Diplomacy & Crisis News

Ukraine may have achieved its biggest breakthrough of the war.

International aid is pouring in, but the local food insecurity would have global consequences.

A top lawmaker says China’s game plan is to blockade the island and stop allies from helping out.

Fighting in Ukraine’s south has caused an exodus.

The idea of “European strategic autonomy” just won’t go away.

Unlike Ukraine, the island will be very hard to arm during a conflict.

Her successor will need to adapt while also protecting the age-old magic of the monarchy.

Through tragedy and tumult, Queen Elizabeth II was a model of constancy. Her death will have important repercussions for the monarchy and the future of the United Kingdom.

As Bolsonaro lags behind in polls, he is scrambling to rally his base and push his far-right platform.

The endless cycle of lockdowns will likely lead to long-lasting political and economic consequences.

Ukraine has started its advance in the Kherson region in order to reclaim as much territory as possible in the south of Ukraine before Russia attempts to permanently annex large sections of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast. Taking sections of the east of Ukraine would give Russia extra control of Ukraine’s significant agricultural exports. Control in the south of Ukraine would give Russia a great deal of control of much of Ukraine’s shipping along the Black Sea coast. With Russia’s oil and gas industry currently toying with shutting energy exports to Germany and Europe, increased control of these parts of Ukraine would place food security and energy security for much of the world in the Kremlin’s control.

Russia has continued to export to India, is planning an oil and gas pipeline to China to satisfy China’s fuel shortages and is trying to lock in much of the energy exports with ties to Iran while sanctions bite on the Russian economy. With fuel prices slowly dropping, a cut in Europe’s gas supply would likely raise inflation along with the increased need for fuel in the colder months. The rise in fuel prices has buoyed the Rouble despite sanctions, and incentivizes Russia’s further restricting of fuel and increased conflict in Ukraine. While Western weapons supports to Ukraine have been significant, North America’s lacking strategic support of Western Europe’s energy needs has not displaced Russian oil and gas, fuelling Russian Forces instead of heating the homes of their allies. Russia’s ties to other regions and large BRICS economies will give them further control over the world’s food and fuel supplies.

India has taken to protect their own interests in the era of the recent conflict in Ukraine. Russia has always been a large supplier of India’s Defense Forces that are made up of equipment from mostly Russian, French and British made systems to defend its borders with Pakistan and China. India has strong ties in the west, but with US weapons being issued to their adversaries, they have chosen to secure much of their food supplies, energy supplies and military supplies with Russia in order to maintain a power balance in the region. India is well aware that they cannot lose strength in their region, lest be at risk of losing in a greater conflict.

China has taken to increase its military activities around Taiwan and hold relations with Russia and the West to its own advantage. China has ensured much of the financing of Russia and is establishing closer energy ties with Russia in order to remedy their own fuel shortages affecting industry and shipping in China. As with Russia, China has become emboldened after the West abandoned Afghanistan and their allies there, and is well aware of the global chip shortage and Taiwan’s significant contribution to the chip market worldwide. China may now see Russia as a weaker world power after they have witnessed the failure of Russian equipment in the field, but their activity around Taiwan and their concerns with a powerful India keeps China focused on maintaining their own power and control in the region.

Brazil is approaching a fork in the road with an election coming this fall between the current Populist President Bolsonaro and former popular President Lula da Silva. The corruption scandals that rocked the last Presidential election and the question of Brazil’s independence from foreign influence may become the deciding factor of an election that promises to change the future direction of Brazil and Latin America. Inflation after the Olympics and World Cup in Brazil along with corruption tying much of the political class to criminal acts might become the ballot question yet again. Current world issues will exacerbate the problems of four years prior as world inflation and drastic changes for BRICS nations come with their support of the West or Russia and China. The great need for agricultural products and oil and gas will give Brazil a lot of leverage in the global markets. The distrust of international leaders and corporations may swing Brazil away from their traditional markets however, expanding their current business relationship with China and further avoiding criticisms of Russia. This is a complicated question for either candidate it seems and will be of great interest during the upcoming election.

South Africa and much of Africa became very aware of the lacking support from the rest of the world during the Covid crisis. While vaccine policies were supplying Europe, North America and parts of Asia, Africa was one of the last regions to receive Covid vaccines, and this may have contributed to one of the first new strains to be logged coming out of South Africa. With China increasing their influence in the region and South Africa being the mid point of commerce between much of the West and new Chinese investment in the region, their view of their place in the old economies of the West and new economies of the East leaves their future in question. Closer ties with the BRICS may change South Africa, but it will likely become a point of leverage for many large economies, influential regions and global institutions a lot sooner than anyone expected.

BRICS nations have determined that their best interests may not lay in the same policy choices that many of their Western allies have chosen as an approach. Actions that lead Western powers to abandon their allies in Afghanistan will come to be seen as one of the greatest policy determinants of our era. BRICS nations already see what many countries in the West fail to acknowledge from their policy failure. A further limiting of North American oil and gas exports to such a degree that it raised the Rouble and will put Western Europe in an energy shortage not seen since the Berlin Airlift is affecting the world greatly in 2022. BRICS nations have decided to take to classical policy approaches, and will act in a manner that protects their interests and keep their citizens fed and warm as much as possible. Any approach that would hinder those basic needs will end the leadership of any of the BRICS nations rapidly, as it should.

The nuclear agreement could unleash Chinese activity in the Gulf and complicate U.S. goals in the Indo-Pacific.

USAID now has a playbook to check bad actors.

As Beijing clings to rigid lockdown measures, the Chinese public has been paying the price.

The first country to default in the COVID era makes a deal with the IMF.

Ignore the naysayers—the long-prepared plan is a smart way to slash the Kremlin’s profits.

A long-delayed report on Xinjiang was an important step forward, but it has critical omissions.

The Integration Center for Georgian Azerbaijanis (GAIM) was opened on April 3, 2019 in the Marneuli region of Georgia.

The opening ceremony was attended by Fuad Muradov, the chairman of Azerbaijan’s State Committee for Work with Diaspora, Shota Rekhviashvili, the governor of Kvemo Kartli region of Georgia, Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, the state minister for reconciliation and civil equality, and other officials.

The opening of the Integration Center of Georgian Azerbaijanis in Marneuli is an important event. The proposal regarding the integration center opened in Marneuli was put forward by local youth living in Georgia in 2018. The opening of the center is a very important project, and it is the solution for a number of issues that concern the local Azerbaijanis in Georgia.  

The main purpose of the establishment of the center is to deepen the existing relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia in the fields of science, education, culture and sports and to support the integration of local Azerbaijanis into civil society. Azerbaijani, Georgian and English languages, as well as the history of Azerbaijan and Georgia, will be taught in the center, and sports clubs will operate.

The center operates in various directions and supports Azerbaijanis living in Georgia. The biggest support was during the Coronavirus pandemic. With the support of the State Committee for Work with Diaspora, they helped foreign compatriots by providing support to low-income and vulnerable population groups, such as Azerbaijani houses and separate diaspora organizations established abroad, by carrying out humanitarian actions. The Integration Center of Georgian Azerbaijanis repeatedly helped low-income and elderly families and elderly people living in social isolation in various cities of Georgia during the quarantine period and distributed food parcels to Azerbaijani families due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The center also organizes events on significant days for both countries. This year, a commemorative event was held at the Georgian Azerbaijani Integration Center in connection with the 30th anniversary of the Khojaly genocide. They laid a wreath in front of the monument in February 2022. Azerbaijani Minister of Education Emin Amrullayev, who was on a visit to Georgia, also visited the Integration Center of Georgian Azerbaijanis in Marneuli.

 

The “proxy paradox”, namely, the fact that the “Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics”, which for 8 years have been completely subsidized by the Russian Federation, enjoy broad military support and have “authority” totally dependent on the Kremlin, but so officially and not annexed to Russia, suggests that there is a complex and multi-level model of Moscow’s interaction with the “satellites”.

A kind of “food chain” has been formed, in which a “satellite” country or territory can be “sacrificed” for the sake of Russia receiving geopolitical benefits and advantages.

At the lowest level of this “chain” are several well-known countries in Africa, in which both governments and national wealth are controlled by Russian private companies, primarily the infamous Wagner private military company. The socio-economic development of Russia, in essence, is of little interest, despite the traditional declaration of “friendly ties with the countries of Africa.” Much more profitable and interesting is the export of minerals, the “range” of which is very wide, including gold. The presence of PMCs, which do not require large resources, makes it possible to keep local clans “on a short leash”, as well as successfully compete and even squeeze Western countries out of the region, i.e. former metropolises.

“Trojan horses” are Russia’s “gold asset” among the “satellites”, primarily due to the personal loyalty of the leaders, in the spirit of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, or traditional “historical” allied relations, as in the case of Serbia. The main task of the “Trojan horses” is to create a deep split in the West, in particular, the European Union, designated by Russia as a hostile entity. The situation with sanctions has clearly shown that a “Trojan horse” can be used to destroy political unity on conceptual international issues.

The current “energy crisis” in Europe also did not do without the Hungarian “Trojan horse”. Against the background of serious problems in the industry and the growing dissatisfaction of the population caused by a shortage of gas in European countries, Hungary is confidently increasing its pumping, demonstrating to the entire EU the “advantages of friendship with Russia.”

Serbia, whose economic potential is very small, is being used by Russia in its traditional role as an “eternal fuse” in the Balkans. The recent idea to create a military base in Serbia was met with a bang by the local patriotic community, but with great apprehension in neighboring countries. The fears are quite understandable since Russian forces are almost in the center of Europe close to the NATO countries.

Serbia is a “satellite” very vulnerable to pressure. On the one hand, the Serbian economy, and its export potential, are focused on the EU, but on the other hand, the status of a “historical ally” obliges the Serbian authorities and Serbian society to demonstrate loyalty to Russia at all levels.

The “satellite” countries from among the former republics of the USSR traditionally play the role of a “security belt” for Russia. “Setting fire to conflicts” along the perimeter of its borders, Russia is trying to “stop” tension, preventing destructive processes from spreading to its territory. True, with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the “satellites” from the CSTO began to demonstrate intractability and therefore are now considered a cheap source of resources for the war with Ukraine. Mercenaries are being recruited in Central Asia, and Soviet-made weapons are being exported.

Also, “post-Soviet satellites” are considered by Russia as platforms for circumventing sanctions or a profitable exchange with influential players in the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia. The role of PMCs at this level of the “food chain” is performed by the Russian “peacekeeping contingent”, the effectiveness of which is doubted, for example, by all parties to the Karabakh conflict.

Belarus occupies a special place among the “post-Soviet satellites”. In fact, this is a military springboard for Russia’s advance to the West and at the same time a “theater of military operations” that allows you to “export chaos” and take the war out of Russia.

Finally, one more, extremely interesting element of the “food chain” of Russian satellites, is now being actively developed. These are “rogue states”, i.e. Iran, and North Korea. In exchange for economic preferences, they must also ensure the “export of chaos” and blackmail of the West, including nuclear. The special operation in Ukraine made its adjustments to this standard set. Now these “satellites” are also a source of weapons (Russia tried to buy drones from Iran) to continue the war with Ukraine.

Several countries in Latin America, where Russian propaganda is traditionally strong, can also replenish the “food chain”. They are destined for the role of “counterweight” to American influence in the region.

Finally, the BRICS countries. In the literal sense, they are not “satellites” of the Kremlin, but they have a “strange respect” for Russia (like India). This group of countries is a platform for Russia’s attempts to realize the idea of ​​a “multipolar world” and declare a “pivot to the East”, which in many respects has a pure propaganda value.

The entire food chain satellites” is called upon to play an active role in Russia’s struggle with the West. We now have a rather unique situation – what for centuries formed the basis of the existence of the Russian state, namely, opposition to the West, is being implemented at all levels. We hear about the “turn to the East”, about the “predatory aggressive West”, about the “pernicious Western values”. But this was during the time of the dispute between the “Slavophiles” and the “Westerners” back in the 19th century.

Using “satellites”, Russia is testing new technologies for the destruction of Western civilization.

Russian “satellites” are active or potential “grey” zones of instability. The formation of such “zones” is Russia’s calling card. So it was in Georgia, so it was in Syria. Now, this technology is being scaled up in Ukraine, where Russia is trying to turn the occupied Ukrainian regions into mini-satellites. The same scheme is being implemented – control over resources, mobilization of the population, the transformation of the territory into a “theater of military operations”, a barrier that does not let the war directly into the territory of Russia.

The carriers of the “ideology of destabilization” in the occupied Ukrainian territories are both local collaborators and officials who “landed” from Russia. But, most importantly, these are figures from the ruling United Russia party, a kind of “collective Putin”, organizing “referendums” and establishing quasi-state structures in these territories.

There is no guarantee that Russia will not organize such “gray zones” somewhere in Europe. The scheme is quite simple. A country, region, or even a separate city declares itself to be a “satellite” of Russia, due to traditions, historical memory, or the presence of a Russian population, which is allegedly “infringed on their rights.” Further, the current government is declared illegitimate, and an enclave controlled by Russia is rapidly forming with all the attributes of chaos – from the degradation of administrative and economic structures to the emergence of a base of militants, arms, and human trafficking.

The events in Ukraine testify that the “export of chaos” can be organized by Russia anywhere in the world.

Mykola Volkivskyi is a political scientist, fellow of the Lane Kirkland Scholarship, Founder of the Foundation for the Development of Ukraine in Poland, and the Institute for Government Relations in Kyiv. Former Advisor to the Chairman of the Committee of the Ukrainian Parliament.

Artem Oliinyk is a political scientist, President of the IAPSS in Ukraine and research assistant at the Academy of Political Sciences of Ukraine, Director of the Institute for Government Relations (Kyiv).

The recent news that Venezuela will be providing Iran with 1 million hectares of arable land for farming draws further concern from the security circles concerned about the Islamic Republic’s growing influence in the Western Hemisphere.  That follows a rapidly growing energy collaboration between Caracas and Tehran following the Biden administration’s decision to lift oil sanctions on the Maduro regime. This collaboration includes the boosting of Iran’s crude supply to Venezuela for refining, which gives room for an increased export of Iranian oil for sale – and further undermines the impact of sanctions on Iran’s operations.  

There is reason to believe that the recent US government’s foreign policy in Latin America has encouraged a more assertive political and defense cooperation between leftist governments, rogue regimes such as Iran, and its terrorist proxy Hezbullah, as well as assorted criminal enterprises and gangs. 

With the election of the FARC-affiliated leftist president of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, the United States is losing one of its few remaining allies in Latin America. US-Colombia cooperation on drug trafficking and counterterrorism strengthened Colombia against cartels, curtailed the Marxist-Leninist FARC rebels (despite the ill-advised peace deal), limited the spread of Hezbullah and its Venezuelan supporters, and bolstered Israel and Colombia’s security relationship. 

Colombia helped prevent the assassination of an Israeli businessman by Hezbullah, allegedly planned in retaliation for the liquidation of Qassem Soleimani. But stability in Colombia has always been contingent on US political and security support. The refugee crisis in Venezuela, which brought 3.5 million Venezuelans to Colombia, has resulted in economic concerns and risks of destabilization.  Instead of addressing this crisis, the Biden administration has announced the removing of FARC from the Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list. Colombia and the European Union withdrew the “terrorist” label from FARC when the peace agreement was first concluded in an effort to encourage integration, but FARC has factionalized into militias that engage in occasional bouts of violence.  The US administration’s signal that it no longer considers FARC a security threat could embolden the group’s worst elements. With the newly elected President Petro pursuing the policy of decriminalization of cocaine, many fear that the policy will give cover to drug cartels, and Hezbullah to enter the markets under more official covers and embed themselves further. 

The election’s context was one that experts had warned about: despite the formal end of the civil war guerrilla warfare continued. FARC’s political success brought more leftist elements into the government.  Far from renouncing violence, many fear that FARC affiliates will instead use it to further spread and entrench the ideology that caused the civil war and that has already resulted in political and economic crises in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba. All of those countries have several things in common – strong opposition to capitalism, populist distaste for the United States, close relations with narcotraffickers, and alliances with Iran, China, and Russia.  The brazen assassination on a Colombian beach of a Paraguayan prosecutor, Marcelo Pecci, known for his tough positions on corruption, gangs, and Hezbullah, may be a harbinger of the chaos that can be expected should leftist policies so destructive to Venezuela take root in Colombia.  

That episode, however, did little to change the US government’s haphazard approach to Latin America. Over the various administrations, US role in Latin American has vacillated, with Republicans traditionally emphasizing the security-oriented approach and focusing on countering terrorism and gangs, while the Democratic administrations focusing more on human rights and humanitarian assistance. The Trump administration, for instance, has pushed for Hezbullah’s terrorist designation among both left and right-wing governments in Latin America, and has worked with El Salvador to address the border crisis and to clamp down on the MS-13 entry into the US. 

However, none of the US administrations in the past twenty years had developed a broad strategic approach in the Western Hemisphere. Specifically, there has been neither an effort to work with individual target countries to address ingrained economic conditions, political upheavals, and regional problems – such as the impact of Venezuela’s refugee crisis on its neighbors – nor a broader security framework to root out the pro-Iran elements which have grown across the continent thanks to the Cuban/Venezuelan intelligence network, and Iran’s strategic cooperation on economy and defense with Latin American countries. Both Republican and Democrat administrations overall adopted a reactionary approach to specific pet peeves, failing to develop a vision for engagement which would help advance security, prosperity, and peace in the neighboring countries past any specific governments in the US or among their counterparts. 

The relative silence after Pecci’s murder is an illustration of the US government’s overall failure to understand that the security concerns in Latin American require a long-term consistent bipartisan approach. As Joseph Humire, Center for Secure Free Society’s specialist on Transnational Threat Networks in the Western Hemisphere, told the author, Iran has been patiently pursuing a systematic ground game through As Joseph Humire, Center for Secure Free Society’s specialist on Transnational Threat Networks in the Western Hemisphere, told the author, Iran has been patiently pursuing a systematic ground game throughout the continent, slowly but surely expanding its reach, through consistent social, cultural, and economic initiatives and the expansion of alliances with the help of its regional proxies and networks, including assorted criminal elements. 

Some have compared Pecci’s murder with the analogous killing of Alberto Nisman, an Argentine prosecutor who was investigating the leftist Kirschner government’s cover-up of the Iranian orchestrated AMIA bombing by Hizballah. Since the return of leftists to power in Argentina the investigation into these events has gone cold again – and the Iranian presence has grown stronger. Under the current president, Alberto Fernandez, Argentina claims to crack down on Iranian smuggling, but recently allowed a Venezuelan-flagged flight operated by a US-sanctioned Iranian aviator with at least one senior Tehran official on board to land on its soil.  

The US reaction to these incidents has been muted. Low-key policies on leftist politicians in Latin America lie in sharp contrast to the Biden administration’s aggressively interventionist approach with the few remaining right-wing governments, which are also some of the last remaining US allies and opponents of Iran.  The White House, which initially embraced the Guatemalan president Alejandro Giammattei, later parted ways and even tried to impede his efforts to replace an official from the prior administration.  The attack on Nayib Bukele’s government in El Salvador has been far more extensive, public, and potentially destructive to US security interests in the Western Hemisphere.  

After Bukele replaced officials loyal to his leftist predecessors and linked to corruption, the newly inaugurated Biden administration reacted by diverting humanitarian aid to leftist self-styled human rights NGOs connected to opposition parties.  A number of these groups were reportedly receiving funding from past lawmakers, who themselves had served in sanctioned governments. The Biden administration also criticized the Bukele government for allegedly engaging in secret negotiations with notorious gangs, such as MS-13, in a scheme that would have reduced violence in exchange for votes for Bukele’s party, “The New Ideas”. The sole source for this accusation were journalists at the left-leaning Salvadoran opposition-alligned publication El Faro. 

Subsequent events raised questions. Between November 9th and 11th, El Salvador saw a strange increase in gang-related murders (46 in a 72-hours-period) before going back to zero homicides on November 12th. These numbers were provided by local authorities on Twitter on November 13th. “After 24 hours of having launched #DespliegueNacional, we can announce that we have contained the increase in violence during the past couple of days,” Bukele wrote. Later he used the phrase “old enemies and new allies with external financing” when referring to the situation.  

Giovanni Giacalone, senior analyst for the Europe Desk at ITCT, Itstime, and ITSS’ Latin America team, says that “[a]ccording to former ES anti-gang units, Bukele is referring to the right-wing and the left-wing political parties that always provided funds to the Maras [gangs].  Those would be the old enemies.” The cryptic reference to the ‘new allies with external financing’ may reference the flow of weapons into the country that ends up in the hands of these gangsters. Whether that external financing includes Venezuela, whose reach is growing across the region, the US, which has been openly meddling in El Salvador’s domestic affairs while ignoring the flow of weapons into the country, or other parties remains to be investigated. 

The Maras appeared to indiscriminately kill people – including vendors, bus passengers, and market-goers. La Prensa Grafica reported that gang members may have been instructed to leave bodies in plain sight. According to Giacalone, these brief spikes of violence usually occur when the Mara leaders want to send a message to the government. 

In January 2022, a Canada-based digital rights organization called Citizen Lab produced a report attacking the Bukele government for its alleged violations of journalists’ privacy via use of NSOGroup’s Pegasus software. In its reports, Citizen Lab relies on the Biden administration’s El Faro-based claims of Bukele’s collusion with the gangs, but produces no new evidence. It also does not reveal the technical methodology by which it arrives at its conclusion. The Bukele government rejected these claims stating it had no access to Pegasus and that several of its own officials had also been hacked. Pegasus is only sold to specific state-based actors and is reportedly untraceable. Could Citizen Lab also be one of the “new allies with external funding”? 

Curiously, despite this alleged collusion with the gangs and the subsequent cover up, the gangs soon declared open season in El Salvador, challenging the rule of law with unprecedented violence. “The ES government always denied such allegations and its strong actions against the Maras, in prison and on the streets, make it hard to believe that Bukele attempted some secret negotiations,” states Giacalone, adding: “Is it possible that those new allies that Bukele referred to are trying to discredit the government by making the public opinion believe that a deal was made and those sudden peaks are supposed to prove it? If the Mara leaders currently detained had the possibility to order a long-term war against the government, they clearly would. However, we have only seen 72-hours-long peaks of violence, mainly against civilians.” 

Bukele reacted by ordering a special operation and rounding up over 47,300 gang members since the state of emergency was approved by El Salvador’s Congress in April, and was extended for the fourth time the week of July 29th, with minimal losses on either side. The Biden administration reacted by issuing multiple statements of concern and sanctioning several officials for “undermining democratic norms” by passing a law preventing the media from sharing gang communications. Ironically, several Salvadorans added to the list are from the previous left-wing administrations, and are being added in connection to their past corruption and embezzlement. While putting political pressure on President Bukele and openly siding with his opponents, the Biden team reportedly shuttered America’s MS-13 task force and embraced open border policies, increasing the flow of fleeing MS-13 members into the country. 

The likely impact of such policies by the US is easily predictable. First, coupled with domestic reluctance to hold accused violent criminals without bail, the US government’s tolerance of MS-13 and other gangsters encourages the flow of violent crime into the United States. Second, the political pressure on the Bukele government encourages criminal elements and the groups that cover for them, and strengthens whatever links may exist between the leftist opposition and these elements. It is the opposition, and not Bukele, who stand to benefit the most from gang violence. Externally, foreign entities, such as Iran and Venezuela would also gain from the Bukele administration either falling by popular will, which is unlikely as it has a widely popular mandate and has coordinated all of its activities with its Congress, or was destabilized and made ineffectual thanks to US pressure.  

The Northern Triangle is a geographically and geopolitically advantageous area for Iran, Hezbullah, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and the new socialist Honduran administration’s Red-Green Axis. Given its strange passivity in reaction to growing Iranian and Venezuelan interventions across Latin America, and its aggressive position towards Nayib Bukele, one wonders whether a pro-Iran radically leftist Western Hemisphere is in fact the geopolitical goal of the US, or at least, a reality it is willing to tolerate while in pursuit of the Iran deal. One also wonders, why, over the course of the past decades, both Republicans and Democrats have failed to develop an effective outreach and coordination strategy to ensure that the popular will of the voters in Latin American countries and support for improved relations with the US will outlive any particular government of the day. Iran, on the other hand, has been stealthily pursuing that vision of becoming one of the central influencing powers in the Western Hemisphere. 

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security lawyer, a geopolitical analyst, President of Scarab Rising, Inc., and the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider.