Defence`s Feeds

Three European C27J nations (Bulgaria, Italy and Romania) participate in the first edition of the Balkan Spartan exercise with the aim to increase interoperability among European C27J Spartan operators. The exercise, taking place from 29 June to 8 July in Sofia, Bulgaria marks the beginning of yet another deliverable from the European Air Transport Fleet (EATF) partnership signed in 2011 by twenty Member States.

Designed by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and hosted by the Bulgarian Air Force, this first-of-its-kind flying event is aiming at promoting aircraft user type approaches to harmonise tactics, techniques and procedures as well as to develop more cost-effective solutions to operate and sustain the C27J. The objective of Balkan Spartan is to provide air crews with both academic and flight training as well as to have ground crews developing harmonised procedures to eventually allowing them to perform cross maintenance on each other’s aircraft.  

This flying event was developed in the framework of the C27J cooperation concept launched in 2015 by EDA. This concept is looking at developing a far reaching level of interoperability amongst European C27J operators through a variety of projects in the areas of operations & training, logistics, airworthiness, common procurement and SESAR. In 2016 a similar working group has been created for the European C295 operators.

The main advantages of EDA’s user groups – that are working in full transparency and cooperate with all other existing user groups led by other organisations, industry and/or service providers – is to group medium and small national fleets to take advantage of economies of scale, to exchange best practices and to be more cost-efficient in operating and sustaining the aircraft.

 

Background information

The European Air Transport Fleet (EATF) partnership, launched in 2011 and now gathering 20 Member States (AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, EL, ES, FI, FR, IT, LT, LU, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SE, NO and HU), aims at increasing the airlift provision in the EU, developing concrete solutions to increase the efficiency of existing and future fleets and to optimise the use of air transport organisations and structures. Other activities undertaken as part of EATF include the European Air Transport Training (EATT) and European Advanced Tactics Training Course (EAATC) events as well as the European Air Transport Symposium.

 

Balkan Spartan: List of participating air forces and aircraft

• Bulgaria: 1 x C27J
• Italy: 1 x C27J
• Romania: 1 x C27J
• Slovakia: Personnel included in the multinational command & control
• Observer nations: Greece, Lithuania, Australia

 

More information

• European Air Transport Fleet project page

 

The European Defence Agency (EDA) has received so far 21 submissions in response to the “Call for Proposals for the Pilot Project on defence research” closed on 23 June.* The objective of the call is to award grant agreements for the value of almost €1.4 million for two technological development projects in the area of defence and one research and development project linked to certification for military and civil uses. Received proposals came from across Europe (twelve countries) and cover all of the aforementioned activities.

“The good number of proposals received shows the interest in the Pilot Project by SMEs, industry and R&T organisations. The Pilot Project – as a predecessor to the larger Preparatory Action for defence-related research – is an important test bed for funding of defence research through the EU budget. The European Defence Agency is looking forward to advancing the projects and to opening this new chapter in the way defence research is funded in Europe”, comments Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency.

The Pilot Project has been entrusted to EDA by the European Commission through a Delegation Agreement which was signed on 16 November 2015. As a result, EDA is responsible for the execution and management of the projects. The call for proposals, the submission of proposals, the evaluation and the awarding of the grant agreement is organised and coordinated by EDA. 

The evaluation of the proposals will be conducted over the summer period with the objective to conclude the grant agreements before year end.

 

Background

Research in defence related technologies is critical for the development of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base and the strength and strategic autonomy of the EU Member States armed forces. The European Commission, in agreement with the European Council, will launch a Preparatory Action on defence research, which will start in 2017 and last for three years. Its aim is to test and prepare the ground for a possible defence research programme in the next Multiannual Financial Framework. The Pilot Project has been introduced in the EU budget (2015 and 2016) adopted by the European Council and the European Parliament, on the basis of an initiative of the latter.

The EDA published the Call for proposals for the Pilot Project in March 2016. The deadline to respond was on 23 June 2016 and the three activities covered are relating to Unmanned Heterogeneous Swarm of Sensor Platforms, Inside Building Awareness and Navigation for Urban Warfare and Standardisation of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) Detect and Avoid (DAA).”

* More submissions might be received in the coming days by post.

 

More information:

• News "EC and EDA sign agreement on defence related research" (18 Nov 2015)

A delegation from the International Criminal Court (ICC) is planning to visit Afghanistan in 2016, but the government has hesitated about receiving it. It has established an inter-ministerial committee to ensure the Rome Statute, the treaty establishing the ICC, is finally translated into local languages and published in the official gazette so that the public can read it. That treaty was signed 13 years ago. The committee has also been trying to ensure the ICC will not be trying any Afghan cases. AAN’s Ehsan Qaane takes a closer look at where Afghanistan and the ICC are on prosecuting war crimes.

Afghanistan deposited its ratification of the Rome Statute on 10 February 2003 and it entered into force on 1 May 2003. Only crimes committed in Afghanistan or by Afghans after this date can be prosecuted by the ICC. Four years later, in 2007, the ICC began a preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan. The process has been very slow, largely because of a lack of resources – including relevant language resources – within the court. However, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC did publish five preliminary examination reports between 2011 and 2015. The first three, published between 2011 and 2013, focus largely on whether crimes falling under the ICC’s jurisdiction, namely war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide had been committed in Afghanistan. The last two reports (2014 and 2015) focus mainly on questions of admissibility – at whether crimes are grave enough for the ICC to be involved, whether crimes are being tackled by Afghanistan’s own judiciary and whether it would be in ‘the interests of justice’ for an ICC intervention (find the reports here).

The Rome Statute, crimes and Afghanistan

The findings of the Situation Analysis Section of the Office of the Prosecutor, published in the preliminary examination reports, show that two types of crimes against humanity and seven types of war crimes have been committed in Afghanistan since 1 May 2003:

• Murder, as a war crime under article 8(2)(c)(i) and as a crime against humanity under article 7 (1) (a) of the Statute;
• Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of the fundamental rules of international law as a crime against humanity under article 7 (1) (e) of the Statute;
• Cruel treatment under article 8(2)(c) (i) or outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime under article 8(2)(c)(ii);
• The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court as a war crime under article 8(2)(c)(iv);
• Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, materials, units or vehicles involved in humanitarian assistance as a war crime under article 8(2)(e)(iii);
• Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to education, cultural objects, places of worship and similar institutions as a war crime under article 8(2)(e)(vii);
• Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years of age into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities as a war crime under article 8(2)(e)(vii); and
• Treacherously killing or wounding a combatant adversary as a war crime under article 8(2) (e) (ix).

A closer look at the crimes and alleged criminals

The ICC can only prosecute individuals, not institutions, as article 25 of the Rome Statute states:

“The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural person pursuant to this Statute. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.”

Indeed, during the preliminary examination stage, the Office of the Prosecutor analyses the available information regarding a situation (or a case) to determine whether there is any “reasonable basis” (article 15, Rome Statute) to launch an investigation into an alleged crime. The Office of the Prosecutor is not tasked with attributing alleged crimes to any individual at this stage. For example, in Afghanistan’s case, the Office of the Prosecutor reports have so far only attributed potential crimes to parties of the conflict, which it sees as:

1) Pro-government forces that include Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and their international partners under the umbrella of ISAF, and, more recently, the Resolute Support Mission (RSM).

2) Anti-government forces such as the Taleban, the Haqqani network and Hezb-e Islami (led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar).

Anti-government forces are accused of all nine of the crimes mentioned above. Pro-government forces have been accused of torture, only. The Office of the Prosecutor singled out the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) (see here), as well as the CIA and the US military.

The ICC examined the killing and wounding of civilians by pro-government forces, but the Office of the Prosecutor said it could not attribute the crime of murder to them:

The information available does not indicate that civilian deaths or injuries caused by air strikes launched by pro-government forces, as well as escalation-of-force incidents and “night raids”, resulted from the intentional directing of attacks against the civilian population. Accordingly, the information available does not provide a reasonable basis to believe that the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities pursuant to article 8(2)(e)(i) has been committed by pro-government forces.

Assessment of admissibility

In order for cases to be admissible for the ICC they need to meet three conditions (Rome statute: see here, articles 17 and 53). Two of these, the Office of the Prosecutor believes, have been fulfilled in the case of Afghanistan and it is looking into the third:

• The gravity threshold

According to available information in public sources and 112 communications which the ICC has directly received from victims and other individuals and organizations, the Office of the Prosecutor confirmed the seriousness and widespread nature of the nine above-mentioned crimes:

Between 2007 and 2014, approximately 37,000 civilian casualties (14,700 deaths and 22,300 injuries) have been attributed to anti-government armed groups, primarily from their use of improvised explosive devices. Many alleged crimes were committed with the aim to terrorise and spread fear among the local civilian population, as a means of control… There are an estimated 5,000 conflict-related detainees in Afghan government custody. The manner in which the crimes are alleged to have been committed appears particularly gruesome and was seemingly calculated to inflict maximum pain. The alleged crimes had served short-term and long-term impacts on detainees’ physical and mental health, including permanent physical injuries. (Related to international forces in particular to USA forces) The information available suggests that victims were deliberately subjected to physical and psychological violence, and that crimes were allegedly committed with particular cruelty and in a manner that debased the basic human dignity of the victims.

• No national prosecution: government unable and/or unwilling

Once a crime covered by Article 5 of the Statute – namely genocide, a war crime or crime against humanity – has been determined as having been serious or widespread in nature, there is no impunity and the most responsible perpetrator(s) must be prosecuted either by a national court or by the ICC. The ICC has complementary jurisdiction over these crimes. This means the country’s judiciary is authorised to address these crimes first. However, if it is unable or unwilling to do so, then the ICC can claim jurisdiction. A member state can transfer its jurisdiction to the ICC by requesting its intervention; alternatively, the ICC can initiate, by proprio motu (Latin for ‘own initiative’), jurisdiction if a member state is unable or unwilling to prosecute the alleged crime (article 13, Rome Statute). The Office of the Prosecutor must establish the unwillingness or inability of the Afghan government to prosecute these crimes before the ICC can launch an investigation.

So far, Afghanistan has not referred any cases to the ICC. Neither have the five preliminary examination reports cited any of the perpetrators of the most serious crimes as having been tried by either a national court or by one of the country’s international partners providing military support to the Afghan government. Only a few cases of torture have been looked into by national courts, but these were mostly administrative enquires rather than criminal proceedings, or considered only lower-level alleged perpetrators; none of the main perpetrator(s) have been subject to investigation.

The Government [of Afghanistan] has instituted only a limited number of proceeding against alleged perpetrators (see here). Despite the scale of alleged ill-treatment in NDS and ANP detention facilities (an estimated 35-51% of conflict-related detainees according to the finding of UNAMA’s detention monitoring program (see here), information provided by the government of Afghanistan to UNAMA indicates that to date the Government has prosecuted only two NDS officials (in relation to one incident), and no ANP officials, for this conduct.

In its fifth report, published in 2015, the Office of the Prosecutor discussed Afghanistan’s Amnesty Bill (see AAN’s Transitional Justice paper), which the Afghan parliament passed in 2007. The Office of the Prosecutor identified this law as a sign of unwillingness on the part of the government to prosecute war crimes or crimes against humanity committed by anti-government forces, notably by former warlords or insurgents who put down their weapons and joined the government after 1 May 2003.

The Law on Public Amnesty and National Stability provides legal immunity to all belligerent parties including those individuals and groups who are still in opposition to the Islamic State [sic] of Afghanistan, without any temporal limitation to the Law’s application or any exception for international crimes (see here).

Additionally, crimes covered by the Rome Statute have not been criminalized by the Afghan government and the country’s judiciary organs are incapable of addressing these complicated types of crime.

The example of Sarwari, former head of KhAD

An example of the Afghan judiciary’s inability to try crimes that fall under the Rome Statute is the case of Asadullah Sarwari, head of the intelligence service directorate (KhAD) during the communist PDPA regime. He was arrested on 26 May 1992 by the mujahedin who had just captured Kabul and accused of ‘plotting against the mujahedin government’. He was tried, however, only in 2005. A judge familiar with the trial said Sarwari was accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes, but as these had never been criminalised under Afghan law, he was tried according to article 130 of the Afghan constitution, which refers to the Hanafi Sharia law of Islam (anyway, when Sarwari committed his crimes, Afghanistan had not signed the Rome Statute so they were outside its temporal jurisdiction). Sarwari was found guilty, but of what crime exactly still remains unclear.

Sarwari’s case also demonstrated how far Afghanistan’s judges are influenced by powerful people. One of the plaintiffs in the case was Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, mujahedin factional leader and president of the first post-PDPA, mujahedin government in 1992, and still a prominent figure. Members of his family were forcibly disappeared or killed by KhAD under Sarwari. According to one of the case judges, Mujaddedi has rejected all punishments for Sarwari except capital punishment. However, the evidence against Sarwari is not strong enough to merit capital punishment. The standoff has led to the case never being resolved. After almost eleven years, it is still ongoing even though the Afghan Criminal Procedural Code states that proceedings may not take longer than eleven months in total. It is also unclear at which stage the case is at the moment.

Another challenge for the Afghan judiciary when trying members of insurgent groups such as the Taleban, is their vulnerability to retribution. Judges and prosecutors are often targeted by insurgents, which, of course, impacts their willingness and ability to try war crimes. After the execution of six convicted terrorists in May 2016, for example (five Taleban, including two members of the Haqqani network, and one member of al Qaeda (see AAN reporting here)), the Taleban threatened the judges and prosecutors. They then followed up with three attacks on Afghan courts and members of the judiciary: against the personnel of the Maidan Wardak Appeals Court on 31 May, against the Ghazni Appeals Court on 1 June and against the Logar Appeals Court on 5 June 2016. During these attacks, a total of 22 civilians, at least half of them judges and prosecutors, were killed and 37 other civilians were wounded.

• The ‘interests of justice’

The third issue considered by the Office of the Prosecutor is whether an ICC intervention would serve justice. According to articles 17 and 53 of the Rome Statute, an intervention in Afghanistan would have to be supported by the victims of the alleged crimes. Although none of the five published reports has said anything about the willingness of victims to have their cases prosecuted, the last report said information to this end is in the process of being gathered and analysed. In the same paragraph, it is also stated that Afghanistan is at a stage where it could turn to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the body in charge of resolving all issues arising before a trial phase can begin which supervises the Office of the Prosecutor in its investigatory and prosecutorial activities. The Office of the Prosecutor must gain authorization to open an investigation. It could now request this as its findings show war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed and there has not been prosecution of alleged criminals by national courts.

The Office [of the Prosecutor] will also continue to gather information relevant to the assessment of whether there are substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice prior to making a decision on whether to seek authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to open such an investigation of the situation in Afghanistan.

According to articles 15 and 57, once the Office of the Prosecutor feels there is a “reasonable basis” to warrant belief that crime(s) covered in the Statute have been committed and the ICC has admissibility to investigate, the Office must request the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorization to open an investigation into the case.

In the last report issued in December 2015, the Office of the Prosecutor mentioned that, following a decision taken in October that year, it intended to send a delegation to Afghanistan to conduct admissibility assessments. The report said the trip had not yet taken place due to, “the non-permissive situation in the country.” According to information AAN received from a source within the Office of the Prosecutor, the ICC asked the government of Afghanistan to issue visas for the members of this delegation, but that this had been delayed – reportedly, because the government wanted time to prepare for the visit and to define its strategy for interacting with the ICC delegation once it arrived in Kabul.

The inter-ministerial committee prepares for the ICC visit

The National Security Council (NSC) decided in January 2016 to establish a high-level, inter-ministerial committee, led by Second Vice-President Sarwar Danish, (1) to investigated the purpose of the ICC visit and prepare for it. It was to consult with international partners who provided military support regarding their position on the ICC request to send a delegation. Apart from defining its strategy for working with the ICC, the committee had two further tasks: first, the translation of the Rome Statute into the local languages, Dari and Pashto, and publication of the translated law in the official gazette and; second, collect all cases relevant to the Rome Statute (if any) that Afghanistan had prosecuted (see here). The inter-ministerial committee established a technical sub-committee consisting of qualified, mid-level officials which had six months (January to June 2016) to carry out these four tasks, at which point they must submit their findings and recommendations for review and approval to the inter-ministerial committee. The technical sub-committee has almost completed its tasks (see below) and is expected to submit its findings to the committee soon.

Cases prosecuted in Afghanistan

A member of the technical committee, who asked not to be named, told AAN on 1 June 2016 that the purpose of collecting information on cases relevant to the Rome Statute that have been prosecuted in Afghanistan was “to show to the ICC the willingness of Afghanistan to prosecute the alleged crimes, which are under cover of the Rome Statute.” He added that it was “impossible to develop the capacity of the Afghan judicial organs in one night, but still we can show our willingness.” His point was that the government is trying to convince the ICC that it is indeed willing, but that the national judiciary have lacked the capacity to effectively address crimes falling under the Rome Statute.

Of the three bodies involved (Attorney General’s Office, Ministry of Interior and Supreme Court), only the Attorney General’s Office has presented a list of cases. It compiled a list of 54 cases of torture (including conflict-related and non-conflict related detainees and prisoners’ cases), based on the work of a special governmental committee that had been established by President Karzai in 2013 as part of the verification of a UNAMA report. The report, published on 22 January 2013, claimed torture had taken place in Afghan detention centres (see the report here). (See AAN reporting here and here. According to a source from the technical committee who spoke to AAN on 30 May 2016, only two out of the 54 cases have been investigated by the Attorney General’s Office, so far. The same source confirmed that the Supreme Court had submitted a letter to the technical sub-committee stating that it could find no cases related to the Rome Statute. The Ministry of Interior has shared no information to date.

Translation and publication of the Rome Statute

13 years after it went into effect in Afghanistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finally translated the Rome Statute into Dari and Pashto and, on 30 May 2016, sent it to the Ministry of Justice to have it published in the official gazette. This was only decided by the inter-ministerial committee on 23 January 2016. According to the current Afghan constitution, any international treaty or agreement signed by Afghanistan has to be published in the official gazette following approval by the parliament, with the documents being translated into Dari and Pashto. Technically, the Afghan government was obliged to publish the Rome Statute in 2004 at the latest. However, the statute was signed before the current constitution was approved by the Constitutional Loya Jirga on 13 December 2003, so, at the time of signing, it did not require the approval of parliament (which had not yet been established). Nonetheless, it should still have since been translated and published.

Due to the lack of a translated version of the Rome Statute in local languages, even one of the nine Supreme Court judges and the then-acting head of the Attorney General’s Office, Habib Jalal, (this was before Farid Hamidi’s appointment as Attorney General on 7 March 2016) had been unaware of Afghanistan’s ICC membership (this, according to a source at the NSC whom AAN spoke to May 2016, Habib Jalal). In fact, according to a source in the technical sub-committee, one of the reasons for creating the inter-ministerial committee prior to issuing visas to the ICC delegation was to give information to relevant officials about Afghanistan’s obligations under the Rome Statue.

What were the responses of Afghanistan’s international partners?

Once the ICC announced its intention to visit Afghanistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked NATO members involved in Afghanistan about the nature of their relationship with the ICC. Feedback, including that from the US, was overall positive, a source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told AAN. However, when the US and Afghanistan signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (see AAN’s analysis on BSA here), as when it signed the earlier Status of Forces Agreement (2003), (2) Kabul agreed neither to prosecute American soldiers, nor hand them over to a third party for the prosecution of war crimes.

Article 98 of the Statute states that a member state is not responsible for arresting or transferring foreign suspects whose country of origin the member state has an international agreement with banning such an arrest or transfer (3). In other words, Kabul is not bound to violate the 2015 Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and hand over any US national accused of war crimes to the ICC. However, the ICC can still prosecute US soldiers for alleged crimes committed on Afghan territory after 1 May 2003, despite the BSA and the fact that the US is not a member of the ICC. The ICC can still request the US or any of the ICC’s State Parties to arrest perpetrators who are suspected of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity, and send them to the ICC detention centre in The Hague.

Developing the regulation for the implementation of the Rome Statute

Part Nine of the Rome Statute, International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, states that state parties must assist the ICC in any way and at any stage of the investigation, prosecution, trial or implementation of a sentence. Therefore, the newly established inter-ministerial committee has also been tasked with developing a regulation or a law to legalize Afghan interaction with the ICC in its future work. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), a member of the committee, is in charge of this task. Developing a regulation or law on such a delicate matter needs a lot of work – and the subcommittee only had six months to finish its tasks. Hussain Moin, who is in charge of developing the regulation, told AAN on 25 May 2016, that the committee had just started on this task. Due to this, the technical committee decided on 24 May 2016 to submit its findings in a report to the inter-ministerial committee and to ask for more time in drafting the regulation or law.

The inter-ministerial committee decided on 23 January 2016 to develop a regulation, but some members are lobbying for a law instead. AAN was told by someone present at the January NSC meeting that figures such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Salahuddin Rabbani, who are not happy with the intervention of the ICC, want to postpone the ICC delegation’s visit. Approval of a law would require more time than a regulation, as a law requires the approval of the Afghan parliament while a regulation just needs the nod of the Afghan cabinet. The same source said that Rabbani presented three arguments for delaying the visit. The first was that cooperation with the ICC would destroy whatever trust existed between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taleban. At the time, the Quadrilateral Cooperation Group, QCG, on Afghan Peace Talks and Reconciliation was still active. However, this argument lost its strength on 25 April following a presidential speech in which Ghani, while not closing the door to negotiations, said fighting the Taleban had to take priority (see AAN’s dispatch). Rabbani’s second reported argument was that the ICC visit would damage the relationship between the government and its international partners (ie the US) fighting in Afghanistan against the insurgency, who are mentioned in the ICC’s preliminary examination reports. Thirdly, he said it would make the mujahedin more suspicious of the National Unity Government (the two are not mutually exclusive, of course) as they might fear prosecution. It seems there may be a misunderstanding about the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction here. It seems Rabbani may have thought the ICC could investigate pre 2003, Taleban, mujahedin and PDPA-era crimes. Salahuddin Rabbani is now leader of one of the main parties to the conflict during these eras, Jamiat-e Islami, and his late father, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was its leader for decades until his death in 2011.

What is next for the ICC in Afghanistan?

Based on the Office of the Prosecutor reports, war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed on Afghan territory since 1 May 2003. The Office is trying to launch an investigation in order to prosecute such crimes. It believes the crimes are serious and widespread and that the Afghan state has proved unwilling or unable to try them. It is looking into whether an ICC intervention would be in the interests of justice. Before any intervention, it would also have to obtain authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC. For the purpose of an admissibility assessment, the Office of the Prosecutor wants to send a delegation to visit Afghanistan in 2016. However, the government has postponed issuing visas until it has received the inter-ministerial committee’s findings on the consequences of the ICC’s intervention in Afghanistan. The committee had six months to finalize its work. One difficult and time-consuming task remains, which is the drafting of a regulation formalising Afghan government relations with the ICC. With the committee out of time at the end of June, it is unclear as to how this can be accomplished and, consequently, when the ICC might visit Afghanistan.

 

 

(1) The Ministry of Interior, Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Justice, the NDS, Attorney General’s Office, the Supreme Court and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) all have representatives on the committee.

(2) The 2003 Status of Forces Agreement said:

The Government of Afghanistan recognizes the particular importance of disciplinary control by United States military authorities over United States personnel and, therefore, Afghanistan authorizes the United States Government to exercise criminal jurisdiction over United States personnel. The Government of Afghanistan and the Government of the United States of America confirm that such personnel may not be surrendered to, or otherwise transferred to, the custody of an international tribunal or any other entity or state without the express consent of the Government of the United States.

(3) Article 98 of the Statute says:

1) The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.

2) The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender, which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.

 

Today, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that the commander (Vice Admiral Viktor Kravchuk) and chief of staff (Rear Admiral Sergei Popov) of the Baltic Fleet were both fired for cause, as were several other unnamed senior officials at the fleet. This was the largest mass replacement of senior naval officials in the Russian Navy since the Soviet period. The official statement indicated that the removal was the result of serious shortcomings in the officers’ work that were revealed in a month-long review of the fleet’s performance that concluded on June 10. The official notice highlighted “serious shortcomings in organizing combat training, daily activities of their units, poor care of their subordinates as well as misrepresenting the real situation in their reports.”

Although Kravchuk has his defenders, it appears that his removal  was the result of real shortcomings, although combined with external factors that made his removal relatively easy to carry out. Ilya Kramnik and Konstantin Bogdanov have done some very interesting reporting on this subject. They argue that these shortcomings include the unsatisfactory performance of Baltic Fleet minesweepers during exercises that took place in August 2015, combined with a low level of combat readiness among the fleet’s newest ships. The fleet’s four Project 20380 Steregushchiy class corvettes have not deployed to the Mediterranean Sea or Indian Ocean a single time in the nine years since the first of the ships was commissioned into the fleet. Furthermore, the ships have had more than their share of accidents and fires.

In addition to questions about the fleet’s combat readiness, the commanders were also criticized for inadequate living conditions for personnel stationed at the fleet’s bases. The commanders were given until this spring to correct the problems in both areas, and today’s announcement shows that the recently completed review found them still wanting.

Kravchuk’s enforced departure was smoothed by the replacement last winter of the Commander of the Russian Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, who was removed in November 2015 officially because of health concerns. Chirkov, who had been Kravchuk’s patron in the navy for many years, was rumored to have also been removed due to complaints about inadequate readiness in some units — in his case naval infantry and support ships. These problems had come to a head because of increased requirements related to the Syrian Express operation for supplying Syrian and then Russian troops in Syria with military equipment.

Kramnik and Bogdanov note that although problems at the Baltic Fleet may have been particularly noticeable, they do not differ that much from problems evident in Russia’s other fleets. The reason that the leadership of the Baltic Fleet was chosen may be more a factor of the fleet’s relative lack of importance in present-day Russian operations. Therefore, today’s announcement may also serve as a warning to the commanders of the other fleets that they need to improve their work or face similar consequences.

 

Chinese Luhai Class Guided Missile Destroyer

Americas

• The MQ-8B deployed on board USS Coronado (LCS-4) is the first to be equipped with the new AN/ZPY-4(V)1 radar. Previously, the unmanned helicopter was fitted with the RDR-1700 maritime surveillance radar under an urgent requirement. Compared to the previous radar, the AN/ZPY-4(V)1 will increase the search area of the LCS, improving the ability to simultaneously track up to 150 targets and increase detection accuracies out to 70 nautical miles.

Africa

• Gabon is considering doubling the size of its transport fleet by revamping an early B model C-130. The 1976-built aircraft (TR-KKB) is currently at the Alverca facility of Portuguese maintenance and overhaul specialist OGMA, following its recovery from the African state after being grounded for eight years. OGMA has now sent a proposal to the government for upgrades which would see the installation of new avionics and a glass cockpit, as well as the replacement of several structural parts, including outer wing-caps and the 6m (19.7ft)-long sloping longerons at the rear of the aircraft.

Middle East North Africa

• After several months of frosty relations, Turkey and Russia have resumed bilateral ties including coordination on the fight against terrorism. Tensions between Ankara and Moscow have been high since the former’s shooting down of a Russian fighter accused of invading Turkish airspace last November. Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan expressed regret for the incident on Wednesday and the Kremlin announced that Vladimir Putin said he would order the government to start talks with Turkey on resuming “mutually advantageous” trade relations and to drop restrictive measures on Russian tourists visiting Turkey.

Europe

• Germany’s Ministry of Defense has reached an agreement with Israel Air Industries (IAI) over the lease of five Heron TP unmanned aerial vehicles. The $666 million deal will see the drones become operational in 2018. A previous deal to lease drones to Germany was specifically intended for aerial intelligence-gathering missions; however, the Heron’s are capable of carrying payloads of up to one ton.

• An investigation by Norwegian authorities into an Airbus helicopter crash in April has found that the incident was probably the result of metal fatigue in the aircraft’s gearbox. All 13 people on board were killed when the Super Puma’s main rotor blades separated from the aircraft as it was ferrying passengers from a Norwegian offshore oil platform operated by Statoil. Previous Super Puma incidents linked to gearbox problems include a 2009 crash off Peterhead, Scotland, in which the rotor also flew off and 16 people died.

• BAE Systems, Northrop Grumman, and the Defence Electronics and Components Agency (DECA) are to team up to bid for a significant long-term deal to become the avionics sustainment hub for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in Europe. The UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) confirmed the involvement of BAE and Northrop Grumman, but declined to say anything about whether DECA, the British state-owned components repair operation, would have a role; however, due to US government insistence, some avionics repairs on the jet here are only undertaken by UK government employees.

Asia Pacific

• The US Army has awarded a number of contracts to companies for the Afghanistan Intelligence Services supporting US Forces in Afghanistan. BAE Systems and Six3 Intelligence Solutions were given $31 million and $28.6 million deals respectively with work to be carried out in Afghanistan, and will last until January 9, 2017.

• Four types of aircraft operated by the Indian Air Force are to receive the latest version of Rafael’s Litening targeting pod as part of a larger $500 million deal between India and Israel. The improved system has been equipped with upgraded infrared cameras and a charge-coupled device color camera to help identify targets on the ground, particularly in dense areas. Furthermore, the new pod doubles as a surveillance and reconnaissance system in addition to being a targeting pod.

Today’s Video

• VMA-211 is set to become the second operational F-35B squadron and the first unit to transition from the AV-8B Harrier on Jun. 30:

Prevailing approaches to security sector reform (SSR) have tended to stress Westphalian notions of the state characterized by legal-rational norms and institutions. Thus, SSR processes have more often than not concentrated on the formal arrangements of the state and its security and justice institutions. Yet, such approaches are fundamentally at variance with the underlying realities of

More than 70 representatives from Member States, industry and EU institutions gathered on 28 June for the workshop “Opportunities for Dual-Use Technologies – Components” organised by the European Defence Agency, the European Commission, the ECSEL JU.

The aim of the event was to find areas of cooperation and to pave the way for possibilities for dual-use research in the future.

Khalil Rouhana, Director in the European Commission, opened the workshop by presenting snapshots of the Commission’s ambitions in the electronic field. Through dual-use research, we can make sure we have technology autonomy in Europe and industrial autonomy for the future. Denis Roger, EDA Director, underlined that the workshop will strive to have a better understanding of activities which can be jointly explored, believing that “better exploitation of dual-use synergies can bring a win-win situation for all stakeholders”. He addressed the issue of the fading borderline between civil and defence and stressed that “more cooperative investment and clear prioritisation in resource allocation is a must for defence”. Bert de Colvenaer, Executive Director ECSEL-JU, presented the joint undertaking’s role in investing in knowledge and innovation through its PPP-model.

The projects presented during the workshop showed success stories of electronic components research from each of the three institutions. The main technological areas addressed were thermal management and robustness, RF components, III-V technologies and advanced digital components. Key takeaways from the discussions in the three sessions of the workshop were: the importance of developing value chains, ensuring supply, quality, appropriate business approaches, volume considerations, EU funding and support towards industry. In the panel “dual-use, dual-benefits”, representatives from the UK MoD, STM, DG GROW and ESA outlined the dual-use spin-off benefits, spin-in technologies, unique European assets and the role of innovative SMEs.

The most important conclusion of the event was that exploiting synergies are highly necessary. Panagiotis Kikiras, Head of Innovative Research at the EDA, highlighted the perfect timing of this discussion in the context of the upcoming EU Global Strategy and European Defence Action Plan. Recognising the effort of the EC, EDA, and ECSEL communities as well as the need to further raise awareness on the subject, Willy Van Puymbroeck, EC, concluded that: “We need to seed in order to harvest but we have to dare to harvest the work that is being done.”

Joint efforts by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) to support dual-use small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) led to a first concrete result this week (27 June) when a Dutch SME named IC3D Media, which had been put forward by EEN, was allowed to participate in the EDA’s expert cell (CapTech) dedicated to ‘System of systems, Battlelab and Modelling & Simulation’.

It was the first time that a dual-use SME recommended to the EDA by the Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) was offered this opportunity. The CapTech meeting allowed the company in question, which develops gaming techniques for training of police agents and soldiers, to showcase its innovative products and know-how, as well as to discuss potential collaborations, synergies and future contract opportunities with the EDA’s participating Member States and their stakeholders. As a next step, IC3D Media could also participate to the EDA’s Modelling & Simulation platform which offers a virtual meeting room for SMEs active in this particular domain.

The fact that this Dutch SME, with the support of the Enterprise Europe Network, was given the possibility to access the EDA CapTech demonstrates that the cooperation between the EDA and the EEN works effectively and that it can yield practical results; it also shows the way to follow by other SMEs.

EEN is a network coordinated by the European Commission’s DG GROWTH (and co-supported by the EU COSME programme) providing SMEs with a wide range of free-of-charge services delivered by several hundreds of local points of contact in native language.

In a recent ‘Assessment of defence-related SME access to the COSME Programme’, the EDA explored several opportunities for the defence sector within the EU Programme COSME (Competitiveness of SMEs) 2014-2020. As a result of this study, defence-related SMEs and clusters can access the newly created EDA’s ‘COSME web-platform’.

 

More information:

• EDA’s support to access EU funding for the defence sector
• EDA’s support to defence-related SMEs
• EDA’s COSME web-Platform
• EDA’s CapTechs

 

EQ-36 concept
(click to view full)

Firefinder radars track the path of incoming shells, rockets, mortars, etc., and calculate the point they were fired from. Raytheon’s TPQ-36 radar is specifically designed to counter medium range enemy weapon systems out to a range of 24 kilometers, while the TPQ-37 can locate longer-range systems, and even surface launched missiles, out to 50 kilometers. Michael Yon, embedded with 1-24 (“Deuce Four”) in Mosul, offered a first hand description of counter-battery radars’ effect on enemy tactics in 2005.

Better radar technologies offer a number of potential advantages for this role, including wider fields of view and less maintenance. Not to mention fewer disruptive, time-sucking false positives for deployed troops. In September 2006, Lockheed Martin began a contract to deliver their “Enhanced AN/TPQ-36” (EQ-36) radars. Despite the close official name and designation, this was a wholly new radar system, from a different company. Orders have begun to accumulate, along with deployments – and, finally, a less confusing designation change to AN/TPQ-53.

The TPQ-53 Counterfire Radar System TPQ-53 components
(click to view full)

The TPQ-53 includes a number of operational improvements, including 360 degree coverage capability instead of the TPQ-36’s current 90 degrees, and dramatic reductions in false alarm rates. A successful program would replace many of the TPQ-36 radars currently in service.

In 2002, the US Army began a research project called the Multi-Mission Radar Advance Technology Objective. The goal was similar to the US Marine Corps’ G/ATOR: a single mobile radar system able to perform Air Defense Surveillance, Air Defense Fire Control, Counter Target Acquisition (artillery tracing) and Air Traffic Service missions. Unlike the Marines, the Army didn’t proceed from there toward a full development project. Instead, they incorporated some of the technologies and learning from MMRATO into a competition that would begin by fielding radars to solve the CTA problem.

Both the truck-mounted AN/TPQ-53, and the smaller Humvee-mounted TPQ-50 LCMR (Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar) trace back to that effort, and the TPQ-53 also grew out of lessons learned from the previous generation TPQ-36/37 Firefinder radar series. The base radar technology is more advanced, and software and hardware were modernized. Mechanically, the radar got more robust gears, a rotating platform, an automated leveling system for faster and more reliable emplacement, and an improved air cooled system to improve reliability and keep costs down. The Army expects these changes to save millions of dollars over the radars’ lifetimes.

An AN/TPQ-53 radar system is actually made up of 2 vehicles. One FMTV truck is the Mission Essential Group, containing the radar antenna and the power generator. The second FMTV truck carries the Sustainment Group, with a climate controlled operations shelter and backup power generator.

The TPQ-53 is IFPC (Indirect Fire Protection Capability) compatible in countering rocket, artillery, and mortar attacks, and the Army is thinking of adding software upgrades to allow it to track larger targets, and perform air defense surveillance against UAVs, helicopters, and enemy aircraft.

The system’s operations center allows the radar to link back to Army command systems like AFATDS and FAADC2. Linkages to ground-based Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) command systems, which can also connect to fire control radars and defensive weapons like the Phalanx Centurion, provide a complete defensive solution for protected bases. If the radar’s functions expand to include broader air defense, those command system linkages will become even more important.

Automation and built-in test sensors means that only 4 soldiers can operate the system, with an emplacement time of 5 minutes and a displacement time of just 2 minutes. This compares to 3 HMMWVs and 6 people for the previous TPQ-36v8 system; or 2 FMTV trucks, 2 HMMWVs, and 13 people for the TPQ-37v8.

A built-in encrypted wireless radio can reach up to 1 km away, allowing operators to disperse and make themselves more difficult targets. Soldiers can use a pair of ruggedized Linux laptop computers to handle operations from anywhere in range, or work from the climate-controlled shelter vehicle.

EQ-36/ TPQ-53: Program and Industrial Team Old: TPQ-36 Firefinder
(click to view full)

The initial Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) contract for 5 radars was issued in January 2007. In spring 2007, the prototype completed successful counterfire target acquisition testing in both 90- and 360-degree modes at the U.S. Army’s Yuma Proving Grounds in Yuma, AZ. In summer 2007, the system completed successful air surveillance testing at White Sands Missile Range in White Sands, NM. A prototype was unveiled in October 2007, and the 1st system was delivered to the Army in summer 2009. By late 2010, the first EQ-36 systems were deployed in Iraq & Afghanistan.

An August 2011 option raised the EQ-36’s QRC order total to 36 systems (4 + 12 + 17 + 3), though some official documents place the number at 38. Another 65 AN/TPY-53 radars were ordered later, following the Milestone C update decision that launched low-rate initial production.

Over the longer term, the potential exists for $1.6+ billion in orders, covering all QRC units + 136 radars in the program of record. The Full Rate Production decision is scheduled for Q4 FY 2014.

Industrial team members for the EQ-36 program include Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors (MS2):

• Lockheed Martin MS2 in Syracuse, NY (Program lead, antenna array, digital module assemblies);
  
• Lockheed Martin MS2 in Moorestown, NJ, facility (transmit/receive modules);
  
• Lockheed Martin Simulation, Training and Support, in Orlando, FL (TPQ-53 training system and curriculum);
  
• Burtek, Inc. in Chesterfield, MI (operations shelter and stationary platform);
  
• Syracuse Research Corp. in Syracuse, NY (digital signal processor);
  
• Tobyhanna Army Depot in Tobyhanna, PA (maintenance support).

Contracts and Key Events

The radar is an American product, with the USA as its founding and largest customer. As such, timelines and divisions use American fiscal years, which end on September 30th.

FY 2014 – 2016

13 more for USA under MYP; Singapore’s export request. TPQ-53 system
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June 29/16: Lockheed Martin’s AN/TPQ-53 counter-battery radar has proven that it can be used to detect unmanned aerial vehicles alongside its usual task of detecting incoming artillery and rocket fire. The company announced the success following testing carried out by the US Army as part of its Maneuver and Fires Integration Experiment (MFIX) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Conducted annually, the MFIX exercise brings together military, industry and academia to assess solutions to future warfighting needs in a live environment.

February 9/16: Testing of the Q-53 Counterfire Target Acquisition Radar System in June 2015 has shown the radar is having difficulty detecting volley-fired mortars. While the second initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) found the system effective against single-fired rockets, artillery, and mortar munitions, it was unable to handle the detection of more than one munition fired at the same time, according to Michael Gilmore’s annual Operational Test & Evaluation report. The radar also struggled to identify the difference between a mortar, a rocket, and artillery. The Army, however, has stated that the radars have been working well in operational environments, and plans are to increase performance in high clutter environments with development and integration of software upgrades in 2019, with more testing planned for 240 mm and 122 mm munitions not assessed in previous tests.

April 7/14: Support. Lockheed Martin in Liverpool, NY receives a $9.1 million contract modification for interim contractor ssupport of the AN/TPQ-53 radar fleet.

All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2012 Army budgets. Work will continue until Sept 30/14, and will be performed in Liverpool, NY. US Army Contracting Command in Aberdeen, MD manages the comntract (W15P7T-06-C-T004 P00092).

March 28/14: +14. Lockheed Martin in Liverpool, NY receives a $145.9 million contract modification for another 13 AN/TPQ-53 radar systems, along with 13 corresponding sets of on-board spares. This is the 4th installment under the March 13/12 multi-year contract, and brings orders to $751 million: 65 systems over 4 phases.

All funds are committed immediately, using FY14 US Army budgets. Work will be performed in Liverpool, NY, with an estimated completion date of Nov 30/16. US Army Contracting Command in Aberdeen, MD manages the contract (W15P7T-12-C-C015, PO 0022).

Oct 8/13: Singapore. The US DSCA announces Singapore’s export request for up to 6 AN/TPQ-53(V) Counterfire Target Acquisition Radar Systems (CTARS) with 120 degree sector scan capability, along with generators, power units, a simulator, a live fire exercise (!), tool and test equipment, spare and repair parts, repair & return services, software support, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, communication support equipment, personnel training, and other forms of US Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $179 million.

Singapore would be the radar’s 1st export customer. Their forces do deploy abroad, where CTARS capability will be very useful. At home, the city-state’s small size also makes them inherently vulnerable if problems in neighboring countries should allow local terrorists to acquire ballistic rockets.

The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin in Syracuse, NY. If a sale is negotiated, they’ll need Government and contractor representatives in Singapore for 6 weeks to support equipment deprocessing/fielding, systems checkout and new equipment training. Source: US DSCA, Oct 8/13.

DSCA: Singapore

FY 2012 – 2013

Multi-year contract; Milestone C approval; Initial fielding; Future competition? AUSA 2011
(click to view video)

June 27/13: +19. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Liverpool, NY receives a $206.9 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to procure AN/TPQ-53 Radar Systems and corresponding spare parts, using a combination of FY 2012 and 2012 funds. Lockheed Martin sets the number at 19 radar systems, and this order brings the cumulative total face value of this contract is $605.1 million over the low-rate initial production contract, with 52 systems ordered over 3 phases.

Work will be performed in Syracuse, NY. US Army Contracting Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD manages this contract (W15P7T-12-C-C015, PO 0010). Sources: Pentagon, Lockheed Martin Aug 26/13 release.

March 12/13: Support. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Liverpool, NY receives a $12 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification, to provide interim contractor support for the AN/TPQ-53 radar system.

Work will be performed in Liverpool, NY until the end of FY 2013 on Sept 30/13. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W15P7T-06-C-T004).

Dec 19/12 – Jan 17/13: future competition for FRP? PM Radars issues a Sources Sought request to determine whether reintroducing competition for Full Rate Production (FRP) may be possible in FY 2014. In other words, this is not an RFP to displace incumbent Lockheed Martin just yet, but it’s the homework that might create the option to do so.

The Army anticipates an FRP contract in Q4 FY 2014, as a single award, firm fixed price (FFP) contract comprised of a base year, with multiple separately priced options and range quantities. Spares, new equipment training, and technical manuals will also be acquired on a FFP basis. This would lead to the acquisition of about 70 systems over 4 years. Key factors in the source selection process include a Live Ammunition System Demonstration (LASD) planned for the first half of FY 2014. Data witnessed by the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) will not be an adequate substitute to participating in the live demo.

The submission date for this information request, originally set to Jan 14, 2013, is later postponed to Feb. 12. The FRP RFP itself is planned for release in Q4 FY 2013, with an award in Q3 FY 2014. FBO: W15P7T-13-R-C113.

Jan 2013: DOTE report. In its FY2012 report, the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation notes reliability improvements, with less frequent system aborts than the 2011 system demonstration’s 1 per 30 hours. Some of these original issues were attributed to user documentation and training, which slated for further improvement.

Even so, the results show a fallback from vast improvements after initial configuration changes, to a final configuration figure of 1 abort every 75 hours during limited testing. Initial Operational Test & Evaluation is scheduled for fall 2013, and the radars will need a big jump to hit required reliability levels of 1 abort every 257 hours.

A Limited User Test (LUT) took place in the fall of 2012, but that’s in FY 2013, and so it isn’t covered in the 2012 annual report.

Oct 17/12: Add other functions? The US Army announces that it has begun fielding the AN/TPQ-53, and the Humvee-mounted AN/TPQ-50 Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar, to protect forward-deployed forces. They also discuss a number of the AN/TPQ-53 system’s features, and reveal that the Army is considering software upgrades that would add general air surveillance radar capabilities against helicopters, UAVs, cruise missiles, and aircraft. Note that the radar’s antenna is heavily derived from the 2002 MMR ATO radar project, which already contemplated air volume search as a mission.

One indication that the Army is serious is that they’re moving the program from PEO IEWS Product Manager Radars, to PEO Missiles and Space. That will organize air defense radars under the same organizational umbrella as the counter-fire radars. US Army.

April 20/12: +21. Lockheed Martin issues a release citing $391 million in US Army contracts for 33 TPQ-53 systems.

Asked for clarification, the firm explains that the US Army has exercised its 2nd option under the contract since the March 13/12 announcement, adding another $225 million for another 21 systems (W15P7T-12-C-C015).

April 2/12: Lockheed Martin MS2 Radar Systems in Liverpool, NY receives a $23.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, for services “in support of the EQ-36 radar” through April 30/13.

Work will be performed in Liverpool, NY. The original bid was solicited through the Internet, with 3 bids received by U.S. Army Contracting Command in Fort Monmouth, NJ (W15P7T-06-C-T004).

March 13/12: Multi-year contract. Lockheed Martin Mission System and Sensors in Liverpool, NY receives a $166 million firm-fixed-price contract for 12 “enhanced AN/TPQ-36” (now called AN/TPQ-53) radar systems, including spares, testing, and training materials.

This means that Lockheed Martin will be the producer for the EQ-36 program of record, which could rise to 136 systems. It’s also the 1st installment of a larger $881 million contract, which could end up buying up to 51 low-rate production systems, plus Limited User Test (LUT) and Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) services.

Work will be performed in Liverpool, NY, with an estimated completion date of Feb 28/17. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 1 bid received. The US Army Contracting Command at Fort Monmouth, NJ manages the contract (W15P7T-12-C-C015). See also US Army PEO IEW&S, Aug 15/11 entry | Lockheed Martin.

Multi-year contract

February 2012: Despite the issues noted in the DOT&E report, the TPQ-53 radar receives Milestone C clearance, allowing it to go ahead to Low-Rate Initial Production. Source.

Milestone C

Jan 17/12: Test reports. The Pentagon releases the FY 2011 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The “Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 (EQ-36) Radar System” is included. The Army conducted 3 Live Ammunition System Demonstration (LASD) radar test events at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, in October 2010, January 2011, and June 2011. Unfortunately, the DOT&E office reports that the systems had problems with reliability and accuracy:

“Based on radar testing at Yuma Proving Ground and Army reporting from theater to date, radar reliability remains poor and is well below system requirements… one system abort every 30 hours [instead of 1 per] 185 hours… provided accurate locations of most rocket, artillery, and mortars systems… [but] has difficulty detecting certain types of rockets and artillery rounds. Using updated software, the QRC AN/TPQ-53 radar demonstrated improvements in reducing the rate of misclassifying aircraft as threat projectiles in the 90-degree and 360-degree modes… June 2011 testing, the QRC AN/TPQ-53 radar decreased the rate of [false positives, but]… misclassifying and false location reporting rates remain below the Program of Record requirement of one false report in 12 hours.”

FY 2008 – 2011

1st delivery. New name. TPQ-53 on truck
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September 2011: TPQ-53. The EQ-36 gets a formal designation change, to the less-confusing QRC(Quick Reaction Capability) AN/TPQ-53. The Army will select the Program of Record EQ-36 radar contractor some time in FY 2012, to produce up to 136 systems. Source: 2011 DOT&E report.

Designation change

Aug 15/11: Army Contracting Command (ACC) APG-C4ISR, in Aberdeen, MD announces that it intends to buy more EQ-36 radar systems, to begin Program of Record purchases instead of the Quick Reaction Capability buys to date.

The solicitation for Full Rate Production (FRP) was first posted on Feb 16/11 at an estimated value of $940 million. The response date has been postponed by 30 days to Sept 14/11, under “Best Value” consideration and Firm Fixed Price (FFP) pricing. A June 30/11 revision addressed inconsistencies on desired quantities that had built up since the presolicitation. The planned production schedule for this 5-year contract is currently set to 12 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) units in FY 2013, 23 LRIP units in FY 2015, and 32 Full-Rate Production (FRP) units in FY 2016, for a total of 67 systems (W15P7T-11-R-T201). FBO.gov, ASFI.

Aug 15/11: +3. A $91.5 million firm-fixed-price cost-plus-fixed-fee award modifies Lockheed Martin’s April 14/10 contract, raising it to 20 EQ-36 systems: 4 EQ-36 radar systems with armored Sustained Operation Group (SOG) and Mission Essential Group (MEG) equipment, and 16 EQ-36 systems with standard SOG and MEGs.

Work will be performed in Liverpool, NY, with an estimated completion date of July 30/12 (W15P7T-06-C-T004). By our records, this appears to raise the order total to 54 systems, though DOT&E figures place QRC buys at just 38 systems.

3 more systems

Oct 26/10: Deployment. Lockheed Martin announces that the U.S. Army has deployed the first AN/TPQ-36 (EQ-36) radars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Deployment

June 21/10: Sub-contractors. Donaldson Company announces that the EQ-36 will use its patented StrataTube filtration technology to air-cool its electronics, without introducing dust and other contaminants. Current schedules have the final units for that initial 17-system June 2007 contract delivered by fall 2010.

Donaldson StrataTubes use inertial force to spin dust and other contaminants out of the air stream, but have no moving parts to wear out or break, and are maintenance-free. Custom designed EQ-36 Strata panels are included in the radar’s antenna and pedestal systems, and it joins other StrataTube using military devices like the M1 Abrams tank and H-60 family of helicopters.

April 14/10: +17. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Syracuse, NY receives a sole-source $108.5 million firm-fixed-price contract for 17 enhanced AN/TPQ-36 (EQ-36) radar systems, plus associated sustained operational group and mission essential group (MEG) non-recurring engineering and MEG installation. Work is to be performed in Syracuse, NY, with an estimated completion date of Oct 8/10. The US CECOM Acquisition Center in Fort Monmouth, NJ manages the contract (W15P7T-06-C-T004).

This award is made under an unfinalized contract, and commits 49% of the estimated final value. Lockheed Martin has confirmed to DID that this is a new radar order, which would make 34 radars ordered so far.

17 more Radars

July 2/09: 1st delivery. Lockheed Martin delivers the first EQ-36 Radar System to the U.S. Army on time, following successful live-fire performance testing against indirect fire from mortars, artillery and rockets this spring at the Army’s Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona. The effort also included engineering, contractor and government acceptance testing.

To accelerate the fielding of the EQ-36 radar, the U.S. Army in June 2008 exercised contract options with Lockheed Martin for 12 additional systems, which will include enhanced performance capabilities. With production for both orders now running in parallel, and the 12-radar order accelerated, all 17 of the EQ-36 systems are expected to be delivered by fall 2010. Lockheed Martin.

1st delivery

April 29/09: Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Liverpool, NY receives a $20.7 million firm-fixed-price contract that buys spares for the 12 initial production Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Radar Systems.

Work is to be performed in Liverpool, NY, with an estimated completion date of Aug 31/10. One sole source was bid solicited from the radar’s manufacturer and one bid was received by the CECOM Acquisition Center in Fort Monmouth, NJ (W15P7T-06-C-T004).

FY 2006 – 2008

SDD; CDR. EQ-36 at Yuma
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July 29/08: +12. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Support in Syracuse, NY receives an $84.3 million firm-fixed-price contract to accelerate the production and delivery of the 12 Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder Initial Production Radar Systems (EQ-36), which were listed as options within the initial development contract. Those options were reportedly exercised in June 2008.

Work will be performed in Syracuse, NY, and is expected to be complete by Oct 25/10. There was one bid solicited on March 23/08, and 1 bid was received by the CECOM Acquisition Center in Fort Monmouth, NJ activity (W15-P7T-06-C-T004)

March 2008: EQ-36 program successfully completes its Critical Design Review. Source.

CDR

Nov-Dec 2007: Testing. A prototype EQ-36 radar built by industry partner SRC is tested against mortars and rockets at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ. During the tests, the EQ-36 prototype successfully located the firing positions of both rocket and mortar launchers. Lockheed Martin says that live fire testing was conducted over a 7 day period without a single false alarm.

October 2007: EQ-36 program successfully completes its Preliminary Design Review. Lockheed Martin.

Oct 9/07: Lockheed Martin unveils an EQ-36 prototype.

Rollout & PDR

Sept 27/06: Development + 5. Lockheed Martin’s contract win of up to $120 million, issued by the Army’s Program Executive Officer-Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors (PEO-IEW and S).

The original release says that the company is directed to provide the Army with 5 Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 radars, within 36 months (W15P7T-06-C-T004). Subsequent conversations with Lockheed Martin reveal that this stage included just 4. The firm uses key technology from the MMR ATO program, especially the antenna/ emitter. Lockheed Martin release.

SDD

2002: MMR ATO. Contract to Syracuse Research Corp. (SRC) for a “Multi-Mission Radar, Advanced Technology Objective”. The radar is designed to perform C-RAM/ Firefinder, Air volume search, Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD), and Air Traffic Control functions.

For this demonstration project, Lockheed Martin is a sub-contractor. The radar turns out to be a TPQ-53 precursor. Later, the roles flip to make SRC a Lockheed sub-contractor, with responsibility for the radar’s core Digital Signal Processor.

Additional Readings

• Lockheed Martin – TPQ-53 Radar System. Formerly called the EQ-36, or Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counterfire Target Acquisition Radar. Still referred to that way in some contracts.

Competitors and predecessors include…

• Raytheon – AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder Weapon Locating System. See also ThalesRaytheon page.

• Global Security – AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder Radar

• Raytheon – AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Weapon Locating System. See also ThalesRaytheon pages for the TPQ-37.

• Global Security – AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Artillery Locating Radar

• DID – US Marines to Get G/ATOR AESA Ground Radars. G/ATOR’s scope matches MMRATO’s, but its evolution is a reverse image of the TPQ-53’s. It begins with air defense, and will add counterfire in Increment II. By Increment IV, it will have all of MMRATO’s envisioned capabilities, including Air Traffic Control.

• DoD Inspector General, via WayBack (Oct. 2001) – Firefinder audit report [PDF]. Older Firefinder radars were known as AN/TPQ-36, AN/TPQ-37 and AN/TPQ-47.r Artillery Locating Radar

• DID – US Marines to Get G/ATOR AESA Ground Radars. G/ATOR’s scope matches MMRATO’s, but its evolution is a reverse image of the TPQ-53’s. It begins with air defense, and will add counterfire in Increment II. By Increment IV, it will have all of MMRATO’s envisioned capabilities, including Air Traffic Control.

• DoD Inspector General, via WayBack (Oct. 2001) – Firefinder audit report [PDF]. Older Firefinder radars were known as AN/TPQ-36, AN/TPQ-37 and AN/TPQ-47.

Americas

• Lockheed Martin’s AN/TPQ-53 counter-battery radar has proven that it can be used to detect unmanned aerial vehicles alongside its usual task of detecting incoming artillery and rocket fire. The company announced the success following testing carried out by the US Army as part of its Maneuver and Fires Integration Experiment (MFIX) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Conducted annually, the MFIX exercise brings together military, industry and academia to assess solutions to future warfighting needs in a live environment.

• The USAF has released an infographic revealing that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter scored an 8:0 kill ratio against the F-15E during mock air combat. Using combat-coded F-35As from Hill Air Force Base, the simulations were part of the evaluation process needed in order to declare the jet to be initially operationally capable. The seven fighters used also demonstrated their ability to carry out basic close air support and limited SEAD/DEAD missions with crews attaining a 100% sortie generation rate with 88 of 88 planned sorties and a 94% hit rate with 15 of 16 GBU-12 bombs on target.

• Sikorsky has achieved a key USMC requirement with the CH-53K King Stallion by successfully flying 100ft above the ground with a 12,250kg (27,000lb) payload. Due to replace the CH-53E Super Stallion, the new helicopter promises better range and triple the E model’s payload in hot weather conditions, as well as flight-by-wire flight controls designed to reduce pilot workload in degraded visual environments. While successful testing has the CH-53K currently on track, it hasn’t always been plain sailing with gearbox trouble delaying its first flight for a year.

Middle East North Africa

• Monday’s rapprochement deal between Turkey and Israel is unlikely to trigger near-term resumption of defense trade or bilateral military cooperation. The agreement shows a normalization of relations after the 2010 Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla which left eight Turks and an American citizen of Turkish origin dead. However, a return to major defense cooperation between the two which saw a peak between 1998-2005 is unlikely amid Turkey’s rising Islamist policies and ongoing tension with Egypt, Jordan and many Arabian Gulf states.

• Belgium has sent six F-16s to Jordan to aid in operations against Islamic State targets. This will be Belgium’s second rotation of F-16s to Jordan, the first lasting from October 2014 to June 2015. While the last time saw the jets target militants in Iraq, the second deployment will see operations expanded to targets in Syria. This is the first military action the country has taken since IS carried out terrorist attacks against Brussels’ airport and metro system.

Europe

• Development of Russia’s S-350 air-defense system prototype is almost complete and is already undergoing trials, according to senior military commander Sergey Babakov. The system will replace the older S-300PS as the Armed Force’s middle-range air-defense capability. Capable of being activated in five minutes, Russia aims to have 30 in operation by 2020.

Asia Pacific

• Testing of a Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system operated by Taiwan is to be carried out at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico next month. This marks the first time Taiwan has fired the new system and reasoning behind having it in the US is to avoid China collecting information about it and due to airspace restrictions in Taiwan. Scheduled for early July, the tests will see two missiles being fired to intercept a target simulating a ballistic missile.

• Japan has issued a Request For Information (RFI) for three alternatives to replace the F-2: a new fighter type, modifying an existing one, or importing. However, concepts devised by the Defense Ministry suggest Tokyo is leaning towards a new fighter as it wanted a large, twin-engine jet with long endurance, and internal carriage of six big air-to-air missiles. Unfortunately, no current fighter in service or development in the West satisfies those demands, leaving China’s Chengdu J-20 the closest to what Japan wants.

Today’s Video

• First flight test of the BrahMos missile on an Indian Su-30MKI: