Diplomacy & Crisis News

Suite au sondage réalisé sur ce blog, nous avons le plaisir de vous offrir l’article du numéro d’hiver 2015 de Politique étrangère que vous avez choisi : « Prévention de la radicalisation et déradicalisation : les modèles allemand, britannique et danois », par Asiem El Difraoui et Milena Uhlmann.

« Les termes « radicalisation », « prévention », « désengagement » et « déradicalisation » se sont largement répandus depuis les attentats du 11 Septembre, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en Allemagne et dans les pays du Nord de l’Europe. Ces concepts sont liés et connaissent un regain d’intérêt en France depuis les attentats de janvier 2015.[1]

La radicalisation est définie comme le processus qui conduit un individu à rompre avec la société dans laquelle il vit pour se tourner vers une idéologie violente, en l’occurrence le djihadisme. La prévention regroupe un ensemble de mesures, concernant des domaines sociétaux variés, visant à empêcher la radicalisation. La déradicalisation vise à « défaire » le processus de radicalisation et à encourager la réintégration des individus concernés dans la société. Dans d’autres contextes, on emploie également le terme de « réhabilitation ». L’ensemble des mesures de prévention et de déradicalisation est souvent désigné par le terme de « contre-radicalisation ».

Si le présent article fait occasionnellement référence au concept de prévention, son objet principal réside dans l’analyse de différents programmes de déradicalisation mis en œuvre dans trois pays européens précurseurs : l’Allemagne, la Grande-Bretagne et le Danemark. L’objectif principal est d’identifier les initiatives les plus prometteuses, mais aussi les problèmes récurrents, pour en tirer quelques leçons pour la France.

[…]

Hayat : déradicalisation et médiation

Hayat est l’un des premiers programmes de déradicalisation au sein de la société civile, lancé par le Centre de la culture démocratique (ZDK) de Berlin, qui disposait d’une expertise en matière de déradicalisation dans les milieux d’extrême droite (« Exit-Deutschland »). Hayat – « vie » en arabe et en turc –, qui compte dans ses rangs un ancien officier de police et des spécialistes de l’islamisme radical, est un programme de conseil et de suivi pour les jeunes radicalisés et leur famille. Depuis janvier 2012, le ministère fédéral de l’Intérieur s’est associé à cette initiative. Une nouvelle structure a été créée dans ce ministère pour coordonner les efforts de contre-radicalisation, structure supervisée non plus par les services de renseignement mais par l’Office fédéral pour les migrations et les réfugiés. Portant sur des aspects « émotionnels », « idéologiques » et « pragmatiques » de la radicalisation, les activités de Hayat sont tournées vers des individus soit en voie de radicalisation, soit déjà radicalisés mais sans avoir quitté le sol allemand, soit de retour des différents théâtres de djihad, ou encore se trouvant toujours sur une terre de djihad mais souhaitant rentrer. Sur le plan émotionnel, l’équipe intervient auprès des familles avec lesquelles les radicalisés, ou ceux en train de l’être, entretiennent encore des liens de confiance. La composante idéologique inclut la déconstruction des notions, interprétations et récits fondateurs des extrémistes, et nécessite une connaissance approfondie des concepts islamiques et islamistes. Le programme comporte également une composante dite pragmatique, englobant les démarches administratives ou de réinsertion professionnelle susceptibles de modifier l’environnement de l’individu. L’équipe de Hayat peut également offrir aux jeunes une assistance psychologique, ou les rediriger vers un groupe religieux non radical.

[1]. Les auteurs souhaitent apporter leurs remerciements à Hugo Micheron pour son aide précieuse dans la relecture de l’étude à l’origine de cet article.

Lire prochainement la suite sur Cairn.info.

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

As the developing world continues to get richer, global inequality will continue to fall. But there is more to the story than this: economic globalization has also increased inequality within individual countries, partially offsetting the effects of the convergence of the rest with the West.

Via New Middle East Blogspot

In quick succession, the set of ISIS attacks in Paris, Sharm el-Sheikh and Beirut suggest that the group has crossed a threshold for international terrorism. In the case of the Paris attacks, these were “spectacular acts,” planned well in advance, with terrorists waiting for the opportune time to strike.

Less obvious is why now. Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realist “three level analysis” and Robert Jervis’ notion of “perception and misperception” may provide a broader picture of connected issues (Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959, Man, the State and War, New York: Columbia University Press; Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press). First, at Waltz’s “third image” or systems level, there appears to be realignment of terrorist group interests and possibly terrorist groups across several North African countries. After years of estrangement from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) leaders, particularly Abdelmalek Droukdel and Mohktar Belmokhtar’s “al-Mourabitoun” carried out the Radisson Blu terrorist assault in Bamako in conjunction with AQIM’s “Sultan Emirate” led by Yaha Abou-Hammam.

This is new. Consistent with North African terrorist group “fence mending” as al-Qaeda and ISIS compete, it bodes ill for security in northern Africa as groups now might achieve “economies of scale” in operations. This environment, where terrorist groups dictate events, echoes U.S. problems with foreign policy in the early 1950s, when the Soviets chose when and where to marshal American military resources in proxy wars. That realignment also puts the spotlight on Ansar Dine and its leader, Iyad Ag Ghali in Mali, because Ansar Dine’s actions (or inaction) influence French foreign policy both in Mali and Algeria.

Another “third image” factor that involves three or more states is Putin’s Syrian strategy. With Putin’s “first mover advantage,” ISIS and the West must probably accept Assad’s continued role in Syria for at least the next few months. The “perception or misperception” is probably that a weaker transitional authority after Assad is vulnerable to an ISIS onslaught. Thus, the Paris attacks might be an act of Thomas Schelling’s  “compellence” to force Assad from power even though as Schelling states, “compellence” is harder to accomplish than deterrence (Schelling, Thomas 1963. The Strategy of Conflict, New York: Oxford University Press). Still, 139 dead in the heart of Paris is very compelling.

At the “second image” level, focus is on Turkey, Iran, and France. Both are what Brian Jenkins and Martha Crenshaw would call “secondary audiences” to the Paris assaults. President Erdogan, fresh from his recent electoral victory, has new political capital to either increase his support for his Turkmen allies, reinforce his stance against the Kurdish YPG (People’s Protection Units) in Syria, or shift the burden of ISIS to other NATO members to work with Russia, if he believes, at least in the short-run, that it is inopportune to confront ISIS now. The Russian SU-24 shot down over Hatay province dovetails with that notion. Be that as it may, it is wise for Erdogan to support Russia’s backing of Assad at least tacitly, since Russia and Turkey are significant trade partners.

Another “second image” level is Iranian foreign policy. It seems possible ISIS leaders have “perceived or misperceived” the recent rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran as a gateway for future Iranian-American cooperation against ISIS in Yemen and Syria, and that the time is now for Iran’s President Rouhani to receive a strong message about the consequences of such a partnership. In addition, French policy toward North Africa is deeply flawed—at the domestic level, acculturation and political and economic assistance remain poorly developed. Internationally, French leaders cope with perception they do little or nothing to integrate former colonies into the French economy and the European Union (EU).

At the “first image” or individual level,  explanatory factors and their effects remain harder to decipher outside of broader strains between Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The attack in Paris showcased ISIS’s own French nationals of North African background. That terrorist assault characteristic is consistent with recent terrorist group realignment of the type described against the backdrop of this worldwide competition against al-Qaeda. Much about the Paris attacks timing remains largely unknown, but all or some of those factor effects probably coalesced to produce the critical mass necessary to launch the Paris assaults.

La revendication de la tuerie à « Charlie Hebdo » par la branche d'Al-Qaida dans la péninsule arabique replace sur le devant de la scène un mouvement évincé des médias par les succès militaires de l'Organisation de l'Etat islamique. Les deux formations ont cependant des stratégies divergentes. / (...) / Afghanistan, Irak, Proche-Orient, Syrie, Histoire, Idéologie, Islam, Mondialisation, Mutation, Terrorisme, Violence, Fondamentalisme, Stratégie militaire - 2015/02

Lutter contre les idéologies religieuses sectaires requiert une vaste politique de contre-radicalisation s'appuyant sur la mobilisation des élites et des institutions musulmanes de France. / Éducation, Islam, Justice, Prison, Religion, Secte, Terrorisme, Violence, Fondamentalisme, Associations, (...) / Éducation, Islam, Justice, Prison, Religion, Secte, Terrorisme, Violence, Fondamentalisme, Associations, Société civile - 2015/02

(Own report) - Demands to halt EU expansion and even begin to scale it back are being raised in several northern and northwestern European countries. In last Thursday's referendum, the Danish population rejected the proposal for Denmark to adopt EU domestic and judicial policies. Denmark will therefore retain its "opt-out," obtained following its "No"-majority in a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992. There is also little chance that Denmark will join a common EU foreign and military policy, in the near future, as favored by Berlin and Brussels. Because the single currency is perceived as the reason for Finland's economic crisis, that country's parliament will soon debate whether to hold a referendum on leaving the Euro zone. Great Britain will hold a referendum on exiting the EU by 2017, at the latest, with already a majority in favor, according to recent polls. In the Netherlands, demands are being raised to reduce the Schengen Zone to a "mini-Schengen." Following the convulsions in Southern Europe, the EU project - the foundation of German global policy - is also beginning to crumble in the North.

  Paru dans Ouest-France du 2-12-2015

Les attaques subies par la France ce 13 novembre dernier ont suscité une émotion légitime, et appellent des réponses fortes. Pour autant, elles n’invalident pas un certain nombre d’analyses stratégiques établies préalablement, qu’il serait dangereux de renier précipitamment.En premier lieu, si la politique étrangère de la France doit incontestablement s’adapter à une nouvelle donne, le lien entre cette politique-là et les attentats reste à démontrer. On peut, on doit, évoquer les risques inhérents à l’interventionnisme militaire de la France dans les dernières années (du Mali à la Syrie), ou sa relation avec plusieurs Etats du Golfe. Mais on doit aussi reconnaître que d’autres Etats européens comme l’Allemagne ou la Belgique sont également menacés aujourd’hui, alors qu’ils affichent des postures internationales fort différentes. Ensuite, le phénomène « Etat islamique » (comme le phénomène jihadiste en général) est d’une grande complexité, et une solution uniquement militaire à cette question n’existe pas, pas plus qu’une perspective de victoire à court terme. La France, comme les Etats-Unis et d’autres, ont jugé non-souhaitable d’envoyer des troupes au sol en Syrie : le terrain syrien ne s’est pas subitement modifié dans la nuit du 13 novembre.le régime de Damas, appuyé par Moscou qui l’a sauvé à plusieurs reprises, a été jugé responsable du désastre syrien autant que Daech. Que l’avenir de son chef importe moins à l’heure actuelle, cela est sans doute vrai. Que la Russie modifie son comportement, cible enfin l'Etat islamique davantage que les autres groupes d’opposition syriens, pour se réinsérer dans un dialogue stratégique avec l’Occident après son coûteux isolement ukrainien, voilà qui ouvre quelques pistes. Qu’il faille, pour une politique étrangère sérieuse, parler avec tous les acteurs qui comptent, c’est une évidence : on sait ce que coûte la posture néo-conservatrice consistant à ne dialoguer qu’avec ceux qui nous plaisent. Pour autant, le passif de Bachar al-Assad d’une part, l’agenda politique de Vladimir Poutine de l’autre, restent probablement incompatibles avec la vision française, au-delà de quelques opportunités tactiques. Enfin et surtout, la France se veut une puissance de proposition, capable d’élargir le champ de vision stratégique. Au-delà de l’émotion du moment, c’est bien à cela qu’il faut procéder. Proposer une vision inclusive des maux du Proche-Orient et des déséquilibres sécuritaires internationaux, ne pas réduire les enjeux à l’avenir d’un seul régime, ne pas remplacer la finesse d’analyse par quelques slogans, ne pas oublier que la France n’est pas seule à être touchée par le terrorisme, et que le soutien international dont elle a bénéficié ne doit pas se transformer en « deux poids deux mesures » par relativisation des maux des autres, sont autant d’impératifs en ces temps d’épreuve, pour éviter de nouvelles étranges défaites.

Sur les huit conflits les plus meurtriers et dévastateurs du moment, sept se déroulent en Afrique, où la désintégration de la Libye alimente en armes les groupes djihadistes. Une première force d'urgence continentale pourrait voir le jour cette année… / Afrique, États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires (...) / Afrique, États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), France, Libye, Nigeria, Sénégal, Conflit, Islam, Terrorisme, Mali, Géographie, Sahel, Frontières - 2015/02

Les régimes du Proche-Orient imaginent se protéger de la contagion du « printemps arabe ». La logique : exacerber les tensions avec leurs voisins pour préserver le statu quo intérieur. Leur stratégie débouche sur une impasse lourde de menaces nouvelles. / Arabie saoudite, Égypte, États-Unis, États-Unis (...) / Arabie saoudite, Égypte, États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Golfe, Irak, Iran, Liban, Proche-Orient, Syrie, Monde arabe, Géopolitique, Guérilla, Idéologie, Islam, Mouvement de contestation, Religion, Terrorisme, Fondamentalisme, Yémen, Dictature, Répression, Autoritarisme, Réveil arabe 2011- - 2015/02

Lutter contre les idéologies religieuses sectaires requiert une vaste politique de contre-radicalisation s'appuyant sur la mobilisation des élites et des institutions musulmanes de France. / Éducation, Islam, Justice, Prison, Religion, Secte, Terrorisme, Violence, Fondamentalisme, Associations, (...) / Éducation, Islam, Justice, Prison, Religion, Secte, Terrorisme, Violence, Fondamentalisme, Associations, Société civile - 2015/02

/ Géopolitique, Islam, Terrorisme, Violence, Fondamentalisme - Relations internationales / Géopolitique, Islam, Terrorisme, Violence, Fondamentalisme - Relations internationales

Photo: Arc2020

As the 21st Conference of Parties begins this week in Paris, for the first time in years, the prospect for serious, substantive international progress on climate issues is not bleak.

China and the U.S., the world’s two biggest carbon emitters, are more or less on the same page, looking to reduce emissions, if for very divergent reasons.

In my latest video, I take a look at what’s going on at COP21.

 

La question des déficits publics, qui anime le débat occidental depuis les années 1980, a conduit les Etats à expérimenter des solutions pour alléger le « fardeau » de l'aide sociale sans dégâts catastrophiques sur les populations. / Canada, France, Royaume-Uni, Capitalisme, Dette, Économie, État, (...) / Canada, France, Royaume-Uni, Capitalisme, Dette, Économie, État, Finance, Fiscalité, Inégalités, Libéralisme, Protection sociale, Solidarité, Associations - 2014/12

Depuis trente ans, les gouvernements occidentaux usent de multiples artifices pour réduire leurs dépenses. L'un d'eux consiste à sous-traiter les services sociaux à des bénévoles et à des associations, tout en encourageant la charité privée. Si le Canada, la France et le Royaume-Uni, par exemple, (...) / États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Christianisme, Économie, Entreprise, État, Finance, Fiscalité, Idéologie, Inégalités, Parti politique, Pauvreté, Personnalités, Protection sociale, Religion, Solidarité, Associations, Université - 2014/12

When Putin started to increase Russian military presence in Syria, I was reading Kissinger’s Diplomacy and coincidently its chapter on the Suez Canal Crisis. I couldn’t resist comparing Putin’s move to that of Khrushchev’s, when he provided support and aid to Nasser’s Egypt. 1950s Soviet Union and today’s Russia suffer from the effects of containment imposed by the West. Containment brought on themselves through acts the West views as blatant aggression. The difference between the two contexts is that  Russia is no longer communist and the primary adversary of the West. Yet, in both circumstances the same underlying motivations and logic seem to have convinced Russia to play the Middle East card.

When Khrushchev came to power following Stalin’s death in 1953, the transition was not smooth. It took him until 1957 to cement his strangle hold on the Kremlin. This insecurity in Moscow led him to take a few cocky decisions, even when the West took him to be the best chance for peace. One of these decisions was to throw his support behind the Nasser regime in Egypt and its Pan-Arabic aspirations. The West was stunned by this Soviet diplomatic victory. Containment was intended to keep the Russian maneuvers within its communist sphere. The traditional sphere of influence of the diminishing British and French powers in Middle East now involved a new player. U.S. diplomatic bargaining with Nasser had gone no where. The end result was British and French humiliation and withdrawal from the region after the 1956 Suez Crisis, the creation of the short lived United Arab Republic involving Egypt, Syria and North Yemen and the 1967 Six-Day war.

The important point to note here is that Khrushchev did not squeeze into the Middle East power struggle at a moment of strength for the Soviet Union. It was at a point of great weakness; Stalin’s death led to power struggles and purges, the Korean war had been a stalemate and the U.S. still maintained an edge in the nuclear race. The incursion into Egypt was meant to showcase to his opponents and critics that he was a capable leader, who could take the ailing Soviet Union to heights even Stalin could not.

Putin, in contrast, definitely does not have the issue of being overshadowed by the legacy of his predecessor. He has been in power since 2000. Instead of proving to be an adversary to the West, Putin started as a surprising collaborator, supporting Bush’s War on Terror (obviously to garner support for his own war on terror in Chechnya). Over the last 15 years, he has slowly positioned himself as an adversary. The 2008 war with Georgia was the turning point. The annexation of Crimea and the insurgency in eastern Ukraine has cemented that view. He  supported the Assad regime in rhetoric, vetoes and limited material support, but providing Assad with a Russian air force seemed a bit far off.

Since Soviet times, the naval base at Tartus was Russia’s only permanent naval installation in the Mediterranean Sea. It has managed to hold on to this one last bastion, even when Hafez Assad decided to bomb a Soviet vessel at the base. Thus, it is doubtful that any Russian leader would want to lose the naval base, especially one with an ailing economy and a nationalistic fervor keeping him in power.

Putin had promised much to the Russian people during the commodity boom.  The military modernization project was planned on a $100 oil barrel. But that all went south when the prices plummeted in 2014. The Ukrainian crisis only made things worse as the U.S. and EU slapped on sanctions. Trade with China seems to be the lifeline of the economy. Yet the military continues to be modernized, while  Soviet strategic bombers are seen from the English Channel to Guam. Putin has used displays of military prowess as a means of sustaining the nationalistic fervor at home and distracting the people from the economic woes.

Assad has been losing ground since July and many expected him to start withdrawing to his Alawite homeland in the coastal region. That was until Putin emulated Khrushchev. He announced that Russian fighter jets, stationed in Latakia would be bombing ISIS targets in support of Assad’s troops. NATO forces until then dominating the region’s air space had to suddenly share it . There was suddenly a chance of U.S. and Russian planes facing each other off over enemy territory. The only previous event of similar magnitude was when in 1970. 15,000 Soviet troops were stationed in Egypt to man a comprehensive air defense system against Israeli incursions.

The question is can Russia afford this new active role in the region, something it has not performed since the 1970s ? Khrushchev did not enter Middle Eastern affairs with a clear cut strategic end game in mind. He didn’t achieve anything of much significance other than to commit Soviet resources, when its own people and satellites in Eastern Europe needed them the most. In 1972, Egypt’s Sadat simply evicted the Soviet personnel and its Syrian foothold was what was left.

Today in trying to protect the last Russian chip left in the region, Putin might be pitting the very survival of the Russian Federation. Russia is overextended today, as it once was under the Soviet Union. The A321 flight crash over Sinai and Turkey shooting down the Su-24 jet continuously put Russia on the headlines. Initially, Russia refused to accept the Sinai crash was a terror attack, but as soon as the French attacks occurred and it was obvious that fighting ISIS would allow an “alliance’ with France, Putin declared the truth of the matter. The Turkish action has been labelled a “stab in the back” by Putin. His reaction has been sanctions against Turkey, but obviously the economic impact won’t be merely one way.

The Russian Orthodox church’s declaration that it is a holy war to defend christianity might buoy the impact of those killed to protect the Assad regime. But just like Americans, Russians would also start decrying war when the body bags count begins to increase. It helps that Russian media is under strict state control. RT and massive military parades against Fascism can only sway public opinion for so long. In 1991, Russia survived by shedding away its Soviet empire. If Russia collapses again, the Federation is what is at stake. A nuclear power in chaos is a bad proposition for world peace. So all one can hope is that unlike Khrushchev, Putin has a clear end game in sight and knows when to pull back before over extension passes the point of no return.

Dans le cadre de la conférence de Paris sur le climat, l'Union européenne réfléchira-t-elle à son modèle agricole, qui accompagne plus que jamais la mondialisation libérale ? En développant l'agroécologie, une idée neuve, la France pourrait réduire considérablement son empreinte carbone tout en produisant (...) / Europe, France, Agriculture, Agroalimentaire, Alimentation, Animal, Commerce international, Écologie, Énergie, Mer, Forêt, Climat, Environnement, Néolibéralisme, Pollution - 2015/12

Crisis Group mourns the passing today of Sandy Berger, a tremendous friend and colleague who worked tirelessly to promote greater peace and security in a troubled world. He died of cancer at the age of 70.

Protesters displaying placards during a rally in front of the Chinese consulate in Manila on Aug 31, 2015.  PHOTO: AFP

The unanimous ruling on October 29 by an international arbitral tribunal over its jurisdiction to arbitrate territorial claims claimed by the Philippines in the South China Sea comes as a slap in the face to Beijing, and may lead to further filings by Southeast Asian nations.  Under its notorious nine-dash line, or “cow’s tongue”, Chinese leaders claim over 90 percent of the South China Sea and have argued against any international jurisdiction over sovereignty issues.

The current ruling, the first of its kind, concerns a case filed by the Philippine government at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague in 2013, under the United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to the ruling, the case will now be handled by the Arbitral Tribunal under UNCLOS, and is expected to determine maritime zone entitlements of ten reefs and shoal in the South China Sea: Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and McKennan Reef.  Some of these reefs are currently being converted into islands.

Beijing bases its claims on the disputed waters and features as “traditional fishing grounds,” despite the presence of fisherman from around the region for centuries. For example, the Scarborough Shoal was referenced in a May 2012 article in the PLA Daily, claiming a Chinese astronomer, Guo Shoujing, first visited the shoal in 1279 as part of a survey of the Chinese empire. China’s formal claim to the shoal was made in 1935, while Manila says its initial claim was in 1937-1938, although it was unable to publicize its claim due to Japanese incursions and invasion. The shoal did not feature on Philippine maps until 1997, when Manila began to press its claim by taking ownership of the shoal as terra nullius, or “no man’s land.”

Beijing has reiterated it will not accept the Tribunal’s resolution, arguing that the only way forward is through bilateral negotiations.  China had previously argued in a position paper that the “2002 China–ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea constitutes an agreement to resolve disputes relating to the South China Sea exclusively through negotiation.”

International leaders, however, welcomed the decision over the Court’s jurisdiction.  German chancellor Angela Merkel recently addressed the issue while on a visit to Beijing, “The territorial dispute in the South China Sea is a serious conflict. I am always a bit surprised why in this case multinational courts should not be an option for a solution.”

Merkel’s statement clearly reflects Beijing’s two faces over the rule of law, for despite China ratifying UNCLOS in 1996, Beijing now says it will not accept procedures referring to “binding decisions” and compulsory processes under the law.  While Beijing considers certain UNCLOS rules to be inconsistent with its national policy, it has similarly chosen to invoke UNCLOS law to seek a binding decision for its claim against Japan on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. China is also party to the Declaration on the Conduct for Parties in the South China Sea, which it signed in 2002. Through its dredging efforts to create artificial islands, Beijing has blatantly ignored Article 5 of the DOC, which calls for “self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes in uninhabited islands and reefs.”

So while it is high time for an international referee like the Arbitral Tribunal under UNCLOS to step in, separate the fighters, and issue a ruling concerning the sovereignty of the disputed waters, it is highly unlikely the Court will be able to enforce a ruling against China, which Beijing is likely to ignore.  Any court rulings issued by the tribunal are binding on its member countries, including China, but the tribunal has no powers of enforcement, so some of its rulings have been ignored before.  

The Tribunal’s eventual ruling, expected in 2016, will also be limited in scope to asserting whether or not specific features (rocks and low-tide elevations) can claim EEZs. Some of the reefs being converted into islands by China will fail to be recognized as islands–thereby losing any expanded territorial claims. Under UNCLOS, artificial islands are entitled to the rights enjoyed by the original feature–a 12 nautical mile territorial sea for rocks above water at low tide, and a 500-meter safety zone for elevations below water at low tide.  

Should Beijing refuse to honor a potential ruling against their claims of sovereignty, we can expect China to again attempt to assert its economic muscle to persuade other regional nations to settle the disputes bilaterally.  China’s Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin announced earlier this month Beijing’s offer to Southeast Asian countries of around US$10 billion in infrastructure loans.    

Yet China’s weakening muscularity and an economic pivot by Washington could lead other Southeast Asian nations toward pursuing similar rulings.  This month, some voters in Vietnam put forth a proposal to their National Assembly, calling for the initiation of legal proceedings against China at an international tribunal over its violation of the Southeast Asian country’s sovereignty in the East Vietnam Sea (South China Sea).  How far this request will go is disputed–Hanoi will need to balance the concerns of its nationalistic citizenry while maintaining close ties to its communist brother.  Indonesia has also hinted it may also go to court to assert its sovereignty over disputed territory.

Beijing can still effectively lobby its other neighbors–as it did when it scuttled efforts by Association of Southeast Asian Nations defense ministers to mention the South China Sea in a joint declaration after meetings in Malaysia earlier this month. On the international stage, a negative outcome for Beijing will surely lead to a loss of face for Chinese leaders, and they will face increasing isolation for failing to respect international law–a precondition for their regaining great nation status.

En perpétrant des attentats aveugles dans les rues de Paris, Tunis ou Beyrouth, les djihadistes veulent semer la terreur. Ils espèrent ainsi se singulariser face à un monde qu'ils exècrent, en suscitant des réactions guidées par la peur. Chercher à comprendre impose de revenir sur les convulsions qui (...) / Arabie saoudite, France, Proche-Orient, Armée, Conflit, Histoire, Terrorisme, Violence, Fondamentalisme - 2015/12