperformed [the competition] in all of those areas.”

See: GAO ruling | Military.com

April 25/12: M4s from Remington. Remington Arms Company, LLC in Ilion, NY receives an $83.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for 24,000 M4A1 carbines. Remington is positioned for any future carbine competition, if there is one, with the ACR. Meanwhile, its “R4” seems to have found a production niche, now that Colt no longer owns all rights. This is the 1st non-Colt M4 contract, and Remington beat 5 other bids – presumably including Colt.

Work will be performed in Ilion, NY until April 12/17. U.S. Army Contracting Command in Warren, MI manages the contract (W56HZV-12-D-0056).

Oct 5/11: GTD, Inc. in Lola, MT, received an $8.6 million firm-fixed-price indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for M4/M4A1 Carbine Trigger Components. Work will be performed in Lola, MT, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/16. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 4 bids received by the U.S. Army Contracting Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-11-D-0207).

June 14/11: RFP. FBO.gov releases Presolicitation W56HZV-10-R-0593, covering 70,000 – 100,000 M4 and M4A1 carbines over 5 years. The Government expects to order 25-30% in each of years 1 and 2, and 13-17% in each of years 3 through 5.

The contractor(s) winning the best value competition will also be required to provide ancillary equipment as specified by the contract, and will be paid only for produced items, not for setup and manufacturing costs. Bidding is restricted to firms in the U.S. & its territories, and the carbines will be produced in accordance with the M4/M4A1 Technical Data Package (TDP) and the license agreement between the U.S. Government and Colt Defense, LLC. That TDP is restricted/ export controlled, and requires submission of a Non-Disclosure Agreement. The TDPs will not be available until an NDA is submitted, and an FBO.gov solicitation is issued. Read “Colt M4 Data Rights & The Individual Carbine Competition” for an analysis of how the Army reached this point, and what it could mean in practice.

Feb 2/09: Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a $9.5 million firm-fixed-price 5-year Requirements contract for 18,000 Barrel & Front Assemblies; 13,600 Hand Guards; 7,100 Heavy Barrel Assemblies; 22,000 Receivers and Cartridges; and 200,000 Extractor Spring Assemblies. Work is to be performed at Hartford, CT with an estimated completion date of Sept 28/12. US Army Tank and Automotive Command Rock Island in Rock Island, IL manages this contract (DAAE20-03-D-0191).

April 17/07: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT, was awarded on April 6, 2007, the full delivery order amount of $50.8 million as part of a firm-fixed-price contract for M4 and M4A1 carbines. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by July 30, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on Feb. 16, 2007 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (W52H09-04-D-0086). See also July 26/06.

Jan 22/07: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a delivery order amount of $5.6 million as part of a $24.3 million firm-fixed-price contract for Unique Spare Parts for the M4 and M4A1 Carbine. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by May 30, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on April 5, 2004. The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Rock Island, Ill., is the contracting activity (DAAE20-03-D-0191).

Sept 26/06: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a maximum $10 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for M4A1 machine guns. The M4A1 Carbine and variants will be utilized with the family of carbines that are currently in the U.S. Military arsenal. The M4A1 Carbine will come in four basic versions, which consist of longer and shorter versions of the M4A1 Carbine. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by September 2011. Contract funds in the amount of $278,300, will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division in Crane, Indiana (N00164-06-D-4805).

July 26/06: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a delivery-order amount of $53.8 million as part of a $242.5 million firm-fixed-price contract for procurement of M4/M4A1 carbines. Work will be performed at Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by Sept. 30, 2007. This was a sole source contract initiated on June 30, 2006. The Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Rock Island, Ill., is the contracting activity (W52H09-04-D-0086).

Jan 13/06: Small business qualifier Center Industries Inc. in Wichita, KS received a $7,712,600 modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for aluminum magazines for the M16 rifle/M4 carbine. Work will be performed in Wichita, KS and is expected to be complete by Oct. 31, 2007. This was a sole source contract initiated on Dec. 30, 2005 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-02-F-0022).

April 1/05: FN Manufacturing Inc. in Columbia, SC received a delivery order amount of $6.7 million as part of a $29.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for M16A4 rifle and M4 carbine. Work will be performed in Columbia, SC, and is expected to be complete by Dec. 31, 2008. There were 2 bids solicited on Dec. 20, 2004, and 2 bids were received by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (W52H09-05-D-0080).

FN Manufacturing LLC writes in to say that they have won “the vast majority of M16A2, A3 and A4 contracts as well as spare parts contracts for these systems since 1989” through “full and open competition.” Having said that: “…never was FN Manufacturing LLC, or any other small arms manufacturer, awarded M4 contracts. The M4 cannot be competed and always has been awarded sole source to Colt because of licensing rights restricting full and open competition until 2009.”

Aug 30/04: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received a delivery order amount of $0 as part of a $123 million firm-fixed-price contract for 124,803 weapons in either M4 carbine or M4A1 carbine configurations. Work will be performed in West Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by Sept. 30, 2007. This was a sole source contract initiated on Oct. 14, 2003 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (W52H09-04-D-0086).

Jan 15/04: Small business qualifier Colt Defense LLC in Hartford, CT received Jan. 13, 2004, a delivery order amount of $4,029,095 as part of an $8,058,190 firm-fixed-price contract for M4 unique spare and repair parts. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete by Jan. 30, 2009. This was a sole source contract initiated on Sept. 18, 2003 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-03-D-0191).

July 31/02: Colt’s Manufacturing Company Inc. in Hartford, CT received an $18.5 million undefinitized contracting action for 25,764 M4 carbines and 300 M4A1 carbines, in support of the U. S. Air Force, U. S. Army, and foreign military sales countries on July 30, 2002. Work will be performed in West Hartford, CT, and is to be complete by Sep. 30, 2004. This was a sole source contract initiated on June 6, 2002 by the U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-02-C-0115).

Sept 19/96: Small business qualifier Colt’s Manufacturing Company Inc. in Hartford, CT received a $5.5 million firm fixed price contract, with a potential value of $.5 million if all options are exercised, for 9,861 M4 Carbines, 5.56mm and 716 M4A1 Carbines. Work will be performed in Hartford, CT and is expected to be complete by April 30, 1998. This is a sole source contract initiated on September 6, 1996 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive & Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-96-C-0391).

Appendix A: Testing, Testing – Fairly? XM-8 Family
(click to view full)

The promised tests included the M4 and 3 other rifles: the M4-based HK416, the FNH USA-designed Mk16 SOCOM Combat Assault Rifle (best known as FN SCAR-L), and the H&K XM8 carbine. Unlike the M4, the HK416, XM8, and FN-SCAR all use gas-piston operating systems to achieve automatic fire. The XM8 family is an very updated version of the popular G36 in use with many NATO militaries; it was slated to be the M4’s replacement, but that RFP was suspended by the Army in July 2005 and then canceled in October 2005. The FN-SCAR is a “live” program, and July 2007 marked the beginning of Special Operations Command’s operational tests of the FN-SCAR 5.56mm Mk16 and the 7.62mm Mk17, which could become its future mainstays.

Miltary.com reported that the US Army sand tests will include 10 samples of each weapon through which engineers will fire 6,000 rounds. Each weapon and loaded magazine will be exposed to “extreme dust” for 30 minutes then test fired with 120 rounds. Each weapon will be wiped down and lubricated every 600 rounds, with a full cleaning every 1,200 rounds. The firing, collection of data and analysis of data is expected to take approximately 5 months.

FN SCAR w. Grip Pod
(click to view full)

One’s first reaction upon seeing the proposed testing regimen was to compare it very unfavorably with the regimen Delta Force put the HK416 through, firing it day after day without maintenance for thousands of rounds. Or even the testing HK itself uses for its HK416s. Indeed, it seems on its face to be a test designed to minimize the very weaknesses in the M4 incumbent that have triggered this controversy. Those who believe the cycle is reasonable cite 300 rounds as the soldier’s 1-day load, and say that under sand storm conditions, a once a day wipedown is the bare minimum for any weapon. Every 600 rounds is thus a safety factor of 2 against the worst possible conditions. Of course, sandstorms have a way of lasting more than one day, and when they do – as in the initial portion of Operation Iraqi Freedom – even vehicle interiors may feature a fine particulate haze.

Within its chosen regimen, there were 3 key ways the Army could choose to bias the test. One was the size of the particulate in the dust chamber – which can be made large in relative terms to lower the number of problems with fouling and jams. The biggest problems in theater are with the very fine particulates. This is especially relevant given the October 2004 report prepared by the Desert Research Institute for the US military. “Geochemical and Physical Characteristics of Iraqi Dust and Soil Samples” [PDF, 2.9 MB] stated that:

“…current chamber test methodology misrepresents real-world conditions. The character of the soils and dust collected from areas of military activity in Iraq is greatly different from the material used in current weapons testing procedures. Current procedures employ laboratory generated dust that is 99.7% silicon dioxide (i.e. quartz), contains no salt or reactive chemicals, and contains coarser particle sizes than most of the Iraq samples. Use of this material cannot simulate conditions in Iraq that have contributed to the weapons failures.”

The next item to watch was whether the rifles used were randomly chosen, or cherry picked and then pre-maintained to perform at an unusual reliability level vs. a field weapon. A third way of gaming the testing system could involve the level of lubrication used. One source noted that the first dust test new M4s had 9,836 jams in 60,000 rounds – almost one jam every 6 rounds. The Army kept working on the test until they figured out a “generous lubrication” approach that used far more than the manufacturer recommended, but lowered jams to 1 in 88 rounds. A fair test must match the manufacturer’s manual for each weapon, or use the same lubrication for each weapon based on the minimum recommended among all test weapons.

Additional Readings Background: Weapons & Key Trends

• DID – Colt M4 Data Rights & The Individual Carbine Competition. guest Article by Daniel E. Watters of The Gun Zone.

• The Gun Zone – A 5.56 x45 mm “Timeline”. The prologue section begins in 1882, and subsequent sections go all the way to the present day. The feature includes M4-related contracts that were never announced on the Pentagon’s DefenseLINK.

• Gary K. Roberts, LCDR, USNR at NDIA 2008 conference – Time for a Change [PDF format]. LCDR Roberts offers a history of US military small arms programs, as well as testing results from the 2007 multi-agency M4A1/MK12 Modified Upper Receiver Group (MURG) project. Includes evaluations of 6.8mm and 7.62mm caliber performance.

• Winds of Change – Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer. Links to official report re: the need for lethality at range in Afghanistan, and related materials.

• NY Times At War: Notes from the Front Lines – The Weakness of Taliban Marksmanship. And how they make it work for them anyway. Effective, accurate counterfire at range offers an especial advantage against such opponents.

• Colt – M4 5.56mm Carbine

• Quarterbore – Special Operations improves M4 carbine. Written by SGT. Nelson Mumma Jr.

• Special Operations.com – A Short History of the M4 Carbine. More of a chronicle of variants and add-ons.

• Hartford Courant (Dec 5/04) – Ex-Marine has West Hartford, Conn., Gun Maker Colt Shooting Straight. Also notes the firm’s political backers in Washington, most prominently Rep. Jack Murtha [D-PA, now deceased].

• Gun Websites – Colt CM901 modular battle rifle. Can be chambered in 5.56mm through 7.62mm.

• ADCOR: The B.E.A.R. Story

• Modern Firearms [Guns.RU] – FN SCAR: Mark 16 and Mark 17- Special Forces Combat Assault Rifle (USA / Belgium). One of the 7.62mm SCAR’s most interesting and potentially life-saving features is the ability to switch its chambering, which would let operators scavenge Russian/Chinese magazines from the enemy for ammunition.

• Defense Update – Special Operations Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR)

• National Defense Magazine (July 2005) – Custom-Designed Rifle Aims to Fit Commandos’ Special Needs. Discusses the FN SCAR.

• Heckler & Koch USA – HK416

• Soldier Tech – HIGHLY EVOLVED: The HK416 Enhanced Carbine

• HK Pro – The HK416: The M16 has finally been fixed (Cal 5.56 mm x 45). There’s also a larger 7.62mm version in development, the HK417.

• DID – IAR What IAR: The USMC’s SAW Substitution. The FN-SCAR, HK416, and Colt variants of the M16 were all competing. A variant of the HK416 won, and became the M27 IAR.

• Remington Defense – ACR. Their Adaptive Combat Rifle is multi-caliber in 5.56mm, 6.5mm Grendel, or 6.8mm.

• GlobalSecurity.org – XM8 Future Combat Rifle / Lightweight Assault Rifle/ Modular Assault Weapon System

• National Defense Magazine (February 2004) – Army Tests New Rifle That Could Replace M16, M4. Referring to the canceled XM-8; it also discusses the XM-29 OICW.

• Ghost Recon.NET – XM29 Objective Individual Combat Weapon. Very good coverage.

News & Views

• EveryJoe (May 12/14) – Are U.S. Soldiers Dying From Inadequate Weapons? By Lt. Col. Tom Kratman (ret.), who summarizes a number of significant improvements in rifle design since the M4.

• Washington Times (Feb 20/14) – Cover-up? Army historian says report on deadly Afghan battle was altered to absolve faulty gun.

• Washington Times (Feb 19/14) – Troops left to fend for themselves after Army was warned of flaws in rifle.

• US DoD Inspector General (Sept 16/13, #DODIG-2013-131) – Army Requirement To Acquire Individual Carbine Not Justified. Because asking bean counters what the combat troops need is the way to win wars.

• NDIA National Defense (March 2013) – Industry Shooting for Army’s First New Rifle in Half Century (UPDATED). Details the contenders.

• Defense Procurement News (June 14/11) – Colt May Face World Without M4 Carbine Production

• AP (May 25/11) – INFLUENCE GAME: As Army eyes a new combat rifle, companies load with lobbyists to win the work

• Defense Tech (Dec 30/10) – Enemy Performance at Wanat. Not such a positive review of the M4.

• NY Times At War blog (July 7/10) – Examining the Complaints About American Rifle Reliability. Positive review of the M4/M16.

• US Army (Nov 13/08) – Army looking at new carbines as follow-on to M-4. Industry day for firms to show their small arms products to Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and representatives of the Army’s Program Executive Office-Soldier. The US Army remains clear that buying almost 500,000 M4s in the near future remains their priority – at which point, the space for a follow-on purchase is questionable.

• Tactical Life, via Military.com (Oct 10/08) – M4 Round Has Strong Competitors. Shooting tests involving the 6.8mm SPC and 65mm Grendel round are discussed; note that 6.8mm versions of the M-16/M4 family are already available in the marketplace.

• Anarchangel (Nov 1/07) – Stuck on You. Looks at the issues of network effects and sunk costs as they apply to rifles etc. Author’s own opinions.

• Military.com (July 27/07) – Army Agrees To M4 Sand Test Shoot-Off

• FN Herstal USA (July 12/07) – FN Herstal SCAR And EGLM Receive Approval To Proceed With Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E). Money is requested for procurement in FY 2008. EGLM is the SCAR rifle’s grenade launcher.

• Military.com Defense Tech (May 25/07) – Soldiers Want a Bigger Bang. Describes a December 2006 survey, conducted on behalf of the Army by the Center for Naval Analyses. Figures included jamming in combat, based on over 2,600 interviews with Soldiers returning from combat duty. The M249 SAW light machine gun and M9 pistol fared especially poorly.

• Military.com (April 30/07) – Senator Tells Army to Reconsider M4

• Defense Tech (April 30/07) – M4 Debate Fires Up

• Sen. Tom Coburn, R-OK (April 12/07) – Letter to the Hon. Peter Green, Secretary of the Army re: M4 competition. DID also spoke with Sen. Coburn’s office.

• Military.com (April 6/07) – Army Won’t Field Rifle Deemed Superior to M4

• Murdoc Online (April 3/07) – Jammed. Reprints a letter to Defense News from a Sgt. Who served in Afghanistan with B Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment.

• US Army (March 29/07) – Army position: M4 Carbine is Soldier’s battlefield weapon of choice

• Colt Defense Weapon Systems (March 26/07) – Letter to the Editor from Colt Defense LLC in response to Army Times staff writer Matthew Cox article, “It’s Better Than the M4, but You Can’t Have One.” No permalink, just a position on the web site’s news page at this time. Signed by Colt COO Marine Corps Maj. Gen. James R. Battaglini (ret.)

• Gannett Company Inc., Army Times (March 19/07) – Straight shot: Next rifle should be tested, selected by soldiers who’ll use it. Author Maj. Chaz Bowser is a leading weapons designer within US Special Forces, and has helped lead the development of their SCAR Rifle system.

• Gannett Company Inc., Army Times (Feb 26/07) – Army Times Editorial: Field the best weapon

• Gannett Company Inc., Army Times (Feb 26/07) – Out of Reach: Better than M4, but you can’t have one

• US Center for Naval Analyses (December 2006) – Soldier Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat [PDF format]. Includes statistics and reports re: jamming and other issues.

• DID (Nov 2/05) – OICW-1 Canceled, Door Closes on XM-8 For Now

• DID (July 22/05) – OICW Individual Weapon RFP Temporarily Suspended. Well, maybe not so temporarily.

• The Shepherd and the SEAL: An Afghan Tale. Describes the aftermath of the Red Wing Down incident in Afghanistan, and the eventual rescue of a Navy SEAL thanks to Afghan traditions of hospitality and a very brave man.

• US Army News Service (July 17/03) – Army releases findings from 507th ambush

• Association of the US Army (Jan 30/03) – Chief Awards 8 Silver Stars to Rangers. Including Capt. Nate Self.

Belgian F-16
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Belgium is embarking on minor but useful modernization of its remaining F-16 fleet, which is expected to serve until at least 2022, and could easily end up serving past 2030. Under Belgium’s 2000-2015 Modernization plan, the Belgian Defense Forces plan to keep just 60 F-16s in the fleet, creating a total of 48 operational aircraft (46 for NATO duties and 2 for domestic air defense).

BAF F-16s & AdlA C-135FR
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The F-16.net database shows a current active fleet of 49 F-16As and 10 F-16B trainers/ fighters, with likely delivery dates from 1982-1991. A Mid-Life Upgrade modernization was ordered in 1997 – 1998, which included a full Aircraft Structural Integrity Program.

This upgrade will help the F-16s remain useful for deployments like Kandahar, Afghanistan and Baltic air policing, but it won’t substantially change the fighter’s core capabilities. The AN/APG-66(V)2 radar remains, for instance, instead of being replaced with the APG-68(V)9 or something equally modern. Belgium’s addition of JHMCS helmet-mounted displays in recent years was more consequential.

On the other hand, the M6 OFP adds the Universal Armament Interface, which will make it much easier and cheaper for the Belgian Air Force to add new weapons to their F-16s. This upgrade may be one that becomes consequential with the passing of time.

Updates

January 13/16: The Belgian government has approved a plan to modernize its airforce by 2030, but at a cost of a reduction in personnel. $10 billion will be made available for upgrades to equipment and machinery, however it will necessitate a decrease in the military and civilian workforce from 32,000 to 25,000. While no preferences have been made as to what will be bought, the investment will see thirty-four fighter bombers bought to replace the fifty-six aging F-16s in service. This will go alongside two new frigates, six minesweepers and two new UAVs. Brussels is also considering participation in the Tanker Aircraft Program.

May 12/14: The US DSCA announces Belgium’s official export request for upgrades to its F-16A/B Block 15 Mid Life Upgrade (MLU) aircraft with:

• Operational Flight Program (OFP, core mission software) tapes S1, M5 and M6.
  
• 69 LN-260 Embedded Global Positioning System-Inertial Navigation Systems (GPS-INS).
  
• 8 Remote Operated Video Enhanced Receivers IV (ROVER IV) terminals, which greatly improve coordination with ground forces.
  
• 62 BAE AN/APX-125 Transceivers (AN/APX-125 Air Identification Friend of Foe Radios), with the latest NATO Mode 5/ Mode S capabilities so they can operate with other NATO countries. IFF Mode 5 needs the M6 OFP software to work.
  
• 43 AN/ARC-210(V) RT-1990(C) Ultra High Frequency/Very High Frequency (UHF/VHF) radios. They need the M5 OFP tape to work.
  
• 32 KIV-78 encryption devices.
  
• 1 Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS).
  
• 4 BRU-61/A Carriage Systems, used for the GPS-guided GBU-39 Small Diamater Bomb I. SDB-I needs the M6 OFP software to work.
  
• Plus spare and repair parts, support equipment, repair and return services, software development/ integration, test and equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, and other forms of US Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $113 million.

The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control in Orlando, FL, and implementation of any negotiated sale won’t require any additional US government or contractor personnel in Belgium. Sources: US DSCA #14-13, “Belgium – F-16A/B Block 15 Aircraft Mid-Life Upgrade”.

DSCA request: Belgium

SU-35 flight test, 2009
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The Russian Su-35 was something of a mystery for many years. Pictures from Russian firms showed different fighter jets carrying that label, even as the aircraft remained a prospective design and research project, rather an active program of record.

Revelations after 2007 began to provide answers. This article explains the sources of the widespread confusion regarding the Su-35’s layout and key characteristics, reviews what is now known about the platform, and tracks its development. Those developments are likely to have broad consequences. The aircraft now has a home customer in the Russian Air Force, and the Su-35 is being positioned to replace most Su-30MK variants as Russia’s fighter export of choice within the coming decade. Will its succession bid succeed?

Which Sukhoi? The SU-35 Platform SU-35 ?
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As one of our readers noted, DID’s articles from 2005-2007 seem to describe 2 different SU-35s. One was a mid-life modernized SU-27 Flanker, but there’s also a much more re-engineered “SU-35” variant with canards, thrust vectoring, etc. which has been confused with (and possibly redesignated between) the SU-37. So… what do we mean by “SU-35”?

Until very recently, only KnAAPO had listed the SU-35 as a product on its site; Sukhoi now does so as well, but Irkut does not. If this seems confusing, it’s because Sukhoi subcontracts production to affiliate firms – IAIA (Irkut) and KnAAPO (Komsomolosk un Amur). Each has their own intellectual property, and their own interests. In addition, the designation “SU-35” has been used in several different contexts over the years. It has been referred to, and even photographed, in ways that referred to both mid-life Flanker upgrades, and canard-equipped next-generation aircraft. KnAAPO’s site added the confusion by showing SU-35 pictures on its type page and gallery that display the aircraft both with and without canard foreplanes.

The current “SU-35”, which has been definitively described by Sukhoi, appears to be something of a compromise between the upgrade and full redesign visions. Reader assistance, and sources from Sukhoi and various media, offer an outline of its key systems and characteristics.

SU-35 flight, 2008
(click to view full)

“…(known as Su-35BM by some sources- ie. T-10BM to the original Su-27s internal T-10S designation). Differences and features largely speak for themselves in the video, but a short summary follows as related in various other sources follows:

1 – N035 Irbis-E PESA (Passive Electronically Scanned Array) Radar, a follow-on to the Bars-M.
2 – No canards
3 – Rear-looking self-defense radar in shorter tail sting
4 – AL-37FU/ 117S thrust-vectoring turbofan engines rated at 142-147kN
5 – Extended high-lift devices with large flaperon occupying the full trailing edge of the wing
6 – L175M Khibiny-M electronic-warfare self-defense system
7 – Reduced-area empennage
8 – Larger Air Intakes
9 – New and lighter systems, including quadruple digital fly-by-wire flight-control system.
10- New man-machine interface with fully-glass cockpit with two large LCD screens and helmet mounted display.”

Movable nozzles
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Sukhoi says that the fighter’s structures have been reinforced because of the increased takeoff and landing weight of the aircraft, and the front bearing has 2 wheels for the same reason. Performance is touted as 1,400 km/h (Mach 1.14) at sea-level, and 2,400 km/h (Mach 2.26) at altitude, with a ceiling up to 10 km/ 60,000 feet. Sukhoi has not touted loaded supercruise (Mach 1+, with weapons and without afterburners), which is likely to require improved engines. Thrust vectoring adds new dimensions of maneuverability, however, once pilots understand when to use it and when to avoid it.

The SU-35S will also depend on its sensors. It couples an electronically-scanned array radar with a 2-step electro-hydraulic drive unit, which creates a maximum radar beam deflection angle of 120 degrees. The NIIP Tikhomirov Irbis-E passive phased-array can reportedly detect and tracks up to 30 air targets, simultaneously engaging up to 8. It can also reportedly detect, choose and track up to 4 ground targets, and engage 2. Detection ranges of over 400 km/ 240 miles have been reported for airborne targets, which are the easiest, but resolutions are unspecified. Detecting a 747 passenger jet at 400 km is much easier than detecting a JAS-39 Gripen lightweight fighter, and information about the radar’s resolution would be needed before its real capabilities would be clear.

Full stealth jets like the F-22A Raptor, of course, create drastic reductions in radar detection range that make them a special case. In an emerging age of stealth fighters, therefore, the 80+ km detection range of the SU-35S’ IRST (infra-red search and track) system is very significant.

The SU-30 family has never been especially stealthy, and their overall airframe design limits what one can accomplish in this area. Nevertheless, Sukhoi cites an unspecified amount of “reduced reflectance” for the SU-35 in the X-band, which is a popular choice for modern radars, and in the angle range of plus or minus 60 degrees. Further improvements were made during testing by adding radar-absorbent materials, and removing or modifying protruding sensors that create radar reflection points.

The reported service life of the new aircraft is 6,000 flight hours, with a planned operational life of 30 years. The claimed service life of NPO Saturn 117S thrust-vectoring engines is 4,000 hours. Time will tell.

SU-35: Export Prospects Flanker customers
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The SU27/30 Flanker family was designed and built after American had completed its “teen series” (F-14/15/16/18) fighters, and uses lessons from those designs as well as Russia’s own approaches. The result was a very extensible design that boasted impressive performance, and quickly became the global fighter reference point among global military planners. Exports followed, and Flanker variants quickly surpassed the MiG-29 as Russia’s most popular export fighter.

The SU-35 aims to build on that legacy, as a final bridge to the 5th generation PAK-FA. Three key changes to Sukhoi’s circumstances may make a similar level of export success much more difficult.

1. A globalized market.

When it was first introduced, the S-27 family was the main global competitor to any western offerings, and was sold to countries whose ties and access to western technologies were weak. An array of SU-27s were gifted to breakaway Soviet satellites by virtue of being located on their territory, but India and China were its real anchor export customers. Now, SU-35 exports can expect to compete on 2 fronts. On the one hand, a less balkanized global market means that it must compete globally with western offerings that include upgraded American “teen series” fighters; and matured 4+ generation European designs that include Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen, France’s Rafale, and EADS’ Eurofighter. On the other end, it will be competing with Chinese offerings, including the J-11 that Russia correctly accuses China of copying/deriving from the SU-27, the smaller and less expensive 4+ generation J-10, and even the joint Chinese/Pakistani JF-17.

Chinese J-10
(click to view full) 2. The China factor

China has a large inventory of SU-30MKKs, but it’s less than they contracted to produce. They’re also pressing ahead with their own J-11B, which substitutes Chinese electronics, radars, and engines in an SU-27 family airframe. Russia is very upset by this theft of its intellectual property, which has reportedly hindered sales of its carrier-capable SU-33 variant into the Chinese market.

The J-11 has run into some problems, in particular China’s inability to copy Russian engine performance. That has made exports to China thinkable again for some Russian officials, but the J-11 experience remains a barrier to further Chinese sales on both sides of the table. A preliminary agreement has reportedly been signed to negotiate a 24 plane sale, but it’s controversial. China’s questionable status among the roster of future SU-35 customers, and its certain presence as an export competitor, both create more difficult dynamics for SU-35 export success.

IAF SU-30MKI
(click to view larger) 3. Other decisions by key markets.

With Eastern European countries no longer buying Russian equipment, the Flanker family’s key export markets likely closed, and key emerging markets that have decided to go in different directions, the SU-35’s export potential is likely to be much more limited than its predecessors.

India has fielded, and continues to field, the SU-30MKI, a design that includes locally-built electronics, canard foreplanes, and full thrust vectoring. Malaysia has ordered a less customized SU-30MKM variant that uses Russian and French technologies instead. Both of these designs are highly capable, and comparable to the SU-35. India in particular is unlikely to upgrade, as it continues to produce the SU-30MKI and expects to do so for several more years. That removes a major potential market, and this design is even filtering back into Russian orders, as the SU-30SM.

On a similar note, Algeria and Venezuela are inducting less advanced SU-30MK2 and MKAs, which means that future spending is likely to focus on other military areas.

Elsewhere, South Korea has opted for American F-15Ks instead of the SU-35 or European fighters for its F-X buy, and their next competition has skipped the SU-35 to invite the next-generation PAK-FA/ future SU-50. Saudi Arabia, which has become more receptive to purchases from Russia, bought Eurofighters as the future of their air force. Brazil, which could have significantly expanded Russia’s Latin American penetration, did not shortlist the SU-35 for the final round of its F-X2 future fighter competition.

The Middle East offers limited opportunities for Russian fighters these days, with some potential among long-standing clients in Libya, Syria, and possibly Iran, but competition from France’s Rafale in particular must be expected in Libya, in the wake of Gadhaffi’s ouster. Assuming that Libya buys any high-end fighters at all over the next decade. The SU-35 could be useful to other countries in the Middle East, but most are already committed to other suppliers. Success is possible, and it would be important to the platform, but any win would require a breakthrough.

The newly oil-rich countries around Africa’s Gulf of Guinea offer easier opportunities, but sales will face competition from China, as well as from the west.

Emerging South Asian markets like Indonesia and Vietnam also offer promise, and are less inclined to buy either Chinese or western fighters, but initial orders from that quarter have involved earlier-generation SU-27/30s, and future orders are likely to be limited.

Overall, the numbers add up far less favorably for the SU-35 than they did for its earlier cousins.

SU-35: Contracts and Key Events 2014-2016

Opportunities: Indonesia; Why is Russia buying Su-30SMs and Su-35s? “The UFO” at Paris

January 13/16: United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) is to supply fifty more of their Su-35 fighters to the Russian Army. When delivered, this will bring the number of the jets in operation by the Russians to ninety-eight. The deal is estimated to be worth between $787-800 million. UAC subsidiary Sukhoi, who manufactures the jets, looks to have a busy 2016 ahead as the order from the defense ministry adds to a recent agreement to export twelve Su-32 bombers to Algeria.

November 30/15: The Chinese ministry of defense has confirmed the the $2 billion purchase of Su-35 fighters from Russia. China’s plan to also purchase the S-400 missile defense system is also going ahead smoothly according to Colonel Wu Qian and will generate another $3 billion in revenue for Russia. While arms sales between China and Russia are nothing new, the sale of Russia’s most developed military technologies to China represents a policy shift within the Kremlin primarily brought on by financial necessity.

Indonesia has announced that it will order 12 Su-35 fighters following the the $2 billion sale of the aircraft to China last week. The fighters will replace the 16 F-5 Tigers which have been in service since 1980. The Su-35 saw competition from the Lockheed Martin F-16 Viper. The Indonesian Air Force also operate the Su-30 in its fleet and already have an existing maintenance system that will be compatible with the new Su-35.

November 25/15: Russia is to install communications systems for China as part of the $2 billion sale of Su-35 fighters. The deal includes the delivery and installation of the NKVS-27 communications system which will begin in 2016. The delivery of the 24 fighters will follow in 2017. It has been speculated that the Chinese may attempt to reverse engineer and copy the design of the aircraft as it did Su-27SK and could include the communications system. The NKVS-27 is designed to ensure information interaction between CPs and crews of any aircraft. Interaction may be by means of conversations through voice communications radio networks as well as data exchange through data exchange radio networks.

November 20/15: China has signed a substantial contract with Russia to purchase 24 Sukhoi Su-35 fighters in a deal that is said to be worth $2 billion. The agreement comes shortly after speculation that a number of countries were interested in purchasing the advanced fighters, including Pakistan, Indonesia and UAE, during the Dubai Air Show. This comes at an important time for Russia who have been suffering economically from falling oil prices and frosty trade relations with western nations and Ukraine. Arms sales have been one constant in this rather bleak financial outlook as the Kremlin looks to find new buyers for its military technologies.

Following China and their inking of contracts for the Sukhoi Su-35 fighters, the Indonesian ambassador to Russia has announced that they too are interested in making a purchase. Ambassador Djauhari Oratmangun told news agency RIA Novosti that a delegation will be sent from Russia to Jakarta to discuss contracts for the purchase of a number of the aircraft. No further details about the deal are known but seem to be part of a plan to increase trade between the two in 2016 by $5 billion.

November 9/15: The United Arab Emirates is engaged in talks with Russia over a potential acquisition of Su-35s, according to Ria Novosti. The discussions are taking place at the Dubai Air Show, with Pakistan also thought to be considering an acquisition of the type, and China and Indonesia also possible export customers for the Su-35.

September 11/15: Pakistan and Russia are reportedly in talks over the supply of Su-35 fighters and Mi-35M helicopters, according to both Pakistani and Russian press reports Thursday. The sale of Mil Mi-35M helicopters was also reported in August, with it unclear whether current negotiations are a continuation of this previous contract or a new one entirely. The two countries signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement last November, with the fourth-generation Sukhoi Su-35 also eyeing potential export customers in China and Indonesia.

Oct 10/14: Delivery. Another batch delivery from Sukhoi, SU-35 and SU-30M2 fighters for Russia’s VVF, handed over at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur aviation plant.

Note that the SU-30M2 is the “standard” SU-30, as opposed to Irkut’s SU-30SM which is based on the canard-winged SU-30MKM. Sources: Sukhoi, “Sukhoi handed over a batch of Su-35 and Su-30M2 aircraft to the Ministry of Defense”.

Oct 7/14: Indonesia. Indonesian Military Commander General Moeldoko tells Republika Online that they’re leaning toward the Su-35 as their F-5 replacement, with the JAS-39 in 2nd place and the F-16 a distant 3rd:

“Menurut dia, jet tempur buatan negeri Paman Sam itu sudah tidak layak pakai lantaran teknologinya sudah ketinggalan zaman…. “Untuk udara, ada pengajuan penggantian F-5. Sukhoi Su-35 menjadi pilihan pertama, Saab JAS 39 Gripen pilihan kedua, dan pesawat F-16 pilihan ketiga,”…”

This isn’t the end, because negotiations, budgets and other considerations will still come into play. If that pick does stand, it would keep the Flanker family as the backbone of the TNI-AU, but the fleet would also be fragmented among 3+ types with partial commonality at best: 5 Su27SKM, 11 Su-30 (2 MKs, 9 MK2s), and 16 Su-35SK. The Su-27SKM and Su-30MK fighters will retire first, which will simplify matters, but that’s unlikely to happen before 2025 or so. Sources: ROL, “Helikopter Apache dan Sukhoi Su-35 Segera Perkuat TNI”.

Feb 21/14: No mystery. “Russia’s New Air Force Is a Mystery” wonders why Russia is buying SU-30MK2s, SU-30SMs and SU-35s, in addition to the future PAK-FA. It turns out that the answer is extremely simple: industrial priorities that bought up aircraft the Chinese stopped buying, took advantage of successful advanced SU-30MKx export developments, and aim to provide the SU-35 with a home country order base for potential exports. That sort of thing happens all the time, everywhere. The article ends up stinging itself with this quote re: the PAK-FA:

“The T-50’s schedule has stretched farther and farther to the right. Originally planned for handover to the air force’s Akhtubinsk flight test center for evaluation in 2014, recent announcements suggest this might now slip until the second half of 2016. This would derail plans to declare initial operational capability, and the start of full-scale production, at the end of 2016.

The best-case scenario would have seen 60 production T-50s delivered between 2016 and 2020, but this now seems a distant hope. As a result, the air force is badly in need of supplementary equipment.”

The 1st PAK-FA/ T-50 arrives in Akhtubinsk for testing that same day, but even if the new stealth fighters arrive on time, Russia will still need more warplanes to replace its aging force. Sources: War Is Boring, “Russia’s New Air Force Is a Mystery”.

Jan 7/14: Indonesia. Indonesia wants to replace its 11 remaining F-5E/F Tiger II light fighters with 16 modern aircraft. Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro confirmed that they “have received proposals from several jet fighter manufacturers,” and are evaluating them. Indonesian Military Commander General Moeldoko added that the TNI-AU has studied the SU-35, F-16, F-15, and JAS-39 Gripen.

Moeldoko wants the requisition plan included in Indonesia’s Strategic Plan II for the 2015 – 2020, but the air force’s choice will also depend on available funds. The F-15 is significantly more expensive than other options, and if the air force wants 16 fighters, the state of Indonesia’s economy will influence what they can buy.

There are always extraneous considerations in Indonesia. Still, if commonality matters, the F-16 is the only fighter currently in Indonesia’s inventory. The F-15 and JAS-39 are used by its neighbors, and have Asian support networks in place. Picking the SU-35 seems odd, as it would leave Indonesia vulnerable to becoming the 1st export customer, while worsening the fragmentation within an already-split Flanker fleet. Still, the existing SU-30MK fleet is a known quantity, which means the SU-35 is the only variant would require study for a full consideration of their options. Sources: Antara News, “Defense Ministry looking to replace aging F-5 tiger fighter aircraft”.

2011 – 2013

Russia buys SU-30SMs; Russian plans to 2020; Final SU-35S model flies; Libya derailment; China impasse unblocks, but still no deal. Russian SU-35
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May 20/13: Brazil. RIA Novosti quotes Rosoboronexport’s SITDEF exhibition lead Sergey Ladigin, who says they’ve offered to deliver Su-35 fighters and Pantsir S1 air defense systems to Brazil outside the framework of a tender, and says the offer is being considered.

Brazil wants the Pantsir short-range air defense gun/missile systems, but the SU-35 failed to make the shortlist in 2009. On the other hand, if you don’t ask, you’ll never get. So Russia’s is throwing in the SU-35 offer, and Ladigin said in Lima that they were “ready to transfer 100% of manufacturing technologies,” as well as some technologies from their T50 (future SU-50?) stealth fighter.

It doesn’t help. In December 2013, Brazil picks Saab’s JAS-39E/F Gripen. Russian Aviation.

March 26/13: China. Media reports say that a deal has been signed for 24 SU-35 fighters, and 4 advanced Amur/Lada Class submarines, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia.

Defence News claims that “During a recent visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Moscow from Friday to Sunday, no discussions took place regarding “military-technical cooperation” issues, the ITAR-TASS news agency reported Monday.” Our Russian isn’t very good, but the Google Translate version simply quotes the CCTV report of a deal, while saying that there were no problems regarding military-technical cooperation issues. Defense News also quotes outside observers within Russia; readers will have to make up their own minds. ITAR-Tass [in Russian] | CCTV [in Chinese] | South China Morning Post | Defense News | International Business Times.

March 7/13: China confirmed. China and Russia have apparently signed an intergovernmental agreement, as the 1st step toward a contract for 24 SU-35s. Reports credibly place the agreement date as January 2013, but contract negotiations could take a while.

A trickle of reports from November 2012 to February claimed that Russia and China had a preliminary agreement in place, which would let them negotiate a deal for varying numbers of SU-35s. Russia’s Interfax confirmed the existence and date of that agreement in February 2013, but didn’t specify numbers. Now, a March 8/13 article in The Hindu confirms that talks involve 24 planes, a climbdown from Russia’s initial insistence on 48.

The Russians are said to have more confidence that China can’t copy their engines, and are also said to need SU-35 orders. Russia has placed an initial contract, but a deal with Libya fell by the wayside when its regime did, Venezuela has pulled back, and even Russia’s VVS is ordering follow-on buys of SU-30SMs instead. On the other side, there’s speculation that SU-35’s improved AL-117S engine could be “of interest” for China’s J-20 stealth plane. If so, it would be a setback to India on 2 fronts: breaking an old pattern by selling China a more modern fighter than India’s SU-30MKIs, and strengthening a competitor to the Indo-Russian PAK-FA stealth fighter project. South China Morning Post | Defense News | Voice of Russia | The Hindu.

China agreement to negotiate

April 17/12: China. RIA Novosti quotes Russian state-controlled arms exporter Rosoboronexport said on Tuesday, who says that the 18+ month long negotiations to sell Su-35s to China have been put on hold. The Chinese only wanted to buy a few, and the Russians weren’t interested in selling them a few templates for Chinese copying efforts.

Rosoboronexport deputy chief Viktor Komardin characterized Russia as wanting “a large consignment to make [the deal] economically viable.” Translation: China would have to buy large numbers of SU-35s, under a contract with strict and enforceable cancellation penalties. See also Nov 16/10 entry.

March 30/12: Russia plans. Russian Air Force commander Gen. Alexander Zelin discusses their aircraft acquisition plans under Russia’s Weapons Program 2011-2020. Those plans include about 100 SU-35 and SU-30SM fighters put together, and their conflation could be a worrying sign. The VVS also expects to field 60 Sukhoi PAKFA (T-50) stealth fighters by 2020, and intends to buy 140 SU-34 long range strike fighters.

The SU-35’s future may ride on how many of the 70 remaining VVS orders before 2020 request it, instead of more SU-30SMs. AIN Online. See also March 16/10 entry.

March 23/12: Russian setback. Russia’s own VVS moves to buy 30 SU-30SM fighters, for delivery by 2015. These planes are a version of the canard-winged, thrust-vectoring SU-30MKI/M variant that was developed for India, and has since been exported to Algeria and Malaysia. Which raises the question: why didn’t Russia buy 30 more SU-35S fighters? A RIA Novosti article offers one explanation:

“Irkut has been churning out these planes for 10 years thanks to its completely streamlined production method. This means that its products are of high quality, relatively cheap… and will be supplied on time.

It is one thing if, in order to make 30 aircraft, you have to breathe life into an idling plant, to fine-tune (or develop anew) your technological method, buy additional equipment, and – still worse – hire personnel. But it’s quite another if you have been manufacturing standardized aircraft for years and years and can easily divert your workforce to produce an “improved” modification for your own country’s Air Force… This approach (buying quickly and on the cheap what can be produced immediately) has been growing in popularity in the Russian military.”

There is a contract for 48 SU-35s, but the production rate doesn’t appear to be very advanced yet. If Bogdanov’s analysis is correct, the SU-35 could have a problem. It would mean that more SU-30SMs become a very attractive near-term choice for the next few years, as Russia’s rearmament program kicks into gear. Farther down the road, the T-50 PAK-FA stealth fighter (likely to become the SU-50), will be a priority after 2016 or so. In that scenario, the SU-35 could find itself starved of budgetary oxygen at home, followed by avoidance abroad in favor of the SU-30MKx models that have already been exported to Algeria, India, and Malaysia.

Sept 19/11: Testing. Sukhoi says that its SU-35 fighters have carried out more than 300 test flights at the 929th State Flight Test Center (GLITS), and offers a number of data points regarding the aircraft.

“The maximum ground-level speed is 1,400 km/h, speed at altitude – 2400 km/h, the ceiling – 18 thousand meters. The detection range of targets in the “air-to-air” mode is over 400 km. This is significantly higher than that of the combat aircraft currently in service. The onboard OLS (optical locator station) can detect and track multiple targets at ranges exceeding 80 km… a new phased antenna array radar with a long aerial target detection range and with an increased number of simultaneously tracked and engaged targets (30 aerial targets tracked and 8 targets engaged plus the tracking of 4 and engagement of 2 ground targets)… The radar signature of the fighter has been reduced by several times as compared to that of the fourth-generation aircraft by coating the cockpit with electro-conducting compounds, applying radio absorption coats and reducing the number of protruding sensors. The service life of the aircraft is 6,000 hours flight hours… The assigned service life of vectored thrust engines is 4,000 hours.”

May 3/11: Final SU-35S model. Sukhoi begins flight tests for its final series production version SU-35S model. Among other things, it marks the program’s recovery from the April 26/09 accident. Sukhoi [in Russian] | Russia’s RIA Novosti | China’s Xinhua | DefenceWeb | Flight International.

Feb 27/11: Libya. Russia’s Interfax news agency says that a recent UN embargo on arms sales to Libya, in the wake of the regime’s military attacks on demonstrators, could cost Russia $4 billion:

“The already-signed arms deals between Moscow and Tripoli amount to $2 billion, while deals for another $1.8 billion are in the final stage of readiness. In January 2010 the two sides agreed on supply of Russia’s small arms, six operational trainers Yak-130 and some armored vehicles for total of $US 1.3 billion. Libya has been supposed to become the first country to get Su-35 fighter jets, the contract to buy 15 jets for $800 million is fully accorded and ready to be signed. Tripoli also expressed interest in buying 10 Ka-52 Alligator assault helicopters, two advanced long range S-300PMU2 Favorit air defense missile system and about 40 short range Panzir C1 air defense complexes for a total over $1 billion. The Libyan military has also discussed possible supply of modern tanks, multiple rocket launcher systems, high speed missile boats etc.”

If the civil war drags on long enough, don’t be surprised to see a number of these potential sales revived, even as other counter-insurgency related equipment steps to the fore. Russia could wind up finds ways to skirt UN sanctions and support its client, something that has been an issue before with countries like Sudan. China could do the same, and has a long history of supporting civil war factions without regard to human suffering or disposition, in exchange for medium-long term resource deals. Russia Today | AFP.

2009 – 2010

Russia orders 48; KnAAPO gets financing; Crash delays program; Opportunities in China, Libya. Ready for takeoff
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Nov 16/10: China. At Airshow China 2010 in Zhuhai, Rosoboronexport Deputy General Director Alexander Mikheyev tells RIA Novosti that Russia is ready to hold talks with China on selling SU-35 fighter aircraft to the Chinese air force. That’s a bit of a surprise, given China’s consistent record of buying, copying, and then competing with Russian technologies – see “The China Factor,” above. On the other hand, Mikheyev also told RIA Novosti that:

“We have made progress in an understanding of [illegal production of Russian arms in China]. Moreover, all the documents concerning the protection of intellectual property have been signed… China does not refuse to discuss these issues, which are primarily a concern for Russia.”

It would be darkly amusing to many in western defense organizations to have Russia fleeced in arms-related agreements, by a country that follows their own pattern of offering paper guarantees, while doing something else.

Sept 20/10: Financing for KnAAPO. Sukhoi Holding Company the Yuri Gagarin Aviation Industrial Concern (KnAAPO) in , Komsomolsk-na-Amure strikes a financing agreement with Sberbank, the Savings Bank of Russia. The agreement will allow the firm to invest in producing the Russian Air Force’s SU-35S orders. Brahmand | Frontier India.

July 23/10: Update. Aviation Week reports from Farnborough 2010. Sukhoi CEO Mikhail Pogosyan says that the Russian air force is still set to take delivery of its first Su-35S by the end of 2010, and the firm issues its own release with test results.

Preliminary testing of Su-35 has now been concluded with 270 flights and 350 flight hours, using 2 rather than 3 aircraft after a fire destroyed one of the prototypes (vid. April 26/09). The NIIP Tikhomirov Irbis passive phased-array radar was also a focus of testing, and moves were made to reduce radar signature by adding radar-absorbent materials and removing protruding sensors. They add:

“Tripoli will likely be the launch export customer [for the SU-35S]. Alexander Mikheev, deputy head of Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state-owned arms export agency, confirmed at Farnborough that the contract for delivery of undisclosed number of aircraft to Libya, one of the traditional recipients of Soviet armaments, is expected to be signed this year. The first export production slots are available from 2012.”

March 16/10: Russian plans. In “The future of the Russian Air Force: 10 years on“, RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik discusses planned buys and pending recapitalization of the Russian Air Force over the next decade:

“According to various media reports, the Ministry wants to buy at least 1,500 aircraft, including 350 new warplanes, by 2020. The fleet would include 70% new equipment at that point, said Air Force Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Alexander Zelin… The Defense Ministry has now signed contracts for the purchase of 32 Su-34 Fullback advanced fighter-bombers to be delivered by 2013, 48 Su-35 Flanker-E fighters by 2015, 12 Su-27SM Flanker-B Mod. 1 fighters by 2011, 4 Su-30M2 Flanker-C planes by 2011 and 12 Su-25UBM Frogfoot combat trainers. This year, the Defense Ministry intends to sign a contract for the delivery of 26 MiG-29K Fulcrum-D fighters by 2015. Additional contracts for the delivery of at least 80 Su-34s and 24-48 Su-35s are expected to be signed. In all, the Russian Air Force is to receive 240-260 new aircraft of these types. It is hard to say much about the specifications of another 100-110 aircraft, due to be manufactured primarily after 2015. They will probably include 25-30 MiG-35 fighters, another 12-16 Su-30 combat trainers for Su-35 squadrons and 40-60 Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA (Advanced Frontline Aviation Aircraft System) fifth-generation fighters…”

Nov 17/09: Sukhoi announces that it has begun work on Russia’s SU-35S contract.

Nov 15/09: Libya. Interfax quotes Rosoboronexport’s special missions director and Dubai Airshow delegation chief Mikhail Zavaly:

“Libya wants to buy our aircrafts, including Sukhoi fighter jets and Ilyushin Il-76 military airlifters,” Zavaly told Interfax on Sunday. The talks deal with the technical details of the planes offered to Libya, he said. After technical arrangements are approved, “the Russian side will make commercial proposals to Libya,” Zavaly said.”

Oct 19/09: Libya. Russia’s Interfax media agency reports that Libya plans to buy 12-15 Sukhoi Su-35 multirole fighters, another 4 Su-30s as an immediate interim order, and 6 Yakovlev Yak-130 trainer and light attack aircraft aircraft. Reports indicate that a contract could be signed with state arms export agency Rosoboronexport by the end of 2009, or early 2010.

Libya has also been in talks with France to buy its Rafale fighters since late 2007. A Sukhoi deal is likely to end the Rafale’s near-term chances in Libya. UPI report.

Aug 18/09: Russia orders 48. The Russian government signs the SU-35’s inaugural production contract at the Russian MAKS 2009 air show. The Russian Defense Ministry has reportedly signed a contract with Sukhoi to deliver 48 SU-35s by 2015, plus an interim buy of 12 single-seat SU-27SM and 4 dual-seat SU-30M2 multirole fighters by 2011.

RIA Novosti cites “open sources” that estimate the flyaway cost an SU-35 at about $65 million. This contract should be larger, since it’s a new type that must carry the additional costs of training spares stocks, etc. Statements place the contract’s value at “over 80 billion” roubles, where RUB 80 billion is currently about $2.51 billion. The contract follows on the heels of RUB 3.2 billion (about $100 million) in capital injected into Sukhoi, and Vnesheconombank head Vladimir Dmitriyev said the national development bank would grant Sukhoi a 3.5 billion-ruble (about $109 million) loan to start SU-35 production. ITAR-TASS | ITAR-TASS re: loans, contract value | RIA Novosti | RIA Novosti’s Russia Today | domain-b | Flight International.

April 26/09: Crash. An Su-35 burst into flames and exploded before take-off at the Komsomolosk-na-Amure Aviation Production Association (KNAAPO) Dzemgi flight test aerodrome. Yevgeniy Frolov, one Sukhoi’s most experienced pilots, managed to eject safely before the aircraft exploded. The crash may jeopardize the SU-35’s expected appearance over Russia’s May Day festivities, and will delay testing. To make matters worse, this 2nd operational aircraft was carrying a new NIIP Irbis-E radar set, which will require some effort to replace. The Weekly Standard adds:

“Su-35 programme representatives told THE WEEKLY STANDARD that the crash was the fault of one of the NPO Saturn 117S engine’s PMC units and not a failure of a fuel pump, as had been previously reported. “One of the engine’s control systems failed and the engine was working at only 93 per cent power,” said the representative.”

March 23/09: Flight #100. KNAAPO announces that the Su-35 has made its 100th flight, during which they conducted final tests of the flight control system. Flight tests began Feb 18/08, and in the second quarter of 2009 another test aircraft is expected to join the current 2-plane fleet.

The firm expects to bring the number of flights up to 150-160 on 3 fighters, allowing them to finish static tests and start the super-maneuverability mode testing with the plane’s thrust-vectoring engines. First deliveries to Russian and foreign customers are still scheduled for 2011.

2007 – 2008

Maiden flight; Eliminated in Brazil. SU-35 early concept
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Oct 2/08: 2nd test plane. Sukhoi says they have started flight tests of the second SU-35 production fighter. “The addition of the second aircraft to the testing program will speed up its completion and ensure the beginning of deliveries to our customers in 2011.”

Since its demonstration flight on July 7/08, the first production aircraft has made over 40 more test flights. RIA Novosti.

Oct 1/08: Brazil loss. Brazil has decided on its 3 finalists: Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault Aviation’s Rafale, and Saab/BAE’s JAS-39 Gripen.

EADS Eurofighter, Lockheed Martin’s F-16BR, and Sukhoi’s SU-35 all failed to make the cut. Brazilian FAB release [Portuguese] | Reuters | Boeing release | Gripen International release.

July 9/08: A Sukhoi release says that it has presented the newest SU-35 multi-role to the “Flight Scientific Research Institute named after Gromov in Zhukovsky near Moscow,” where earlier test flights have taken place.

It adds that the SU-35 is one of the priority programs of the new United Aviation Corporation (UAC), resulting from the government’s consolidation of Russia’s aerospace industry, and notes that Russia’s 5th generation PAK-FA fighter project will not be fielded before 2015-2017. In contrast, batch production and deliveries of the SU-35 are promised between 2010-2011. Moscow News | Russian release (English version not yet on web).

March 6/08: Maiden flight. Russia test flies SU-35. The first Su-35 prototype made its maiden flight on Feb 18/08, and 2 more aircraft are being prepared for similar tests at an aircraft manufacturing plant in Russia’s Far East. The company expects the jet to enter service with Russia’s military in 2-3 years. RIA Novosti.

Sept 4/07: Clarity? A subsequent Flight International article may begin to offer clarity re: the platform. It states categorically that the SU-35-1 design, unveiled at Russia’s MAKS 2007 air show, is a single-seat aircraft without canard foreplanes, but with a lighter airframe than the SU-27, enlarged fan and engine inlets, 2 NPO Saturn/Ufa MPO Item 117S engines that reportedly offer thrust vectoring and supercruise performance in clean layout, 2t more fuel, modernized electronics at all levels, a Tikhomirov NIIP Irbis (updated N-011M Bars) passive electronically scanned array radar, 6,000 hour airframe life, and 4,000 hour engine life.

Additional Readings

• Sukhoi – Su-35

• KnAAPO – THE SU-35 Single-Seat Multi-Role Super-Maneuverable Fighter

• Fighter Tactics Academy, via WayBack – Sukhoi Su-35. By Sergei Drobyshev, Head of the Regional Policy and Marketing Department, KnAAPO.

• Ubisoft Forums, via WayBack (Aug 20/04) – How is SU-35UB different from SU-MKK? Reader forum Q&A. Caveat reader.

• Air Power Australia – Sukhoi Flankers: The Shifting Balance of Regional Air Power. Program history, details, regional procurement notes, and analysis of the SU-30 family’s current capabilities and likely future upgrades.

• DID – PAK-FA: India, Russia Cooperating re: “Fifth-Generation Fighter”. The PAK-FA, likely to be renamed SU-50. The SU-35 is competing with the SU-30MKI/SM right now, but as the SU-50 moves closer to reality, it will also implicitly compete with that stealth jet.

• RosOboronExport Air Forces Catalog [odd mixed web/PDF format]

Tejas LCA
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India’s Light Combat Aircraft program is meant to boost its aviation industry, but it must also solve a pressing military problem. The IAF’s fighter strength has been declining as the MiG-21s that form the bulk of its fleet are lost in crashes, or retired due to age and wear. Most of India’s other Cold War vintage aircraft face similar problems.

In response, some MiG-21s have been modernized to MiG-21 ‘Bison’ configuration, and other current fighter types are undergoing modernization programs of their own. The IAF’s hope is that they can maintain an adequate force until the multi-billion dollar 126+ plane MMRCA competition delivers replacements, and more SU-30MKIs arrive from HAL. Which still leaves India without an affordable fighter solution. MMRCA can replace some of India’s mid-range fighters, but what about the MiG-21s? The MiG-21 Bison program adds years of life to those airframes, but even so, they’re likely to be gone by 2020.

That’s why India’s own Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project is so important to the IAF’s future prospects. It’s also why India’s rigid domestic-only policies are gradually being relaxed, in order to field an operational and competitive aircraft. Even with that help, the program’s delays are a growing problem for the IAF. Meanwhile, the west’s near-abandonment of the global lightweight fighter market opens a global opportunity, if India can seize it with a compelling and timely product.

LCA Tejas: India’s Lightweight Fighter Tejas, side view
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Within India’s force structure, the LCA is largely expected to replace its 400 or so MiG-21 aircraft with a more versatile and capable performer. The MiGs are being retired as age claims them, and even India’s 125 or so upgraded MiG-21 ‘Bisons’ are only scheduled to remain in service until 2018. The LCA’s overall performance is expected to be somewhat similar to India’s Mirage 2000s, with lower top speed but more modern electronics.

The Tejas LCA design uses a tailless compound delta plan that’s designed to be unstable, but controllable over an 8g / -3.5g flight range thanks to advanced flight software and quadruplex fly-by-wire technology. Composites are used heavily in order to to save weight, and proper placement can also lower the plane’s radar profile. Japan’s F-16-derived F-2 fighters also made heavy use of composite technologies, but Japanese issues with delamination and cracking required repairs and changes. ADA has conducted Static and fatigue strength studies on finite element models, and aeroservoelastic studies have been performed on the Tejas design; nevertheless, only full testing and actual service will reveal how it fares. So far, composites haven’t become a public problem for the aircraft.

Unfortunately, reports indicate that the lack of early pilot input has compromised several aspects of the design, while a failure to consider maintenance up front has made key components difficult to reach. Barring published comparisons from experienced pilots or evaluating countries, it’s very difficult to pin down the extent or seriousness of these issues, but Tejas has certainly spent a very long time in testing.

The following sub-sections go into more detail about the fighter’s equipment rationales, and that equipment’s specific capabilities. The above list seems straightforward, but getting there has been anything but.

Electronics

The plane’s avionics architecture is configured around a 3 bus, distributed MIL-STD-1553B system, using a 32-bit Mission Computer (MC) and software written in Ada. A “glass cockpit” of colour Active Matrix Liquid Crystal Displays (AMLCDs) provides the pilot with information, and is supplemented by Elbit’s DASH helmet-mounted display for commonality with other IAF aircraft.

The Mk.II is slated to use a more advanced glass cockpit with better computing and graphics processors behind it, full-duplex cross-Switched Ethernet (AFDX) based back up avionics, and digital maps. Elsewhere on the plane, a Universal Pylon Interface Computer (UPIC) will replace the Pylon Interface Boxes.

Radar Love: Weapons & Fire Control Radar Failure & Replacement EL/M-2032
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The Tejas project’s original radar, like its original engine choice, very nearly sank the project. The state-run Aeronautical Development Agency had originally intended to use Ericsson Microwave Systems’ PS-05/A radar, until they changed their mind and decided to develop their own. India’s Multi Mode Radar (MMR) program was started in June 1991, with a “Probable Date of Completion” of 6.5 years. More than 15 years later, development was still plodding away as a joint effort between Hindustan Aeronautics Limited in Hyderabad, India’s Electronics and Radar Development Laboratory in Bangalore, and the Centre for Airborne Studies. Even worse, test results for the radar were poor.

By August 2007, over 16 years into the project, even India’s MoD finally had to admit that the MMR faced serious problems. Radar co-development has now been initiated with Israel’s IAI Elta, with the EL/M-2032 as the radar base and interim solution. The EL/M-2032 multi-mode radar was originally developed for Israel’s Lavi fighter, and already equips India’s Sea Harrier fleet and Jaguar IM strike aircraft, and is popular around the world. M-2032s can be found on some F-16s in Israel and elsewhere, Kfir C10s flown by some Latin American customers, Chile’s upgraded F-5s, Romania’s MiG-21 Lancer upgrades, and South Korea’s FA-50 lightweight fighter. The radar features modular hardware design, with software control and flexible avionic interfaces, and a TWT coherent transmitter with a low-sidelobe planar antenna. The M-2032 functions in several air-to-air modes, as well as the air-to-ground, air-to-sea, ground-mapping in RBS, DBM, SAR with moving target tracking, and terrain avoidance modes.

Detection and classification ranges will vary depending on the aperture size. A radar adapted to fit in an F-5’s narrow nose will have lower performance than one that fits into a larger F-16. The Tejas’ dimensions suggest that performance may be near the radar’s claimed 80 nautical mile maximums for detection of fighter-sized objects.

There have been reports that the Tejas Mk.II and operational LCA Naval will fly with IAI’s EL/M-2052 AESA radar instead. That change would roughly double performance, while drastically reducing radar maintenance costs. These reports are unconfirmed, however, and other accounts cite American pressure to prevent Israeli AESA radar exports.

Other Sensors & Defensive LITENING pod

RAFAEL’s LITENING advanced surveillance and targeting pod will give Tejas long-range looks at ground targets, independent laser designation capability, and (rumored) fleet commonality with India’s Jaguars, MiG-27s, Mirage 2000s, and SU-30MKIs. The Mk.II will reportedly be adapted for a more advanced variant of the LITENING pod, but that means the pods would have to be bought and given to the Tejas fleet, rather than the SU-30MKI fleet for example.

The defensive system will be designed in India. Late testing means that it won’t be fully effective in the Mk.I aircraft, which must depend on an external Israel Aerospace Elta ELL/8-2222 jamming pod. The Mk.II is supposed to have a fully effective system of warning receivers, automated decoy dispensing, etc. In advanced western aircraft, these systems can even feed geolocation data from pinpointed threats into the plane’s targeting computers. Time will tell whether the Mk.II also has those capabilities.

Weapons LCA Tejas, armed
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Unsurprisingly, RAFAEL’s Derby radar-guided fire-and-forget missile will serve as the Tejas’ initial medium range air-air armament. It lacks the range and datalink of Raytheon’s AMRAAM or Russia’s R-77/AA-12, but in practice, positive identification requirements have kept most aerial fights within Derby range. Derby reportedly has good seeker cone coverage, which improves performance. It has already been integrated with the EL/M-2032 on India’s own Sea Harriers, and equips the country’s new SPYDER mobile anti-aircraft missile systems. If India’s own Astra MRAAM continues to progress, it will be integrated later.

For shorter-range engagements, Derby will be complemented by TMC’s infrared-guided Vympel R-73/AA-11 “Archer,” giving Tejas partial weapon commonality with India’s large MiG fleets. The R-73 is known for its exceptional maneuverability and a “wide boresight” seeker cone, a combination that inaugurated the era of 4th generation missiles. There’s even a rear-facing version, which offers enemies a nasty surprise. The jets will also carry RAFAEL’s Python 4/5, which can face forward and still hit targets behind their fighter.

Tejas planes are expected to carry a range of ground attack weapons, from ordinary bombs and unguided Russian S-8 80mm rockets, to precision munitions. Tests for unspecified laser-guided bombs and cluster bombs are expected, though they’re expected to be Russian KAB-1500L and RBK-500 weapons, along with Russian Kh-31/35/59 anti-ship and precision strike missiles. Specifications don’t mention a MIL-STD-1760 electrical interface with carriage stores, which is very helpful when integrating GPS-guided munitions. Time will tell, but the Tejas Mk.I’s initial weapons don’t include GPS guidance.

Engines & Alternatives F414-GE-400 engine
(click to see in sections)

With its radar issue solved by a foreign partnership, the fighter’s indigenous Kaveri engine (vid. Appendix B) was left as the project’s biggest unresolved issue. That was resolved with a stopgap, followed by a competition to field a working engine; even so, India’s DRDO continues to pour dollars and time into Kaveri development.

The removal of American arms trade sanctions allowed smooth incorporation of a slightly modified F404-GE-IN20 turbofan in initial Tejas Mk.I production models. Over the longer term, an international competition for the Tejas Mk.II’s engines had 2 shortlisted competitors, 1 unofficial competitor, and 1 winner in GE’s F414.

The winner: F414. GE’s F414 is that company’s more advanced alternative to the F404 family that equips the Tejas Mk.I; it currently equips Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen and Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet family. India’s F414-GE-INS6 engines will include the same single-engine FADEC modifications as the Gripen’s F414Gs, and may include some components of the F414-EPE research program for enhanced thrust. Standard F414 engines can reportedly produce up to 22,000 pounds of thrust on afterburners.

GE has been remarkably coy about its thrust in normal operation, but the figures it supplied to India were obviously good enough to beat Eurojet’s EJ200, which reportedly revised its bid too close to the deadline to change its fortunes.

Slow fade: Kaveri. This was supposed to be the fighter’s main engine, but India couldn’t develop a world-leading jet engine from a base of no experience. Kaveri was sidelined in 2008 by GE’s F404, in order to allow flight testing to go forward. DRDO finally admitted defeat in 2013 and stopped advocating Kaveri for the Tejas, after around 6 fruitless years of negotiations with French engine maker Snecma. A global re-tender for assistance was proposed, but late 2014 saw DRDO finally admit the obvious and file the paperwork to end the program.

In the Navy… Naval LCA 2011 briefing
click for video

Indian officials were interested in an improved engine for 2 reasons. One is simply better performance, thanks to an improved thrust:weight ratio. Another is the need for additional thrust, in order to operate the Tejas successfully as a naval aircraft.

India will induct the 40,000t INS Vikramaditya in 2013, after extensive modifications to Russia’s former Admiral Gorshkov carrier. The navy is also proceeding with construction of 2 more 35,000t “air defence ship” Vikrant Class carriers, designed in collaboration with Fincantieri and built in India. Orders have been signed for 46 Russian MiG-29Ks, but India also wants to operate navalized LCA fighters from their decks.

These fighters are actually being designed in a trainer variant first, which will then be converted into a naval fighter. Key changes to the Naval LCA include:

• Dropped nose, for better visibility in high angle-of-attack (nose pointed up) landings.
  
• Leading edge vortex controls that can extend from the edges of the main wing. They help the aircraft safely sink faster to land in smaller spaces, and can also improve takeoff response.
  
• Arrester hook to catch landing wires.
  
• Strengthened spine and related systems, to absorb the high impact of carrier landings (7.1 m/s descent vs. 3m/s for IAF).
  
• Longer, strengthened undercarriage. That actually ended up being a bit overdesigned.
  
• Powered nose wheel steering for better maneuverability on deck.
  
• Fuel dump system that can shed 1,000 kg of fuel from the fighter’s wing tanks, in case of an emergency just after take-off. Fuel weighs a lot, and that added weight can imperil attempted emergency landings.

Naval LCA rollout
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The other change will be the engine. India’s military and designers believe that the naval Mk.I derivative, powered by the same F404-GE-IN20 engine in the IAF variant, can be used for training and testing. At the same time, they believe that only the a Tejas Mk.II derivative with its more powerful F414-GE-INS6 engine will be capable of loaded carrier operations from the Vikrant Class’ “ski jump” ramp, in just 200m of takeoff space.

The naval Tejas program began in 2003. Variant paper designs were produced, and an initial order placed in 2009 began turning those designs into prototypes. April 2012 saw the 1st flight of NP-1, and a 2012 decision gave the go-ahead for initial production of 8 planes. The naval variant is expected to receive a different designation than “Tejas.”

LCA Tejas: Program, Prospects, and Future The Program India’s LCA Programs
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The Tejas Light Combat Aircraft program began in 1983, and is currently in Full-Scale Engineering Development (FSED) Phase-II, under which India’s DRDO was trying to deliver production fighters to the IAF by December 2010. Initial Operational Clearance wasn’t granted until January 2011, and then only with significant waivers. Limited Series Production aircraft in final configuration have arrived, but IOC wasn’t declared until November 2013, and even that was done under pressure from the ministry. The plane’s core self-protection systems were only installed in October 2013, most weapons haven’t been tested yet, and neither has aerial refueling. The ministry is pushing for Final Operational Clearance as a day/night, all-weather platform, and the official induction of a Tejas squadron at Sulur Air Base in Tamil Nadu near Sri Lanka, by the end of 2014. It isn’t clear that the fighter can actually achieve those performance goals in time.

So far, 40 Tejas Mk.I fighters have been ordered. Current plans call for another 100 aircraft (mostly Mk.II) for the air force, and up to 60 naval variants for the Navy.

When it was originally approved in 1983, the Tejas program’s cost was set at Rs 560 crore (5.6 billion rupees). The cost had risen to over 3,300 crore by the late 1980s, and has continued to rise since. The Times of India places the 2011 program total at 17,269 crore/ $3.77 billion for all variants. As shown above, subsequent reports show continued cost increases.

LCA Tejas Mk.II: Delhi, we have a problem… MiG-21bis: Hanging on
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The first test-flight of the improved and re-engined Tejas Mark-II is currently scheduled for December 2014, with production beginning in June 2016. Unfortunately for the air force, those markers are looking less and less likely, and switching in a new engine adds design and testing changes that will complicate matters. Engineers must rebalance the aircraft’s weight, adjust fuel capacity for changed consumption rates, etc. It’s already known that the LCA will need to add 0.5m in length to fit the F414, and its air intakes offer inadequate airflow and will have to be redesigned.

One also expects that an LCA Mk.II will add newer technologies in some areas, and there are reports that India intends to upgrade from IAI’s ELM-2032 phased-array radar to the ELM-2052 AESA. India’s avionics industry also continues to advance, leading to potential component swaps and re-testing. Finally, Tejas Mk.I has placed many key components in inaccessible places. Unless significant redesigns are forthcoming in Mk.II, maintenance costs will be high, and readiness will be low.

Redesign processes usually takes several years, even in a best-case scenario. China’s shift to a Russian RD-33 engine for its J-10 fighter was the centerpiece of a redesign that took more than a decade. Sweden’s JAS-39 Gripen made a similar shift from Volvo’s F404-derived RM12 in the JAS-39 A-D models, to GE’s F414 for its new JAS-39E/F, over a few years. There was a standing offer to have Saab adopt a significant role in Mk.2 development, with strong support from DRDO, but that offer remains in limbo.

Major delays to Tejas Mk.I production mean that activity probably won’t end until 2018. The delays will buy time for Mk.II testing, at the cost of IAF readiness and force strength. If the Mk.II also runs into testing problems, the LCA program will face a hard choice: produce more than 40 Tejas Mk.Is, or buy Mk.IIs before testing is done, with the accompanying risk of expensive rework and fielding delays.

Meanwhile, India’s MiG-21 fleet continues to age out.

Industrial Team

The Tejas industrial team is weighted toward government participation, which is one of the reasons for its long development cycle. Instead of buying finished and tested equipment from abroad, new designs had to be invented by government research agencies, then tested by themselves until they were ready, followed by integration testing with other elements. These choices were driven by India’s desire for long-term self-sufficiency in many aircraft sub-systems, in order to reduce their dependence of foreign suppliers.

There have also been a wide variety of sub-contracts to Indian firms for Tier 3 or Tier 4 participation to supply tooling, testing equipment, software development, or sub-assemblies. They are not covered in our list.

In late 2013, HAL told India’s Business Standard that it aimed to roll out the first 2 Tejas IOC fighters by March 2014, and deliver 8 more by the end of 2014. The next step after that will be to enhance to production line to 16 fighters per year, a task that might prove challenging without outside aid (q.v. Dec 9/12). That would leave 10 Tejas Mk.I IOC fighters to be built in 2015, whereupon HAL would be able to begin production of 20 Tejas Mk.I Full Operational Capability variants.

Required FOC upgrades to the IOC fleet, and initial naval production orders, will also compete for production space. An early 2013 interview with ADA director Shri PS Subramanyam saw 2018 as a realistic date for Mk.I production to end.

Tejas Prospects: Think Globally, Begin Locally Tejas: 2 views
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Exports are important to fighter programs. The added buys keep production lines open at no cost to the home country, and drop prices per plane. A combination of profits and paid-for modifications would help keep the design current, allowing the plane to add new technology and remain relevant. On the industrial front, if ADA can move the plane from the current 55% Indian content to around 80% without creating more problems, it would help to insulate prices from currency exchange swings.

The Tejas Light Combat Aircraft’s exact per-plane flyaway price point isn’t known yet, but the goal is an inexpensive fighter in the $20-25 million range, with performance that compares well to early model F-16s and Mirage 2000s. Historically, the low end of the market is where the largest volume of global fighter buys have taken place. In recent years, however, pressure from home-country buyers has pushed the West into a niche of high-end platforms like the F-15, F-35, Eurofighter, and Rafale. Some mid-tier options exist, like new F-16s, the F/A-18 Super Hornet, and JAS-39 Gripens, but even those are fairly pricey for emerging economies. As regional tensions rise, it remains to be seen whether the last decade has seen a permanent shift toward mid-level and high-end platforms, or whether traditional buying patterns will reassert themselves through emerging economies.

Long-term Tejas competitors in the $20 – 40 million range include the market for second-hand F-16s, the Chinese/Pakistani JF-17, and Korea’s T-50 Golden Eagle family of supersonic trainers and light fighters. RAC MiG has received enough work from India and others to retain the MiG-29M family as a viable platform in this bracket; Russia’s chosen pricing approach will determine whether the thrust-vectoring MiG-35 multi-role fighter also becomes a competitor.

click for video

India’s growing geopolitical influence, and the ability to price toward this bracket’s low end, offers the Tejas decent prospects, even in this crowded field. HAL’s problem is that the Tejas must first achieve success in India.

Delays have taken their toll. Bangalore-based Aeronautics Development Agency (MoD ADA) chief R K Ramanathan promised a 2010 in-service date, while touting a reduction from over 30,000 components to around 7,000. Even that was a late milestone, fully 27 years after the program began, but it didn’t come close to happening. Plans to field 40-48 interim aircraft in the first 2 operational air force squadrons won’t take place until 2015 (32 years), and the final “Tejas Mk.II” version will be very hard-pressed to become operational before 2018 (35 years).

A lot can change in 35 years. Official plans still call for 100+ fighters, but the IAF has embarked on a wide set of upgrade and purchase commitments for existing MiG-29s and Mirage 2000s, the new mid-tier MMRCA fighter, and a high-end FGFA stealth fighter joint venture with Russia.

Meanwhile, the IAF is now taking something of a “wait and see” approach to a longer term commitment, until the final aircraft is delivered with working systems and the “Tejas Mark II” design has shown what it can do. One the one hand, the project’s long development period, and DRDO’s past performance on defense projects, tend to justify that wait-and-see approach. On the other hand, the project can easily run into danger without adequate military and political backing. On Feb 6/06, The Telegraph in Calcutta reported that:

“Though air headquarters has not said so in public, it is weighing whether it should commit funds because it is anticipating a resource crunch for the big ticket purchases of multi-role combat aircraft – that could cost the exchequer more than $5 billion over 10 years – and other equipment that it has projected as an immediate need.”

The rumored growth of the MRCA foreign fighter program to 170-200 aircraft, naval plans for 32 more ships in the next 10-15 years, submarine construction imperatives, and other planned capital purchases do indeed have the potential to squeeze the Tejas. The reality of limited funds and budget cuts began to hit home in 2013, and another global economic slowdown will press India into harder choices still. Confidence in the Tejas, or the lack of it, will influence India’s choices.

So will other negotiations. India’s choices mean that the MMRCA program will deliver fewer aircraft at a flyaway price tag of $100+ million each. That makes $25-35 million Tejas LCA fighters look more attractive, in order to plus up numbers. Just as long as the LCA can in fact be produced to that cost level, be delivered in time to replace the MiG-21s, and perform at an adequate level.

Unfortunately, every one of those variables is currently in question.

At present, the worst-case scenario for the Tejas program is truncated production at about 40 operational aircraft, which would doom exports. In that scenario, Tejas Mk.I is built, but other expenditures grab priority. The plane’s role is then divided among upgraded MiG-29UPGs, new naval MiG-29Ks, upgraded Mirage 2000s, and possibly even Hawk Mk.132 trainers that are armed in a backup role.

The generally accepted goal for Tejas is 5 IAF squadrons plus 2 Navy squadrons, or about 140-150 planes. Even that is a relatively short production run at full capacity, which is the rate India must use in order to field new lightweight fighters in time.

The best-case scenario would involve full production for the IAF that raises planned order totals beyond 120, a serving STOBAR (Short Take Off via ramps, But Assisted Recovery via arrester gear and wires) naval variant in service by 2020, and export successes that drive up production totals and help finance future upgrades.

Contracts and Key Events 2014-2016

ADA Tejas video

January 13/16: Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is making final preparations for their HAL Tejas lightweight fighter debut at the Bahrain Air Show next week. With plans to impress the experts and pick up a few potential customers along the way, HAL’s display apparently “significantly surpasses any aerobatics display the fighter has presented earlier”. The company plans to have gained final operating clearance (FOC) by mid-2016, and has also annouced that it is to test fire the Rafael Derby beyond-visual-range missile (BVRAAM) in March. The Israeli made missile has been bought as a stopgap arrangement as India grapples to make BVR missile Astra, which is still in development, operational.

October 27/15: India has offered Sri Lanka the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft as an alternative to the JF-17 Thunder, co-developed by China and Pakistan. Previous reports in June by the Pakistani press indicated that the Sri Lankans had signed for an undisclosed number of JF-17s, with this subsequently denied by the Sri Lankan Air Force which stated that it was still evaluating possible fighter options. However, Sri Lankan and Pakistani officials are due to meet in November to discuss the possible acquisition of the JF-17, with India likely looking to export the problematic Tejas LCA in an attempt to undermine strategic rival Pakistan.

October 8/15: The Indian government’s recent decision to procure seven squadrons of the heavily-criticized indigenous Tejas Mk.1A was pushed on the Indian Air Force by the Modi administration, according to a report by Reuters on Wednesday. The Indian Air Force had reportedly requested 44 additional Rafale fighters on top of the 36 announced in April turned down by the government, instead the Modi government pushed the Tejas on the IAF despite concern over the aircraft’s performance.

October 1/15: India will induct seven squadrons (112 to 126 aircraft) of Tejas Mk.I-A light combat aircraft, despite the aircraft’s Final Operating Clearance delayed in July until next year. Despite improvements to the heavily-criticized original indigenous Tejas Mk.I design, the Mk.I-A still has a fair share of problems, including issues with the aircraft’s radar and weapon payload. The fighters are slated for delivery from next year and are intended to provide the Indian Air Force with a much-needed air defense capability.

July 22/15: In a characteristic set-back, India’s Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) will see its Final Operating Clearance delayed until next year. The schedule has slipped consistently for the indigenous fighter, with FOC previously pushed back to December this year. The Indian Defense Ministry has blamed the delays on late delivery of components from foreign manufacturers; however the program also came under severe criticism from the Indian government’s principal oversight body in May, with the aircraft’s performance in question after over three decades of development. The new FOC for the aircraft is now reported to be timetabled for March 2016.

May 11/15: India’s indigenously-developed Tejas Mk I light combat aircraft has come under serious criticism from the country’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), with 53 deficiencies cited in a recent report. A major concern is the lack of defensive countermeasure capability, with the jet reportedly failing to meet Indian Air Force (IAF) survivability standards. The LCA achieved initial operating clearance in December 2013, with the project severely delayed from its original scheduled induction date of 1994. The CAG report to Parliament also highlighted how the IAF will likely be forced to induct the aircraft without a trainer variant available for pilot training, with a repair and overhaul facility also yet to be established at manufacturer HAL’s facilities, a requirement previously set out by the IAF.

Nov 18/14: Kaveri. The DRDO is doing something unusual: submitting documents to cancel a major research project, after INR 21.06 billion has been spent by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) in Bangalore. The request to end the GTX-35VS Kaveri program must now be approved by the Ministry of Finance, and receive clearance from the top-level Cabinet Committee on Security. Which also helps explain why so few projects are canceled, but the biggest change required still involves the DRDO’s mentality. Director-General (Aero) Dr. K. Tamilmani indicates that elections do have consequences:

“These are part of the bold stand being taken by DRDO. Whereever we have found bottlenecks for long time, with no realistic solutions, it’s better to move on. It is an honest stand we are taking…. If you are fit to run only for 50 km, why attempt 100 km? DRDO has realized its mistakes of the past and we have no hesitation in taking some bold steps.”

It is an honest stand, and DRDO can take it without giving up on India’s strategic industrial policy to become more self-sufficient in jet engine technologies. The project delays created by Kaveri remain a total waste, but the research itself can be harvested. DRDO intends to press on with jet engine research, and it’s possible to undertake projects that are militarily useful but much less ambitious. INR 3 billion has reportedly been earmarked for such work, and DRDO wants to make progress is 12 identified technical areas. Sources: OneIndia, “OneIndia Exclusive: DRDO to abandon indigenous fighter jet engine Kaveri project”.

All Kaveri research to end

Oct 4/14: Industrial. Defense News quotes an unnamed source, who says that the Indian government has been talking to major private sector industrial players about setting up a full production line for up to 250 Tejas Mk.2s. That would certainly justify the investment.

If carried out, that move would sidestep HAL’s production difficulties (q.v. Dec 9/12) by partly or wholly removing Tejas from HAL’s purview, create a full competitor to HAL in the aerospace sector, and turn the winner into India’s 1st major private sector defense firm. It would also double planned Tejas Mk.2/naval buys, based on past reports (q.v. Jan 11/14).

Since it seems apparent that the Indian government would have to fund a new production line for HAL anyway, funding the line elsewhere and reaping the benefits of diversification and competition is a logical policy option. Especially since the resulting competitor would also be a potential source for programs like India’s light transport competition, which stalled out because the private sector can’t afford to set up a full production facility for just 40 planes.

The challenge is that setting up a production line for modern combat jets isn’t simple, and major problems could really mess with already chancy schedules for Tejas Mk.2 and the planned naval variant. One obvious way to reduce this risk would be to bring in a foreign firm like Boeing, Saab, Dassault, et. al. to help set up the plant, and assist with management for the first few years. If done in conjunction with Mk.2 design assistance (q.v. June 17/14), the Tejas program as a whole could get a substantial boost.

Tata Group, Mahindra & Mahindra and Larsen and Toubro have been mentioned, and L&T Heavy Engineering President Madhukar Vinayak Kotwal has confirmed that discussions are taking place, but that’s all he is prepared to say. Watch this space. Sources: Defense News, “India Offers To Spend $12B To Break Monopoly”.

Aug 17/14: Industrial. HAL and DRDO’s ADA are trying to encourage more small and mid-size manufacturers to make parts for the aircraft:

“They aim to raise the LCA’s indigenous content to 80 per cent in three years, up from the present 50 to 55 per cent…. HAL Chairman R.K. Tyagi told them that starting 2015–16, “we aim to roll out 16 LCAs every year, [increasing] from the initial target of eight a year”.

Currently, 168 of the 344 LCA components are made in the country.

A key defence scientist involved in the programme said HAL and ADA would help manufacturers to pick up at least 10 more simple components and offer the use of government-owned manufacturing and test facilities.”

If they can do that while maintaining quality, and pick manufacturers who are capable of further innovation, they would make future upgrades easier. More local content would also reduce cost shifts based on currency exchange rates, and create a wider base for future programs like the Su-50/FGFA. The bad news? This policy falls into the “simple, but not easy” category. Sources: The Hindu, “A few small production pushes for LCA”.

June 17/14: Saab for Mk.2? As M-MRCA negotiations to buy advanced Rafale fighters stall, and projected costs rise sharply, Saab remains in position with a different offer. Instead of touting their superior JAS-39E/F Gripen, they’ve proposed to take a 51% share of a joint venture company, then leverage their expertise to create the LCA Mk.2. DRDO chief Dr V K Saraswat was enthusiastic, and they issued an RFI in 2012 and an RFP in 2013.

It isn’t a crazy idea. The Indo-Russian BrahMos missile has been very successful using a similar structure, and a 51% share plus freedom from Indian government strictures would remove many of the program’s decision-making and organizational issues. Saab is the only aircraft major with single-engine fighter conversion experience from the F404 to the F414 engine, so tasks like stretching the fuselage 0.5m, changing the air intakes, etc. have already been thought through in another context. Their Gripen has also achieved low operating costs, in part due to maintenance-friendly design. That’s another Tejas weakness, thanks to very maintenance-unfriendly placement of key components.

Since LCA Mk.2 is also expected as a carrier fighter, success already matters to India. they need to complete development successfully. From the IAF’s perspective, replacing M-MRCA with Tejas Mk.2 would simplify their future high-medium-low mix by avoiding a 2nd fighter in the same class as the SU-30MKI, while allowing them to field more squadrons. The flip side is that their high-end capability becomes irretrievably Russian-dependent: SU-30MKIs now, and FGFA/SU-50s later. For Saab, a JV would give them a major new niche in the global marketplace, providing a low-end fighter in a class below the Gripen and its Western competitors.

The catch? Incoming DRDO chief Dr Avinash Chander is more focused on developing the Mk.2 alone, and believed that any foreign partnership would require a global tender. In India, that would take years. Re-opening the opportunity would depend on a failure of M-MRCA negotiations, and continued failure to field Tejas, pushing the new BJP government to take a second look at all of its options. Sources: India’s Business Standard, “Rafale contract elusive, Eurofighter and Saab remain hopeful”.

Feb 12/14: Costs. India’s MoD releases another set of official cost figures for the program, leaving out the Kaveri engine but adding a “Phase-III” development period. LCA development costs have now risen from an original INR 71.16 billion to INR 140.33 billion (+97.2%), or INR 168.72 billion (+137.1%) if one properly counts the Kaveri engine. Expected production line investments would push those figures even higher. India’s MoD was savvy enough to compare development costs to Saab’s more advanced Gripen NG:

“Developmental cost of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas is Rs.7965.56 Crore ($1.09 Billion) including building of 15 aircraft and creation of infrastructure for production of 08 aircraft per annum. This compares with the developmental cost of JAS 39 NG Grippen is $1.80 Billion for developing 5 Proto Vehicles.”

That’s actually just the current predicted cost of the IAF’s MK.I/II development, minus the Kaveri engine, and arguably without creating infrastructure that could actually deliver 8 aircraft per year. The Gripen NG figure would need to be checked carefully, to see what it included and excluded. Even so, the simple act of making the comparison shows a greater sense of external awareness than we’re used to seeing from India’s MoD. Source: India MoD/ PIB, “Developmental Cost of LCA Project”.

Feb 10/14: A written reply from Minister of State for Defence Shri Jitendra Singh to Lok Sabha parliamentarians triggers stories about the IAF raising their planned LCA buys from 200 to 300. Unfortunately for the media reporting that story, it rests entirely on an error of logic. Here’s the exact quote, which can’t be linked anymore thanks to MoD web site changes:

“The MiG-21 and MiG-27 aircrafts of the IAF have already been upgraded and currently equip 14 combat squadrons. These aircraft, however, are planned for being phased out over the next few years and will be replaced by the LCA. Steps have been initiated for upgradation of other fighter aircrafts like MiG-29, Jaguar, Mirage-2000; transport aircraft like AN-32 and Mi-17/Mi-17 IV helicopters.”

What this statement does not say is that the replacement will happen on an equal basis. It’s perfectly possible to replace existing squadrons with fewer squadrons and fewer planes, if one is so inclined. The Americans have been doing so for decades, and they’re hardly alone. So far, firm IAF commitments involve 126 LCA Tejas planes: 6 squadrons of 21 planes each, with only 96 (16 x 6) as front-line fighters. Each squadron also has 3 rotation aircraft to cover maintenance absences or loss replacement, and 2 twin-seat trainers, to make 21. Beyond those 2 Tejas Mk.I squadrons and 4 Tejas Mk.II squadrons, we’ll have to see. Sources: India MoD, “Modernisation of IAF” | India’s Business Standard, “IAF will buy 14 Tejas squadrons, lowering costs”

Jan 12/14: Budgets. India’s defense budget will drop by INR 78 billion in 2013-14, after a drop of INR 100 billion in 2012-13. A more sluggish economy, and a weakened ruling Congress Party that’s trying to shore up its electoral base, are the issues. At the same time, India is negotiating the MMRCA deal for 126 Rafales, the FGFA deal with Russia for their future high-end stealth fighter, the Project 75i submarine buy that’s becoming an emergency, and attack and heavy-lift helicopter buys with Boeing. They also want to add to their fleet of P-8i long-range maritime patrol planes, buy AWACS early warning jets as a priority, and improve their aerial tanker fleet as a priority. Among other priorities.

That explains why the MoD asked for INR 400 billion more, instead of 78 billion less. Unless this gap changes, future Tejas production will find itself caught in an environment where everything can’t be funded, but big air force commitments have already been made. Sources: Times of India, “Despite budget cut, defence ministry continues with modernization drive”.

Jan 11/14: Pricing. Sources tell India’s Business Standard that HAL has quoted the Ministry a price of INR 1.62 billion (about $26.5 million) per plane for the first 20 Tejas Mk.I fighters. The Ministry wants to know why its 40% higher than the INR 1.165 billion quoted in 2006, and HAL has a good answer. One, inflation over the past 8 years takes a toll. Two, 45% of the plane’s cost involves imported parts, and the Indian rupee is sinking. Three, Tejas is still about half the $45.8 million price of a Mirage 2000 upgrade ({EUR 1.4 billion is now INR 118.3 billion + INR 2.02 billion to HAL}/ 49 jets = INR 2.8 billion or $45.8 million per), and those upgrades are even more dependent on currency rates.

HAL sees eventual purchases of 40 Mk.Is, 84 Mk.IIs, 11 naval trainers, and 46 naval variants (TL: 181), and recent government declaration have used 200 aircraft as a possible figure. Now that Tejas is on surer ground, and the opportunity is clearer, HAL is trying to control costs using longer-term commitments of its own. Step one reportedly involves Long Time Business Agreements (LTBAs) of 3-5 years and 40-50 aircraft sets with key sub-contractors, including clauses that let it vary annual production rates to some extent, a feature also seen in many of the US military’s multi-year purchase agreements. Long lead time components have been identified, and industrial improvements are underway. Practices like having 5-axis CNC machines on hand, and using computerized drilling of 8,000 holes or so in the composite wing skin, are more or less assumed in North America. They’re a step forward for HAL, which needs that kind of long-term investment in its industrial capacity.

Will that investment, and higher production, improve costs enough? Pakistan’s JF-17, which has already delivered 50 planes, is reportedly priced around $23-24 million per plane. If the Tejas Mk.II comes in around $30 million in current dollars, pointing to composite construction and supposedly better avionics isn’t going to cut it in export competitions as a reason for the 25% price difference. An AESA radar might, depending on what Pakistan does for the coming JF-17 Block II, and how much it costs. Sources: Business Standard, “HAL pegs price of Tejas fighter at Rs 162 crore”.

2013

GE F414 engine contract; No Kaveris for Tejas fleet; AESA radar?; Why the multi-year delay for self-protection EW?; IOC at last, but is the plane ready? LCA Naval
(click to view full)

Dec 20/13: IOC-2. the LCA program achieves Initial Operational Clearance II. This is closer to the F-35’s IOC than traditional American IOC designations: limited capabilities with some initial weapons, and more testing required, but regular air force pilots can now fly it. Sources: Economic Times of India, “Indigenous fighter aircraft LCA-Tejas gets Initial Operational Clearance”.

Dec 19/13: What’s next? Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification Director-General Dr K Tamil Mani explains what’s next for Tejas, whose remaining testing and certification needs show the IOC-2 designation’s limits. The fighter needs to pass 6 milestones in the next 15 months, on the way to G=Final Operational Clearance. They include:

• Integrating the Russian GSH 23mm gun, which also requires certifying the surrounding LRU electronics boxes for much higher vibration levels.
  
• Integration of additional weapons, incl. Python 4/5 short-range air-to-air missiles and Derby medium range air-to-air missiles.
  
• Integrating Cobham’s air refueling probe.
  
• Increasing sustained Angle of Attack parameters from 22 – 24 degrees.
  
• Improved braking system with higher heat tolerance. They might even need to add fans, as they did for some of their MiGs.
  
• Change the nosecone from composite materials to a quartz-based material, in order to remove the current 45-50 km limit on the radar and bring it to its design level of 80+ km.

Sources: Indian Express, “Tejas Needs to Cross 6 Milestones in 15 Months”.

Dec 18/13: IOC process. India’s Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC) explains what IOC-2 certification involved to the Indian Express. The bureaucracy takes credit for the plane’s accident-free history, of course, and proudly notes their “concurrent participation in all development activities,” without discussing Tejas’ developmental delays.

The did have a lot to do between the incomplete Initial Operational Clearance on Dec 10/11, and IOC-2 about 2 years later. Full integration and testing of IAI’s ELM-2032 radar, testing of stores integration and release, flight envelope expansion from 17 degrees Angle of Attack to 22 degrees. Maximum flight parameters are now 6gs maneuvering, with a maximum speed of Mac 1.4 and a service ceiling to 50,000 feet. Safety-related work included safe emergency jettisoning of all stores, engine relight, wake penetration, night flying and all weather clearance. Sources: Indian Express, “Clearing Flight Test Parameters was a Challenge, Says Airworthiness Centre”.

Dec 17/13: Updates. India’s MoD summarizes the state of the LCA program. The key takeaways? As on Nov 30/13, they’ve conducted 2,415 flight tests using 15 Tejas Aircraft. A lot of reviews are riding herd on the program, which can add urgency or slow down actual work, depending on how that’s handled. Structurally, the Phased Development Approach has been changed to Concurrent Development Approach, which adds development risk but can cut time if it works, and Quick Reaction Teams have been formed to address design and production issues as they arise.

IOC-2 is still expected on Dec 20/13, but another release makes it clear that the Mk.II project continues to slip. The Probable Date of Completion for LCA Phase-II full-scale engineering design work is now December 2015: 9 months later than the previous March 2015 goal, and 7 years later than the original plan. Sources: India MoD, “LCA project” and DRDO projects“.

Dec 17/13: MiG-21 update. India’s MoD summarizes the state of the IAF’s MiG-21 fleet. The MiG-21FLs are retired now, but the answer shows that the remaining MiGs may have to serve longer than intended:

“254 MiG-21 aircraft are still in service with the Indian Air Force. During the last ten years (2003-2004 to 2012-2013) and the current year (upto 30.11.2013), a total of 38 MiG-21 aircraft have crashed.

Phasing out of aircraft and their replacement with new generation aircraft depends upon national security / strategic objectives and operational requirements of the defence forces and are reviewed by the Government from time to time. This is a continuous process.”

On Dec 12/13, Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne confirmed that the LCA Tejas would replace the MiG-21 in the IAF fleet. That may appear to have been obvious, but official confirmation indicates a greater degree of confidence in the program. Sources: India MoD, “MIG-21 Aircraft” | Indian Express, “Tejas to Officially Replace MiG-21 FL”.

Dec 9/13: Defence Minister A K Antony is scheduled to give the Tejas its Initial Operational Certificate (IOC) on Dec 20/13, which would allow Tejas to be flown by regular IAF personnel outside of the test pilot community. Note that IOC doesn’t include key performance parameters like qualification with many of the fighter’s weapons, basic self-protection systems, air-to-air refueling, or finalization of the Tejas Mk.I’s design. Those will have to wait for Final Operation Clearance (FOC), and an increasingly-impatient defense minister has reportedly ordered DRDO to ensure that FOC takes place before 2014 ends.

The first Tejas squadron of 18-20 fighters will be built to IOC standard, and based at Sulur AB in Tamil Nadu, near Sri Lanka. They should be able to handle the minimal threats from that quarter, and one hopes that reported problems (q.v. April 21/13) were either untrue, or have been fixed.

On the industrial front, HAL has told India’s Business Standard that it aims to roll out the first 2 Tejas IOC fighters by March 2014, and deliver 8 more by the end of 2014. The next step after that will be to enhance to production line to 16 fighters per year, a task that might prove challenging without outside aid (q.v. Dec 9/12). That would leave 10 Tejas Mk.I IOC fighters to be built in 2015, whereupon HAL would be able to begin production of 20 Tejas Mk.I FOC variants. Required FOC upgrades to the IOC fleet, and initial naval production orders, could probably keep HAL at a minimum activity level through 2017; but an early 2013 interview with ADA director Shri PS Subramanyam saw 2018 as a more realistic date for Mk.I production to end. That might actually be helpful. If Tejas Mk.II isn’t ready to begin production by time Mk.I is done, India will have an industrial problem on its hands. Sources: Business Standard, “Tejas LCA sprints towards IAF’s frontline squadron” | AeroMag Asia, Jan-Feb 2013 issue.

Dec 7/13: Testing. The LCA’s 1st firing of an AA-11 short range air-to-air missile is successful, as the missile hits a target that was towed by a drone. The demonstration was conducted off the coast of Goa, in the Arabian Sea. Sources: The Hindu Business Line, “Light combat aircraft Tejas fires missile on target”.

Dec 7/13: MiG-21FL retires. After 50 years of service, the IAF is about to phase out its MiG-21FL variant, which is prepping to fly its last sortie on Dec 11/ 13 over Kalaikunda AFS in Bengal. Other MiG-21 variants will remain in service, and current expectations will extend the most modern MiG-21 Bison variants to at least 2018. Sources: The Calcutta Telegraph, “Supersonic jet set for last sortie”.

Aug 7/13: Costs. A Parliamentary reply to Shri S. Thangavelu in Rajya Sabha sets out the costs for each phase of the Tejas program in slightly more detail. Our chart above has been amended to reflect the current figures.

India is still in Full Scale Engineering Development Phase II, which aims to build 3 prototypes and 8 Limited Series Production (LSP) aircraft, and establish infrastructure for producing 8 aircraft per year. LSP-8 made its maiden flight on March 31/13, but reports to date suggest that meeting the infrastructure goal will require a significant increase in development costs (q.v. Dec 9/12). India MoD.

BEL on EW, 2011
click for video

Oct 16/13: Why no EW? The DRDO has finally fitted a Tejas fighter (PV-1) with electronic warfare/ self-protection systems, and intends to begin flight tests in November and December. Why has this key development been delayed for 5 years? Believe it or not, they thought it was more important to preserve the plane’s flight safety record:

“For almost eight years, a section of the aeronautical community has been resisting its fitment, anxious that the add-ons may cause a first crash…. They have been very keen on securing the operational clearance, initial as well as final from the Indian Air Force, even if the LCA did not have the electronic system…. no one wished to risk an add-on on the LCA that had not been tried. The idea was to defend the ‘zero crash’ record. This was made known sometimes explicitly to engineers and scientists working on the electronic systems, who, however, had been pressing for very long that the systems ought to be fitted and trials conducted to be able to fine-tune them.”

Unfortunately, PV-1 hasn’t been flying recently, so they may end up introducing risk that way. Tejas Mk.Is will have an Israeli IAI Elta jamming pod available as an external store, with the full RWJ system slated for the Mk.II. Sources: Deccan Herald, “Finally, Tejas gets electronic warfare systems”.

DRDO’s problems, in a nutshell

June 1/13: Excuses. DRDO chief V K Saraswat tries to deflect criticism of Tejas’ continuing delays, by citing the effects of sanctions that ended 13 years ago. Lack of cooperation and foreign help might explain why Tejas was slow to develop from the early 1980s to 2000. It doesn’t explain why DRDO didn’t follow professional practice by working with experienced pilots and the IAF, which created a multitude of poor design decisions that required years of delay to produce only partial fixes. Or the reason DRDO has wasted so much time with engine and radar choices that were obviously inadequate, all well after sanctions had ended. Or why, 13 years after sanctions had ended, Tejas isn’t ready for service yet, while Pakistan’s JF-17 equips 3 squadrons.

Weak excuses do not inspire future confidence. Brahmand Defence & Aerospace.

April 21/13: Tejas a lemon? The Sunday Standard reports that the Tejas is much farther away from viability than anyone is admitting, and says that DRDO’s notional stealth AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) has been put on hold until the LCA project can be made to work. A stealth FGFA/SU-50 is already in co-development with Russia, so AMCA’s value is unclear anyway. With respect to the Tejas LCA, the Sunday Standard’s unnamed sources say:

“The plane cannot fly on its own. It needs a lifeline in the form of support and monitoring of its systems from the ground by technicians…. The common man thinks the plane is doing fine, its engine sounds great and the manoeuvres are perfect. But those flying and weapons firing displays are done with ground monitoring and support. The plane is still not ready to flying on its own”…. the sources noted that LCA was grounded for three months between September and December 2012 following problems with its landing gear. “Normally, a combat plane is ready for its next sortie following a 30-minute [servicing]. In the case of LCA, after a single sortie of about an hour or so, it needs three days of servicing before it can go for its next sortie,” they said.”

These revelations come against a backdrop of pressure from India’s defense minister Antony and India’s government to buy designed-in-India items unless there’s no other choice. He’s selling changes to India’s Defence Procurement Policy as an anti-corruption effort – but what do you call spending billions of dollars on politically-allied state organizations, who don’t deliver on the critical defense projects assigned to them, and never pay any serious penalties for it? Their competitors in China and Pakistan are consistently faster and often better – while doing a better job developing their industries. See also India PIB.

March 20/13: More delays. A Parliamentary reply confirms the obvious, formally extending the scheduled end of the LCA’s Phase 2 Full Scale Engineering Development from December 2012 to March 2015.

The IAF has ordered 20 fighters in “Initial Operational Clearance” (January 2011) status, and another 20 in “Full Operational Clearance” (i.e. combat-ready) configuration. Full Operational Clearance is now expected in December 2014. PTI, via Zee News | India MoD.

Feb 6/13: AESA Radar? At Aero India 2013, Defense Update files a report that adds the short-range Python 5 air-to-air missile to the Tejas’ list of integrated weapons, alongside the Russian R-73/AA-11. It adds:

“The LCA will also carry the EL/M-2052 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar developed by IAI Elta. Originally, the EL/M-2032 was selected but the new 2052 now available with a more compact antenna is best designed to fit the nose cones of LCA and Jaguar, offering enhanced capabilities for both fighters.”

If the Defense Update report is true, it would roughly double the Mk.II fighter’s radar performance, and sharply lower its maintenance costs. DID has been unable to confirm this report, and there have been previous reports (q.v. Jan 14/11 entry) that said M-2052 sales for the Tejas Mk.II had been barred by American pressure. Indeed, the Americans managed to pressure the Israelis not to install the M-2052 in their own F-16i fighters.

Feb 5/13: On the eve of Aero India 2013, Indian defense minister AK Antony tells DRDO that:

“I am happy for your achievements of DRDO but not fully happy. Delay in delivery is a real problem… Try to speed up your process and reduce time for research, development and production. [DRDO is getting ready for a 2nd initial clearance for Tejas, but] I am impatient for the Final Operational Clearance (FOC)….. Antony also expressed his disappointment over reported lack of cohesion between the aircraft development agencies under DRDO and aircraft maker HAL.”

In India, FOC means “ready for combat operations”, which is closer to the US military’s idea of “Initial Operational Capability.” The Pioneer.

Jan 20/13: F414 deal. India Strategic quotes DRDO Director General V.K. Saraswat, who says that India’s government has finalized the terms of GE’s F414 contract, including the difficult issues surrounding Indian production. That process took over 2 years, as the engine was picked in September 2010.

The deal is reportedly a Rs 3,000 crore (about $560 million) contract for 99 of the Tejas Mk.II’s F414-GE-INS6 engines, with an option to buy another 100 at fixed terms. IANS via Silicon India | Times of India.

F414 engine deal finalized

Jan 4/13: Kaveri. India’s Business Standard reports that India’s Ministry of Defence has failed in its 6 years of sole-source negotiations with Snecma, and will try a global tender to secure cooperation in developing the Kaveri engine. The engine’s development has hit a technical dead-end, and cannot incorporate key alloys, single-crystal blades, and other manufacturing and design technologies without foreign help. The DRDO’s GTRE department has also conceded defeat with respect to the LCA, according to its chief Dr. C.P. Ramnarayanan:

“We were planning to re-engine first 40 Tejas fighters with the Kaveri. But now they will continue to fly with the F-404 engine.”

DRDO swill use Kaveri for its UCAV, and still holds out hope that a redesigned Kaveri can power a locally designed AMCA twin-engined medium fighter. To power AMCA, the engine would need to improve afterburner performance of about 15,825 pounds thrust. That means foreign help, but DRDO has made global solicitations before, and had no takers beyond Snecma.

2012

Cert & program delays; Naval prototype flies; Kaveri for UCAV; Shaping up HAL – which clearly needs it. IUSAV: News report
(click for video)

Dec 26/12: Kaveri. India wants to develop a long-range, jet-powered armed drone, powered by a modified Kaveri engine (vid. March 21/12 entry). These are commonly called UCAVs (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles), but India refers to their project as IUSAV (Indian Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle). Note that most of the video and pictures in the video are of other countries’ efforts, since India is at a very early stage.

Now DRDO’s GTRE has asked the Ministry for another Rs 595 crore (about $93 million), covering a 48-month program to develop 2 prototypes of a modified Kaveri engine with no afterburner. This includes removing the base design flaws detecting during 2010-11 testing in Russia, ground testing in Bangalore, and confirmatory tests in Russia at the Gromov Flight Research Institute. The program would be capped by flight testing of the 2 no-afterburner prototypes in LCA prototype PV-1.

This idea actually makes sense. The Missile Technology Control Regime makes it problematic for countries to sell India a USAV jet engine, since a cruise missile is also an armed unmanned aircraft. On the Indian side, the Kaveri engine has the most problems adding enough thrust in afterburner, but “dry” statistics of 11,060 pounds thrust are close to the project’s goal of 11,500. Dropping the afterburner sheds engine weight, which has been an issue for Kaveri, and UCAV engines to date don’t have afterburners anyway. Other countries’ UCAV designs have all been sub-sonic drones that rely on stealth or low-threat environments to survive. Business Standard.

UCAV: a good use for Kaveri

Dec 12/12: Naval LCA. India’s Navy is upset by the fact that only 1 naval LCA has been built, and need aircraft to train with. Media reports say they’re about to issue a an Rs 1,000 crore (about $185 million) RFP to produce the first 8 Limited Series Production Tejas naval fighters, which would include both single-seat test aircraft and 2-seat trainers. This would turn the Feb 27/12 approval into a contract after negotiations with HAL, and work is expected to begin in 2013. Whether HAL’s production capacity can handle it (vid. Dec 9/12) is another question.

Business Standard reports the Indian military’s current belief that the navalized Tejas Mk.I can be used for training, and the state-owned ADA is touting a 1st representative takeoff by mid-2013 and a 1st representative landing by the end of 2013. At the same time, they believe that only the Tejas Mk.II will be capable of loaded carrier operations, using just 200m of space and a “ski-jump” ramp. The design has also turned out to be harder than expected. Commodore CD Balaji, who directs the Naval LCA project at ADA told India’s Business Standard that:

“In the paper design it looked feasible [to convert the IAF’s Tejas], similar to what Eurofighter proposed for a navalised Typhoon; or what Gripen proposed for the Sea Gripen [DID: both of which are higher end designs, with better base performance]. But when we started the detailed design and the actual build… we realised the benefits of what Dassault had done with the Rafale. They designed and built the naval variant first, the Rafale Marine. The air force Rafale is just a subset of Rafale Marine. That is the easiest path.”

Dec 9/12: Industrial fail, more $. India’s Business Standard offers a scathing portrait of incompetence at HAL, which has been unable to set up and operate a production line for the LCA, even though many of its projects involve assembling foreign designs on production lines in India. On the other hand, see the March 24/11 entry, where HAL executives point out that it doesn’t make much sense to establish a full modern production line for a program that has only featured limited production orders and an uncertain future.

As a result, Tejas fighters built to date have been custom-built limited-production and prototype aircraft. The immediate consequence is that the Ministry of Defence has to budget another Rs 1,500 crore (about $277 million) to try and set up a modern production line. Air Marshal (ret.) Pranab K Barbora:

“HAL’s assembly line expertise is outdated by at least three decades. They have done nothing to upgrade their technology. Setting up a modern assembly line for the Tejas is far beyond HAL’s capabilities.”

The paper points out that HAL’s new CEO RK Tyagi has “no experience in aeronautical development or manufacture,” and openly doubts the government ADA’s program manager, P. Subramanyam. He promises that HAL will build 20 Tejas Mk.I fighters in 2.5 – 3 years, with production of the next 20 in just over 2 more years, by 2018. That might be possible if an experienced foreign manufacturer is contracted quickly to help set up production, and the MoD is reportedly studying that idea. By itself, however, HAL hasn’t been able to build even 2 Tejas fighters per year over a prolonged reference period, and India has no operational squadrons. Meanwhile, Pakistan has already fielded almost 3 squadrons of their JF-17 Thunder fighter, which began its design cycle after Tejas.

Note that the Business Standard’s figure of INR 155.470 billion (Rs 14,047 + 1,500 crore) for the entire LCA Tejas program is almost exactly double the Indian government’s official March 2012 figures. The math indicates that they’re probably including the Kaveri engine. DID considers the 2 programs to be separate, and pegs unofficial total Tejas development costs at INR 131.015 billion (Rs 13,101.5 crore, currently about $2.15 billion), including current and forecast costs for the naval variant, and the expected Rs 1500 crore for production line help. With Kaveri included, our figures rise to INR 144.405 billion, and are probably slightly behind actual Kaveri spending. Business Standard.

HAL: Industrial fail

Dec 3/12: Kaveri. India’s state-owned Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) aims to integrate the Kaveri powerplant with a Tejas fighter operated by India’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), with the aim of flying it by the end of 2013. Whether it can perform to standard won’t change DRDO’s advocacy, but it may matter to the IAF. As of May 14/12 (q.v.), India’s Minister of Defence said that it couldn’t meet India’s 90kN/ 20,200 pound thrust requirement.

A March 21/12 answer to Parliament (q.v.) pegged the Kaveri’s development cost at INR 28.39 billion ($520 million), nearly 10 times greater than the original INR 3.83 billion. Flight International.

Aug. – Nov. 2012: Testing halted. The Tejas encounters a DASH of trouble, as India discovers that the top of the pilot’s DASH-III integrated helmet display can end up above the top of the Martin-Baker ejection seat. That’s a serious problem, because it means the helmet could hit the canopy as the seat rockets out of the cockpit, killing the ejecting pilot. India had to halt testing for 3 1/2 months before the problem was fixed. Their response was to modify the seat, and to provide a backup mechanism that they calculate will blow the canopy off before the pilot’s head can hit it. They had better be right.

DRDO chief V. K. Saraswat has confirmed to India’s Business Standard that the fixes are done, adding that ADA used the down time to make other modifications as a result of flight test feedback. Even so, a string of setbacks has shifted Tejas’ Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) from a re-baselined end-2010 to mid-2013 – if nothing else goes seriously wrong. Final Operational Clearance (FOC) for combat operations was scheduled for end-2012, and now looks unlikely until 2014-2015.

To the west, Pakistan has already inducted 3 squadrons of its comparable JF-17 fighters, whose joint development with China began 16 years after Tejas. India’s Business Standard.

A DASH of trouble

Oct 18/12: Lessons Learned. Air Commodore Muthanna’s “Challenges In Design To Deployment: Critical Lessons From the D&D of LCA” [PDF] has some interesting bits in it. The Commodore believes that the fighter deserves to enter service. Unfortunately, Indian officials and firms didn’t involve aviators in the initial design process, either by teaming with the IAF or by the widespread practice of embedding aviators in the design teams. The IAF had to get involved after the 2006 contract, and a lot of the time and cost slippage from then until now has involved RFAs aimed at fixing deficiencies that should have been addressed in design. Beyond that, he cites serious issues in management, manufacturing, and training:

“A fundamental challenge has been the structure of the Indian higher defense management. Broadly speaking, there are three verticals within the Indian Ministry of Defense that steer this program…. In this totally State funded and State managed program, interdepartmental oversight has been lacking. It is necessary that a single political entity take charge….

….[Transitioning from design to manufacture,] the necessity to convert frozen design drawings into production drawings…. [is] an elaborate process…. Other shortcomings are; inability to meet manufacturing tolerances; non availability of correct jigs, fixtures and tooling to mee t DAL requirements; non availability of suitable calibrating equipment; and, lack of trained manpower.

….With the flight simulators, however, it was a strange story. While the ASR did envisage the requirement of a simulator before deployment, no such development was undertaken…. there would be no representative flight simulator available for use by the customer aircrew. The situation will be aggravated by the non availability of a trainer variant of the aircraft in the required time frame.”

Lessons learned report

May 14/12: Kaveri. Minister of Defence Shri A K Antony replies to Shri Bal Kumar Patel in Lok Sabha. No, DRDO still has no time frame to fully develop its Kaveri engine. Antony reiterates that the engine does not meet requirements for the Tejas, but will be used in UAVs and marine applications. A technology demonstrator may fly in a Tejas Mk.I fighter around 2015. The operative word here is “may”.

April 27/12: Naval LCA. NP-1, the 1st Tejas naval prototype, has its maiden flight. The plane is piloted by chief test pilot of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) national flight test centre (NFTC) Commodore TA Maolankar and co-piloted by the centre’s flight test engineer, Wing Commander Maltesh Prabhu. NP-2 will be the single-seat naval variant. Zee News.

Naval variant flies

March 21/12: Costs. Defence minister Antony answers a Parliamentary question, and provides cost and schedule slips for the LCA Tejas, LCA Naval, and Kaveri engine. Those are reproduced above along with other information. Antony also discusses what’s being done about these slips, which amounts to more oversight and monitoring. That won’t cure a system whose main problem is a lack of accountability or consequences for the state-run development agencies, and whose secondary problem is the system’s own red tape. On the other hand, the answer makes it sound like the government is doing something. Antony adds that:

“Tacit knowledge acquired by the DRDO scientists during this project will also be applied for further aerospace technology. Kaveri spin-off engine can be used as propulsion system for Indian Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle (USAV).”

Readers may note that he is not referring to the LCA Tejas program as a destination for Kaveri, despite DRDO’s wishes in the matter. See also Indian government PIB | Flight International.

March 14/12: Goal – 6 squadrons. Indian minister of state for defence M M Pallam Raju tels the Rajya Sabha upper chamber that the IAF plans to induct 6 LCA squadrons over the next decade or so, including 4 squadrons of Tejas Mk.II fighters. Given current schedules, past performance, and the extent of the redesign and testing involved, India may be lucky to induct any Mk.II fighters by 2022. Deccan Herald.

March 11/12: Naval LCA. India’s Sunday Guardian reports that India’s Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC) has refused flight certification for the Naval LCA, until the new landing gear’s weight is reduced, and its wing leading-edge vortex controls are redesigned. The US Navy and EADS are reportedly being consulted to help fix the problems.

CEMILAC’s decision will add further delays to a program that is already late, and effectively ends hopes for a March 2012 flight. The naval variant’s initial flight was initially slated to happen by the end of 2010, following a July 2010 roll-out. As of Sept 26/11, it had managed only an Engine Ground Run.

March 10/12: Testing. While Tejas continues to make test flights, and has been granted initial certification, final certification and full production continues to face delays, and will not come until late 2013 or even 2014 now.

New test aircraft LSP-7 had a maiden flight, without a chase plane, “to test many indigenously-developed instruments,” as well as the M-2032 radar and DASH helmet. It’s close enough to the final standard that it will be one of the planes offered for IAF user-evaluation trials, but the final-configuration LSP-8 won’t be ready until later in 2012. LSP-8 will be the version presented to CEMILAC for full certification and flight clearance, a necessary step before full production can begin for the two 20-plane orders. The Hindu.

Feb 29/12: HAL, shape up. India’s MoD explains that changes are coming to HAL, and cites the Tejas program as one reason behind the push:

“The Defence Minister Shri AK Antony today asked the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to realign its business processes for strategic alliances and joint ventures, as also, to step up R&D efforts to remain globally competitive… Keeping in mind the mammoth role that the HAL would assume in the coming years in the aerospace industry and the challenges that it would face, the government has set up an expert group under the chairmanship of Shri BK Chaturvedi, Member, Planning Commission to suggest measures to strengthen and restructure HAL… the Group will suggest how best the spin offs from HAL order book can be earnest to ensure better involvement of the private industry in the defence sector. It will also suggest measures to enhance the synergies between HAL, the private defence sector and the civilian industry.

“Taking part in the discussion the Members of Parliament appreciated the role played by HAL in the defence arena of the country over the years. They, however, pointed out certain shortcomings such as the delay in the induction of the Light Combat Aircraft in the Indian Air Force, delay in the development of Kaveri Engine, delay in phasing out of Mig-21 aircraft and lack of an aggressive strategy to export HAL products.”

See also March 24/11 entry, The Pioneer | Flight International | IN FOCUS: India advances air force modernisation.

Feb 27/12: Naval LCA. The Indian Ministry of Defence’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) has sanctioned the building of 8 Naval LCA aircraft by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), and reportedly allocated the necessary funds for a contract. That does not mean a contract has been signed yet.

The 8 planes will be built as a mix of single-seat test fighters and twin-seat trainers, and would begin to add production fighters on top of the ordered fleet of 6 test aircraft. The first flight is announced for sometime in March, though talks last year of a maiden flight in July did not pan out. Business Standard.

2011

Tejas initial clearance; RAFAEL Derby picked as MRAAM; Kaveri engine still alive but in limbo; HAL pushed to outsource. IOC flight
(click to view video)

Dec 21/11: Kaveri. In response to Parliamentary questions, Defence Minister Antony explains the Kaveri engine’s current development status:

“So far 9 prototypes of Kaveri engines and 4 prototypes of Kabini (Core) engines have been developed. Total 2050 hours of testing have been conducted on various Kaveri and Kabini engines at ground and altitude conditions for various requirements including performance, operability, endurance, environmental, etc. Two major milestones viz. successful completion of Official Altitude Testing (OAT) and completion of first block of flights of Kaveri engine in Flying Test Bed (FTB) has demonstrated the technological capability and maturity of this indigenous effort. Kaveri engine prototype (K9) was integrated with IL-76 aircraft at Gromov Flight Research Institute (GFRI), Russia and flight tests have been successfully carried out up to 12 km maximum forward altitude and a maximum forward speed of 0.7 Mach No. Twenty seven flights for 55 hours duration have been completed on IL-76. Critical subsystems and its associated knowledge know-how and know-why has been acquired in association with Indian public & private sector industries, including certification methodologies.”

Nov 23/11: Kaveri. In response to Parliamentary questions, Defence Minister Antony says that nothing has changed with respect to the Kaveri engine’s successor. He doesn’t put it like that, but that’s the reality. India MoD.

Aug 8/11: Kaveri. In response to questions, the Indian MoD clarifies the status of the Kaveri engine project. There is no signed co-operation agreement with SNECMA, but the Air Force has reviewed the draft technical specification and approved it.

“The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has made no agreement with a French firm to develop the Kaveria aero engine to be used for the Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas. However, DRDO is negotiating with M/s Snecma, France for co-development and co-production of Kaveri aero engine for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas MK-II. The project proposal will be put up for Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approval after the completion of price negotiation… IAF has further suggested that the engine design should have minimal impact on the LCA Tejas airframe for future retrofitment.”

If it succeeds, India’s Tejas fleet would have an alternative engine option, much like the popular F-16. Several countries fly F-16s, and even F-15s, with 2 different types of engine (PW F100 or GE F101) in their fleet, as insurance that keeps their air force flying even if an engine type develops problems. First, however, an agreement must be signed. Then, the development project must succeed at a reasonable cost.

July 20/11: Naval LCA. The naval Tejas will probably get a different name. Meanwhile, an F404-IN20-powered naval variant is undergoing ground integration tests at HAL’s Bangalore facility, followed by engine runs and ground runs in the coming weeks. A 1st flight within 3 months is considered optimistic.

Meanwhile, India’s ADA has asked the US Navy to help it define carrier suitability plans, and the US Navy is assisting. Flight International.

May 23/11: Testing & Weapons. Aviation Week reports that the Tejas Mk.I is due to undergo a 2nd phase of night trials. Aircraft LSP-5 reportedly made 6 night flights in April 2011, which tested avionics, the instrument landing system, and integration involving the IAI ELTA multimode radar, Elbit’s DASH helmet-mounted display, and RAFAEL’s LITENING pod. The push to finish night operations clearance will also include items waived for the IAF’s initial clearance (vid. Jan 10/11 entry) – waivers that the service does not intend to grant again.

The next 16 months will see assessments of Tejas’ angle of attack, g-forces and sustained turn rate, with limited series production aircraft #6 arriving to help speed things along. It will also see a greater focus on weapons integratiopn tests – so far, only R-73/AA-11 Archer short-range air-to-air missiles and standard bombs have been tested. Still to go: Laser-guided bombs, cluster bombs, and Russian 80mm S-8 rocket pods. RAFAEL’s Derby medium-range air-to-air missile isn’t set to test until mid-2012, and the IAF also expects Russian Kh-31/35/39 anti-ship and precision strike missiles as part of the Tejas Mk.I’s intended configuration.

March 24/11: Industrial. India’s Business Standard reports that the Indian DRDO is pushing HAL to outsource some Tejas production or set up joint ventures, in order to meet required delivery schedules and keep the IAF’s fighter fleet at acceptable numbers. The current line can reportedly produce just 8 planes per year, and a high-level HAL team has reportedly toured Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Eurofighter GmbH facilities.

A request of this nature from the DRDO is nothing short of revolutionary. HAL has 2 serious problems, however, which make such a different approach thinkable for India’s bureaucrats. One is low real orders for Tejas. As one HAL executive put it: “…how much money could we have realistically invested in a production line?… So far, future Tejas orders of 100-120 more fighters are only plans.” The other problem is the load level on the state-owned firm’s Aircraft R&D Centre, which is is simultaneously trying to develop the Tejas Mark II; the Sitara Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT); the Sukhoi-HAL Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA); and the Irkut-HAL Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MRTA). The firm is also developing Dhruv helicopter variants, including a light attack helicopter. That’s a tremendous amount of competition for attention and resources, and HAL will face more strains if/when each project becomes a production demand.

Other likely candidates for partnerships wold have to include France’s Dassault Aviation, Sweden’s Saab, and Israel Aerospace Industries, as well as BAE and Northrop Grumman. The latter 3 firms have considerable experience as fighter program sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman is looking to sell its E-2D AWACS and Global Hawk UAVs to India; while IAI supplies a range of equipment to India already, and has industrial partnerships in place. So, too, does BAE, who is already working with HAL to produce its Hawk advanced trainer jets in India.

Feb 14/11: Tejas runs the Derby. Indian Aeronautical Development Agency director P.S. Subramanya says they have picked RAFAEL’s Derby as the Tejas’ initial beyond visual range air combat missile. He expects a contract by March 2011, with delivery expected in the second half of 2012, in time for the final phase of Tejas Mk.I testing.

Derby has range limitations, and was accepted on India’s Sea Harrier fleet despite not meeting the program’s original range goals. It also lacks a datalink. On the other hand, it offers a fire-and-forget weapon that’s already in India’s inventory, and integrated with Tejas’ EL/M-2032 radar, possessing what’s reported to be a wide boresight cone. It’s also true that given the need to avoid fratricide and positively identify targeted aircraft, most aerial engagements have taken place within Derby’s range, and future conflicts involving India are expected to feature that same limitation.

Long-term plans were to deploy the locally developed Astra missile as the Tejas BVRAAM, but in 2010 India decided to use a foreign missile and get Tejas into operational service. If Astra succeeds, it can always be integrated later. Meanwhile, Tejas gets ordnance commonality with India’s Sea Harriers, which also carry the EL/M-2032 radar, and with India’s SPYDER anti-aircraft systems. Defense Update | Livemint | RAFAEL on Derby | ACIG on Derby.

RAFAEL Derby BVRAAM picked

Feb 3/11: Kaveri. DRDO hasn’t given up trying to force the issue with its long-delayed Kaveri engine. After proposing it as a naval turbine, the newest gambit is to specify it for a proposed twin-engine Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (A-MCA), which would be developed by 2020 and operational by 2025. The proposal is an aircraft somewhat comparable to America’s F-35 – not an encouraging comparison, given that plane’s development costs.

Government acceptance of that plan would buy the engine project another decade, but the question is whether the A-MCA project is even realistic. India’s M-MRCA medium fighter competition hopes to field an advanced 4+ generation plane by 2015, but deliveries will take years, and real operational capability isn’t likely until 2016 or later. Meanwhile, the 2020-2025 time frame is also the expected window for India’s FGFA 5th generation collaboration with Sukhoi. Both are very big budget programs, even as India looks to field a much larger Navy to counter Chinese ambitions in the Indian Ocean basin, and faces a growing need for expensive ballistic and cruise missile defenses. In that environment, MCA could easily find itself fighting hard to avoid becoming yet another sidelined Indian technology demonstrator project.

DRDO also hopes to muscle the Kaveri v2 engine into the Tejas. They want the Indian government to swap the engines in when the initial 40 GE F404 equipped Tejas Mk.Is come in for their scheduled overhauls, during the 2015-2020 time period. Flight International | The Hindu | UPI.

Jan 31/11: Kaveri. Livemint reports that India’s DRDO expects to close price negotiations for a Kaveri joint venture (JV) with France’s Snecma by the end of February 2011, following over 2 decades and INR 28.8 billion spent on the project in India. DRDO declined to reveal the estimated cost of the Snecma-GTRE project, which reportedly aims to produce a viable competitor to the GE F414 that powers the F/A-18 Super Hornet family, Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen NG, and will almost certainly power the Tejas Mk.II.

Reports suggest that Snecma will bring in critical technology for the hot engine core, which is key to the 38% thrust gain sought over existing Kaveri models, while DRDO’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) will work on the “cold” sections around it. GTRE would be left with complete know-how and intellectual property rights for the engine,which will also need to become lighter.

Jan 10/11: Tejas IOC. The Tejas LCA is given Initial Operational Clearance by the Indian Air Force, marking their first induction of an Indian designed and built front line fighter. It has been a long road. The Hindustan Times reports that: “The government has so far pumped Rs 14,428 crore into the LCA programme which was pegged at Rs 560 crore when conceived in 1983.” The program cost was set at over 3,300 crore by the late 1980s, and has continued to rise. At today’s exchange rates, the INR 144.28 billion figure translates into about $3.15 billion. The Times of India places the program total even higher, at 17,269 crore/ $3.77 billion for all variants.

Note that India’s IOC designation is not the same as Initial Operational Capability for America’s military, which represents a combat-ready unit. India doesn’t have that yet, and Tejas receives this designation without all of its advertised capabilities, such as air-air engagements using radar-guided missiles. Indeed, subsequent reports reveal that key criteria for even minimal operations were waived, including wake penetration tests, lightning clearances, and some basic all-weather and day/night items. What India’s IOC does, is allow regular IAF pilots to begin flying it.

Indian Air Force chief P.V. Naik says that Final Operational Clearance for induction and formation of a Tejas squadron isn’t expected until 2013 or 2014, an event that will take place at Sulur Air Base in Tamil Nadu. The first test flight of the Tejas Mark-II version is currently scheduled for December 2014, with production beginning in June 2016. Indian Government | Economic Times of India | The Hindu | Hindustan Times | IBNLive | LiveMint | New Delhi TV | Sify | Times of India | Times of India op-ed || BBC.

Tejas IOC

Jan 14/11: Radar. domain-b reports that American pressure has forced Israel to bar exports of its EL/M-2052 AESA radar to India. The radar was reportedly intended to replace the EL/M-2032 on the Tejas Mk.II aircraft, where it would sharply improve radar performance and sharply lower maintenance costs (q.v. Oct 3/08, Dec 4/09 entries).

Israel wanted to install the radar in its own F-16s and F-15s, but the Americans moved to strangle a potential competitor by telling the Israelis that installing the M-2052 would cut off all manufacturer support for its fighters. On the export front, the USA can use ITAR restrictions to block technologies developed with American assistance, and forced Israel to implement a set of military export controls that add up to unofficial American review. Israel has reportedly sold a limited number of M-2052s to 1 undisclosed customer, but use in the Tejas Mk.II would represent the radar’s 1st major sale anywhere.

2010

GE’s F414 engine for Tejas Mk.2/Naval; 1st Naval LCA prototype rolled out. EJ200s in Eurofighter
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Nov 21/10: Cost. The Times of India places the cost of India’s Tejas program at 17,269 crore, or over $3.7 billion. The report adds:

“Latest figures also show each of the first 40 Tejas fighters will cost around Rs 150 crore [DID: about $33 million], over and above the huge developmental cost… Tejas, incidentally, has clocked around 1,420 flights with 10 prototypes till date. Its FSED (full-scale engineering development) Phase-I till March 2004 cost Rs 2,188 crore [DID: 1 crore = 10 million rupees]. The Phase-II, to be completed by December 2012, will cost another Rs 5,778 crore. To add to that, there is fabrication of two Tejas Mark-II, with alternate engines, to be completed by Dec 2018 for Rs 2,432 crore, along with development of indigenous technologies for Rs 396 crore. Naval Tejas FSED Phase-I, in turn, is to be completed by Dec 2014 for Rs 1,715 crore, with Phase-II slated for completion by December 2018 for another Rs 1,921 crore.

Tejas will, of course, also be powered by American GE engines, with its indigenous Kaveri engine floundering despite Rs 2,839 crore being spent on its development since 1989. Towards this, India recently finalised a $822-million deal for 99 GE F-414 engines.”

These figures are later shown to fall short of government figures. India’s goal of a $20-25 million fighter at full rate production may still be achievable, but it will bear close watching. It is very normal for the first production sets of a fighter to cost far more than fighters at full-rate production, with figures of double or even triple the price common for aircraft with very long production runs.

Nov 6/10: F414. During President Obama’s visit, the White House provides further details regarding the F414 engine order, which it places at 107 engines:

“…Upon finalizing the contract, General Electric’s facility in Lynn, Massachusetts, and other sites across the United States will be positioned to export almost one billion dollars in high technology aerospace products. This transaction is tentatively valued at approximately $822 million, all of which is U.S. export content, supporting an estimated 4,440 jobs.”

This is strictly true, since any contract with GE would be 100% export content, but the deal itself may still contain provisos for technology transfer and related contracts in India. UK Financial Times Beyond BRICs blog | Hindu Business Line | Indo-Asian News Service (IANS) | NDTV | Sify | WSJ India Real Time blog.

Nov 3/10: At the end of the India-UK “Indra Dhanush 2010” exercise, Indian Air Chief Marshal P V Naik tells the media that LCA Mark-I will be inducted into operational squadrons by the middle of 2011, while the LCA Tejas Mark-II should be operational in the next 2-3 years, as “the process of selection of engine for LCA Mark-II is nearing completion.” It doesn’t happen that way.Deccan Herald.

Nov 1/10: Testing. Aviation Week reports that LSP-5, the 11th test jet and 1st final configuration Tejas Mk I aircraft, is readying for flight trials as the ADA tries to meer a Dec 27/10 deadline for release-to-service certification. Changes include internal cockpit lighting for night flying, a revised internal communication set similar to HAL’s Druhv helicopter, and National Aerospace Laboratories’ auto-pilot mode. Aviation week adds that:

“If the delivery schedules are met, then the Indian Air Force will have LSP-7 and LSP-8 for user evaluation trials by March 2011. LSP-6 will be a test vehicle for high angle of attack. The Tejas squadron is expected to be in Bengaluru by mid-2011 and the first two series production aircraft (SP-1, SP-2) also should be ready by then.”

Oct 25-28/10: Engine II. Report, and denial. After NewsX’s Vishal Thapar broadcasts a reports that a Eurojet consultant has been expelled from India for illegally obtaining information on GE’s bid, trying to substitute a new Eurojet bid by offering a monetary inducement, and then planting media reports that Eurojet was ahead on price. Thapar also claims that this is why the Indian MoD took the unusual step of announcing GE as its low-cost bidder, before a contract was signed.

The follow-on effects could be very severe if true, making it very difficult for India to pick the Eurofighter as its M-MRCA medium fighter. Eurojet’s communication agency subsequently issues the following denial. See Milplex | India Defence:

“Eurojet Turbo GmbH categorically denies unfounded allegations made in the NewsX report titled ” India expels arms dealer”, authored by Vishal Thapar and released on 23 October 2010. The report lacks any factual base and is a work of fiction.”

Oct 1/10: Engine II – F414. India’s Business Standard may want a word with its sources. GE announces that its F414 engine has been picked to power the Tejas Mk.II fighter. India’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) will order 99 jet engines, with GE Aviation supplying the initial batch of F414-GE-INS6, engines and the rest manufactured in India under transfer of technology arrangements. When questioned by DID, GE sources confirmed that this is not a contract yet, merely preferred bidder status.

The selection of GE’s F414 deepens a relationship that has supplied 41 earlier model GE F404 engines so far, in order to power initial Tejas LCA Mk.I fighters and LCA Naval prototypes. GE describes the F414-GE-INS6 as “the highest-thrust F414 model,” without offering specifics, but is has been working on an F414 Enhanced Performance Engine. The INS6 will add single-engine safety features in its digital controls, something GE also installed in the F414 variant powering one M-MRCA candidate, the JAS-39 Gripen NG.

F414 engine picked for Tejas Mk.2

Sept 20/10: Engine II. India’s Business Standard reports that the European EJ200 engine may have the edge in the competition to supply the Tejas Mk.II fleet’s powerplants:

“Informed sources have told Business Standard that when the bids were opened last week, European consortium Eurojet bid $666 million for 99 EJ200 engines, against US rival General Electric, which quoted $822 million.”

Both engines have been ruled technically suitable, so the lower priced bid will win, but the bidding process isn’t 100% final yet. The paper also quotes Air Vice Marshall Kapil Kak (ret.) of the Indian Air Force’s Centre for Air Power Studies, who draws the obvious conclusion:

“It is as clear as daylight. Selecting the EJ200 for the Tejas would boost the Eurofighter’s prospects in the MMRCA contest. Its engines, which form about 15-20 per cent of the cost of a modern fighter, would be already manufactured in India for the Tejas [after the 1st 10 were built abroad]. For the same reason, rejecting the GE F-414 would diminish the chances of the two fighters [F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet and JAS-39NG/IN] that fly with that engine.”

Aug 25/10: Kaveri. Defence Minister Shri AK Antony updates progress in the Kaveri engine in a written reply to Shri N Balaganga of India’s Rajya Sabha (upper house of parliament). It’s phrased in terms of what DRDO is doing as development and testing continues, and gives various reasons why the engine is so late. It does not mention that the IAF isn’t interested, except to note at the end that “LCAs are, meanwhile, as decided by user, being fitted with imported engines.” Unlike some Indian programs, the Kaveri program has managed to spend most of its yearly budgets; over the last 3 years, these expenditures have been:

2007-2008: INR 1,525.1 million
2008-2009: INR 1,535.4 million
2009-2010: INR 1,220.6 million

As of Aug 25/10, INR 100 million = $2.15 million, so INR 1.2206 billion = $26.05 million.

July 6/10: Naval LCA. NP1, the first naval Tejas prototype, is rolled out. HAL will build NP1 and NP2 for testing, which will take place at a new facility in Goa. The naval variant adds a tailhook, strengthened undercarriage, leading-edge vortex controllers to slow down landings, auto-throttles, and a fuel dump system.

Naval LCA rollout

May 5/10: Engine II. GE describes 3 of the programs underway to improve its F414 engine. The most relevant is probably the F414 EPE (Enhanced Performance Engine), which has a new fan to increase airflow, and aims to increase thrust by 20%. It’s explicitly “targeted for potential international customers,” which includes India’s Tejas Mk.2.

The US Navy wants the F414 EDE (Enhanced Durability Engine), which uses an advanced high pressure turbine and 6-stage high pressure compressor (HPC) that offers a 2-3X hot-section durability gain, and reduced fuel consumption. F414 EDE forms the base of the EPE engine, but the gains will not be the same in both engines, owing to other design differences.

Crowded India may also appreciate the retrofittable F414 noise reduction kit project, with serrated edges where each “lobe” penetrates into or out of the primary airflow and generates a secondary flow, reducing jet noise by 2-3-decibels. The USN has identified funding for a program to mature the technology and prepare it for incorporation in the USN F414 engine fleet, with work scheduled to continue through 2011. GE Aviation.

Feb 3/10: Engine II. Eurojet says it will share single-crystal engine blade technologies with India if Eurofighter wins MMRCA, or the EJ200 engine is selected for the LCA Tejas Mk2.

Eurojet’s EJ200 equips the Eurofighter Typhoon. The EJ200 weighs about 2,200 pounds and produces 13,500 pounds of thrust in normal operation, or 20,000 pounds with afterburners. There were even rumors of a thrust-vectoring version, to improve Tejas maneuverability, but the engine lost the Tejas MK.II competition, then the Eurofighter was edged out by France’s Rafale in India’s M-MRCA finals.

Feb 2/10: Indian defence minister AK Antony watches flight demonstrations by twin-seat (PV-5), and single-seat (LCP-2) Tejas test aircraft, and declares: “Serious doubts were raised about Tejas… Now I can proudly say we will fly our own fighters.” He states Cabinet Committee of Security approval to add Rs 8,000 crore (about $1.73 billion) to the 27-year program for continued air force and naval development, and development of a new engine for the Mk.2, and expresses confidence in final operational clearance for the Mk.1 version by end of 2012. Antony also agreed that the government is in talks with parties abroad for the development of that Mk.2 engine, but would not be more specific.

The Indian Air Force has already ordered 20 LCAs, and has reportedly expressed interest in ordering another 20 aircraft. Meanwhile, the Navy is building 2-seat trainer (NP1) and a single-seat fighter (NP2) prototypes, with NP1 nearing completion of equipping after the structural assembly. NP1 is scheduled to roll out by April 2010, followed by a hoped-for first flight in June 2010. The single-seat NP2 is scheduled for its first flight by June 2011. India’s Business Standard | The Hindu | Indian Express | Times of India | Agence France Presse | The Asian Age.

2009

First 6 LCA Naval ordered; Tejas Angle of Attack flight issues; US red tape trips Lockheed Martin; Engine competition to equip Tejas Mk.II. Tejas test
(click to view full)

Dec 31/09: Kaveri. The Hindu reports that India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been given government permission to accept an offer from France’s Snecma to ‘partner’ with the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) to jointly develop a new version of the Kaveri jet engine. Senior GTRE officials tell The Hindu that talks could begin early in 2010. When that might result in a signed contract is anyone’s guess.

This article’s Dec 26/08 entry covers the verdict of a senior Indian committee, which had recommended against the DRDO-Snecma collaboration. The Hindu highlights the Matheswaran team’s criticism that using Snecma’s fully developed ‘Eco’ engine core would not create sufficient transfer or control of technology, but reports:

“Snecma, which indicated that an engine run of at least 250 is required to make their offer economically viable, agrees that an existing core would be at the heart… will take at least five years before the first production engine comes out. Snecma chairman and chief executive officer Philippe Petitcolin told The Hindu: “Yes we first stated a 15-year period to hand over the design technology, but now we have indicated that the technology can be given as fast as the Indians can assimilate it.”

Note that the article does not indicate commitment to use the “Kaveri II” engine for any particular purpose, or offer a likely timeline. Rather, the emphasis seems to be on continuing to develop India’s industrial capabilities, rather than fielding an operational engine. StrategyPage places the cost of that collaboration at $200 million, but this must be an estimate, as no firm deal has been negotiated. See also Sri Lanka Guardian. See also Aug 20/08 entry.

Dec 14/09: Kaveri. In a written Parliamentary reply, Defence Minister Shri AK Antony responds to Shri Gajanan D Babar:

“The proposal on the Kaveri-Snecma engine joint venture for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas is under consideration of the Government. Request for Proposal (RFP) for procuring 99 engines have been sent to two short-listed engine manufacturers, namely GE F414 from General Electric Aviation, USA and EJ200 from Eurojet Germany. The engine houses have responded to the RFP. Both Commercial and technical responses have been received for procurement of 99 engines along with Transfer of Technology.”

Dec 7/09: A Parliamentary response from defense minister Antony offers details regarding the initial Tejas Mk.1 contract:

“A contract for procurement of 20 Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) configuration, along with associated role equipment, reserve engines, engine support package, engine test bed and computer based training (CBT) package from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) was signed in March 2006. The total contract cost is Rs. 2701.70 crores.” [currently about $580 million]

Dec 4/09: Radar – AESA? DRDO’s Bangalore-based Electronics & Radar Development Establishment (LRDE) reportedly invites global bids to become the development partner for a Tejas active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. This would presumably replace the IAI Elta EL/M-2032 derivative that will requip Tejas Mk.1 fighters.

The Active Array Antenna Unit (AAAU) would be supplied by the development partner. Responsibilities would include “detailed design, development and realisation” of the antenna panel (main antenna, guard antenna and sidelobe cancellation antenna), transmit/receive modules/groups, the RF distribution network (RF manifold/combiners and RF interface), antenna/beam control chain (T/R control and T/R group control), and array calibration/BITE among other areas. Livefist.

Nov 26/09: Testing. Tejas PV-5, a 2-seat trainer version, makes its maiden flight. The Deccan Herald says that commonalities between the 2-seat trainer and Tejas naval version will help that sub-program as well, but it will take hundreds of flights over a year or more before the trainer version can be qualified for use by IAF, as a key step in pilot training and induction of the single-seat fighter into IAF operational service.

Sept 28/09: US red tape. India’s Business Standard reports that Lockheed Martin was selected in June 2009 as a consultant for developing the Naval version of the Tejas. Lockheed Martin has no serving carrier-borne fighters, but they’re developing the F-35B STOVL and F-35C Lightning II for use from carriers.

Unfortunately, delays in US government approval has led DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Agency to recommend that another consultant be chosen instead; Dassault (Rafale) and EADS (no carrier-borne aircraft) were recommended as alternatives,and EADS was eventually picked. Lockheed Martin is still fighting to get through the red tape and salvage the contract, and may continue trying until V K Saraswat, India’s Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister, makes a decision.

This has happened before, and recently. Boeing was the front-runner for a similar role with respect to the main (IAF) version, and would be a logical consultant for any naval version – but the Indian MoD awarded EADS that contract in early 2009, after the US government failed to grant Boeing a Technical Assistance Agreement clearance in time.

Sept 21/09: Naval LCA. India’s Business Standard reports that the Tejas Mk.II is attracting funding from India’s Navy, who believes that a modified, EJ-200/F414 equipped Tejas would have the power required to operate from its future aircraft carriers in STOBAR (Short TakeOff But Assisted Recovery) mode:

“Business Standard has learnt that the navy has okayed the placement of an order for six Naval LCAs. At an approximate cost of Rs 150 crore per aircraft, that will provide a Rs 900 crore infusion into the Naval LCA programme.”

At today’s rates, Rs 900 crore = $187.8 million. Naval LCA fighters would operate from India’s 30,000t-35000t Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC), which is being built at Cochin Shipyard with assistance from Italy’s Fincantieri, and is expected to join the fleet by 2014. That creates a potential timing issue, as the Tejas Mk.II’s engine selection and ordering process isn’t supposed to produce new engines before 2013-14. Aeronautical Development Agency director P S Subramaniam told Business Standard that they would fly the modified Naval Tejas airframe with the current GE-404 engine, to test its flight characteristics and structural strength. The new INS Hansa in Goa, with its land-based carrier deck outline and equipment, will be extremely helpful in that regard. If those tests go well, a naval Tejas variant would not operate from a carrier until the new engines were delivered and installed. See also: India Defence

India: 6 Naval LCA.

Aug 4/09: Engine II. Flight International reports that the Eurojet consortium has done tests regarding the EJ200’s fit into the Tejas’ space, and believes itself to be in a strong position for the expected 99-engine order to equip the Tejas Mk.II. The RFP response date is Oct 12/09.

Aug 3/09: Kaveri. India’s DRDO is attempting to resurrect the Kaveri engine project, but the IAF’s lack of enthusiasm is pointed. MoD release:

“Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has offered to co-develop and co-produce 90 kN thrust class of upgraded Kaveri engine with M/s Snecma, France to meet the operational requirement of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas with 48 months from the date of project inception… The proposal for co-development was considered by Indian Air Force. Indian Air Force has suggested a proven engine that is already in production and flight worthy for meeting immediate requirement. Request for Proposal (RFP) has been issued to reputed engine manufacturers.”

A separate MoD release gives December 2012 as the target date for the LCA Tejas Mk.I’s “final Operational Clearance,” adding that project oversight currently involves a high level review by the Chief of Air Staff once per quarter, and by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff once per month.

March 4/09: Testing. India Defense reports that a multi-agency team is carrying out 2-weeks of Phase 2 weapon testing for the LCA Tejas. The focus is on safe separation, aerodynamic interference data, and complex weapon release algorithms in different modes of release. Note that the tests still involve aerodynamics, rather than full weapons system integration.

Feb 25/09: Government of India:

“A contract for 20 indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) has been signed. One IAF squadron is expected to be equipped with this aircraft in 2010-11. Government is not planning to set up a hi-tech facility at Nagpur costing about Rs. 300 crores [3 billion rupees, or about $60 million] for indigenizing components of these aircrafts. Product support including spare parts will be supplied by the vendor as per the terms of the contract that will be concluded.”

Feb 17/09: Engine II. Flight International reports that the Eurojet engine consortium may be about to change the competitive field for the expected RFP to equip LCA Tejas MkII aircraft. The firm has been working on a thrust-vectoring model of its engine, and the magazine reports that it will be offered to meet India’s expected RFP for up to 150 engines.

The Eurofighter is also an MMRCA medium fighter competitor, and twin wins for Eurojet could offer India important commonality benefits, even as they justified an in-country production line. Thrust vectoring would also offer the Tejas a level of maneuverability and performance that could be a difference-maker in combat, and on the international market. The Eurofighter is considered a long shot to win the MMRCA competition, however, and timelines could become an issue. Flight tests of a thrust vectoring EJ200 engine are not expected to begin for another 2 years.

Feb 6/09: Engine II. The Press Trust of India quotes Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) Director P Subrahmanyam, who says that India’s state-run DRDO is still looking for partners to develop the indigenous Kaveri engine. That hasn’t stopped the Ministry of Defence’s ADA from preparing a competition to equip the LCA Mark II version from 2014 onward, after the initial aircraft are fielded with F404-IN-20 engines:

“We are looking to procure either the GE-414 from US or European consortium Eurojet’s EJ 200 to fly with the LCA Mk II version [after going through offers from various global manufacturers]. Request for Proposals (RFP) is just about to go out and very soon it would be floated.”

Eurojet’s EJ200 equips the Eurofighter Typhoon, while GE’s F414 equips Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen and Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet family. All 3 of these fighters are competitors in India’s MMRCA, which aims to buy at least 126 medium multi-role fighters to fill the gap between Tejas LCAs and India’s top-tier SU-30MKIs.

The article appears to indicate that India would be looking to switch production to the new engines, after low-rate initial production equips the first 2 IAF squadrons with 48 aircraft. In practice, required engineering changes and aircraft testing make such an early switch unlikely.

Jan 29/09: AoA issues. Indopia reports that India’s DRDO/ADA and HAL are proposing a $20 million collaboration with EADS to assist with flight trials, and help to increase the fighter’s flight envelope. Performance at high “angles of attack,” in which a fighter’s nose and wings are tilted at steep angles, will reportedly be the focus for EADS efforts.

At any aircraft’s critical angle of attack, the wing is no longer able to support the weight of the aircraft, causing a tail slide that generally worsens the problem and can lead to an aerodynamic stall. Different aircraft have different critical angles of attack, and design changes can lead to an expanded range for safe, sustained flight maneuvers. In some cases, such as India’s Sukhoi 30MKIs with their modern triplane configuration, the design’s flight envelope can become so large that maneuvers like the near 90 degree “Cobra” become safe and routine.

Jan 23/09: Testing. The Tejas LCA completes its 1,000th test flight since the first 18-minute flight by Technology Demonstrator-1 on 04 Jan 4/01. Frontier India | The Hindu | The Times of India.

Flight #1,000

2009

Why Kaveri was a failure, demonstrated; Kaveri for naval ships? Inverted flypast
(click to view full)

Dec 26/08: Kaveri. The Hindu reports that a committee set up by the IAF in September 2008 has recommended against Snecma’s offer (see Aug 20/08 entry). The report says that the result would not be a co-designed, co-developed engine, but rather a license production arrangement. The group recommends continued development of the Kaveri engine and its core technologies instead, despite the failures to date.

These conclusions are less surprising when one examines the committee’s composition. Air Vice Marshal M. Matheswaran chaired the group, which included representatives from India’s state-run Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification, and IAF officers posted at ADA, the National Flight Test Centre and the Aircraft Systems and Testing Establishment. All are state-run groups that have been involved in the Kaveri’s ongoing development, and have strong incentives to protect that turf.

Dec 13/08: Testing. A Tejas fighter prototype lands at Leh air base in the high-altitude Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir, at an altitude of 10,600 fee. Leh is one of the highest airfields in the world, with a temperature variation ranging from 5 to -20 C/ 41 to -4F. .

That was the whole point, of course: perform cold weather testing, while making an assessment of the aircraft’s performance in high-altitude conditions, without the confounding influence and additional challenge of high temperatures. India Defence

Oct 3/08: Radar. The Hindu newspaper relays news from ADA Programme Director P.S. Subramaniam that the Israeli Elta “EL/M-2052” radar has already undergone tests on the flight test bed and ground rig in Israel, and “airworthy units” are expected to arrive early next week.

There had been some unconfirmed mentions of EL/M-2052s in connection with the Tejas, and it’s possible that ADA is beginning tests related to the Mk.II. It’s more likely that the radars are IAI Eltas M-2032, instead of Elta’s AESA option. The Elta M-2032 multi-mode radar already serves on India’s Sea Harriers and some Jaguars, and was picked as an “interim option” until India’s indigenous radar program performs to the required standard. Because the indigenous radar has failed to perform to standard, the ADA has reportedly been running weaponization tests on the Tejas using a weapon delivery pod, and has been forced to keep critical tests on hold. Past experience suggests that the Tejas’ radar will remain an import.

Aug 20/08: Kaveri & Snecma. The Wall Street Journal’s partner LiveMint.com has an article that more or less sums up the Kaveri project in a nutshell, and also the DRDO: “In aircraft engine development, you cannot set a timeline.” The article interviews T. Mohana Rao, director of India’s state-run Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE). Rao explains why the Kaveri engine is effectively dead as a fighter aircraft engine, leaving GE’s popular F404-GE-IN20 variant to power the Tejas for at least the next 4 years.

Rao quotes the Kaveri’s performance at 11,000 lbs./ 5,000 kg dry thrust at sea level, and 16,500 lbs./ 7,500 kg thrust on afterburners. That’s about 1,000 lbs./ 400 kg short of specifications. The engine is also overweight by 330 lbs./ 150 kg, and has yet to perform long-endurance tests to assess its durability.

The GTRE cannot promise any date for successful delivery, and so political approval was granted to form a partnership with a foreign engine firm on a risk-sharing basis. Russia’s NPO Saturn and France’s Snecma responded, while GE, Rolls-Royce, and Pratt and Whitney declined. After almost 2 1/2 years, the GTRE chose France’s Snecma, but there’s no contract yet. industrial issues need to be settled, and the government requires consultation with the Indian Air Force before any contract and requirements are signed.

Snecma’s proposal involves an engine core (compressor, combustor and high-pressure turbine) called Eco. Snecma would have a workshare of 45%, and GTRE’s would be 55%, with nearly 85% of the manufacturing within India. Snecma says the aircraft could be certified for fitting in the Tejas within 4 years. Assuming that project remains on time, of course. The policy question is whether this outcome was predictable from the outset. As the Live Mint article notes:

“Nearly 20 years after it promised an indigenous engine to power India’s light combat aircraft Tejas, the… country’s sole aero engine design house, is now seeking outside help…”

Aug 13/08: Kaveri KMGT. The DRDO’s GTRE in Bangalore believes it may have found a use for the Kaveri engine, in naval vessels. Using the core of the Kaveri engine, plus a low-pressure compressor and turbine, the engine would become a gas-fired 12 MW propulsion unit in warships up the he Rajput Class, or find uses as on-shore electricity generators. A Kaveri Marine Gas Turbine (KMGT) has been transported to naval dock yard at Vishakapatnam, and installed on to the marine gas turbine test bed there. Yahoo! India | RF Design.

The Rajput Class “destroyers” are modified Russian Kashin-II Class ships, though their top weight of just under 5,000 tons would mark them as large frigates in many navies.

Aug 3/08: Kaveri – And Replacements? The Wall Street Journal’s partner LiveMint.com reports that France’s Snecma will partner with India’s DRDO to develop a new engine, sidelining the Kaveri project.

“GTRE has spent nearly Rs1,900 crore of the Rs2,800 crore that was sanctioned since an engine project Kaveri, named after the river in southern India, began in 1989… Vincent Chappard, a Snecma spokesman in France, said he could not immediately confirm the development.”

While the IAF waits for Snecma’s efforts, reports also suggest that the DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Agency has invited both General Electric and Eurojet Turbo GmbH, a European engine consortium, to bid for higher-powered interim engines. GE offers the F414, and the Eurojet 2000 already has higher thrust, but the engines will have to fit the Tejas’ design – or vice-versa. These engines would be slated for Tejas aircraft produced beyond the initial 48 plane order, but before any indigenous engine is certified. WSJ partner Live Mint | domain-b

March 4/08: Radar. There are reports that Europe’s EADS has offered to co-develop an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar with India, for installation on board the Tejas fighters. Work is currently underway on an AESA radar to equip EADS’ Eurofighter, which is a long shot in India’s 126-190 aircraft MMRCA fighter competition.

The nature of AESA radars makes it possible to scale them up or down while retaining high commonality with larger versions, the main difference being changes to radar power and hence overall performance. Northrop Grumman whose AN/APG-77 AESA radar equips America’s F-22, recently introduced its AESA Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR) at Singapore’s February 2007 air show. It’s designed to equip existing F-16 fighters with no modifications required, and is advertised as being scalable to other platforms.

A win for EADS in this area offers to solve a problem for India, while creating a commonality hook for the Eurofighter – or at worst, a supplier diversification option for India that adds external funding to help EADS catch up in this key technology area.

March 3/08: Indian Defence Minister Shri A K Antony responds to a Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament) question by saying that the Tejas flight test program is:

“…progressing as per the schedule. So far, 829 flight tests have been completed. Efforts are being made to accelerate the flight tests… Presently, no need is felt for strategic partner. To complete the project at the earliest, a top level review is being conducted by the Chief of Air Staff once in every quarter and review by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff once in every month. So far, Rs. 4806.312 cr [DID: 48.063 billion rupees, or about $1.19 billion at current conversion] have been spent on development of various versions of Light Combat Aircraft.”

2006 – 2008

1st 20 production Tejas ordered; IAI to substitute for MMR radar failure; F404 engines ordered; AA-11 fired; Naval Tejas contemplated. AA-11/R-73 Archer
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Oct 25/07: Testing. The Tejas fires a missile for the first time: Vympel’s short-range, IR guided AA-11/R-73 Archer air-to-air missile. Test aircraft PV-1 fired the missile at 7 km altitude and 0.6 Mach within the naval air range off the coast of Goa, marking the beginning of weaponization as a prelude to initial operational clearance (IOC) phase of the Tejas program.

The main objectives of test firing were to validate safe separation of the missile, the effect of missile plume on the engine’s air-intake and on composite structures, the workings of the stores-management displays and software, and quality assessment. India DoD release | Times of India.

While the beginning of weaponization is a significant event, the state of the fighter’s indigenous radar development means that the critical weaponization event for the Tejas LCA will be its first successful test-firing of a radar-guided missile.

Aug 13/07: Radar – IAI. Defence Minister Shri AK Antony states the obvious in a written reply to Shri Sugrib Singh and others in Lok Sabha, but adds new information concerning foreign cooperation:

“There has been a time and cost overrun in the said project. The project to develop two MMR systems for ground testing was sanctioned at a cost of Rs.62.27 crore. This activity was completed in 2004 at a cost of Rs.105 crore.

Yes, but see poor testing results in the April 8/06 and May 1/06 entries, below. He does not mention them, but effectively concedes the point by adding that:

A co-development activity of MMR has been initiated for Limited Series Production and Series Production with M/s ELTA Systems Ltd, Israel, which has experience in developing similar types of radars. To expedite the project, close monitoring of activity at the highest level of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) management has been put in place.”

See also India Defence follow-on | Flight International.

IAI Elta radar agreement

April 26/07: Testing. The 1st of the Limited Series Production Tejas jets (LSP-1), makes its successful maiden flight at HAL airport in Bangalore, reaching an altitude of 11 km/ 6.6 miles and a speed of Mach 1.1 during the 47 minute flight.

According to the Indian government release, LSP-1 marks the beginning of series production of Tejas for induction into the Air Force.

1st production flight

March 1/07: India’s Defence Minister Shri AK Antony offers an update re: the Tejas LCA:

“Five Tejas are currently being flight tested for Initial Operational Clearance by the Indian Air Force pilots posted at National Test Centre of Aeronautical Development Agency, Ministry of Defence. So far 629 flights accumulating 334 hours have been completed. Twenty aircraft have been ordered by the Indian Air Force as the first lot.”

Feb 7/07: F404. HAL ordered an additional 24 F404-GE-IN20 afterburning engines in a $100+ million contract, in order to power the first operational squadron of Tejas fighters for the Indian Air Force.

This buy follows a 2004 purchase of 17 F404-GE-IN20 engines, in order to power a limited series of operational production aircraft and naval prototypes.

F404 engine order #2

Jan 25/07: India tries to throw a large monkey wrench into Pakistan’s rival JF-17 project. They almost succeed.

Nov 22/06: Reuters India: “Pakistan set to get eight JF-17 fighter jets next year.” Anxieties are becoming more acute as Pakistan readies its JF-17 fighter developed in conjunction with China and Russia, and prepares to induct them into service in 2007-2008. The JF-17 is a sub-$20 million fighter designed to replace F-7P (MiG-21+) and Mirage 3/5 aircraft in Pakistan’s fleet, and is a comparable peer for the LCA Tejas.

Sept 19/06: India set to induct 28 LCA Tejas aircraft by 2007. They would have GE F404 engines rather than the Kaveri, says former project director Dr. Kota Harinarayana. As it turns out, India has 0 inducted aircraft, 5 years after that stated date.

May 2/06: India Defence reports that the Indian Navy may be interested in a Tejas LCA version of its own.

May 1/06: Radar. More bad news for the radar project. The Vijay Times also notes that that the performance of several radar modes being tested still “fell short of expectations,” and may force acquisition of American or Israeli radars (likely APG-68 or Elta’s EL/M-2032) as an interim measure.

April 8/06: Radar. The Sunday Telegraph reports that the Tejas’ radar, which was also set up as an indigenous project after foreign options like the JAS-39 Gripen’s fine PS05 radar were refused, could only perform at the most basic levels, putting tests on hold:

“According to the IAF, which proposes to buy 220 of the planes when they are ready, the radar is now “marooned in uncertainty”… While two basic radar modes have been tested, the other modes have failed, throwing up serious questions about the system’s fundamentals.

In written replies to queries sent by The Indian Express, DRDO chief M Natarajan said: “Because of the complexity of technologies involved (in the radar project) and the extent of testing to be done, help of specialists in the field may be sought to complete the task… When Natarajan was asked why there was uncertainty over the radar so long after development began, he said: “The radar is under development by HAL and not at LRDE (the DRDO’s lab).” This, even when the signal processor built by the DRDO is the very heart of the radar.

Security analyst K Subrahmanyam has earlier called the dogged refusal to entertain foreign help by the DRDO as reflective of the organisation’s bad project management.”

March 2006: Order #1. India signs a contract with HAL for 20 Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in “Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) configuration,” along with associated role equipment, reserve engines, engine support package, engine test bed and computer based training (CBT) package.

The total contract cost is INR 27.017 billion. Source.

India: 20 LCA

February 2006: Kaveri. Jane’s claims that SNECMA won the contract to assist India in developing the Kaveri.

Appendix A: DID Analysis & Op/Ed (2006) More exportable Kaveri

The complexities inherent in designing a new fighter from scratch are formidable, even for a lightweight fighter like the Tejas. As Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (Retd) notes, India’s industry had significant experience deficits going into this project, which have delayed the project significantly, and raised costs. The insistence on pushing the envelope with a new fighter design, a new engine, and a new radar all at once has had consequences. In the long run, those consequences will lead to a smaller IAF, and could be set to create major force gaps if MiG-21 lifespans can’t be extended long enough.

As experts like Richard D. Fisher have noted, Chinese projects tend to quickly hand off significant components to others and confine the kinds of domestic expertise required. The J-10 has been an example, and the massive changes required when Israeli and Western cooperation ended made the project incredibly challenging. Only a Chinese decision to outsource major components like the engines to the Russians kept the project from failing completely.

As the J-10 shows, delays remain possible, even with extensive foreign cooperation. It’s also true that every new jet engine type can expect teething issues when it is first installed. This may explain why even Sweden, with their long history of indigenous fighter development, chose the less risky approach of adopting the proven GE F404 & F414 engines for the JAS-39 Gripen. They made minor modifications as required in conjunction with the manufacturer, then concentrated their design efforts elsewhere.

All the more reason, then, to bring in foreign partners for components like the engine etc., and minimize the complexities faced by India’s indigenous teams in its state-run organizations.

Sainis and Joseph’s examination of the benefits to Indian industry from the LCA program demonstrate that most industrial benefits would have been retained had India taken this route. So, too, would the project’s timelines, which have suffered instead as India’s fighter fleet dwindles.

In India’s case, these added complexities can also spill over onto the export front. If potential Tejas export customers aren’t offered a common, fully tested international engine like the GE F404, with a broad network of support and leverage across multiple aircraft types, risk calculations will get in the way of some sales. When deciding on their buy, potential customers will have to evaluate the Kaveri engine’s prospects for future spares, upgrades and support, available contractors with relevant skills in maintaining them, etc. This tends to make potential buyers more cautious, and is likely to reduce Kaveri’s odds when competing against options like the Chinese/Pakistani JF-17, which uses a modified version of the engine that equips many MiG-29s around the world.

As the French have found with the Rafale, lack of exports for a limited production indigenous fighter equals rising maintenance and upgrade burdens that hit right in the home budget, and make it that much harder for the design to keep up with contemporary threats over its lifetime. Which in turn affect export prospects in a vicious circle.

Will India’s decision to proceed with the Kaveri engine offer short-term customization benefits, at the expense of long-term pain? Or can HAL maintain the Tejas airframe design, and field a lightweight fighter that offers its customers a choice of engines?

Appendix B: The Kaveri Saga – Keystone, or Killer? Kaveri prototype
(click to view full)

The GTRE GTX-35VS Kaveri was envisioned as a variable cycle flat-rated engine, in which the thrust drop is compensated by increased turbine entry temperature at the spool. The variable cycle flat-rated engine would be controlled by a Kaveri full authority digital control unit (KADECU/ FADEC). The goal was a powerplant with slightly more thrust than GE’s F404 engines, whose characteristics were uniquely suited to India’s hot and humid environments.

India’s frequent goal of “100% made in India content” has derailed a number of its weapon projects over the last few decades, but foreign decisions also played an important role in the Kaveri project’s genesis. In 1998, India’s nuclear tests prompted the US to place sanctions on military exports, including GE’s F404 turbofans and Lockheed Martin’s assistance in developing the Tejas’ flight control system. In response, India began its program to develop an indigenous engine. As the Rediff’s Feb 5/06 report notes:

“DRDO scientists had kept the development of the Kaveri engine under wraps, exuding confidence that India had developed the technological edge to develop its own aircraft engine, so far confined to handful of developed countries.”

The prospect of ending that dependence is a powerful lure, but some of the reasons for that small club are technical. Modern jet engines are far more complex than even Vietnam-era engines like the GE J79 that equipped the F-4 Phantom. Producing a working, reliable engine that can operate at these high pressures and thrust ratings isn’t easy, and weaking and troubleshooting a new and unproven jet engine always involves a great deal of work and expense. The Kaveri engine’s climate performance targets added even more challenges to an already-full plate. That proved difficult for the program when the program’s entire context changed.

Eventually, the USA lifted its weapons export restrictions on India. In contrast, the natural barriers to developing an advanced engine from scratch, in a country with no past experience doing so, to technical specifications more challenging than current market mainstays, were not lifted so easily. The complexities inherent in this challenge belied DRDO’s apparent confidence, forcing India to bring in turbine experts from Snecma in France and from US firms like Pratt and Whitney.

In the end, the Indian DRDO was finally forced to look for a foreign technology partner, and issue an RFP. Even then, acceptance of program realities was slow in coming. In the initial stages, DRDO secretary M Natarajan referred to it as an effort to “add value and look for a partner to stand guarantee,” and stated that any partners would have to work to India’s terms. A committee in which IAF experts would be included would evaluate the bids to decide on:

“…how much to take and from whom… But Kaveri is and would remain an Indian project… We have gone this way to shorten time for making the engine airborne, as we don’t wont to delay the LCA induction schedule.”

GE F404

Those goals did not prove to be compatible.

US engine manufacturer General Electric, who supplies the F404 jet engines that power initial Tejas models, seemed unenthralled with those proposed terms. They declined to respond to the RFP for foreign assistance. Eventually, India’s state agencies were forced to concede that they could not develop an engine with the required specifications, and that seeking foreign help to improve the basic design was also unlikely to produce a design that met the required specifications.

With no engine in production as late-stage aircraft testing began, and none forthcoming in the forseeable future, India’s drive to develop an indigenous “Kaveri” jet engine had become a key roadblock for the Tejas program in India – and very possibly, beyond India as well.

In contrast to the Kaveri, F404 family engines are already proven in a number of aircraft around the world including Saab’s 4th generation JAS-39 Gripen lightweight fighter, the F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter, models A-D of the F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft in service around the world, South Korea’s T/A-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer & light attack aircraft, and Singapore’s soon to be retired A-4SU Super Skyhawk attack jets. Kaveris equipped with F404/F414 engines would present a lower risk profile to potential export customers, due to the engines’ long-proven performance, GE’s global support network, and the number on engines in operation around the world.

Kaveri would offer none of these important benefits, in exchange for one offsetting feature: foreign sales would not require US military export approval for the engines.

India has not been a major weapons exporter, so export realities didn’t carry a lot of weight. On the other hand, the technical and timeline difficulties experienced by the main Tejas program created a potential natiional defense crisis that could not be ignored. By August 2008, the Kaveri program had effectively been sidelined, in order to get the Tejas into service within an acceptable time frame and preserve India’s operational fighter strength. While political changes may resurrect the Kaveri program as a political exercise, the Tejas program’s technical procurement path has been moving in the other direction.

This kind of vague drift away from an indigenous option is common in India’s procurement history. It usually ends with off-the-shelf “interim” buys becoming permanent; and an indigenous program that’s either shelved, or bought in very low numbers alongside a much larger foreign purchase of similar equipment.

GE’s F404-IN20 will be the Tejas’ initial powerplant, to be followed by the F414-GE-INS6, which beat the Eurojet EJ200 as the Tejas Mk.II’s planned engine.

Even so, DRDO continued to fund and back its long-delayed project. By January 2013, they had abandoned negotiations with France’s Snecma to create a Kaveri 2.0 version using key Snecma engine technologies, and resolved to try yet another global tender. A Kaveri without an afterburner would power a notional UCAV strike drone, and DRDO specified a pair of Kaveri engines for a proposed “Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft” project.

These pursuits would have kept the Kaveri development project consuming defense funds for another decade. In May 2014, however, Narendra Modi’s BJP Party scored a crushing landslide victory, and vowed to shake up the way government was run. DRDO felt the change, shifted their prioritization methods, and decided in November 2014 that the Kaveri program should be abandoned entirely.

\Additional Readings & Sources Background: LCA Tejas

• Indian Government – Tejas: India’s Light Combat Aircraft.

• India’s Aeronautical Development Establishment – Main site. Government agency developing the LCA family.

• DRDO – Light Combat Aircraft.

• Aerospace Web – Hindustan (HAL) Tejas / Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Light Multi-Role Fighter.

• Air Force World – LCA. Chinese site.

• GlobalSecurity.org – Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA).

• MILAVIA – ADA Tejas LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).

• Wikipedia – HAL Tejas. Detailed and well footnoted.

Background: Ancillary Technologies & Weapons

• General Electric – F404 engine family.

• IAI – EL/M-2032 – Multimode Airborne Fire Control Radar.

• ACIG Database – Kfir C.10. Includes a great deal of information concerning IAI Elta’s EL/M-2032 radar, and looks at the Derby missile.

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – R-73E/R-73EL. AA-11 Archer short range air-to-air missile in the West.

• RAFAEL – DERBY Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – KAB-1500LG-Pr-E, KAB-1500LG-OD-E, KAB-1500LG-F-E. Laser guided bombs.

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – Kh-59MK2 Air-Launched Missile. Short-range strike, similar to Raytheon’s AGM-65 Maverick.

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – Kh-31A Medium Range Airborne Missile. AS-17 Krypton in the West, has several variants including the Kh-31P radar-killer.

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – Kh-35E – Tactical Anti-Ship Missile. Sub-sonic, similar to Boeing’s Harpoon.

Background: Tejas Mk.II Technologies

• General Electric – F414 engine family. In Mk.II.

• Eurojet – EJ200. Lost Mk.II competition.

• India’s DRDO – Kaveri Engine. The state-owned R&D agency grudgingly abandoned their push to put this on the Tejas. For now.

• IAI – EL/M-2052 – Active Phased Array Airborne Fire Control Radar. Reportedly slated for Mk.II.

Official Reports

• India MoD (March 20/13) – Delay in Manufacturing of Tejas by DRDO.

• Air Commodore Muthanna (Oct 18/12) – Challenges In Design To Deployment: Critical Lessons From the D&D of LCA.

News & Views

• DID FOCUS – India’s MMRCA Fighter Competition. Covering the MRCA foreign competition, whose choices and success will affect the Tejas LCA project.

• DID – India’s DRDO Rethinking the Way it Does Business. Contains an extensive set of links to articles covering India’s defense sector and its organizational/ program issues. One of which is Tejas.

• Bharat Rakshak (Feb 11/13) – Interviews with LCA program test pilot Cmde Jaydeep Maolankar and N-LCA Deputy Project Director Cmdr Sukesh Nagaraj. Claimed. DID can’t confirm their authenticity, but we have no reason to disbelieve this account.

• AeroMag Asia – Jan-Feb 2013 issue [PDF] includes “LCA-Tejas: Sky is not the limit” | “TEJAS Programme is dashing towards the completion of IOC: Subramanyam” | “LCA-Navy can be a replacement for Sea Harrier: Balaji”.

• The Indian Express (Nov 15/06) – 23 yrs and first fighter aircraft hasn’t taken off. Says the LCA Tejas may face further delays, and the entire project could even be forced into a joint-venture in order to successfully deliver the aircraft.

• Vijay Times (May 1/06) – Glitches in LCA radar.

• The Sunday Express (April 8/06) – ‘Indigenous’ aircraft needs foreign lift, for its radar.

• Rediff (Feb 5/06) – Kaveri Engine – Reignited Hopes, Technological Edge?. Scroll to the right if necessary.

• Press Trust of India (Feb 2/06) – Light Combat Aircraft project to be completed in 2010. Scroll to the right if necessary.

• Frontier India (March 6/05) – Light Combat Aircraft – Tejas Testing. By Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (Retd). Good description of the issues encountered trying to design and build the aircraft.

• Bharat Rakshak Monitor (March-April 2001) LCA Development and Costs. By Sunil Sainis and George Joseph. Contains the most detailed cost and industrial participation information we have found.

Americas

• The USAF will not be lifting weight restrictions on F-35 pilots until at least 2018. The push back comes as ejector seat manufacturer Martin-Baker needs more time to conduct additional testing on the ejector seat safety features in the fighters. The program has been experiencing problems with this specific aspect of the plane’s development since the summer of 2015, but this has just been one of many issues to have dogged the program amid increased delays and spiraling costs. The Pentagon hopes to make the aircraft’s European debut at the Farnborough Air Show in the UK this summer after engine issues forced it to be omitted from last year’s show. No doubt foreign partners in the program will be following with interest.

• It’s a dirty job but someone has to do it. Seaward Marine Services has been awarded a $53.3 million contract to carry out waterborne hull cleaning and associated work on the underwater portion of ships and crafts for the US Navy. Work is to be carried to support the Director of Ocean Engineering, Supervisor of Salvage and Diving and will take place in seas and oceans across the world. Options, if carried out, could reach $257.9 million.

Middle East North Africa

• A delegation from Israel’s defense ministry has visited a Lockheed Martin production facility in Forth Worth, Texas as the frames of their first F-35I’s enter their advanced production phase. Israeli procurement of the F-35 fighter, dubbed the AS-1, differs slightly from the standard model of F-35A to be exported to other nations involved in the program. Unique features include the integration of Israel’s own electronic warfare systems into the aircraft’s built-in electronic suite, as well as the ability to use indigenously produced guided and air-to-air missiles. Israel has ordered thirty-three F-35I fighters at a cost of $3.6 billion.

Europe

• UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia have come under more scrutiny after the sale of missiles to the kingdom have been deemed in breech of international law. The accusation comes as human rights groups, the UN and EU parliament have all expressed concerns that UK manufactured missiles have been used by Saudi-led coalition forces to kill civilians in Yemen. The Conservative Party government’s relationship with Saudi Arabia had been put increasingly under the spotlight lately, as human rights issues both within the Gulf kingdom and its war in Yemen are being met with increased international outcry. Since David Cameron came to office in 2011, UK arms licensed to Saudi Arabia are valued at $8.7 billion.

• Russia will ramp up its testing of ICBMs in 2016 according to its MoD. Strategic Missile Troops will be kept busy with sixteen intercontinental ballistic missile test launches alongside flight test procedures for advanced weapons, and control of the technical readiness of missile systems that have already entered service. Strategic Missile Troops also plan to conduct more than one hundred command and staff, tactical and special exercises. Unannounced inspections of the forty Russian missile regiments will continue throughout 2016 to test combat readiness of troops.

Asia Pacific

• South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) have selected Korean Air Lines Co. to mass produce their first reconnaissance UAV. Korean Air designed and developed a UAV back in 2014, and the $333 million deal will see more of the UAVs produced over the next four years. They will then be deployed to operate along the country’s northern border and DMZ shared with North Korea.

• Following hot on the heels of Sri Lanka and Nigeria, Azerbaijan looks to be the next in line for an order of JF-17s from Pakistan. Following his recent trip to the country, Pakistan President Mamnoon Hussain said that a deal regarding the sale of defense products to Azerbaijan was just one of several areas in which both were looking to increase cooperation. The potential for increased Azerbaijani-Pakistani trade comes as Chinese officials signed a number of documents with the Caucasus nation in December. Beijing, Pakistan’s partner in the development in the JF-17 program, is looking to develop a “Silk Way” economic belt stretching along developing countries that encompass the historical trade route.

• India’s long awaited purchase of thirty-six Rafale fighters is set to be finalized as French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian is scheduled to visit New Delhi next week. It’s believed that the visit is specifically for the purpose of officially concluding the high-profile deal ahead of President Francois Hollande’s visit to the country. Hollande will visit as a guest to celebrate India’s Republic Day on January 26. France and manufacturer Dassault will no doubt be happy to see the deal secured, which has been ongoing for some time, and the cause of much haggling over price offsets and a deal to produce parts for the aircraft within India.

Today’s Video

• The US flying a B-52 bomber near North Korea as the mind games continue:

Americas

• Raytheon has been awarded a $2.35 billion contract to deliver 52 SM-3 Block IB missiles. The contract finalizes a preliminary one for 44 missiles valued at $541 million. The addition of 8 further missiles comes as the US military is increasing its stocks of SM-3s in the wake of increased missile threats, and orders by foreign allies of its weapons systems.

• General Atomics will conduct logistical support for Predator (MQ1) and Reaper (MQ9) unmanned aerial systems for the US Air Force. The one year contract is worth $338.2 million. Work to be carried out includes program management, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, contractor field service representative support, inventory control point management, flight operations support, depot repair, and depot field maintenance. The MQ1s and MQ9s will also see sensors contractor logistics support provided by Raytheon for the year in a contract worth $49.4 million.

Middle East North Africa

• Raytheon Corp. has been awarded a $74.5 million foreign military sales contract to provide English language training and a series of Pre-PATRIOT military occupational specialty training classes to the government of Kuwait. Training is to be completed by December 17, 2018. The contract coincides with the expected June 2016 delivery from Lockheed Martin of fourteen four pack Patriot missiles and seven launcher modification kits to Kuwait. The training will increase the Gulf nation’s military integration and interoperability as it conducts military intervention as part of the Saudi Arabian led coalition in Yemen.

Europe

• Germany is looking to develop the replacement of the Tornado jet, with planning discussion set to begin in 2016. Like the Tornado, the replacement may be manufactured by a consortium of European manufacturers. The announcement was made as part of a government draft document on “military aviation strategy” although a decision on whether the fighter would be manned or unmanned was not noted. It is possible that a version of both will be designed. The document also mentions the idea of extending the life of the German Tornado fleet until the mid-2030s, a decade longer than their planned retirement.

• The purchase of Javelin missiles and command launch units by Lithuania has been cleared by the US State Department in a deal worth $55 million. The acquisition includes 220 anti-tank missiles, 74 launch command units, 10 fly-to-buy missiles, and aims to help modernize the capabilities of the Lithuanian Army to participate in future NATO operations. Recent Russian military action in Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea in 2014 has resulted in neighboring countries increasing their defensive capabilities against any future Russian aggression.

Asia Pacific

• The US State Department has approved the sale of three CH-47F Chinook helicopters to Australia. The $180 million foreign military sale includes six Aircraft Turbine Engines and three Common Missile Warning Systems, as well as three Infrared Signature Suppression Systems and logistical support. Australia has ordered seven of the latest CH47F model to replace the existing CH-47Ds currently in service with the Royal Australian Air Force. Delivery is expected to be completed by 2017.

• Malaysia may consider purchasing Pakistan’s JF-17 aircraft as part of its current fighter replacement program. Malaysian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Dr. Hasrul Sani made the announcement citing the excellent relations both nations currently have in terms of defense cooperation. The sale would also see further increase in the bilateral trade between the two, which currently stands at over $2 billion per annum. Other options currently being considered are the Dassault Rafale, Boeing’s F/A-18 and Lockheed Martin’s F-16V. The interest in the JF-17 comes alongside the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project which will see over $40 billion invested in Pakistan’s infrastructure and economic development. Dr. Sani stated that the whole region would stand to benefit from the CPEC project.

• Saab has made another bid to sell its Gripen fighters to India, after it lost out a tender to Dassault’s Rafale in 2011. With a deal to buy 36 Rafale fighters just signed last month, Saab has claimed that India will require more fighters to maintain an at capacity fleet. The offer comes sweetened with a technology transfer, giving full system and software control and an offer to help develop India’s aerospace industry for the next 100 years. This deal would see Saab help in the development of India’s own indigenous Light Combat Aircraft Tejas and the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). The promise of a Saab base in India and full technology transfer is a tempting one as it would mark a big success for President Modi’s “Make in India” program after tough negotiations with France and Dassault over the Rafale purchase.

Today’s Video

• NATO has conducted the maiden flight of NATO’s RQ-4 Block 40 Global Hawk as part of the Alliance Ground Surveillance program, marking an important milestone for them and Northrop Grumman.

MQ-1 vs. MQ-9
(click to view full)

The MQ-1 Predator UAV has become a stable of the Global War on Terror; the program is finishing up a major 5-year fleet expansion. Its successor, the larger MQ-9 Reaper UAV/UCAV (aka. ‘Predator B’), is designed to carry more ordnance while loitering over its coverage area for long periods.

Amidst all the gee-whiz, it’s worth recalling that these systems need the same things any other craft needs: maintenance, spares beyond initial buys, back-end and even in-field support, support for associated systems like sensors, etc. Hence a number of recent contracts, one of which may be related to the recently-publicized ability of Iraqi terrorists to intercept Predator signals…

Predator AAS-52 MTS turret
(click to view full)

Note that DID’s coverage includes contractor support of integral sub-systems like the UAVs’ surveillance and targeting turrets, but not the purchase of new drones or sub-systems. Unless otherwise indicated, all contracts are issued by the Headquarters Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH.

Contracts & Events

December 22/15: General Atomics will conduct logistical support for Predator (MQ-1) and Reaper (MQ-9) unmanned aerial systems for the US Air Force. The one year contract is worth $338.2 million. Work to be carried out includes program management, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, contractor field service representative support, inventory control point management, flight operations support, depot repair, and depot field maintenance. The MQ-1s and MQ-9s will also see sensors contractor logistics support provided by Raytheon for the year in a contract worth $49.4 million.

September 24/15: General Atomics – manufacturer of Predator and Reaper UAVs – will open a training facility for international customers of its unmanned aircraft, according to a company press release. The new ‘RPA Training Academy’ facility on Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota will ultimately aim to train up to 60 flight crews a year, using a US government-approved training scheme.

Dec 31/09: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in Poway, CA received a $266.1 million contract for program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contract engineering technical specialists, contractor inventory control point and spares management, depot repair, flight, operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, and CAMS/REMIS/CEMS data collection entry for the Predator/Reaper MQ-1 and MQ-9 unmanned aircraft system (UAS) program. At this time, $53.2 million has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028).

Dec 31/09: Raytheon Co in McKinney, TX received a $38.1 million contract to provide for CY 2010 contractor logistics support of the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper’s multi-spectral targeting system turrets. At this time, $12.6 million has been committed by the 703rd AESG/SYK at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH (FA8620-06-G-4041).

Sept 30/09: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. of Poway, CA received a $46 million contract for Linux operating systems, technical orders, improved display, and spares for the Predator/Reaper. At this time, the entire amount has been committed by the 703 AESG/SYK at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH (FA8620-05-GD-3028).

May 18/09: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems of Poway, CA receives a $9.8 million firm fixed price contract for Predator receiver terminals, installation, and software updates. At this time, the entire amount has been committed by the 703rd AESG/SYK at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH (FA8620-05-G-3028).

Subsequent media reports in December 2009 would reveal that standard-issue Predator UAVs were vulnerable to interception of their surveillance footage, using an inexpensive satellite receiver and low-cost SkyGrabber software. Some reports added that retrofits have been underway to fix this, beginning with deployed UAVs. See Wall St. Journal | Ars Technica | cnet | Defense Tech | John Robb’s Global Guerrillas | Flight International.

March 3/09: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems of San Diego, CA received a $168.4 million firm-fixed-price contract for program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contractor inventory control point and spares management, depot repair, flight operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, data collection/entry and numbered periodic depot maintenance for the Predator MQ-1 and MQ-9 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) program. At this time, the entire amount has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028).

Dec 30/08: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, CA received a $42.6 million contract for program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contractor engineering technical specialists, contractor inventory control point and spares management, depot repair, flight operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, and CAMS/REMIS/CEMS data collection/entry for the Predator/ Reaper MQ-1 and MQ-9 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) program. At this time, $42.6 million has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028 Delivery Order 0048).

Dec 29/08: Raytheon Co. in McKinney, TX receives $27.3 million to provide CY 2009 Contractor Logistics Support for the MQ-1 and MQ-9’s Multi-Spectral Targeting Systems. At this time, $4.1 million has been committed under this cost plus fixed fee contract by the 703rd Aeronautical Systems Group at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (FA8620-06-G-4041, #009).

Oct 30/08: General Atomics in San Diego, Calif., received a cost plus fee term contract for $177.1 million for program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contractor engineering technical services, contractor engineering technical specialists (formerly field support representatives), contractor inventory control point (formerly depot supply support) and spares management, depot repair, flight operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, CAMs/REMIS/CEMS data collection/entry and numbered Periodic Depot Maintenance (PDM) for the Predator/ Reaper MQ-1 and MQ-9 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) programs. At this time $163.1 million has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028 Delivery Order 003502).

MQ-1 Predator
(click to view full)

June 27/08: Raytheon Co. in McKinney, TX received a firm-fixed-price $11.4 million contract to provide Multi-Sensor System (Predator MTS-A and the Reaper’s Multi-Sensor System-B) support at American and overseas locations. It includes depot OEM(Original Equipment Manufacturer) spares and repairs, depot configuration management, technical manual OEM system source data and software maintenance, depot level contractor Field Services Representative (FSR) support and other functions. At this time $10 million has been committed by the 658th Aeronautical Systems Squadron at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (FA8620-06-G-4041, DO 0007).

Dec 21/07: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, CA received a contract for $67 million for program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contractor engineering technical specialists (formerly field support representatives), contractor inventory control point (formerly depot supply support) and spares management, depot repair, flight operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, CAMS/REMIS/CEMS data collection/entry and numbered Periodic Depot Maintenance for the Predator/ Reaper MQ-1 and MQ-9 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) program. At this time $50.3 million has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028 Delivery order 0035).

MQ-9, armed
(click to view full)

June 22/07: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in Poway, CA received a $69.4 million contract modification for program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contract engineering technical specialists, contractor inventory control point and spares management, depot repair, flight, operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, and CAMS/REMIS/CEMS data collection entry for the Predator/Reaper MQ-1 and MQ-9 unmanned aircraft system (UAS) program. At this time, $53.2 million has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028 Delivery Order 001503)

Dec 29/06: General Atomics in San Diego, CA received a $42.7 million cost-plus fixed-fee term contract. This contract delivery order includes all program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contractor engineering technical specialists (formerly field support representatives), contractor inventory control point (formerly depot supply support) and spares management, depot repair, flight operations support, reliability/maintenance enhancements, CAMS/REMIS/CEMS data collection/entry and numbered Periodic Depot Maintenance (PDM) for the Predator MQ-1 and MQ-9 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) program.

Work will be complete December 2007. At this time $38,099,885 has been obligated (FA8620-05-G-3028 Delivery Order 0015).

Dec 29/06: Raytheon Company in McKinney, TX received an $11.5 million cost-plus fixed-fee contract for Contractor Logistics Support of the Predator A and B Multi-spectral Targeting Systems (MTS). This contract includes program management, repairs and services, depot configuration management, technical manual system source data and software maintenance, engineering technical services, contractor field service representatives support, contractor inventory control point and spares management, depot-level repair, design and engineering reliability/maintenance enhancement, Core Automated Maintenance System/Reliability and Maintainability Information System/Maintenance Management Information System data collection/entry, and obsolescence management.

Work will be complete in December 2007. To date, $8.7 million has been obligated (FA8620-06-G-4041, #0003).

UAV TCS ground control trailer
(click to read about it)

March 15/06: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. in San Diego, CA received a $30.1 million cost-plus fixed-fee contract modification. This action will provide services necessary to perform Predator organizational maintenance of aircraft, Ground Control Stations, and Predator Primary Satellite Links. This work will be complete March 2007. The Air Combat Command Contracting Squadron at Langley Air Force Base, VA issued the contract (FA4890-05-C-0001/P00016).

March 13/06: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. in San Diego, CA received a $27.1 million cost-plus fixed-fee contract to provide total support to the for the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Predator B unmanned aircraft system programs. Specifically, this contract includes all program management, urgent repairs and services, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, contractor inventory control point (formerly depot supply support) and spares management, depot repair, flight operations support, engineering technical specialists (formerly field support representatives), reliability/ maintenance enhancements, CAMS/REMIS/CEMS data collection/entry, and numbered periodic depot maintenance.

Solicitations began September 2005, negotiations were complete March 2006, and work will be complete December 2006 (FA8620-05-G-3028, delivery order #0011).

Feb 10/05: General Atomics-Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, CA received an $8.3 million cost-plus fixed-fee contract to provide services necessary to perform Predator Organizational Maintenance for: aircraft, Ground Control Stations, and Predator Primary Satellite Links. The contractors also shall be responsible for Launch and Recovery Elements including contract aircrew for forward deployed operations. The contractor will be responsible for program management and providing support, following the basic requirements of AFI 21-101.

The principal place of performance is Indian Springs Air Force Auziliary Field, NV as well as various worldwide locations. Other key locations of performance are General Atomics-Aeronautical San Diego, CA, and the Indian Springs Auxiallary Airfield, NV. Total funds have been obligated. Solicitation began June 2004, negotiations were completed January 2005, and work will be complete by March 2006. The Air Combat Command Contracting Squadron at Langley Air Force Base, VA issued the contract (FA4890-05-C-0001).

Land-based SM-3 concept
(click to view full)

SM-3 Standard missiles have been the backbone of the US Navy’s ballistic missile defense plans for many years now, and are beginning to see service in the navies of allies like Japan. Their test successes and long range against aerial threats have spawned a land-based version, which end up being even more important to the USA’s allies.

In July 2008 the US Missile Defense Agency began considering a land-based variant of the SM-3, largely due to specific requests from Israel. Israel currently fields the medium range Arrow-2 land-based ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) system, and eventually elected to pursue the Arrow-3 instead of SM-3s. Once the prospect had been raised, however, the US government decided that basing SM-3 missiles on land was a really good idea. The European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense is being built around this concept, and other regions could see similar deployments.

EPAA & The SM-3 Option Aegis Ashore
(click to view full)

The European Phased Adaptive Approach aims to use a combination of naval and land-based missile defense systems, which hope to share a common architecture and missile set. The core physical component is a “deckhouse” enclosure, containing the command and control center and a BMD-enhanced SPY-1(D) radar that’s similar to those aboard US Navy destroyers and cruisers. The software will be taken from the Aegis combat system on US Navy ships, beginning with version 5.0.1 and upgrading over time. A connected vertical launching system building will contain 24 SM-3 missiles, which will become more advanced as newer variants are fielded.

The USA is building 3 Aegis Ashore sites: one test site in Barking Sands, Hawaii, USA, and sites in Deveselu Air Base, Romania and Redzikowo, Poland. The GAO estimates that building these sites and bringing them to operational status will cost the USA about $2.3 billion. Our own tracking includes R&D into land-based SM-3 options, and tracks obviously related categories in MDA’s shifting budget lines.

The European Phased Adaptive Approach

The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) currently envisions 4 phases:

EPAA Phase 1, 2011-2015

In 2011, the US Navy expected to have naval SM-3 Block 1A missiles and ships fully in place, on more BMD-capable ships than the 2 Atlantic Fleet destroyers available in 2009, to pair with land-based AN/TPY-2 radars that are also used in the THAAD system. Another 4 destroyers are being forward-deployed to Rota, Spain in FY 2014-2015. Unfortunately, naval SM-3 Block 1 missiles cannot cover the Czech Republic at all, and can offer only limited coverage for Poland.

The Obama administration bowed to Russian pressure and picked the THAAD system’s AN/TPY-2 radar as the system’s ground accompaniment, to limit the distance they could see into Russian airspace. The Russians simply saw weakness, and kept up the pressure, but couldn’t make any more headway. Turkey agreed to host the AN/TPY-2 radar near Diyarbakir in SE Turkey, though they added conditions that the data must not be shared with Israel.

This will be the only EPAA option until 2015, which is beyond the Obama administration’s current term of office. During that interim period, THAAD continues to receive upgrades. At sea, AEGIS BMD system 4.x is being rolled out beyond USS Lake Erie [CG 70], offering some capability improvements on board ship, and laying an open architecture foundation for future upgrades.

In parallel, NATO has fielded an initial version Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) command and control architecture. They declared an “interim” BMD capability in May 2012, after a successful multinational test.

ALTBMD will also have European components to draw upon, including the national early-warning system under development by France. In August 2012, Poland announced that it was pursuing its own national BMD system, which may mirror many of France’s components. France (11 systems) and Italy (6 systems) can also contribute with their land-based SAMP/T Mamba and its Aster-30 missile, which is designed to address threats in the SRBM (<1,000 km) class. On the naval front, the Netherlands is upgrading its 4 top-tier air defense frigates with ballistic missile tracking capability, and its ships are compatible with SM-3 missiles if they decide to purchase some. Elsewhere, Aster-30s are already found on advanced air defense destroyers: the Franco-Italian Horizon Class, and Britain's Type 45 Daring Class. The naval system hasn't been tested against ballistic missiles yet, but the systems could all be upgraded to do so. EPAA Phase 2, 2015-2018 In Parallel:
SAMP/T launch
(click to view full)

If progress continues per plan, 2015 would see advances on 2 fronts.

One front involves improved SM-3 Block 1B missiles, which will expand the range of coverage for American ships. Serious orders for the Block 1B missile began in 2011, but technical issues have delayed full production. That delay means that US Navy ships based in Europe will be competing with other priorities in Asia and around the USA, as they seek to host the new missiles. A slower phase-in that extends to 2018 now looks most likely.

The other element was to be a land-based “Aegis Ashore” site at Deveselu Air Base, Romania, hosting SM-3 missiles instead of Boeing’s longer-range, fixed-location GMD system. Aegis Ashore designs appear to have shifted from an easily-deployable configuration, toward high-investment fixed sites that are similar to the GMD program they replaced. The Romanian deployment would use SM-3 Block 1B missiles from an emplaced Mk.41 VLS launcher, and be controlled by a SPY-1D radar and AEGIS BMD 5.0.1 combat system. An interim setup was formally commissioned in October 2014.

If successfully deployed, this is a defense against short and medium range missiles (SRBMs & MRBMs), with some capability against intermediate range missiles in the 1,850-3,500 mile class (IRBMs). On the other hand, the location of these defenses still leaves central Europe mostly unprotected.

During Phase 2, NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) command and control network will be operational at an initial level. France, Italy, and possibly Poland will have armed land-based BMD systems of their own deployed, and it’s likely that ALTBMD compatible BMD-capable ships will be fielded. The Netherlands is already preparing its vessels for missile tracking and SM-3 hosting, and the Aster-30/ PAAMS combination is fielded on British, French, and Italian ships.

EPAA Phase 3, 2018- SM-3: EPAA phases
(click to view full)

Around 2018, America expects to deploy the longer-range, 21″ diameter SM-3 Block II missile, on ships and (if deployments have been accepted) on shore. The US MDA would add Redzikowo, Poland to its list of land-based sites, defending Northern Europe with SM-3 Block 1B & Block IIA missiles, controlled by an AEGIS BMD 5.1 combat system.

This system would be intended to kill SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM threats, with some capabilities against full intercontinental range missiles (ICBMs). Gen. Cartwright has stated that just 3 SM-3 Block II locations would be able to cover all of Europe, but that missile is an earlier-stage R&D effort, with all the expected implications for dates and certainty of capabilities.

EPAA Phase 4, 2020+

Effectively cancelled.

The USA was going deploy a new Next-Generation Aegis Missile (SM-3 Block IIB) design, to improve performance and begin to field a credible anti-ICBM capability. Technical issues became a serious problem, once experts concluded that the initial sites picked for EPAA aren’t all that helpful for defending the USA. A liquid-fuel booster could be used to boost interceptor speeds, but that isn’t safe to use on ships. Even though the best place to defend the USA against an ICBM launched from Iran is from the middle of the North Sea. Now throw in a planned development schedule defined by a wild-guess political promise, rather than solid information. The whole thing was a mess, and in March 2013, it was “restructured” into into an R&D program by the Pentagon.

Aegis Ashore AN/TPY-2
(click to view full)

Making these things happen requires a number of additional steps. AN/TPY-2 radars will provide initial services during Phase 1, and will continue to play a supplemental role thereafter in both EPAA and NATO’s ALTBMD.

Beyond Phase 1, the USA has shifted to a larger and more permanent basing structure, which removes some of the benefits of switching away from GMD. The US Missile Defense Agency is building an “Aegis Ashore” test complex near Moorestown, NJ, and another at its missile defense testing center at Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. The Hawaiian complex is hosting a land-based Mark 41 launcher, a 4-story building with a SPY-1 radar, and three 125-foot tall test towers.

Poland is being considered for Aegis Ashore deployment in 2018, but the country is beginning to diversify its options. The September 2011 agreement with the USA is still in force, but Poland is determined to have its own missile defense infrastructure, and may choose to place their bets on a parallel NATO/ European system. Their other option would likely involve American PATRIOT and/or THAAD systems.

Beyond Europe

Aegis Ashore may spread beyond Europe. In the Pacific, Japan is already deploying SM-3s at sea, and may find land-based counterparts useful. Its neighbor South Korea shares Japan’s worries about North Korea’s evil and semi-stable regime; the ROK intends to load shorter range SM-6 missiles on its AEGIS destroyers, is buying and deploying Patriot PAC-2 GEM+ missiles, and has contracted with Israel for “Green Pine” air and missile defense radars. Its cruiser-size KDX-III AEGIS destroyers could be modified for a ballistic missile defense role, but land-based SM-3s linked to air and naval systems offer an option that doesn’t require naval upgrades.

The other country that has been linked to land-based SM-3s had a more complicated set of choices, and possible rationales. See Appendix A’s coverage of Israeli deliberations, which ended with a decision to deploy their own Arrow technology instead.

The Missiles SM-3 seeker: target!
(click to view full)

With a maximum range of about 300 miles/ 500 km, the Standard Missile 3 Block I (SM-3) has just 1/5th to 1/6th the reported reach of GMD’s Ground Based Interceptors, but a longer reach than current mobile land options like THAAD. SM-3 has 4 stages. The booster motor and initial stage launch the missile, and take it out of the atmosphere. Once it goes “exo-atmospheric,” the 3rd stage is used to boost the missile higher, and also corrects its course by referencing GPS/ INS locations. The final stage is the LEAP kill vehicle, which uses infrared sensors to pick out the target, then guides itself in to ram it. That target is expected to be an enemy ballistic missile, but America’s shoot-down of its own ailing satellite in 2008 showed that the same technology can be used against any low earth orbit object.

The introduction of Raytheon’s SM-3 Block II variant will widen the missile’s diameter from 13.5″ to 21″, greatly extending its range and speed. That means better performance against longer range missiles that move faster, and offer different trajectories. Block II weapons will add the ability to handle longer-range, higher-flying IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, usually 3,000-5,000 km range), and even offer some hope against global-strike threats like ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile) warheads. SM-3 Block IIA is currently expected to debut around 2015, but testing and other requirements mean it won’t be part of EPAA until 2018 or later.

Contracts & Key Events Europe scenario

Because of the intertwined nature of the EPAA system, many contracts will be covered elsewhere. The AN/TPY-2 radar has its own article, as does the THAAD theater air defense system the TPY-2s were originally developed for. Standard Missile family contracts also have their own FOCUS article, as does the ubiquitous Mk.41 vertical launching system that will be part of the Aegis Ashore complex.

Unless a contract of these types specifically notes dedicated assets for EPAA/Aegis Ashore, or is directly germane to key program technologies, they will not be covered here.

FY 2015 – 2016

NSF Devesulu opens.

December 22/15: Raytheon has been awarded a $2.35 billion contract to deliver 52 SM-3 Block IB missiles. The contract finalizes a preliminary one for 44 missiles valued at $541 million. The addition of 8 further missiles comes as the US military is increasing its stocks of SM-3s in the wake of increased missile threats, and orders by foreign allies of its weapons systems.

December 10/15: Raytheon has been awarded a not-to-exceed $543,337,650 undefinitized contract action modification to a previously awarded contract to manufacture, assemble, test, and deliver 17 Standard Missile-3 Block IIA missiles. The deal, initially set at $87 million, has now been extended to $543.3 million. The news comes after the US Navy and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced the second successful flight test on Tuesday. The SM-3 is the only ballistic missile killer to have the capability to be launched from both land and sea, and is being jointly funded and developed by US Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces. Future development of the program will see the interceptor be tested for the European missile defense system and hopeful deployment in Poland by 2018.

Oct 10/14: Romania. NATO formally inaugurates Naval Support Facility Devesulu, the new Aegis Ashore facility in Romania. Capt. William Garren becomes the site’s 1st commander, and construction continues on site. It’s scheduled to become fully operational in 2015. Stars and Stripes, “Navy to commission missile defense base in Romania” | Romnaia TV, “Vin americanii! SUA preia vineri baza de la Deveselu” [picture is wrong] | Iran’s PressTV, “US will commission missile base in Europe amid tensions with Russia” | Russia Today, “US commissions ‘crucial’ NATO missile shield facility in Romania”.

NSF Devesulu, RO opens

FY 2014

GAO & CRS reports cite software issues, spectrum frequency conflict in Poland, question operating cost estimates and cost-sharing; Initial Turkish deployment was very ragged; 1st launch from AA facility; DDGs deploying; SM-3 Block IIA passes CDR. NATO BMD concept
click for video

June 2/14: DDG Deployment. USS Ross [DDG-71, uses BMD 3.6.1] steams out of Norfolk to its new base in Rota, Spain, where it will join USS Donald Cook [DDG-71, uses BMD 4.0.2] as part of EPAA efforts. Sources: WVEC Norfolk, “Photos: 2nd Navy destroyer leaves Norfolk for Spain”.

May 22/14: SAMP/T. France and Italy carry out a test of their own at the French DGA’s Biscarosse test range, with SAMP/T Mamba systems from each country firing an Aster-30 missile and destroying a target drone. The larger story is the successful interconnection of their systems, within a broader test campaign that also involved French air force Crotale SHORADS batteries, French Army man-portable Mistral VSHORADS, and a French E-3F AWACS plane, all connected to the French 3D Defense Management Center (CMD3D) and control centers at Lyon and at Mont de Marsan.

France is building a national air defense and anti-missile system, which needs to inter-operate with NATO. Italy is another natural partner for missile defense, as they’re also using Aster-30 missiles on land in SAMP/T Mamba systems, and using them at sea in Franco-Italian Horizon Project frigates. Sources: French DGA, “Vidéo : reussite d’un double tir SAMP/T franco-italien” | defense-aerospace, “Surface-to-Air Campaign at Biscarosse: “Barrois” Squadron from Saint Dizier Fires First Mamba, Demos Interoperability”.

May 20/14: AA CTV-01. The 1st SM-3 launch from an Aegis Ashore facility takes place at the Pacific Missile Range Facility test site in Kauai, Hawaii. It’s a live SM-3 Block IB launch, but not a live intercept, since they’re only using a simulated target. The main goal is ensuring that all systems work when they’re transferred to land. Sources: US MDA, “Standard Missile Completes First Test Launch from Aegis Ashore Test Site” | Lockheed Martin, “Aegis Ashore Achieves Major Test Milestone for Worldwide Ballistic Missile Defense System” | Raytheon, “Aegis Ashore Launches Standard Missile-3 for First Time”.

1st Aegis Ashore launch

April 11/14: GAO Report. The Pentagon has been reluctant to develop a life-cycle cost estimate for BMD in Europe, on the dubious grounds that it isn’t a separate program. that’s why GAO-14-314 concerns itself with EPAA’s costs and implementation issues.

PATRIOT and AN/TPY-2 deployments have already shown weaknesses. The Turkish PATRIOT batteries faced roadblocks involving deployment when they arrived in December 2011. Other issues included training to different NATO engagement procedures, information-sharing uncertainties, soldiers deployed to cold mountaintops in tents that couldn’t handle the conditions, and poor local roads that could be dangerous. Build-out of longer-term infrastructure won’t even begin until mid-2014. The TPY-2 radar deployments to Turkey (2011) and CENTCOM (2013), meanwhile, still can’t share information and work together, because that hasn’t been worked out.

For Aegis Ashore, previous reports (q.v. April 26/13) have mentioned the AN/SPY-1D radar’s conflicts with local civil frequency usage. That’s largely worked out now in Romania, but not in Poland. Indeed, the Poles are about to issue commercial licenses for key radar frequencies, which would complicate things even more. It doesn’t get easier to handle all of this when US Strategic Command, European Command, MDA, and the Navy all claim roles in each deployment.

On the cost side, the US Navy will take over maintenance and operation of both European Aegis Ashore sites in 2018, but they haven’t developed a joint 25-year O&M estimate. There are also gaps concerning other BMD elements. The Army is estimating $61 million to support the Turkish TPY-2 radar, and $1.2 billion over 20 years. This assumes contractor support throughout, but different arrangements might be better and cheaper. A full analysis is expected in FY 2015. THAAD batteries have an estimated O&M cost of $6.5 billion over 20 years, but that $325 million per year involves basing in the USA. Costs for basing in Europe are expected to be higher. How much higher? We don’t know, because the US MDA and US Army can’t agree on how to do the analysis.

April 9/14: Speed up? Vice Adm. James Syring of the US Missile Defense Agency responds to speculation by saying that they could speed up the deployment of Poland’s Aegis Ashore installation in response to Russia’s invasion of Crimea, but:

“We’d need some additional funds in the budget, and we’d need to move up the development of the [SM-3 Block] IIA,”

The first part of the statement is true. Given the likely cost of the SM-3 Block 1B missiles, and known costs for the facility, it will take somewhere between $400 – 500 million to fully pay for an operational site. The second part of Syring’s statement, however, is wishful thinking. Unless development is being slow-walked and funds are the primary bottleneck, extra funds have a very limited effect in moving up a project’s development. The SM-3 Block IIA isn’t the type of project that will get much benefit. Sources: Defense News, “US May Accelerate Deployment of Missile Defense System in Poland”.

April 8/14: CRS Report. The Congressional Research Service updates their backgrounder covering the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system, which includes the EPAA. They confirm DID’s charts regarding these areas, though CRS doesn’t divide general naval BMD from the land-based European implementation.

They do have some pointed questions for Europe, however, proposing a calculation of relative American vs. European total contributions to European missile defense, and asking “Why should European countries not pay a greater share of the cost of the EPAA, since the primary purpose of the EPAA is to defend Europe against theater-range missiles?” That’s a different attitude.

Meanwhile, the FY 2015 budget cuts 132 SM-3 missiles from the FY 2014 budget’s 2015-2018 buys, and it will also change the composition and makeup of the naval BMD fleet via slower upgrades, and the mothballing of 4 BMD cruisers. Congress will want to know what effect that will have on overall capabilities, but asking the military will be pointless.

April 1/14: GAO Report. GAO-14-351 focuses on acquisition goals and reporting for missile defense in general. Most of the key findings for EPAA have already been covered recently, but the program is concerned about flight test delays and cancelations affecting Aegis Ashore, while adding that a 17 month delay in the modernized Aegis system is at a problematic point:

“Discovery of software defects continues to outpace the program’s ability to fix them; fixes may have to be implemented after software is delivered.”

March 25/14: AA Poland. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training, Moorestown, NJ receives a $93 million contract, exercising options for the core radar and equipment in Poland’s Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS), and providing multi-year procurement funding for Aegis Weapon System (AWS) MK 7 equipment sets.

All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 budgets and FY 2013 shipbuilding budgets. Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (85.5%), Clearwater, FL (13.1%), and Akron, OH (1.4%), and is expected to be complete by September 2021. US NAVSEA in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-14-C-5114).

March 21/14: AA Poland. Raytheon IDS in Sudbury, MA receives a $45 million modification for 1 AN/SPY-1D(V) Transmitter Group and select Missile Fire Control System MK 99 equipment, which will become part of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System in Poland.

Work will be performed in Andover, MA (78.3%); Sudbury, MA (19.3%); Canada (1%); Moorestown, NJ (0.9%); and Norfolk, VA (0.5%), and is expected to be completed by March 2016. All funds are committed immediately, using FY14 funds. US NAVSEA in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-13-C-5115).

March 14/14: GAO report. The GAO releases GAO-14-248R, regarding the USA’s EPAA plans for defending Europe from ballistic missiles. The bottom line? There are a lot of moving parts, they’re being developed in parallel, and some of them aren’t moving as fast as others. Which means the system as a whole is going to be a bit behind. The MDA isn’t interested in acknowledging that, but the GAO makes a strong case by citing all the promised capabilities that are being removed from the beginning of each phase.

Phase 1, 2011. A TPY-2 radar is deployed in Turkey, but C2BMC systems still haven’t tested scenarios where they’re managing more than 1 TPY-2 radar, and GAO says that “Key capabilities for Phase 1 will not be fully available until 2015.”

Phase 2, 2015. The biggest issue is C2BMC S8.2 software, which has been delayed until 2017. It was supposed to improve the integration of incoming missile tracks for Phase 2, and provide a Lock-On After Launch firing capability for AEGIS BMD systems. Without it, radars like the TPY-2 will perform below their planned potential, and so will the missiles. Especially since the Romanian site’s Aegis Ashore system will only be an interim version, which will also wait until 2017 before it has all of the initially promised capabilities. On the mobile front, THAAD’s ability to distinguish incoming warheads in debris fields won’t reach desired capability until 2017, either.

Phase 3, 2018. The 2-year delay of full Phase 2 Aegis Ashore capability leads one to wonder if AEGIS BMD 5.1 will really be ready for 2018 deployment. The same might be said of the SM-3 Block 2A missile, even though MDA says it’s on track. Meanwhile, C2BMC is the biggest issue again. S8.4 is meant to let AEGIS BMD systems intercept incoming missiles without using their own radars, thanks to faster integrated tracks, more precise tracking, and resilience in more “complex” conditions. It won’t arrive until 2020 or later, forcing the MDA to deploy an S8.2.x build instead. That lateness will affect THAAD as well as Aegis Ashore, and THAAD’s own upgrades will happen in a timeframe that means any issues found in testing will delay them until after Phase 3 has begun.

Dec 27/13: Aegis multiyear. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training in Moorestown, NJ receives a multi-year $574.5 million firm-fixed-price contract for Aegis MK 7 equipment sets. All confirmed orders will be used in destroyer production and refits (DDG 117 – 123), but there’s 1 option that can be used for Poland’s Aegis Ashore complex, along with associated engineering services. Lockheed Martin confirms that the core of all sets will be Aegis Baseline 9, which includes missile defense features.

$308.4 million in FY 2013 shipbuilding funds is committed immediately, to enable advance buys in bulk. Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (85.5%); Clearwater, FL (13.1%); and Akron, OH (1.4%), and is expected to be complete by September 2021. As one would expect, this is a sole source contract under 10 U.SC 2304(c)(1). US NAVSEA in Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-14-C-5114). See also Lockheed Martin, Jan 7/14 release.

Oct 31/13: SM-3-IIA. Raytheon and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries have completed the SM-3 Block IIA’s Critical Design Review (CDR), and the USA and Japan have agreed on workshare arrangements that allocate development responsibility between each country. SM-3-IIA is the key new piece in EPAA Phase 3, and the successful CDR keeps it on track for flight test in 2015.

Raytheon made the announcement at the 2013 AIAA Multinational Ballistic Missile Defense Conference in Warsaw, Poland. Sources: Raytheon, “New, Larger Standard Missile-3 Moves From Design to Testing” | Raytheon, Oct 31/13 release.

Oct 28/13: AA Romania. American, Romanian and NATO officials break ground on the Aegis Ashore facility at Devsulu AB, based on the September 2011 accord between the United States and Romania.

Romania’s SC Glacial PROD SRL has already done $3.3 million in site-activation work, including temporary offices, container housing units, a warehouse, and a vehicle inspection area. US Navy, “US, Romania begin work on Aegis Ashore missile defense complex”.

FY 2013

SM-3 Block IIB canceled; European multi-system test; GAO Report; MBDA’s Aster-30 SAMP/T and USA’s GBI advance in parallel. 2013 BMD conference
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July 18/13: AA Romania. KBR announces a $134 million Aegis Ashore build-out contract from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Europe District. The 269-acre site on Romania’s Deveselu Air Base will include a 4-story radar deckhouse structure relocated from New Jersey, security fencing, plus facilities and infrastructure including roads, support buildings, communications, security and utilities.

April 26/13: GAO Report. The GAO looks at the Missile Defense Agency’s full array of programs in report #GAO-13-342, “Missile Defense: Opportunity To Refocus On Strengthening Acquisition Management.” With respect to EPAA/ Aegis Ashore, the report reiterates concerns from the GAO’s March 30/12 and April 20/12 reports (q.v.): unstable cost baselines, concurrent testing & development, and questions about the ability to use the SPY-1’s radar frequencies without creating spectrum interference problems for the host nations.

The program office sees its greatest risks as (1) integration testing in Hawaii and New Jersey, (2) potential shipping or transportation delays, and (3) construction delays for the operational and test facilities. The disconnect stems from a fundamental disagreement about the project’s level of risk. With the program citing similarity to sea-based Aegis BMD as a reason for low risk. If the GAO’s concerns re: spectrum issues come true, however, the similarity will drop quickly. An analysis for Romania is due in 2013, but Poland will present its own independent situation. Meanwhile, knowledge gained from flight tests that begin in 2014 can’t be used to guide construction. Under a new plan, even Poland’s 2018 site will be ordering advance construction components in January 2014.

The GAO estimates the cost to develop and build the Polish facility at $746 million, from R&D to operational status. As such, the MDA reported costs of all 3 Aegis Ashore facilities is $2.3 billion. The GAO wonders about the US MDA’s portfolio balance, given R&D needs for multiple missiles, plus full build out of Aegis Ashore and full production of the SM-3 Block IB, plus operation, support, and testing for the iffy GMD system. The GAO recommends Analysis of Alternatives studies as one way to help manage that portfolio.

April 18/13: Poland. US State Department official Frank Rose (Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance) speaks to the Polish National Defense University in Warsaw about Aegis Ashore. Poland is looking to build a national missile defense architecture, so Rose stresses the important of interoperability with NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) command-and-control system (q.v. May 21/12). He adds that:

“The Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement between the U.S. and Poland entered into force in September of 2011. This agreement places a land-based interceptor site, similar to Phase 2, in Redzikowo, and includes the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. This EPAA Phase 3 site is on schedule and on budget for deployment in the 2018 timeframe. The interceptor site here in Poland will be key to the EPAA. Not only will it protect Poland itself, but when combined with the rest of the EPAA assets, Phase 3 will be able to protect all of NATO Europe against ballistic missile threats from the Middle East.”

March 15/13: Following North Korea’s 3rd nuclear test attempt, the new US Secretary of Defense announces that the USA will add 14 more ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, AK and Vandenberg AFB, CA, boosting the total number from 30 back to the 44 planned by the previous administration. At the same time, they’re re conducting Environmental Impact Studies for a potential additional GBI site in the United States.

They’re paying for this by “restructuring” the SM-3 Block 2B Next Generation Aegis Missile program, whose 2020 deployment date was never realistic (vid. April 20/12 GAO report). It’s effectively canceled.

Japan will continue to collaborate with the USA on the SM-3 Block 2A program, and they’ll get a 2nd AN/TPY-2 radar on their territory. Pentagon AFPS | Full Speech Transcript | Boeing | CS Monitor re: Russian angle.

No EPAA Phase 4

March 6/13: SAMP/T. MBDA’s SAMP/T system is operated by a joint French & Italian crew, and successfully intercepts a 300 km (short range) tactical ballistic missile target. Eurosam describes it as:

“…the first SAMP/T firing test in a NATO environment, close to what would be an operational use… [within] the alliance ALTBMD programme…. DGA sensors did provide the firing units and the command levels long-range detection data on A L16 radio network. DGA MI, in Bruz, acted as a L16 [Link-16] national C2, interfacing in L16 both with NATO BMDOC [in Ramstein, Germany], via L16 JREAP and with SAMP/T.”

The SAMP/T system is now widely deployed in France & Italy, with 15 land-based units equipped, alongside naval use of its Aster-30 missile from the countries’ Horizon Class frigates. We won’t be covering it here beyond this initial milestone, but it will be part of NATO’s missile defenses going forward. France’s DGA [in French] | Eurosam.

Feb 11/13: GAO Report. GAO-13-382R: “Standard Missile-3 Block IIB Analysis of Alternatives” throws cold water on the idea that the SM-3 Block 2B can defend the USA from bases in Poland or Romania. The geometry isn’t very good, and success may require a boost-phase intercept. Those are very tricky, and have limited range, because you have to hit the enemy missile within a very short time/ distance.

Some members of the military think it’s possible, at an initial estimated budget of $130 million extra. The problem is the tradeoffs. Liquid propellants can boost speed, but are unsafe on Navy ships due to the fire risks. On the other hand, the middle of the North Sea offers much better missile intercept geometries. Maybe Block 2B shouldn’t be land-based at all, but then why replace Block 2A in such an expensive way? MDA still needs to set the future missile’s performance requirements and limits. Where should the tradeoffs be made?

This brings us to the GAO’s point about the MDA developing the SM-3 Block IIB under a framework that dispenses with a good chunk of the usual paperwork, including an Analysis of Alternatives. On reflection, this is more than a bureaucratic point driven by “records show that programs doing the paperwork usually fare better.” One of the EPAA’s key underlying assumptions is now in question, and the proposed solution must now be in question as well. Is the best solution for land-based European missile defense still SM-3 Block IIB? What are the tradeoffs vs. using a system like the NRC’s recommended GMD-I from the USA (vid. September 2012 entry), and making Block 2B a ship-deployed missile? Does Block 2B even make sense now? Without good answers regarding capability, options, and maintainability, how does the MDA decide – or pick the right winning combination among the Block 2B competitors? A full AoA could improve those answers, and hence the odds of a smart pick.

Dec 21/12: Radar components. Raytheon IDS in Sudbury, MA receives $19.7 million for firm-fixed-price delivery order for radar components: Stabile Master Oscillator ordnance alteration kits, Radio Frequency Coherent Combiner ordnance alteration kits and associated spares, and material and installation services in support of the modernization effort on Navy ships and Aegis ashore units. This contract includes options which could bring the contract’s cumulative value to $22.9 million.

Work will be conducted in Norfolk, VA (63%); Andover, MA (27%); and Burlington, MA (10%), and is expected to be complete by June 2015. $19.7 million will be obligated at time of award. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-11-G-5116, #0020).

Dec 21/12: AA Romania. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives a $57.3 million contract modification for an Aegis Weapon System in support of DDG 116 and the purchase of material assemblies to support Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Host Nation #1, Romania.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (85%), Clearwater, FL (14%), and Akron, OH (1%), and is expected to be complete by January 2017. All contract funds in the amount of $57,336,086 are committed immediately. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington DC manages the contract (N00024-09-C-5110).

Dec 20/12: Trainer SDD. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors (MS2), Moorestown, NJ receives a $20.7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price contract for the Aegis Ashore Team Trainer. This trainer will be designed to meet the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS) individual watch station and watch team training, qualification and certification requirements. This contract will also fund information assurance requirements for the trainer, an information assurance training course, an instructor operator training course, and travel associated with the trainer’s development.

$4.7 million are committed immediately. Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ and is expected to be complete in October 2014. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 by the US Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division in Orlando, FL (N61340-13-C-0007).

Dec 10/12: AA Romania. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors (MS2) in Moorestown, NJ receives a $45.9 million a contract modification for Aegis Ashore Engineering Agent engineering support and skid integration for “host nation” (which would be Romania) though “this is not a Foreign Military Sales [FMS] acquisition.” If the US military is buying it, it isn’t an FMS, even if they’re preparing to base it at a foreign location. This award raises the total contract’s value to date from $209.9 million to $255.8 million.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ through Dec 31/15, and $7.8 million FY 2013 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds will get things going. The US Missile Defense Agency in Dahlgren, VA manages this contract (HQ0276-10-C-0003, PO 0044).

Nov 5/12: Networking. Boeing in Huntington Beach, CA receives a $16.7 million firm-fixed-price and time-and-material contract for gigabit ethernet data multiplex systems. They’ll be used in the DDG modernization program, new ship construction, and Aegis Ashore Systems. This contract includes options which could bring its cumulative value to $30 million.

Work will be performed in Camarillo, CA (57%), Smithfield, PA (33%), and Huntington Beach, CA (10%), and is expected to be complete by May 2015. $475,975 will expire by the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12. This contract was procured on a limited competition basis via the FBO.gov and Navy Electronic Commerce Online websites, with 2 proposals solicited and 2 offers received. The Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, Dahlgren, VA manages this contract (N00178-13-C-2000).

Oct 2/12: C2 Integration. ALTBMD. NATO’s NCI announces that “Ensemble Test 2” has been successful, using NATO’s Combined Federated Battle Lab Network (CFBLNet) as a test bench. Participants included 12 laboratories from 5 Nations across 2 continents, and the systems included:

• An Italian AN/TPS-77 transportable long range radar, built by Lockheed Martin
  
• French and Italian land-based SAMP/T systems, using MBDA’s Aster-30 missile
  
• Italy’s Horizon Class high-end air defense frigate, which uses the PAAMS combat system and Aster-30 missile
  
• US, Dutch and German PATRIOT missile defence systems
  
• A Dutch ADCF (De Zeven Provincien Class) high-end air defense frigate
  
• A German SAM Operations Centre from Germany,
  
• An American Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence System
  
• The USA’s C2BMC (Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications) system
  
• The AN/TPY-2 radar that accompanies THAASD, and is part of EPAA
  
• The USA’s huge Shared Early Warning System (SEW) radars
  
• NATO’s Air Command and Control System (ACCS), the Air Command and Control Information Services (AirC2IS), CRC System Interface (CSI), and Interim Command and Control (ICC) system.

Firing missiles is the easy part. Having different command and control systems work together, which is required for any sort of coordinated defense, is difficult. Ensemble Test 3 is scheduled for May-June 2013. NATO NCIA.

FY 2012

NATO declares interim defensive capability; EPAA won’t really defend USA; SM-3 Block IIs may not meet EPAA schedule; Costs keep rising; Poland independent, but not out. Operational
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Sept 25/12: AA Romania. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Sudbury, MA a $43.6 million contract modification “for the production and integration of an Aegis Weapon System (AWS) and Missile Fire Control System in support of DDG 116, and an AWS in support of Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Host Nation #1” (HN-1, i.e. Romania). Raytheon makes the AN/SPY-1 radar transmitters and MK99 FCS illuminators.

Work will be performed in Andover, MA (80%), Sudbury, MA (15%), and Portsmouth, RI (5%), and is expected to be complete by September 2017. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington DC manages the contract (N00024-09-C-5111).

Sept 14/12: AA Romania. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems & Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives an $18.5 million contract modification for the production and integration of an Aegis weapon system in support of DDG 116, and the purchase of material assemblies to support Aegis ashore missile defense system Host Nation 1 (Romania).

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (85%); Clearwater, FL (14%); and Akron, OH (1%); and is expected to complete by January 2017. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington DC manages the contract (N00024-09-C-5110).

September 2012: NRC report. The US National Research Council publishes “Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives.” The report staff have deeply impressive backgrounds related to missile defense, and their main conclusion is that very fundamental reasons of geography and physics make boost-phase defense systems a waste of time.

This includes AEGIS BMD systems. The report explains very clearly that the window for stopping a warhead before it has enough energy to hit “defended” areas makes it difficult to impossible to position a ship in a place that allows even future SM-3 Block II missiles to hit their target.

It also states that EPAA Phase IV is not likely to be an effective way to defend the United States, and recommends that the USA make changes to its own GMD system and radar set. They’re not advocating the dismantling of EPAA, just saying that the USA should have a system in which EPAA is about Europe’s defense, and the USA has a system that doesn’t depend on it.

Aug 30/12: AA Kauai. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ gets an $8.3 million contract ceiling increase, to provide Aegis Ashore Engineering Agent (AAEA) long-lead-time materials for the complex being built at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) in Hawaii. This brings the total contract value from $200.1 to $209.3 million.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ through April 30/13, and $5 million in FY 2012 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds will be used as initial funding. The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in Dahlgren, VA manages the contract (HQ0276-10-C-0003, PO 0038).

Aug 10/12: CRS Report. The US Congressional Research Service issues its latest update of “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress” [PDF]. Key issues highlighted or examined by Mr. O’Rourke include the cost of forward-deploying 4 destroyers to Spain, the FY 2013 budget’s proposal to slow the 2013-2020 ramp-up rate for BMD ships, the potential for European contributions to naval BMD, the inability to simulate China’s DF-21 ship-killing ballistic missile, SM-3 Block IIB risks, and concurrency and technical risk in the AEGIS BMD program generally.

With respect to the Spanish deployment (vid. Feb 16/12 entry), Rota can accommodate all of the new personnel, but infrastructure upgrades will be required. In total, the Navy estimated that it would incur approximately $166 million in up-front military construction, personnel, and maintenance costs; a small annual increase in operations and maintenance; and personnel costs of approximately $179 million – though really, you have to pay them wherever they are.

Aug 6/12: Poland fixing its “mistake”. Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski states that Poland is prepared to create its own anti-aircraft and missile defense system as part of a NATO shield, at a cost of $3-6 billion. With respect to the USA’s defensive plan, which Poland hasn’t rejected yet:

“Our mistake was that by accepting the American offer of a shield we failed to take into account the political risk associated with a change of president. We paid a high political price. We do not want to make the same mistake again.”

The missile and air defense system proposed by the Polish president would target all short and some medium range missiles, just like the initial 2 stages of the EPAA. The system would be part of NATO’s broader air defense systems, as well as the emerging NATO ALTBMD Missile Defense shield. Germany and France are specifically mentioned as potential partners, and MBDA’s naval PAAMS system and Aster-30 missiles have already been converted to a land equivalent of their own. Their SAMP/T is the logical competitor if Poland wants to buy a non-American system. Its weakness is that it wouldn’t be able to grow into a counter against IRBM or ICBM missiles, but that could make it a very good complement to an American system that did. Relations with Israel are close, but David’s Sling is a joint development with Raytheon, and past American behavior has been to use its weapon export rules against potential competitors. Read “Alone, If Necessary: The Shield of Poland” for full coverage of Poland’s WISLA and NAREW air defense competitions.

June 27/12: FTM-18 test. USS Lake Erie [CG-70] with its AEGIS BMD 4.0.1 system successfully launches an SM-3 block IB missile to hit a separating ballistic missile target. This is the same configuration that will be used for the land-based Phase 2 of the USA’s European missile defense plan, and represents an important success for the SM-3 block IB after the FTM-16 failure. This firing makes the AEGIS & SM-3 combination 23/28 in intercept tests so far (82.1%), vs. 31/40 (77.5%) for all other missile defense system intercept tests. US MDA | Lockheed Martin | Raytheon.

June 7/12: AA Romania. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors (MS2) in Moorestown, NJ gets a contract ceiling increase of $9.8 million, increasing the total contract value to $197.4 million from $187.6 million. Under this modification, they’ll provide Aegis Ashore Engineering Agent Phase 2B support for the Host Nation 1 (Romania) skids and skids accessories.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ, and Akron, OH through Oct 31/13. $6.9 million in FY 2012 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds will be used as incremental funding. The US Missile Defense Agency in Dahlgren, VA manages this contract (HQ0276-10-C-0003, PO 0032).

June 4/12: Aegis Ashore. URS Group, Inc. in San Antonio, TX wins a $129.5 million firm-fixed-price task order to build the Aegis Ashore test complexes in Moorestown, NJ and the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Barking Sands, Kauai, HI.

In Moorestown, they’ll build a radar deckhouse and support building, and do related work to test the government-furnished, government-installed MK41 missile launchers. The Pacific Missile Range facility involves full site construction of a radar deckhouse, support building, launch pad, electrical power, potable water, sewer connection, synthetic natural gas system, and communications systems, in addition to testing their success in integrating government-furnished, government-installed MK41 missile launchers. The task order also contains 1 unexercised option, which, if exercised, would increase cumulative task order value to $130 million.

Work will be performed in Kauai, HI (72%), and Moorestown, NJ (28%), and is expected to be complete by November 2013. Three proposals were received for this task order by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (N62742-09-D-1174, HC02). See also Aug 24/10 entry.

May 21/12: NATO ALTBMD. NATO leaders declared that the Alliance now has an interim ballistic missile defence capability, via a basic ALTBMD command and control system capability which has been tested and installed at Headquarters Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany.

At present, ALTBMD is just a C2 network. NATO members need to provide sensors and interceptors to connect to the system. Full Operational Capability isn’t expected until the end of the current decade, or the early 2020s. NATO.

ALTBMD interim capability

April 20/12: GAO report. The US GAO releases report #GAO-12-486, “Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency.” The implications for missile defense belie the bland title:

“To meet the presidential 2002 direction to initially rapidly field and update missile defense capabilities as well as the 2009 announcement to deploy missile defenses in Europe, MDA has undertaken and continues to undertake highly concurrent acquisitions. Concurrency is broadly defined as the overlap between technology development and product development or between product development and production. While some concurrency is understandable, committing to product development before requirements are understood and technologies mature or committing to production and fielding before development is complete is a high-risk strategy that often results in performance shortfalls, unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test problems. It can also create pressure to keep producing to avoid work stoppages… During 2011, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, the Aegis Standard Missile 3 Block IB, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense experienced significant ill effects from concurrency.

…Aegis Ashore began product development and set the acquisition baseline before completing the [Preliminary Design Review]. This sequencing increased technical risks and the possibility of cost growth… The program has initiated procurement of components for the installation and plans to start fabricating two enclosures called deckhouses – one for operational use at the Romanian Aegis Ashore installation and one for testing at the Pacific Missile Range Facility – in fiscal year 2012, but does not plan to conduct the first intercept test… until fiscal year 2014. Further, the program plans to build the operational deckhouse first, meaning any design modification identified through system testing… will need to be made on an existing deckhouse and equipment. As we have previously reported, such modifications on an existing fabrication may be costly.”

March 30/12: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs” for 2012. For Aegis Ashore, RDT&E costs have increased from $835.1 million in April 2010 to $1,418.6 million as of October 2011. The reconstitutable deckhouse design for the sites had not been included in its baseline, and the addition of hardware for a 3rd site in Poland also had to be paid for.

GAO sees concurrency risks from the program’s decision to begin system development before the preliminary design review, and from its plan to buy operational components before testing is done. the Navy defends their practice by saying that all of these systems are in advanced testing or deployed on Navy ships already. The program’s last milestone was a Critical Design Review in December 2011, and flight tests aren’t expected to begin before Q2 2014. The 1st “deckhouse” with radar, missiles, etc, is expected to be ready in December 2015, and the 2nd by December 2018. GAO:

“The SPY-1 radar requires modifications for its use on land and other changes may be necessary due to host nation radar frequency issues… In addition, the maturity of SM-3 Block IB may be overstated because some of its component technologies have not been flight tested or have experienced failures in testing. The multimission signal processor also faces development challenges, and the Defense Contract Management Agency has identified its schedule as high risk. We have previously reported that a significant percentage of its software still needs to be integrated.”

March 30/12: SAR. The Pentagon’s Selected Acquisitions Report ending Dec 31/11 includes elements of EPAA:

“Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) – Program costs decreased $3,596.4 million (-3.1%) from $122,362.6 million to $118,766.2 million, due primarily to a reduction in the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile production rate (-$1,247.2 million), the elimination of seven AN/TPY-2 radars (from 18 to 11) (-$1,237.2 million), and the placement of the Sea Based X-band (SBX) radar in limited test and contingency operation status (-$666.3 million). There were additional decreases for the reduction of three THAAD batteries (from 9 to 6) (-$540.8 million), reductions in Special Programs funding (-$408.2 million), a reduction of Aegis Standard Missile-3 Block IB missiles in FY 2013 (-$298.1 million), cancellation of the Airborne Infrared Program (-$239.3 million), and reductions in the Directed Energy Program (-$194.2 million). These decreases were partially offset by the application of revised escalation indices (+$684.8 million), increases to the Israeli Cooperative Program for FY 2011-2012 (+$217.8 million), increased construction estimates for Romania and Poland Aegis Ashore sites (+$213.0 million) [emphasis DID’s], and increases for Iron Dome in FY 2011 (+$205.0 million).”

Program costs

March 29/12: AA Romania. BAE U.S. Combat Systems in Minneapolis, MN receives a $23 million contract modification for MK 41 Vertical Launching System mechanical modules and related equipment and services for DDG 116 and Aegis Ashore, Host Nation One (Romania). Contract modification efforts includes requirements to procure MK41 VLS mechanical systems, production of support material, interim support parts, and equipment in support of DDG51-class new construction, and Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Systems requirements.

Work will be performed in Aberdeen, SD (43%); Farmingdale, NY (19%); Aiken, SC (15%); Fort Totten, ND (10%); York, PA (7%); Minneapolis, MN (5%); and Louisville, KY (1%). Work is expected to complete by September 2015. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-11-C-5301).

March 28/12: Beyond Europe? Hurriyet Daily News reports that EPAA could soon have other regional counterparts:

“The US seeks to expand its missile systems to Asia and the Middle East by building regional shields against ballistic missiles, similar to the NATO shield already in Europe. A senior Pentagon official says the Obama administration will hold talks with South Korea, Japan, Australia and Gulf Cooperation Council countries.”

Feb 23/12: AA Romania. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Sudbury, MA receives a $106.5 million modification to previously awarded contract for the production of an AN/SPY-1D-V radar transmitter group for Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Host Nation 1 (Romania), as well as 2 AN/SPY-1D-Vs and a MK 99 Mod 14 targeting illuminator to equip the future DDG 116 destroyer.

Work will be performed in Andover, MA (80%); Sudbury, MA (15%); and Portsmouth, RI (5%), and is expected to be complete by September 2017. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contracts (N00024-09-C-5111).

Feb 18/12: Turkey(s). During meetings with NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu states the TPY-2 radar based at Diyarbakir (vid. Sept 3/11) must not have any of its data sets shared beyond NATO, with a specific reference to Israel. The radar is positioned in a way that makes it easy to see into Iran, for early detection of ballistic missile launches. Voice of America | UPI.

Feb 16/12: Phase 2 ships. The US Navy announces the 4 Arleigh Burke Class guided-missile destroyers which will be forward deployed to Rota, Spain in FY 2014 and 2015. See also DoD Buzz.

“The four include three from Norfolk, Va; USS Ross, USS Donald Cook, and USS Porter, and one from Mayport, Fla., USS Carney. The ships are in support of President Obama’s European Phased Adaptive Approach to enhance the security of the European region… Ross and Donald Cook will arrive in fiscal 2014 and Carney and Porter in fiscal 2015.”

Nov 1/11: Radars. The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) awards Raytheon IDS of Woburn, MA a maximum $307.6 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract. Under this new contract, Raytheon will maintain software required to operate “the X-band family of radars,” and perform and Ballistic Missile Defense System test planning, execution and analysis. Discussions with Raytheon personnel confirmed that the funding applies to the XBR radar on the SBX naval platform, as well as their AN/TPY-2 radars (THAAD, EPAA, deployed in Israel & Japan), and a “Ground Based Radar Prototype” that they’re working on as a technology demonstrator.

Work will be performed in Woburn, MA from Nov 1/11 through Oct 31/13, and the MDA’s FY 2012 research, development, test and evaluation funds will be used to fund initial orders. The MDA at Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract (HQ0147-12-D-0005).

FY 2010 – 2011

Europe grapples with BMD; Czechs out, Turkey in; Aegis Ashore shifts the plan and the costs; Progress report. (click to view full)

Sept 15/11: Progress report. The White House offers an update on progress made so far on its European missile defense plans. By Phase:

Phase 1: “In March of this year the USS Monterey [CG-61] was the first in a sustained rotation of ships to deploy to the Mediterranean Sea in support of EPAA. Phase One also calls for deploying a land-based early warning radar, which Turkey recently agreed to host as part of the NATO missile defense plan.”

Phase 2: “This week, on September 13, the United States and Romania signed the U.S.-Romanian Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. Once ratified, it will allow the United States to build, maintain, and operate the land-based BMD site [and SM-3 deployment] in Romania.”

Phase 3: “Poland agreed to host the [SM-3] interceptor site in October 2009, and today, with the Polish ratification process complete, this agreement has entered into force.”

Russia: “As an initial step, NATO and Russia completed a joint ballistic missile threat assessment and agreed that the [NATO-Russia Council] would resume theater missile defense cooperation. The United States and Russia also continue to discuss missile defense cooperation through a number of high-level working groups at the State and Defense Departments.”

Sept 9/11: Aegis Ashore. The US Missile Defense Agency in Dahlgren, VA awards a $115.5 million sole source cost-plus-award-fee/ cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification to Lockheed Martin MS2 in Moorestown, NJ, for continued Aegis Ashore Combat System adaptation efforts, site planning, transportation planning, technology initiatives and studies. This award of contract line item number (CLIN) 0001, and increase in the amounts for CLINs 0011 (material) and 0012 (travel), increases the total contract value to date from $61.2 million to $176.7 million.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ, through Sept 30/12. FY 2011 research, development, test and evaluation funds will be used to incrementally fund this effort (HQ0276-10-C-0003, PO 0019).

Sept 2/11: Turkey in. Turkey has agreed to emplace an AN/TPY-2 early warning radar, facing Iran and linked to US Navy systems via Cooperative Engagement Capability. Turkish reports place it near Diyarbakir in SE Turkey, which also hosts Patriot missile batteries. Col. David Lapan tells Stars & Stripes that the agreement has some further required approvals to clear, but “The hope is to have it deployed by the end of this year.” Zaman Dis Haberler [in Turkish] | Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance | Stars & Stripes | Russia’s RIA Novosti.

Turkey

Aug 23/11: Phase 3. Raytheon Missile Systems Co. in Tucson, AZ receives a $9.8 million sole-source, cost-plus-award-fee contract modification. The CLIN 0008 option, “Future Upgrades and Engineering Support,” will help the Missile Defense Agency execute technical analysis for the Aegis BMD 5.1/SM-3 Block IIA combination, which is critical to PAA Phase 3. Exercising CLIN 0008 increases the total contract value from $276.7 – $286.5 million.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ through Sept 30/16, and will be incrementally funded by FY 2011 research, development, test, and evaluation funds. Though the SM-3 Block IIA is a cooperative program with Japan, this is not a foreign military sales acquisition. The US MDA in Dahlgren, VA manages the contract (HQ0276-10-C-0005, PO 0015).

July 6/11: DSB Report. In an open letter, the US Defense Science Board aims to dispel impressions that they recommended against the SM-3, which by its nature is a mid-course or terminal phase interceptor:

“The DSB concluded that the Missile Defense Agency is on the right track in developing European Phased Adapted Approach (EPAA) options, including continued evolution of the SM-3 family of missiles… The DSB also examined the potential in the EPAA context for EI [Early Intercept] in regional defense against short-range missiles before threat payloads could be deployed, and concluded that this was not a viable option because of technical constraints… The fact that this form of EI is not viable in shorter-range regional applications does not imply that either SM-3 family interceptors or the EPAA concept are flawed… MDA is on the right track in pursuing this capability for national missile defense, and examining the potential application in regional defense as a function of the range of threat missiles.”

June 23/11: CRS Report. The US Congressional Research Service releases the latest update of “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress” [PDF]. Key excerpts:

“Some observers are concerned – particularly in light of the EPAA – that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. They are also concerned that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for… BMD operations could strain the Navy’s ability to provide regional military commanders with Aegis ships for performing non-BMD missions… MDA states that SM-3 Block IAs have a unit procurement cost of about $9 million to $10 million, that SM-3 Block IBs have an estimated unit procurement cost of about $12 million to $15 million, and that SM-3 Block IIAs have an estimated unit procurement cost of about $20 million to $24 million.”

June 15/11: Czech Republic. The Czech Republic formally abandons its proposed role in the U.S. “Phased Adaptive Approach” to missile defense. Defense Minister Alexander Vondra told visiting Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn that his country no longer wanted to participate in the American system, but would continue working within NATO on potential European defenses. Stars & Stripes.

Czech out

April 15/11: Testing. Flight Test Standard Missile-15 (FTM-15) begins to test the European Phased Adaptive Approach architecture, firing an SM-3 Block 1A missile against an intermediate-range (officially, 1,864 – 3,418 miles) target, based on AN/TPY-2 ground-based radar data, before the USS O’Kane (DDG 77, equipped with AEGIS BMD 3.6.1) could pick the target up using its own radar. Initial indications are that all components performed as designed, and the missile recorded the 21st successful AEGIS BMD intercept in 25 tries.

The target missile was launched from the Reagan Test Site, located on Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, approximately 2,300 miles SW of Hawaii. The AN/TPY-2 radar, which is also used as part of the THAAD missile system, was located on Wake Island, and crewed by Soldiers from the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command. It detected and tracked the missile, then sent trajectory information to the 613th Air and Space Operations Center’s C2BMC(Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications) system at Hickam Air Force Base, HI. That was relayed to USS O’Kane, sailing to the west of Hawaii, which launched the SM-3-1A missile about 11 minutes after target take-off. O’Kane’s own AN/SPY-1 radar eventually picked up the incoming missile itself, and controlled the missile until impact.

As an important sidebar, the 2 demonstration Space Tracking and Surveillance Satellites (STSS), launched by MDA in 2009, successfully acquired the target missile, providing stereo “birth to death” tracking of the target missile.

FTM-15 was less dramatic than the 2008 satellite kill using an SM-3, but it’s equally significant. The successful full integration of ground and naval defenses, remote launch, and supplementary satellite track confirmed that EPAA Phase I, which has already deployed, works. It did so even though launch on remote track was supposed to wait for AEGIS BMD 5.1, and IRBMs were supposed to wait for SM-3 Block II. Instead, the test also combined to extend the current system’s proven capabilities, while validating the difficult connections that make a missile defense system more than the sum of its parts, and proving out an important early warning element (STSS) in the system. US MDA | Lockheed Martin | Raytheon | Lexington Institute.

April 3-18/11: The Russian Question, Take 2. Russia’s NATO envoy Dmitry Rogozin describes the issue of NATO-Russian missile defense cooperation as “a complicated matter, but it is not hopeless.” Nonetheless, differences run very deep. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov roiled the waters recently when he said that:

“We insist on only one thing: that we’re an equal part of [a joint missile defense arrangement]. In practical terms, that means our office will sit, for example, in Brussels and agrees on a red-button push to start an anti-missile, regardless of whether it starts from Poland, Russia or the U.K.”

It’s not 100% clear if he meant veto power over launches, though it certainly sounds that way. In response, Sen. Mark Kirk [R-IL] sent a letter to President Obama, co-signed by 38 Republican senators. Excerpt:

“In our view, any agreement that would allow Russia to influence the defense of the United States or our allies, to say nothing of a “red button” or veto, would constitute a failure of leadership… ask for your written assurances that your Administration will not provide Russia with any access to sensitive U.S. data, including early warning, detection, tracking, targeting, and telemetry data, sensors or common operational picture data, or American hit-to-kill missile defense technology…”

They’re not likely to get those things, but it’s a warning shot that any agreement along these lines would face a Senate backlash, and become a 2012 election issue. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen also poured cold water on the concept, saying “We are thinking about two systems – one NATO’s and one Russian – that will cooperate and exchange information to make us more secure.” Bloomberg re: Lavrov | Agence France Presse | right-wing Heritage Foundation | Russia’s ITAR-TASS | Moscow Times re: NATO | The Telegraph (UK) | Voice of Russia re: Rogozin | AEI’s Weekly Standard (incl. full text of Senators’ letter).

March 24/11: GAO Report. The US GAO issues report #GAO-11-372: “Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Accountability.” Key excerpts:

“In 2010, MDA was able to meet or exceed its delivery goals for several MDA activities, such as missile defense upgrades to Aegis ships… MDA finalized a new process in which detailed baselines were set for several missile defense systems… [but] GAO found its unit and life-cycle cost baselines had unexplained inconsistencies… DOD has not fully implemented a management process that synchronizes European missile defense acquisition activities and ensures transparency and accountability. Without key management and oversight processes, there is a limited basis for oversight, and there is a risk that key components will start production before demonstrating system performance… GAO makes 10 recommendations for MDA to strengthen its resource, schedule and test baselines, facilitate baseline reviews, and further improve transparency and accountability. GAO is also making a recommendation to improve MDA’s ability to carry out its test plan. In response, DOD fully concurred with 7 recommendations. It partially concurred with 3…”

Feb 7/11: Turkey. With Turkey seen to be demurring on proposals to host one or more American AN/TPY-2 radars, as part of a European missile defense shield, US Senators Jon Kyl [R-AZ], James Risch [R-ID], Mark Kirk [R-IL] and James Inhofe [R-OK] have sent a joint letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, asking him to consider Georgia as one of several potential alternate hosts.

Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister David Dzhalagania says the country has not formulated a concrete position, but thinks the proposal is interesting. The very thing that makes it interesting to Georgia – a major US asset that America would feel compelled to protect if hostilities begin again with Russia – is also the potential down-side to its placement in that country. On the other hand, a radar there would be very well positioned to monitor Iran. Civil Georgia | Georgia’s The Messenger | Russia’s RIA Novosti.

Dec 27/10: AA Kauai. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives a $65.6 million contract modification for production of the Aegis Weapon System, tooling, test equipment, and associated technical services for the Aegis Ashore test site at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Kauai, Hawaii.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (87%), and Clearwater, FL (13%), and is expected to be complete by October 2014. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-09-C-5110).

Nov 3/10: AA Kauai. Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp. in Overland Park, KS receives a $6.5 million for firm-fixed price Task Order under an indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for architect-engineer services in support of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. They’ll prepare plans, specifications, cost estimates for design-bid-build requests for proposal contract documents, and other related services for FY 2011.

Work will be performed in Barking Sands, Hawaii, and is expected to be complete by June 2011. One proposal was received for this task order by NAVFAC Hawaii in Pearl Harbor, HI (W912GB-09-D-0062, SR02).

Aug 24/10: AA Kauai. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors (LM MS2) in Moorestown, NJ, is being awarded a sole-source, not-to-exceed $69.8 million cost-plus-fixed-fee letter contract to serve as the “Aegis Ashore” Engineering Agent. In accordance with the AA Program of Record. Contract finalization is expected to be complete by Nov 19/10. The work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ, and the performance period is from August 2010 through April 2011.

This project is part of a $278 million program to increase missile testing on Kauai. LM MS2 will provide the engineering and necessary material to support the design of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex; the deployment sites; the integration of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS) into the removable deckhouse; the installation, test and checkout of the AAMDS at these sites; and initial site maintenance and logistics support during site transfer to the lead service. This unfinalized contract will allow LM MS2 to assist in the development of the Aegis Ashore Combat System (AACS) requirements, to include supporting program planning, element capability specification, and concept of operations development. LM MS2 will begin the AACS adaptation, design efforts associated with the configuration of the AAMDS in the removable structure, and designing the enclosures for transport.

LM MS2 will begin those activities associated with validation and verification of the deckhouse requirements and will facilitate system requirements review in September 2010, and system design review in January 2011. FY 2010 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds will be utilized to obligate $10.1 million for this effort. The Missile Defense Agency manages this contract (HQ0276-10-C-0003). See also Honolulu Star-Advertiser.

April 1/10: SAR. The Pentagon releases its April 2010 Selected Acquisitions Report, covering major program changes up to December 2009:

“Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) – Program costs decreased $10,068.9 million (-9.7%) from $102,912.4 million to $92,843.5 million, due primarily to the following: cancellation of the Kinetic Energy Interceptor and Multiple Kill Vehicle Program (-$5,304.2 million); cancellation of the Airborne Laser Program (-$2,634.7 million); elimination of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System follow-on constellation (-$1,972.0 million); transition of the sensor content to procurement (-$1,223.7 million); general infrastructure reductions (-$1,216.7 million); revised estimates for special classified programs (-$1,155.4 million); application of revised escalation indices (-$1,169.1 million); reduced Ground-Based Interceptor inventory due to the change of European site architecture (-$88.0 million); and infrastructure reductions (-$1,216.7 million). These decreases were partially offset by the change in European architecture to Aegis Ashore (+$2,493.5 million) [emphasis DID’s] and the consolidation of targets and revised Integrated Master Test Plan (+$1,646.4 million). In addition, procurement costs of $9,520.3 million, which were previously excluded from the SAR due to its pre-Milestone B Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)-only status pursuant to section 2432 of title 10, United States Code, were added as an adjustment to the program in accordance with Congressional direction. RDT&E and Military Construction (MILCON) costs of $14,340.1 million were also added as adjustments to reflect the addition of two years to this program, which is considered Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) limited and has been allowed to add two years of cost to the program with each biennial budget. These adjustments are not considered to represent cost growth.”

Program costs

Dec 7/09: Europe BMD. Aviation Week notes several undercurrents involved in discussions around Europe’s missile defense.

One is “consequences of intercept,” which are certainly less than the consequences of a missile strike, but could well fall outside the launching country. Another is the compressed time frames, which means authority will reside in the commander – who will that be, and where will that commander be based?

A 3rd question is how the proposed SM-3 phases mesh with European NATO plans, including NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program command and control hub, and proposed land-based radars. Which are going to be an issue all their own, since the system requires them, and the American TPY-2s may not be the only players. Finally, there’s the question of whether European navies will join the program, which would further blue the question of whether this is an American system with NATO ancillaries, or a NATO system with American assets.

Nov 17/09: Early intercept. Northrop Grumman announces a 3-month $4.7 million task order from the US Missile Defense Agency, under an indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity Joint National Integration Center Research and Development Contract. Under the Sept 29/09 task order, the firm will help the MDA integrate and demonstrate an early-intercept capability using existing SM-3 and GBI missiles. This kind of capability is especially relevant for forward-based SM-3s.

The Early Intercept effort aims to address renewed focus by the U.S. Department of Defense on dealing with large raids and countermeasures. Early Intercept will demonstrate an integrated architecture of early warning sensors, including space, airborne, land and sea; regional fire control and battle manager systems; and secure communications. This integrated architecture will enable current systems to engage threats earlier in the battle space to improve protection against large raids and facilitate “shoot-look-shoot” opportunities.

Northrop Grumman will begin by assessing existing sensor and battle management systems’ ability to support missile interception in the difficult boost phase, including technology developed for programs like the now-canceled Kinetic Energy Interceptor and battle management projects. The firm will plan demonstration experiments, leading toward the design and development of an experimental, plug-and-play architecture for battle management, command and control.

FY 2008 – 2009

Israeli interest in land-based SM-3; EPAA plan unveiled. SM-3 launch from CG 70
(click to view full)

Sept 17/09: Plan B – EPAA. The Obama administration announces revised plans for its European missile defense architecture. Instead of positioning Boeing’s Ground-Based Interceptors, which could intercept even the longest-range ballistic missiles, they choose an architecture based around the SM-3.

According to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. James Cartwright, the new plan begins with the current deployment of Patriot PAC-3 point defense systems in Europe, which may be adjusted. Those adjustments will bear watching, as early indicators of seriousness.

• In 2011, the US Navy is expected to have naval SM-3 Block 1A missiles and ships fully in place, on an expanded fleet of BMD-capable ships versus the 2 Atlantic Fleet destroyers available today. Unfortunately, naval SM-3 Block 1 missiles cannot cover the Czech Republic at all, and can offer only limited coverage for Poland. This will be the only option until 2015, which is beyond the Obama administration’s current term of office.

• 2015 would see progress on 2 fronts. One is SM-3 Block 1B missiles, and an improved AEGIS BMD system that will expand the range of coverage for American ships. The other would be land-based SM-3s in an easily-deployable configuration, based in Europe, instead of the longer-range Boeing Ground Based Interceptors. Political support for that land-based deployment is likely to become a political flash point, again.

• The final iteration would take place in 2018 or so, with deployment of the much larger SM-3 Block II missile, on ships and (if deployments have been accepted) on shore. Gen. Cartwright stated that no more than 3 SM-3 Block II locations would be able to cover all of Europe, but cautions that it’s an earlier-stage R&D effort, with all the expected implications for dates and certainty of capabilities.

Cartwright and Gates also added several additional considerations that affected their decision. One was Russian concerns about having large X-band BMD radars that could peer deeply into Russia. By using shorter-range, directional TPY-2 radars deployed in the Caucasus, Iranian aggression can also be hedged without covering Russia so deeply – something that allies like Poland may not necessarily see as a plus. The other, more significant Russian concern was that the GBI missile was powerful enough to be fitted with a nuclear warhead, and become an offensive MRBM with very low warning time. American denials did little to dissuade the Russians, since one must plan on the basis of capabilities rather than intent. That concept becomes technically ridiculous with an SM-3, removing that issue from the table.

Another issue for the USA was cost and flexibility. Gen. Cartwright cited a cost-per-missile of $3.3 million for a Patriot PAC-3, about $9 million for THAAD v1, $9.5-10 million for SM-3 Block I, about $13-15 million estimated for SM-3 Block II… and $70 million for the GBI interceptors. In a global environment that was seeing rapid growth of medium-range offensive missiles, that cost disparity had implications for strategic flexibility, as well as budgets. According to Gates and Cartwright, the GBI deployment was really designed to deal with 3-5 incoming intercontinental missiles, rather than larger salvos of medium-range missiles that are now possible. GBI is also silo-based and so immobile, as opposed to mobile ships and redeployable land-based SM-3s. The question is whether the USA will actually increase its planned buys of SM-3 in response, something that Information Dissemination’s report suggests hasn’t really been thought through yet. The US Navy’s next 5-year budget plan will tell the tale.

With that cost and architecture change comes a 3rd consideration: greater capacity for allied burden-sharing. Several other nations deploy and will deploy AEGIS ships that could be upgraded to SM-3 BMD capability, including Japan (Kongo class, being upgraded), South Korea (KDX-III), Spain and Australia (F100), plus the non-AEGIS F124 frigates fielded by Germany and the Netherlands. The SM-3 missile has already been exported, and could easily be exported more widely. Gen. Cartwright cited the potential for development of a common architecture linking land and naval systems, which would be deployed in Europe, Asia, Israel, and elsewhere. The architecture is being developed to incorporate non-American systems, and Israel’s IAI/Boeing Arrow was specifically cited. Gates added that talks along these lines had begun with Arab Gulf states, who are already developing their own missile defense preparations based on regional command and control systems, Patriot missiles, and possibly THAAD and MBDA’s comparable Aster-30 SAMP/Ts.

Meanwhile, THAAD missiles are still scheduled to deploy to Europe in 2009, as part of operational testing, and the system is still planned for roll-out as the Army’s area-defense weapon. The USA is also still interested in adding 2-stage capability to its GMD/GBI interceptors in Alaska and California, in order to improve their speed and increase their range. The big winner in these changes, however, is unquestionably Raytheon’s SM-3. Pentagon: Gates/ Cartwright press conference | Pentagon: DoD/ Czech MoD press conference | Aviation Week | Aviation Week Ares | Defense Tech called it early | Information Dissemination | Lexington Institute.

Switch to EPAA

August 18/09: Onto land. In a presentation at the 2009 Space and Missile Defense Conference & Exhibition in Huntsville, AL, Raytheon announces that it is developing a land-based system SM-3 system that would work with THAAD’s Raytheon-made AN/TPY-2 long range radar, and could be ready as early as 2013.

The presentation states that this solution could provide Israel a near-term solution to counter ballistic missiles from Iran, given the deployment of TPY-2 radars in Israel by the US government. It is also reportedly under consideration for use in Europe as the missile component of planned deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic.

It’s no accident that this comes just as Boeing announces a “mobile GMD” proposal for Europe by 2015, and Lockheed Martin has gone farther by submitting a modified THAAD proposal to the US Missile Defense Agency for consideration in the 2011 budget. Lockheed Martin has already invested privately funded R&D into a 21″ wide THAAD variant that would nearly double the Army interceptor missile’s range. Current SM-3s are 13.5″ in diameter, current THAADs are 14.5″, and the proposed SM-3 Block II being developed in partnership with Japan will also be 21″ in diameter. It would appear that a competition for the forward-deployed theater defense role may be brewing. Arutz Sheva | Reuters | Aviation Week re: shifts in doctrine | Aviation Week re: THAAD | Jerusalem Post re: Boeing’s “mobile GBI”.

April 27/09: Study. Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun reports that the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has started studying a new missile defense system capable of launching the Standard Missile-3 from the ground.

Aug 4/09: Study. Colin Clark of DOD Buzz publishes a short video interview with Raytheon VP of advanced missile defense and directed energy Mike Booen. The interview took place at the 2009 Paris Air Show, and the topic is the $50 million FY 2010 US military budget request to study land-based SM-3 deployment.

July 17/08: Israel. Aviation Week reports that the US Missile Defense Agency is considering a land-based variant of the SM-3 Standard missile, at Israel’s request:

“SM-3 prime contractor Raytheon is examining a range of options — including a moveable, but not highly mobile, system that could fill Israel’s needs. Very few modifications would be needed for the missile and some tweaks would be required in the command and control system. The system would employ the same vertical launch modules, in an eight-pack configuration, used in the Aegis ship-based system.”

Appendix A: EPAA – The Rationale for The Switch GBI Missile loading
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When it was first announced in 2009, land-based deployment of SM-3 missiles was seen as a political move. That’s partly true. The proposed GBI missile is so powerful that it could be fitted with a nuclear warhead, and become a serviceable MRBM itself. This made Russia very uneasy. Then, too, a massive American investment in fixed site deployments, in countries that could cave in to pressure and ask the USA to leave later on, was both politically and financially problematic.

There’s also a valid military rationale in the European theater for replacing the longer-range Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system used in the USA itself, with the shorter-range and seemingly less-capable SM-3. The bottom line is more missiles, in semi-mobile locations. SM-3 missiles cost about 80% less than GMD’s GBI missiles, and the ground-based infrastructure of adapted Mk.41 vertical launchers and mobile radars is also less expensive than GMD’s full multi-silo complex and fixed radar. Now throw in the ability to move those assets once they’re built, and to quickly bulk up defenses using similar systems deployed at sea. That’s very useful against an enemy who is building a lot of MRBM/IRBM missiles, and could easily use a mass rush offense to overwhelm limited numbers of GBI interceptors – possibly coupled with terrorist operations against their fixed GMD launch complexes.

All of the rationales regarding mobile options vs. fixed sites evaporated when the US MDA switched to the Aegis Ashore configuration, which shares all of the same drawbacks inherent to fixed GMD deployments. The cost benefits remain intact, however, and so does the rationale for deploying more missiles in theater.

Meanwhile, the switch had political costs. Countries like Poland and the Czech Republic are out of range for naval SM-3 Block 1 coverage, and would require too many THAAD batteries on land. That had prompted the push for GBI missiles, and those governments had held firm in the face of domestic political controversy. The USA’s revised plans dealt them a political setback, and delayed meaningful local missile defenses until around 2015 or later. The shift was somewhat jarring, and the Czech Republic subsequently dropped out of US missile defense plans. In 2012, Poland followed with a declaration that it would deploy its own parallel system.

Israel’s Possible Rationales Arrow test concept
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Statements from Raytheon indicated that Israel was already doing research into a land-based SM-3, despite its existing Patriot PAC-2 GEM+ and Arrow-2 architecture. In the end, however, Israel maintained of its focus on an improved “Arrow-3” interceptor, and America agreed to support that program in the FY 2010 budget. Those developments leave dim odds for land-based SM-3s in Israel.

The question is why they were interested in the first place. Several possibilities exist that might justify an Israeli desire to retain an active Arrow missile fleet, and still deploy the SM-3s.

One is the naval defense option. While Israel has apparently decided on a different direction, its proposed LCS-I frigates would have possessed the ability to fire SM-3 missiles, and their proposed MEKO derivatives might still have that if they’re equipped with strike-length Mk. 41 VLS launchers. The Arrow missile has not been integrated with the Mk.41 VLS, and the program has not described navalization plans.

The 2nd possible justification for an Israeli SM-3 buy revolves around and command-and-control developments. Like the LCS-I, any new Israeli frigates firing an SM-3 would need to link to an anti-ballistic capable radar for guidance. Israel already fields ABM-capable land radars like its “Green Pine” system, and the USA has reportedly moved manned AN/TPY-2 THAAD radars into Israel as additional insurance against a Second Holocaust perpetrated by Iran. Linkage of a naval missile’s guidance to those kinds of land platforms would involve many of the same modifications required by a fully land-launched and controlled SM-3, and statements by America’s General Cartwright say that the USA’s land-based anti-missile command and control systems that will work with land-based SM-3s, are also being developed to include the Arrow.

The 3rd possible justification is range. The SM-3 boasts a range about 5x longer than the Arrow-2, at 300 miles vs. 50-60 miles. A tripartite system of SM-3, Arrow-2, and Patriot missiles would effectively offer the 3 layered tiers required by a country of Israel’s size: national defense/ first line of defense, defense of key regions/ second shot, and defense of specific sites/ final attempt.

Fourth, deployment would coincide with a growing shift in the USA to focus on “ascent-phase intercept” of medium (MRBM) and intermediate-range (IRBM) missiles. If the launchers are deployed close enough to the firing missile, interceptions become possible sometime between the boost and mid-course phases during entry into space, right before the target missile can begin deploying decoys. The Middle East’s compressed distances are a threat, due to low warning times and the resulting hair-triggers. They might also be an opportunity.

Finally, the SM-3 is an active production item for the USA and Japan, which leverages the infrastructure created by a large-scale, full-rate production set of programs. This means that SM-3s can be produced far faster than additional Arrow missiles. If developments in Iran are leading Israel to conclude that it needs to deploy many more theater-range defensive missiles within a short period of time, the THAAD and Arrow programs are unlikely to be able to handle that request due to the stage they’re at, and the industrial framework around them. That would leave the SM-3 as Israel’s only realistic rapid plus-up option.

In the end, as noted above, Israel decided to improve its Arrow system and create the Arrow-3, with funding assistance from the USA. The country clearly considers ballistic missile defense to be a strategic technology capability, has yet to purchase ships that would make naval SM-3 deployment possible, and have already spent the money to integrate the Arrow system with Israel’s air defense architecture. The SM-3’s land-based progress will happen elsewhere.

Additional Readings Background: EPAA Systems

• US MDA – Aegis Ashore.

• US MDA – Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense: Future Capabilities.

• DID FOCUS – Raytheon’s Standard Missile Naval Defense Family.

• NATO – Ballistic missile defence.

• DID – Alone, If Necessary: The Shield of Poland. Poland will be fielding a national air and missile defense system as a complement to EPAA – and also as insurance against its failure.

Official Reports

• US National Research Council – Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives. Tremendous in-depth look at US missile defense, from September 2012.

• US GAO (April 11/14, #GAO-14-314) Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Address Implementation Issues and Estimate Long-Term Costs for European Capabilities.

• US Congressional Research Service (#RL33745) – Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress [PDF]. Last update April 8/14.

• US GAO (April 1/14, #GAO-14-351) – Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and Improving Accountability.

• US GAO (Apr 26/13, #GAO-13-432) – Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition Management. Notes a civil wireless spectrum issue with EPAA’s radars.

• US GAO (Feb 11/13, #GAO-13-382R) – Standard Missile-3 Block IIB Analysis of Alternatives. Argues why they should do one. They cancel it instead.

• US GAO (April 20/12, #GAO-12-486) – “Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency.

• US GAO (March 24/11, #GAO-11-372) – Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Accountability. Includes EPAA.

News & Views

• Breaking Defense (Oct 17/13) – Why Russia Keeps Moving The Football On European Missile Defense: Politics. “Ironically, moving the technology further away from Russian borders could increase the potential for its successful use against Russian missiles. So, whether or not Russian technical concerns could ever really be assuaged must be questioned.”

• Commentary Magazine (December 2009) – The Missile Defense Betrayal. The revised European missile defense plan was not universally well-received on the political front, with many conservatives sharply critical. Commentary Magazine’s article includes coverage of the political dynamics at work in Poland and the Czech Republic.

• Lexington Institute (Nov 5/09) – Aegis Ashore: The Navy’s New Missile Defense Mantra.

FC-1/ JF-17, armed
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The FC-1/ JF-17 Thunder is a joint Chinese-Pakistani project that aimed to reduce Pakistan’s dependence on western firms for advanced fighters, by fielding a low-cost multi-role lightweight fighter that can host modern electronics and precision-guided weapons. It isn’t a top-tier competitor, but it represents a clear step up from Pakistan’s Chinese MiG-19/21 derivatives and French Mirage III/V fighters. This positioning addresses a budget-conscious, “good enough” performance market segment that the West once dominated, but has nearly abandoned in recent decades.

Pakistan has fielded JF-17s in squadron strength, with more on order and a Block II R&D program nearing completion. India’s competing Tejas fighter is overcoming project delays by looking to foreign component sources, but Pakistan and China remain out front with their offering, even though they began their project much later than India did. Pakistan and China have even set up a joint JF-17 marketing agency to promote export sales, which hasn’t paid off as quickly as they had hoped, but it would be unwise to count them out just yet…

The JF-17 Thunder, aka. FC-1 Fierce Dragon JF-17 at IDEAS 2008
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The JF-17/FC-1 is a $20 million class fighter designed as a co-operative venture between Pakistan and China to replace Chinese A-5C (massively modified MiG-19), F-7P (MiG-21+), and French Mirage 3/5 aircraft in Pakistan’s fleet. China also has options to produce them, but has made no firm decisions and seems unenthusiastic. It’s a comparable peer for India’s still-under-development LCA Tejas, Taiwan’s F-CK-1 Ching Kuo fighters, and South Korea’s F/A-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer & light fighter.

F-20 (1980s)

The design itself is fairly conventional, resembling a somewhat boxy F-20. A drag chute can be installed at the base of the rudder, in order to make landings easier and shorter. Power will be provided by the RD-93 derivative of the MiG-29’s RD-33 engine; it’s proven and widely used, but known to leave smoke trails. Future models may see the engine replaced with China’s WS-13, an RD-93 copy with some modifications. Avionics involve a modern “glass” cockpit of digital screens, using Chinese technologies, and commercial processors. Reports indicate that aircraft software coding was done in the commercial C++ language, rather than a military language like Ada.

Farnborough array
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Conflicting reports exist regarding its databuses: MIL-STD-1553, or the more advanced MIL-STD-1760. That will affect its range of usable weapons, and GPS-guided weapons in particular benefit from the -1760 databus.

China’s KLJ-7 mechanically-scanned array serves as the radar, despite past media references to a deal with Thales, or to the Selex Galileo’s Grifo. Grifo already equips Pakistan’s F-7s (Grifo-7), and some of its Mirage III/Vs (Grifo M3/M5), and Selex Galileo’s own materials [PDF] describe the Grifo S7 as “The version selected for the JF-17 aircraft.” Even so, multiple reports from November 2010 consistently point to the Chinese KLJ-7 instead. the following table compares the JF-17 with India’s indigenous Tejas fighter, which has taken far longer to develop and isn’t quite in service yet:

At present, the main questions concerning Pakistan’s JF-17s revolve around integrated sensors and weapons, rather than the aircraft itself or its performance. The Farnborough 2010 display showed Chinese air-air missiles, a LeiShi-6 guided glide bomb, China’s C802 anti-ship missile, and even a WMD-7 laser designator pod. Full status as a recognized multirole fighter, however, must wait until their ability to use precision laser guidance and/or GPS-guided ground attack weapons is confirmed.

JF-17/FC-1: The Program PAF F-16A drops Mk.82s
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Sino Defense reminds us that the JF-17/FC-1 ‘Xiaolong’ has a long history. The site recalls that China signed a $550 million agreement with Grumman in 1986 to modernise its J-7 fighter (MiG-21 copy) under the “Super-7” upgrade project, with US and British firms competing to provide the engine and avionics. The project was canceled after the Tienanmen Square massacre, but Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation managed to continue the program with its own resources, and the project was eventually re-branded as FC-1 (Fighter China-1).

The next big step forward for FC-1 came when the USA imposed military export sanctions in response to Pakistan’s nuclear program, and to Chinese-Pakistani transfers of ballistic missile components. With spares for its top-of-the-line F-16s in question, and additional F-16s removed as an option, Pakistan sought help from its Chinese ally.

A joint development and production agreement was signed in June 1999, with China Aviation Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) and Pakistan each contributing 50% of the estimated $150 million in development costs. The design was finalized in 2001, with initial prototype flights beginning in 2003. A JF-17 did not fly with its full avionics suite until 2006, but testing and development appear to have progressed smoothly. Until political complications intervened.

Unfortunately for India, the engine export understanding that they thought they had with Russia, was reversed by Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin. JF-17 production began in 2009, complete with Russian engines.

Chinese J-7E
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Ultimately, Pakistan intends to induct 150-250 JF-17s into its air force, replacing most of its Mirage III/Vs, F-7s (Chinese MiG-21 copies), and A-5Cs (massively modified Chinese MiG-19 derivatives). The A-5s will retire more or less immediately as JF-17s enter service, and the Mirages are next in line for replacement due to their uncertain spares situation. The number of JF-17s requested could rise, and some reports place potential Pakistani orders as high as 300 aircraft. Even at the JF-17’s bargain price, however, Pakistan’s budgets will be hard-pressed to afford that many. In the short term, even reaching the desired goal of 150 JF-17s could prove challenging without external aid.

China has remained on the fence regarding the program, with no PLAAF orders to date. Their air force appears to be more focused on their 4+ generation J-10 design, which offers more advanced capabilities and aerodynamics. The FC-1 remains a candidate to replace large numbers of PLAAF MiG-17s (J-5) and MiG-19s (J-6/ Q-5), if the PLAAF decides it needs to take steps to maintain the size of its force. If not, the FC-1’s role is likely to resemble the Northrop F-5’s. The USA sold them in large numbers to other countries, even as the USAF equipped itself with larger and more expensive designs instead.

Stuck in Sichuan: The Saga

The Pakistan Government had hoped to sign a deal to acquire 150 JF-17/FC-1 fighters in 2007, with 8 aircraft in service by year’s end. China had reportedly even bought 100 Klimov RD-93 engines from Russia for installing on JF-17s, with an option to contract for another 400 engines.

In January 2007, however, Forecast International reported that Russia had refused permission for the transfer of its RD-93 engines, derived from the RD-33 that equips the MiG-29. According to FI the decision came only a few days after a visit to India by Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, during which a number of joint defense projects were discussed and agreements were signed. January 2007, DID:

“The military world has no shortage of irony. The defense industry has its moments too, as Pakistan just discovered. An aircraft whose development was driven by military sanctions from the US and Europe is now derailed by military sanctions [regarding its engines]. This leaves the Pakistani Air Force dependent on an alternative from… America. Meanwhile, the Chinese are left with no export launch customer for a plane they may now have to reluctantly buy themselves, instead of the favoured and more capable J-10. Somewhere in Delhi, champagne is pouring – but first, a bit of background.”

Coincidence? Didn’t look like it. Replacement with another engine? Unless it’s a very close copy, that requires re-work of the entire fighter design and takes years. Just ask the Chinese J-10 project team.

As it turned out, however, that wasn’t necessary. The arms market also features no shortage of change, and Russia eventually chose not prevent re-export of the RD-93 engines, in an announcement that caught even India’s diplomats by surprise. The RD-93 comes with some disadvantages, including a tendency to leave smoke trails, but tacit re-export approval removed a huge potential roadblock, and let the program proceed more or less on schedule.

Updates and Key Events 2010 – 2015

1st & 2nd squadrons stand up; Fatal JF-17 crash; JF-17 Block II production begins; Myanmar interested again; Saudi Arabia’s interest a puzzle. Dubai 2013

December 22/15: Malaysia may consider purchasing Pakistan’s JF-17 aircraft as part of its current fighter replacement program. Malaysian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Dr. Hasrul Sani made the announcement citing the excellent relations both nations currently have in terms of defense cooperation. The sale would also see further increase in the bilateral trade between the two, which currently stands at over $2 billion per annum. Other options currently being considered are the Dassault Rafale, Boeing’s F/A-18 and Lockheed Martin’s F-16V. The interest in the JF-17 comes alongside the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project which will see over $40 billion invested in Pakistan’s infrastructure and economic development. Dr. Sani stated that the whole region would stand to benefit from the CPEC project.

November 24/15: Pakistan is to keep using the the Russian made RD-93 engine for its series of JF-17 fighters. The confirmation comes after hints made by Chinese officials that Pakistan would revert back to an original arrangement with China but Pakistan Air Force (PAF) officials are happy with the Russian engine. PAF officials have said that improvements to the JF-17 along with the reliability of the RD-93 engine has resulted in a number of interested parties. Russia on the other hand will be happy to see product solidarity due to economic sanctions over Ukraine closing many export markets.

October 12/15: Sri Lankan Air Force officials are due to arrive in Islamabad in November to discuss a possible acquisition of JF-17 fighters, according to Pakistani press reports. Sri Lanka played down reports in June that the country was the first export customer for the JF-17, stating that a decision has yet to be made on a possible procurement of the fighter.

June 15/14: Myanmar. The government of Myanmar has stepped back from its close Chinese alliance in recent years, but reports indicate that they may be taking a second look at the JF-17. The junta recently bought more Russian MiG-29s instead (q.v. Dec 23/09), but MiG-29s are notoriously difficult to keep in service. The problem is a combination of short part lifespans, and byzantine Russian “service” procedures.

“The Government of Myanmar is planning to acquire technologies from China and Pakistan to build JF-17 multirole combat aircraft at its own aircraft factory to boost its Air Force…. The force is plagued by serviceability issues due to lack of spare parts and trained manpower however introduction of JF-17 would mean that Myanmar Air Force will be investing in such areas to mitigate its short comings.”

Production may be a stretch, but parts production and a local servicing depot may be doable. The report offers an existing force breakdown of 32 MiG-29B/SE as the modern force, plus 25 F-7Ms (Chinese MiG-21 knockoff) and 21 Nanchang A-5C (Chinese plane based on MiG-19 but heavily modified). A mix of 16 Chinese (K-8) and Serbian (Sokol Galeb) jet trainers are used for ground attack roles, as well as pilot training. Sources: Burma Times, “Myanmar plans JF-17 production” | The Diplomat, “Burma to Purchase Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 Fighter Jets” | See also DID, “More MiG-29s for Myanmar”.

June 20/14: R&D. Defense News begins a report in a very odd way, saying that “Contrary to speculation, development of the JF-17 aircraft continues apace…” We’re scratching our heads as to why anyone ever thought otherwise, given announcements re: Block II development and the jet’s clear importance to Pakistan. Indeed, Chief Project Director and Air Vice Marshal Javed Ahmed was quick to aver that the PAF’s 3rd squadron would be operational by year-end.

Ahmed adds that avionics improvements are underway, using the words “situational awareness” but not specifically corroborating rumors of a helmet-mounted display. Near-term improvements will also reportedly focus on “integrating some additional smart and indigenously developed weapons”. The Chinese NRIET KLJ-7 will remain the fighter’s main radar, however, as possible substitutions won’t be considered until the program reaches Block III. An AESA radar, and the possibility of offering drop-in western radar & avionics for export, are both under investigation.

On the other hand, former Pakistani Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail claims that the JF-17’s range is an issue, citing the frequency of flights with drop tanks and the averaged length of sorties. MiG-29s, which use a very similar engine, are known to have range issues, but the JF-17 uses only 1 engine. The Klimov RD-93 is less efficient than GE’s F404/F414, however, and public information gives the JF-17 fuel reserves and operational weight that are similar to the short range Indian Tejas LCA. Tufail may have a point. Sources: Defense News, “JF-17 Developments Indicate Aircraft Is Still On Track”.

Jan 23/14: Saudi Arabia. After Saudi Deputy Defense Minister Prince Salman Bin Sultan visits Pakistan and tours the JF-17 production complex, the World Tribune reports that:

“…officials said representatives of the ministry as well as the Royal Saudi Air Force were examining the feasibility of procuring JF-17 as part of cooperation with Islamabad. “This project could provide the kingdom with technology that could be used in future projects,” an official said.”

Saudi Arabia is an important donor to Pakistan’s government, and there are persistent rumors that the Saudis even financed Pakistan’s nuclear program. On the one hand, JF-17 cooperation could make sense industrially. The Saudis tried to set up a local Eurofighter final assembly and check-out line with BAE, but the kingdom backed off when it became clear that this wouldn’t work. The JF-17 might be an easier starting point, and it would also fit with growing Saudi interest in defense equipment that requires zero American involvement.

On the other hand, there’s no real hole in the RSAF that JF-17s need to fill. The RSAF’s F-5s are no longer frontline fighters; they and the Tornado F3 ADV interceptors have effectively been replaced by an order for 72 high-end Eurofighter Typhoons. The Typhoons already offer a potent non-American option, and the depth and breadth of the pre-existing Al-Yamamah partnership with Britain would make any cancellation a region-altering diplomatic event. Meanwhile, an in-progress order for 84 new Boeing F-15SA Strike Eagles is well underway, and contract penalties would make the order almost pointless to cancel at this point.

The Saudis are already expanding their fighter fleet with these buys. They would have to either expand it further to accommodate the JF-17 – or become industrial partners, and then use JF-17s as a form of regional aid that isn’t subject to American ITAR regulations. Most likely: they do none of those things, while making an ally feel good by being publicly impressed, and holding some initial discussions that go nowhere. Sources: World Tribune, “Saudi eyeing Pakistan’s JF-17 fighter jet, modeled from U.S. F-16”.

Dec 19/13: Block-II begins. Pakistan Aeronautical Complex in Kamra rolls out their 50th JF-17 fighter, and reportedly launches production of the Block II variant with improved avionics, air-to-air refueling capability, and additional weapons. Flight International’s World Air Forces 2013 lists total Pakistan’s JF-17 orders as 70 planes, plus 50 more pending finalization. Meanwhile:

“Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif…. mentioned the Pakistan China Economic Corridor project, which would link Gwadar to China through Khunjrab Pass and said that economic zones would be set up along the Corridor. The project would have far-reaching impact on the future of both countries, he added. Nawaz said cheap labour in Pakistan would also contribute to the smooth materialisation of projects with China.”

Block 2 production is expected to continue until at least 2016, after which some sources say manufacture of Block 3 will begin. That variant may get a new engine, either an updated RD-93 or possibly a Chinese engine if one is ready. Sources: DAWN, “Production of improved version of JF-17 aircraft launched” | Pakistan’s The Nation, “Production of JF-17 fighter jet launched” | Defense News, “Pakistan Rolls Out 50th JF-17, Block II Production To Commence” | The Diplomat, “Pakistan Begins Producing Block-II JF-17 Aircraft”.

Block II begins

Nov 19/13: Weapons. Flight International carries a report regarding a large Chinese precision strike missile. It’s hard to say how accurate such presentations are, but here’s the claim:

“A full list of specifications for the CM-400AKG missile was played on a loop inside the AVIC exhibit stand at the Dubai air show; a marketing venue for the JF-17 fighter jointly developed between China and Pakistan…. News reports have indicated the CM-400 has entered service with the Pakistan air force. The AVIC video notes vaguely that the 910kg (2,000lb) weapon “can be carried by JF-17, etc”. It is usually compared with the Indian/Russian Brahmos high-speed cruise missile.”

The CM-400AKG export variant of China’s YJ-12 missile supposedly has a reach of up to 130 nmi, in order to keep it within MTCR treaty limits. It flies at Mach 3+ and high altitude, using GPS/INS as base guidance within 50m CEP, with the ability to switch to Imaging Infrared for final targeting of moving items like ships, possibly augmented by L/S/X-band passive radar. Sources: Flight Global, “DUBAI: China details performance of ‘carrier killer’ missile for JF-17”.

Nov 14/11: A Pakistani JF-17 crashes in the mountainous Attock Distrct, killing Squadron Leader Muhammad Hussain. He had ejected successfully, but his parachute failed to open properly. Pak Tribune.

Crash

May 19/11: Shortly after American special forces killed Osama Bin Laden in a unilateral raid 40 miles from Islamabad, Pakistan announces a wide swath of major defense projects with China. The most consequential is that the deep water port of Gwadar in western Pakistan will be run by its paymasters, the Chinese government. Pakistan also wants the Chinese to build a naval base there, and no doubt expects to have its own ships use that facility alongside the Chinese PLAN.

The flashiest aspect of the announcements involve the JF-17, with reports that China will be sending Pakistan 50 improved JF-17 fighters, with upgraded electronics. To date, JF-17s have rolled off of Pakistani manufacturing/finishing lines, but these will reportedly involve more Chinese manufacturing to speed delivery, arriving within 6 months. Reports say that China is financing the deal, though they differ on the terms, and how much of the cost China is absorbing. Some reports paint the fighters as more or less a gift.

The interest in a batch of 50 more JF-17s isn’t a surprise, nor are the planned improvements (vid. Dec 22/10 entry). If deliveries do complete in that time frame, the end of 2011 will see Pakistan with over 92 serving JF-17s. India’s comparable Tejas will have over a year to go before the 1st squadron is formally inducted, and will still be waiting to conduct qualification tests of key weapons. DAWN | DAWN re: expediting | Kakuda Hafiz | Tribune || India’s NDTV | Economic Times || Wall St. Journal.

Chinese A-5/Q-5
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April 12/11: 2nd squadron. PAF No. 16 Squadron at PAFB Peshawar becomes the 2nd operational squadron with the CAIC-PAC JF-17 Thunder.

The ceremony also marks the retirement of the PAF’s A-5C Fantans, a heavily modified derivative of the MiG-19. The Panthers of 16 Sqn. were the 1st PAF squadron to covert to the A-5C in 1983, and the last to operate the type. AirForces Monthly.

March 1/11: Aviation Week reports that Pakistan is in negotiations with the U.S. to get more Lockheed Martin F-16s, but also quotes PAF Air Chief Marshall Rao Qamar Suleman as saying that indigenous projects will remain a priority. As part of that effort, Pakistan intends to eventually field a supplementary datalink, which would work alongside the Link 16 systems carried by the F-16s and communicate with the JF-17 fleet. With respect to the JF-17s:

“Rao says Pakistan will have the second squadron of JF-17s enter operation at the end of March while simultaneously phasing out all of its Nanchang A-5s… “As for the Chengdu F-7s and Dassault Mirages, we will phase these out as we get JF-17s,” Rao says. “Some of Pakistan’s Mirages are the oldest in the world,” he says, adding that some were built in 1967. Phasing out the older Mirages is a top priority. The Mirages are difficult and costly to maintain because no one is producing spare parts for these aircraft anymore, he says. “We are getting secondhand parts, but we don’t know the history of these spare parts we are getting. It’s a flight safety issue and a nightmare for me,” he adds.”

Jan 26/11: Iraq. JF-17s for Iraq? Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh tells a press conference that the Council of Ministers has approved the purchase of 18 F-16s, and budgeted an unspecified sum. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who is also the acting Defense Minister, would negotiate the deal’s final parameters. There has been talk of a $13 billion weapons buy, which would include the existing DSCA request for F-16IQs, but no confirmation as yet.

The USA will reportedly deliver the F-16s to Iraq within 2-3 years, but in the meantime, and even for some time thereafter, Iraq will not be able to police its own airspace effectively. Iraq Order of Battle author DJ Elliott believes that 2018 would be the earliest. The French are presenting a complementary offer of upgraded Mirage F1s, and DJ Elliott reports that the Iraqis may also be looking at a 3rd option: China & Pakistan’s JF-17 Thunder. Iraq-Business News | DJ Elliott’s Montrose Toast | UPI | Saudi Arab News re: Iraqi readiness.

Dec 22/10: 1st squadron. Aviation Week reports that about half of the 42 JF-17s Pakistan has ordered (q.v. March 7/09) are now in place, and one squadron is operational. PAF officials now plan to set up a 2nd unit. The focus, as is true in all initial inductions, is on getting all staff familiar with the equipment. Fully qualifying crews for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions will be the next step.

PAF Air Commodore Junaid told the magazine that the government hopes to order a second batch of 50 fighters in 2011, with undefined “enhanced features,” though the avionics package fielded on the baseline JF-17 has reportedly been a positive surprise.

PL-12 & PL-8 on JF-17
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Nov 18/10: Avionics & Weapons. Reports from Pakistan indicate that the PAF’s JF-17s will be equipped with Chinese radars and SD-10A/PL-12 medium range air-to-air missiles, thanks to a recent contract with China.

The Thales/MBDA ATE consortium had been seen as front runners for a $1.2 billion contract to equip the first 50 Pakistani JF-17s with radars and missiles, and could stand to reap another EUR 15 million or so per plane thereafter. In April 2010, however, Le Monde reported that the French government had refused to clear the deal. That’s not surprising, since France has a $4+ billion contract to build submarines for India, is competing in the $10-11 billion M-MRCA fighter competition, and wants to sell equipment like frigates and missiles in future. France isn’t in the same geo-political position as the USA, which means retaliation for a defense sale of that magnitude is more likely. France’s DCNS still won India’s Scorpene submarine contract, despite building Agosta AIP submarines for Pakistan, but the French government evidently decided not to chance it this time.

PAF Chief Air Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman told The Nation in an exclusive interview that “PAF has no plans to install Western devices and weapons on the aircraft for the time being.” Pakistan’s The Nation || Agence France Presse | India’s Hindustan Times | Russia’s RIA Novosti | India’s Sify.

July 5/10: Engines & Egypt. India isn’t the only party with reservations about Russian engine exports for the JF-17. United Aircraft Corp. CEO Mikhail Pogosyan publicly opposes the sale of 100 RD-93 jet engines to China, citing the threat of FC-1/JF-17 competition against the MiG-29. He says that said the re-export of technologies should be approved by the original manufacturers to avoid unfair competition, but Rosoboronexport’s position is that re-export rights is a government decision with no manufacturer input. RIA Novosti adds that:

“A Russian aircraft industry source said the FC-1 is inferior to MiG-29 in performance, but sells for about $10 million, while the price of a MiG-29 is about $35 mln. MiG-29s are currently competing with FC-1s in an Egyptian tender on the delivery of 32 fighters. In addition, Egypt has launched negotiations with Pakistan on the licensed production of FC-1 aircraft. Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) approved the re-export of RD-93 engines to Egypt as part of the FC-1 fighter package in November 2007.”

Feb 18/10: 1st squadron. The first squadron of JF-17 Thunder aircraft is formally indicted into Pakistan’s Air Force by Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman. DAWN.

1999 – 2009

From MoU through test aircraft, 8 initial planes, and an order for 42; Russia OK’s engines to allow the program to proceed; 1st locally-built JF-17 rolls out; Export loss in Myanmar. Lift-off?
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Dec 23/09: Myanmar. Myanmar (ex-Burma) reportedly buys 20 MiG-29s from Russia, preferring them over Chinese options that are said to have included the JF-17/ FC-1. Read “More MiG-29s for Myanmar.”

Myanmar loss

Nov 23/09: Industrial. The first JF-17 Thunder built at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) at Kamra rolls out. The rest of the order is expected to undergo final assembly at by PAC Kamra within the next 3 years. Associated Press of Pakistan | DAWN | Pakistan’s Daily Times | Pakistan’s The Nation | Pakistan Times | SANA News || Chandigarh Tribune | Press Trust of India | China’s Xinhua.

March 7/09: +42. The Associated Press of Pakistan reports that a contract for 42 co-produced JF-17s has been signed in Islamabad by China’s CATIC and the Pakistani Air Force, financed by “seller’s credit.” Production capacity is listed at 15 aircraft in the first year, rising to 30 aircraft per year thereafter.

Pakistan has been flying 8 aircraft to work out tactics, techniques, and procedures, and expects to stand up the first JF-17 squadron before the end of 2009. The aircraft will be based at Peshawar, alongside existing Chinese-made Q-5/A-5C “Fantan” fighters that are a hugely modified Chinese derivative of the MiG-19, and their accompanying JJ-6/FT-6 MiG-19 trainers.

The article adds a quote from Air Chief Marshal Tanvir Mehmood Ahmed. He reiterated that cooperation on China’s canard-winged J-10/FC-20 is also progressing, with first deliveries to Pakistan expected in 2014-15. CATIC’s President MA Zhiping reportedly added that the first FC-20 aircraft built under that agreement would fly in 2009. APP | Pakistan’s The News.

42 JF-17 Block I

Jan 1/09: Industrial. Associated Press of Pakistan quotes Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) chairman Air Marshal Khalid Chaudhry HI (M) T Bt re: the JF-17 project, and PAC’s work more generally. The report was triggered by briefings associated with a visit from Sheikh Aftab Ahmad, head of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly on Defence Production. Air Marshal Chadhry reportedly said that PAC has the capability to manufacture 75% of the JF-17’s avionics, and 58% of its air frame.

The firm is currently deepening its experience and earning revenue by overhauling about 180 aircraft engines and 60 aircraft per year, including work undertaken by PAC’s Mirage rebuild factory that helps maintain Pakistan’s aged Mirage III/V fighters, and refurbishes scrap Mirages from other countries in order to keep overall fleet numbers up. High-tech avionics machinery recently imported “from various developed countries” is extending PAC’s capacity, and so has a $15 million contract from Boeing for aircraft parts.

Nov 28/08: Exports. Pakistani Ministry of Defence Production Secretary Shahid Siddiq Tirmizi claims that as many as 8 countries have shown interest in buying the JF-17 Thunder fighter. Azerbaijan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe are 3 countries that have been linked to export interest in the past. The News International.

A Pakistan Defense article widens that potential field to include Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka.

Nov 20/08: Pakistani Chief of Air Staff ACM(Air Chief Marshal) Tanvir Mahmood Ahmad says that aid the first JF-17 squadron would be inducted into the PAF fleet in the first quarter of 2009.

His accompanying announcement that another 36 high-tech combat aircraft (FC-20, probably a version of China’s J-10) would be inducted into the PAF fleet by 2010 got even more attention, but that didn’t come to pass. Pakistan Daily | Pak Tribune.

April 11/08: Exports. Jane’s Defence Weekly reports that:

“Pakistan and China have established a joint marketing organisation to promote international sales of their JF-17 ‘Thunder’ fighter aircraft, the head of the main Pakistani arms export agency has told Jane’s. Major General Muhammad Farooq, director general of Pakistan’s Defence Export Promotion Organisation (DEPO), described the JF-17 in early April as an ideal “choice for countries which are mindful of their finances.”

March 19/08: An article in Pakistan Defence claims that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) now has 8 JF-17 Thunder aircraft, after 6 more planes were received this March. All 8 will be used for testing and evaluation; the aircraft hasn’t been formally inducted into service yet.

Serial production has begun, and Pakistan’s Air Cheif Marshal reportedly said that about 60% of the airframe and 80% of the avionics would be manufactured in Pakistan by 2010, with production capacity rising to 25 aircraft per year by 2011. If true, it seems likely that deals with significant industrial offsets may be in the cards, as the article also claims that negotiations have begun with British, Italian, and French defense firms over potential avionics and other systems; France has reportedly offered its RC-400 radar and MBDA MICA missile.

Finally, the article claims that that:

“Thirteen countries have so far expressed interest in purchasing the JF-17 aircraft are Azerbaijan, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Algeria and Sudan.”

Jan 22/08: Industrial. According to India Defence, Pakistan’s national TV reports that it has begun in-country manufacturing of the JF-17 fighter. About half of the on-board equipment and avionics will be manufactured in Kamra, Pakistan, with the rest coming from China.

PakAF Chief of Air Staff Ahmed reportedly committed to 15 aircraft built in 2008 and 20 in 2009, with the goal of building 25-30 per year.

FC-1/ JF-17
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Nov 29/07: Exports. The IWPA reports that:

“Azerbaijan is currently negotiating with Pakistan for the purchase of 24 Chinese-made JF-17 Thunder combat planes, worth between 16 and 18 million dollars each.”

In February 2009, however, Azerbaijan’s APA files a report that says the parties are still in talks, rather than under contract.

Nov 13/07: Jane’s Defense Weekly quotes Pakistani Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Tanvir Mahmood Ahmed as saying that the Pakistan Air Force will have an operational capability with JF-17 Thunder light fighter aircraft by the end of 2008, and expects to have its first 8 aircraft under a “small batch order” within the next few months.

“Speaking to Jane’s at the Dubai Air Show on 12 November, ACM Ahmed dismissed concerns over the Russian RD-93 engine that powers the joint Sino-Pakistan aircraft as “an issue created from here and there.”

April 26/07: Engine OK. India may need to hold that champagne, in the wake of recent reports. India Defence relays a report from the Russian newspaper Kommersant, which said that Vladimir Putin himself had personally supervised and signed a “Sino-Russian Fighter Assembly Agreement” which included joint assembly of JF-17 fighter aircraft with RD-93 engines, and their supply to third countries. Kommersant added that:

“This permission will enable the supply of 150 Chinese JF-17 fighter aircrafts to Pakistan, and help implement the contract for the supply of Russian engines worth USD 238 million.”

Kommersant added that “the permission does not imply Pakistan’s inclusion in the list of countries with which Russia has direct military-technical cooperation.” The question is whether Russian military-technical cooperation would be required under the Sino-Russian agreement. Meanwhile, the Indians appear to have been blindsided. The Press Counsellor of the Indian Embassy in Moscow Ramesh Chandra told Kommersant that “the Embassy was not aware” of the permission for re-export. See India Defence | India’s domain-b.

Russia OKs engines

March 29/07: Program. Pakistan’s The News International references an interview that Air Chief Marshal Tanvir Mehmood Ahmed gves to Jane’s:

“The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) aims to acquire 200-250 JF-17 Thunder (FC-1) fighter aircraft in place of the 150 originally envisaged, Air Chief Marshal Tanvir Mehmood Ahmed has said… According to Jane’s Russian sources had initially said emphatically, that the RD-93 engines… could not be re-exported to Pakistan. This position was reversed in November 2006… during a joint [Klimov/ Chengdu] press briefing at the Zhuhai Air Show in China… Pakistani sources claim they have a clear understanding from Chinese authorities that there will be no Russian effort to block the supply of the RD-93 engines to Pakistan. “The Chinese have told us the Russians haven’t issued a written licence but the Russians will not block the supply of the RD-93 to Pakistan,” one senior Pakistani government official told Jane’s.”

March 2/07: Delivery. China delivers a pair of JF-17 fighters equipped with Russian-made RD-93 engines to Pakistan, prompting Indian protests that claim a violation of the end-user agreement between Russia and China. The aircraft were officially presented on March 12/07, and made their first public appearance during the Pakistan Day Parade on March 23/07. Scramble.

April 28/06: Testing. PT-04 makes its first flight with fully operational avionics. Source.

April 2004: Testing. Second prototype flies, though some sources contend that the aircraft in question was PT-03 instead. A total of 4 aircraft were manufactured for flight testing, while PT-05 was designed for static fatigue testing on the ground. APP | Wikipedia.

Aug 25/03: Testing. First prototype aircraft flies. Source.

July 1/03: First prototype completes first taxi trials. Source.

May 13/03: First prototype aircraft rolled out. Source.

1st prototype

September 2001: The FC-1/JF-17’s detailed design is finalized. Source.

1999: MoU. China and Pakistan agreed on 50-50 joint development of the FC-1/Super 7.

Development MoU

Additional Readings Background: JF-17 Thunder

• Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra – JF-17 Aircraft. See also Avionics Systems Co-produced Projects.

• Sino Defence – FC-1/JF-17 Multirole Fighter Aircraft.

• Wikipedia – JF-17 Thunder.

• GlobalSecurity – FC-1 “Chao Qi” / JF-17 Thunder. The Chinese name translates as “Fierce Dragon.”

• GlobalSecurity – JF-17 Thunder.

• JF-17.com. Not an official site.

Background: Aircraft Ancillaries

• Klimov – RD-33 Family. Of which the RD-93 engine is one.

• Selex Galileo – Selex Galileo’s Grifo. The firm is a Finmeccanica subsidiary. While their material has said in the past that their Grifo S7 radar would equip the JF-17, that role seems to have gone to the Chinese.

• Sino Defence – PiLi-12 Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile.

• Sino Defence – PiLi-5 Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile. The PAF reportedly uses the PL-5E II.

• Sino Defence – LeiShi-6 Precision Guided Glide Bomb.

• Global Security – C-802 / YJ-2 / Ying Ji-802 / CSS-C-8 / SACCADE/ C-8xx / YJ-22 / YJ-82.

• Sino Defence – KongDi-88 (C-802KD) Air-Launched Land-Attack Cruise Missile. Developed from the YJ-82/C802 anti-ship missile.

• PAF Wallpapers (Oct 15/12) – JF-17 Thunder’s Weapon load. Incl. configurations, with pictures.

Background: Other

• DID – $5.1B Proposed in Sales, Upgrades, Weapons for Pakistan’s F-16s. The JF-17’s counterpart in the PAF. Current commitments are for 63 F-16 C/Ds, all at or near Block 52 standard.

Javelin, firing
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The FGM-148 Javelin missile system aimed to solve 2 key problems experienced by American forces. One was a series of disastrous experiences in Vietnam, trying to use 66mm M72 LAW rockets against old Soviet tanks. A number of replacement options like the Mk 153 SMAW and the AT4/M136 spun out of that effort in the 1980s, but it wasn’t until electronics had miniaturized for several more cycles that it became possible to solve the next big problem: the need for soldiers to remain exposed to enemy fire while guiding anti-tank missiles to their targets.

Javelin solves both of those problems at once, offering a heavy fire-and-forget missile that will reliably destroy any enemy armored vehicle, and many fortifications as well. While armored threats are less pressing these days, the need to destroy fortified outposts and rooms in buildings remains. Indeed, one of the lessons from both sides of the 2006 war in Lebanon has been the infantry’s use of guided missiles as a form of precision artillery fire. Javelin isn’t an ideal candidate for that latter role, due to its high cost-per-unit; nevertheless, it has often been used this way. Its performance in Iraq has revealed a clear niche on both low and high intensity battlefields, and led to rising popularity with American and international clients.

The Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missile System M47 Dragon
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Javelin’s development began in 1989 with a contract to develop a replacement for the M47 Dragon wire-guided anti-tank missile – a weapon that left its operator’s head and torso exposed to fire during the missile’s flight, and required a certain level of fine motor control. This was extremely dangerous for the operator, and of questionable effectiveness in genuine combat situations. The body’s survival-level fight or flight chemistry causes a lot of changes, one of which is a severe reduction in fine motor control under intense stress situations. Like, for instance, firing a missile whose flash and plume singles you out on the battlefield, then keeping your torso exposed for up to 10 loooong seconds while enemy machine gunners etc. zero in and try to cut you in two.

Unlike its predecessor, Javelin is be a fire and forget weapon. Its advertised 2.5 km/ 1.5 mile effective range is shorter than some other anti-tank systems, but remains more than double the M47 Dragon’s. Javelin’s cooled imaging infrared (IIR) guidance system can take 30 seconds or more to reach required temperatures for combat use, but once the sensor is ready, it will lock on to a heat emission ‘picture’ in order to hit vehicles, designated spots on the ground, or even helicopters. The operator can choose between top attack against an armored vehicle’s weakest protection, or direct fire, and the missile’s 8.4 kg/ 18.5 pound dual warhead design will defeat even reactive explosive armor protection. Its last key feature is called “soft launch capability,” which is milspeak for “you can launch the missile from inside a building without barbecuing yourself and your squad.”

Javelin fire team
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Javelin technically consists of 2 parts. The 26-pound, 80,000+ Javelin missile comes in ready-to-fire tubes. These tubes are attached to the 14-pound, $125,000+ Command Launch Unit (CLU), which contains the weapons optics, electronics, and sensors. The CLU also contains a quiet innovation: embedded training that allows operators to train and qualify through multiple scenarios, using the same equipment they’ll use in the field, but without firing a live missile. While some live-fire is required for truly effective training, the expense of weapons like TOW and Javelin has traditionally limited training and practice to unacceptably low levels – one live firing per year for “trained” crews is not uncommon. Using an embedded virtual training option helps to alleviate this problem.

The Block 1 CLU makes 2 critical improvements: an increase in lethal range to about 3.45 km/ 2.1 miles thanks to improved sensors, and doubled battery life.

The Block 1 missile adds an improved rocket motor that shortens flight time, software enhancements, and an enhanced performance warhead.

The entire Javelin system weighs about 49 pounds, plus about 5 pounds each for spare BA5590 lithium batteries. Each battery lasts up to 4 hours, and 5-10 batteries is a normal range for mission loads.

Adding “Javelin Vehicle Launcher” (JVL) electronics can make the missile compatible with remote weapon systems, which let crews use a machine gun and advanced day/night sensors from inside the vehicle. So far, integration has taken place with Kongsberg’s Protector RWS system, which has a leading position in the international market as the US Army’s standard.

Javelin ATGM: The Program Javelin missile: fire!
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The JAVELIN Joint Venture was formed by 2 firms. Texas Instruments (now Raytheon Missile Systems) of Dallas, TX is responsible for the Command Launch Unit (CLU), missile guidance electronic unit, system software, and system engineering management. Lockheed Martin Electronics and Missiles (now Missiles and Fire Control), of Orlando, FL is responsible for the missile seeker, missile engineering and assembly. Other key subcontractors include ATK (missile tube), BAE systems (British version’s missile seeker), and DRS (thermal sensors).

Production began in 1994, and the missile equipped its first unit in 1996. initial reliability issues resulted in some delays and additional testing, and full rate production was authorized in May 1997.

The Javelin Block 1 missile upgrade went into production in 2006, with successful qualification tests in 2007. It includes an improved rocket motor that offers more speed for less flight time, an enhanced warhead, improvements to the command launch unit (from 9x to 12x thermal magnification), and upgraded software.

The next step was once called Block 2, and is now called Increment II. it aimed to offer a major increase in range, improve the seeker, and add a multifunction warhead that’s better at killing enemies in the open. The FGM-148F missile will be paired with CLU Block 1 as part of that process, and future efforts will try to lighten the CLU without affecting performance.

These changes brought Javelin Increment II in line with a very attractive prize: the ATGM missile requirements in the USA’s $160+ billion Future Combat Systems meta-program. Even with FCS’ demise, the missiles remain positioned for FCS’ successor, or for future vehicle upgrades. The USA has test-fired Javelin from its CROWS-II remote-control weapon system (RWS), for instance, and Norway has conducted winter tests from a similar Kongsberg RWS. Operationally, it’s the French leading the way, via Javelin integration onto their VAB wheeled APCs.

Javelin may even find itself in naval roles. In 2013, it was successfully test-fired from the very compact and innovative Centurion launcher, which is able to equip vessels as small as patrol boats with decoy countermeasures, signaling, and short-range guided weapons.

Customers & Recent Budgets Excel
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Javelin received initial attention and interest from a few countries in its early years, but its successful use in Iraq from mid-2003 onward definitely gave its exports another push. Countries that have requested, bought and fielded Javelin systems now include: Australia (2002), the Czech Republic (2004), France (2010), Indonesia (2013), Ireland (2002), Jordan (2001, 2009, 2013, 2014), Lithuania (2001), New Zealand (2003, 2014), Norway (2005), Oman (2006 & 2012), Qatar (2014), Taiwan (2002 & 2008), the UAE (2008), the UK (2003), and the USA (original).

Sometimes the delay between an initial request and fielding can be surprisingly long. The UAE, for instance, ordered Javelins almost 4 years after their formal 2004 DSCA request. DSCA requests and national selections that have yet to result in publicly-announced contracts or fielding include Canada (2003 request), Bahrain (2006 request), Saudi Arabia (2010), Belgium (2012), and Estonia (2014). Georgia has also reportedly asked for Javelin systems, but there is no official announcement trail, and the outcome isn’t known.

India hasn’t filed a DSCA request, but its soldiers fired 9 Javelin missiles during their October 2009 Yudh Abhyas exercises with the U.S. Army’s visiting 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. Technology transfer issues were turning India toward Javelin’s Spike competitor, and despite American efforts to fix that, India opted for the Spike family in October 2014.

Javelin ATGM: Reports from the Front UK Javelin, Iraq(click to read article)

The Javelin missile received very good reviews from the front lines during Operation Iraqi Freedom for its fire-and-forget accuracy and large explosions. Its role in the Battle of Debecka Pass in northern Iraq received particular attention. As Army Magazine notes:

“Debecka Pass basically had two Special Forces ‘A’ Teams facing a battalion-sized enemy force that had 12 tanks, 24 armored personnel carriers, three howitzers, a multiple rocket launcher, an anti-aircraft gun, 150 soldiers and probably another 18 to 20 light vehicles and trucks,” [Raytheon business development manager Roy] Adams said.

“The American force ended up destroying two tanks, eight personnel carriers and four cargo trucks. More important, they were able to hold off that enemy force until the 173rd Airborne Brigade could relieve them and assume ownership of that pass.”

He added, “One of the sergeants who was there said, ‘Without the Javelin weapon systems, 30 Americans never would have left that pass alive.’ “

See also Michael Yon’s May 7/07 article “Rattlesnake,” covering British forces near Basra, Iraq, as they plan and execute a counter-ambush trap using Javelin missiles in a prominent role. While any guided anti-armor missile down to a 1960s-era wire-guided AT-3 Sagger could have been substituted with similar results, note the C4SI (Command, Control, Communication, Computing, Surveillance & Intelligence) issues faced by British forces on the battlefield – issues any substitute weapon would also have to overcome.

Interestingly, the Javelin CLUs have also received rave reviews from the front lines. Their advanced optics and thermal imaging led to widespread and effective use as a day & night surveillance tool.

Javelin: Contracts & Key Events

Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued to the JAVELIN joint venture between Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, whose HQ is located in Orlando, FL. Given the proximity of Disney World’s “It’s a Small World After All” ride, Javelin employees have shown commendable restraint in their test venues.

Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are from the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL.

FY 2014 – 2016

India firing
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December 22/15: The purchase of Javelin missiles and command launch units by Lithuania has been cleared by the US State Department in a deal worth $55 million. The acquisition includes 220 anti-tank missiles, 74 launch command units, 10 fly-to-buy missiles, and aims to help modernize the capabilities of the Lithuanian Army to participate in future NATO operations. Recent Russian military action in Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea in 2014 has resulted in neighboring countries increasing their defensive capabilities against any future Russian aggression.

Oct 31/14: Orders. An unfinalized $15.3 million contract foreign military sales contract modification will buy 74 Javelin Block I Missiles, 318 Battery Coolant Units, 22 Outdoor Trainer Instructor Stations, 22 Javelin Weapon System-Student Stations, and 44 tripods. They will be divided among the US Army and foreign customers, including Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Lithuania, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. $11.5 million is committed immediately, using FY 2010, 2011, and 2014 budgets plus FMS money.

This is part of a contract that runs until April 30/23. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal (Missile), Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity (W31P4Q-13-C-0129, PO 0012).

USA, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Lithuania, Oman, Qatar, UAE

Oct 24/14: India. India’s top-level Defence Acquisition Council clears INR 900 billion in acquisitions. New submarines are the biggest, but there’s also clearance for up to INR 32 billion to buy and license-build about 300 Spike family launcher systems and 8,000 missiles.

Javelin may get a 2nd crack in future (q.v. Nov 11/13), but for now, RAFAEL’s Spike is India’s choice. See DID, “Spike Served: India’s New ATGM.”

Loss in India

Oct 7/14: Estonia. The US DSCA announces Estonia’s official export request for 120 Command Launch Units (CLU) with Integrated Day/Thermal Sight, 102 Battery Coolant Units, 350 Javelin Guided Missiles, 102 Missile Simulation Rounds (MSR), 16 Enhanced Performance Basic Skills Trainers (EPBST), spare and repair parts, rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries, battery chargers and dischargers, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, and other U.S. Government and contractor support.

Estponia’s army, the Maavagi, has been using MBDA’s MILAN 2 and the wire-guided Israeli MAPATS, alongside a variety of shoulder-fired rockets. The Estonian Cabinet approved the military’s selection of Javelin in June, and a successful contract would make it their 1st fire-and-forget anti-tank missile.

The estimated cost is up to $55 million, and the principal contractors will be the Raytheon/ Lockheed Martin Javelin Joint Venture in Orlando, FL and Tucson, AZ. Sources: Us DSCA #14-54, “Estonia – Javelin Missiles” | Estonia’s Postimees, “Eesti kavatseb USA-lt osta tankitorjesusteemi”.

DSCA request: Estonia (350)

Sept 30/14: Contract. An unfinalized $84.3 million contract modification buys 534 Javelin Block 1 Missiles and 14 Javelin Command Launch Unit retrofits, divided among the US Army, USMC, and FMS customers Jordan and Qatar. $62.4 million is committed immediately, using FY 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2014 budgets on the US side.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and the overall contract will end on Sept 30/23 (W31P4Q-13-C-0129, PO 0011).

USA, Jordan, Qatar

July 14/14: Contract. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel hosts Qatar’s Minister of State for Defense Affairs Hamad bin Ali al-Attiyah at the Pentagon, where they sign letters of offer and acceptance worth around $11 billion for AH-64E Apache helicopters, Patriot PAC-3 air and missile defense systems, and FGM-148 Javelin Block 1 anti-tank missiles (q.v. March 27/14).

As noted earlier, precise numbers and costs aren’t given, but Qatar’s DSCA export request (q.v. March 28/13) included up to 50 launch units and 500 missiles. Sources: Pentagon, “U.S., Qatar Sign Letters on $11 Billion in Helicopters, Defense Systems”.

Qatar order

July 3/14: Order. A $162.4 million firm-fixed-price contract modification will buy 570 Block 1 tactical missiles and 284 command launch unit (CLU) retrofits:

• 361 missiles and 137 CLU retrofits for the US Army
  
• 189 missiles and 147 CLU retrofits for the US Marine Corps
  
• 20 missiles for New Zealand and Jordan combined; both are existing customers

Work will be performed at Tucson, Arizona, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/14 (W31P4Q-13-C-0129, PO 0007).

USA, Jordan, New Zealand

March 27/14: Qatar. At DIMDEX 2014 in Doha, the Emirate announces $23 billion worth of military contracts, including Javelin missiles. Precise numbers and costs aren’t given, but their DSCA export request (q.v. March 28/13) included up to 50 launch units and 500 missiles. Sources: Al Defaiya, “Qatar Announces Big Defense Deals at DIMDEX 2014” | Arabian Aerospace, “Qatar in $23bn arms order including Apache and NH90 helicopters” | Reuters, “Qatar buys helicopters, missiles in $23 billion arms deals”.

March 4-11/14: Budgets. The US military slowly files its budget documents, detailing planned spending from FY 2014 – 2019. The FY15 order is a 44% cut in missiles ordered to 338, and that theme is repeated from 2015 – 2018.

Over that period, the difference between current projections and past expectations is $156.7 million, and 1,030 missiles. That cost-to-missile ratio may seem disproportionate with current buys. It is. Numbers cuts raise costs, from about $163,000 in the “Past Years” column of the Army’s detailed submission, to a listing of $229,000 per missile in FY15. This will rise to $273,000 per missile by FY19, unless foreign orders create enough scale to push costs back down again. Average cost of the foregone missiles from FY 2015 – 2018, using strict math? $152,136.

Note that the strict math approach isn’t strictly fair. Budgets have to work with actual costs, which can trigger a cycle. Other decisions or outside circumstances can raise costs, which may then force order reductions, which raises costs per unit again. We don’t have a concrete breakdown from within the program, but DoD’s FY15 guide to budgets by weapon system notes that:

“[FY15] Begins procurement of FGM-148F (F model) Javelin missiles with a new Multi-Purpose Warhead, which improves lethality against exposed personnel. Begins development of a lightweight CLU to reduce soldier burden and bulk.”

Centurion launcher
click for video

Dec 10/13: Javelin Naval. Raytheon announces that they’ve successfully fired a Javelin missile from Chemring’s multirole Centurion launcher, during testing at Britain’s Defence Training Estate on Salisbury Plain.

This is a big breakthrough for Javelin, which hasn’t had a naval niche. The Centurion’s extremely small cylindrical footprint, bolt-on installation, and optional stealthy enclosure make it an easy retrofit for vessels ranging from small patrol boats to aircraft carriers. With Javelins on board in a Centurion launcher, the ships would enhance their decoy options, while adding a useful options to kill small boats, or even overflying helicopters and UAVs. Guidance and tracking would need to happen through other systems on the ship, but if Raytheon can integrate one of its surveillance and targeting turrets as an option for ships without IRST/EOTS, that wouldn’t take up much space.

To date, Centurion had been tested as a launcher for mix-and-match 130mm – 170mm missile and torpedo decoys, flares, chaff, etc., but this is the first weapon firing. Raytheon intends to expand the system’s weapon options, though size considerations means that its Griffin-B missile is the only other option that really fits. With that said, there are tube-launched mini-UAVs… Sources: Chemring Centurion mini-site | Raytheon, “Raytheon, Chemring Group complete first live-fire test of CENTURION launcher”.

Nov 11/13: India. Indian defense minister AK Antony and the Defence Acquisition Council give Javelin an opening in India, by delaying any decision on INR 150 billion project to equip Indian military vehicles with 321 vehicle-mounted launchers and 8,356 of RAFAEL’s Spike missiles.

Raytheon had received the Indian Army’s 2010 RFP, but only RAFAEL responded. Europe’s MBDA, Russia’s Rosoboronexport, Raytheon, and General Dynamics reportedly balked at India’s technology-transfer requirements, and did not bid. Javelin needs the competition to be withdrawn and replaced by another RFP, in order to have a chance. At that point, Raytheon would need to choose between Javelin and TOW, and India’s own state-run firms may choose to offer a version of their problem-plagued Nag missile. There were indications that a full competition might be on offer back in March 2013, and the DAC’s non-decision leaves the situation very unclear.

Even if RAFAEL does win, however, Javelin is expected to remain a viable competitor for subsequent infantry buys. Sources: Times of India, “Antony defers decision on critical but controversial missile deals with Israel” | Defense News, “India Again Considers Buying Israeli-made ATGM” | Defense News, “India Pursues Indigenous ATGM Amid Javelin Talks” | Times of India, “Scam-wary Army calls off Israeli missile deal” (March 2013).

FY 2013

Orders: USA, Jordan, Indonesia; Requests from Indonesia, Oman & Qatar; India slipping away?; Long shot. Afghanistan
click for video

Sept 18/13: India. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter is visiting India for talks, which included the Javelin ATGM. Javelin was in danger of falling out of contention due to technology transfer issues, but a new proposal would replicate the PJ-10 BrahMos missile development model for the portable strike missile niche. With encouragement from the Pentagon, Raytheon and Lockheed Martin would co-produce Javelin in India, and would also include India as a development partner for the next iteration of the Javelin system. The response remains to be seen:

“DEPUTY SECRETARY CARTER: Well, India needs to take time to consider that. It’s an offer. It’s in the spirit of the [Defense Trade and Technology Initiative]. And we intend to do that, to develop many ideas, make many proposals…. We don’t have the history that Russia does here and we’re trying to replicate that, or overcome the fact that our defense technology and industrial system and the Indian defence and technology industrial system were segregated for many decades. Now destiny is bringing us together and we need to work to make those two systems mesh. That’s not automatic. They’re different. They have different histories, different bureaucracies and so forth, so it takes the leaders of our two defense industrial systems to help our companies do that.”

Sources: Pentagon, “Media Roundtable with Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter in Delhi, India”.

Sept 6/13: Order. A $67.7 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 260 Javelin Block 1 rounds and command launch unit (CLU) retrofits for Jordan (q.v. Nov 30/09, May 22/13), Indonesia (q.v. Nov 19/12, May 22/13) and Oman (q.v. Nov 19/12).

A November 2013 release from the Javelin JV adds the US Army and USMC, and corrects this to a $176 million contract for 842 Block I Javelin missile rounds, plus 120 command launch units (CLUs) funded with US Special Defense Acquisition Funds. This exceeds even the May 22/13 and Sept 6/13 announcements put together.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, with the CLUs expected for delivery to the US Army beginning in October 2014. US Army Contracting Command, Missile at Redstone Arsenal, AL acts as the buyer and FMS agent to manage the contract (W31P4Q-13-C-0129, PO 0001). Sources: Pentagon, Raytheon, Nov 18/13 release.

USA, Indonesia, Jordan, Oman

May 22/13: Order. A firm-fixed-price, maximum $53.4 million contract for Javelin Block I Tactical Missile Rounds, on behalf of the US Army, US Marine Corps, and the governments of Jordan and Indonesia.

The USA is using a combination of FY 2010 and FY 2013 Procurement funds to pay for their share. Indonesia submitted an export request for up to 180 missiles on Nov 29/12, and they’re a new customer. In contrast, this is Jordan’s 3rd purchase. The US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract, and acts as Jordan and Indonesia’s agent (W31P4Q-13-C-0129).

USA, Jordan & Indonesia

March 28/13: Qatar. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Qatar’s official request to buy 500 Javelin Guided Missiles, 50 Command Launch Units (CLU), Battery Coolant Units, tripods, Missile Simulation Rounds (MSR), the Enhanced Performance Basic Skills Trainer (EPBST), the Javelin Weapon Effects Simulator (JAVWES); plus training, spare and repair parts, rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries, battery chargers and dischargers, support equipment, publications and training equipment, and U.S. Government and contractor support.

The estimated cost is up to $122 million, but actual costs will depend on contract negotiations involving the Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Javelin Joint Venture. Implementation of this proposed sale won’t require any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives in Qatar.

Qatar request

Feb 6/13: 4,000m+? The Javelin Joint Venture touts the missile’s ability to engage targets out to 4,750 meters in US Army tests. That’s far beyond the 2,500m specification usually associated with the missile, but as Javelin Joint Venture president Duane Gooden notes, most militaries want at least 4,000m for vehicle-mounted missiles. The clear hope is that the test will open up a larger market for vehicle-mounted Javelins, which is just beginning to emerge (vid June 11/12, Dec 7/10 entries).

Asked for further clarification, Lockheed Martin representatives said that the tests at Eglin AFB, FL used standard Javelin Block I Command Launch Units and missiles. Gooden’s quote had included a caveat about “under favorable conditions,” and the firm explained that this meant avoiding conditions that reduce the effectiveness of the CLU and missile’s Focal Plane Arrays: “dust, snow, rain,” etc. Long-wave infrared usually penetrates those fairly well, compared to visible light, but apparently, there’s still some drop-off in total performance.

Many competing vehicle-fired missiles benefit from ongoing guidance using wires or datalinks, which can allow them to take advantage of heavier and better sensors. The Lock-On Before Launch, fire-and-forget Javelin will either need a datalink, or lock-on after launch mode plus some additional system algorithms, to put it on a truly even footing. Otherwise, it may still have export potential as a “4,000m+ best case” fire-and-forget option. Candidate platforms would include vehicles already mounting a compatible RWS with low integration costs, light vehicles that need to keep moving; and vehicles expected to serve in frequent urban fights, where long range is closer to 500 meters.

Competition: Spike
click for video

Nov 29/12: India. The Times of India reports that Israel’s Spike-MR missile may be about to elbow Javelin aside, because the Israelis are willing to transfer enough technology to allow production in India.

The Ministry wants to equip all 356 of its infantry battalions with an estimated 2,000 launchers and 24,000 missiles, produced by state-owned Bharat Dynamics. The Army reportedly wants to complete the induction of advanced 2.5 km range anti-tank guided missiles by the end of the 12th Plan (2017).

The US does make technology transfer offers to India, but Spike is eventually picked (q.v. Oct 24/14).

Nov 19/12: Oman. The US DSCA announces [PDF] the Government of Oman’s official request to buy up to 400 Javelin Guided Missiles, plus the Javelin Weapon Effects Simulator (JAVWES), missile containers, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, and other forms of US government and contractor support.

This is Oman’s 2nd DSCA request (q.v. July 28/06), and its estimated cost is up to $96 million. If both requests result in maximum orders, Oman would have 650 missiles and 30 CLUs.

The principal contractors will be the Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Javelin Joint Venture in Orlando, FL and Tucson, AZ. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Oman.

Oman request

Nov 19/12: Indonesia. The US DSCA announces [PDF] the Government of Indonesia’s request to buy up to 180 Javelin Block I Javelin Missiles, 25 Command Launch Units (CLU), Missile Simulation Rounds (MSR), Battery Coolant Units (BCU), Enhanced Basic Skills Trainer, Weapon Effects Simulator, batteries, battery chargers, support equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training and training equipment, and other forms of U.S. Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $60 million.

The DSCA submits that “The acquisition of the Javelin system is part of the Indonesia Army’s overall military modernization program.” The principal contractors will be the Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Javelin Joint Venture in Orlando, FL and Tucson, AZ. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Indonesia.

Indonesia request

FY 2012

Javelin + RWS; France’s VAB Javelin APC; UAE follow-on request; Various orders. French VAB & US RG-31,
Afghanistan 2009
(click to read article)

Sept 23/12: India issues. India is absolutely interested in Javelin. Their soldiers fired some in 2009 joint exercises with American troops, and Defence Minister AK Antony said in August 2010 that a Letter of Request would be sent. So, why has no DSCA request been approved? India’s PTI explains that conditions regarding the secrecy of certain components are holding up an agreement. This isn’t the first time transfer of technology and proprietary designs have had an impact on US-Indian sales, and it won’t be the last. Raytheon will say only that:

“The Javelin JV stands ready to respond to all requests of the Indian government relating to the evaluation and procurement of the combat-proven missile while ensuring it adheres to a US and Indian governments’ agreement.”

If Javelin continues to hit roadblocks, Israel’s RAFAEL awaits with its popular Spike family of missiles, which go all the way up to the 25+ km Spike-NLOS / Tamuz.

Aug 6/12: Belgium request. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Belgium’s official request to buy 240 Block I Javelin Missiles, 60 Command Launch Units (CLU), Missile Simulation Rounds (MSR), Battery Coolant Units (BCU), support equipment, spare and repair parts, training, and U.S. Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $88 million, but exact figures will depend on a negotiated contract.

The Belgian Army would use them to replace its existing MBDA MILAN anti-tank missiles. The Javelin Joint Venture (JJV) consortium would be the prime contractor, and implementation would require 6 U.S. Government or contractor representatives to travel to Belgium for a period of 2 weeks for equipment training.

Belgium request

June 19/12: France. At the Eurosatory 2012 show, French operators give the Javelin missile high marks for performance in the field, and the Javelin JV is in talks with 2 French firms to integrate Javelin with the BAE/Nexter CT40 turret. Nexter is the first firm, of course. Javelin integration would offer France a way to use their stock of Javelin missiles after they leave Afghanistan, though there has been no shortage of demand-stoking brushfire conflicts in recent years.

The longer-term issue for Javelin is that France intends to develop a competitive MMP anti-tank missile for their troops.

At the same time, Panhard General Defense is working with Lockheed Martin UK to develop its Sphinx medium 6×6 wheeled armored vehicle concept for France’s EBRC light tank competition. Lockheed Martin UK expects to leverage its turret work for the British FRES-SV and WCSP, which means that any integration work could eventually filter back to those British programs. Sources: Army Recognition, “Lockheed Martin at Eurosatory 2012”.

June 11/12: Javelin RWS. Lockheed Martin touts winter firings of Javelin missiles in Norway, launched from a Kongsberg Protector Remote Weapon Station (RWS) with Javelin Vehicle Launcher (JVL) electronics. Norway already owns and deploys Javelin, and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence sponsored the live fire demonstration in Rena, Norway. The 2 Javelin missiles scored 2 direct hits when fired from the Protector-JVL system on a Piranha V wheeled APC, striking targets 800 and 1650 meters away.

The move positions Norway’s Kongsberg to consolidate and grow its RWS market share among Javelin’s international customer base, by offering a system that lets vehicles of all sizes add both machine gun and anti-tank capabilities that are controlled from inside the vehicle. Norway is first off the blocks, as Javelin Joint Venture president Duane Gooden says that discussions are underway to deploy the Protector/Javelin combination on their vehicles. Ultimately, the largest buys of existing Protector and Javelin systems point to their biggest opportunity: the US Army, which has already conducted tests with its Kongsberg-build CROWS-II RWS (q.v. Dec 7/10).

April 13/12: Order. A $30.1 million firm-fixed-price contract modification buys Javelin missile Block 0 rounds, plus battery coolant units, student stations, instructor stations, and tripods. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, with an estimated completion date of March 31/15. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by U.S. Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-09-C-0376).

Feb 13/12: Retrofits. A $12.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification will buy cost reduction initiative retrofits for the 2001BH tactical (missile) round and 3001AM command launch unit. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and the contract will run to Dec 31/14. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W31P4Q-09-C-0376).

Jan 17/12: Order. A $6.7 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for Command Launch Unit retrofits, and missiles. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/14. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W31P4Q-09-C-0376).

Jan 4/12: Australia support. A 5-year, $1.9 million Javelin Repair and Support Services contract for Australia. FBO.gov.

Jan 3/12: UAE support. A 5-year, $749,122 Javelin Repair and Support Services contract for the United Arab Emirates. FBO.gov.

Dec 16/11: UAE request. The US DSCA announces [PDF] the United Arab Emirates’ official request for another 260 Javelin missiles, plus containers, tripods, weapon simulators, enhanced basic skills trainers, training and other training equipment, rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries, battery chargers and dischargers, battery coolant units, and other support equipment including spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, and U.S. Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $60 million, but will depend on negotiations.

The UAE’s original DSCA request for Javelins was issued on Nov 17/04, and a July 2/08 contract finally began production. This DSCA request confirms that the UAE now has Javelin Anti-Tank missiles in its inventory, but numbers weren’t specified for the 2008 contract, and Raytheon would not discuss them. The DSCA request had mentioned 1,000 missiles and 100 CLUs. As before, the prime contractor would be the JAVELIN joint venture of Lockheed-Martin in Orlando, FL, partnered with Raytheon in Tucson, AZ.

UAE request

Nov 30/11: VAB Javelin. Renault Trucks touts their work integrating Javelin onto France’s 13-tonne VAB 4×4 wheeled APCs. The Javelin integration project was ordered on June 15/11 as an urgent operational requirement. Renault Trucks Defense designed, developed and tested an integration kit that allows 6 missiles, 2 firing posts and 2 tripods to be carried inside the VAB. The 10 kits were delivered Oct 14/11, and integration onto existing VAB Eryx vehicles is taking place in theater.

France has over 500 VABs in Afghanistan alone, and the vehicle is used by both regular forces and by the French Foreign Legion. MBDA’s Eryx is a shorter-range (0.6 vs. 2.5 km), wire-guided anti-armor missile that will still see widespread use by French forces, but Javelin’s range and guidance do make it a better option in an environment known for long-range infantry engagements. Each year, VAB improvements are made through a partnership between Renault, the DGA and the French Army Technical Department (STAT).

Nov 9/11: Order. A $97.8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification of an existing contract “to support the Javelin Hardware Program,” i.e. buy Javelin components. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ and Orlando, FL with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/14. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W31P4Q-09-C-0376).

FY 2011

France orders; Saudi request; CROWS-II Javelin firing. So easy, even a
General can use it!
(click to play video)

June 14/11: Order. A $187 million contract for 715 rounds; 386 battery coolant units; 10 C-size authorized stockage lists; and 386 command launch unit retrofits. Inquiries confirmed this as a Javelin contract.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and Orlando, FL, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/14. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W31P4Q-09-C-0376).

Jan 12/11: Georgia. The Voice of Russia reports that Georgia has requested anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons from the USA, including Javelin missiles. Voice of Russia.

Georgia request

December 2010: France order confirmed. France is starting to train troops to use its Javelins, ordered earlier this year (vid. April 5/10 entry). DefenseNews reports that 1st batch of 4 simulator units were deemed in bad condition and refused by DGA.

France

Dec 7/10: CROWS-II integration. Raytheon announces:

“…the first Javelin missile firings from a Common Remote Operations Weapon Station II [DID: sensors and a machine gun mounted on vehicles, and controlled by a joystick and screen inside]. The station was mounted on a Stryker Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) in a near-tactical configuration. Three missiles impacted their targets at 500 and 1,000 meters (1,640 and 3,280 feet) downrange, confirming the successful integration of the Javelin into the CROWS II.”

Dec 3/10: Order. A $10.4 million firm-fixed-price contract, exercising contract options for Javelin hardware: command launch units, battery coolant units, retrofits and authorized stock list spares. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, with an estimated completion date of June 30/13 (W3IP4Q-09-C-0376).

Nov 18/10: Saudi request. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces Saudi Arabia’s official request [PDF] to buy 20 JAVELIN Command Launch Units (CLUs) with Integrated Day/Thermal Sights, 150 JAVELIN Guided Missiles, and 12 Buy-to-Fly test Missiles. The order also includes containers; missile simulation rounds; the Enhanced Producibility Basic Skills Trainer (EPBST); rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries; battery dischargers, chargers, and coolant units; support equipment; spare and repair parts; publications and technical data; and other forms of U.S. Government and contractor support.

The prime contractors will be the Javelin Joint Venture of Raytheon in Tucson, AZ, and Lockheed Martin, in Orlando FL; and the contract is estimated at up to $71 million. Saudi Arabia currently does not have Javelin Anti-tank missiles in its inventory, but the DSCA says they will have no difficulty adding them, and implementation of this sale will not require the assignment of any U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Unlike the requests made under the Saudis’ $60 billion set of requests in October 2010, this DSCA request does not mention what branch of the Saudi military this purchase is for. Defense Update says that:

“The Saudi Arabian Land Forces currently have about 1,000 obsolete Dragon anti-tank missiles which are due for replacement by the new Javelins. The new combined arms battalions fielded with the Royal Saudi National Guard could also be equipped with the new weapons.”

On the other hand, the Saudi Arabian National Guard recently bought wireless TOW-2A RF missiles. TOWs are heavier and can be fired by ground vehicles and helicopters, but the DSCA request was very large, and the TOW can also fill the same portable infantry niche that Javelin claims. Note that unlike the fire-and-forget Javelin, the BGM-71 TOW requires continuous guidance.

While most military branches would lean toward standardization, the Saudis have never been especially enamored of the concept. Javelins could supplement TOW missile in the National Guard, therefore, or they could be destined for Saudi Land Forces as a Dragon replacement. If so, this request is best seen as a precursor buy, allowing the Saudis to gain more direct experience before deciding on a larger order and full replacement. A 3rd option, especially given the low number of units, would involve a sale of these higher-end and more portable weapons to the Saudi Royal Guard.

Saudi request

Oct 13/10: Support. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL receives a $42.7 million firm-fixed-price contract, covering life cycle contractor support services for US Army and USMC Javelin hardware returned from the field for maintenance. The contract is technically issued on Sept 30/10, the last day of FY 2010.

Work is to be performed in Los Angeles, CA (40%), and Orlando, FL (60%), with an estimated completion date of Dec 30/15. One bid was solicited with one bid received. (W31P40-07-C-0154).

Oct 13/10: Order. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL receives a $48.8 million firm-fixed-price contract covering more US Army, US Marine Corps, and Foreign Military Sales under the FY 2009 Javelin hardware production requirement. The contract is technically issued on Sept 30/10, the last day of FY 2010.

Work is to be performed in Tucson, AZ (50%), and Orlando, FL (50%), with an estimated completion date of Oct 30/12. One bid was solicited with one bid received by U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, AMSAM-AC-TM-H at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-0-C-0376).

FY 2009

British ship more to the front, order more; French win & request; Jordan request. Royal Marines,
Afghanistan
(click to view full)

Aug 12/10: Order. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL receives a $309 million firm-fixed-price contract for US Army, US Marine Corps, and Foreign Military Sales under the FY 2009 Javelin hardware production requirement.

Work is to be performed in Tucson, AZ (50%), and Orlando, FL (50%), with an estimated completion date of Oct 30/12. One bid was solicited with one bid received by U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, AMSAM-AC-TM-H at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-0-C-0376).

July 19/10: US Order. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL receives a $96 million firm-fixed-price definitized letter contract to buy US Army and Marine Corps hardware requirements for the FY 2009-2011 Javelin hardware program.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (50%), and Orlando, FL (50%), with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/14. The missile has just 1 manufacturer; 1 bid was solicited with 1 bid received (W31P4Q-09-C-0376).

April 5/10: France. The US DSCA announces [PDF] France’s official request to buy 260 JAVELIN Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, 76 Command Launch Units with Integrated Day/Thermal Sight, plus missile containers, missile simulation rounds, the Enhanced Basic Skills Trainer, JAVELIN Weapon Effects Simulator Trainers, 2-level maintenance services, batteries, battery dischargers and chargers, battery coolant units, spare and repair parts, test and tool sets, personnel training and equipment, and other forms of US government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $69 million.

The prime contractor will be the Javelin Joint Venture between Raytheon in Tucson, AZ, and Lockheed Martin in Orlando, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Note that a DSCA request is not a contract, but it does pave the way for one.

France request

Feb 25/10: Order. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL received a $21 million firm-fixed-price contract for FY 2009-2011 hardware production of Javelin systems for Taiwan.

Work is to be performed in Tucson, AZ (50%, Raytheon), and Orlando, FL (50%, LM), with an estimated completion date of Jan 17/11. One bid was solicited with one bid received by Aviation & Missile Command Contracting Command, CCAM-TM-H in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-09-C-0376). See also Oct 3/08 entry.

Feb 22/10: France picks Javelin. French defense minister Hervé Morin announces that France will buy Javelin missiles, rather than the Eurospike family or MBDA’s Milan-ER variant. The current set of Milan missiles will be kept until 2015, and the ministerial investment committee has decided on an initial buy of 260 Javelin missiles and 76 launchers, which are expected to see use in Afghanistan. The expected cost is around $70 million, but negotiations will determine the final price and numbers. Raytheon representatives confirmed to DID that no Letter of Offer and Acceptance has been signed yet. Once it is signed, this deal will have 2 interesting points worth watching.

Javelin is widely used by American and British forces in Afghanistan, and France has just signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UK, to allow joint purchases of military equipment for Urgent Operational Requirements. It will be interesting to see if France’s eventual contract becomes, in effect, a joint buy that benefits from Britain’s negotiated terms and volume discounts.

The second interesting question involves future opportunities. A larger future purchase of anti-tank missiles is expected to replace French Milan missile stocks more fully within the next few years. See also Oct 9/09 entry. Defense News.

Feb 1/10: The Pentagon releases its FY 2011 budget request, which includes $163.9 million for 715 Javelin missiles. While this continues full rate production, it is a sharp drop-off from previous years.

Dec 17/09: UK order. The Javelin Joint Venture announces a $176 million (about GBP 109 million) contract from the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense for more than 1,300 Javelin missile rounds and associated engineering support.

See the Nov 13/09 entry, which discusses a related internal transfer of Javelin rounds, and the way these missiles are being used in Afghanistan.

Britain

Nov 30/09: Jordan request. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] Jordan’s official request to buy 162 more Javelin Command Launch Units (CLUs) with Integrated Day/ Thermal Sights, 1,808 more Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, 18 Fly-to-Buy Missiles for testing, plus containers, missile simulation rounds, enhanced basic skills trainer (EPBST), rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries, battery dischargers and chargers, and coolant units, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, and U.S. Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is $388 million.

“Jordan, which already has Javelin Anti-Tank missiles in its inventory, will have no difficulty absorbing these additional missiles.” The prime contractor will be the Javelin Joint Venture, and implementation of this proposed sale would not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Jordan.

Jordan request

Nov 13/09: UK. The UK Ministry of Defence announces that it’s sending an extra 1,300 Javelin missiles to Afghanistan to:

“…top up stocks… Troops in Afghanistan are using Javelin to blow up fortified enemy positions and mortar compounds. The system also provides an excellent 24-hour surveillance, target and acquisition capability for the troops… The missile can be fired from enclosed spaces, providing enhanced flexibility and protection for its crew.”

Sergeant Ross Jones, Royal Marines, from 42 Commando is quoted as saying that:

“If we are going to invest in these missiles it’s definitely a good idea – the amount that are being used and fired in theatre is phenomenal. They do save lives and anything that can do that is a good idea.”

That is so, but routinely using Javelins from beyond enemy engagement range, as a form of artillery, is a very expensive proposition that wastes most of the missiles’ capabilities. Much cheaper alternatives that could serve this front-line need are available on the global market – and might even be available in Britain via the RB57 NLAW, if that project is able to deliver.

Oct 9/09: France. France is reportedly considering an emergency buy of Javelin missiles for use in Afghanistan, though the Israeli-designed EuroSpike is also a reported contender. The estimated requirement is around 50-60 launchers and 300 missiles, with an estimated budget of EUR 70 million. All of these figures are subject to revision and negotiation, of course, and there are reports that the French Army evaluators preferred the cheaper Spike for its cost and faster delivery. Defense News | Liberation’s Secret Defense blog [in French].

See also Allbusiness August coverage of the wider man-potable anti-tank missile competition between MBDA’s Milan ER, the Lockheed/ Raytheon Javelin, and RAFAEL’s Spike/ EuroSpike.

Oct 6/09: Order. Raytheon and the Javelin joint venture announce a $214 million U.S. Army contract for Javelin missiles, command launch units (CLUs), and training and field support.

FY 2007 – 2008

UAE & Oman order; 5-year USAR support deal; Taiwan request; Block 1 missile qualified. Desert fire
(click to view full)

July 10/09: Support. Raytheon and the Javelin joint venture announce a new 5-year, 298.6 million contract from the US Army for life-cycle support. The Javelin Joint Venture will provide the U.S. Army with depot spares, repair support, training and data. The contract will be issued in stages over its lifetime, and the FY 2009 funded value is $34.9 million.

The Javelin JV’s support won an award in 2007 (q.v. Jan 17/07 entry), and VP Barry James proudly cites his team’s ability to coordinate shipments in and out of theater to the repair facility and back to the front line in a matter of days.

Dec 18/08: USMC upgrade. Raytheon announces a $29.9 million U.S. Marine Corps contract to upgrade 404 Javelin Block 0 command launch units to Block I. The upgrade will extend the detection, recognition and identification range of the CLUs but about 38%, while doubling the operating time. The joint venture team began the upgrade program in October 2008 and expects to have it completed by spring 2011.

Both changes will be welcome. Enemy forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are sing machine gun fire and mortars at ranges of 2.5 km/ 1.5 miles or more. Block I gives U.S. Marines the ability to employ the Javelin missile in riposte within that same effective range. Doubled operating time means fewer heavy batteries to carry, which will be equally welcome.

Oct 3/08: Taiwan. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] Taiwan’s formal request to buy 182 more Javelin guided missile rounds and 20 command launch units, plus 40 missile simulation rounds, trainers, rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries, support equipment, spare and repair parts, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $47 million.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require a U.S. Government Quality Assurance Team consisting of 1 contractor and 2 U.S. Government representatives in country for 5 days to accomplish the initial deployment of the missiles. Taiwan won’t need more help than that, as they were one of the Javelin “fire and forget” missile’s early customers in 2002.

Taiwan request

Sept 4/08: Order. Raytheon announces a $111.6 million Javelin supplemental contract to produce additional missiles and command launch units. The joint venture expects to deliver the missiles and CLUs to the U.S. Army in the spring of 2011.

July 2/08: UAE & Oman order. A $101.4 million firm-fixed price contract for an award of foreign military sales (FMS) for missile rounds, command launch units, the enhanced producibility version of the basic skills trainer, battery coolant units, and 1 C-size authorized stockage list spare. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and Orlando, FL, and is expected to be complete by May 15/11. One bid was solicited on July 31/07 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).

At the time, DID noted that Bahrain and Oman were the only new FMS request for the Javelin missile since 2006, adding that the announced value of their combined contracts would equal about $100 million. A July 29/08 release from Raytheon, however, said that the Javelin Joint Venture had “received a $115 million U.S. government contract to produce the Javelin anti-tank missile and command launch unit for the United Arab Emirates and Oman.”

Raytheon confirmed to DID that this is the UAE’s 1st contract for Javelin missiles, and Oman’s 2nd. The UAE’s Nov 17/04 DSCA request for Javelins (see entry) involved 1,000 missiles, 100 CLUs, etc. for an estimated value of $135 million. Oman’s July 28/06 request involved 250 missiles, 30 CLUs, etc., for an estimated value of $48 million (see entry); this is the 2nd installment of that request.

UAE & Oman

FY 2007 – 2008

UAE & Oman order; 5-year USAR support order; US support wins logistics award; Taiwan request; Block 1 missile qualified. UK Javelin, Afghanistan
(click to view full)

Aug 13/07: Australia order. A $5.3 million firm-fixed-price contract for tactical rounds (i.e. missiles) for Australia. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%), and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Oct. 31, 2009. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22, 2003 by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).

Australia

July 9/07: The Javelin JV receives a $172.2 million modification to their firm-fixed-price contract, exercising an option for Javelin FY 2007 production and remanufacture, and Command Launch Unit supplemental hardware.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%), and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Feb. 28, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22, 2003 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).

Jan 17/07: Javelin Joint Venture Earns Logistics Award for Supporting the Warfighter. The Javelin Joint Venture Logistics Support Team receives the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency’s 2006 Defense Logistics Award for Contractor-Military Collaboration.

Jan 10/07: Block 1. Raytheon and Lockheed report successful qualification tests for the Block 1 Javelin missile at Redstone Arsenal, in Huntsville, AL. The Block 1 missile has an improved rocket motor that will reduce the missile’s time of flight; improvements to the command launch unit (CLU); software enhancements; and an enhanced performance warhead that increases Javelin’s lethality against a wider range of target sets. Raytheon release | Lockheed Martin release | Defense Update | Jane’s.

Javelin Block I qualified

FY 2006 and earlier

Bahrain request; Oman request; UAE request. Looks like OIF made a local impression. Javelin

Sept 6/06: Order. A $38.9 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for Javelin missile rounds and remanufactured rounds. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%), and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Feb. 28, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22, 2003 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).

July 28/06: Oman request. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] Oman’s formal request for 250 Javelin missiles, 30 CLUs, simulators, plus required support involving trainers, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, a Quality Assurance Team, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $48 million.

The prime contractor would be the Raytheon/Lockheed-Martin JAVELIN Joint Venture in Orlando, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale, and implementation will require a U.S. Government Quality Assurance Team consisting of 1 contractor and 2 U.S. Government representatives to Oman for 1 week to assist in the delivery and deployment of the missiles. Several contractor and U.S. Government representatives will travel to Oman for 2-week visits twice annually, in order to participate in training, program management, and technical review. Se also Raytheon’s Jan 6/05 release, which covers the selection decision but predates the formal request.

Oman request

July 21/06: Bahrain request. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announces Bahrain’s request [PDF] for 180 Javelin anti-armor missile rounds (see MPEG video of Javelin firing) and 60 Javelin command launch units (CLUs), plus simulators, trainers, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, Quality Assurance Team services, and other related elements of logistics support.

The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $42 million, and the prime contractor will be Raytheon/Lockheed-Martin JAVELIN Joint Venture. Bahrain is the base for the US 5th Fleet, and a close ally in the region.

Bahrain request

July 3/06: Order. A $17.2 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for the Javelin’s CLUs (Command Launch Units). Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%), and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Feb. 28, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22, 2003 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).

Sept 21/05: Order. A $42.4 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for “Javelin CLU (901)/ EPBST (101) supplemental hardware definitization,” which means it settles up the final price for the July 5/05 contract at $110.1 million.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Feb 28/08. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136). Note that EPBST = “enhanced producibility basic skills trainers.”

July 5/05: Order. a $67.7 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for “Javelin CLU (901)/ EPBST (101) Supplemental Hardware Quantities.” Work will be performed in Orlando, FL (40%), and Tucson, AZ (60%), and is expected to be complete by Sept 30/08. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).

May 11/05: USN Order. A $6.2 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for Javelin Weapon Systems Hardware for the US Navy. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Feb 28/08. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).

April 6/05: Order. A $128 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for Javelin Weapon System Hardware Procurement. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Feb 28/08. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).

Nov 17/04: UAE request. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] the United Arab Emirates’ formal request for 100 Javelin command launch units and 1,000 missile rounds, plus simulators, trainers, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, a Quality Assurance Team, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $135 million.

Implementation will require the assignment of a U.S. Government Quality Assurance Team consisting of 2 U.S. Government personnel and 1 contractor representative to UAE for one week to assist in the delivery and deployment of the missiles. DSCA adds a tactical note:

“The desert warfare missions of the infantry and light armored forces of the UAE require the protection afforded by the capabilities of the JAVELIN system. The UAE land forces are small, well-rounded forces that are multi-mission oriented. JAVELIN will provide the forces with a credible anti-armor defense that is critical to success in the open desert.”

UAE request

June 25/04: Order. A $5.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for Javelin Weapon Systems Hardware. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by May 31/06. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 22/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0136).

April 2/04: Support. A $6.4 million cost-plus-award-fee contract for engineering services for the Javelin weapon system. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by March 31/06. This was a sole source contract initiated on July 31/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0092).

March 5/04: Order. A $49.7 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for 450 Javelin Tactical Rounds, 90 Command Launch Units, 120 Battery Coolant Units, 3 Cutaway Missiles, Spares, Tripod Trade Study, Special Tool Kit, Technical Instruction Manuals, Missile Product Description, Missile Description, Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)/Logistics Support Analysis/Provisioning, and an ILS Reports Database.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by March 31/06. This was a sole source contract initiated on Oct 29/99 (DAAH01-00-C-0108).

Feb 2/04: Support. An $18 million firm-fixed-price, cost reimbursable, and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for life cycle contractor support for the JAVELIN weapon system. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by Jan 15/08. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 5/03 (W31P4Q-04-C-0046).

Jan 20/04: Order. A $10.5 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for 82 tactical rounds, 36 command launch units, 6 enhanced producibility basic skills trainers, 36 battery coolant units, 1 short round and spares. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%) and Orlando, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by March 31/06. This was a sole source contract initiated on Oct 29/99 (DAAH01-00-C-0108).

Additional Readings

Readers with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

DID thanks reader Trent Telenko for his assistance and tips.

• GlobalSecurity.org – Javelin Antitank Missile

• Army Technology – Javelin Anti-Armour Missile, USA

• USA Today – Javelin missile presentation & explanation (Flash format)

• DID – US Military Bringing a Switchblade to a Gun Fight. Miniature kamikaze drones with the equivalent of a 40mm grenade warhead. Won’t help you against a tank, but it’s just as good against enemy snipers or machine gun nests, and lots cheaper.

• Defense Update (May 2008) – Improving the Strykers. Note that “LAV-H” concept on display at IDGA Tactical Vehicles Summit 2008, which includes a Javelin missile mounted beside the machine gun on its Protector remote weapons station.

• Michael Yon (May 7/07) – Rattlesnake. Michael is becoming one of the best military journalists of this generation. Here he files a dispatch that covers British forces near Basra, Iraq, as they plan and execute a counter-ambush trap using Javelin missiles in a prominent role. While any guided anti-armor missile down to a 1960s-era wire-guided AT-3 Sagger could have been substituted with similar results, note the C4SI (Command, Control, Communication, Computing, Surveillance & Intelligence) issues faced by British forces on the battlefield – issues any substitute weapon would also have to overcome.

• US Army, Army Magazine via WayBack (June 1/06) – Soldier Armed. Reviews the Javelin’s development history, talks about the system’s utility on the battlefield and discusses planned future enhancements.

• Australian DoD Army Newspaper (December 2003) – Watch out, armour: First Javelin instructors qualify at School of Infantry. Covers training aspects.

Australian CH-47D:
Afghanistan, 2006
(click to view full)

In December 2005, Australia decided to upgrade its CH-47D Chinook fleet, in preparation for use on the front lines. Afghanistan’s high altitudes and sometimes-scorching temperatures reduce rotor lift. That made the Chinooks a far better choice than upgrading the ADF’s S-70 Black Hawk helicopters, whose reduced carrying capacity would limit their tactical uses. Those CH-47D Chinooks have gone on to play an important role in Afghanistan, amidst a general shortage of useful helicopters. Now, Australia seems determined to supplement its older CH-47D fleet with new and improved CH-47F models, which feature more modern electronics, uprated engines, and numerous other improvements.

The question was when the DSCA request would become an actual contract. That question has just been answered.

Contracts and Key Events Kandahar pickup
(click to view full)

December 22/15: New FMS Order. The US State Department has approved the sale of three CH-47F Chinook helicopters to Australia. The $180 million foreign military sale includes six Aircraft Turbine Engines and three Common Missile Warning Systems, as well as three Infrared Signature Suppression Systems and logistical support. Australia has ordered seven of the latest CH47F model to replace the existing CH-47Ds currently in service with the Royal Australian Air Force. Delivery is expected to be completed by 2017.

September 15/15: The Australian Army has taken delivery of a seventh CH-47F Chinook helicopter ahead of schedule, with this the final Chinook ordered through a $513.5 million contract with the US Army Security Assistance Command in 2010, along with simulators and spares. The Australian government first requested the helicopters in April 2009. The Australian CH-47Fs are US-configured models, which allowed Australia to take advantage of volume pricing when the $370 million manufacturing order was placed with Boeing in January 2012. The helicopters will operate from Queensland-based 5th Aviation Regiment, 16th Aviation Brigade, with Boeing’s Australian subsidiary set to provide maintenance support for the seven aircraft. A housing facility for the new Chinooks is also under construction, with this slated for completion by mid-2017.

Nov 14/14: Infrastructure. Australia’s government announces announces an A$ 54.8 million contract with Lend Lease Pty Ltd, who will build new facilities to house and support the Army’s CH-47F Chinook Helicopters at RAAF Base Townsville. Construction is expected to begin before the end of 2014, and be complete by mid 2017. Sources: Australia DoD, “Defence awards contract for new Chinook helicopter facilities in Townsville”.

July 18/14: Infrastructure. Australia’s government announces Parliamentary approval of a $54.8 million project for facilities at RAAFB Townsville, which will support the introduction and sustainment of the incoming 7 CH-47F Chinooks, and corresponding replacement of 6 CH-47Ds there.

Construction is expected to begin in late 2014 and be complete by mid 2017, supporting about 50 full-time jobs over the life of the project. Sources: Australia DoD, “Parliamentry Secretary to the Minister for Defence – Multi-million dollar Defence investment in Townsville”.

Jan 5/12: Contract. Boeing Co. in Ridley Park, PA receives a $370 million firm-fixed-price contract to “provide for the services in support of the bridge requirement for new CH-47 F model aircraft to support foreign military sales.” The English translation, based on responses to our inquiries, is that Australia and the UAE are buying 14 CH-47Fs (7/7 RAAF, 7/16 UAE) under the US Army contract, in order to benefit from its volume pricing.

Other CH-47F customers like Britain and Canada, who ordered heavily customized versions, can’t take advantage of that. Neither can Italy, who will produce the machines in-country under an agreement between Boeing and AgustaWestland.

Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA, with an estimated completion date of June 30/16. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received by the US Army Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL, on behalf of its Foreign Military Sale clients (W58RGZ-12-C-0010).

Australia: 7

May 20/10: Agency contract. Australia’s Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) signs a contract with the US Army Security Assistance Command, at the Australian Embassy in Washington. The AUD$ 513.5 million (about $470 million) contract will buy 7 CH-47F Chinook helicopters, 2 Simulators, and associated spares. The first 2 aircraft are planned to enter service in 2014, with all 7 in service by 2017.

With respect to standardization, the helicopters will be delivered in American configuration. Greg Combet, the Minister for Defence Personnel, Materiel and Science, says that:

“Australian industry will have the opportunity to incorporate the Australian specific enhancements and to support the new helicopters as part of through-life support arrangements.”

Feb 25/10: Approved. The Australian Government gives second pass approval to “Project AIR 9000 Phase 5C” for 7 CH-47Fs, at a budget of AUD $755 million. This approves the plan’s details, but is not itself a contract. Australia expects to field the first 2 helicopters in 2014, with all 7 expected by 2017. The ministerial statement makes it clear that the 7 CH-47Fs would replace 5th Aviation Regiment, C squadron’s existing 6 CH-47Ds, would also be based in Townsville, and would be expected to serve until 2040.

Per the recommendations of past commissions like Australia’s famous Kinnaird Review, Senator Faulkner said the new aircraft will be procured and maintained in the same broad configuration as the United States Army CH-47Fs. Australia also promised to consider joining the USA’s Chinook Product Improvement Program as a way to keep those configurations aligned, “when information on this program is of second pass quality.” Having said all that, however, “The new Australian Chinooks will also receive some additional ADF-specific equipment to meet certain operational and safety requirements.”

2nd pass approval

July 1/09: Delay. Shephard Group reports that Australia may not place a contract order for the new CH-47Fs until 2012, and doesn’t expect to field them before 2016-2018. In the interim, Australia hopes to issue maintenance support tenders for its 6 existing CH-47Ds.

The original acquisition plan, approved by the Liberal Party government, would have bought 3 new-build CH-47Fs, and remanufactured existing CH-47Ds to CH-47F configuration. The new Defence Capability Plan, issued this day, revises the timeline and is silent on the balance between new and remanufactured aircraft.

April 13/09: Request. The USA’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces Australia’s official request for 7 CH-47F CHINOOK Helicopters with 14 (2 per aircraft) T55-GA-714A Turbine engines, 7 Dillon Aero M134D 7.62mm Miniguns, 16 AN/ARC-201D Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radios (SINCGARS), 7 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below Blue Force Trackers (FBCB2/BFT), 2 spare T-55-GA-714A Turbine engines, plus mission equipment, communication and navigation equipment, ground support equipment, spare and repair parts, special tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, and support. The estimated cost is $560 million, but a DSCA request is not a contract.

The prime contractors will be: Boeing Integrated Defense Systems in St. Louis, MO (helicopters); Rockwell Collins in Cedar Rapids, IA (engines); and ITT in Fort Wayne, IN (radios). Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of 2 contractor representatives to Australia for approximately 3 years, with about 6 U.S. Government personnel participating in program management and/or technical reviews in-country for 1-2 week intervals annually.

DSCA request: 7 CH-47Fs