No one has done better than the great British comic illustrator Heath Robinson to illustrate the intrinsically reciprocal dynamic of military engineering in general and mining and countermining in particular. This cartoon is from a collection Heath Robinson at War I found in a rummage sale years ago–no doubt there are abundant reprints.
I would guess, though, that for many KOW readers the dominant mental image of war underground is more akin to that in Sebastian Faulks’ novel Birdsong, later adapted for television. The harrowing scenes of tunnel warfare beneath the trenches of the First World War are extraordinarily vivid. In his introduction Faulks described it as ‘a hell within a hell‘. For a lot of people, it seems to me on the sound scientific basis of a dozen or so conversations (some of them drunken), that’s where tunnel warfare resides–at a safe historic distance from today, a claustrophobic nightmare of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers.
Of course this is completely wrong. Tunnel warfare has been a constant in human history for as long as there have been humans making war. In recent memory it was a major preoccupation of the American military. Consider the poem below written in praise of the massive tunnelling efforts of Vietnamese communists during the Vietnam War. I love it. (Can anyone tell me if the words ‘your entrails, Mother, are unfathomable’ rhyme in Vietnamese?) I found it in the front matter of the classic book The Tunnels of Cu Chi by Tom Mangold and John Penycate.
The Mother–The Native Land
by Duong Huong Ly
When she dug the tunnels, her hair was still brown.
Today her head is white as snow.
Under the reach of the guns she digs and digs.
At night the cries of the partridge record the past.
Twenty years, always the land is at war.
The partridge in the night cries out the love of the native land.
The mother, she digs her galleries, defenses,
Protecting each step of her children.
Immeasurable is our native land.
The enemy must drive his probes in everywhere.
Your unfathomable entrails, Mother,
Hide whole divisions under this land.
The dark tunnels make their own light.
The Yankees have captured her.
Under the vengeful blows she says not a word.
They open their eyes wide but are blind.
Cruelly beaten, the mother collapses.
Her body is no more than injuries and wounds.
Her white hair is like snow.
Night after night
The noise of picks shakes the bosom of the earth.
Columns, divisions, rise up from it.
The enemy, seized by panic, sees only
Hostile positions around him.
Immeasurable is our native land.
Your entrails, Mother, are unfathomable.
And even more recently tunnel warfare has begun to concern Israel in a major way since the 2006 capture of Corporal Gilad Shalit by Hamas commandos who attacked his army outpost near Kibbutz Kerem Shalom via an infiltration tunnel originating in Rafah. Locating similar tunnel entrances and destroying them was the primary objective of the 2014 IDF incursion into Gaza (Operation Protective Edge). I cannot recommend highly enough this report on Hamas’ tunnelling efforts in and out of Gaza by Dr Eado Hecht given as testimony to the UN. There are dozens and dozens of journalistic accounts but none so far as I’m aware approaches Hecht’s in detail and sheer good judgment.
In other words, the underground battlespace has always been an aspect of warfare but in contemporary times it’s vitality has become much more apparent. That being the case it merits more serious attention than it has gotten of late. I’ve been doing some of that lately in the form of quite a lot of library time (my forte) as well as some fieldwork in Israel and in the sewers of a major city, which I can’t talk too much about yet because technically I wasn’t supposed to be there. I thought I might share a few observations for the amusement of the handful of other claustrophile war studies types who must exist out there.
Why is tunnelling and counter-tunnelling the new hotness?
I think the reasons that the underground is an increasingly active component of the warfare are possibly pretty obvious. Firstly, consider the scene below–no doubt you’ve seen dozens like it, this one’s from some marketing bumf of the Lockheed Martin company ‘Staying ahead of the curve‘, which purports to show the post-2030 battlespace. Everybody loves these clean scenes, right out of a George Lucas film. Yay blue! Get those reds!
‘ ‘Damn’, says the half of the world that can’t afford the high tech accoutrements of the system of systems, ‘since I can’t hope to challenge “next generation air dominance” I guess I’ll just give up.’ Well, no, not actually. In the real world, clever people who are determined in their cause find other ways of bringing/avoiding the pain. In the case of Hamas attacking the IDF from infiltration tunnels is in fashion because every other means of advancing to contact with them is pointlessly suicidal. Similarly never operating without top cover–or at any rate scurrying like mad whenever you’re in the open is simply what you do in an era of ubiquitous surveillance and sensor-to-shooter gaps measured in minutes or seconds. I suspect we all know now that the post-2030 battlespace will look a lot like this 2015 one from Damascus–apparently shot from a Russian operated commercial drone with a go-pro camera. Yay gray! Get those grays!
Another reason for the proliferation of tunnels is the parallel proliferation of walls in our world today–the two basically always seem to go together, always the ying to the others yang, where you have walls you will soon have tunnels. This is less directly related to warfare than it is primarily to the efforts of governments to curtail migration and smuggling (and somewhat plausibly terrorism). See for instance this CNN report on a drug ‘super tunnel‘ running under the US-Mexico border. Pretty crappy, eh? Here, have some more Heath Robinson.
A final reason is simply the much discussed and completely self-evident urbanisation of the surfaces of the planet where most people now live. If you’re fighting in cities you are either fighting in and from tunnels or you are dead.
Anyway, you get the point. Tunnelling is a time honoured asymmetric tactic. Also if you put a wall between someone and the potential of great profit that they can’t around then they will put a lot of energy into going under.
The science of tunnelling and counter-tunnelling is surprisingly slow moving*
In this day and age of rapid innovation and scientific progress it is sometimes oddly disorientating to come across fields of endeavour where the number of really fundamental ‘game changing’ innovations are so few. Remember this famous scene from Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey? It’s not in a cave but that’s what the war was about–the winning tribe got to keep the cozy cave by the water, the losers got to carry on roaming the desert being preyed on by leopards.
That’s stage 1. People lived underground in the comparative comfort of natural caves and undoubtedly had to defend them against the attentions of others who craved those same natural security and comforts.
Stage 2 differed only in that people started to dig their own caves and tunnels where they wanted them, for defence or for hiding, instead of waiting for Mother Nature to do it for them. Accounts of such activity are found in the The Bible, Judges, Chapter 6, Verse 2: ‘And the hand of Midian prevailed against Israel: and because of the Midianites the children of Israel made them the dens which are in the mountains, and caves, and strong holds.’ And actual remnants, some very extensive and well preserved, such as the cave cities in Cappadocia, Turkey built initially as defence against the Hittites in 1000 BC and inhabited up until just a few centuries ago, can be found in many places.
Stage 3 began in the late Middle-Ages with the invention of gun-powder. Then as now heroism alone was no real challenge to a fortress that was minimally competently defended; you had to go underground. The miner was the most feared of all attackers:
The skill of the miner was reflected in the number of sites which, otherwise vulnerable, were immune through water to the slow but deadly process of undermining. Considerable subtlety was employed in the underground approach. The entrance would be distant and well-concealed. Diversionary attacks would be staged to distract the defenders’ attention. As nothing could be achieved from the surface the castle holders would dig out countermines, and on several occasions would break into the besiegers’ galleries and engage them in hand-to-hand combat. There are numerous accounts of desperate battles underground, and the skill, science, and courage of the attacker was often matched by similar qualities in the counter-miner.
Philip Warner, Sieges of the Middle Ages (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1968), pp. 23-26.
(If you haven’t already read the report on Gaza tunnels by Hecht that I mentioned above then do that now and reflect on what, if anything, has changed in this basic dynamic).
Pre-gun powder the basic technique of attack was this: choose a vulnerable section of the fortress, a turret, say, then slyly dig a tunnel beneath it. Once you are beneath the foundation then expand your tunnel–very quietly–into a large cavity shored up with stout timbers so it does not collapse on you as you work. Now stuff the place with inflammables and set it alight. In the ensuing fire the supports will be consumed and the structure above will come crashing down beneath its own weight. Undoubtedly effective, the technique also required great skill in quiet mining and accurate navigation–and was intrinsically perilous. After all if the defenders detected your efforts they could dig a tunnel to intercept yours. There is a terrific example of this at St Andrews Castle, Scotland where you can still see the mine dug during a siege in 1546 and the counter-mine, which after some initial difficulty locating its target ultimately allowed the defenders to ambush and slaughter their attackers. Here’s an illustration:
Gun powder made the job of the attacker simpler and easier. Its explosive power meant that you didn’t have to dig such a large cavity, meaning also that you didn’t have to make as much noise or take so much time and were therefore less likely to be intercepted. Also if your underground navigation was off a bit there was still a good chance that you could ruin a fair chunk of the wall you were attacking. Over a few centuries the arms race of mine and counter-mine came to the point where by the early modern era a really properly defended fortress would, in theory, have a system of counter-mines already dug long before the besiegers arrived–in fact, actually at the first stage of the fortification’s construction.
A system of permanent countermines was one of the most expensive but effective systems of fortification, enabling the governor to offer a foot-by-foot three-dimensional defence of the ground from the tail of the glacis all the way back to the counterscarp… From the main gallery, a number of galleries or half galleries (four and a half feet by three) radiated underneath the glacis along the imaginary prolongations of the capital (central) lines of the bastions and ravelins. From these again there was a further proliferation in the form of major branches (rameaux, three by two and a half) and simple branches or listeners (ecoutes, two and a half by two) which sprouted off at right angles. These stuffy masonry tubes gave the counterminers the means of detecting the approach of the enemy, and offered a variety of sites where they could plant their charges of gunpowder. The branches and listeners were built of such small dimensions not for the sake of economy (in fact it was very awkward to excavate them), but because small tunnels were easy to tamp (stop up) when a charge was about to be exploded.
Christopher Duffy, Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660-1860 (London: Greenhill Books, 1996). pp. 83-84.
(If this all sounds quaintly ancient to you then read go read Hecht’s piece, particularly para. 36 where he remarks on the extreme difficulty of locating tunnels. In the old days ‘listeners’ would use barrels of water into which they would plunge their heads to enhance the sound of distant tunnelling–think of how things sound when you submerge your ears in the bath–or basic microphones, such as a brass cymbal placed against a wall of a mine, in the hope of triangulating on their attackers. That’s still fundamentally how it’s done today.) Again, Heath Robinson’s imagination is fanciful but not entirely inaccurate.
Stage 4 came along in the late 19th century with the invention of excavating machines that could bore tunnels faster and more accurately than men could with shovels and pick axes. At first glance, you might think this a terrifically consequential development allowing the rapid excavation of lots of large tunnels. In actuality, the extra noise made by mechanical digging greatly compromises their offensive utility because it makes them more easily detectable to anyone listening. It has long been known that North Korea has dug several very large, deep, and long ‘invasion’ tunnels suitable for the use of large units into South Korean territory but there is a good deal of dispute over how many there may be.
Stage 5 is where we are now and it involves the development of really effective detection equipment. It bears emphasising how difficult this is technically. The ground underneath you is naturally a jumble of layers of differing density and full of cracks and fissures so mapping it with ground penetrating radar, say, even if useful depth could be achieved would still present big problems of analysis. Infiltration tunnels, moreover, can run deep and do not need to be large–a space sufficient for a man’s shoulders or perhaps the width of a bicycle’s handlebars is perfectly sufficient for commandos to transit even with heavy weapons–and they can be dug quietly. Finding a tunnel is a bit like finding a spaghetti noodle in a plate of spaghetti.
Siege warfare is never anyone’s first choice. It’s extremely expensive. It’s exhausting and challenging on many levels. But when every other option is locked down it works. In fact, it’s never really gone completely out of use. It’s probably that our belief in the salience of mobile warfare practically since Napoleon ran roughshod over Europe two centuries ago has just blinded us a bit to it’s new fashionableness. Anyway, it’s back.
So, what next?
Well, this post is already quite long so I’ll keep this bit short. Let’s recap. For a variety of reasons the ground beneath us is now a vital part of the battlespace. Historically, this is nothing new–perhaps what we’re seeing is a reversion to the norm. That being the case it is worth spending some time reacquainting ourselves with the strategic and tactical wisdom of the past, much of which now lies forgotten on dusty shelves. But we should also be exploring more and be more attentive to the infrastructure of the places we live. On which point I must admit that I have something of a man crush on this fellow, urban historian and photographer Steve Duncan. I don’t think I could get away this as a research methodology–pretty sure my university would disown me. Have a watch:
But, really, if we’re going to make some progress in this field we need to be scrambling around these places more and learning from the people who work and live in these environments a lot more. Also, goddamn that looks fun.
On 16 December 2015, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA) Jorge Domecq and Director of the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) Tim Rowntree signed a revised guidance document defining the terms of cooperation between the EDA and the Executive Administration (EA) of OCCAR as well as between the EDA and OCCAR Member States.
Compared to the Interface Document on EDA-OCCAR relations formulated in 2013, the new publication develops concepts of cooperation in a more detailed and pragmatic manner. Referring to the Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation, the two organisations will introduce greater synergies in terms of project or programme management. New areas described in the document include different models of how EDA cooperative projects can be taken forward by relying on the OCCAR-EA cooperative programme management expertise as well as how OCCAR programme activities could be entrusted to the EDA. In addition, the Interface Document describes how, within the frame of an existing OCCAR managed programme, OCCAR may benefit from EDA tools, services and expertise.
Hungary hosted the sixth Helicopter Tactics Symposium of the European Defence Agency (EDA) Helicopter Exercise Programme (HEP). Held in Budapest on 7-9 December 2015, the event continues to be a major venue for European helicopter crews to discuss and share experience in helicopter tactical procedures.
Over sixty helicopter tactics instructors and experts coming from ten countries, as well as representatives of the Helicopter Tactics Course (HTC), Helicopter Tactics Instructor Course (HTIC), Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC), and NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), gathered at this annual HEP event to bring the common tactical knowledge base up-to-date.
Briefings and discussions covered the latest tactical lessons from the helicopter operations in Iraq, Syria, Mali and Afghanistan. The panel discussions, divided between attack and support helicopter operators and planners, brought an insight to the latest developments in night vision goggles (NVG) training, Electronic Warfare (EW), tactics used to land on different types of landing zones, use of sensors and technologies applied in Degraded Visual Environment (DVE) and helicopter self-defence aids used by the Member States. Reflecting on several comments coming out of discussions, new proposals to update the HEP Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), the capstone tactics manual for multinational helicopter operations, were submitted.
The aims and objectives of the upcoming HEP exercises were briefed in detail, including Cold Blade 2016 (Finland, environmental training in extreme conditions), Black Blade 2016 (Belgium, Special Operations Forces exercise) and Fire Blade 2017 (Hungary, live-fire, urban operations).
The HEP Member States fully realise that the multinational dimension is key to the development of the helicopter capabilities of European countries. Therefore, the well-established HEP community calls for a wider extension of proven exchanges of operational experience, such as the ones conducted during the Helicopter Tactics Symposiums.
Carried on SSBN-726 Ohio Class submarines, The Trident II D-5 is the US Navy’s submarine launched nuclear missile, with exceptional range for a sea-launched weapon and accuracy figures that rival or even exceed land-based ICBMs. These missiles are arguably the most important and effective component of the US nuclear deterrent, and they constitute Britain’s entire nuclear deterrent as well. They were first deployed in 1990, and are planned for continuous deployment to 2042.
The US Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs in Washington, DC and Lockheed Martin recently issued over $100 million in contracts related to the Trident II D-5 SLBMs, in order to maintain their propulsion and guidance systems.
Alliant Techsystems received a $76 million contract from Lockheed Martin to produce solid propulsion systems for all three stages of the U.S. Navy’s Trident II (D-5) missile. Under the terms of the contract, ATK will continue to supply Trident solid propulsion systems to Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company in Sunnyvale, CA through 2010. LMSS is the Trident II (D-5) Missile System’s Prime Contractor,
ATK has a 50-year history of producing solid propulsion systems for submarine-launched ballistic missiles, beginning with the original Polaris missile. The company’s solid rocket portfolio ranges from 3-inch diameter spin motors to the Space Shuttle’s Reusable Solid Rocket Motors (RSRM).
Meanwhile, the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory in Cambridge, MA received a $26.9 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract to provide repair and recertification of MK-6 guidance systems, including pendulous integrating gyroscopic accelerometers, inertial measurement units, electronic assemblies, inertial measurement units electronics, repair parts, test equipment maintenance, and related hardware. Work will be performed in Cambridge, MA and is expected to be complete September 2006. The contract was not competitively procured by the US Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs in Arlington, VA (N000-30-06-C-0002).
DID has covered work on the aging MK-6 guidance systems before, including key subcontracters to Draper’s efforts. We have also noted the efforts underway to develop a modernized Mk6 LE guidance system that dispenses with obsolete 1980s era electronics, and how that fits into overall Trident II modernization activities.
Contracts & EventsDecember 17/15: Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training and Charles Stark Draper Laboratories have each been awarded contracts to carry out support and engineering services for the US and UK Navies’ Trident systems. Lockheed was awarded $72.47 million to provide Trident (D-5) II navigation sub-system engineering support services and that contract may contain add ons that amount to a total of $147.3 million if options are exercised. CSD Labs will provide specialized tactical engineering services, logistics services, fleet support services, and guidance SSP alteration services to test, repair and maintain guidance subsystems, test equipment, and related support equipment of existing Trident (D-5) weapon systems. The contract with CSD Labs is for $54.3 million, but with options could total $392.9 million.
Faced with a plethora of crises and foreign policy challenges, Sven Biscop asks whether Europeans are up to the challenge of acting strategically.
The post Can European strategy cope? appeared first on European Geostrategy.
From 23 November to 11 December 2015, the European Defence Agency (EDA) in cooperation with Austria as host nation, organised the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear explosives Improvised Devices Search Pilot Course (CBRNe ID Search Course), to enhance pMS’ knowledge on all aspects of C-IED.
The event took place at the “AbwehrSchule” CBRN School in Korneuburg, Austria. A total of sixteen students attended the course which included a mixture of military and police Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), CBRN and Search specialists from the following countries: Austria, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Latvia, Czech Republic and Spain. A mixture of military and civilian CBRNe Search expertise ensured a wide range of operational experience was available during the course.
Practical training provided the most effective means of learning for this course and students were able to participate in immersive scenarios as commanders, searchers, EOD and Sampling and Identification of Biological, Chemical and Radiological Agents (SIBCRA) specialists in a joint CBRN response team. A variety of instructional methods were employed to achieve this learning: demonstrations, individual skills practice, group mini-tasks and full tactical tasks for teams provided a structured approach to learning. Differentiation was applied where required to compensate for language difficulties or adaptation of existing skills from SIBCRA to Search.
All practical exercises were recorded using photos and videos; this enabled every day to be concluded with a video debrief to ensure students understood the details of each phase even if they were involved in a separate aspect of the task.
The various scenarios provided a range of operational complexities which highlighted the different operational capabilities, policies and procedures each pMS had. As a result, the course provided much opportunity for sharing best practice, and a seminar was held to facilitate discussion about the range of capabilities.
A Distinguished Visitors Day was hosted by Austria on 10 December 2015. Several Defence Attaches and other visitors participated in the event and took the opportunity to visit the CBRN School for briefings on the course design and contents. Visitors also had the chance to visit a live “vessel search” demonstration in the Danube river.
The EDA intends to hold a CBRNe ID Search seminar during 2016 to define and exploit concepts on this area of expertise.
Hello, Dear Reader! Yes, it has been a long time since I’ve posted here. Thanks for not bringing it up.
2015 will certainly stand out as a banner year for things going to Hell in a hand basket. Planes, trains, rock concerts…nothing was immune from terrorist attacks. ISIS (or ISIL, or IS, or Daesh) was everywhere…
Or was it?
I am reminded of a post that I crafted here five years ago (5 years!?! where does the time go, eh?) Given that re-gifting is the new…er…uhhh…gifting the same thing more than once, I thought I would share it with you again, for a second time, once more:
Terrorism and the Myth of Santa: Do you believe?
All the very best for this time of year (wink, wink, nudge, nudge) and here’s hoping 2016 is broadly better than 2015. (No, Hallmark, you can’t steal that sentiment, it’s all mine.)