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This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution. Among the well-known figures who took part in this political upheaval, Kang Sheng is, in the author’s opinion, the most interesting. Kang is regarded as the first generation of international relations specialists in communist China and the designer of the “China–USSR Grand Debate”.

Kang had been an adviser to the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Before his death in late-1975, he had been a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and vice-president of the People’s Republic of China. He ranked fourth in terms of political power, and was only inferior to Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen (at that time, Wang was regarded as the successor to Mao). Kang had been a party member since about 1925 and was an experienced party cadre. He had become a member of the Politburo after The Fifth Plenum of the 6th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1934. He was in charge of intelligence and famous for his interrogation techniques.

When he died towards the end of the Cultural Revolution, he was accused of being the spiritual leader of the Gang of Four. The new CCP leader criticized Kang, suggesting that the only reason he had held high political power was because he had been able to gain Mao’s trust. However, this argument is not valid. Kang’s success in acquiring political power can be attributed to structural reasons, reasons which are also applicable in the Communist Party today.

The discursive power of identifying “external threats”

Kang’s greatest capital asset was his overwhelming discursive power in the field of international relations. Currently, one of China’s major concerns is the interference of foreign forces. Whether this is of real concern or not, officials at every level have been busily formulating policy in accordance with such doctrine. Thus, those who dominate the discursive power by defining the potential threat of such foreign forces are able to legitimize their subsequent actions.

In Mao’s era, the major external threat was not posed by the US, but by a revisionist USSR. Among the CCP’s high-ranking officials, there were only a few who understood Russian, and the number of those who had worked in USSR but were still loyal to Chinese Communist Party was extremely limited. Kang was one of the few. He had been assigned to work in Moscow in 1933, and was the vice representative of China in the Communist International. He thus gained experience of the USSR and was a capable Russian speaker. Kang spent 5 years in the USSR, but despite this he remained loyal to the CCP. His name “Kang Sheng” is a Chinese translation of his Russian name. His profile, even in the eyes of USSR officials, was impressive.

In 1960, Kang had represented China in the Warsaw Pact conference. As Sino-USSR relations had become frozen, Kang prepared a sarcastic speech targeting Khrushchev. Khrushchev had then criticized Kang as not being qualified to challenge him in debate. In response, Kang calmly defended himself by pointing out that Khrushchev’s qualifications didn’t match his, since Kang was already in 1935 the alternate member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), whereas at that time Khrushchev had not even been a member of the Central Committee. A Soviet representative recalled later that Kang had used his advantage to selectively transmit information to China and played a major role in the worsening of Sino-USSR relations. 9 Points to Criticize USSR was one of Kang’s a major contributions.

A talented artist

Another talent on which Kang could capitalize was his classical education and artistic ability. Although there were many intellectuals among high-ranking officials in the CCP, the qualifications of these intellectuals were highly inflated. The average educational level of the CCP was in fact even lower than that of the Khmer Rouge, whose ranks included a number of professors.

However, Kang, in addition to holding enormous political power, was one of the few whose abilities had not been exaggerated. His artist talent may not have been useful in Mao’s eyes, but Kang’s ideological manipulability allowed him to merge artwork with politics. He was generally seen as a specialist, and his persuasiveness is not in doubt. Kang had been born into a literate family and was raised with an awareness of the Chinese classics. He was also a very fine calligrapher and could use both hands simultaneously. Yu Qiaqing, the backer of Chiang Kai-shek and a Shanghai billionaire, had been attracted by Kang’s calligraphy.

As a consequence, Kang managed to gain employment with Yu as his personal secretary, a position he used as a cover for spying. It was during that time that Kang began to appreciate cultural relics and became a specialist in the field, familiarizing himself with all kinds of skills and techniques regarding the arts. He went under the name “Lu Chishui” and believed that his talent was greater than that of Qi Baishi. It has been suggested that Kang created the term “Shilin” for the scenic stone forest of Yunnan (although the word was erased after the Cultural Revolution for the sake of political correctness). What is undoubtedly true is that Kang is responsible for almost the entire collection of calligraphy that has been handed down from that period. The collection is referred to as “Kang Style”.

Kang had also learned Kung Fu when he was young and the use of assorted weaponry, and when he was in the USSR, he took up wrestling. In addition to this, he was trained to use a gun; he was a sharpshooter, and would execute traitors himself. As he had grown up in Shandong, which retained a strong German influence, he could speak German as well as Russian. His learning attracted many supporters, including the wife of Mao, Jiang Qing. Kang was the only person whom Jiang Qing would identify as her teacher.

The father of spying in the CCP

Though it is impossible for us to find much information about the policy that Kang formulated as one of the fathers of espionage, several characteristics can be gleaned from officially disclosed information. Unlike ordinary secret service agents, Kang was capable of quantitative management. He provided a number of quantified indicators to assess the loyalty of each CCP Central Representative. This data would then be processed by Jiang Qing. The assessment method was applied to all units and officials of all ranks.

Although false judgments and unjust cases were a common result, the method allowed an efficient reshaping of the ideology of the state, at least from the perspective of its leaders. It is widely acknowledged that “On Contradiction” proposed by Mao has been the guiding principle of class struggle. Actually, the principle originally adopted by Kang had been more orthodox, since Kang had been directly influenced the by USSR’s socialist theory. Kang had been in Moscow during the Soviet era of the Great Terror led by Stalin. As Kang had lived through both the Kirov and Trotsky cases, he understood how to manage through the “terror of quantification”. Mao might have had a superficial knowledge of and ability to integrate Chinese traditional emperor-style governance and the scientific management style of the USSR, but it was Kang who executed both styles competently.

Readers may well ask what value there is in considering Kang now, since he passed away so long ago. The significance of Kang’s case is that his rise was not only the result of individual effort, but also created by sociopolitical structure. If the Communist Party demands a change regarding the mode of governance, it is necessary to fine-tune its management style of the elite class and reassert the adoption of Mass Line. To justify the transformation, Kang’s three instruments of “identification of external threats”, “artistic soft power” and “quantified management style” are the necessities for power acquisition.

War on paper may seem easy. However, the reality is a lot tougher. To acquire all the instruments describe above, the individual needs to have relevant expertise, life experience, organizational skills, a certain level of political sensitivity and loyalty. Individuals possessing all these characteristics are rare. However, once such an individual shows up and holds power, how far he will go should not be underestimated.

The post Kang Shen and the CCP from an IR Perspective appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Mettre à profit la coopération économique au sein de l'Union pour accélérer la dislocation des solidarités nationales : et si le rêve bruxellois devenait réalité ? / Europe, Droit, Économie, Entreprise, Finance, Fiscalité, Immigrés, Migrations, Protection sociale, Travail, Néolibéralisme - (...) / Europe, Droit, Économie, Entreprise, Finance, Fiscalité, Immigrés, Migrations, Protection sociale, Travail, Néolibéralisme - 2014/04

Dans L'opinion du 15 juin 2016

Imaginons un instant cet enchaînement, qui n’est plus à exclure : le 23 juin, le Royaume-Uni quitte l’Union européenne ; Donald Trump est élu président des Etats-Unis en novembre ; en mai suivant, un président français est choisi avec une marge trop étroite face à Marine Le Pen, dans un pays de facto immédiatement clivé et paralysé ; quelques mois plus tard en Allemagne, Angela Merkel paie les séquelles de la crise des réfugiés, ou se retrouve avec une extrême droite puissante.

Les trois grands pays de l’Union européenne, quatre des piliers de l’Alliance atlantique, se retrouveraient alors, en même temps et pour plusieurs années, en crise interne et sans boussole. Ailleurs en Europe, le populisme - c’est-à-dire la mobilisation du peuple pour des raisons électoralistes sur la base d’un discours volontairement simplificateur – aura déjà frappé. Après une telle séquence, il est probable qu’il s’étendra encore. Notre rapport au monde ne peut en sortir indemne.

D’abord parce que les idéaux démocratiques en général, ceux de l’Union européenne en particulier, sortiront laminés par l’arrivée au pouvoir de candidats élus sur leur dénigrement. De cette crise des valeurs résultera nécessairement une crise de légitimité, de crédibilité et donc d’autorité internationale des pays concernés. L’UE comme l’OTAN deviendront les théâtres de divisions politiques funestes. La gestion des crises internationales devra se passer d’elles. En un mot, tout sera à revoir. Une page sera tournée, donnant à la période qui s’était ouverte avec la chute du Mur de Berlin, une issue pour le moins surprenante.

Lire la suite sur  L'Opinion.fr

Pour le site Global Brief (Toronto)



Samir Kassir avait identifié, dans ses Considérations, plusieurs facteurs à ce qu’il appelait le « malheur arabe » face à la modernité (S. Kassir, Considérations sur le malheur arabe, Actes Sud, 2004). Plus prosaïquement, les analyses récentes (voir par exemple The Economist, 14 mai 2016, The War Within) avancent souvent quatre dynamiques de l’effondrement de l’ordre politique arabe dans les dernières années : 1- l’échec du modèle autocratique ; 2- le caractère non soutenable du système d’économie de rente ; 3- les tensions entre religion et politique, particulièrement dans le monde sunnite ; 4- les interventions déstabilisatrices des Etats-Unis, suivies sous Barack Obama par un désengagement tout aussi déstabilisant. En cette année de centenaire des accord Sykes – Picot, bien d’autres hypothèses encore peuvent être avancées : un déclin des politiques étrangères arabes depuis une trentaine d’années face aux trois puissances régionales non arabes (Turquie, Israël, Iran) ; la non résolution du conflit israélo-arabe et la perception arabe d’un refus ou renoncement extérieur à traiter le sujet ; des questions de minorités et de réfugiés suspendues au point d’en devenir autant de conflits gelés… La liste est longue.Il est pourtant un facteur commun à l’ensemble de ces maux : ils ont été engendrés il y a longtemps (soit du fait des acteurs régionaux eux-mêmes, soit des acteurs extérieurs), par la recherche de l’intérêt de possession qui caractérisait l’époque. C’est-à-dire par la conviction que dans un jeu à somme nulle, tout ce qui était gagné par l’un (pétrole, territoire, influence…) était perdu pour l’autre. Il fallait donc posséder, et empêcher l’autre de posséder ou d’accéder à des leviers qui puissent lui permettre de posséder un jour. Dans cette logique, il était utile de diviser pour régner, de cloisonner pour prévenir, de monopoliser le pouvoir pour tenir la société, d’avoir recours à des puissances extérieures pour consolider ses acquis. Les temps ne sont plus à l’intérêt de possession mais à l’intérêt de milieu, c'est-à-dire à la construction d’un environnement stable et prospère, avec des voisins en mesure de participer à l’élaboration d’un cadre collectif autorisant le pacte de sécurité, l’échange ou les économies d’échelle. Dans cette perspective, l’absence de dialogue politique national dans beaucoup de pays arabes, la stagnation économique et sociale, l’absence d’inscription dans des logiques d’intégration régionales et globales, constitue une triple impasse suicidaire. Dans cette perspective encore, les recettes antérieures ne garantissent plus la stabilité mais précipitent au contraire la marche à l’explosion.
Lire la suite sur Global Brief  

(Own report) - Together with his French counterpart, the German foreign minister has announced the EU's transformation to become a "political union" and its resolute militarization for global military operations. In a joint position paper, Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) and Jean-Marc Ayrault (PS) are calling for the EU's comprehensive military buildup, based on a division of labor, to enable future global military operations. Following the Brexit, the EU should, step-by-step, become an "independent" and "global" actor. All forces must be mobilized and all "of the EU's political instruments" must be consolidated into an "integrated" EU foreign and military policy. Steinmeier and Ayrault are therefore pushing for a "European Security Compact," which calls for maintaining "employable high-readiness forces" and establishing "standing maritime forces." The European Council should meet once a year as "European Security Council." Before this paper was made public, Germany's foreign minister and chancellor had made comments also promoting a German global policy and massive rearmament, possibly also with EU-support.

While it may intellectually realize that the basis of China’s power is its economy, the U.S. is still fighting militarily. Therefore, any success against China will necessitate the ultimate U.S. realization that it must reform its own economy.

Acting Locally, More Thinking Globally Needed

The U.S. has recently improved relations with Vietnam to the point of lifting its arms embargo against the country. Meanwhile, it is eagerly awaiting The Hague’s verdict in the Philippines’ case brought against China regarding conflicting South China Sea claims. These maneuvers, along with its “freedom of navigation” (FONOP) patrols in the region, clearly demonstrate the U.S.’ resolve to counter Chinese assertiveness.

However, these hard power moves are only tactical gambits. In order to truly succeed in its global game against China, the U.S. must recognize the importance of soft power.  Specifically, the U.S. must recognize the important role of economics in any nation’s foreign policy stance, including its own.  

Japan is the U.S.’ major ally in Asia and, as such, plays a key role in the American “pivot”, or “rebalance” to Asia.  This is seen in northeast Asia, where proposed and actual amendments to the Japanese constitution will allow Japan to play a greater role in supporting U.S. forces in the region. Japan is also forging its own diplomatic and economic path with respect to Russia, irrespective of U.S. hesitation.

This is the case in southeast Asia as well, where Japan has expressed an interest in upholding regional security in the midst of the various South China Sea disputes. Additionally, Japan (like the U.S.) has targeted Vietnam, the Philippines, Australia, and India as potential partners to balance China in this regard. However, Japan, as of yet, has not participated in the U.S.’ FONOP patrols.

However, Japan is in a quandary similar to many other states in the region as its economy is highly interlinked with that of China. The fact that China is now the leading trading partner of many states in the region, including U.S. allies, poses a major dilemma for the U.S.. No matter how strongly the U.S. may have wanted a statement from its recent ASEAN Sunnylands summit condemning China, many of the forum’s participants had to calculate the potential impact of such a statement on economic ties with China.

Washington Consensus vs. Beijing Consensus

To frame the global economic conflict between the U.S. and China as one between the “Washington Consensus” and the “Beijing Consensus” would be simplistic at best. In its most rudimentary form, the argument purportedly pits one model of economic development, dominated by the market, against the other, supported by government intervention. While this debate may be useful in an academic or think tank setting, its utility to a global audience is limited.

This is because many people around the world are still reeling from the effects of the Great Recession.  What form a government takes in its domestic economic policy is considerably less important than the ultimate results which accrue to that particular country’s citizens. As Deng Xiaoping famously said, “It doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white, as long as it catches the mice.”

The story of how China succeeded, within a generation, in transforming itself from a backward, isolated player on the regional scene to a global power with the world’s largest financial reserves has been told many times. Doubtless, the U.S. and Japan both played a part in this economic miracle, by providing for regional security and giving massive development assistance, respectively.  However, the cumulative effect of long-term, strategic planning by the Chinese government and its emphasis on economic development and educational investment in its citizenry can not be denied. The recent economic slowdown notwithstanding, this planning has enabled the country to lift more people out of poverty, not just in Chinese history, but human history.

Many people around the world still look to the U.S. as a model for possible upward mobility. However, this image has been tarnished as the aftereffects of the economic crisis still continue to linger onward nearly a decade later.  Even more importantly, significant numbers of Americans have parlayed this economic dissatisfaction into political action. While the Occupy Wall Street movement may have been dismissed by some at the time, there can be no dismissal of the current widespread economic discontent, which has led to the rise of anti-establishment presidential candidates of both major parties.

Just as previous generations of people around the world marveled at the U.S.’s post-World War II economic miracle, globalization has given the world’s current generation a window into the U.S.’s current economic troubles. Most damaging, huge numbers of millennials, the largest demographic group in America and literally the future of the country, purport to no longer believe in capitalism itself. If America’s future no longer believes in the nation’s economic viability, why should anyone else in the world? In comparison to China, millions of Americans have not been lifted out of poverty, but have actually been returned to poverty, itself a result of the continuing destruction of the middle-class.

Many authors have tackled this subject before, most notably Richard N. Haas in his seminal book, “Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America’s House in Order”. However, this book was first published three years ago and the case can be made that if there’s been any improvement in the economic life of the average American since then, it’s been marginal at best. What is clear, is that without a concerted effort by the U.S. to tackle problems such as the widening gap between rich and poor, crumbling infrastructure, and universal access to education without crippling lifelong debt, it will eventually lose the economic battle for global hearts and minds to China.

The post U.S. Must Fix Its Economy to Effectively Counter China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Pro-Brexit advocate Boris Johnson poses for a selfie photo with voters on the final day of campaigning before Thursday’s EU referendum vote, in Selby, north England. (Andrew Parsons/AP, File)

Depending on which side you were supporting, 24 June, 2016 was either one of Britain’s “finest hours” or a 21st century “Dunkirk.”

That morning, Britain’s nationalistic impulse prevailed over a slow to form multi-national spirit that proved to be far weaker than most ever thought. By choosing to slap the hands of Brussels based bureaucrats off the helm off H.M.S. Great Britain the Brits have set a precedent that other populations across the EU may very well follow. Have Boris Johnson and the seventeen million people that followed his lead inflicted a massive hole into the wall that up until 24 June, 2016 held back surging nationalism?

Chancellor Angela Merkel characterized the exit vote as a “turning point for Europe” and “a turning point for the European unification process.” But might the outcome also be a harbinger of a coming and monumental pivoting away from the globalization process, especially, that dimension of the phenomena that requires the strengthening of the supranational at the expense of local institutions and authorities.

With this vote, the unthinkable becomes far more thinkable, and even doable for populations across Europe and the United States who feel they have come out on the losing side of the globalization proposition.

With this vote, Britain has now made it less indecent for states (and their anti-globalization, anti-immigration political factions) to advance and intensify conversations centered on putting the speed brakes on free trade, open arms immigration and other defining features of globalization.

With this vote, an entity originally devised and established as a war prevention mechanism is now spiritually at its weakest point since the march towards integration began over 60 years ago.

With this vote, President Vladimir Putin smiles knowing that his up-start, but potent, political and security peer competitor to the West has just had its confidence knocked out of it.

But most importantly, with this vote, the aspiration for a more open, prosperous, unified and homogeneous global society will be more vigorously tested by demagogues and right of center factions across the world that can now look to the UK for inspiration.

Further, European and American voters might come to the conclusion as the Brits have, that their national aches and pains, such as protracted fiscal crisis, immigrant and refugee inflows, and urban terror attacks can be better solved in their respective nations’ capitals than by uber-educated elites based in distant cities.

For sure, even if the causal links between the shortcoming of globalization and the economic pain of individual citizens are statistically frail, the isolationist political mood—to varying degrees a backlash to globalization—might prove hard to contain in the coming months and years.

Lastly, the presumptive American Republican presidential nominee, Donald Trump, celebrated the decision of British citizens to “take their country back” and linked the campaign to his own quest for the U.S. presidency. He remarked that the result goes to show how “angry” voters on both sides of the Atlantic are with the status quo. If the vote on 24 June proves to be the beginning of a trend, Mr. Trump just might get this wall.

The post Brexit Makes Trump’s Wall More Likely appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Sultan Qaboos, who after 43 years in charge is the Arab world’s longest-serving leader (AFP)

Written by Shehab Al Makaleh

Since 2011, the Arab uprisings have engulfed much of the Middle East and North Africa, consuming the attention of publics and policymakers around the world. Indeed, while we pay close attention to the tragedies and (rare) triumphs that befall the region, perhaps we should be doing the opposite: looking to those nations left unscarred by revolution and upheaval.

What is it about their leadership and institutions that allowed them to survive and thrive? And what could potentially destabilize and upend these outliers?

The Gulf state of Oman, for one, has largely remained untouched by instability and, sadly, largely unnoticed by observers. Its stability is mainly attributable to the legitimacy and vision of Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said, the longest serving Arab ruler still in power.

Since ascending to the throne in 1970, Sultan Qaboos has transformed Oman from an impoverished Bedouin land into a prosperous nation with first-class infrastructure, a booming tourism industry, and a military agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom.

However, this trend may quickly come crashing to a halt. Sultan Qaboos is advancing in age, has no children, and has not announced who the next heir to the throne will be. And the sultan will likely be blocked from selecting the next heir himself due to the complex nature of the Omani political system.

This potential vacuum of power may leave the small-but-significant country in a precarious position in an already-unstable region. Sitting on major trade routes from Asia to the Middle East, Oman is a veritable “marine silk road” of energy and goods—its disruption would send economic ripple effects across the continent. Its strategic positioning and domestic politics also make it a high-profile target for terrorist groups as they seek to expand influence.

In the 1990s, the Omanis discovered that their oil reserves were smaller than previously thought, which prompted officials in Muscat to accelerate plans for a transition to a post-oil economy. Oman’s proven reserves are 5.15 billion barrels of crude oil, far less than other Gulf Cooperation Council states such as Saudi Arabia’s 268 billion, Kuwait’s 104 billion, the United Arab Emirates’ 98 billion, or Qatar’s 25 billion.

By 1995, Oman decided to take on the challenges stemming from the nation’s more modest oil reserves and production rates when officials announced the Vision 2020. Oman was one of the first Gulf States to implement a robust long-term plan to diversify its economy.

Nevertheless, the 70% slide in oil prices since mid-2014 has truly underscored the risks of Muscat’s overreliance on the Omani petroleum sector. And on June 17, Oman raised $2.5 billion in a bond sale arranged by five international banks to help meet its budget deficit.

The next Sultan, regardless of who they may be, must continue driving national efforts to diversify Oman’s economy and create new job opportunities in both the state and private sectors. Though Oman’s population grows at less than 4% annually, which is amongst the lowest in the Arab region, a lack of job opportunities threatens to send Omani youth to the streets in protest or join extremist groups offering lucrative economic opportunities.

Extremist groups in Yemen, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State (ISIS) as well as other radical groups, will likely threaten Oman’s security in the post-Qaboos era. The extremists of AQAP are less than 500 kilometers from Oman’s Salalah port. This strategically located port is home to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and connects the Middle East to key markets in Asia and Europe.

As a partner in trading and counter-terrorism, Oman has a cautious yet optimistic future with the United States. The Sultanate became the first Gulf Arab state to enter a formal defense relationship with Washington, signing a “facilities access agreement” in April 1980, which granted U.S. military forces access to the Sultanate’s military bases. From time to time, the U.S still accesses the Masirah Island as deemed necessary to support Muscat. Oman has also helped the Obama administration empty out the Guantanamo Bay detention facility by accepting about half of the inmates released since January 2014.

U.S. officials, however, should recognize the extent to which their counterparts in Muscat take pains to decrease the visibility of Oman’s military partnership with Washington. In terms of Muscat’s alliance with Western powers, Omani authorities must consider the risk of extremists portraying the Sultanate as a Western ‘puppet.’ The next Sultan must continue to strike a balance between allying itself with strong powers, yet maintaining its own autonomy. However, Oman has a key comparative advantage here: its national fabric is based on tolerance, dialogue, and nonviolence within the Omani community.

While there is much speculation over the next heir to Sultan Qaboos, potential successors must be ready to face a number of strategic trials. These challenges, in the hands of the wrong leader, threaten to unravel decades of progress and stability. But with a strong and capable successor at its helm, the country holds promise to remain a steady bulwark of security and prosperity in a fractured region.

Shehab Al Makaleh is the President of the prominent Jordanian think tank Geostrategic and Political Studies of the Middle East Media.

The post Whose Foot Will Drop in Oman? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Auteur de l’article « Brexit : les risques du référendum » paru dans le numéro de printemps 2016 de Politique étrangère (1/2016), Vivien Pertusot, responsable du bureau de l’Ifri à Bruxelles, répond à trois questions en exclusivité pour politique-etrangere.com.

1) Comment expliquer ce vote en faveur du Brexit ?

Le Brexit s’est joué autour de deux questions : le vote anglais et le vote des jeunes. L’Angleterre a largement voté en faveur du Brexit : 15,1 millions d’Anglais ont voté « Leave », tandis que 16,2 millions de Britanniques ont voté « Remain ». Le vote « Remain » doit beaucoup aux votes écossais et londoniens. Toutefois, l’élément déterminant concerne le taux de participation. Celui-ci s’est avéré insuffisant dans les régions pro-maintien. Ainsi, il était inférieur à la participation nationale (72,2 %) dans 23 des 33 circonscriptions londoniennes et a été cinq points inférieurs en Écosse. À l’inverse, le Sud-Est et le Sud-Ouest, majoritairement favorables au « Brexit », ont voté à plus de 76 %.

Le vote des jeunes a également été décisif. Au Royaume-Uni, comme ailleurs, la propension à aller voter évolue avec l’âge. De manière proportionnellement inverse, la tendance au maintien dans l’UE diminue avec l’âge. L’argument selon lequel ce référendum concerne l’avenir des jeunes, aussi rationnel soit-il, a eu l’effet d’un prêche dans le désert. Certaines données sont alarmantes : seuls 38 % des 18-24 ans (pourtant favorables à plus de 70 % au maintien) auraient voté.

2) Quelles crises politiques se dessinent au Royaume-Uni ?

Les partis politiques sont divisés. Les Tories sans surprise, même s’il est possible que la démission de David Cameron d’ici le mois d’octobre permette d’éviter des luttes intestines trop violentes. Cela n’empêchera pas le parti de traverser d’incroyables turbulences. Le prochain leader, et Premier ministre, aura une tâche ardue. Comme précisé dans mon article paru dans Politique étrangère, il ne faut pas négliger l’impact sur les Travaillistes. Le leadership de Jeremy Corbin n’était pas absolu et les démissions en cascade depuis les résultats le confirment : le parti va traverser une période de déchirures internes. Il sort plus affaibli par ce résultat que le parti conservateur.

Reste l’intégrité du Royaume-Uni. La First Minister écossaise Nicola Sturgeon brandit déjà l’hypothèse d’un nouveau référendum sur l’indépendance. Il n’est toutefois pas certain que Londres donne son accord immédiatement à un nouveau référendum : le contexte économique est très défavorable à une indépendance écossaise (la livre et le prix du pétrole sont faibles) et ce serait un vrai risque pour les indépendantistes de précipiter l’affaire. Une réunification de l’Irlande revient à l’ordre du jour, mais le débat est marginal et loin d’être mûr.

 3) Quelles conséquences pour l’Union européenne ?

Il est bien difficile de savoir à ce jour comment le reste des 27 États membres va appréhender le « Brexit ». Le résultat a provoqué un torrent de déclarations et de gesticulations politiques. Relance pour les uns, exemple à suivre pour les autres, temps de réflexion pour d’autres encore… Le risque est de vouloir se précipiter vers une solution qui semble toute prête : intégrer davantage dans certains domaines, quitte à le faire dans un petit groupe. Il est évident qu’il faut réagir, mais la portée du Brexit est telle qu’il pourrait être contreproductif de mettre hâtivement en œuvre des décisions mal pensées et mal expliquées. Le temps des grands projets viendra, mais il doit être préparé. Toute crise ne doit pas automatiquement et immédiatement conduire à plus d’intégration. Seule une vraie réflexion, probablement longue et pénible, peut amener à cette conclusion.

Si chacun s'entend pour dénoncer le déficit démocratique de l'Union européenne, les réponses envisagées divergent. Pour certains, une priorité se dégage : renforcer le pouvoir du Parlement. / Allemagne, Europe, Démocratie, Parti politique, Politique, Groupe de pression, Néolibéralisme, Autoritarisme - (...) / Allemagne, Europe, Démocratie, Parti politique, Politique, Groupe de pression, Néolibéralisme, Autoritarisme - 2016/02

Depuis 2008, les inégalités sociales n'ont cessé de se creuser aux Etats-Unis. Car, bien qu'elle se vante d'avoir fait baisser le chômage, l'administration Obama s'est moins préoccupée du sort des travailleurs pauvres que du confort des innovateurs de la Silicon Valley. / États-Unis (affaires (...) / États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Économie, Entreprise, Internet, Politique, Technologies de l'information, Technologie, Travail, Groupe de pression - 2016/03

D'un pays européen à l'autre, le régime du congé maternité varie beaucoup. Les uns réservent ce droit aux salariées (Allemagne, Autriche, Espagne, Grèce) ; les autres l'accordent à toutes les femmes actives (Belgique, Chypre, Croatie, Danemark, Hongrie, Lituanie, Luxembourg, Pologne, République tchèque, (...) / Europe, Démographie, Droit, Femmes, Travail, Droits des femmes - Femmes

Le 23 septembre dernier, la guérilla des Forces armées révolutionnaires de Colombie (FARC) et le gouvernement se sont entendus pour conclure des accords de paix dans un délai de six mois. Un tribunal spécial devra juger les acteurs du conflit… Reste à savoir s'il aura l'audace (et les moyens) de (...) / Amérique latine, Colombie, Agriculture, Armée, Conflit, Droits humains, Extrême droite, Guérilla, Justice, Parti politique, Politique, Violence, Cuba, Norvège, Diplomatie, Répression, Crime de guerre, Réforme agraire, Accord de paix - 2015/12

(Own report) - Berlin is applying intense pressure in the aftermath of the Brexit, to reorganize the EU. Under the slogan, "flexible Union," initial steps are being taken to establish a "core Europe." This would mean an EU, led by a small, tight-knit core of countries, with the rest of the EU member countries being subordinated to second-class status. At the same time, the President of the European Parliament and Germany's Minister of the Economy (both SPD) are calling for the communitarization of the EU's foreign policy, reinforcement of its external borders, the enhancement of domestic repression and the creation of a "European FBI." The German chancellor has invited France's president and Italy's prime minister to Berlin on Monday to stipulate in advance, measures to be taken at the EU-summit on Tuesday. German media commentators are speaking in terms of the EU's "new directorate" under Berlin's leadership. At the same time, Berlin is intensifying pressure on London. The chair of the Bundestag's EU Commission predicts a new Scottish referendum on secession and calls for Scotland's rapid integration into the EU. German politicians in the European Parliament are exerting pressure for rapidly implementing the Brexit and reorganizing the EU. Chancellor Merkel has reiterated her veiled threat that "reconciliation and peace" in Europe are "anything but self-evident," should European countries choose to no longer be integrated in the EU.

Un certain mystère entoure l'enlisement, depuis sept ans, de la directive harmonisant le congé maternité dans l'Union européenne. Pour une fois, la Commission n'est pas en cause : ce sont les gouvernements des Etats membres qui, au sein d'une instance méconnue — le Comité des représentants permanents (...) / Allemagne, Europe, France, Royaume-Uni, Démocratie, Droit, Femmes, Libéralisme, Parti politique, Politique, Protection sociale, Travail, Diplomatie, Droits des femmes - 2016/01

Si, dans la plupart des pays membres de l'Union, la ratification du traité de Constitution européenne se déroule dans une certaine indifférence, en France, la campagne du référendum est plus dynamique que prévu, en partie parce qu'une réponse négative n'est plus exclue le 29 mai. Ce « non » retentirait (...) / Europe, France, Démocratie, Politique - 2005/05 Silence, mensonges et vidéo

Depuis 1945, les pays du continent se sont regroupés en plusieurs organisations aux objectifs divers : économie, culture, défense... Les chevauchements sont nombreux. Malgré les discours, la simplification n'a jamais été à l'ordre du jour, notamment pour préserver l'autonomie des programmes de (...) / Europe, Citoyenneté, Conflit, Culture, Défense, Économie, Politique, Sécurité européenne - Europe

Serait-ce un symbole ? C'est par une expression comptable, celle de « déficit » démocratique, que l'on exprime souvent la déliquescence des droits civiques dans l'Union. Dans les années 1950, les compétences européennes étant limitées, la question ne se posait pas vraiment. Aujourd'hui, Bruxelles traite (...) / Europe, Citoyenneté, Démocratie, Élections, Mouvement de contestation, Politique, Crise économique - Europe

Après le verdict britannique, les dirigeants européens qui s'entêteraient à défendre leurs dogmes libéraux et fédéralistes, par un « renforcement de la zone euro » comme le projette le président français, prendraient consciemment le risque d'un emballement nationaliste plus puissant encore que celui qui (...) / Europe, Royaume-Uni, Mutation, Nationalisme, Protectionnisme - La valise diplomatique

Suite aux résultats du référendum britannique, nous vous proposons de relire l’article de Vivien Pertusot, « Brexit : les risques du référendum » publié dans Politique étrangère (n°1/2016), ainsi que le dossier « Le Royaume-Uni et l’Europe : in or out ? » publié dans Politique étrangère (n°1/2015).

« À l’évocation de la relation entre l’Union européenne et le Royaume-Uni, le titre de l’ouvrage de Stephen George Awkward partner (« partenaire embarrassant ») vient à l’esprit. Cette relation est le fruit d’une incompréhension entretenue, désormais bien ancrée et jamais réellement combattue au Royaume-Uni. Pourtant, elle recouvre une complexité que l’on ne peut occulter. Les Britanniques restent moteurs sur certains dossiers européens, dont le marché intérieur et le développement. Ils sont un utile mouton noir derrière lequel se cacher. Par ailleurs, la marginalisation croissante du pays n’est pas imputable à Londres seul. Ses partenaires européens se sont progressivement désintéressés du Royaume-Uni et se sont accordés sur une série de mécanismes intégrationnistes dont il ne fait pas partie.

C’est dans ce contexte peu lisible de l’étranger que va se tenir le référendum. Le Premier ministre britannique David Cameron a promis de le tenir avant la fin de l’année 2017. À l’heure où ces lignes sont écrites, les contours d’un accord se dessinent dans les négociations menées entre les 27 états membres et Londres ainsi donc que la tenue prochaine du vote.

Le débat britannique sur le Brexit et le référendum à venir incitent à s’interroger sur quatre risques. Le premier est la possibilité bien réelle d’une une sortie du Royaume-Uni de l’Union européenne. Le deuxième est lié au fait que le résultat du référendum ne marquera pas la fin du débat outre-Manche sur l’UE, et pourrait même engendrer un climat politique chaotique. Le troisième renvoie à la cohésion de plus en plus fragile du Royaume-Uni. Enfin, le quatrième risque touche à l’attitude du reste de l’Union qui, trop pressée d’en finir avec cet épisode, pourrait ne pas justement mesurer les conséquences du maintien, ou la sortie, du Royaume-Uni.

Le Brexit est possible

La réélection de David Cameron, et surtout la majorité absolue obtenue par le parti conservateur aux Communes, ont rendu inévitable la tenue d’un référendum sur l’appartenance du Royaume-Uni à l’Union européenne. La question posée est désormais connue : Le Royaume-Uni doit-il rester membre de l’Union européenne ou quitter l’Union européenne ? »

Lire la suite de l’article en intégralité sur Cairn.info.

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Lire également les articles du dossier « Le Royaume-Uni et l’Europe : in or out ? » :

• Alain Lamassoure, « Europe : le cas du patient anglais » (disponible en intégralité)
• Philippe Moreau Defarges, « Et si l’Europe, libérée de la perfide Albion, perdait la boussole ? »

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.