Diplomacy & Crisis News

George Beebe

Ukraine Crisis, Europe

President Joe Biden stated today that Russian president Vladimir Putin has made the decision to invade Ukraine.

Watching President Joe Biden state on Friday afternoon that he believes Russian president Vladimir Putin has made the decision to go to war over Ukraine and to attack Kyiv itself, I recalled a disturbing experience that I recently had on Russian national television. As a former director of Russian analysis at the Central Intelligence Agency, I was asked on a prominent political talk show to discuss reports being circulated by the United States and other NATO member states about Russia’s plans in Ukraine. Did the West believe them?

I replied that intelligence analysis is an inherently difficult business. Errors of course happen, the Iraq weapons of mass destruction fiasco being among the most notable. But in this instance, I said that I was certain the U.S. government truly believes that Russia is preparing for an invasion of Ukraine.

The Russians on the show—among their country’s most informed and insightful foreign policy experts—openly scoffed. They simply would not accept that the American and British governments sincerely believed reports that Moscow was planning to stage a fake Ukrainian attack to justify a Russian invasion, that the Kremlin was preparing to install a puppet government in Kyiv, or that the invasion was set to begin on a certain date. It would be one thing, they argued, if these reports were simply fusillades in an ongoing information battle between the West and Russia. Truth is the first casualty of war, after all. But if Washington and London actually “believe their own propaganda,” as the Russians put it, then we have a genuine problem.

Indeed, we do. Russia and the West find it almost impossible to make sense of each other’s perceptions about Ukraine and the broader European security architecture. We do not merely disagree about what ought to be. We disagree about what the present reality is.

In the West, the notion that Russian experts could sincerely doubt that their government is preparing to initiate an attack on Ukraine is itself viewed as laughable. Is it not obvious that Moscow has been massing forces near Ukraine’s borders, holding ominous military exercises in Belarus and on the Black Sea, and openly threatening to take “military-technical” steps should NATO refuse demands that it back away from Russian borders? Did Russia not already prove its aggressive intentions by attacking Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014? Just as Russian experts accuse the West of peddling propaganda, we regard assertions that Russia has no intention of invading Ukraine as little more than Kremlin disinformation.

But among Russians, the suggestion that Moscow wants to attack or conquer Ukraine, a nation they regard fraternally, albeit condescendingly, is itself far-fetched. Western claims that Russia wants to stamp out democracy in Ukraine elicit guffaws. Russians do not regard Ukraine as a democracy or close to becoming one. They see its government as mired in corrupt and dysfunctional patronage politics, with little regard for the rights of Russophones. And they are incredulous at the notion that they want to reestablish the USSR. Many Russians remember the Soviet days nostalgically, but few want to recreate the old empire, recognizing how burdensome and counterproductive that would be. Where Americans see Russian forces poised for an invasion of Ukraine, Moscow sees them as part of a broader defensive effort to stop the world’s most powerful military alliance from setting up shop on Russia’s doorstep.

The situation recalls a comment that Teddy Roosevelt made about Great Britain and Germany in 1904: “[Kaiser Wilhelm II] believes that the English are planning to attack him and smash his fleet … As a matter of fact, the English harbour no such intentions, but are themselves in a state of panic terror lest the Kaiser secretly intend … to destroy their fleet and blot out the British empire from the map.” It was, he observed, “as funny a case as I have ever seen of mutual distrust and fear bringing two peoples to the verge of war.”

That case, of course, ended in the tragedy of World War I. As the distrust and fear plaguing Russia’s relations with the West today spiral toward a modern catastrophe, we should ponder some critical realities.

The first is that, like Imperial Germany and Edwardian Britain, each side today believes that it is the other that harbors hostile intent, while regarding its own actions as merely defensive. The Kremlin is convinced that the United States has long had Russia in its crosshairs, moving military forces and infrastructure ever closer to Russian territory, arming and empowering anti-Russian factions in neighboring states, and actively supporting subversive elements inside Russia itself. The West, in turn, regards Putin as the mortal enemy of democracy and freedom, both in Europe and inside the United States itself. The result has been that both sides believe they must “stand up” to aggression, producing a cycle of action and reaction that is careening toward conflict.

The second reality is that neither Russia nor the West can defeat the other, whether on the battlefield or at the negotiating table. Since the early years of the nuclear age, we have been yoked together as co-hostages, with one side’s security dependent on ensuring adequate security for the other. Our mutual vulnerability has only grown as cyber technology has deeply entangled the worlds of military operations, espionage, news, and commerce.

Neither Russia nor the West can bring Ukraine into its sphere of influence without tearing that country apart internally. The Kremlin cannot drive the United States from Europe, and Europe cannot be stable so long as Russia is excluded from the region’s most influential security organizations. Under such circumstances, any efforts to produce “win-lose” scenarios between the West and Russia will inevitably result in “lose-lose” outcomes.

John Kennedy observed that the chief lesson of the Cuban missile crisis was that the leaders of nuclear superpowers needed to defuse crises by helping each other find mutual, face-saving compromises. That applies today, no less than in 1962. The window of opportunity for averting disaster is fast closing.

George Beebe is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for the National Interest, a former head of Russia analysis at the CIA, and author of The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia Could Spiral into Catastrophe.

Image: Reuters.

Trevor Filseth

Iran Nuclear, Vienna, United States, Iran

In Vienna, high-level diplomatic talks are meant to address Iran's ability to produce a nuclear weapon. But will they work? 

On Thursday, U.S. officials claimed they had made “substantial progress” toward reaching an agreement with Iran over the future of the country’s nuclear program after a months-long diplomatic standoff between Washington and Tehran.

Despite this progress, however, ongoing issues between the two remain, putting the outcome of the final negotiating session in question. 

The Vienna negotiations have continued since late 2021 and are currently in their ninth round. The discussions are being held between Iran, Germany, and permanent members of the UN Security Council.  Thus far, the Iranian delegation has refused to engage directly with the United States, blaming Washington for the country’s economic misfortunes following President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the original deal, the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA), and his subsequent reimposition of sanctions in 2018.

A State Department spokesperson claimed that, “if Iran shows seriousness, we can and should reach an understanding on mutual return to full implementation of the JCPOA within days,” according to Agence France-Presse. 

The spokesperson added, however, that “anything much beyond that”—e.g., an agreement attempting to resolve other issues in the U.S.-Iran relationship, such as Iran’s ballistic missile program or its support for Tehran-aligned private militias in neighboring countries—“would put the possibility of return to the deal at grave risk.” 

While Trump’s “maximum pressure” sanctions caused severe damage to the Iranian economy and led to an increase in tensions in the Persian Gulf region, it also allowed Iran to return to its enrichment of uranium—a process the country had largely abandoned following the JCPOA’s implementation in 2015.

By now, Iran is estimated to have nearly enough highly-enriched uranium to create a nuclear weapon. Western diplomats have urged the creation of a settlement before the threshold is crossed; French foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian described the timeframe as “a matter of days.”

Further, Iran has never acknowledged that it intends to construct a nuclear weapon, although blueprints for nuclear devices and nuclear-capable missiles have been found and stolen from Iranian government computers. 

Iranian authorities have requested a guarantee from the administration of President Joe Biden that the United States would remain within the deal for the foreseeable future to avoid a repeat of Trump’s 2018 JCPOA withdrawal.

However, nearly two hundred members of the House of Representatives, all Republicans, published a letter earlier in the week explicitly announcing that “they would work to obstruct a renewed deal if certain controversial measures were not included.” This effectively indicates that a potential agreement is vulnerable to cancellation if the GOP  reclaims the White House.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters

Trevor Filseth

Nuclear Weapons, Belarus

Belarus will hold a constitutional referendum later this month that includes a vote on whether to make it legal to host Russian nuclear weapons.

Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko said on Thursday that he was willing to host Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil if the Eastern European country faced an external threat.

Lukashenko’s offer comes as roughly 150,000 Russian troops have gathered on the Russo-Ukrainian border, raising fears that the Kremlin plans to invade Ukraine. Although Belarus is not directly involved in the confrontation between the two countries, tens of thousands of Russian troops are currently engaged in military exercises near Belarus’s border with Ukraine. Some experts in the West have warned that Russia could use Belarus as a staging area to invade Ukraine from the north, as the country’s capital, Kyiv, is less than one hundred miles from the Belarusian border.

Lukashenko previously said that Belarus would remain neutral in any potential conflict, and would only become involved if Belarus was attacked.

“If necessary, if such stupid and mindless steps are taken by our rivals and opponents, we will deploy not only nuclear weapons, but super-nuclear and up-and-coming ones to protect our territory,” Lukashenko said, according to Belarus’s state-run Belta news agency.

However, Lukashenko also that the weapons would not be “needed here for a hundred years” as long as Belarus was not threatened by any unfriendly countries, according to CBS News.

Belarus does not currently possess any nuclear weapons. It briefly inherited a handful of nuclear warheads after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, but returned them to Russia as part of the Lisbon Protocol in 1995. 

There is also no legal basis for the deployment of foreign nuclear weapons within Belarus – a fact that Lukashenko has noted in the past. However, Belarus is holding a constitutional referendum later this month that includes a vote that would make it legal to host Russian nuclear weapons.

More importantly for many Belarusians, the constitutional referendum could also extend Lukashenko’s presidency. It would allow him to serve until 2035 if successively re-elected in 2025 and 2030.

Lukashenko, who has ruled Belarus since 1994, faced international criticism in 2020 after claiming victory in an election widely alleged to be fraudulent in the West. That election spawned a year-long protest movement demanding his resignation, which was ultimately put down in mid-2021 through a crackdown by security forces. 

That crackdown led to a wave of European sanctions on Belarus, pushing Lukashenko to forge closer ties with the Kremlin.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters.

Kevin Ryan

Ukraine Crisis, Europe

Even if he successfully attacks Ukraine and occupies territory, Putin will not have moved one step closer to achieving his stated “core demands.”

Vladimir Putin has lost; he will not achieve any of his core demands vis-à-vis the United States or NATO. Now he must decide whether he is a bully or a bluffer.

Putin made several demands in the initial “security guarantee proposals” he sent to the United States and NATO in December 2021. The proposals, written by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff responsible for these “official documents,” were perhaps done in haste to meet a timeline that was short and hurried.

On February 1, 2022, at a news conference during Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban’s visit to Moscow, Putin clarified his three core demands for the West: “prevention of NATO’s expansion; commitment not to deploy offensive weapon systems near Russian borders; return of [NATO] Bloc’s European military infrastructure to 1997 levels when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed.”

In classified notes that were made later leaked to news media, the United States and NATO responded to these demands by refusing to limit NATO from any enlargement or expansion. They made clear that the West will not return to the situation that existed in 1997, before even Poland or the Baltic states were members of NATO. In response to Russia’s aggressive posturing along Ukraine’s border, the United States and NATO have actually increased the number of troops in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltics, all of which border Russia or the Black Sea. Selected NATO countries have continued to ship more weapons to Ukraine.

In his latest response to the United States and NATO on February 17, Putin fumed, “Russia's ‘red lines’ and fundamental security interests, as well as Russia's sovereign right to protect them, continue to be ignored.”

Putin warned, “In the absence of the readiness of the American side to agree on firm, legally binding guarantees of our security from the United States and its allies, Russia will be forced to respond, including by implementing measures of a military-technical nature.”

No one should doubt that Putin has amassed enough military force on Ukraine’s border to follow through on his threat to attack Ukraine. But the fact is that even if he successfully attacks Ukraine and occupies territory, Putin will not have moved one step closer to achieving his stated “core demands.” Ukraine, or whatever is left of it, will be even more vehemently anti-Russian, a stone in Russia’s boot. The United States and NATO will undoubtedly add more troops to NATO members bordering Russia and seek to help Ukraine recover and improve its military forces. And NATO will remain open to new members.

Russia will have spent treasure and blood but gained none of the things that Putin has clearly said are his goals. And the people of Russia will be savvy enough to recognize his failure, however he tries to sell it. They will add his failure in Ukraine to his other failures to end Russia’s corruption or improve Russians’ living standards. Putin will wear the moniker of bully or bluffer, depending on what he does in Ukraine. But either way, he has lost.

Retired Brigadier (retired) General Kevin Ryan is a Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. He is founder of the U.S.-Russia Elbe Group and served as U.S. Defense Attaché to Moscow.

Image: Reuters.

Sports and politics have long been intertwined- historical figures like Jackie Robinson, Muhammad Ali, Arthur Ash, and Billie Jean King have played a huge role in advancing the cause of human rights both in the United States and around the world. Modern figures like Colin Kapernick, Megan Rapinoe, Enes Kanter Freedom, and many many others have continued to enhance the legacy of politically motivated athletes.

In past years, these efforts have continued at the Olympics. Athletes like Jesse Owens, Tommie Smith and John Carlos, and Fumino Sugiyama have used the platform they earned through sport as an opportunity to push back against repression. To the extent that these demonstrations were controversial in their time, history has vindicated (and will continue to vindicate) the actions taken by these politically minded athletes.

However, as we approach the end of these 2022 Olympic games, examples of athlete activism have, unfortunately, been few and far between- there are a number of reasons for this. 

The most obvious of these is the direct repression that the non-democratic Chinese regime enforces on Chinese nationals and international visitors alike. Most of you taking the time to read this article will already know that the government in Beijing has a long legacy of violating human rights and weaponizing the state against racial and religious minorities living in China.This threat was made even more clearly by the very public crackdown on domestic dissent that took place in the weeks leading up to the games.

However, not all examples of repression come from expected sources…Perhaps the most surprising of these examples comes directly from the International Olympic Committee. The IOC continues to enforce the infamous Rule 50, which bars athletes from participating in political demonstrations while in Olympic venues or other areas. This rule was put in place in the aftermath of the courageous demonstration carried out by Tommie Smith and John Carlos in 1968, and it remains as chilling and regressive today as it was when it was implemented to curb those demonstrations against racism.

Additionally, representatives from the United States and other liberal democracies have advised athletes against making political statements. Perhaps the most shameful of these statements comes from Rep. Nancy Pelossi who suggested that athletes, “(should) not risk incurring the anger of the Chinese government”, citing concerns about, “what the Chinese government might do to (American Olympian’s) reputation and families.”Cowardly statements such as these give credibility to the fundamentally un-American idea that any government can restrict fundamental human rights like the freedom of speech and religion through the threat of force.

Even worse, some Olympians have had their own “liberal” governments bar them from making statements regarding the human rights abuses that the Chinese government inflicts on its people by, functionally, issuing handlers to monitor statements made by their athletes. This precise thing took place when skiers from New Zealand were prevented from responding to a potentially political question when they were interrupted by a handler assigned to them by New Zealand and the IOC.

While there have been broad diplomatic boycotts of the games, these efforts have done little to increase public awareness regarding China’s human rights abuses- much less apply the sort of pressure that might actually lead to change. Further opportunities to increase public awareness about the severity of China’s human rights abuses have been wasted as a consequence of NBC’s unwillingness to highlight China’s continued violations of human rights while broadcasting the Games.

With all of this being said- to the extent that hosting the Olympic games is a sign of international prestige, it should also come with the responsibility to uphold global norms surrounding respect for human rights and individual autonomy. Without coupling the opportunity to host the Games with increased public scrutiny, the Olympics risk becoming an opportunity for repressive regimes to flex their muscles without fear of being shamed for their illiberal policies.

Sadly, it goes without saying that the current regime in China is no champion of either human rights or individual autonomy. Despite this, the authorities that promote, broadcast, and organize the Games have largely remained silent- this lack of active criticism is tantamount to a tacit endorsement of Beijing’s countless human rights violations.

The goal here is not to criticize the athletes who have not spoken out- it is reasonable that those individuals may not want to risk the wrath of a fundamentally illiberal regime. More than that, it is reasonable that these athletes may choose to dedicate their full attention to their crafts without concerning themselves with politics.

Insted, we should look critically at the public statements (or lack thereof as the case may be) made by the Olympic committee, mainstream media, leaders in the United States and in other democracies that have suggested that athletes would be better off staying quiet than they would be speaking out. Bestowing prestige on a bad actor by giving them the Olympic platform and then participating in the coverup is shameful and violates the most basic mission of the Olympic Games- “to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.”

 

—

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association.

Sergei Supinsky / AFP / Getty

 

What is intriguing about the latest military conflict between Russia and Ukraine is how similar both countries are culturally and politically. While many ethnic Russians live in Ukraine, and a fair number of Ukrainians live and work in Russia, their cultural, historical, linguistic and family ties are quite deep. As one of the largest and most influential members of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine made up a good portion of the population and territory of the European part of the former Soviet Union. Beyond having mainstay Russian military capabilities like Antonov being based in the Ukraine and until recently, the Soviet/Russian Fleet in Sevastopol as part of the territory of Ukraine SSR, many mixed families are fairly common. Discussions around the dinner table is likely very intriguing on the current political situation in the past few weeks.

There are many military focused websites putting out their predictions on the result of a possible hot war between Russia and Ukraine. The motivation for theories on these scenarios is likely spurned on by Western media promoting the idea that war is inevitable between the two countries. While I disagree with the inevitability of many of their conclusions, the tactical analysis given is likely true, that the Russian Armed Forces would defeat Ukraine’s Armed Forces in battle.

My impression of the capabilities of each force is that while countries like China in 2008, and Russia have invested more recently in many new weapons systems, Ukraine and the rest of the world have mostly relied on updating late Cold War technologies for conflicts that will never match a Cold War scenario. With the exception of US stealth technology and mostly Russian technological antidotes to stealth and drones via anti-aircraft systems, Ukraine is fielding some of the best late Cold War equipment against Russia’s post-2014 weapons systems. The late Soviet Army was likely the most effective it had ever been in the late 1980s, a concern for any invading army going against a force designed as the best defense force in the world, at least when Billy Joel was at the top of the charts.

Ukraine’s 1980s era tank divisions can more or less be described as the technological parents of Russia’s current systems. The T-64 tank that makes up much of Ukraine’s tank divisions was a model that was considered more expensive and more capable than the T-72 tanks, and were reserved for service within the Soviet Union almost exclusively. While the T-80s that came from the T-64 is possessed by both sides, Russia has more of them as well as the more modern T-72 variant, the T-90, with more modern defensive systems along the T-14 Armata modern battle tank. New technology may prove to keep Russian Forces protected, if it works as it should on the field of battle. NATO
Javelin missiles and Ukrainian Forces will certainly cause notable damage.

While stealth technology is possessed by Russia, much of the makeup of the military structure of the former Soviet Union was to defend against attacks from the West. Trauma from the Second World War created a ethos of integrated missile defence during the Cold War, and while the Soviets were not talented in making Bluejeans, they did and still lead the world on the creation of anti-aircraft radar systems and missiles. Ukraine, while likely being in a weaker position, is still one of the most capable armies in the world and do have possession of many advanced missile systems ranging from the TOR, BUK and S-300 missiles that are a major threat to many modern Russian aircraft. With NATO assistance, Ukraine may have been given some radar technology that can burn through stealth technology in close proximity to ground radars based on the battlefield in Ukraine. Computer systems that can manage a larger number of targets in the event Russia swarms them with drones and cruise missiles may also been distributed to them by NATO allies.

The conflict in Ukraine is really one of posturing against weak opposition to place Russia in a better defensive position physically and politically against the West after the disastrous pullout of Afghanistan and what is likely seen as a weak US and EU. Exporting fuel from North America would likely cause the most distress for Russia, reengage Germany and France in the defense of Ukraine, and put Russia into a more modest position while sorting out some inflationary issues at home. Unfortunately, Western leaders would prefer to choose short term strategies to win small victories in their local elections and play Olympics in places that disrespect human rights instead of uniting their people against real threats of war. It is likely not wise to increase inflationary pressures on food and fuel, while alienating those who feed and heat the local population while asking them to possibly donate their sons and daughters to a future war on the frozen plains of Ukraine. It will be no surprise that the adult youth in your town would rather be working to reduce inflationary pressures with much needed, community inspiring employment. What Ukrainians and Russians do know is that propaganda does not put food on the table, and that Western leaders have not figured that out yet. Plus ca change, unfortunately…

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