Defence`s Feeds

Belgian FN MAG General Purpose Machine Gun

Today in CCLKOW we are reorienting you to the homeland and the problems of interoperability between police and the armed forces. Even without the Paris Attacks earlier this month, the subject of mastering the ‘JIIM’ environment is critical, both in military operations at home and abroad. To discuss this, I am very happy to bring to you a special guest writer, Ian Wiggett, recently retired as an Assistant Chief Constable from Greater Manchester Police. It should be understood, then, that this piece is written from the British perspective, which includes a significant difference with respect to the use of force by the police, particularly as concerns the generally disarmed stance. Nevertheless, the issue of integrating a military response to an attack to the homeland matters even to the US. Although the matter of Posse Comitatus would seem to forestall the use of the regular forces domestically, this matter has never been tested against any significant threat. And in fact, even as it was ultimately tabled, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks the military role in homeland defence was put on the table for serious debate. It is also worth noting that the American disdain for soldiers operating in the homeland is a legacy of our British heritage, and so to a similar degree the use of the armed forces in domestic circumstances is discomfiting on this side of the Atlantic. Furthermore, although they come under the control of the Governors, the National Guard formations of the individual states are trained as military, not police, forces. Thus, even in the American setting, how the armed forces will act in support of local, state, or even federal law enforcement remains a challenge. Alternatively, should the terrorist threat upon the European Continent reach sufficient proportions, it is not out of the realm of the possibility for recourse to NATO forces to be contemplated. Finally, as the importance of security and stabilization campaigns rise, the ability to work with civilian authorities will become more important. If the problems have not been hashed out for homeland defence, it is very unlikely they will succeed in foreign contingencies. Thus, the locus of operations of the armed forces has shifted and it is time to give serious thought to the issues. Read the piece, consider the implications and questions posed, and join the conversation on Twitter, at #CCLKOW and, it is hoped, the newly launched hashtag for policing discussion, #WeCops. — Jill S. Russell

 

First, some history…

Military Assistance to the Civil Powers (MACP) – also known as Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) – has existed for centuries.  In the days before a regular civilian police force existed, it was only the military that had the numbers, organisation and capability to restore order and maintain control.  That was, indeed, the role of the militia: a body of soldiers that could be raised at short notice to provide homeland defence.  It was the militia in North America that provided the backbone of the Revolutionary Army, and after independence, the United States retained the militia as the National Guard.

The original concept of “MACP” was therefore built around the military, either militia or regulars, being the force of last resort to restore and maintain the Peace.  Use of force (or at least, show of force) was central to that.  Armed soldiers putting down the insurrection – and casualties and collateral damage were expected.

 

The Peterloo Massacre, Manchester, 1819.
Contemporary cartoon, Cruikshank

The folk memory does not easily or quickly forget the intervention of armed forces.  The Peterloo Massacre of 1819 is still invoked to inspire radicalism in Manchester, and the impact of that violent suppression is generally acknowledged as leading to further radicalism and ultimately to wider reform.  The Easter Rising in Dublin involved only a relatively small number of republican combatants, but the violence of the military response arguably pushed many towards the cause of independence.  In South Wales mining communities Churchill is known not as a wartime Prime Minister, but as the Home Secretary who had sent troops against striking miners in 1911.

 

Troops deployed in support of local police to suppress striking miners, Rhondda Valley, 1910-11

History therefore suggests that the relationship between the people and the military has to be managed carefully.  Too much force, applied clumsily, may achieve its immediate objective of quelling a riot – but the lasting impact may be far more damaging to the established order.  The ‘silent majority’ are very grateful that the forces of law and order (whether dressed in blue or green) have made it safe for them to walk the streets and sleep soundly at night.  But if too many skulls are cracked, that ‘silent majority’ can quickly change sides.

 

How does MACP/MACA work today?

Military Assistance to the Civil Authorities (MACA) falls into three main types.  The first is simply about extra manpower and equipment to help deal with emergencies such as flooding, heavy snow, evacuations, etc.  The military can bring in large numbers people and specialist equipment or skills at short notice.  Filling sandbags to protect critical sites from flooding.  Moving people away from flooded homes.  Helicopters transporting vital supplies.  Building temporary bridges. This is also known as Military Assistance to the Civil Community.   The military also step in when critical services are threatened by industrial action.  Recent examples include fuel deliveries, firefighting, and ambulances.  This is also referred to as Military Assistance to Government Departments.

A second category, closely linked to the first, is the provision of additional or specialist support which may not be available to the civilian authority.  Installing communications equipment in remote areas, deploying radar or aerial photography, for example.  Both the Olympic Games and the Commonwealth Games used military staff to provide searching and access control.  There are long standing arrangements for handling of explosives and munitions, and until recently the military air sea rescue service worked frequently with local police forces and mountain rescue.

This all has to be paid for, of course.  Whilst the military may be very willing to offer their help, the MoD will want to know which authority to recover their costs from.  This has caused delays in the past, with civilian authorities sometimes being reluctant to call in military because of the costs, and/or arguing over which authority would be responsible for paying. Somewhat of a challenge if the emergency was due to an act of God!

Things have moved on considerably in recent years, with a much wider understanding that protecting life and property is far more important than petty turf wars or arguments over bills.  However, there has a growing tendency over the past decade for political leaders to want to do ‘something’ when faced with a crisis.  This has led to the Army being ‘ordered in’ to ‘sort out’ emergencies such as the foot and mouth outbreak, or the Somerset Levels flooding.  The mission may be loosely defined, and the intervention options may be limited – but it’s ok, the army’s here!   In these situations it’s important that the military recognise local sensitivities.  The civilian authorities will have been working hard for some time, and will feel that military intervention represents a criticism of their efforts.  The Army will also feel uncomfortable about being drawn into incidents that inevitably have political ramifications.

The third category is the use of force – Military Assistance to the Civil Power.  This is the most difficult aspect of MACA.  The military are trained to fight wars, not to be police officers.  It is many decades since the military was deployed to restore order on the streets of the mainland UK, although of course they spend several decades supporting the RUC in Northern Ireland. That deployment still has a painful legacy.

In more recent years, the capability, training and tactics of police and special forces have transformed in response to the changing terrorist threat. For obvious reasons, little of that is seen outside of the counter-terrorist functions.  There is a lot of catching up to be done by politicians, communities and those police and military leaders not directly involved in this specialist area of policing in relation to how the police and military will work together – and what this means for constitutional arrangements, and the longer term impact on the police-military-public relationships.  The maintenance of the Queen’s Peace remains a policing mission, even if it is carried out by the military on the police’s behalf.

 

How MACA/MACP works

In simple terms, the civil power requests the assistance of the military.  The advice to the civil authority is to ask for the ‘effect’ desired, not to specify the resource required.  The military cannot deploy without the authority of the minister of defence.  This is an important constitutional check which we perhaps fail to recognise the significance of in the UK.  In countries where there have been instances of military coups, civil war, or military government, the deployment of the military into the civil space can be highly politically charged and in some cases even outlawed.

In the UK, the civil authorities are used to operating on their own initiative, without ministerial or political involvement.  Consequently, the MACA/MACP approval can be seen as a bureaucratic process, mainly to allow the costs to be recharged.  For more sensitive deployments, the request to deploy military assets will require approval from both the minister overseeing the requesting civil power, and the minister of defence.  This ministerial approval process still applies in critical, fast moving incidents.  There are arrangements to ensure the decisions are made quickly, but the process of contacting ministers and completing paperwork will inevitably introduce some degree of delay.

 

Use of military force in support of police

Churchill directing troops at the Sidney Street Siege, 1911.

 The dividing line between police and military used to be clear.  Police forces simply did not have the capability to take on a well armed terrorist cell.  That was the job of Special Forces. Once the civil police could no longer cope, the incident was handed over to the military and special forces neutralised the threat. The most famous example is the Iranian Embassy Siege. Civilian police surrounded the embassy, but at the point when it was decided a forced conclusion was required, a handwritten note on a scrap of paper allowed the police commander to hand the incident over to the military commander. Once concluded, control was handed back to the police.

Planning for a long time since was based on that premise. The incident would be defined and contained.  When the point was reached that an intervention was decided, this would be conducted by special forces. Police handed control to the military until the incident was resolved. The scene would then be handed back to police.  But the world has changed.

 

So what’s changed?

Alongside the changing nature of terrorism, from 9/11 to lone actors and suicide bombers, the attacks that prompted the most rethinking have been Mumbai and Westgate in Nairobi.  Marauding terrorists, well armed, attacking crowded places pose real challenges for the conventional police armed response.  Police firearms officers are trained to contain the threat and make considered decisions whether to open fire. They should use the minimum force necessary – and indeed, rarely open fire, looking to use less lethal options whenever possible.  Once contained, they negotiate a resolution, again avoiding the use of lethal force as far as possible.  Each decision has to be individually justified and will always be subject to intense scrutiny afterwards, particularly if there has been a fatal discharge.

Terrorists intent on killing as many people as possible require very different concept of operations in response.  Armed officers need to respond quickly and take on the terrorists in order to minimise the loss of life. Negotiation is likely to be pointless (but cannot be discounted, regardless of what has happened).  Police forces will need to bring as many armed officers together as quickly as possible.  They will work as ad hoc teams, put together as they arrive.  This has led to common training, tactics, and weaponry.  The fast response also includes Special Forces, mobilised quickly by air.  As the military component will be arriving alongside the civilian police response, the training includes shared and flexible command models. The priority is to save life, and they will need to get in quickly and resolve the incident, using whatever resources are available.

Depending where and when the incident occurs, command structures and ministerial involvement may be ‘in flux’. MACP/MACA will still be needed.  But the situation on the ground will be developing rapidly and is likely to be confused.  There are a number of possible scenarios, ranging from police dealing with the situation themselves through to a full handover to SF.  The priority will always be saving life.

 

But the threat continues to change? What about other scenarios?

In the last few years we have seen: the two Paris attacks; a shooter on a train in France; an attack on a synagogue in Copenhagen; incidents in Belgium; the attack by Anders Breivik in Norway; car bombs in Glasgow and London; lone actors attacking Parliament and the military in Canada; the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby; several attacks and plots in Australia; the downing of civilian jets over Egypt and Ukraine; the attack on tourists in Tunisia.  In the meantime, counter terrorist police and the Security Service have continued to disrupt attack plots in the UK.  The threats range from multiple and coordinated attacks with automatic weapons and explosives, unsophisticated attacks by individuals or groups with knives, to bombing plots with homemade explosives.  The targets could be military personnel, police, crowded spaces, sensitive religious locations or communities, high profile individuals, or representatives of particular countries and communities.

The range of possible attack scenarios is endless. The greatest unknown, however, is the number of threats/incidents that have to be confronted at the same time.  One attack is bad enough, but several happening simultaneously and/or lasting over a long period will stretch the available specialist capacity.   The threat level in the UK is already at severe, the second highest level.  If the threat increases, we are entering unprecedented territory for the UK in peacetime.

The recent Paris attacks could have conceivably happened in the UK.  The response in France and Belgium was a massive armed military presence on the streets.  An incident in the UK or overseas could lead to our government deciding to deploy armed soldiers (other than SF) across the UK.  There may or may not be intelligence to inform the specific response required.  Whilst planning has already envisaged this sort of event, the questions remain – what are they going to do?  What is their role? What are they expected to deal with?

An incident (or incidents) in the UK may require extra numbers to be drawn in beyond the current planning assumptions.

For police forces, there have been further changes in planning assumptions and responses brought about by the 7/7 and 15/7 bombings, the riots of 2011, the 2012 Olympics, and Austerity.  In short, even the largest forces cannot deal with major incidents without support from other forces.  If there are multiple major incidents happening simultaneously and/or for extended periods, police forces may struggle to cope without assistance.  The most likely, if not only source of assistance is the military.

The progressive increase in the threat level in the UK has also brought into question whether police in the UK can remain unarmed for much longer.  There are only a few countries in the world where the police are unarmed.  Whilst a lone officer with a handgun may have limited impact against a group of terrorists armed with automatic weapons, routinely armed police have options which are not available in the UK.  There are between 5,000 and 6,000 armed officers available in the UK, many being committed to protection of vulnerable sites or high profile individuals.  Multiple and protracted incidents could require additional armed resources, which could only come from the military.  But the way police operate with firearms is very different to the way soldiers are trained for combat.

 

What are the likely scenarios?

The various terrorist attacks around the world show the range of possible scenarios.  The unknowns as ever are the where and when.  But the issue for planning are the assumptions about the scale of the attacks and the number of simultaneous attacks (or other incidents).  For the purpose of this paper, the assumption has to be that additional military support has been requested because events are beyond the capability of police and SF capacity.

Without examining each possible scenario, there are are some key considerations that the military need to prepare for:

• Command and Control. It is likely that the incident will remain under civil police command.  Are these arrangements understood?  Does the military understand the police organisational structure?
• Can the military operate effectively within civil police communication systems? What if those systems break down?
• Concept of Operations. Is it clear what the role of the military is? Is this understood by all agencies? Is there a mutual understanding of each other’s roles, constraints, and ‘red lines’?
• Use of Force. What authority is required? What are the rules of engagement? What options are available, including less lethal? What risks and contingencies are envisaged?  What guidance and instructions have been given to the those deployed?  Is the guidance fit for purpose?  Who carries the responsibility if soldiers end up in a situation where they have to defend themselves?
• Locality and Community. How does the local context affect decision making and the options available? What information is needed, and how does that get relayed?

 

Beware of linear assumptions

Planning in the past has been based on a phased, incremental escalation of a single incident.  As the incident escalates, military assistance is engaged.  The mission is relatively clear, and the military resources required are self-selecting.

Planning and preparation are no longer so easy.  It is not inconceivable that the military is deployed for a general security and reassurance presence.  Presumably, though, they will need to react or respond if something happens.

The support requested may be for a specific purpose or role. Perhaps the civil police need additional explosives officers, or logistics, or certain technical skills to deal with the incident, but the military will not be engaged in tackling the threat directly.

There may be a general emergency which requires additional security presence, perhaps for guarding and searching, or to support and work alongside civil police, or even to replace civil police if they are not available or not able to deal with the threat.

And there may be a need for additional armed resources to be deployed quickly to tackle an armed threat, and the current police armed capability may not be available or sufficient.

 

National Security Strategy 2015

The new Strategic Defence and Security Review sets out the need to strengthen domestic resilience, and the need to tackle the terrorist threat at home and abroad using the ‘full spectrum of capabilities’.  Ten thousand military personnel will ‘be available on standby to support the civil authorities for significant terrorist incidents at short notice, supported by a wide range of niche military experts’.

MACA is now a central part of domestic security policy and planning.

 

There is much in the piece to contemplate, and so rather than limiting the discussion to answering a few questions, what I prefer to do is merely set the big issues up as areas of primary concern for debate. To my mind these are very broadly in two categories:

first, the Use of Force and the Rules of Engagement for the armed forces upon the civilian streets; and,

second, the differences between police/law enforcement and the armed forces across the universe of tactics, doctrine, language, etc., for as certainly as ‘secure the house’ means something different between the services (we all know the joke, right?), so too does the same issue apply in this case.

Specifically for the Americans, I would be interested to hear your thoughts as to what level of threat or incident would alter the political calculus on Posse Comitatus.

Join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW and #WeCops.

 

———-

Ian Wiggett is a former police officer who retired in 2015 after 30 years service. Ian served in the Metropolitan Police, Cheshire Constabulary, and Greater Manchester Police, reaching the rank of Assistant Chief Constable. During his service, Ian worked in both detective and uniformed specialist roles, gaining particular expertise in serious crime and counter terrorism investigations, public order, specialist firearms command, and intelligence. He was the chair of the Cheshire Local Resilience Forum and deputy chair of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum, and has been Gold commander for numerous major operations and events. He was the North West regional lead for counter-terrorism, firearms, and air support. He was the national lead for Casualty Bureau, a member of the national boards for Prevent, and for Protect and Prepare, and a member of the national civil contingencies committee. Ian has led a number of major change programmes and as national lead for systems thinking and continuous thinking helped lead work on demand and new performance measurement approaches nationally.

Here’s why Wild Weasel missions were among the most dangerous sorties flown in Southeast Asia. During the Vietnam War the main threat to the strike packages was the V-750 (S-75) Dvina, the first effective Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM). Better known by the NATO designation SA-2 Guideline, the missile was developed in the mid 1950s and it was used […]

Climate change is already having a severe impact on Afghans’ daily lives – but this challenge is often over-shadowed by what seem to be more-urgent problems: war and the economic crisis. Therefore, the reports submitted by the Afghan government for the Paris climate conference starting today, 30 November 2015 (and President Ashraf Ghani speaking in the early afternoon) provide a concentrated picture of the challenges arising from this phenomenon. At the same time, there are doubts that Afghanistan’s institutional strength and capacities are sufficient to cope with the evolving impact of climate change. Furthermore, the mid-term growth-based development aims of the government, at least in part, run contrary to the needs for long-term environment protection and climate change adaptation. A primer by AAN’s co-director and senior analyst Thomas Ruttig and guest author Ryskeldi Satke. (*)

“Afghanistan is ranked among the most vulnerable countries in the world to the adverse impacts of climate change. . . . As a result of climate change, it is anticipated that the incidence of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods, and droughts will likely increase. . . . Between 1990 and 2000, Afghanistan lost an average of 29,400 hectares of forest per year, at an average annual deforestation rate of 2.25 per cent, which further increased to 2.92% per annum between 2000 to 2005. . . . With these climatic changes the foundation of the country’s economy, stability, and food security is under threat.”

These striking statements are taken from major documents the Afghan government has submitted for the United Nations conference on climate change that will open in Paris today, 30 November 2015 – the twenty-first annual Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). With its 195 signatories, the UNFCCC is the only existing widely legitimate international convention on how to tackle global warming. (1) Every participating country must submit two documents – a so-called Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC, a kind of status report about the national climate situation (Afghanistan’s is here), and the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (Afghanistan’s position paper is here) – in the run-up to the conference.

The gravity of Afghanistan’s situation is made strikingly clear by a short glance at the maps (p 41) in the 2014 synthesis report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – ­the most important report on the subject. These maps show that Afghanistan is part of a region that stands out for having the second-highest rate of rising temperatures and is expected to have a net loss of annual precipitation. According to these models, and cited in Afghanistan’s Initial National Communication for Paris, the country’s “mean annual temperature is projected to increase by 1.4 to 4.0°C by the 2060s, and 2.0 to 6.2 degrees by the 2090s.” As a result, the Afghan reports for Paris warn, by 2060 “large parts of the [country’s] agricultural economy will become marginal without significant investment in water management and irrigation.”

While the Paris conference’s focus on greenhouse gas emissions is rather narrow, the documents submitted by the Afghan government provide valuable insights into the gigantic challenge that the country is facing, but which are usually crowded out by the attention to the war with the Taleban, the political deadlock in the National Unity Government (NUG), the economic crisis and its fallout, and the mass exodus of young Afghans. This challenge is the changing climate that already has started to affect the lives of many Afghans and will continue to do so increasingly drastically in the decades to come, if no measures are taken.

Briefly put, even if Afghanistan had peace and a highly effective government tomorrow, it would still face a daunting task: to adapt to the effects of the worldwide climate change.

Afghan climate change: Lacking data, striking indications

The empirical data on how exactly the climate is changing in Afghanistan is rather scarce, though. The systematic gathering of data and on-the-ground research in the country that boasted of having “the most advanced meteorological monitoring in the region” before 1979 had been disrupted by decades-long wars. Nonetheless, the effects of climate change are clearly visible, both in Afghanistan and in the region.

The strong earthquake in May 2014 that caused a massive landslide burying a newly-built part of the village of Ab-e Barik in Badakhshan’s Argo district and many of its inhabitants clearly showed how a combination of climate change, conflict and weak governance exacerbate the vulnerability of local populations to natural disasters. The landslide was not the first one in the area but official warnings came too late (pointing to weak government oversight and lack of disaster risk reduction); the destroyed part of the village was built on visibly vulnerable hill slopes (a result of the lack of land for construction and of local government neglect); the slopes were additionally prone to landslides because of the destruction of the top soil by ploughing lalmi (rain-fed) land for cultivation (as a result of overall lack of agricultural land, an effect of unchecked population growth and settlement). Lastly, the main road over which relief should have come had been destroyed by previous flooding (lack of government capability to respond and conflict-related underdevelopment of the infrastructure).

The flooding that destroyed the road to Argo was what people called a “100-year-flood.” In its course, over April and May 2014, flash floods that hit 123 districts in 27 of the 34 provinces, washed away roads and crops, killed over 160 people, destroyed 6,800 homes, displaced 16,000 and affected altogether 125,000 people, according to UNOCHA. The rainfalls that caused the devastating floods were two to three times higher than normal annual averages for the area.

Despite the lack of a final assessment of the damage of the two earthquakes of October and November 2015 in Badakhshan (the first one alone affected more than one quarter of all districts in country, killed more than 300 people in northern Afghanistan and Pakistan and destroyed about 7,000 homes), it can be assumed that climate- and conflict-related degradation of the environment exacerbated the damage.

“So far we do know that the climate change impact is observable in the tributaries of the Amu Darya river in the Wakhan corridor,” Professor Benjamin Orlove from the University of California, also a member of the working group advising the University of Central Asia’s Mountain Societies Research Institute, based in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, told one of the authors in an interview. He is referring an observable decreased water flow in the Amu Darya and its tributaries, which form much of the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. A 2011 study found that 76 per cent of the sampled alpine glaciers in the Hindu Raj, a mountain range in Northern Pakistan, and the Wakhan of Afghanistan “have retreated since 1976”; the speed of this retreat was characterised as “rapid.” The melting of Afghan and Pakistani glaciers combined with the heavy rains during the 2014 spring and summer seasons translated into that year’s heavy flooding in Afghanistan.

Orlove also interpreted heat waves in southern Pakistan and India during spring and summer 2015, which together claimed close to 5,000 lives, as a sign of changing climate in the region.

According to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), “more than 6.7 million Afghans have been affected by disasters and extreme weather events such as drought, earthquakes, disease epidemics, sandstorms, and harsh winters” since 1998. The latest poverty status update for Afghanistan, compiled by the government and the World Bank and published in October 2015 (based on the latest available data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessments of 2007/08 and 2011/12), reports that

In 2007-08, 36 percent of the population in Afghanistan was poor, that is more than one in every three Afghan person was living on levels of expenditure insufficient to satisfy basic food and non-food needs. Four years later, in 2011-12, the poverty rate in Afghanistan remained substantially unchanged despite massive increase in international spending on military and civilian assistance, and overall strong economic growth and labor market performance. . . .

Another government report stated that a “high proportion of Afghanistan’s 27 million people face chronic and transitory food insecurity.”

A new start for research after 2001

Climate-related research and environment-related institution building in Afghanistan have started to catch up again over the past one and a half decades, both to its former capacity and international standards. Afghanistan joined the UNFCCC in 1992, ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2013 and became a party to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) in 1995 and the Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) in 2002. These commitments to address environmental and climate-related issues have also given Afghanistan access to UN funding and technical support.

In 2003, UNEP in cooperation with the then Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environment of the Afghanistan Transitional Authority and a broad array of international and Afghan governmental and non-governmental organisations, produced the first “post-conflict environmental assessment” for Afghanistan. With support of the UN and bilateral donors, Afghanistan’s National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) was established in 2005. In the same year, Afghanistan’s first environmental law came into force; its current version is from early 2007. In 2008, under a NEPA lead, the assessment of Afghanistan’s environment was updated in a new report.

Britain’s DFID (Department for International Development) and the government of Estonia funded the Afghanistan Environmental Data Centre (AEDC) operating in beta mode, with support from Kabul University’s Department of Geography and NEPA. Afghanistan’s Environment Strategy is covered under Afghanistan National Development Strategy for the period of 2009 to 2014.

NEFA also is involved in awareness raising and education on environmental issues. On its website, it has an almost 100 page-long document on “Environmental Education in light [sic] of Holy Quran” (in Dari: here). Among its successes is its declaration of a number of protection areas and national parks (see AAN reporting here) and its reported compilation of the first list of protected species in Afghanistan which, however, cannot be found on its own website.

In 2012, NEPA and UNEP launched a climate change initiative – the first of its kind in the country – in four particularly vulnerable provinces, Badakhshan, Balkh, Bamyan and Daikundi. This six million US dollar program was mainly financed by the Global Environment Facility “improved water management and use efficiency; community-based watershed management; improved terracing, agroforestry and agro-silvo pastoral system [ASPS]; climate-related research and early warning systems; improved food security; and rangeland management.” (2)

The hydro-meteorological database is also growing again. Today, the Ministry of Transportation that had set up Afghanistan’s pre-war weather stations – the first ones were installed in selected locations around the country in 1953 (3) – again oversees data collection and monitoring through its Department of Meteorology (maps p 92 here). According to UNEP, in 2014 under Afghan Meteorological Authority (AMA) at least 140 weather stations were operating countrywide. Additionally, a number of Afghan ministries and projects gather climate-related observations.

Furthermore, several international foundations and international and national NGOs, individually or within consortiums, are addressing the issue of climate change, or ecology and environmental protection more broadly, as part of their work plans. Five international and national development agencies – Afghanaid, ActionAid, Concern Worldwide, Save the Children and UNEP – have come together as the Afghanistan Resilience Consortium “to provide a coherent and coordinated response to Afghanistan’s urgent needs and vulnerabilities to natural disasters and climate.” This consortium collaborates with the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority, NEPA, the ministries of rural rehabilitation and development and of education as well as provincial, district and community development councils in Badakhshan, Bamyan, Balkh, Ghor, Jawzjan, Samangan, Sar-e Pul and Takhar provinces. The German Heinrich Boell Foundation and Madera, a French NGO operating in Afghanistan since 1988, are working with communities and other stakeholders on natural resource management and in other fields. The Boell foundation  states on its website: “there are already conflicts about the distribution of resources, about fertile lands, grazing grounds and water today. These are likely to increase the more affected Afghanistan will become by the effects of climate change.” Furthermore, the above-mentioned Mountain Societies Research Institute provides research fellowships for Afghans to conduct on-the-ground research on sustainable development in mountain areas.

Large donors like DFID and World Bank are also increasingly incorporating environmental protection as a criterion for their projects and dedicate funding to environmental protection and conservation activities. As Afghanistan has limited funds, it is important that donors mainstream environmental protection as part of their projects.

These examples show that efforts are being undertaken in Afghanistan to start the debate and action on climate change in the country. But environmental awareness is still lacking, both among the population and the authorities. The destruction of the country’s remaining forests continues unabated, because of multiple factors, from the lack of alternative fuels to profit interests of the wood smuggling and land mafias (read examples from the Afghan media from Helmand here and from Badghis here). The government states in its Paris documents:

Between 1990 and 2000, Afghanistan lost an average of 29,400 hectares of forest per year, to an average annual deforestation rate of 2.25%, which further increased to 2.92% per annum between 2000 and 2005. Forest now occupies less than 2% of county’s total area.

Forestry Cover Change Over 30 Years in Afghanistan (Source: Afghanistan Initial National Communication to UNFCCC, p.16)

In another example, Hasht-e Sobh, a Kabul-based independent daily, reported about a recent seminar that brought together non-governmental activists and government officials on the subject of protected species. Both sides complained that Afghans would “mercilessly” hunt all birds, including protected ones, during their migration period, and that police reacted with incomprehension when asked to intervene.

The number 1 problem: drought – from frequent to permanent

In its “initial national communication” to the UNFCCC, the Afghan government identified seven sectors that are particularly vulnerable: “water resources is the most vulnerable sector followed by forestry and rangeland, agriculture, health, biodiversity, energy and waste.” In the same document, it cites an EU report according to which, in general, “regular cycles of around 15 years are observed, during which one would expect 2-3 years of drought conditions. In recent years, however, there has been a marked tendency for this drought cycle to occur more frequently than the model predicts, and since 1960, the country has experienced drought in 1963-64, 1966-67, 1970-72 and 1998-2006.” The period from 1998 to 2005/6, the Afghan report further states, “marked the longest and most severe drought in Afghanistan’s known climatic history” but the country “currently [is] in the grips of the most severe drought in living memory” again.

Such a pattern had already been predicted in 2009, by the Stockholm Environmental Institute. In a report also quoted in Afghanistan’s statement to the UNFCCC 2012 meeting  it stated:

The climate models suggest that Afghanistan will be confronted by a range of new and increased climatic hazards. The most likely adverse impacts of climate change in Afghanistan are drought related, including associated dynamics of desertification and land degradation. Drought is likely to be regarded as the norm by 2030, rather than as a temporary or cyclical event.

According to a 2007 environment assessment by the Asian Development Bank, effects of desertification and drought were particularly observable in the country’s arid north, west and south. This includes the Harirud valley in the western Herat province, the most fertile one in Central Asia, as Daud Saba, Afghanistan’s mining minister and a former governor of that province, told AAN. Similarly, Orlove has already found that climate change will be a cause for internal mass migration in the Central Asian Ferghana valley and may aggravate social tensions within the densely populated area.

Already by late 2000, the penultimate year of the Taleban, Herat had become home to 68,000 IDPs, distributed over six camps, as one of the authors observed then. Most were nomads fleeing a combination of fighting and drought in Badghis (one of the most backward and vulnerable provinces in the country), which had cost them 75 per cent of their harvest and half of their flocks.

In those years, the term Afghan “hunger belt” was coined. It comprised parts of western and large parts of northern Afghanistan, where more than three million people (more than half the population in that region) were dependent on food aid and stretched through the central Hazarajat to parts of southern Afghanistan. During a visit by one of the authors to Kandahar during that period, sheep killed by heat stroke were found along the main road linking the airport with the city. Most of the population of Reg and Shorabak districts, in the very south of the province, was displaced into camps, including to Zhari and Maywand districts of Kandahar, as their herds of camels and other animals had perished due to lack of water. Some were reportedly airlifted out by the Taleban with helicopters after all the animals had died and they were stranded in the middle of the desert (see a contemporary assessment here). The majority of these drought-induced IDPs were never able to return to Reg or Shorabak, because drought conditions there did not improve for more than seven years. Although some IDPs continued to request assistance to facilitate a return, a UNHCR assessment deemed this as unsustainable.

In Badghis, the situation has also not changed fundamentally over the past decade. In 2014, still, a newspaper article put the province in an Afghan “hunger belt” where “grain has become the only currency that matters” in “its fourth year of a drought, which has destroyed the rural economy” and where “people have been reduced to selling their daughters for grain.” And Maslakh, the biggest IDP camp in Herat in 2000 (named after the old slaughterhouse in which it was situated), is also still there, AAN heard from UNHCR Kabul. (The latest figures from 2014 gave 3,648 families, with altogether 17,933 people living there.) The IDPs in Maslakh and those from Reg and Shorabak  likely can be categorised as climate change refugees.

In 2011, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that an estimated three million people have been affected by severe drought in that year throughout 14 provinces of Afghanistan. In 2015, the warmest year ever recorded worldwide, the droughts in Afghanistan remained on the same level as in the previous years, according to UNEP.

How strong are adaptive capacities?

UN conventions on climate change also enable Afghanistan to “identify and communicate urgent and immediate adaptation needs of Afghanistan to the effects of climate change.” Already in 2009, the Afghan authorities calculated that the country’s National Adaptation Plan to climate change would require 10.785 billion US dollars over the next ten years. For the Paris conference, the requirements were increased to 17.405 billion US dollars.

At the same time, Afghanistan’s capacity to adapt to challenges associated with climate change is clearly limited. According to its government’s own assessment, it not only lacks the necessary data basis but also human and institutional capacity and expertise as well as basic environmental awareness, both within its government institutions and among the general population. Under these circumstances, the danger is that funding, such as that being channelled through the UNFCCC, could not be used efficiently or might be diverted into corrupt channels. On the content side, the latest available assessment of the country’s adaptive capacity, published in 2009, concluded that aid for climate-change-related programmes remains marginal due to concentration of “efforts on emergency response together with high-priority development issues that include education, health and basic infrastructure, amongst others” (p 57). Currently, as it does every two years, UNEP is updating its country assessment, due to be released next year.

A strategy dilemma: Development versus environment

NEPA also says in its communication to Paris: “At present, [the Afghan government] does not have a National Strategy on Climate Change including the mitigation strategy.” This was repeated recently by Environment Watch Afghanistan, one of the few local NGOs that focuses on Afghan ecology, in an under-reported press conference – and then promptly denied by a government representative. Indeed, as Afghanistan’s Paris documents state, “the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) with its Vision 2020 aims for environmentally sustainable development” but “does not emphasize ‘climate change.’ . . . [The Afghan government] does not have a national climate change policy or strategy.”

Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s position paper for Paris with its action plan already comes with a price tag of over 17 billion US dollars for the decade between 2020 and 2030 (the period covered by the UNFCCC). It will be presented by President Ashraf Ghani, when he joins almost 150 other world leaders at the Paris conference today (30 November 2015). Since Afghanistan’s contribution to global warming is low, being one of the lowest emitters globally, the expectation is that it may receive pledges against its national position paper, including funds for equipment and required technical resources, the UNEP country director for Afghanistan, Andrew Scanlon, told AAN.

As the energy chapter of the funding-oriented action plan shows, Afghanistan has joined those developing countries and emerging economies (including the so-called BRIC countries Brazil, Russia, India and China) that have pitted their development goals against the struggle to curb greenhouse gas emissions. They argue that industrialised countries’ hydrocarbon-based development over past centuries has given them an advantage and that other countries must be allowed to catch up using the same means. As a result, the Afghan government stated that while, so far, “Afghanistan has very low relative per capita GHG emissions . . . there would be lower costs and a clearer development path for Afghanistan if it pursued development using mainly fossil fuels, as other countries have.” The projections – again in Afghanistan’s Intended National Contribution (p 2) – do not bode well for the country’s environment:

The current growth of transport sector both road and air, will increase demand on diesel and gasoline from 1.2 million tons in 2010 to 12 million tons in 2030, and aviation fuel from 1.0 million tons in 2010 to 22 million tons in 2030. Parallel with the economic development and changing lifestyle of people, waste volume generated in cities is projected to reach 3.1 million tons annually by 2030, compared to 1.4 million tons in 2010. 

But there are ways to at least alleviate the impact of these possible developments on the climate – and both the immense follow-up costs for the Afghan health system and the country’s environment – that could be implemented today. These include a simple change of law, namely an update to the quality standard for car fuel, which is still based on a Soviet standard from the 1970s; a curb on the import of at least the most out-dated second-hand cars; better traffic regulation in Afghanistan’s main cities; or – more long-term – the construction of a stable energy base built on solar and water power and a phase out of diesel generators. Already in 2010, a review of environmental studies had put Kabul among the ten most-polluted cities in the world.

 

(*) Ryskeldi Satke is a contributing writer and researcher with news organisations and research institutions in Central Asia, Turkey, EU and the US. Currently, he is based in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan). Contact e-mail: rsatke at gmail.com.

(1) The UNFCCC goes back to the so-called ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This convention set out a framework for action aimed at stabilising atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The UNFCCC, which entered into force on 21 March 1994, now has a near-universal membership of 195 parties. Annual Conferences of Parties (COP) review the convention’s implementation. At COP3, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, which ran out and was not followed-up at COP15 in Copenhagen. At COP17 in Durban, the Green Climate Fund was created, the basis for the Paris conference, where participants, for the first time in over 20 years of UN negotiations, aim to achieve a legally binding and universal agreement on climate, with the aim of keeping global warming below 2°C.

Naomi Klein, meanwhile, one of the most relevant activists worldwide, captured the Paris conference dilemma in one tweet: “response can be ‘historic’, a ‘major step forward’ *and* catastrophically inadequate all at the same time.”

(2) ASPS is a collective name for land-use systems, implying the combination or deliberate association of tree or shrub vegetation with cattle farming in the same site. (See: Ricardo Russo, “Agrosilvopastoral Systems: A Practical Approach toward Sustainable Agriculture”, Journal of Sustainable Agriculture, 07/1996.

(3) In a contemporary article of 1969, German researcher Hermann Flohn, says, “until 1940, there were only foreign-installed weather stations,” including by the USSR. He also mentions a hydrological yearbook for the Kabul River valley for 1960 to 1964. He lists 14 stations in Afghanistan (p. 210), criticises however that “the precipitation stations . . . all lie in the valleys and basins, [and therefore] cannot be in any way taken as representative of the higher areas.” (Hermann Flohn, “Zum Klima und Wasserhaushalt des Hindukush und der benachbarten Hochgebirge”, Erdkunde  23 (1969), 205-15).

Russian Igla Man-Portable Air Defense System

European Geostrategy continues its analysis of the United Kingdom's 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review. Daniel Fiott sits down with Julian Lindley-French, Olivier de France and Ben Jones to go over the fine print.

The post The UK Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: a conversation appeared first on European Geostrategy.

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The commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General John Campbell, has said the deadly air strike on the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in Kunduz in the early hours of 3 October 2015 was “a direct result of avoidable human error compounded by process and equipment failures.” The US military investigation, moreover, found that several personnel closely involved in the attack had not followed US rules of engagement. Given that these rules incorporate key principles of the Geneva Conventions, not following them effectively means the attack breached the laws of war. Several battlefield-level personnel have been suspended. However, the failures in command which led to the attack on the hospital appear to have gone much higher. AAN’s Country Director Kate Clark takes a closer look.

After the attack on MSF hospital on 3 October 2015, which killed at least 30 people and injured at least 37 others, the US military conducted an investigation. The main – vetted – findings were presented during a press conference held in Kabul and relayed live to the Pentagon press corps on 25 November 2015. The US military said a redacted version of the investigation’s report would be released, but did not say when.

During the press conference, General Campbell said the US military had “learned from this terrible incident” and that he had “already directed some immediate changes to ensure we learn and apply the right lessons from this incident.” His spokesman, Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, said three times that “we are determined to learn the right lessons” and repeated that they were “committed to ensuring that this does not and cannot happen again.” (For a full transcript of their remarks see the end of this dispatch.) However, a closer look at the findings of the investigation and the US military’s response – as well as what was left unsaid – shows that the ‘mistakes’ were of a far more serious nature than Campbell would have us believe and that the lessons the military now intends to learn, have in fact long been standard operating procedure. The question remains whether the disregard of these procedures was intentional.

What went wrong – on the ground and in the air

Late on 30 September 2015, said Campbell, following the Taleban’s capture of Kunduz city (see AAN reporting here and here), “U.S. SOF [Special Operations Forces] and their Afghan counterparts moved from the airfield into the city and established themselves in the provincial chief of police, or PCOP, compound.”

On the evening of 2 October 2015, the Afghan SOF commander asked the US SOF commander for close air support for a clearing operation that night, including of the NDS headquarters which they believed was occupied by Taleban. The US SOF commander agreed to have air support on standby. By that time, Campbell said, US SOF and their Afghan allies had been engaged in heavy fighting for “nearly five consecutive days and nights.”

Campbell said the AC-130 aircraft designated to provide close air support actually launched more than an hour before it was due to leave, after receiving an emergency call to protect troops under fire. In the end, this particular aircraft was not needed and it proceeded on to its initial mission. However, the early take-off meant the crew had not received a normal mission brief for the NDS headquarters attack and had not secured “crucial mission essential related materials, including the no-strike designations which would have identified the location of the MSF trauma center [the hospital].”

No explanation was given as to why the aircrew had not already known about the hospital. Kunduz is a small city and the MSF hospital was a highly distinctive building – large, in the shape of a cross, and the only one lit up at night in a city without electricity because of its use of generators to keep the intensive care unit and operating theatres working. The US had used air assets every day since 29 September. Yet, Campbell would have us believe, this particular crew did not know about the hospital from earlier sorties which did have accurate lists of ‘no strike designations’.

Campbell further said the investigation had found the electronic systems on board the aircraft had malfunctioned, preventing the transmission of video, email or other electronic messages. He said this prevented “the operation of an essential command and control capability.”

He also said the aircrew had thought that, in the vicinity of Kunduz, they were being targeted by a missile (he gave no further details) and had moved away from what he called the aircraft’s “normal orbit to an orbit approximately eight miles from the mission area.” He said “this degraded the accuracy of certain targeting systems which later contributed to the misidentification of the MSF trauma center.”

The investigation determined, said Campbell, that the US SOF commander, who was still at the Provincial Police headquarters in the city, had given the “correct coordinates of the NDS headquarters building, the intended target of the Afghan SOF” through his joint Terminal Attack Controller or JTAC (an officer specialised in targeting). However, when the aircrew entered the coordinates into their fire control systems, Campbell said the coordinates produced the wrong location; they correlated instead to “an open field over 300 meters from the NDS headquarters.” This mistake happened, said Campbell, because the aircraft was several miles beyond its normal orbit and its sensors were degraded at that distance.

Alarm bells apparently did not ring for the aircrew when the coordinates led them to an empty field. Instead, according to Campbell, they visually located the “closest, largest building near the open field” whose physical description “roughly matched” that of the NDS HQ. It was the MSF trauma centre. (However, according to the US military’s map produced at the press conference, the NDS headquarters was actually nearer to the empty field – 329 metres away – than the MSF hospital was – 402 metres away.)

The crew also ignored what Campbell called other “contradictory indicators,” for example, “once the aircraft returned to its original orbit, the aircraft’s grid location system correctly aligned with the NDS facility instead of the open field.” Yet the crew remained “fixated on the physical description of the facility, and at that point, did not rely on the grid coordinate.” They also did not “observe hostile activity at the MSF trauma center” which, given they were supposed to be giving close air support, should also have been noticed as strange.

Campbell said the person who authorised the attack, the US SOF commander, had remained at the police headquarters compound and “was beyond the visual range of either the NDS headquarters or the MSF trauma center as he monitored the progress of his Afghan counterparts.” This indicates he was monitoring the progress of partners who had presumably been expecting close air support for their clearing operation on the NDS headquarters. Yet, neither the Afghans nor the US commander seems to have been surprised or alarmed when the air support did not turn up as planned.

Campbell further said:

“The report found that, under the circumstances, the U.S. SOF commander lacked the authority to direct the aircrew to engage the facility. The investigation also found that the U.S. SOF commander relied primarily upon information provided by Afghan partners and was unable to adequately distinguish between the NDS headquarters building at the MSF Trauma Center.”

And most damningly:

The report also determined that the personnel who requested the strike and those who executed it from the air did not undertake the appropriate measures to verify that the facility was a legitimate military target.

As AAN understands it, standard operating procedure has been for air strikes to be signed off by a one star general. For voluntary strikes like this one, where the strike is not in response to an emergency call to protect troops under attack, the bar for authorising a strike and ensuring civilians will not be harmed, is particularly high. Did the SOF commander on the ground have the seniority to authorise this air strike or had the rules of engagement been relaxed to allow more junior officers to authorise strikes? Also, were the normal checking procedures followed to ensure this was a military target was being attacked and there was not going to be disproportionate harm to civilians? Such procedures are always important, but are vital when launching air strikes in a built up area.

What went wrong – further up in the system

The failures extended beyond those immediately involved in the operation. Campbell said that, one minute before launching the attack, the aircrew transmitted to their operational headquarters at Bagram Airfield that they were about to engage the building and “provided the coordinates for the MSF Trauma Center as their target.” The headquarters failed to “realize that the grid coordinates for the target matched a location on the no-strike list or that the aircrew was preparing to fire on the hospital.” In other words, whoever had the task of checking to make sure air strikes do not target a protected site failed to carry out their job. Under the laws of war – the Geneva Conventions and other laws which protect civilians and reduce suffering during conflict – hospitals, medical staff and their patients enjoy special protection (for more detail, see here). It is for this reason that medical facilities give their coordinates and identify themselves to the warring parties in a conflict.

What Campbell called the “confusion” at Bagram was exasperated, he said, by the lack of video and electronic communications between the headquarters and the aircraft, caused by the earlier malfunction and “a [mistaken] belief at the headquarters that the force on the ground required air support as a matter of immediate force protection.” Headquarters staff, it seems, had not remembered/realised/been told that the mission of the AC-130 had changed.

Campbell did not describe the attack itself, but other reporting has showed that it was concerted. Survivors described the plane circled round again and again, making five passes in all. Munitions leveled much of the hospital and killed and injured at least 67 people, staff, patients and caretakers. Survivors described “massive explosions, sufficient to shake the ground”, “coming in concentrated volleys”, with attacks aimed at the main hospital and also at those trying to run away.

The duration of the attack according to the US investigation was 29 minutes. MSF, however, based on its record of mobile phone calls and text messages sent to Resolute Support and the Pentagon, among others, to try to stop the strike, said it lasted closer to an hour. Campbell said MSF had called a SOF officer at Bagram twelve minutes after the strike started, but it took the command 17 minutes to discover the error and by that time, the AC-130 had already ceased firing. It is unclear, and unexplained, why it took so long.

Also left unexplained was why the Afghan authorities have been so adamant and so consistent in their version of events, that this was a correctly targeted strike, intentionally made on the hospital because they said – and MSF has denied – there were active Taleban fighters there and they were coming under fire from them.

What really went wrong

In conclusion, Campbell summarised the blame like this:

… the approximate cause of this tragedy was a direct result of avoidable human error compounded by process and equipment failures. In addition, the report found that fatigue and high operation tempo contributed to this tragedy. It also identified failures in systems and processes that, while not the cause of the strike on the MSF Trauma Center, contributed to the incident.

However, rather than a simple string of human errors, this seems to have been a string of reckless decisions, within a larger system that failed to provide the legally proscribed safeguards when using such firepower. There were also equipment failures that compounded the problem but, again, if the forces on the ground and in the air had followed their own rules of engagement, the attack would have been averted.

The US SOF commander, according to Campbell, had relied primarily upon information from Afghan partners and, Campbell said, had been “unable to adequately distinguish between the NDS headquarters building and the MSF Trauma Center.” The word ‘distinguish’ is key, as under the laws of war, the commander had a duty to distinguish between civilian and military targets. If he was unable to do so, he should not have ordered the strike. The aircrew had also recklessly assumed they were homing in on a legitimate military target, while choosing what was in essence a random building that happened to be near the coordinates they had received and one, moreover, from which there was no hostile activity. These are not errors, but rather reckless decisions which failed to distinguish between civilian and military targets and failed – again a legal obligation – to take “all feasible precautions” to protect civilians. 

There are also questions surrounding whether the SOF commander’s use of airpower was justified by US mission parameters. (1) When asked about this, the US military spokesman, General Shoffner said, “Under these circumstances, US assets can be used to support Afghan forces if they request air support. Ultimately that decision is in the hands of a [sic] U.S commander.” He was pressed again:

Q: Do I understand your answer to mean that no, this is not the proper circumstance under which to use combat power? Is that what you’re saying?

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

This was one of several times Shoffner answered by saying some US individuals had not followed the rules of engagement. He made the same reply when asked whether the aircrew had ever expressed “any concern or question the validity or legality of the target they were about to strike” and “whether, given “there were so many problems with systems and with comms and with identifying targets… that attack [was] allowed to proceed?” He also gave the same answer to a question asking whether the attack had been ‘proportional’, given, the journalist said, “every U.S. servicemen from basic training all the way through and prior to deploying must … review the basic laws of war, including proportionality and distinction.”

When asked about taking precautions to protect civilians, Shoffner said:

The investigation found that — that the actions of the aircrew and the special operations commander were not appropriate to the threats that they faced. The investigating officers’ recommendations on this matter have been referred to the proper authorities for disposition and I won’t comment on that further.

The legal duty on parties to a conflict to take precautions to protect civilians is, however, systemic, not just at the individual level. Campbell admitted that “failures in systems and processes that, while not the cause of the strike on the MSF Trauma Center, contributed to the incident” included “the nature of the planning and approval process employed during operations at Kunduz City and the lack of a single system to vet proposed targets against a no-strike list.”

This means that, after all these years, precautions – on the ground, in the air, and within the higher command – were still not adequate to ensure civilian and military targets were distinguished. Procedures to ensure that protected sites were not attacked were not followed. The chain of command and communication did not function when MSF’s designated point of contact in the US military tried to urgently stop an illegal and deadly operation.

Campbell promised to learn lessons from the ‘tragedy’ of 3 October 2015. However, the US military had already learned such lessons from many ‘mistakes’ over many years of catastrophic air strikes, which killed hundreds of Afghan civilians in the years after 2001. Starting from around 2008-2009, the US command realised those deaths were undermining America’s military and political mission in Afghanistan, after which, successive commanders of ISAF and US forces repeatedly tightened the rules of engagement, especially with regard to air strikes.

Over the years, the US learned not to rely on Afghan intelligence, because it was often mistaken or mischievous. It learned to take special care when strikes were voluntary, ie not launched to protect troops in imminent danger on the ground. Even when air power was used to protect ‘troops in contact’, it was increasingly used judiciously with the aim of not harming civilians disproportionately. Those rules of engagement succeeded in massively bringing down the number of civilians killed in airstrikes . Many would argue (2) they also actually brought US forces into line with the laws of war.

It appears that what happened on the night of 3 October amounted to a throwing away of the rule book.

In general, says the US “Department of Defence Law of War Manual” rules of engagement “reflect legal, policy, and operational considerations” but are always “consistent with the international law obligations of the United States, including the law of war.” States use them, says the Manual, to implement “their law of war obligations during military operations.” The failure of US forces to follow their own rules on 3 October is, then, more serious than General Campbell made it sound. The attack on the MSF hospital involved not only violations of the US military’s rules of engagement but breaches of the laws of war: US forces failed to distinguish between civilians and military targets, failed to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and launched an indiscriminate attack. (3)

According to General Campbell “those individuals most closely associated with the incident have been suspended from their duties, pending consideration and disposition of administrative and disciplinary matters.” But the problems went higher than that – to those planning, vetting targets and to Campbell himself who has command responsibility for ensuring that both the rules of engagement and the laws of war are respected.

Have the rules of engagement been ‘liberalised’?

During the late ISAF years, keeping civilian casualties down had become a central part of the military command, particularly under General John Allen (see AAN reporting here who was both commander of ISAF and Enduring Freedom, the separate US counter-terrorism mission which also answered to the same rules. This was during the surge years when the US and ISAF was actively battling the insurgency with offensive strikes and kill/capture operations. However, not only had the rules of engagement become very strict, (4) but General Allen had also made it a personal priority that they were implemented effectively. A senior officer whose sole responsibility was mitigating civilian casualties sat in the command centre and answered directly to Allen who had also ordered that he be notified, day or night, of any incident. All incidents and ‘near misses’ were investigated by a team which carried clout, and lessons learned were actively fed back into procedures to improve them. Soldiers deploying to Afghanistan were given ‘scenario training’ on applying the rules of engagement and officers were sacked for breaching them. During this period, ISAF and the US military were more open to discussions, allegations and feedback from NGOs, the United Nations and civil society: transparency, the military held, would help reduce the numbers of civilians needlessly being killed. Those working in this field have noticed a new secrecy surrounding such matters.

In addition, when it comes to US forces in Afghanistan, the dividing line between the two military missions currently operating has been blurred: US forces are interchangeably used for the NATO Resolute Support non-combat mission and the US military counter-terrorism, partially combat, Freedom’s Sentinel mission. Campbell is the commander of both missions. As AAN has reported, this blurring has led to confusion as to who answers for what and what may be permissible for particular forces, depending on what mandate they might be under that day.

The ‘unlearning’ of lessons of the past has appeared to coincide with a possible “liberalisation” of the rules of engagement during the battle to retake Kunduz (according to a senior US military officer speaking to AAN). The hospital strike was not the only legally questionable strike that night, according to Washington Post reporting. Two other strikes on 2/3 October that thankfully only hit a house and a factory, both empty, were also reportedly requested by Afghan forces to locations where they said they were under pressure from Taleban. According to residents in the area interviewed by the Post, there was, however, no longer an insurgent presence. These strikes seem to have been ordered with the same recklessness and disregard for the obligation to distinguish civilian from military targets.

What happens next?

Campbell told the Kabul and Pentagon press corps, “Matters regarding individual accountability will be managed in accordance with standard military justice and administrative practices for joint commands. I have decided to refer some of the recommendations to the command of U.S. Special Operations Command for his review and action, as appropriate.” So far, only those “closely involved in the strike” appear to have been singled out for suspension.

It is a familiar pattern in the US military, and other organisations, to let junior staff carry the blame. However, from what Campbell told the press, the failures went far higher than just those on the ground and in the air, and went to those in the highest command who were responsible for the planning, vetting and setting the parameters of the campaign.

Campbell claimed that the investigation was independent because it had been carried out by US officers not under his command. However, he is both commanding and adjudicating officer and this is an internal investigation from an organisation with an abysmal record on holding its own accountable, particularly senior officers. It is not surprising that the calls for an independent investigations continue. Human Rights Watch has said a criminal investigation is necessary, while MSF continues to call for an independent international investigation mandated by the UN. Its director, Christopher Stokes, said:

“The US version of events presented today leaves MSF with more questions than answers…

The frightening catalogue of errors outlined today illustrates gross negligence on the part of US forces and violations of the rules of war.”

It is clear that the Afghan government will not press for greater accountability. Unlike President Karzai, who was outraged when Afghan civilians were killed, President Ghani and CEO Abdullah would like more US military involvement and have been reluctant to criticise their US allies. A Afghan government statement said it was confident the US investigation had “been conducted in a thorough manner and will reveal measures that can be taken to prevent such tragedies from occurring in the future.” Most earlier statements by government figures, moreover, had falsely accused MSF of hosting Taleban fighters. Even now, in the government’s statement, President Ghani is still largely blaming the Taleban for the hospital attack: “‘Such mistakes can and should be avoided, but it is also a painful demonstration of the cost of war being brought upon us by terrorist groups and enemies of Afghanistan.’”

The seriousness of the actions and failures revealed in the US military’s investigation were great, major enough, it seems, for the command to release the report on the eve of one of the quietest days in the US Calendar – Thanksgiving. They must have hoped it would be a good day to bury bad news.

 

(1) The journalist was referring to the fact that the US officially has a ‘non-combat mission’ in Afghanistan. As AAN has reported, the US’s declared non-combat mission in Afghanistan has long actually been, in part, a combat mission. The US under its agreement with the Afghan government has a ‘train, assist and advice’ role, although the agreement says “US military operations [in support of Afghan operations] to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates may be appropriate.” Self defence is also always permitted whether or not the mission is combat or non-combat. In this instance, however, US troops were not under fire and the strike was ordered to protect Afghan forces against the Taleban, not al Qaeda.

(2) See for example, Human Rights Watch’s 2008 report “Troops in Contact” which looked at the US military’s use of airstrikes in Afghanistan to protect ground troops, and the deaths and injuries done to civilians in those attacks:

The cases described here raise concerns as to whether the attacking forces acted in accordance with their obligation under the laws of war to exercise “constant care to spare the civilian population” and take “all feasible precautions” to minimize loss of civilian life. This obligation requires that combatants do everything feasible to verify that targets are “military objectives,” and not civilians; that the means and methods of warfare are chosen to minimize civilian loss; and that the expected civilian loss is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected. Attacks that do not meet these requirements must be cancelled or suspended.

 (3) The International Committee of the Red Cross’ online database cataloguing the 161 rules of customary international humanitarian law includes the following (original legal citations can be seen online): 

Rule 1. The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.

Rule 11. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. 

Rule 12. Indiscriminate attacks are those:

(a) which are not directed at a specific military objective;

(b) which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or

(c) which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by international humanitarian law;

and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.

Rule 15. In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

(4) See for example the ISAF commander’s Tactical Directive (‘directive’ is another term for rules of engagement) of 30 November 2011 which includes the order:

Presume that:

Every Afghan is a civilian until otherwise apparent;

All compounds are civilian structures until otherwise apparent;

In every location where there is evidence of human habitation, civilians are present until otherwise apparent.

 

ANNEX

Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Campbell via teleconference from Afghanistan 

News transcript 

General John F. Campbell, commander, U.S. forces in Afghanistan; Captain Jeff Davis, Director, Defense Press Office; Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communication, Operation Resolute Support, Afghanistan

GENERAL JOHN CAMPBELL: Well, good evening and good morning back in Washington, D.C. I received a report of the U.S. national investigation into the strike on Doctors Without Borders, MSF Trauma Center in Kunduz City, Afghanistan on October 3, 2015. Let me start by offering my sincere condolences to the victims of this devastating event. No nation does more to prevent civilian casualties than the United States, but we failed to meet our own high expectations on October 3.

This was a tragic, but avoidable accident caused primarily by human error. It was important that the officers investigating the incident had the requisite seniority and independence to conduct a thorough and unbiased inquiry. For that reason, I requested an outside investigative team.

U.S. Central Command supported my request and sent an army major general, independent of U.S. forces-Afghanistan, to lead the investigation. He was assisted by two brigadier generals, one from the Army and one from the Air Force, also outside from my command.

The report included specific findings relating to systems, processes and personnel, and I’ve already approved some of the findings and recommendations. Based on the recommendations, I’ve already directed some immediate changes to ensure we learn and apply the right lessons from this incident. In addition to the U.S. national investigation, a NATO and Afghan partner combined civilian casualty assessment team, or CCAT, also conducted an investigation.

The findings of both reports were generally consistent. I personally briefed the NATO secretary-general, General Breedlove SACEUR, President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah on the results of the CCAT. NATO will release the CCAT report in the coming days. Also, earlier today, I briefed MSF on the results of the U.S. national and CCAT investigations.

Recommendations dealing with systems and processes will be managed within this command and adopted consistent with current operations. Matters regarding individual accountability will be managed in accordance with standard military justice and administrative practices for joint commands. I have decided to refer some of the recommendations to the command of U.S. Special Operations Command for his review and action, as appropriate.

I won’t discuss individual cases because our system requires fairness and the discretion of individual decision-makers. I can tell you that those individuals most closely associate with the incident have been suspended from their duties, pending consideration and disposition of administrative and disciplinary matters. Because I am still in the process of reviewing the investigative report and investigating officers report, I will defer any questions today to my spokesperson, Brigadier General Shoffner, as mentioned earlier.

That said, I’m able to provide an accounting of the events of October 3rd, 2015.

The report determined that the U.S. strike upon the MSF trauma center in Kunduz City, Afghanistan was the direct result of human error, compounded by systems and procedural failures. The U.S. forces directly involved in this incident did not know the targeted compound was the MSF trauma center.

The medical facility was misidentified as a target by U.S. personnel who believed they were striking a different building several hundred meters away where there were reports of combatants. The report also determined that the personnel who requested the strike and those who executed it from the air did not undertake the appropriate measures to verify that the facility was a legitimate military target.

It’s important to place events leading up to this tragic incident in context. On the evening of September 27th, Kunduz City was suddenly attacked by a significant force of Taliban and associated insurgents. By the evening of September 28th, local Afghan forces quickly withdrew, leaving the Taliban in control of most of the city. On September 29th, MSF sent the coordinates of their trauma center in Kunduz to multiple recipients within the U.S. and NATO chains of command.

Those coordinates were received and distributed by this headquarters to subordinate headquarters. The United States special operation forces and their Afghan counterparts were rapidly deployed to a camp adjacent to the Kunduz airfield in the early morning on September 29th. By that evening, they were forced to defend the Kunduz airfield from a Taliban attack.

U.S. SOF maintained defensive positions at the airfield throughout the night, until the early morning on September 30th. Later that day, U.S. SOF and their Afghan counterparts moved from the airfield into the city and established themselves in the provincial chief of police, or PCOP, compound. Between the time that the team was established inn the PCOP compound and the time of the incident on October 3rd, U.S. and their Afghan SOF partners repelled heavy and sustained enemy attacks and conducted multiple defensive strikes in Kunduz.

By October 3rd, U.S. SOF had remained at the PCOP compound longer than intended in continued support of Afghan forces. As a result, by the early morning hours of October 3rd, U.S. SOF at the PCOP compound had been engaged in heavy fighting for nearly five consecutive days and nights.

During the evening of October 2nd, Afghan SOF advised the U.S. SOF commander that they intended to conduct a clearing operation that night. This included a former national director of security, or NDS, headquarters building they believed was occupied by insurgents. The Afghans requested U.S. close air support as they conducted their clearing operation. The U.S. SOF commander agreed to have the support on standby. He remained at the PCOP compound during the operation and was beyond the visual range of either the NDS headquarters or the MSF trauma center as he monitored the progress of his Afghan counterparts.

The report found that from this point forward multiple errors occurred that ultimately resulted in the misidentification of and the strike on the MSF trauma center.

First, the AC-130 aircraft designated to provide close air support in Kunduz city launched 69 minutes early, in response to a troops-in contact situation.

This type of emergency requires an immediate response. But the result was that the aircraft launched without conducting a normal mission brief or securing crucial mission essential related materials, including the no-strike designations which would have identified the location of the MSF trauma center.

Because this AC-130 aircraft and crew were ultimately not needed for the initial troops in contact mission, they were diverted in flight to provide close air support to the U.S. SOF commander in Kunduz. During the flight, the electronic systems onboard the aircraft malfunctioned, preventing the operation of an essential command and control capability and eliminating the ability of aircraft to transmit video, send and receive e-mail or send and receive electronic messages. This is an example of technical failure.

In addition, as the aircraft arrived in the vicinity of Kunduz, the aircrew believe it was targeted by a missile, forcing the aircraft to move away from its normal orbit to an orbit approximately eight miles from the mission area. This degraded the accuracy of the certain — this degraded the accuracy of certain targeting systems which later contributed to the misidentification of the MSF trauma center.

I’d like to refer you to the chart now in order to show you key locations as I describe the events. To give you some scale, the distance from the top to the bottom of this graphic is approximately 1,000 meters. The U.S. SOF command on the ground was located at the provincial chief of police compound, depicted by the green dot in the upper right of the chart.

Through his joint Terminal Attack Controller, or JTAC, the U.S. SOF commander provided the aircraft with the correct coordinates to the NDS headquarters building, the intended target of the Afghan SOF. The green 1 depicts the location of the NDS compound. Again, this was the building that the U.S. SOF commander intended to strike. But when the aircrew entered the coordinates into their fire control systems, the coordinates correlated to an open field over 300 meters from the NDS headquarters. The yellow 2 on the chart depicts the location of the open field.

This mistake happened because the aircraft was several miles beyond its normal orbit and its sensors were degraded at that distance. The investigating officer found that the aircrew visually located the closest, largest building near the open field, which we now know was the MSF trauma center. The MSF trauma center is depicted by the red 3 on the chart.

The physical description of the NDS headquarters building provided by the Afghan SOF to the U.S. SOF commander roughly matched the description of the MSF trauma center as seen by the aircrew. At night, the aircrew was unable to identify any signs of the hospital’s protected status.

This second chart shows the MSF facility pre-strike. This is what the aircrew was able to visualize, although it would have been seeing the facility at night. According to the report, the aircrew concluded, based on the JTAC’s description of a large building near a field, that the MSF trauma center was the NDS headquarters.

Tragically, this misidentification continued throughout the remainder of the operation, even though there was some contradictory indicators. For example, once the aircraft returned to its original orbit, the aircraft’s grid location system correctly aligned with the NDS facility instead of the open field. However, the crew remain fixated on the physical description of the facility, and at that point, did not rely on the grid coordinate. Also, the investigators found that the aircrew did not observe hostile activity at the MSF trauma center. These are examples of human and procedural errors.

The report determined that as the operation proceeded, the U.S. SOF commander, through the JTAC, requested the aircraft to engage a building that the aircrew mistakenly believed was the NDS headquarters.

The report found that, under the circumstances, the U.S. SOF commander lacked the authority to direct the aircrew to engage the facility. The investigation also found that the U.S. SOF commander relied primarily upon information provided by Afghan partners and was unable to adequately distinguish between the NDS headquarters building at the MSF Trauma Center.

According to the report, one minute prior to firing, the aircrew transmitted to their operational headquarters at Bagram Airfield that they were about to engage the building. They provided the coordinates for the MSF Trauma Center as their target. The headquarters was aware of the coordinates for the MSF Trauma Center and had access to the no-strike list, but did not realize that the grid coordinates for the target matched a location on the no-strike list or that the aircrew was preparing to fire on the hospital.

This confusion was exasperated by the lack of video and electronic communications between the headquarters and the aircraft, caused by the earlier malfunction and a belief at the headquarters that the force on the ground required air support as a matter of immediate force protection.

The strike began at 2:08 a.m. At 2:20 a.m., a SOF officer at Bagram received a call from MSF, advising that their facility was under attack. It took the headquarters and the U.S. special operations commander until 2:37 a.m. to realize the fatal mistake. At that time, the AC-130 had already ceased firing. The strike lasted for approximately 29 minutes.

This is an example of human and process error. The investigation found that the strike resulted in the death of 30 staff, patients and assistants and the injury of 37 others. U.S. Air Forces Afghanistan is currently working hand-in-hand with MSF to identify the injured and the families of those who lost loved ones in order that we may offer appropriate condolences.

Based upon the information learned during the investigation, the report determined that the approximate cause of this tragedy was a direct result of avoidable human error compounded by process and equipment failures. In addition, the report found that fatigue and high operation tempo contributed to this tragedy. It also identified failures in systems and processes that, while not the cause of the strike on the MSF Trauma Center, contributed to the incident.

These included the loss of electronic communication systems on aircraft, the nature of the planning and approval process employed during operations at Kunduz City and the lack of a single system to vet proposed targets against a no-strike list. We have reviewed each of these failures and implemented corrections as appropriate.

We have learned from this terrible incident. We’ll also take appropriate administrative and disciplinary action through a process that is fair and thoroughly considers the available evidence. The cornerstone of our military justice system is the independence of decision-makers following a thorough investigation such as this one. We will study what went wrong and take the right steps to prevent it in the future.

As I said in an earlier statement, this was a tragic mistake. U.S. forces would never intentionally strike a hospital or other protected facilities. Our deepest condolences go to all of the individuals and families that were affected by this tragic incident. We will offer our assistance to Doctors Without Borders in rebuilding the hospital in Kunduz.

Doctors without Borders is a respected humanitarian organization that does important life-saving work, not only within Afghanistan, but around the world. Alongside our Afghan partners, we will work to assist and support them in this critical role that they play in this country.

Again, thank you very much time — thank you very much for your time. I will be followed by General Shoffner as he will take your questions.

BRIGADIER GENERAL WILSON SHOFFNER: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, and good morning to those of you joining us from Washington, D.C. I’m Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, the spokesman for Resolute Support and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.

Regarding the investigation, what we’ve said from the beginning is that we are determined to ensure this investigation is both thorough and transparent. The fact that we’re even doing this press conference today is unusual, but as Secretary Carter has said, we are committed to ensuring full accountability on this incident.

This investigation is an important step, but it is only one step in the overall process. U.S. authorities may determine that additional investigations are required, and if so, that process will take additional time. We also have to ensure that due process for anyone who may be involved in this process.

In an effort to be transparent, we are going to share everything that we possibly can at this point. Once the investigation is redacted, the full report will be posted to the U.S. Central Command website and we’ll provide you a link to that at the completion of this press conference.

At this time, I will take your questions and Lynn O’Donnell, let’s start with you.

Q: Thank you.

Talking about suspensions — (inaudible) — and followed the due process, et cetera. It sounds like a lot of — violations — multiple violations of the rules of law here dressed up as human error. There is a chain of command, there has to be a point of responsibility. Where does the buck stop? Does it stop with General Campbell, who took his authority directly from the President — Are we looking at him being forced or even a matter of honor offering his resignation?

The other thing that interests me about this is that Afghan officials have said all along that the hospital — they specifically referred to the hospital as they command and control center for the insurgents. So you know, when did the NDS come into this? In the process of making the decision whether or not to continue with the attack, when does the NDS come into this?

And in terms of — you know, I think like a contradiction. So I’m just wondering what impact will this whole incident have on the level of trust between U.S. NATO and Afghan forces going forward? Because you have to work very closely going forward.

GEN. SHOFFNER: To the first part of your question, the investigation found that some individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

In terms of what happens next, as I said, the investigation itself is an important step in the process, but it is just one step toward full accountability.

Based on his findings, the investigating officer made several recommendations. General Campbell has decided to retain some of those recommendations at his level and he has referred others to the commander of the U.S. SOCOM for his review and action as appropriate.

The individuals most closely associated with the incident have been suspended from their duty positions. I won’t comment on the recommendations that have been made while those reviews are underway, and I won’t comment on individual cases that are underway, as we have to allow for due process for those involved and we must allow for the independent review by the decision-makers involved.

To the second part of your question, I won’t speak for Minister (Stanikzine ?), but I will point out that on the civilian casualty assessment team investigation that was done, that wasn’t just a U.S. investigation. It was a NATO investigation. The members of the team consisted of coalition partners, U.S. and non-U.S. It consisted of seven Afghans that were appointed by President Ghani.

On the civilian casualty assessment team, and I need to point out the purpose of that was different from the 15-6. It was intentionally narrow in purpose. It was designed to determine the basic facts and then to validate whether or not these civilian casualties had occurred. It did that. And the results of the civilian casualty assessment team report informed the 15-6 investigation.

As to your final statement or your final question, we remain committed to working with our Afghan partners to help them build sustainable security in Afghanistan.

Thank you.

Q: (inaudible) — New York Times.

Can you tell us how many individuals were suspended? And also, was — was General Campbell himself interviewed by the investigators?

GEN. SHOFFNER: All I can tell you is that some individuals have been suspended from their duty positions. I can also say that U.S. authorities may direct additional investigations to determine whether further actions are warranted regarding actions of specific individuals that were involved.

Should additional investigations be required, those will be made public once complete and redacted. Again, we have a responsibility to ensure due process for those involved.

Q: And General Campbell, was he interviewed by the investigators?

GEN. SHOFFNER: I won’t comment on General Campbell’s position, as he is reviewing some of the recommendations that have been made in his capacity as the appointing officer for the investigation.

COL. LAWHORN: (inaudible) — on one — (inaudible) — at this time, Roger, can you hear us at the Pentagon?

CAPT. DAVIS: We — we hear you just fine. Can you hear us?

COL. LAWHORN: Yes.

GEN. SHOFFNER: Yeah, we’ve got you. Go ahead.

Q: Hello. This is Bob Burns from Associated Press, General.

Question for you about — you referred to the rules of engagement were violated. Aside from reaching the point where there were a combination of human error and other malfunctions, was the basic decision to use air power under these circumstances justified, given the noncombat role that the U.S. assumed at the end of 2014? In other words, there are very limited, narrow circumstances under which is the use of force is permitted, and did that — did this fit that circumstance? thank you.

GEN. SHOFFNER: Under certain circumstances, U.S. assets can be used to support Afghan forces if they request air support. Ultimately, that decision is in the hands of a U.S. commander. I won’t get into the specific rules of engagement on that, but I will tell you that we are determined to learn the right lessons from this.

We’re committed to ensuring that this doesn’t happen again. We will evaluate all the recommendations in this report and use them to improve our systems and our processes. We take all reports of civilian casualties seriously and we review each one of them thoroughly.

General Campbell has already directed a thorough review of our planning process as well as our targeting process. This will take place at all echelons of command and we’ll conduct a thorough examination of how we develop and how we use no-strike lists.

Q: General, a very quick follow-up from Bob Burns. Do I understand your answer to mean that no, this is not the proper circumstance under which to use combat power? Is that what you’re saying?

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

Q: Jim Miklaszewski from NBC News. General, Doctors Without Borders, which has proven to be a pretty reliable source in regard to what happened there in Kunduz, said that they made at least two phone calls, one just prior to and one during the airstrike, to the Pentagon. And we’ve been told that that information was relayed from Joint Staff to the NMCC that they were under attack.

Did that information ever reach the operators there in the battlefield?

GEN. SHOFFNER: What I’d like to do is, to better answer that question, just briefly review the sequence of events leading up to the issue at hand. Approximately 12 minutes after the firing commenced, Doctors Without Borders called to report the attack. Unfortunately, by the time U.S. forces realized the mistake, the aircraft had stopped firing.

It’s important to remember that this was a complicated and a chaotic situation. The AC-130 had already been shot at by a surface-to-air missile. U.S. personnel at the time were focused on doing what they had been trained to do. That said, chaos does not justify this tragedy.

Let me be very clear. We did not intentionally strike the hospital. We are absolutely heartbroken over what has occurred here and we will do absolutely everything in our power to make sure that it does not happen again.

You mentioned Doctors Without Borders. We have great respect for the important and life-saving work Doctors Without Borders does in Afghanistan and around the world. We’re committed to working with them. We’re committed to helping them, as General Campbell mentioned, rebuild the hospital and provide condolence payments for those affected by this terrible tragedy.

We appreciate their dedication toward easing the suffering of those affected by conflict and we will do everything within our power to enable their efforts.

COL. LAWHORN: Let’s take one last one from the Pentagon before we lose their connection.

So Pentagon, go ahead.

Q: General, just a couple of quick follows up — follow-ups. Did the flight crew aboard the AC-130 ever express any concern or question the validity or legality of the target they were about to strike? And if there were so many problems with systems and with comms and with identifying targets, why was not — why was that attack allowed to proceed?

GEN. SHOFFNER: I’ll tell you that the investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

CAPT. DAVIS: Tom Bowman from NPR.

Q: General, Tom Bowman. A couple of questions.

When was the MSF called, looks like less than halfway into this attack and it took 17 minutes, you guys say, for the commanders to realize they made a mistake. That’s almost half the amount of time of the attack itself. Why did it take so long? Did you ever get an answer to that?

And also, if there’s no fire coming from the hospital, no clear threat, why would they think this was a legitimate target?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Well, the investigation found that the medical facility was misidentified as a target by U.S. personnel who believed that they were striking a different building several hundred meters away where there were reports of combatants. I think it might be helpful to put this in context. At the time of the incident, U.S. and Afghan forces in Kunduz had been fighting for five days when the incident occurred. Both U.S. and Afghan forces had reports of Taliban throughout the city of Kunduz.

Again, we are determined to learn the right lessons and we’re committed to ensuring that this does not and cannot happen again.

Let’s go to a question here in Kabul.

COL. LAWHORN: We’ll take the questions here in the room. We’ll just — (inaudible).

Q: (off-mic)

GEN. SHOFFNER: So General Campbell has already directed that all U.S. personnel in theater receive training on targeting authorities and on the rules of engagement. General Campbell has also directed that we conduct a comprehensive review of our planning process, as well as our targeting process at all echelons of command. He has directed a thorough examination of how — what we develop and how we use no-strike lists.

Q: May I continue?

GEN. SHOFFNER: You may, please.

COL. LAWHORN: Do you have a follow-up?

Q: You want to continue that kind of close air support to the Afghan forces in the future?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Again, I will state that we remain committed to working closely with our Afghan allies as we assist them in their efforts to build sustainable security for this country.

COL. LAWHORN: Let’s go to — (inaudible) Washington Post.

Q: Yes. (inaudible) — Washington Post. A few hours before the MSF strike, an NDS building and buildings surrounding were actually struck by U.S. airstrikes. So the location was totally known. How do you — how do you account for this discrepancy a few hours later? The coordinate shift, and as you say, the MSF hospital was mistaken for the NDS building when just a few hours earlier, there had been an attack, had been — (inaudible) — there and had a strike in that area.

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigation found that the U.S. special operations forces commander did rely on information provided by the Afghan partners on the location of the NDS compound. However, the investigation determined that those grid coordinates given by the Afghan forces to that NDS compound were correct.

And let me comment on — just a minute on how we came to that conclusion. The investigative team went to great lengths to ensure a full and impartial accounting of the facts and the circumstances. They were driven by the need to be thorough, not by a timeline. Investigative team consisted of three general officers and a dozen subject-matter experts.

They spent a full three weeks completing their report. They visited the Doctors Without Borders site. They visited other sites within Kunduz. They interviewed over 65 witnesses. And they compiled over 3,000 pages of documentary evidence.

They also visited and engaged with each echelon in the chain of command. We stand by their findings and recommendations. And we support the process by which they conducted the investigation.

COL. LAWHORN: Let’s go to — (inaudible) — and — (inaudible).

Q: (inaudible)

(inaudible) — asking for — (inaudible). Do you share the — (inaudible)? What was — (inaudible) — response — (inaudible)?

GEN. SHOFFNER: I’m sorry. Could you repeat the first part of your question?

Q: (inaudible) — asking — (inaudible) — investigation — (inaudible). What was your response?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Thank you.

General Campbell did meet with representatives from Doctors Without Borders. When he met with them, they provided their initial review. General Campbell read and considered that initial review. He also gave it to the investigative team. They read it and they considered that as they wrote their report.

I’ll also point out that the findings of the U.S. national investigation, the 15-6, were consistent with that of the CCAT, the combined civilian casualty assessment team. So again, we’re confident with those two investigations coming to the same conclusions, we’re confident in those findings.

Q: (inaudible)

Are you going to allow an international independent investigation? General Campbell is the commanding officer and apparently also the adjudicating the officer. And it seems the investigation team was all American — also the forces involved in the attack were all American. Is there any problem with that? While you say it’s not an intentional strike, that in no way abrogates the laws of the rule of war.

Every U.S. servicemen from basic training all the way through and prior to deploying must be — must review the basic laws of war, including proportionality and distinction. Even if you had struck the proper place, do you think that the attack was proportional?

And in terms of – its not just rules of engagement, in terms of the basic laws of war why would more training make things better?

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigative team has completed a thorough investigation. And we’re confident with the facts and the evidence collected.

With regard to your question on the rules of engagement, the investigation, the investigation

Q: laws of war, not rules of engagement, laws of war

GEN. SHOFFNER: I can tell you what the investigation found, and the investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

With regard to your question on proportionality, the investigation found that the actions of the aircrew and the Special Operations Forces were not appropriate to the threats that they faced. The investigating officer’s recommendations on this have been referred to the proper authorities for disposition. I cannot comment further on that part as that matter is under review.

Again, we did not intentionally strike the hospital, and we are absolutely heartbroken over what has happened here.

Q: What about an independent investigation?

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigative team has completed a thorough investigation —

Q: I mean, an independent international investigation. MSF has called for it, and the investigation panel has been activated. The U.N. mandated procedures in this — in this situation when there’s a humanitarian problem. They’re ready to go but they need the Americans and the Afghans to say yes, and it seems that you have said no.

GEN. SHOFFNER: We believe the investigation completed was full and impartial, and we stand by the findings and recommendations, and we support the process by which it was conducted.

Q: Sorry. How can it be impartial when your commanding officer and your adjudicating officer and the people investigating are in the same organization as the people that attacked?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Again, General Campbell has decided to refer some of the recommendations to the commander of U.S. SOCOM for his review and action as appropriate.

CAPT. DAVIS: All right. Let’s go here to this gentleman.

Q: (off-mic). This is not the first time that U.S. airstrikes caused civilian casualties previously even the U.S. forces bombarded the ANA compound — (inaudible). How do the U.S. assure — (inaudible) — that will not occur again?

GEN. SHOFFNER: We’re determined to learn the right lessons from this and we’re committed to ensuring it doesn’t happen again. The civilian casualty assessment team process that I mentioned is part of this headquarters procedures whenever we have an indication of civilian casualties or an allegation of civilian casualties.

It provides us the means of looking into it very quickly to determine if further investigation is needed. If further investigation is needed, as it was in this case, that will be done and we’ll use that investigation as the basis for adjusting our systems and procedures so that this does not happen again.

We have time for one more question.

COL LAWHORN: (off-mic) Jessica?

Q: Afghan special forces are saying that they relayed to U.S. special forces that they were firing coming from the building, so when the building was hit, presumably Afghan forces would have seen whether the firing was continuing or not. So what kind of messaging was passed between the Afghan special forces and U.S. special forces at the time. And if they continued to report that there was firing from the building when in fact the wrong building had been attacked – can it be trusted as a partner when carrying on these kind of strikes?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Well, I can tell you that the investigation found that U.S. Special Operations Forces commander did rely on information provided by the Afghan partners. The investigation also found that that information was correct. As I stated earlier, the investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did violate the rules of engagement and we’ll take proper action on that —

Q: (off-mic) precautions, international humanitarian law that you have to take precautions with civilians. Was that also violated (off-mic) because it looks like your systems were not working. These systems were set up in order to protect civilians the — (inaudible).

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigation found that — that the actions of the aircrew and the special operations commander were not appropriate to the threats that they faced. The investigating officers’ recommendations on this matter have been referred to the proper authorities for disposition and I won’t comment on that further.

That’s all the time I have for questions, but before I depart, I want to emphasize we made a terrible mistake that resulted in unnecessary deaths. We have been committed from the beginning to a transparent and thorough investigation, and we will do everything possible to prevent this from happening again. This investigation was an important step in this process, but it is just one step toward full accountability.

And finally, we would never, ever do anything to harm innocent civilians.

Thank you.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The hearing will look at the use of private security companies in external operations and the relevant rules in Europe.
Location : Altiero Spinelli 3G-2
Programme
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

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The latest issue of "European Defence Matters", the official magazine of the European Defence Agency, is now available. 

With cyber defence being the leading topic, the ninth issue of "European Defence Matters" presents the EU, NATO and industry views on cyber defence with a special focus placed on the European Defence Agency's efforts in this area. It also comprises opinions of Luigi Rebuffi, Chief Executive Officer of European Organisation of Security on cyber security. 

In addition to cyber defence topic, this issue also includes an exclusive interview with Mauro Moretti, Chief Executive Officer & General Manager of Finmeccanica and President of the AeroSpace & Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), who presents his assessment of the European defence and security market. Another highlight is the interview with Etienne Schneider, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Economy, Internal Security and Defence of Luxembourg presenting a LuxGovSat project. This issue also encompasses an extensive report on this year's EDA Annual Conference "European Defence Matters."

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• The latest issue of "European Defence Matters" is available here

On 20 November 2015, the European Defence Agency (EDA) hosted the Executive Steering Group of the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 2015-16.

MCDC is a US-led fellowship of twenty-four nations and international organisations; its aim is to develop defence capabilities for effective and interoperable global coalition operations.

The meeting focused on subjects of particular interest to the MCDC members, such as countering hybrid warfare, multinational defensive cyberspace operations, federated mission networks, maritime operations, countering unmanned autonomous systems and social media. The executives recognised that some of these could add real value to countering emergent threats within Europe. They also confirmed their commitment for a more structured dialogue in order to develop valuable military capabilities together.

The EDA joined MCDC in 2013 with the twofold objective of sharing the principles of defence capability development in a global context, and ensuring the Common Security and Defence Policy is considered in the group’s discussions.

 

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•  News "EDA Symposium on Social Media in Security and Defence" (21 August 2014)
  
  
  

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Forget the tropes on “Pilgims and Indians,” the American Thanksgiving you know is written in the military history of the nation. During the War for Independence, with America as yet fully defined, there were several thanksgiving celebrations called by Congress that were ad hoc and not at all related to one another. They were, furthermore, the legacy of the European celebrations, and often based in religion rather than anything particularly American. By the Civil War, the war that was the ultimate test of the political entity’s survival, the moment had arrived to codify the as yet relatively informal celebrations into a national holiday. In the wake of the victory at Gettysburg, President Lincoln finally yielded to Sarah Hale’s perennial call for the institutionalization of the Thanksgiving holiday. One negative result of the holiday’s Civil War roots was that into the 20th Century the holiday would chafe the former Confederate States. Nevertheless, as the United States came into its own as a world power in the 20th Century, not only a holiday but an iconic menu and setting was created via Norman Rockwell’s “Freedom From Want” painting. Depicting a roast turkey for dinner and the extended family around the table, while this image might not literally replicate the Thanksgiving experience of every American, it represented an ideal that could serve as a touchstone for any American, and as a blueprint for what the military authorities could provide to the troops so as to signify the holiday.

This menu component of the holiday is one of its critical features. According to Priscilla Ferguson’s arguments Thanksgiving has become the most significant symbol of culinary unity in the American melting pot. She argues that the diverse traditions that have combined to create the American menu means that there is no singular American gastronomic culture to which all can relate. While her argument in favor of Thanksgiving notes its importance as an event, and that individual Thanksgiving meals can vary according to region and ethnic background, a persuasive argument can be made that by the 20th Century a singular, iconic menu emerged that is recognized by any American as the Thanksgiving dinner. This may not be the meal that any particular individual may enjoy; however, if on Thanksgiving that meal is served it will be enjoyed as such. And, as mentioned previously, the ability to have recourse to a singular, shared tradition is of great value to the military usage of Thanksgiving. A shared tradition allows for a relative ease in the military’s ability to provide a celebration of this holiday.[1] Interestingly, in the post-Vietnam War period there has been a willingness to diverge from the traditional menu to pay heed to regional tastes.

How did the Revolutionary War create a holiday? Celebratory meals were taken up by the early American military tradition because of the deeper meanings associated with such events. The importance of the feast portion of a holiday celebration is defined in the scholarship on food and dining by the socio-cultural content it conveys. The Clifford Geertz maxim that “men have birthdays, but man does not,” highlights the value of such content which create our lives, both individually and in the groups to which we belong. As Wood explains the phenomenon, “at the macro-social level various forms of feasting serve to link individuals to the wider social fabric through shared understandings of cultural conventions. Thus, [holiday meals and celebrations] to some degree unite peoples and their culinary culture in shared symbolic experiences.”[2] To inspire the martial cohesion necessary to create an army and an entirely new society, holidays played a significant role. Recourse to socio-cultural content had strategic implications as well. The Revolutionary War was the first conflict to rely in equal terms on the relationship between the people, the state and the military which Clausewitz would identify in the Napoleonic Wars. Reflecting this new calculus in warfare, political and military leadership sensibly relied upon standard celebrations to mark the martial calendar.

In part derived from Christian ritual, in part celebrations of the fall harvest, the Colonial thanksgivings which form the popular understanding of the holiday were as likely recognized by fasts as well as feasts. Just a year shy of the Colonies’ declared independence, the new patriot political leaders called for a Thanksgiving fast to inspire sober reflection of the gravity of the mounting tensions with the British in the aftermath of the fighting at Lexington and Concord. Noting that a fast was called by Congress “to implore the Divine Benediction on our country,” Thacher defined the larger importance of the event as a factor in the development of a shared identity for the Colonies: “This is the first general or Continental Fast ever observed since the settlement of the colonies.”[3] Called for in the midst of increasing military conflict, it is notable that this was the first such celebration by the Colonies as a unified entity. It can be argued that this event marks the first thanksgiving celebration defined by a unique and integral American identity. In the following year Congress called for another day of thanksgiving. This culturally American tradition was enjoyed again in 1776 by Private Joseph Martin and his fellow soldiers convalescing from small pox inoculation in Connecticut after inoculation against small pox. Martin, a soldier, gave earnest thanks for what was (and remains) of the greatest import to the man in the war, a good meal: “Of the pig and the pies we made an excellent Thanksgiving dinner, the best meal I had eaten since I left my grand sire’s table.”[4]

With yet another thanksgiving celebration in 1777, the Revolution and the War for Independence brought the new country together in its first official national holiday. This one marked the Continental Army’s victory over the British forces at Saratoga in October of that year, which success guaranteed French diplomatic and military support. In recognition of this momentous occasion Samuel Adams led the Continental Congress to declare a national day of celebration and thanks. On 18 December of that year, the first national thanksgiving was celebrated throughout the colonies. Even the soldiers at Valley Forge in 1777 were able to celebrate with a feast. As recorded by a young surgeon, Albigence Waldo, General Washington’s troops dined upon roasted pig.[5]

Of course, not all soldiers dined well on that thanksgiving holiday. Joseph Martin recounts, in sarcastic tones, the slim pickings that comprised the “sumptuous feast” to which his unit was treated: half a gill of rice and a tablespoonful of vinegar. Martin’s ire was with his fellow citizens in civilian life, for he knew full well that while the Army endured near starvation, the citizenry at large was enjoying the abundance the country afforded. His scathing sentiment is displayed when he credits the repast provided to the soldiers to a citizenry that had “opened her sympathizing heart so wide.”[6]  The Revolutionary War, with its near-broken logistics system, was the inspiration for the practice of griping over relative injustices. American sensibilities, even then, favored fairness. Shared harshness could be endured for a common purpose, which explains the paradox of the strengthening cohesion of the soldiers within the army. As between the army and society, however, the growing belief that the one side was suffering unduly inspired the soldiers’ indignation. This sentiment was particularly strong, because the soldiers felt poorly done by for being made to starve in a land of plenty while in noble service defending the terms of the revolution. To alleviate these negative emotions, the soldiers griped.

However, Martin’s prospects had improved by the late years of the war. Returning to an area in New Jersey in which he had served earlier in the war, Martin and several of his fellow soldiers, while searching for a deserter, enjoy the late war hospitality of the locals: “We had a good warm room to sit and lodge in, and as the next day was Thanksgiving, we had an excellent supper.” The next morning their host provided them with toast and cider, the latter of which Martin describes “as good and rich as wine,” as a proper beginning to their day. However, the bounty did not end there, as the host would not allow them to leave until they had shared “a genuine New Jersey breakfast” with him, consisting of buckwheat pancakes “flowing with butter and honey,” and washed down with “a capital dish of chocolate.” Their Thanksgiving continued as they lucked into obtaining lodgings with a family that felt kindly towards the Connecticut troops, “as that section of the state was originally settled by Connecticut people.” Finally, at another house they were again provided for by “the remains of [the] Thanksgiving cheer.”[7] In these celebrations, the sharing of the holiday with extended family that will become the standard was already in evidence in embryonic form.

The citizens who provide for Martin and his comrades were happy to be clear of the British Army and loyalists, heartened by the impending victorious close of the war, and likely harbored a degree of gratitude towards the Continental soldiers. This sharing with strangers, of making them like extended family, precedes the traditions that would accrete to the holiday in later years. However, given the notion of a “Thanksgiving” holiday as it existed then, where the objective was to express gratitude for the blessings one enjoyed, it seems reasonable that sharing one’s good fortune would accord with the spirit of the holiday.

The end of the War of 1812 was celebrated with a day of prayer and thanksgiving. At President James Madison’s urging, Congress resolved to celebrate the second victorious confrontation with the British on April 31st of 1815. As that war is often considered the final act in the War for Independence, it is fitting that its successful conclusion should be marked by what was emerging as an American holiday.

The establishment of a permanent national holiday of Thanksgiving resulted from the decades’ long campaign of Sarah Josepha Hale, a prominent women’s magazine editor. Beginning in 1827, her efforts finally bore fruit in September 1863, when an editorial on the subject struck a chord with President Lincoln and the public in the North. Again, this moment in the holiday’s history was inspired in part by military events: Hale’s editorial appeared in the wake of the Union victory at Gettysburg. This moment was particularly ripe as the victory had a tremendous effect upon popular sentiment regarding the war. Lincoln’s proclamation of that same October declaring the holiday brought the two pieces together:

It has seemed to me fit and proper that [God’s gifts of prosperity and freedom] should be solemnly, reverently and gratefully acknowledged as with one heart and one voice by the whole American people. I do, therefore, invite my fellow citizens in every part of the United States, and also those who are at sea and those sojourning in foreign lands, to set apart and observe the last Thursday of November next as a day of thanksgiving and praise to our beneficent Father who dwelleth in the heavens.[8]

Thus the creation, evolution, and designation of the Thanksgiving celebration as a national, culturally American holiday were all intimately connected with the country’s wars.

Despite the growing importance of the holiday, particularly for the Northern forces, 1862 was a dismal Thanksgiving year for Billy Yank. Although the Army of the Potomac fared better than the Army of Northern Virginia in the quality and quantity of rations, Union soldiers on campaign in Fredericksburg were known to suffer for lack of food. Bell Wiley, a historian of the Union and Confederate soldier experience in the war, offers the experience of one Massachusetts volunteer whose Thanksgiving meal offered little for which to be grateful: “Yesterday was Thanksgiving at home, but a dismal day for us. Never since I have been in the Army have I seen supplies so short. Now we see soldiers going round begging hard bread.” Things were so bad that Wiley tells that this and other soldiers reported some were found scavenging in the slaughter pens for what meager scraps were left behind, whether that be head, hoof, or tail.[9] Americans, especially Northerners, had, by this time, developed an expectation of the feast that was meant to exemplify this holiday.

Enshrined as a national holiday, Thanksgiving emerged as an event of “family homecoming,” in response to the societal disruption wrought by the massive economic changes in the 19th Century, reconciling the conflict between “individualism and obligation to family.”[10] According to Elizabeth Pleck, the defining feature of the Thanksgiving celebration in the United States is its function as a “domestic occasion.” This is:

a family gathering held in the home which paid homage to the ideal of the ‘affectionate family.’ Such a family was a privatized nuclear one, with a nurturant mother creating a proper home atmosphere…. Although the ideal of the affectionate family was a nuclear one, the domestic occasion was often a gathering of extended kin, a family homecoming…. The domestic occasion was a culturally dominant form, practiced at first mainly by the upper classes and middle classes, which spread throughout society in the 20th Century.[11]

This concept of the holiday squares with the near manic celebration of the holiday within the American military in the 20th Century. Deprived of the actual ability to return home in most cases, military personnel were provided the opportunity for a symbolic homecoming by partaking of the traditional meal. The menu, the specific foods, became totems of home and family for the troop who could not fulfill this “domestic” obligation. The troops were thus able to pay homage to the rites and customs of the holiday. Furthermore, as Thanksgiving was a particular holiday for the extended family, the members of the unit could substitute for these relations. Finally, the family at home would know of the satellite celebrations, and be relieved that at the very least their deployed loved one was enjoying something of the holiday. For these reasons, Thanksgiving became a very important holiday to the American Armed Forces.

Pleck goes on to argue that Lincoln’s role in the creation of the Thanksgiving holiday rooted the celebration in the by then established values of the country: “By having Lincoln as its midwife, Thanksgiving also celebrated the blessings of American nationhood as well as its domestic ideals. Thanksgiving was – and is – a holiday of belief in the national purposes and destiny.”[12] The holiday’s association with the blessings bestowed meant that the wars, and therefore troops, fought to secure them were included as well.

The Spanish American War brought the first appearance of any significant celebration of the holiday in the south since the end of the Civil War. In the face of war, the North and South united against a common external foe. While they were encamped in Savannah awaiting embarkation for Puerto Rico, the Georgia volunteers were treated to a lavish Thanksgiving banquet in 1898 by the ladies of that city.[13] The citizens of Savannah also treated the massing soldiers from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Nebraska to a turkey dinner for Thanksgiving that same year.[14]

During the Progressive Era, Thanksgiving moved into the schools as a means of indoctrinating the children of immigrants into the ways of their new country so that they could go home and be the “Americanizers” of their parents. This is also a time when the Protestant roots of the holiday began to be downplayed. A holiday or celebration started by the nation’s first “immigrants,” it could be shared with the succeeding generations of newcomers.[15] According to Pleck, this linkage to nation, rather than creed, was important to making Thanksgiving America’s holiday:

Yet in the case of Thanksgiving, nationalism was a more significant feature than commerce. In that sense, Hobsbawm and Ranger were correct to draw attention to nationalism as a force in creating new traditions and reinvigorating others. Celebrating the national mission was an important impetus for the invention of Thanksgiving in the early 19th Century and remains a central element in the holiday to this day.[16]

The nationalism angle is confirmed in Etzioni’s formulation of a theory of public rituals. He argues that “holidays serve to socialize members of a society as well as to reaffirm their commitment to values and as such serve to sustain the integration of society.”[17]

Thanksgiving would also mark the end of the first global conflagration of the century. General Pershing celebrated his army in November 1918, declaring ‘victory…was the Thanksgiving gift to the American nation,” and an honorable repayment of the debt owed Lafayette and the French in the Revolutionary War.[18] Another Thanksgiving meal just after the Armistice was uniquely celebrated. William Langer, a soldier in the AEF, recounts the story in the memoir of his unit while his unit was in Verdun, awaiting transport back to the States. Upon agreement with the company cook to delay their meal to 3 or 4 o’clock, the troops were promised a proper turkey dinner with all the trimmings. Just as the men sat down to tuck into the holiday feast, the bugle sounded to call the regiment. All in the company fell out, save Langer: “I was a sergeant and I thought a good soldier. Of course, I should have set a good example in answering the call without complaint. But the war was over and I decided, with the Thanksgiving dinner before me, that for once I would disobey orders.” As time passed and the rest of the company did not return, Langer began to worry, “could the company have entrained to start for home?” His wait was ended at long last when his unit mates returned. And what was the cause of the delay, the explanation for which was difficult to get out of his fellow soldiers? The Regimental Chaplain had chosen that exact moment to deliver a sermon in honor of Thanksgiving and the end of the war in the ruins of the Verdun Cathedral.[19] This turn of events contains the sort of irony particular to military service: the sermon interrupted the meal, one of the few things, besides survival, for which a soldier can be truly grateful.

By WWII, the American holiday, state, and armed forces had reached global maturity. A young lieutenant in Western Europe describes how the Mess Sergeant brought a proper feast to the soldiers on the front lines for Thanksgiving 1944. “A hamburger would have been a treat, but a hot turkey dinner was almost beyond belief.”[20] The commitment to the meal was an institutional requirement. In a government publication meant to explain to the American public the lengths to which the armed forces would go to provide the troops with every comfort of home possible, the declaration of the institution’s commitment to a proper Thanksgiving dinner was its opening salvo. Offering little room for doubt, the publication echoes the essence of the subsistence doctrine: “Thanksgiving turkey, cranberry sauce, and pumpkin… American food for the American soldier in England, Iceland, India, Australia, in Malayan jungle, and African deserts – wherever he is fighting in this global war, the Army endeavors to feed him the food he likes, the food that makes him feel at home.”[21] This commitment was shared across the services, as US Navy Thanksgiving menus from the first half of the century display the familiar gastronomic landmarks of the national meal. Given their druthers, soldiers would assemble a feast of similar fixings on their own as well. Neal Barton records that his unit used their mess fund to put together a traditional feast for Thanksgiving 1941. Reflecting the relaxing nature of the holiday, he writes that “all day long the boys visited the mess hall. Seemed as tho they would eat, go walk it off then start the process all over. Nothing was removed from the tables but dirty or empty dishes.”[22]

The commitment to turkey on Thanksgiving was also codified operationally within the Quartermaster Corps. Per one subsistence publication, “Turkey rations are authorized for all men actually messing with the organization on Thanksgiving….” The exact meaning of this point for the bureaucracy and administration of quartermaster duties is set out in a footnote to the above directive: “The so-called ‘turkey ration’ is merely the garrison ration increased by the excess cost involved when 28 ounces of turkey (undrawn) is substituted for the meat component of the garrison ration. This excess cost is computed by the regional depots on the 15th of October… of each year. A certificate showing the actual number of men present on Thanksgiving… is attached to the ration return.” One hopes the turkey meat was not as dry as the language authorizing it. The recipe for “Turkey, Roast” from the 1941 Manual of Mess Management is equally sparse, but the ingredients and intent give prospects for a decent meal.[23]

In part, these pledges were made to maintain the morale of the American civilian population. There is an almost liturgical quality to them, as if the authors realize they must include certain vital recitations to keep the public happy. World War II was conducted on such a scale that the war could not be fought or won without public support. One very important way to secure this was to make the public feel that the troops were being well cared-for, demonstrating the military’s commitment to them. Although to do so would be a substantial undertaking, no effort or expense would be spared to get it done. Maintaining the link to home, no matter where on the globe the troops might be serving, could be achieved through the Thanksgiving menu, which recalled, at least in general terms, the sense of home. This objective is reflected in the experience of Ann McCaughey, a Red Cross Aide in France, who wrote of her Thanksgiving experience of 1944 that “it was a piece of America that we had transplanted [thousands of] miles across the ocean and set up in the little town of Commercy in France.”[24] For Charles MacDonald, Thanksgiving 1944, was not only a national holiday, but his birthday as well. Escorted to his table in the company mess hall, where he found a plate already prepared for him. As he sat down to eat, the division orchestra broke out into “Happy Birthday.” He writes that “[i]t was only then that I remembered that this was something special; this was my birthday.” As a cake was brought out and his men sang “Happy Birthday” him, he “could not repress a choking sensation,” nor barely “keep back the tears of gratitude.” While the celebration was in itself touching, the event, with its particular emphasis upon the food tokens of a holiday and celebration, was used to signify something of greater meaning; he had earned the respect and admiration of his men.[25]

Blind adherence to this institutional promise to provide a turkey dinner on Thanksgiving could also ruin the promise of this meal, as the grievously put upon Paul Boesch experienced in Germany in the fall of 1944. As was evident from previous experience, he and his fellow soldiers learned again that if Division had set its mind to something, in this case a hot turkey dinner on Thanksgiving Day, then that was what was going to happen. It was going to happen even if that meal was more a burden than a blessing. As darkness fell that Thanksgiving evening, with the American units deployed along a hill within range of German artillery, Boesch received unwelcome news from battalion headquarters. The operations officer at the other end was calling to inform him that a hot turkey dinner had been prepared and awaited a carrying party to come pick it up and bring it back to the rest of the unit. Boesch tried to argue against the meal, but was told, “’It’s the General’s orders.’”  The staff officer chided him for failure to follow the faith: “’You want to see the men get a nice hot meal, don’t you?’” This provoked the infantrymen’s sensibilities:

“Well, Jeezus Christ, that’s a fine way of putting it. Of course I want to see them get a hot meal. I want to see them get three hot meals a day and a dry bed every night and a babe to sleep with, but let’s save the turkey until they can pull back where they can enjoy it. Who the hell knows it’s Thanksgiving except some silly bastard in the rear who gets hot meals anyway and just wants a change in diet?”

Attempts to make his case further up the chain of command were fruitless. Poignantly, he argued that the folks back at division headquarters “’have no idea what it means to try to get food to those men, not mention the troubles of trying to eat it.’” Unsuccessful in this particular battle, Boesch was resentful: “What the hell difference did it make when a man ate his Thanksgiving turkey? One day was like any other to us.” His soldiers echoed this sentiment, but orders were orders. The unfortunate but logical consequence of the activity in such close proximity to enemy lines followed. As the meal was being brought to the men the German artillery opened fire. The bulk of the casualties from the barrage were taken by the men bringing the food as they were caught out in the open. For their efforts, “seven men had been wounded and three killed, an awful price to pay for a Thanksgiving dinner that nobody wanted to eat.”[26] While this thesis maintains that, in spirit, the foodways policy chosen for the American armed forces has tremendous potential to positively influence morale and effectiveness, it equally recognizes that even the best doctrines if poorly applied can have disastrous results.

Half a world away from Lt. Boesch’s unit, on a ship operating near the Philippines in the Pacific Theatre, greater command sensibility prevailed. James Fahey’s memoirs tell of how the captain, in his Thanksgiving message to the crew, decided to delay the holiday meal. Operational conditions had been such that the ship’s crew was going to General Quarters with such frequency that to try to cook and serve a Thanksgiving meal would be an effort in futility. He promised them, however, that once the situation changed a turkey dinner would be in the offing. Four days later, just outside of Palau, circumstances had changed: “Today was the first chance we had to have our Thanksgiving Dinner, almost a week late but it was worth waiting for. We really had quite a feed. Turkey, and all the trimmings. It was very good.”[27]

The commitment to Thanksgiving did not wane in the Korean War. By this war, the components of the holiday were firmly established. As it happened, that first Thanksgiving of the Korean War fell during the fateful campaigns into North Korea. In the first example, PFC Herman Nelson’s memories demonstrate that the celebration included a settled menu: “On Thanksgiving Day, 1950, we moved to a new location near Kunu-ri, well north of the North Korean capital of Pyong Yang. We ate our Thanksgiving dinner there with an armored tank company, and it was really good. We had a turkey dinner and all the stuff that goes with it.”[28] Another soldier, writing home, told of his Thanksgiving experience:

Well, here it is Thanksgiving afternoon. We’ve finished eating our turkey dinner and a very fine dinner it was indeed. Every man had all he wanted to it. It’s about time. We had turkey (frozen, shipped from the States) sweet potatoes, corn, stuffing, gravy, olives, pie, and candy. We were very lucky we got all that as we were only relieved from the line yesterday.

Lucky indeed, as he went on to tell that his unit had been treated to hot showers as well. As this was the first such opportunity to shower since late September, these soldiers had much for which to be grateful.[29]

Montross and Canzona’s history of Marine Corps Operations in the Korean War demonstrates that this first celebration of the Thanksgiving holiday in that war included all of the necessary components:

Thanksgiving Day, which fell on the 23d, was celebrated both in Korea and the United States…. It was a tribute to American bounty as well as organizational genius that the troops in Korea were served a dinner which would have done credit to a first-rate Stateside restaurant. The menu, as proposed by X Corps to component units, included… roast young tom turkey with cranberry sauce, candied sweet potatoes… fruit cake, mince pie and coffee.[30]

Generally speaking, however, the Chosin Thanksgiving experience varied depending on where a unit was in the march north. The campaign presented unique complications to front line food service. As they moved north towards the Yalu River, the units that comprised X Corps had several different experiences of Thanksgiving. In his history of the Marine campaign in North Korea, Edwin Simmons provides photographs to document the celebrations of the units stationed at the bases at Hamhung and Hagaru-ri.[31] One Marine, Lance Corporal Harold Mulhausen, certain that the operation would mean missing the holiday dinner, found otherwise:

On Thanksgiving Day, 1950, the Marines continued to move north toward the Chosin Reservoir….we were pretty upset over the thought of missing our Thanksgiving dinner….To our great joy, next morning the cooks brought the kitchens up to our positions and we had our Thanksgiving dinner after all – turkey, dressing, pumpkin pie, and all the goodies. It was delicious and I ate until my belly nearly popped.[32]

Interestingly, there is a contradiction between the official history of the Marine Thanksgiving of 1950 and the experiences of specific units and personnel. In their description of the Thanksgiving for Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Davis’ unit, Montross and Canzona record that “the men of 1/7 belatedly celebrated Thanksgiving on the 24th with a full, hot turkey dinner.”[33] As recounted in Martin Russ’ history of the campaign, according to Davis, the dinner did not go as smoothly as that:

“We were out on the very end of the limb tactically. When the turkeys caught up with us they were frozen solid and the cooks couldn’t figure out how to thaw them. What we finally did was make a mountain of birds around two fired-up field kitchen stoves, then covered the whole affair with two pyramidal tents sealed tight with snow. By morning the birds were thawed enough for the cooks to cut up and cook, which took several hours. We rotated the platoons down from the slopes throughout the day. Lieutenant Lee’s platoon, at the point, didn’t get the word, however; each man had to settle for a cup of reconstituted milk and two slices of fresh bread. I felt bad about that.”[34]

Joseph Owen, a platoon commander in Davis’ battalion, provides an even bleaker picture. Describing the policy initiative that drove the Thanksgiving efforts that year, he suggests in his memoir that the impetus behind it was for public relations purposes, suggesting that “it was especially important” to the military leadership in Tokyo “that the front-line troops be shown enjoying the bounties of Thanksgiving.” As a measure of the hubris he believed had infected General MacArthur’s command, he notes that, despite intense combat with the Chinese forces who had entered the war, they “could afford to give the men not only the traditional meal, but also the day off.” Regarding the meal itself, “we had our dinner in frigid darkness at 2300.” However, even then problems arose:

We sat in the snow and on the big boulders with overflowing trays. We relished the feast before us, but we had not reckoned with the cold. The temperature had sunk far below zero again, and our food began to freeze before we could set a fork into it. The giblet gravy congealed and became an icy coating over the chilled turkey and mashed potatoes. The cranberry sauce became sherbet. The oranges froze as hard as baseballs.

To add insult to injury, Owen and one of his corpsmen were sniped at while they tried to make the best of their dinner.[35]

The celebration of the holiday continued through the conflicts of the late 20th century. And in the first decade of the new century, the tradition did not wane as American troops found themselves abroad again for the holiday. Firmly established, the institutional menu can now take account of changes in tastes, so that troops have enjoyed deep fried and Cajun spiced turkeys alongside the traditional fare. Nevertheless, the iconic meal remains, no better demonstrated in the surprise trip of then President George W. Bush to Baghdad Airport to deliver the main course.

Which event was ultimately rendered thusly:

So, America, when you sit down to eat your turkey dinner today, put aside the myths of your childhood. Your holiday has its roots in the martial traditions and experiences which have formed the identity and ethos of the nation.

 

 

Notes

[1] Priscilla Ferguson, “A Cultural Field in the Making,” pp. 633-4.

[2] Roy Wood, The Sociology of the Meal, Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press (1995), p. 47, citing Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, New York: Basic Books (1973).

[3] James Thacher, Military Journal, p. 30, 20 July 1775.

[4] George Scheer, ed.,  Private Yankee Doodle, p. 57.

[5] Hugh Rankin, ed., Narratives of the American Revolution, p. 184. Another important wartime thanksgiving was celebrated by General Washington’s troops at Valley Forge, to commemorate the formalization of the alliance with the French in 1778. James Thacher describes this event. In addition to a mass military demonstration by the battalions and brigades with much saluting and many huzzahs, there was a dinner provided by Washington for the senior officers and wives present for the celebration. (Thacher, Military Journal, pp. 126-7)

[6] Scheer, Private Yankee Doodle, p. 100.

[7] Scheer, pp. 251-3.

[8] Book of Days, p. 1055.

[9] Bell Wiley, Life of Billy Yank, p. 226. Interesting to consider, Bell Wiley, a Southern historian, does not discuss Thanksgiving much. Given the holiday’s legal blessing by President Lincoln in 1863, it is not surprising that there is no mention of the holiday in The Life of Johnny Reb. However, the holiday is also largely absent from his companion study of Billy Yank.

[10] Elizabeth Pleck, “The Making of a Domestic Occasion,” p. 775.

[11] Pleck, p. 773.

[12] Pleck, p. 776.

[13] “Spanish American War in Georgia History,” The New Georgia Encyclopedia, http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-3222

[14] David Ott, “Remember the Maine! Adam County’s Involvement in the Spanish American War,” http://www.rootsweb.com/~neadams/spanish.htm

[15] Pleck, pp. 778-9.

[16] Pleck, p. 783.

[17] Amitai Etzioni, ”Toward a Theory of Public Ritual,”  p. 47.

[18] “Proud to pay debt, says General Pershing,” The New York Times, 1 December 1918.

[19] William Langer, Gas and Flame, pp. xxiv-xxv.

[20] William Devitt, Shavetail, p. 146.

[21] Eleanor Hoffman, Feeding Our Armed Forces, New York: Nelson (1943), p. 1.

[22] Donald Vining, ed., Diaries of World War II, Barton’s Diary, p. 20.

[23] Subsistence: Conference Bulletins, The Quartermaster School, (1942) p. 21; Manual of Mess Management, p. 132.

[24] Vining, ed., Diaries of World War II, Diary of Anne McCaughey, p. 98.

[25] Charles MacDonald, Company Commander, pp. 76-7.

[26] Paul Boesch, The Road to Huertgen, pp. 170-3.

[27] James Fahey, Pacific War Diary, pp. 237-8.

[28] Richard Peters and Xiaobing Li, Voices from the Korean War, p. 69.

[29] Donald Knox, The Korean War: An Oral History, p. 464.

[30] Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea: Volume III: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, pp. 143-4.

[31] Simmons, Frozen Chosin, p. 41.

[32] Peters and Li, pp. 99-100.

[33] Montross and Canzona, p. 148.

[34] Martin Russ, Breakout, p. 75.

[35] Joseph Owen, Colder Than Hell, pp. 213-5.

On 29 September 2015, thirty experts from Ministries of Defence, European Commission, NATO staff, industry and academia participated in an European Defence Agency (EDA) seminar to address the future impact of metamaterials technologies on defence capabilities. The seminar was co-organised by the Capability Technology groups (CapTechs) on Materials & Structures, Technologies for Components and Modules, Radiofrequency Sensors Technologies, and Electro-Optical Sensors Technologies.

Metamaterials are engineered structured materials used principally to control and manipulate electromagnetic fields and acoustic waves. Their properties come both from those of the materials they are made of, as well as from their geometrical arrangements. 

High level experts on metamaterials and defence technologies gathered to discuss on the potentials of metamaterials for different defence applications and related future challenges. In order to raise the awareness for these technologies, background information was provided on current work regarding metamaterials at EU level, on relevant activities in various CapTechs, on defence capability needs and on areas were further research is needed. The discussion focused on metamaterials defence applications, such as metamaterials to enhance the performance of radar antennas, their use as radar absorbers and cloaking, both regarding acoustics and microwave signals. Also the challenges and the way ahead regarding measurements, fabrication or modelling were addressed during the meeting.

The main outcome of the seminar is the identification of radar antennas and absorbers as the most promising defence applications. On the other hand, wide-band tunable surfaces are the most wanted applications of metamaterials, although they are far to be achieved. However, with a view to developing different applications, SMEs and academia need military requirements to better align their research to defence needs. Moreover, industry requires understanding of manufacturing tolerances and their performance in real conditions. These issues, together with the fact that metamaterials technologies are mainly civil driven, make the identification of the right area and right moment to start investing in a major challenge for defence actors. 

For further information, please contact CapTech.Materials@eda.europa.eu 

More information: 

• Project page on METamaterials for Active ELEctronically Scanned Arrays (METALESA)
• News "EDA project shows how metamaterials can boost the performance of antennas (MIMICRA)" (15 September 2014)

From 23 to 27 November 2015, an Expert Level Course on European Armament Cooperation (EAC) takes place in Warsaw, Poland, to further increase knowledge on armament cooperation, and to foster ties among the community.

 

The course is organised by the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the Austrian Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Sports, and hosted by the Polish Ministry of Defence. It aims at bringing forward various aspects of armaments cooperation at the EU level. Beyond knowledge development, the course serves as a useful networking platform to foster and to harmonise armaments cooperation among the Member States. 

The Expert Level Course constitutes a follow-on to an Awareness Level Module held at the EDA premises from 27 to 29 October 2015. Additionally, in order to attend the courses, it is mandatory to complete an Internet-based Distant Learning (IDL) module offered by the ESDC. 

“The EDA is fully committed in supporting Member States with education and training initiatives. The high number of participants to this edition of the course confirms that we are going in the right direction. This course represents an important tool for the European cooperation in the armaments domain”, says Massimo Guasoni, the EDA Head of Education, Training & Exercise Unit.

The topics brought on the course agenda include e.g. various aspects of cooperative programmes, research & development in cooperative programmes, harmonisation of the European Military Airworthiness, intercultural aspects in international cooperation and others. Several EDA subject matter experts will share their knowledge and experiences with the course participants. 

 

Background 

The European Defence Agency has been working towards establishing a proper training frame in response to the growing needs for harmonised education in the armament acquisition field since 2006. In 2009, the Czech Republic’s EU Presidency supported the creation of a new European armaments cooperation course, providing an EU-wide training platform where a common understanding of a European approach to armaments cooperation could be promoted. The EDA Member States welcomed the initiative and later that year the EDA Steering Board, in the National Armaments Directors configuration, approved the top-level European Armaments Cooperation (EAC) Framework, under which the current course was established.

In 2013, thanks to the initiative of Austria and other like-minded countries, including the Czech Republic, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the course took its current form. It followed the success of the pilot European Armaments Cooperation Course organised in Brussels and Stadtschlaining in 2012.

More information:

• News "Increasing awareness of European Armament Cooperation
• European Security and Defence College website

Hungary terror suspects are WWII enthusiast, court rules
BBC News 26/11/2015

A court in Hungary has ruled that four men detained as suspected terrorists were in fact World War Two enthusiasts.
The men were arrested after visiting the site of a wartime tank battle at the weekend, carrying old weapons they had found with a metal detector.
News of their arrest drew heightened attention in the wake of this month's Paris attacks in which 130 people died.
But the judge in Budapest said there was no evidence the four men had links to terrorism.
The judge denied a prosecutor's application for the main suspect, known only as Roland S, to be held in custody.
'Looking foolish'
The four men were detained after old weapons explosives were found in their car during spot-checks by Hungary's anti-terrorist police following the 13 November Paris attacks.
The co-ordinated attacks - which were claimed by Islamic State - targeted a series of sites in the French capital.
After the weekend arrests, Hungary's anti-terrorist police chief Janos Hajdu said machine guns, silencers, and even a bomb-making laboratory had been found at the home of one of the suspects
He also added that links to Islamist radicals could not be ruled out.
But the Budapest court said on Wednesday that "circumstances of the case point to the opposite".
The main suspect, it said, had no links with extremists and no criminal record.
It said the man "lives with his mother and stepfather and is a World War Two enthusiast".
The BBC's Nick Thorpe in Budapest says the anti-terror squad have been left looking rather foolish.
All four, however, remain under investigation for unlicensed possession of equipment capable of making explosives.

Hungary seizes live weapons from Brad Pitt World War Z film
Telegraph 3:00PM BST 11 Oct 2011

Nearly 100 live weapons to be used in Brad Pitt's "World War Z" film were confiscated by Hungarian authorities, according to reports.

The weapons included machine guns, rifles and pistols, security officials said.
The weapons arrived from London to Budapest's Ferenc Liszt Airport on Saturday and were discovered at a nearby duty free zone, Janos Hajdu, head of Hungary's Counterterrorism Centre, said. He said he could not confirm they were meant for the film.
"It's possible that all the weapons were brought in for the film, but this would not be allowed by Hungarian law," as the weapons had not been fully deactivated and could easily be used to fire live ammunition, Mr Hajdu said. "This is a very complicated case."
Mr Hajdu said the weapons had been shipped to a Hungarian company, whose representative was being questioned by investigators.
Mr Hajdu explained that in Hungary weapons were considered to be deactivated only if the process "was irreversible," while the weapons seized could still be fired even though screws had been used to fill the end of the barrels.

Xpat Opinion: Terror Police Arrest 'Luke Skywalker' In Budapest
Xpatloop.com

The fearsome ‘terror police’ or TEK of Orbanistan-Hungary on Wednesday raided the oldest technical university in Europe (BME) after an emergency call alerted them to a student roaming the premises armed with a handgun.
The student was arrested and cuffed, as the terror police extracted him from the building. It was later revealed that the student was enacting scenes from Star Wars and was holding a toy gun while being dressed in the robes of none other than Luke Skywalker.

Fidesz officials commented: TEK was just doing its job. Despite this, the affair is one in a chain of embarrasing blunders by the elite swat team.
Just recently, the unit was being laughed at after its captain Janos Hajdu (the PM’s former body guard) tried to contact fake editors of a website, requesting correction of an article. In older news, TEK had confiscated a stash of weapons (actually props) belonging to Brad Pitt, who was about to film in Budapest.

According to Hajdu, the Skywalker incident should not be laughed at, as every call has to be taken seriously. “If it had been a real gun, many would have died that day,” added the hardened veteran.
By Andras M. Badics, published on XpatLoop.com with the permission of BudapestReport.com

The New Hungarian Secret Police
Paul Krugman NYTimes Blog

Another Hungary post from my Princeton colleague Kim Lane Scheppele, after the jump.
The New Hungarian Secret Police
Kim Lane Scheppele
Tuesday 17 April 2012

Brad Pitt knows all about the TEK, Hungary’s new counter-terrorism police.
When Pitt was in Budapest last October shooting World War Z, an upcoming zombie-thriller, TEK agents seized 100 machine guns, automatic pistols and sniper rifles that had been flown to Hungary for use as props in the movie. The weapons were disabled and came with no ammunition. But the Hungarian counter-terrorism police determined that they constituted a serious threat.

The dead-pan seizure of movie props made TEK the laughing stock of the world. As David Itzkoff joked in the pages of the New York Times, “If Hungary ever finds itself the target of an undead invasion, its police force should now be well supplied to defend the nation.”
Few have taken TEK seriously. But that is a big mistake. In fact, TEK seems to be turning into Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s own secret police. In less than two years, TEK has amassed truly Orwellian powers, including virtually unlimited powers of secret surveillance and secret data collection.

The speaker of the Parliament, László Kövér, now has his own armed guard too, since the Parliament yesterday passed a law that creates a separate armed police force accountable to the Parliament. It too has extraordinary powers not normally associated with a Parliamentary guard. The creation of this “Parlia-military” gives Hungary the dubious distinction of having the only Parliament in Europe with its own armed guard that has the power to search and “act in” private homes.

About the Parlia-military, more later. First, to TEK.
TEK was created in September 2010 by a governmental decree, shortly after the Fidesz government took office. TEK exists outside the normal command structure of both the police and the security agencies. The Prime Minister directly names (and can fire) its head and only the interior minister stands between him and the direct command of the force. It is well known that the head of this force is a very close confidante of the Prime Minister.

TEK was set up as an anti-terror police unit within the interior ministry and given a budget of 10 billion forints (about $44 million) in a time of austerity. Since then, it has grown to nearly 900 employees in a country of 10.5 million people that is only as big as Indiana.

Why was TEK necessary? When it was created, the government said that it needed TEK because Hungary would hold the rotating presidency of the European Union starting in January 2011. During the six months it held this office, Hungary could be expected to host many important meetings for which top anti-terrorism security would be necessary. But even though Hungary’s stint in the EU chair is over, TEK has continued to grow.

Eyebrows were raised when János Hajdu, Orbán’s personal bodyguard, was appointed directly by the prime minister to be the first head of this new agency. Since TEK’s job also included guarding the prime minister, some believed that Orbán had set up the office to get his trusted bodyguard onto the public payroll. Patronage turns out to be the least of the worries about TEK, however.

TEK is now the sort of secret police that any authoritarian ruler would love to have. Its powers have been added slowly but surely through a series of amendments to the police laws, pushed through the Parliament at times when it was passing hundreds of new laws and when most people, myself included, did not notice. The new powers of TEK have received virtually no public discussion in Hungary. But now, its powers are huge.

What can the TEK do?

TEK can engage in secret surveillance without having to give reasons or having to get permission from anyone outside the cabinet. In an amendment to the police law passed in December 2010, TEK was made an official police agency and was given this jurisdiction to spy on anyone. TEK now has the legal power to secretly enter and search homes, engage in secret wiretapping, make audio and video recordings of people without their knowledge, secretly search mail and packages, and surreptitiously confiscate electronic data (for example, the content of computers and email). The searches never have to be disclosed to the person who is the target of the search – or to anyone else for that matter. In fact, as national security information, it may not be disclosed to anyone. There are no legal limits on how long this data can be kept.

Ordinary police in Hungary are allowed to enter homes or wiretap phones only after getting a warrant from a judge. But TEK agents don’t have to go to a judge for permission to spy on someone – they only need the approval of the justice minister to carry out such activities. As a result, requests for secret surveillance are never reviewed by an independent branch of government. The justice minister approves the requests made by a secret police unit operated by the interior minister. Since both are in the same cabinet of the same government, they are both on the same political team.

TEK’s powers were enlarged again in another set of amendments to the police law passed on 30 December 2011, the day that many other laws were passed in a huge end-of-year flurry. With those amendments, TEK now has had the legal authority to collect personal data about anyone by making requests to financial companies (like banks and brokerage firms), insurance companies, communications companies (like cell phone and internet service providers) – as well as state agencies. Data held by state agencies include not only criminal and tax records but also educational and medical records – and much more. Once asked, no private company or state agency may refuse to provide data to TEK.

Before December 2011, TEK had the power to ask for data like this, but they could only do so in conjunction with a criminal investigation and with the permission of the public prosecutor. After December 2011, their data requests no longer had to be tied to criminal investigations or be approved by the prosecutor. In fact, they have virtually no limits on what data they can collect and require no permission from anyone.

If an organization (like an internet service provider, a bank or state agency) is asked to turn over personally identifiable information, the organization may not tell anyone about the request. People whose data have been turned over to TEK are deliberately kept in the dark.

These powers are shocking, not just because of their scope, but also because most Hungarians knowledgeable about constitutional law would probably have thought they were illegal. After the changes of 1989, the new Hungarian Constitutional Court was quick to dismantle the old system in which the state could compile in one place huge amounts of personal information about individuals. In its “PIN number” decision of 1991, the Constitutional Court ruled that the state had to get rid of the single “personal identifier number” (PIN) so that personally identifiable data could no longer be linked across state agencies. The Court found that “everyone has the right to decide about the disclosure and use of his/her personal data” and that approval by the person concerned is generally required before personal data can be collected. It was the essence of totalitarianism, the Court found, for personal information about someone to be collected and amassed into a personal profile without the person’s knowledge.

With that Constitutional Court decision still on the books and not formally overruled, the Fidesz government is reproducing the very system that the Court had banned by creating a single agency that can gather all private information about individuals in one place again. What, one might ask, is left of constitutional law in Hungary?

One might also ask: Are there any limits to TEK’s power?

The law specifies that TEK operates both as a police and as a national security agency. When it is acting as a police unit, it has the jurisdiction to spy on any person or group who poses a threat of terrorism, along with anyone else associated with such persons. Hungary, like many countries after 9/11, has a broad definition of terrorism that includes, among other things, planning to commit a “crime against the public order” with the purpose of “coercing a state body . . . into action, non-action or toleration.” Crimes against the public order include a long list of violent crimes, but also the vaguer “causing public danger.” In addition, TEK also may arrest “dangerous individuals,” a term not defined in the criminal law. It is difficult from the text of the law itself to see any clear limits on TEK’s powers.

And TEK is very active. On April 7, TEK agents were called in to capture a young man in the small village of Kulcs who killed four members of his family with a machete. And then, in the early morning hours of Friday, April 13, TEK agents conducted a major drug bust in Budapest, arresting 23 people. According to news reports, fully 120 TEK agents were involved in the drug operation, raising questions about whether the drug bust was thought to be part of the anti-terrorism mission of the agency or a rather broad extension of the concept of the “dangerous individual.” Either way, the drug ring looked like garden-variety crime. If that is within TEK’s jurisdiction, it is hard to imagine what is not.

A You-Tube video of the April 13 drug bust, made available by TEK itself, shows what a middle-of-the-night raid by TEK officers looks like, complete with the use of heavy-duty tools to cut open an exterior door.

Given that this is the video that TEK wanted you to see, one can only imagine the activities of TEK that are not recorded for posterity. (It would be interesting to know, for example, why the audio cuts out at certain points in the clip, as well as what happens between the time that TEK breaks open the door and the time the various suspects are seen lying handcuffed on the floor.)

While its videos are crystal clear, TEK’s legal status is blurry, as some parts of its activities are authorized under the police law and others parts are authorized under the national security law. Different rules and standards apply to police agencies and to national security agencies. Moreover, TEK seems to have some powers that exceed those of both police and national security agencies, particularly in its ability to avoid judicial warrants. No other agency in the Hungarian government has both police and national security powers, and it is unclear precisely how the agency is accountable – for which functions, under what standards and to whom. What follows is my best guess from reading the law.

With respect to its powers authorized under the police law, it appears that TEK must act like the police and get judicial warrants to search houses, to wiretap and to capture electronic data when these activities are part of a criminal investigation. When TEK was arresting the machete-wielder and making the drug bust, it was probably acting under its police powers.

But TEK only need judicial warrants when it is engaged in criminal investigations. It doesn’t need judicial warrants when it is using its secret surveillance powers in security investigations. When it is acting as a national security agency, TEK only needs the permission of the justice minister to engage in secret and intrusive surveillance. Of course, given that the permissions and constraints are different depending on whether TEK is acting as a police agency or a national security agency, it would matter who decides whether a particular activity is conducted for police or national security purposes and what the criteria are for determining that it is one or the other. The law does not provide the answer to either question.

Suppose someone believes that she has been spied upon illegally by TEK. What can she do to object? First, if TEK is engaged in secret surveillance or data collection, it is unlikely that people will know that they are a target, given the extraordinary secrecy of the whole operation. But even if one finds out that one is being watched, the remedies are not encouraging.

A person aggrieved by TEK’s actions may complain to the interior minister, and the interior minister must answer the complaint within 30 days. But given that the interior minister is the minister who controls TEK in the first place, this is not an independent review. If the complainant does not like the answer of the interior minister, s/he may appeal to the Parliament’s national security committee, which must muster a one-third vote to hear the petition. At the moment, the 12-member national security committee consists of two-thirds governing party members and one-third members of all other parties combined. If the governing party does not want to investigate a complaint, garnering a one-third vote would mean uniting the whole opposition – or, to put it in more blunt terms, getting the Socialists to work with the neo-Nazis. That is unlikely to happen. Even if the national security committee agrees to hear a petition, however, it would take a two-thirds vote of the committee to require the interior minister to reveal the surveillance methods used against the complainant so that the committee can determine whether they were legal. There is no judicial review at any stage of this process.

TEK operates in secret with extraordinary powers and no one reliably independent of the current governing party can review what it is doing when it uses its most potentially abusive powers. This shocking accumulation of power may explain the Hungarian government’s abolition of a separate data protection ombudsman who would have the power to investigate such shocking accumulation of data. Instead, the data protection officer – a post required by European Union law – has been made a political appointee of the government itself. This is why the EU has launched an infringement action against Hungary for failing to guarantee the independence of the office. Now we can see why the EU may be onto something.

As if the powers of TEK are not enough, though, Parliament yesterday authorized another security service with the power to use police measures against citizens and residents of Hungary. The cardinal law on the Parliament itself contains a provision that gives the Parliament its own military, a Parlia-military.

The Parlia-military is an armed police unit outside the chain of command of the regular military or police structures. Its commander in chief is the speaker of the house, László Kövér, who served as minister without portfolio for the Civilian Intelligence Services during the first Orbán government from 1998-2002. The Parlia-military has the power to guard the Parliament and the speaker of the house, as might be expected. But if the Parlia-military is only supposed to guard the Parliament and the speaker, why does it need the powers that the cardinal law gives it?

The law gives the Parlia-military power “to enter and to act in private homes.” That’s literally what the law says. It is unlikely that the Parliament will want to conduct a plenary session in someone’s living room, so one must then wonder just what the Parliament will do if its armed military enters someone’s home to “act.” In addition to this power, the Parlia-military may also make public audio and video recordings of people. It can also search cars, luggage and clothing. It can use handcuffs and chemical substances (which I assume means tear gas and nothing more, but the wording make it sound like the Parlia-military may use chemical weapons!). The draft law seems to imply that the Parlia-military would have to operate under the constraints of the police law, which would mean that it would need judicial warrants to conduct these intrusive measures. But that is not completely clear. What is clear is that Hungary now suffers from a proliferation of police that are under direct political control.

Until this point, I have thought that the Fidesz government was just attempting to lock down power for itself for the foreseeable future, which was bad enough. But now, with the discovery of these new security services, it seems increasingly likely that the Hungarian government is heading toward the creation of a police state. Actually, it may already be there. But shhhh! It’s secret.

Tag: TEKHungarian Counterterrorism Centre