Defence`s Feeds

Afghans make up more than a quarter of the inmates ever held at Guantánamo Bay, the largest national grouping among United States ‘war on terror’ detainees taken to Cuba. Most were picked up in the early years of the US-led military intervention when US forces carried out mass, arbitrary detentions of Afghans. In a major new report, AAN’s Kate Clark looks at the Afghan experience in Guantánamo, honing in on the cases of eight of the longest-serving Afghan detainees. Five are still in Cuba, while three were transferred to the United Arab Emirates in August where they are believed still to be in some form of detention. She finds the Afghans’ documents to contain outlandish errors of fact, bad translations, testimony obtained under torture, fantastical allegations and cases based on hearsay and unverified intelligence reports.

Reading through the files of the eight Afghans still in Cuba at the start of 2016 is to enter a Kafkaesque world. None of the eight were detained on the battlefield – six were handed over by Pakistan or Afghan forces and two were detained after tip-offs from unknown sources. Instead, intelligence forms the basis for all the detentions and that intelligence is threadbare.

The US military gets dates wrong, provinces wrong, mixes up non-belligerent groups and jihadists and reaches back to make ahistorical allegations – assuming bin Laden had set up al Qaeda a decade before he did, or deciding association with Hezb-e Islami in the 1980s (when it was part of the mujahidin fighting the Soviet occupation and, incidentally, America’s favourite faction) is proof of malign intent in the 2000s. Three of the detainees had associations with the mass, quietest, missionary organisation Tablighi Jamaat; the US holds that as proof of terrorist intent, even though the organisation is anti-jihadist, believing that now is not the time for fighting (jihad), but for preaching (dawa) and persuading Muslims to live better lives.

Thousands of Afghans (the exact figure is unknown) were detained in the early years of the US-led intervention. The 220 Afghans taken to Guantánamo (the total population of all nationalities was 781) included some Taleban, but the vast majority were non-combatants. They included men who had opposed the Taleban or were part of the new post-2001 establishment, old men with dementia or physical ailments and minors, including two boys who had suffered gang rape by a commander. There was also at least one Shia Muslim.

To determine why a particular Afghan was arrested, when looking at the case files, it often makes more sense to look at his personal circumstances than try to work out what links he might have had to the Taleban or al Qaeda: what factional or tribal conflicts was he involved in, did he have enemies who were allies of US forces or the CIA, was there an opportunity for an informer to make money?

In five of the cases, money or personal enmity appear to have been behind their detentions. This was a common feature in the early years of the US-led military intervention as the US military and the CIA sought to hunt down ‘remnants of the Taleban’ when remnants, in terms of forces offering resistance, did not exist (it would be some years before an insurgency took off in Afghanistan).

Haji Wali Mohammed, for example, a money changer in the central money market in Kabul, was captured by the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, in January 2002 and handed over to the US. He believes the ISI turned him over to the US because a tribal jirga had earlier ruled that he was owed money by an Afghan ISI informer. The US has accused Wali Mohammed of being a financier of both the Taleban and al Qaeda, although his files contain no evidence of him having any role beyond that of a publically-known money changer at a time when the Taleban were in power. Another man detained at Guantánamo, Kamin, an imam from Khost, looks to have been captured and handed over to US forces by the 25th corps of the Afghan army, a Khalqi communist militia originating from his home district. (The militia later escaped demobilisation under the DDR programme because of its close links to US forces. It subsequently became the Khost Protection Force, a CIA-allied militia which still operates and stands accused of abuses, including of detainees).

Many of the allegations against the eight Afghans featuring in the report are strange. Hamidullah, for example, who comes from a prominent Hezb-e Islami family in Kabul, was handed over by the NDS in what looks to have been a case of factional enmity; the Afghan intelligence agency was then controlled by Hezb-e Islami’s historical enemies, Jamiat-e Islami. The US military accused Hamidullah of working to bring former king Zaher Shah back to power in 2002 and of plotting with the “extremists” of Mahaz-e Milli (the National Front led by Pir Gailani, now head of the High Peace Council) against the Karzai government. Mahaz was always known as the most moderate of the mujahedin factions, monarchists who were dismissed by hardliners as ‘Gucci guerrillas.’ It has not fought since 1992. The US also alleged Hamidullah had plotted with Hezb-e Islami, the Taleban, various figures in the (pro-intervention) Jamiat-e Islami establishment, like MPs Mullah Ezat and Haji Almas, and the Iranians.

These sort of ‘alphabet soup’ accusations are common in the files. These were the allegations made against Kamin, the imam picked up in Khost city in 2003, for example:

It is assessed detainee is a key member of the Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) and/or the Al-Qaida Network. Detainee has participated in weapons trafficking, explosives training, operational planning, and attacks against US and Coalition forces in support of the Al-Qaida network. Detainee is affiliated with Al-Qaida, the North African Extremist Network (NAEN), Taliban, and Jayshe-Mohammed (JEM) terrorist Organizations and leaders; further more detainee has admitted ties to the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM). 

Neither ACM or NAEN, despite their appearance, are actual organisations or exist anywhere outside US intelligence reporting. Nowhere is it explained why or how one man could be affiliated with so many groups. From intelligence and legal perspectives, such allegations of multiple, overlapping memberships of disparate (Afghan, Arab and Pakistani) organisations make no sense. Usually, chains of command form the basis for trying to understand an enemy like al Qaeda or the Taleban, and for making a case as to whether war crimes have been committed. Moreover, in Afghanistan where membership of an armed group is usually based on a solidarity grouping (clan, ethnic group or former comradeship), such lists are nonsensical. All the eight Afghans are accused of having been members of at least two groups.

The gap between allegations and evidence

Getting information on the detainees in Guantánamo has been a long, hard struggle given the Bush administration’s desire for secrecy. Transcripts of military review boards were finally published in 2006, after a two-year battle by the Associated Press using Freedom of Information Act requests and litigation. In 2011, WikiLeaks also published secret assessments of the detainees, revealing much of the sourcing on which US allegations had been based. Many assertions, it turned out, were based on weak, or indeed non-existent evidence. There was a heavy use of hearsay and double hearsay (X said Y said Z was a terrorist) and testimony from those who had been tortured. Six of the eight Afghans under study have said they were tortured in ways which match the methods the US military and CIA are known to have used. There is corroborating evidence (from the Senate report on torture or in testimony presented in court) for the use of torture in two of these cases. Accusations by fellow detainees, including those made under torture, are also accepted as evidence.

Unverified and unprocessed Intelligence Information reports (IIRs) are cited both in the military reviews and in court. One former intelligence officer described IIRs as a “generalized reporting vehicle that collects unprocessed and unverified summaries of claims made to U.S. intelligence agencies, usually by foreign sources.” The FBI has described them as raw intelligence reports which usually bear cautions such as: “WARNING: THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED.” The US military also uses summaries, rather than the actual transcripts of interrogations – which may have been lost or never made. It is easy to see how mistranslations, misunderstandings and incorrect inferences could creep in, given that these are summaries, not verbatim transcripts.

The US military also uses also strange, associational notions of suspicion. Bostan Karim, a seller of plastic flowers from Khost, is said to have “admitted” to meeting Jalaluddin Haqqani, of the ‘Haqqani network’. The encounter turned out to have been a, presumably obligatory, meeting of all the shopkeepers in Khost at a time when Haqqani was the pre-eminent commander in Khost: all the shops in the bazaar were closed for the event. At one of Karim’s review boards in Guantánamo, the military goes on to say that Haqqani had formed an alliance with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar which was being supported, guided and funded by al Qaida and the Jamat Ulma Islami [sic] which the US refers to as “Pakhtoon tribe” (it is a Pakistani political party) which “regularly recruited from a mosque in Abdabot [sic], Pakistan,” and “[a]fter Friday prayers, members of the organization solicited for volunteers to fight in the jihad.” It does not say which jihad they were recruiting for or what any of this had to do with Bostan Karim.

No way to plead one’s innocence

Once sent to Cuba, detainees found there was no way to persuade anyone that they were not combatants. In 2001, the Bush administration had believed America was facing a uniquely dangerous enemy and the old rules could not apply. It took unprecedented and unusual measures – keeping all details of the detentions secret, not applying the Geneva Conventions (including the minimum protection given by common article 3), withholding protections given to those suspected of crimes, and using torture in interrogations. This meant those arriving in Cuba were left unprotected by any of the usual measures (whether criminal or military) which aim to safeguard individuals from arbitrary detention by the state.

The administration eventually set up military review boards to try to prevent detainees seeking redress through the federal courts. These review boards never managed even to clean out the obvious factual mistakes in the files, let alone question substantive accusations. There was a presumption that detainees were guilty unless they could prove themselves innocent, but they were not told the specifics of the allegations against them and nor were they allowed to call witnesses or have lawyers.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of AAN’s study is that the civilian courts in the US completely failed to hold the executive to account. Supreme Court decisions in 2004 and 2008 ruled that detainees could seek redress through habeas corpus petitions made in the federal courts. One of the oldest human rights, a habeas petition forces the state to come to court to justify its detention of an individual. However, in the cases of the three Afghans under study who have made habeas petitions, the courts accepted evidence that would have been unacceptable in criminal trials (this was usually admitted on grounds of ‘national security’). Judges have accepted hearsay and evidence kept secret from the petitioners and their lawyers and allowed the government to repeatedly delay proceedings in ways which lawyers told AAN off the record they thought were deliberate.

Money changer Wali Mohammed, for example, had to wait for three years for a judge to rule on his case, as the government sought to re-open the record and present more evidence (some of it secret). In other cases, judges have accepted the testimony of those who have been tortured; they have weighed up whether testimony could be classed as voluntarily given if was made to a different US agency from the one which carried out the torture, or after a period of time had lapsed between torture and confession.

Federal courts have thus generally accepted the state’s evidence and its interpretation of evidence, without much question. Bostan Karim, the plastic flower seller from Khost, for instance, was turned over to the US by the ISI in 2003. The ISI claimed he matched the description of an al Qaeda terrorist and had a broken satellite phone in his possession while passing the border, which they claimed was used as a detonator for IEDs. Karim’s judge took this allegation at face value – as the US military had done before him – even though at the time, before a mobile phone network was established in Khost, satellite phones were in common use by those who could afford them. The judge accepted Karim’s possession of the phone as proof of terrorist intent.

Some end, for some, in sight

It seems likely that now, after between nine and fourteen years in detention, most of the remaining Afghans in Guantánamo will finally be released. A newish body, the Periodic Review Board, which has a mix of military and civilian officials, has been reviewing the case files of all the detainees still incarcerated. In the last year, all eight of the remaining Afghans have had their cases re-assessed. Six of them have been deemed safe for transfer (ie sent from Guantánamo to another country with security guarantees; this is not yet freedom). One was told his role with the Taleban had been “limited” and that he had been “misidentified as the individual who had ties to al-Qaeda weapons facilitation” – as he had contended all along. Another was told there was a “lack of clear information regarding his involvement with al-Qa’ida or the Taliban.” The other four were judged to pose no risk to the US, or a risk that could be mitigated. In August 2016, three of the men were transferred to the United Arab Emirates, where they were put into a ‘de-radicalisation’ programme. Afghan and US officials told AAN it is not clear how long they will have to stay there and whether they will be allowed, eventually, to return to Afghanistan.

One of the Afghans looks likely to remain in indefinite detention, however. In September 2016 the Periodic Review Board decided to keep Muhammad Rahim in detention. The ISI had captured him in 2007 and handed him over to the CIA, saying he was a close associate of Osama bin Laden. The CIA then ‘rendered’ him to Afghanistan where he was tortured, the last ‘participant’ in the CIA’s global rendition programme. Rahim was subject to eight sessions of sleep deprivation including three which lasted for more than four days and one for almost six (138.5 hours). The interrogation resulted in no useful intelligence. Still, Rahim was transferred to Guantánamo and the CIA told the world they had captured bin Laden’s translator.

The US has classed Rahim as a ‘high value’ detainee, which means much of the substance of the allegations against him is classified, even from Rahim himself. He has had no opportunity, even in the limited ways open to other detainees, to defend himself. His lawyer, Carlos Warner, has complained that, while the state can say what they like about his client, he cannot even say why he thinks he is innocent, because to do so would be to reveal classified information. Warner has written extensively about what he calls the unconstitutional abyss that lawyers find themselves in, when trying to represent detainees in Guantánamo.

… this is a system where as counsel I usually cannot share the Government’s allegations with my own client. I cannot investigate the charge because I cannot share the allegations with the subject of the investigation. Imagine trying to get to the bottom of a bar fight that resulted in a death. I can’t tell my client who was killed or why the Government says he’s involved. I can’t even tell him when the assault occurred or in what bar the assault took place. I certainly cannot interview or cross-examine his accusers. Moreover, I can’t visit the bar or talk to any other witness to the fight. I am also prohibited from speaking with the coroner or any of the investigating officers. Sometimes, the Government will say “we have important evidence about your client regarding our allegation, but we can’t tell you what that evidence is.” Sometimes, the Government just tells the judge without telling or notifying me at all. All of my communications with my client are observed and recorded. All of my legal correspondence is read and inspected by the Government. Guantanamo has been referred to as “Kafka-esque,” and that reference is right. “Catch-22” also aptly describes the legal malaise that is currently called Guantanamo habeas corpus. Nothing in my legal training prepared me for this endeavor.

Rahim’s is the only one of the eight cases where the US accusations somewhat coherently point to an Afghan working with the al Qaeda leadership before the fall of the Taleban. Proof that he played a role after the collapse of the Taleban regime, however, is far less evident. We cannot see the evidence against him, but scrutiny of court documents shows the nature of the evidence against him. It is similar to the other cases: Rahim’s own testimony and that of two other detainees (one of whom has also said he was tortured) and unprocessed and unverified intelligence reports. Given what we know about the evidence used against the other detainees, it cannot be assumed that the secret evidence against Rahim is either accurate or true.

Most of the last Afghans in Guantánamo may soon be out, although not yet back and living freely in Afghanistan. Yet there has been a huge cost in lives wrecked. Hamidullah, the ‘Mahaz-e Milli extremist’ has requested not to be returned to Afghanistan or Pakistan. Those who told US forces he was a terrorist are still in power and he fears for his safety if he goes home; he asked the Periodic Review Board to send him to any other Muslim country. Other detainees have suffered depression or other mental health problems. “Prison usually damages people,” said Shayana Kadial, the lawyer for Kamin. “[M]ost of our clients leave not angry but rather broken and depressed.”

The Afghan experience in Guantánamo shows the perils of arbitrary detention. The miscarriages of justice are clear, but the consequences go beyond the harm done to individuals and their families. The early mass arrests – often accompanied by torture by US forces and Afghan allies of US forces, as well as looting and extortion – was one of the main reasons driving some Afghans to become insurgents. Arbitrary detentions, therefore, helped re-kindle a war which Afghans thought was finally over and one which they, and the US, are still now embroiled in. For the US, the costs have been high too; eight years after promising to shut Guantánamo down, President Obama is still struggling with what to do with America’s ‘war on terror’ legacy.

 

Download Executive Summary here.

Read the full report here.

 

 

 

Keeping secrets has never been easy, but in today’s infinitely connected, network-enabled world, it has become a great deal more difficult, especially when the tools necessary to steal sensitive information are readily available and sitting in almost…

Cobham has been contracted by Lockheed Martin to support production of its AN/SPY-1D three-dimensional fixed-phased array radar, which serves as the primary air sensor for the Aegis combat system.

The US Navy has commissioned its auxiliary general purpose oceanographic research vessel, R/V Sally Ride (AGOR 28) at the Broadway Pier Port Pavilion in San Diego, US.

Americas

• A number of F-35Bs will conduct developmental and operational testing aboard the USS America amphibious assault ship. Two of the Short Takeoff & Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant will be used in third phase development testing, evaluating the jet’s short take-off vertical landing operations in a high-sea state, shipboard landings, and night operations. Another five will undergo operational testing which involves the simulation of extensive maintenance on a ship. The USS America is the first ship of its class that incorporates design elements specifically to accommodate the new Joint Strike Fighter.

• Lockheed Martin has won a number of US Navy & USAF contracts for work on the Aegis Weapon System and F-22 Raptor aircraft. A $536 million deal will see Lockheed conduct sustainment services for the F-22 through to December 2017 while a $60 million award covers Aegis ship integration and test efforts for five new Arleigh Burke-class ships, as well as the modernization of five existing ships of that class. Completion of the Aegis contract is expected for November 2017.

• CACI International has landed a massive deal to support the US Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO). Valued at $1.7 billion, CACI will provide JIDO with deployable analytical operations, intelligence and training services to support the organization’s Focused Support/Decisive Effort mission worldwide. The deal will seek to enhance the ability of deploying joint forces to integrate capabilities, technologies and lessons learned against improvised-threat weapons, including improvised explosive devices, or IEDs.

Middle East & North Africa

• Israeli Air Force officials plan to have its fleet of F-35I “Adir” fighters operational as soon as possible, with service technicians due to visit the US in order to participate in a series of test flights manufacturer Lockheed Martin plans to perform at its Fort Worth, Texas facilities. The test flights aim to familiarise the crew with maintaining the fighter and preparing it for a combat mission and also includes a visit to the USAF’s base in Utah to observer operational procedures for the F-35. With the first two Israeli F-35s slated to arrive next month, immediate work is expected to begin on installing Israeli-developed systems.

Europe

• Swiss firm Pilatus is confident that a contract with the French government to sell Paris PC-21 trainers is very close. It’s expected that between 20-25 of the turboprop aircraft will be sold in a procurement deal designed to replace the French Air Force’s aged fleet of Dassault Alpha Jet trainers. A decision on the competition is expected in 2017 with the PC-21 the only trainer being offered by the two shortlisted consortia, respectively led by Airbus Defence & Space and Babcock. Leonardo’s Aermacchi M-345 had also been in the mix but did not make it to the competition’s latter stages.

• The UK’s finance minister has announced funding worth $2.3 billion in order to counter cyberattacks. Speaking at a technology conference in London on Tuesday, Chancellor of the Exchequer Phillip Hammond added that “we will not only defend ourselves in cyberspace, we will strike back in kind when we are attacked.” The spending over the next five years represents a doubling of funding on cyberdefense in the 2011 to 2016 period.

• Planning to visit Crimea? Well, some of the Soviet-era tourist attractions once available may have been commandeered for Russian defense in the region. Previously abandoned Soviet missile bunkers, once open to the public (for a $50 fee), are now off limits as Moscow has blocked roads to the area which locals now believe “is a functioning military base with an anti-ship missile system.” The bunkers are just one of several previously abandoned military installations being used as the militarization of the Crimean peninsula continues, as reciprocal NATO buildups occur within Russia’s east European neighbors.

Asia Pacific

• AAI Corp has won a $206 million US Army contract to carry out work as part of Australia’s RQ-7B Shadow drone program. The foreign military sale includes contractor logistics sustainment services for Shadow, and is expected to be completed by October 2017. Australia’s first Shadow drones have been in operation since 2011 and provides reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition and force protection for brigades in all weather and at all hours.

Today’s Video

Higher quality look at Chinese J-20s:

(click to view full)

In an exclusive June 2006 interview, Israeli Air Force (IAF) chief procurement officer Brigadier-General Ze’ev Snir told Israeli media that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was a key part of their IAF recapitalization plans, and that Israel intended to buy over 100 of the fighters to replace their fleet of over 300 F-16s.

Since then, however, the expected cost of that purchase has more than doubled. Israel’s F-35 contract had to deal with that sticker shock, with issues like the incorporation of Israeli technologies and industrial work, and with major schedule slips in the core F-35 program. Israel was even contemplating delaying its purchase, which would have removed an important early adopter for the Lightning II. In the end, however, Israel decided to forego other fighter options, and became the first foreign buyer of operational F-35s. So, how is the “F-35i Adir” shaping up?

F-35 for Israel: Key Issues F-16B & X-35
(click to view full)

The IAF currently flies 27 F-15I “Raam” Strike Eagles and 102 F-16I “Soufa” fighters as its high-end strike force. Another 72 F-15 A-D Eagle and 224 F-16 A-D Falcon models form the backbone of its force, making Israel the world’s 2nd largest F-16 operator behind the United States.

The plan was that Israel would phase out its F-16A “Netz” models in particular. A smaller number of new F-35s would first replace the Netz fighters, and then replace more advanced F-16 A-D models. That plan is underway, but it has run into turbulence at every step. The F-35i “Adir” will need to address those issues as it competes with other options for future IAF dollars.

Cost

Israel’s original estimates made their F-16 replacement plan seem feasible. They pegged a 100-plane F-35A deal at around $5 billion, and Gen. Snir added that:

“The IAF would be happy to equip itself with 24 F-22s but the problem at this time is the US refusal to sell the plane, and its $200 million price tag.”

Unfortunately, Israel’s September 2008 request for its first 75 F-35s revealed an estimated $15 billion price tag – or about $200 million per plane. All in return for a fighter with poorer air-to-air performance than the F-22, and less stealth. Defense News quoted an official in the IDF General Staff as saying that:

“It’s unbelievable, first it was $40 million to $50 million, and then they [the IAF] told us $70 million to $80 million. Now, we’re looking at nearly three times that amount, and who’s to say it won’t continue to climb?”

Unless its price drops sharply, the F-35 can expect to experience continued competing against other options for each successive IAF offer. A pending gusher of oil and gas revenues from offshore fields may make the Israelis less price sensitive, but Israel’s jets aren’t just for show. If the F-35s are seen as too expensive to support the fleet size Israel needs, the IAF will look at more affordable options to supplement their F-35is.

Capability F-22A Raptor
(click to view full)

Israel originally wanted a different fighter, and pressed the USA for F-22EX aircraft, in order to maintain the IAF’s traditional requirement of regional air superiority. The F-33 offers far fewer weapon choices than the F-35, but it would have been available immediately, while offering better air-to-air performance and higher stealth capabilities against the most advanced air defense systems and fighter radars. Ultimately, America’s shut-down of its F-22 program removed that option.

For Israel, F-35 capability is linked to progress in its testing and integration schedule, which has slipped very badly over the last 5 years. The F-35A Block 3, which will be fielded in 2018, will arrive with a weapon set that hardly distinguishes it from an F-22, and is far inferior to the array its existing fighters already carry.

Longer term, F-35 capability is also linked to another variable: Israel’s ability to customize it, as the IAF has done to its F-15 and F-16 fleets.

Customization Spice bomb
click for video

Access to the F-35’s software source code remains a live issue for the Israelis, as it has been with the Australians [PDF], British, and others. That access is necessary when air forces want to upgrade the aircraft’s computers, and/or integrate new weapons, communications, or electronic warfare systems. Israeli planes generally undergo heavy modifications to incorporate Israeli electronics and weapons systems, and the USA has allowed the Israelis access to the F-15 and F-16’s software. Israel has since exported a number of those enhancements for F-16 and F-15 customers in Asia and Latin America.

The USA doesn’t seem willing to bend on the software code issue for anyone, and insists on routing upgrade and change requests through Lockheed Martin, with attendant costs and possible delays.

Israel has gone ahead with an initial buy anyway, while negotiating to add key items. Israeli “F-35i Adir” fighters will include compatible communications systems and datalinks, and provisions to insert some locally-built ECM and defensive electronics.

Israel will also want to broaden the plane’s weapons array to include Israeli weapons, as a subject of future agreements. Items mentioned in reports to date include Python short-range air-to-air missiles, and dual-mode guidance Spice GPS/IIR smart bombs. Those items are still being negotiated, and Israel’s top-of-the-line strike fighter will need even more weapons than these in order to be fulfill its role.

Israel’s Leverage

Israel didn’t get everything it wanted in its initial buy, and ended up paying considerably more than it had expected. On the other hand, it did get the USA to move on the subject of ECM defensive systems as of 2010, and may succeed in getting more changes made.

On the seller’s side of the table, Israel’s buy is a respected vote of confidence that the F-35 needs. Lockheed Martin is trying to ramp up orders for the F-35 quickly, even though the aircraft are now expected to remain in testing until 2018. A large order book would allow the firm to offer early buyers much lower prices for each plane, using dollar averaging over a substantial initial batch, instead of charging $130 – $170 million for early production aircraft, and $100 million or so for the same plane 3 years later.

That wide difference in purchase costs is standard for military aircraft of all types, but the F-35 is about 5-7 years late versus its ideal market window. Worse, American budgets are already slowing orders, with over 150 planned fighters removed from the latest 5-year plan. Potential customers with air fleets that are reaching their expiry dates are reluctant to pay those high early production costs. If enough of them defect, the F-35 program as a whole could find itself in trouble. By adding an Israeli endorsement, and adding orders during a critical period for the program, Israel’s 20-plane order assumes an importance out of proportion to its size.

The final leverage point for Israel is its solid commitment to its fighter force, and known need for future upgrades. Over time, 326 F-16s have to be replaced with some something, and an early order puts the F-35 in a strong competitive position for further orders. If volume purchases from other countries can help drive costs down closer to $80 million, and new approaches can beat current estimates of high F-35 operating and maintenance costs, the F-35 could become very hard to compete against.

Beyond the F-16s, The IAF’s F-15 Eagles will also require replacement in the coming years, which will be a competition all its own. If the F-35 falters, sharply closer defense relations with Italy could turn the Eurofighter into an option, and Boeing is spending private funds to develop a stealth-enhanced F-15SE “Silent Eagle.” The F-15SE would offer longer range, twin engines for reliability, a much wider set of integrated weapons, and IAF fleet commonalities, in exchange for less stealth than the F-35. If costs are even close to equivalent, the F-35 will have a serious competitor.

Contracts and Key Events 2016

November 3/16: Israeli Air Force officials plan to have its fleet of F-35I “Adir” fighters operational as soon as possible, with service technicians due to visit the US in order to participate in a series of test flights manufacturer Lockheed Martin plans to perform at its Fort Worth, Texas facilities. The test flights aim to familiarise the crew with maintaining the fighter and preparing it for a combat mission and also includes a visit to the USAF’s base in Utah to observer operational procedures for the F-35. With the first two Israeli F-35s slated to arrive next month, immediate work is expected to begin on installing Israeli-developed systems.

July 29/16: The Israeli Air Force has announced that its first F-35I “Adir” fighter has flown in the USA and the flight of a second jet is expected shortly. A pilot from lead manufacturer Lockheed Martin will conduct a number of further tests prior to the fighters’ delivery to Israel on December 12. As with its existing fleets of F-15 and F-16s, Israeli F-35As will be heavily customized to suit the IAF’s needs.

May 5/16: Testing of newer versions of Israeli-made weapons systems is currently underway, and will be eventually installed on Israel’s coming F-35I Adir fleets. While specifics regarding the systems being tested have not been released, the list includes versions of Rafael’s Spice precision-guided bombs and infrared- and radar-guided air-to-air missiles. Testing has been conducted using Boeing F-15s and Lockheed F-16s.

May 4/16: The first F-35I for the Israeli Air Force will be rolled out by Lockheed Martin on June 22 at the manufacturer’s Forth Worth plant. The ceremony will be met by an Israeli delegation led by Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon. Israel’s order of F-35s will then be fitted with the indigenously developed C4 software system designed to meet the Israel Defense Force’s requirement that all Israeli aircraft have unique electronic systems in order to keep a technological edge.

April 6/16: Israel is seeking to gain greater autonomy in its participation and design of its F-35I Joint Strike Fighter procurement. This will include its own command, control, communications and computing (C4) system, indigenous weaponry and the ability to perform heavy maintenance in country rather than at predetermined regional overhaul facilities. Delivery of the first F-35Is are expected to commence this December, and it is expected that Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) will begin installing a tailor-made C4 system on top of the central avionics embedded in the joint strike fighter. At present, Lockheed Martin is working with Elbit subsidary, Cyclone Ltd., for external fuel tanks to mount on the F-35A.

January 21/16: Despite their commitment to the F-35 acquisition program, Israel plans to conduct a deep upgrade of their Boeing F-15I Ra’am fleet, with plans to keep it as the backbone of their strike capabilities. The modifications, including structural changes, the addition of an active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar, updated avionics and new, unspecified weapon systems, will allow for the aircraft’s continued use as a strategic aircraft even after the F-35I comes into operation. While it’s been said that some missions will be switched over to the F-35I, the F-15 will continue to be used as the air force integrates weapons systems on the newer fighter.

2011 – 2014

F-35i development contract; Major sub-contract for F-35 wings; Nevatim will be the F-35’s base; Israel may want to buy other fighters to keep its fleet numbers up.

IAF pilot training in the USA has been pushed back steadily as the F-35 program faltered, and is now expected to start in 2016. The 1st F-35A would arrive in Israel around 2017, and modifications toward F-35i Adir standards would follow soon thereafter.

LMCO Touts the F-35
click for video

Nov 18/14: Politics.

Strategic Affairs Minister Yuval Steinitz says that the 25-31 plane deal now has majority opposition, and will probably be cut in a compromise solution. In addition:

“Steinitz declined to go into detail about the closed-door discussions, but he cited misgivings about whether the F-35’s range, payload and manoeuvrability would suit Israel’s needs.”

If true, that creates some interesting longer-term questions. Meanwhile, Reuters quote an unnamed “Israeli defence official” re: a staggered plan of 13 F-35s now, then another 18 in 2017 to make 31. Once Israel figures out an acceptable compromise, the next challenge is that terms for the Citibank loan guarantees to pay for the F-35 buy were due to expire on Nov 15/14. That could force renegotiation, if an extension hasn’t already been secured. Sources: Jewish PRess, “Will Israel Reduce F-35 Order From US?” | Reuters, “Israel may halve second order of F-35 fighters: minister”.

Nov 6/14: Industrial. IAI Lahav formally opens its production line for F-35 wings, which has been operating since September 2014. Initial deliveries under the current contract for 20 wings will begin around May 2015, with ongoing production of about 4 wings per month. A wider Memorandum of Understanding could expand IAI’s eventual production totals as high as 811 wings, worth about $2.5 billion.

“The wings will be attached to the F-35A stealth fighters, some of which will enter the service of the IAF during 2017 and be upgraded with Israeli systems to become the F-35I (“Adir” in Hebrew). Therefore, it is not unreasonable to believe that some of the wings will return to Israel.”

Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman have worked with IAI before, as a supplier of wings for F-16 fighters and T-38 super sonic lead-in fighter trainers. The firm was also a producer of its own unique fighter aircraft designs until 1987, and continues to upgrade its Kfir design to this day. Even so, F-35 wing production has required “tens of millions of dollars” in investment from IAI, given the advanced materials and extreme fit tolerances involved. Sources: Israel IAF, “F-35 Wings Production Line Inaugurated” | IAI, “IAI Began Serial Production of the F-35 Fighter Wings”.

Nov 2-5/14: Politics. Israeli defense minister Moshe Ya’alon is recommending the cancellation of several deals with the USA, including 6 MV-22 tilt-rotors, more KC-135 aerial tankers, radar-killing missiles, and radar upgrades for Israel’s F-15s – but the potential purchase of more F-35s (q.v. Oct 28/14) has survived.

After a Nov 5/14 meeting of high-level ministers, however, the $3+ billion F-35i’s prospects are in some doubt as well. Opponents reportedly include Strategic Affairs Minister Yuval Steinitz, Finance Minister Yair Lapid, retired IAF General and Agricultural Minister Yair Shamir, former defense minister Moshe Arens, and IDF ground commanders.

Recent fighting in Gaza, and developments in Lebanon and Syria, are pushing the critics to recommend buys of precision weapons, UAVs, and ground forces equipment instead. The weak protection of Israeli M113s has come in for particular criticism, and hundreds of modern armored vehicles could be bought for the same $3+ billion. Sources: Defense News, “Israeli Brass Urge MoD To Stick With V-22 Deal” | Times of Israel, “Ya’alon said to cancel aircraft purchase from US” | Times of Israel, “Ministers may look to shoot down F-35 jet deal”.

Oct 28/14: 2nd tranche? Reuters reports that Israel is looking to buy a 2nd lot of 25 more F-35s for about $3+ billion, with delivery beginning in 2019.

That timeline would force an order no later than 2017, and Israel might expand its order to 31 planes if Lockheed Martin can make good progress on promises to bring the plane’s flyaway cost down to $80 million by 2018. The approval process is still underway within the Israeli government. Sources: Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Israel to buy 25 more F-35 Lockheed stealth fighters -sources.”

Oct 28/14: F-35i. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $220.7 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification for Israel’s F-35 System Development and Demonstration Phase I Increment 2. This modification includes the development and demonstration of the hardware and software for the Israel F-35A/i. $77.8 million in FMS funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed at Fort Worth, TX, and is expected to be complete in March 2019. US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract on behalf of their Israeli client (N00019-12-C-0070).

F-35i SDD

Oct 27/14: LRIP-8. Lockheed Martin announces that they’ve reached an agreement in principle for the LRIP-8 contract for 43 F-35 Lightning II aircraft, including Israel’s first 2, with deliveries beginning in 2016. They don’t have a price tag, but it’s only an agreement in principle.

As of Oct 24/14, 115 F-35s have been delivered, including test aircraft. The key isn’t the aircraft, however, it’s the software required to make it an effective combat aircraft. They aren’t there yet; indeed, that effort is behind schedule. Sources: LMCO, “DOD and Lockheed Martin Announce Principle Agreement on Purchase of F-35s”.

Oct 20/14: F-35i/ ALIS. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $7.7 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification to provide updates for the Israeli effort to develop their F-35A/i and the Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment system, under the Foreign Military Sales program. $2.6 million is committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Orlando, FL (70%), and Fort Worth, TX (30%), and is expected to be complete in December 2017. US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract on behalf of their Israeli client (N00019-02-C-3002).

April 22/13: Industrial. Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) signs a 10-15 year contract with Lockheed Martin to produce F-35 wings, with deliveries to begin in 2015. Their production will reach beyond Israel, and the contract could be worth up to $2.5 billion over its lifetime.

IAI’s Lahav production line already produces F-16 and T-38 wings, but the F-35’s manufacturing methods and challenges are a few steps ahead. IAI is investing in the required advanced systems and technologies, and working with Lockheed martin to get the new line set up. IAI.

Major sub-contract: wings

Aug 28/12: F-35i. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Ft. Worth, TX receives a $206.8 million cost-reimbursement contract modification to pay for Phase I Increment 1, of Israel’s F-35i System Development and Demonstration. This modification includes the development of hardware and software, from the initial requirements development to the Preliminary Design Review (PDR). In addition, a hardware-only post PDR will continue through finalized requirements, layouts, and build to prints, including production planning data.

Note that Pentagon contract announcements are often for the 40-50% of the total expected costs, in order to get work underway. As such, previous figures of $450 million to add Israeli radio, datalink, and electronic warfare systems could still be true. Work will be performed at Fort Worth, TX (60%); Los Angeles, CA (20%); Nashua, NH (15%); and San Diego, CA (5%), and is expected to be complete in May 2016. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD will manage this effort, on behalf of its Israeli Foreign Military Sale client (N00019-12-C-0070).

July 26/12: F-35i ECM. Reuters reports that Lockheed Martin has changed their minds and reached a $450 million agreement to include Israeli ECM/electronic warfare systems within the F-35i. This has been a long-standing and consistent concern for Israel, who needs to adapt immediately to new threats once information is gathered.

If an agreement is signed, the Israeli F-35Is would initially be distinguished by their radio, datalink, and electronic warfare systems, which would theoretically be available to other F-35 customers as an option. “Sources familiar with the negotiations” say that the Israeli systems would be integrated beginning in 2016, and that the deal is “to be finalized in coming weeks.”

F-35i Initial SDD

F-15I, Red Flag 04
(click to view full)

Dec 26/11: Other options. The Jerusalem Post reports that Israel is looking for ways to bolster its fleet before the the F-35s arrive. Phased elections in Egypt, which are beginning to hand significant power to Taliban-style Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood, are creating a new strategic situation. Meanwhile, the possibility of slowdowns to the F-35 program or further cost increases leaves their affordability and timeliness in question.

Beyond upgrades to existing platforms, the Israelis are reportedly considering scenarios in which American budget cuts lead to retirement of serving F-15s and F-16s, and hence the availability of used planes at a bargain price.

Dec 12/11: Other options. The Jerusalem Post reports that delays to the F-35 program appear to be pushing Israel toward further F-16C/D upgrades, and may even trigger new aircraft buys if the multi-national program’s delivery dates slip beyond 2017.

Nov 22/11: Basing. The IDF has decided to base its F-35s at Nevatim AB, in the Negev, between Be’er Sheva and Arad. Arutz Sheva | Jerusalem Post.

June 30/11: F-35i. The IAF has sent 2 servicemen to the United States to serve as the lead technical team in the development of the F-35i, and integrate Israeli technology. It’s now believed that deliveries won’t begin until 2016-2017, and the IAF is reportedly looking at 2016 as the date for pilots to go through training in the USA. Jerusalem Post.

2010

Negotiations lead to Cabinet approval and a contract for 20 “F-35i” planes. F135 Engine Test
(click to view full)

Oct 14/10: Engines. To no-one’s surprise, Israel’s F-35As will fly with Pratt & Whitney engines. Israel’s early delivery schedule meant that the F135 was the only practical engine option.

There’s also a relationship angle to this buy. Unlike the USAF, Israel has remained a steadfast Pratt & Whitney (F100 engine) client for all of its F-16s, as well as its F-15 fleets. Pratt & Whitney.

Oct 7/10: Israeli Ministry of Defense Director General (Maj. Gen. Ret.) Udi Shani signs the F-35A Letter of Offer and Acceptance at a ceremony in New York, covering 20 F-35A fighters with an option for another 55. Lockheed Martin.

Sept 16-20/10: Approval. Israeli Prime Minister’s Office:

“The Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs, chaired by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, has decided to approve the deal to purchase 535 [sic, they mean F-35] stealth aircraft.”

A Sept 19/10 release adds that:

“I would like to commend the staff work that was done by the security establishment and the IDF and which led to the integration of [Israeli] systems into the plane. The plane is currently being developed and will be equipped in the coming years. This is one of our answers to the changing threats around us, to maintain our attack capabilities, along with other actions to improve both our defensive and offensive abilities in the decades to come. We will hold separate discussions on these, but I think that this step, acquiring the most advanced plane in the world, more advanced than any plane in the area, is an important and significant step for the security of Israel.”

On Sept 20/10, the Knesset (Parliamentary) Finance Committee approves the purchase of 20 F-35As plus spare parts, initial maintenance and training, and simulators, for up to $2.75 billion. That approval gives the Israeli Ministry of Defense permission to make a commitment to Lockheed Martin for the purchase of the aircraft.

20-75 F-35s

Aug 30/10: Industrial. Reuters reports that Israel’s F-35 industrial work package may well include wing assemblies, which would be done by Israel Aerospace Industries. A final deal is expected by late September 2010. Reuters adds:

“An Israeli official said reciprocal purchase deals worth $4 billion had been secured for Israeli companies for their participation in the plane’s manufacture and might be increased to $5 billion although it would be conditional on Israel exercising its option to buy the additional 55 planes.”

Aug 27/10: F-35i. Aviation Week reports that Israeli F-35s will be designated F-35i. Initial cockpit interfaces will allow installation of IAF command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C4I) systems, via a plug-and-play feature in the main computer. They will also be able to carry a 600-gallon external drop tank to boost range. The biggest weakness will be electronic warfare systems. The U.S. will not grant Israel the source code to alter threat and jamming libraries, and so Israel must rely on an arrangement by which the U.S. will “make the required software changes to meet any new threat that might emerge in the region.” If they’re willing. When they get around to it.

Other priorities whose exact future is less certain include installing Python 5 and subsequent air-air missile in the F-35’s internal bays; initial F-35As will be restricted to American AIM-9Xs externally. Israel is reportedly interested in adding a version of the Stunner radar/infrared dual-mode anti-air missile from the David’s Sling anti-missile system, and will have to make changes to Rafael’s Spice GPS/IIR guided bombs, in order to fit within the F-35’s weapon bays.

The air force reportedly plans to receive the first JSF for test flights in the U.S. in 2015, with 3 more fighters delivered by the end of the year, another 3 in 2016, and the other 13 in 2017.

Aug 24/10: The F-35A will have to make a wider case in Israel. Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz believes that a decision with such great defense and economic implications, should not be left solely to the defense minister and the Israel Defense Forces. Instead, the F-35 will be considered by a forum of senior ministers. Ha’aretz.

August 15/10: Defense Minister Ehud Barak announces formal approval for purchasing the American F-35A. Reports indicate that Israel will buy 20 jets for about $2.75 billion, and add that the deal is a “closed package” with few to no Israeli modifications. The aircraft would be delivered from 2015-2017. If Israel chooses to buy more F-35s from later production blocks, they may have more Israeli systems.

Defense Ministry Director-General Udi Shani reportedly said that one of the considerations in approving the deal was an American offer of $4 billion in industrial offset contracts to Israeli defense industries. Their exact composition will be part of negotiations and future agreements with Lockheed Martin, who already has good relations with Israeli defense firms in a number of spheres. The entire deal will be funded by American military aid dollars, and still needs the Israeli cabinet’s approval before a contract can be signed and announced. Arutz Sheva | Globes | Ha’aretz | Jerusalem Post | Ynet News || Agence France Presse | Bloomberg | Reuters.

MoD F-35A approval

July 27/10: Customization. A Ha’aretz op-ed article claims that:

“And now Israel goes hat in hand pleading for a chance to be allowed to acquire the F-35 aircraft, at a price tag of $150 million each. But it’s not only the astronomical price. Israel is told that the F-35 must be taken as is – no changes or modifications to suit Israel’s specific needs, and absolutely no Israeli systems included. Take it or leave it.

Just imagine Israel’s position today had the Lavi project not been canceled…”

That claim contradicts other reports.

July 19/10: Negotiations. Reuters reports that Israel may be just “days away” from a $3 billion contract to deliver 19 F-35s. Outgoing DSCA head Vice Admiral Jeffrey Wieringa is quoted saying that: “The ball is in their court… I am waiting for them to make a decision any day.”

Lockheed Martin VP for F-35 business development, Steve O’Bryan, added that the firm is close to reaching a FY 2010 LRIP-4 production agreement with the U.S. government for another 32 planes, adding that classified briefings have been given to other countries, including Greece and Belgium, and that Finland and Spain have expressed interest.

July 8/10: F-15SE. Boeing flies its stealth-enhanced F-15SE “Silent Eagle,” for the first time, demonstrating the weapon bay operation in flight. The next stage will involve firing an AIM-120 air to air missile from the recessed weapon bay, which is part of the plane’s conformal fuel tank.

Boeing executives are also quoted as saying that they expect export approval for the F-15SE, and have received interest for Korea. A Jerusalem Post report adds Israel to this list, citing several conversations between Israeli defense officials and Boeing about F-15SE capabilities, and possible interest in a cheaper Silent Eagle bridge buy that allows full Israeli customization, while the F-35A achieves greater cost certainty and lower production costs. The F-15SE could also fit South Korea’s interest in a KFX-3 development program, which would involve both Korean research and equipment, but use a foreign fighter as the base. Both South Korea (F-15K) and Israel (F-15I) already fly Strike Eagle variants, and the 2 countries have begun to cooperate in a number of advanced defense programs. This raises interesting speculation about the possibility of tripartite cooperation on the F-15SE. Boeing | Defense News | Jerusalem Post.

April 25/10: Customization. Jane’s Defense Weekly reports that earlier expectations of an F-35 contract by the end of 2010 appear to have faded. Instead, the IAF is looking at buying 18-24 F-15 or F-16 variants as a stopgap, and may even postpone its fighter replacement program and retain F-16As in its inventory instead. Leading candidates for the additional squadron, and possible follow-on buys, would be more F-16I or F-15Is, or collaboration with Boeing to develop and field the stealth-enhanced F-15SE Silent Eagle.

With respect to 3rd party equipment issues, Jane’s adds that the Americans have approved the installation of Israeli electronic warfare systems, but no decision has been made concerning RAFAEL’s Python 5 short range air-air missile, or the dual GPS/IIR guidance Spice guided bomb. UPI.

March 8/10: Negotiations. With the American F-35 program facing a delay of a year or more before its variants enter operational service, and testing going very slowly, Israel is reportedly delaying its own contract signing. A contract was originally expected in March 2010, but media reports indicate that spring 2011 is more likely.

The reports also characterize issues of Israeli technology insertion as largely resolved, but adds that delivery delays and the $130 million minimum expected cost may give a leg up to Boeing’s F-15SE “Silent Eagle,” which could be offered for $100-100 million and be available in 2011 instead of 2014-2015. Jerusalem Post | Brahmand | Jane’s | UPI.

Feb 12/10: Negotiations. UPI reports that discussions between Israel and the USA concerning the F-35 are also covering the potentially contentious area of exports to Arab countries.

Traditionally, American weapons exported to Arab countries have been less sophisticated than the same weapons sold to Israel. Saudi Arabia’s F-15S Strike Eagles are an example of achieving that through downgrade, while Israel’s F-16I “Soufa” is an example of achieving that by letting the Israelis fully customize their aircraft with Israeli equipment. Option #2 is currently a sticking point of its own in negotiations, and non-NATO downgrades or Israeli upgrades in the stealth arena would each create their own issues.

2009

Negotiations as cost and customization concerns come to the fore; Boeing unveils stealth-enhanced F-15SE Silent Eagle; F-15SE unveiled
(click to view full)

Nov 25/09: Customization. Jon Schreiber, who heads the Pentagon’s F-35 international program, told Reuters that an Israeli version of the F-35 could include command and control systems developed in Israel, as well as the ability to carry Israeli Python 5 air-air missiles and Spice dual-mode GPS/IIR guided bombs in early model jets. Israel would also get “a relatively inexpensive path for hardware and software upgrades to add future weapons,” by which he may mean the planned reprogramming facility for the global fleet. Ha’aretz says that the boost of an Israeli endorsement has become more important to the program:

“The Americans’ willingness to soften their stance is the result of a series of meetings held by Lockheed officials and Israeli defense establishment officials three weeks ago, and also difficulties with the project, particularly concerns that orders by countries participating in the development project will be low.”

The JSF program office is still reportedly opposed to the introduction of an Israeli electronic warfare suite, but the need for fast reprogramming and tight national security regarding Israel’s knowledge of enemy signals makes that a key Israeli condition. Schreiber is quoted as saying that policy or circumstances would have to change, in order for that restriction to change. At present, the plan is for a centralized F-35 fleet signals database and electronic warfare update facility at the United States Reprogramming Laboratory in Fort Worth, TX.

Schreiber says that the United States plans to formally submit its offer and prices in January 2010. Israel must approve this no later than March 2010, and reach a deal with Lockheed on integrating the Israeli weapons and other systems by June or July 2010, in order to buy in FY 2012 and take delivery delivery in 2015. Reuters | Ha’aretz | Jerusalem Post.

Nov 24/09: Customization. Reuters reports that:

“The United States will keep to itself sensitive software code that controls Lockheed Martin Corp’s new radar-evading F-35 fighter jet… Jon Schreiber, who heads the program’s international affairs, told Reuters in an interview Monday [that] “That includes everybody,”…acknowledging this was not overly popular among the eight that have co-financed F-35 development – Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark and Norway.”

Instead, the USA plans to set up a “reprogramming facility” to develop F-35-related software and distribute upgrades. The terms on which allies might use this facility, and Lockheed Martin’s ability to stall or block upgrades that might boost competing products, are not detailed. Reuters | UK’s Daily Mail | New Zealand TV | UK’s Spectator Op-Ed.

Nov 23/09: Cost. Reuters reports that order delays and reductions by several F-35 partner countries are likely to push up prices for early buyers. With respect to Britain’s F-35B orders (vid. Oct 25/09 entry), however, F-35 international program manager Jon Schreiber says:

“The only thing that they’ve told me is that they’re currently on plan – and don’t believe what you read in newspapers…”

Nov 10/09: Negotiations. The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reports on F-35 negotiations and the associated issues, and lays out the timetable:

“The United States is scheduled to respond next week to Israel’s express request for 25 of the jets. Jerusalem is to reach a final decision by early 2010, and there’s a good chance a deal will be signed by the middle of the year. Assuming Lockheed maintains its original production timetable the first fighters will be delivered in 2014. Two years later, Israel will have its first operational squadron of F-35s.”

Nov 4/09: Customization. Jane’s reports that Israel has decided not to integrate any Israeli equipment into its first F-35As, in order to curtail an expected price tag of over $130 million per plane. A follow-on Nov 11/09 article in Ha’aretz reports that Israeli defense firms are not at all pleased by this development:

“This time, the defense establishment skipped over this [consultation] stage and is willing to accept the American dictate that this aircraft is a closed package [technologically] and it is very difficult to make changes to it that are specific to each client,” the [industry] official said. “The air force urgently wants this aircraft and it looks like they are going to give in, which is going to result in the Israeli industry almost not participating in the largest procurement program in IDF history.”

The country is also debating the wisdom of the purchase as a whole, with the Ministry of Defence arguing for a 2-year delay in procurement. Israel’s air force has always believed in qualitative superiority over regional competitors, but the F-35A’s 2014 delivery/ 2016 in service dates would make it irrelevant to Iran’s expected hostilities. On the other hand, the funds required could buy a lot of Namer heavy IFVs and other equipment, which would be extremely valuable during the next war in Lebanon.

Lockheed Martin is trying to keep the pressure on, saying that by 2016, F-35 production slots will already be filled by other orders and may be unavailable. The question is whether this will spur Israel to begin F-35 payments on schedule in 2010, or spur them to find another aircraft.

Oct 5/09: Cost. Aviation Week reports that the proposed international consortium buy to get allies their F-35s in time, but avoid the vastly higher price tags of early-production aircraft, may have collapsed. If so, the cost repercussions are likely to affect Israel’s calculations as well:

“A plan for a five-year, eight-nation, 368-aircraft order for Joint Strike Fighters is dead, according to a senior Australian government official. According to Australian Financial Review (subscription site) Defence Management Organization chief executive Stephen Gumley has told Australia’s parliament that a lack of interest among partners, plus US procurement rules, has killed the plan. (To “cruel” something, in Australia, means approximately the same as “kibosh” – its implication is terminal.)

Gumley also told AFR that, as a result, Australia may defer its main JSF orders by two years, to 2015 (with delivery in 2017) to avoid buying high-priced low-rate initial production aircraft.”

Other reports, such as a recent Dutch KRO-Reporter TV show, quote Lockheed Martin representatives as saying that they hope to be able to offer a firm averaged price to international partners in Q1 2010.

Sept 8/09: Negotiations. The Jerusalem Post reports that the Israeli F-35 contract signing is likely to be delayed past the target of early 2010, and continues to face problems. That may delay the F-35A’s introduction past 2014:

“A continued Pentagon refusal to integrate Israeli systems into the stealth Joint Strike Fighter will likely cause delays in the arrival of the advanced fighter jet to Israel, senior defense officials and IDF officers told The Jerusalem Post… The negotiations are still ongoing and we do not even know yet what the price of the aircraft will be,” said a top officer involved in the negotiations… Israeli demands have focused on three issues – the integration of Israeli-made electronic warfare systems into the plane, the integration of Israeli communication systems and the ability to independently maintain the plane in the event of a technical or structural problem. The British have made similar requests and according to a recent report in the Daily Telegraph is also seeking independent maintenance capabilities as well as access to some of the more classified technologies.”

July 9/09: Letter of Request. The Jerusalem Post reports that the Israeli Air Force has submitted an official Letter of Request (LOR) to the Pentagon to purchase its first squadron of 25 F-35s:

“Defense officials said that… negotiations regarding the final price of the plane – estimated at around $100 million – as well as the integration of Israeli systems would continue. The LOR will be followed by the signing of a contract in the beginning of 2010. The first aircraft are scheduled to arrive in Israel in 2014…According to senior IDF officers, the Defense Ministry and the Pentagon have reached understandings on most of the major issues…”

See also: Arutz Sheva | defpro | Turkish Daily News | Al Jazeera | Pravda | China’s Xinhua.

April 19/09: F-15SE. The Jerusalem Post reports that Israel’s Air Force is reviewing Boeing’s new F-15 Silent Eagle (F-15SE, see March 17/09), as a potential alternative to Lockheed Martin’s F-35A, if export permission for a downgraded F-22 model is still refused. While the F-35’s high cost remains an issue for the Israelis, expected delivery delays to 2014 and the inability to install Israeli-made systems appear to be bigger stumbling blocks.

In contrast, the F-15SE would be available by 2011; like an F-22EX model, some additional development will be required to finalize the design. The F-15SE offers considerably more range and payload than the F-35, for less than the F-22 would cost; possibly for less than early-model F-35s would cost. Electronics and equipment flexibility would be similar to the other F-15s Israel flies, and the potential option of upgrading Israel’s 25 F-15I Strike Eagles to a similar standard offers an additional consideration.

On the flip side, the resulting aircraft would offer significantly less stealth than the F-22, and less than the F-35A as well. This would make precision strike attacks against advanced air defense systems more difficult. It would also lack the suite of integrated, embedded multi-spectral sensors, which reach their modern apotheosis on the F-35A.

April 17/09: Negotiations. Ha’aretz reports that Israel’s F-35 negotiations are still bogged down, with cost – and more so, technology transfer and control – as the key issues.

March 19/09: Negotiations. The Jerusalem Post relays word from Israel’s Ministry of Defense, who said that Israeli systems “have already been installed in the F-35… We are holding further discussions to install further systems.”

US-built models of the jet would incorporate Israeli-made data links, radios and other command and control equipment, but would reportedly exclude an Israeli-made electronic warfare suite due to the high cost of integrating the system into the plane.

March 17/09: F-15SE unveiled. Boeing unveils the F-15SE “Silent Eagle” variant. The aircraft has slightly canted vertical tails to improve aerodynamics and reduce weight, some minor radar shaping work, the addition of coatings to improve radar signature further, and a pair of conformal fuel tanks with cut-in chambers for 2 air-to-air missiles each, or air-to-ground weapons like the 500 pound JDAM and 250 pound GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb. The tanks would be swappable for traditional conformal tanks if desired, and weapons could also be carried externally. BAE’s DEWS electronic self-protection system would be fitted, along with Raytheon’s AN/APG-63v3 radar that will equip all Singaporean F-15s and be retrofitted to the American fleet.

The intent appears to be to offer a “budget Raptor” in the $120 million range, with a basic radar signature that’s competitive with newer fighters like the similarly-priced Eurofighter Typhoon. Advantages would include better radar signature when internal carriage is used for long combat air patrols or limited precision strikes, a superior and proven AESA radar, longer range, and more total carriage capacity if necessary. On the flip side, it would not provide the same maneuverability options as canard equipped contenders like EADS’ Eurofighter or Dassault’s Rafale. The total package would come closer to parity with the SU-30MKI/M and subsequent versions of Sukhoi’s offerings, but may or may not measure up against longer-term opponents like Sukhoi’s PAK-FA or China’s J-XX. From Boeing’s release:

“Boeing has completed a conceptual prototype of the CFT internal-carriage concept, and plans to flight-test a prototype by the first quarter of 2010, including a live missile launch. The design, development, and test of this internal carriage system are available as a collaborative project with an international aerospace partner.”

March 17/09: Negotiations. Reuters quotes Pentagon official Jon Schreiber, who heads the Joint Strike Fighter’s international program, concerning potential buys by Israel and Singapore:

“I think our system will meet [Israel’s] requirements with some tweaking, and I think they’re starting to come around to that realization themselves. They have pretty tight budget constraints and we’re attempting to fit their requirements into their budget… We expect to get a revised letter of request from (Israel) within the next month or so…”

March 14-15/09: Dave Majumdar of Examiner.com proposes sending Israel the USA’s recently-decommissioned F-117A stealth attack aircraft, in order to meet Israel’s needs immediately and give them breathing room to buy the F-35 at a less expensive stage. That might be an interesting policy move for the USA, but it’s not in Lockheed Martin’s interest to do so. Part 1: The Problem | Part 2: The Solution.

Feb 25/09: Negotiations. Aviation Week quotes an Israeli Air Force general who says the F-35’s price is the biggest issue, industrial participation industries is 2nd, and the tiff about replacing U.S. electronic warfare systems with local products is 3rd.

The report adds that Elta is expected to provide its own AESA radar to replace the APG-81, without U.S. complaint, but the price tag of “more than $100 million” remains the biggest problem.

Feb 10/09: Customization. Aviation Week’s Ares publishes “JSF Secrets to Stay Secret“:

“After a long period of obtuse answers about whether foreign customers would be able to put their own systems in F-35 or customize the software themselves, the issue has been clarified.

“No,” says Maj. Gen. Charles Davis, program executive officers of the Joint Strike Fighter program… They are going to buy aircraft that have basically the same capability as all the others,” Davis says. “They are trying to do a requirements analyses for future missions. Those mission [refinements] would be submitted through Lockheed Martin [and other contractors]. That [customization] is doable through software. It is not doable by Israelis sticking boxes in the airplane. [Elbit and Elta being involved] is not an option…”

The Jerusalem Post notes that this is a significant departure; Israeli F-15s and F-16s have all been modified to carry Israeli electronic warfare, radars, munitions, and command and control systems. Israel believes that electronic warfare in particular must be local and flexible, in order to counter local, evolving threats in a timely way, rather than suffering on someone else’s schedule. Its weapons are another significant area of departure, and have become successful exports while offering their own form of insurance against both countermeasures and foreign diktat. In this case, however:

“…the US refused to conduct the negotiations [on these issues] with the [Israeli] MOD until an announcement that it would procure the plane had been made. The announcement was made in October in an official request to the Pentagon.

A defense industry source familiar with the negotiations between Israel and the US said that the talks were “tough” but predicted that a deal would be reached in the coming months and that Israel would finally place an official order.”

Feb 7/09: Cost. In a talk at the Brooking Institution, JSF program head USAF Maj.-Gen. Charles R. Davis has admitted that that the average cost of F-35 fighters will range from $80 – 90 million in current dollars, but IDF sources tell the Jerusalem Post that they believe the cost per aircraft will exceed $100 million, “making it very difficult for Israel to follow through with its initial intention to purchase 75 aircraft.” Jerusalem Post.

2007 – 2008

Plans for 100 F-35As; DSCA request for 25-75; Cost becomes a concern. F-35B features
(click to view full)

Nov 9/08: Cost. Israel remains relatively unaffected by the global financial crunch, has $3 billion per year in military aid dollars to spend within the United States, and faces growing regional threats to its existence. Lockheed Martin is seeking to finalize early orders for the F-35, in order to assure production. It seems like a natural fit. Israel is only an F-35 “security cooperation partner,” however, and its HMDS helmet-mounted display technology is its only contribution to date.

Israel traditionally incorporates an array of its technologies and weapons into American-bought fighters. A Reuters report adds that:

“A Lockheed source said seven Israeli companies had already been contracted to contribute to the [Israeli F-35] project.

On the other hand, uncertainty over the breadth of and timing that integration, questions about F-35 delivery schedules, and pricing issues are all working against contract negotiations. There are even reports that Israel is considering a renewed request for the $180 million F-22A, which could be delivered by 2011, or for additional purchases of upgraded F-16s instead.

Reuters reports that CEO Robert Stevens visited Israel in early November to lobby for an early 2009 contract, and advanced the argument that an earlier buy would translate into greater participation. The argument is also being used that Israeli investment in technology inserts would become potential export options for other F-35 customers, as was the case with the F-16. On the other hand, Defense News quoted an official in the IDF General Staff as saying that

“It’s unbelievable, first it was $40 million to $50 million, and then they [the IAF] told us $70 million to $80 million. Now, we’re looking at nearly three times that amount, and who’s to say it won’t continue to climb?”

See also: Israel’s Ha’aretz newspaper | Jerusalem Post | Israel’s Globes business paper | Reuters | StrategyPage.

Nov 10/08: F-22. Flight International reports that sticker shock over the proposed $200 million per plane price of F-35As, and a need for rapid delivery, may push Israel to renew its F-22EX request with the new Obama administration. An excerpt:

“This aircraft can be delivered in two years if the deal is approved [DID: 2011, vs. 2012-14 for F-35s], and that is very important for the security of Israel,” comments one Israeli source.”

Oct 16/08: Cost. The Jerusalem Post reports that:

“According to the officials, the IDF will likely hold off signing an official contract with the US Air Force to buy the jet, also known as the F-35, until the economic situation becomes clearer… One official said it was possible that if orders dropped, the cost of the plane would increase and that as a result Israel would need to reconsider the number of planes it will buy.”

Sept 26/08: Request. the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] Israel official request to buy an initial 25 F-35A Joint Strike Fighters, with an option to purchase at a later date an additional 50 F-35A or F-35B Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft. The estimated cost is $15.2 billion if all options are exercised, or about $200 million per plane as the in-service cost.

While the notice states that the aircraft could contain either the Pratt and Whitney F-135 engine or General Electric/Rolls Royce’s F-136 engine, in practice, the F135’s development and testing is far ahead of its rival’s. The initial aircraft are almost certain to contain PW’s F135 engines, which raises the odds that any option purchases will also use F135s for fleet commonality.

Israeli F-35s would also be equipped with unspecified Electronic Warfare Systems; Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence/ Communication, Navigational and Identification (C4I/CNI); Flight Mission Trainer; Weapons Employment Capability, and other Subsystems, Features, and Capabilities; F-35 unique infrared flares; and External Fuel Tanks. These new aircraft would also require: Flight test instrumentation; Unique systems or sovereign requirements; Reprogramming center to add new threats to the F-35′ defensive systems; Software development/ integration; Hardware/ Software In-the-Loop Laboratory Capability. Finally, maintenance will involve F-35 Performance Based Logistics services including Autonomic Logistics Global Support System (ALGS); Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS); aircraft ferry and tanker support, support equipment, tools and test equipment, spares and repair parts, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documents, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

The prime contractors will be Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company in Fort Worth, TX, and either Pratt & Whitney Military Engines in East Hartford, CT (extremely likely) or General Electric Fighter Engine Team in Cincinnati, OH (very unlikely). Because these systems are so new, implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple trips to Israel involving U.S. Government and contractor representatives for technical reviews/support, program management, and training over a period of 15 years. U.S. contractor representatives will be required in Israel to conduct Contractor Engineering Technical Services (CETS) and Autonomic Logistics and Global Support (ALGS) for after-aircraft delivery.

Official request

F-35A head-on
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Oct 25/07: Early delivery? Israel may begin taking deliveries of the F-35 in 2012, a couple years earlier than expected and only slightly after the USA begins receiving production aircraft of its own. The timing and technology agreements reportedly came in the wake of a Washington meeting between Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and may represent an attempt to deflect Israeli calls for an export version of the F-22A Raptor, which has more stealth and capability, and whose production line is currently scheduled to close in 2010.

Read “F-35s to Israel Early?” for full coverage.

June 21/06: Plans for 100. Israel’s globe’s Online interviews Brigadier-General Ze’ev Snir, who confirms that the IAF is looking to replace its F-16s with the F-35, at a cost estimated at at least $5 billion for 100 aircraft, or about $50 million per. That figure was always very questionable, given the F-35 program’s price increases and the additional costs associated with placing a new aircraft type in service.

The F-35 also fits into a broader modernization effort. Israel is also reportedly considering several near-term IAF procurements, including a possible buy of 6 C-130J Hercules transports plus associated support & equipment at a cost of about $500 million [requested July 2008, up to $1.9 billion], as well as a $100 million upgrade of Sikorsky CH-53 Super Stallion helicopters to extend their operational lifespan by 20 years. See full Globes Online article.

Additional Readings

• DID – Lightning Rod: F-35 Fighter Family Capabilities and Controversies.

• DID – Israel Requesting F-22EX Fighters.

• The F-35’s Air-to-Air Capability Controversy. Can the aircraft hold its own against existing fighter competitors like the Russian SU-30 family, French Rafale, the Eurofighters flown by Saudi Arabia, etc.?

• DID – Israel Kicks Off Program to Improve Its F-16s and F-15s.

• Ha’aretz (July 27/10) – F-35 – take it or leave it.

• Aviation Week (June 11/09) – Boeing Studies Stealth Eagle Options. Interesting point made re: retrofits and stealth sales: “It’s not how low can you go, it’s how low are you allowed to go, and the U.S. government controls that,” says Brad Jones, Boeing program manager for F-15 future fighters. “We can get to different levels depending on the country.”

• DID (Aug 22/05) – Follow-Up: Tech Transfers to Israel Resume, Conditionally.

• DID (Apr 19/05) – Reports: Israel Frozen out of F-35 Development.

Liquid Robotics and Boeing have successfully demonstrated the capabilities of four sensor hosting autonomous remote crafts (SHARCs) at the Unmanned Warrior exercise, an event organised by the UK Royal Navy.

The US Marine Corps’ (USMC) seven F-35B Lightning II aircraft are scheduled to start testing aboard the US Navy’s amphibious assault ship, USS America (LHA 6).

Americas

• Embraer believes they will hit their operating targets for 2016 thanks to strong year-end demand. The company made the announcement on Monday. Chief Financial Officer Jose Antonio Filippo also told journalists a writedown of the company’s used aircraft portfolio, which contributed to a $34 million third-quarter loss, was focused on its commercial jets inventory and was not likely to be repeated in coming quarters.

• A Russian arms trafficker serving a 25-year sentence in the US has appealed his conviction. Viktor Bout was convicted for attempting to sell millions of dollars worth of arms to whom he believed were militants with the FARC, a Colombian rebel group. Bout’s lawyer claims that a co-conspirator, Andrew Smulian, was a government informant throughout the investigation, which means Bout could not have been involved in a conspiracy with him. Bout’s infamy made the silver screen in 2005, with his story serving as the basis for Nicolas Cage’s Yuri Orlov in the movie “Lord of War.”

Middle East & North Africa

• After rumors they would do so, Turkey has officially requested a second batch of F-35s under the Joint Strike Fighter program. A meeting of the Defense Industry Executive Committee (SSIK), Turkey’s procurement authority, brought top political and military officials together on Friday to make the decision. Officials are also hoping to build a new-generation, dual-fighter jet fleet by their country’s centennial, 2023, comprised of the F-35 and an indigenous aircraft, known as TFX, that Ankara has been designing.

• Iraqi special forces have reached the outskirts of the city of Mosul, as the offensive to reclaim the city from the Islamic State enters its third week. Soldiers of the elite Counter Terrorism Service (CST) have already captured the state television station, the most important building reclaimed to date. While the offensive on Mosul involves Kurdish Peshmerga, Shia militias and regular Iraqi security forces, the CST has been heavily trained with US help, undergoing training exercises with other elite units in places like Jordan.

Europe

• The Netherlands has contracted AeroVironment to conduct upgrade work on their RQ-11B Raven UAVs in a $10.3 million deal. In service since 2008, the Ravens will see their current analogue configuration upgraded to include AeroVironment’s digital datalink. Also included in the deal are new Puma AE and Wasp micro unmanned air systems, plus a new ground control station and support, which AeroVironment says will be delivered within six months.

• An investigation by the BBC and the Guardian newspaper has suggested that engine maker Rolls Royce was involved in corruption. Findings include the establishment of a network of agents hired to help them land lucrative contracts in at least 12 different countries around the world, sometimes allegedly using bribes. One deal scrutinized uncovered evidence of a suspicious payment of cash that may have helped Rolls-Royce win a major contract for engines on Hawk trainer aircraft worth $400 million to the company.

Asia Pacific

• Two J-20 stealth fighters made their public flying debut yesterday in a brief one minute taster at the Airshow China exhibition. Following a vertical split at the end of the runway, one of the J-20s quickly disappeared over the horizon, leaving the other to perform a series of turns, revealing its delta wing shape against bright sub-tropical haze. Neither of the fighters, however, expanded on basic maneuvers, with both failing to conduct a low-speed, high angle of attack pass, or opening weapons bays. Without a more encompassing display, it may be a while before we see the J-20 as a rival to the F-35 on the export market.

• An official with Indonesia’s defense ministry has confirmed that Jakarta is still in negotiations to purchase either nine or ten Su-35 fighters. Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu had expressed his country’s interest in the fighter in May but any concrete deal has yet to materialize. While Russian and Indonesian officials haggle over pricing, it’s believed that Western companies such as Lockheed Martin and Saab are trying to wrest such a big ticket deal away from Russian manufacturer Sukhoi. Indonesia boasts one of the world’s fastest growing defense budgets with expectations that the archipelago will spend more than $20 billion on procurement between 2016 and 2025.

Today’s Video

J-20s at Airshow China:

Americas

• Two men in California have been charged for taking part in a scheme to smuggle $3 million worth of military aircraft parts and other defense equipment to Iran. Zavik Zargarian and Vache Nayirian stand accused of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, according to the US Department of Justice. If convicted, Zargarian faces a maximum sentence of 115 years in federal prison and a $4,770,000 fine, while Nayirian faces a maximum sentence of 95 years in prison and a $3,770,000 fine, prosecutors said. Their trial begins on December 20.

• Expect to hear more about the DoD Strategic Capabilities Office’s (SCO) swarming drones concept in the coming months, says deputy secretary of defense Ash Carter. Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington last week, Carter claimed the technology has made some important strides in recent weeks, but specific details are still being kept close to the chest of the SCO. The office is currently testing the Perdix, a palm-sized, expendable UAV that springs out of a fighter jet’s chaff dispenser and flies low to capture video. However, Perdix is not believed to be part of the swarming drones concept.

• The first upgunned Stryker infantry carrier vehicle has been returned to the US Army. Designated as the Stryker Dragoon, the vehicle comes armed with a more lethal 30mm cannon and will be fielded with the Germany-based 2nd Cavalry Regiment in May 2018. Other new aspects of the upgrade include an integrated Kongsberg MCT-30mm Weapon System with a remotely-operated, unmanned turret; a new, fully-integrated commander’s station; and upgraded driveline component and hull modifications. Full rate production will commence following an abbreviated test phase in Spring 2017.

Africa

• A delegation from Airbus visited Nigeria following a proposal earlier this year to sell their C295W light transport aircraft to the Nigerian Air Force. While it remains to be seen how many of the aircraft Nigeria would purchase, Airbus is expected to include training and support personnel in any deal made. Ghana, Mali, Algeria and Egypt have all either ordered or currently operate the C295W as Airbus looks to grow sales to the African market. This September saw the company help bring a Portuguese maritime surveillance/patrol variant of the C295 to display at the Africa Aerospace and Defence exhibition in South Africa.

Europe

• Polish prosecutors are to investigate the recently scrapped Caracel military helicopter deal with Airbus to see if the move circumvented Polish law or was linked to corruption. Speaking to local media, prosecutor Michal Dziekanski said “this will be a complicated, comprehensive investigation, encompassing a very large set of evidence.” Tomasz Siemoniak, the defense minister responsible for originally brokering the deal during the previous administration, called the Airbus tender “fair and transparent” and said it was canceled by his rivals for political reasons.

• Sentinel R1 surveillance aircraft operated by the RAF will live to fly until at least March 2017 despite the fact one of the five-strong fleet should have been retired by now. Manufacturer Raytheon has been contracted for $159 million in support work on the remaining fleet which will see four Sentinel aircraft continue in operation until 2021, extended from the previous retirement date of 2018. Funding has yet to be released in order to keep the fifth plane flying over the same period with a decision expected in March.

Asia Pacific

• This week will see China unveil its J-20 stealth fighter during a flight demonstration at the China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in the southern city of Zhuhai. The warplane, along with the J-31, are attempts by Beijing to close the technological gap with the US and to increase their offensive and defensive capabilities. While the J-31 is still in development, it is hoped that the plane will compete with the US-made F-35 on the international market.

• Israeli-made Heron and Searcher UAVs will be armed with missiles by India. Known as Project Cheetah, the program will see the drones equipped with advanced surveillance technology as well as the ability to conduct surgical strikes, severing the need for the deployment of further aircraft. It’s expected that Israeli firms will be involved in the upgrades. The armed drones will then undergo operations against militants fighting in the disputed Kashmir region with the aim of limiting Indian military casualties.

Today’s Video

Testing of the Chengdu J-20 earlier this year:

M1126, post-IED
(click to view full)

Under current plans, the 8×8 wheeled Stryker armored vehicle will be the future backbone of 8 US Army and 1 National Guard medium armored brigades. The 5th Stryker Brigade from Fort Lewis, WA was the first Stryker unit sent to Afghanistan, deployed in the summer of 2009 as part of a troop level increase. The brigade was equipped with 350 Stryker vehicles. In the first few months of deployment, they lost 21 soldiers, with 40 more wounded, to IED land mines. The losses prompted the Army to examine modifications to their Stryker vehicles, in order to make them more resistant to land mines.

One result is the Stryker hull redesign, creating the v-hulled Stryker DVH. The US Army is now on pace to order 2 brigades worth, as it moves toward the end of Stryker armored vehicle production.

Strykers, Struck: The Afghan Experience & Response Struck Stryker
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The Strykers have come under criticism for their performance in Afghanistan since the first Stryker brigade was deployed there in the summer of 2009. The Stryker vehicles have been faulted for their lack of maneuverability on rough terrain, a problem that Canada’s similar LAV-IIIs have also experienced.

That creates an associated vulnerability to IED land mines planted in the road. In June 2009, the 5th Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division deployed to Kandahar province. It had 37 troops killed in action and 238 wounded over its year-long deployment, and their flat-bottom Strykers were diverted part-way through into road guard missions, away from intense combat. Their replacement, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, continued the “freedom of movement” missions, and had suffered 14 KIA, 5 noncombat KIA, and more than 100 wounded, as of May 2011. Stars and Stripes reports:

“In one incident in August [2010], a 1st Squadron flat-bottomed Stryker was struck by a massive bomb hidden in a highway culvert in Kandahar province. The blast peeled away the armor protecting its engine like the skin of an orange, snapped off a wheel at the axel and mangled the metal cage that was designed to protect troops from rocket-propelled grenades.

[Pfc. Dustyn Applegate]… doesn’t rate the Stryker as a good vehicle for the sort of counter-IED mission that his unit was engaged in… “That’s the bad thing about the Stryker,” he said. “It has a flat bottom, so when the blast happens, it just blows up instead of up and out like with an MRAP. There is no safe place on the Stryker.”

On the other hand, “M1126 Strykers in Combat: Experiences & Lessons” detailed surprisingly positive reviews of the wheeled APCs’ performance in Iraq. There, they made good use of roads, and their relative silence compared to tracked vehicles was an asset in urban warfare. If the Stryker is not the vehicle for all situations, it has at least proven to be very useful under defined circumstances.

Any campaign that includes the mission of securing key roads, which is to say any mission that depends on economic progress and trade growth, will find Strykers very useful – so long as they remain survivable.

Deflecting Danger: The Strykker DVH Effort V-Hull at work:
Cougar MRAP
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Hence the Stryker double-v hull design, which channels blast force away from the vehicle and its occupants. The US Army has announced contracts to produce 742 Stryker DVH vehicles, as retrofits and as new production vehicles. That’s the full extent of the current plan, which was a major step beyond the program’s initial plan of 450 Stryker DVHs.

The modified M1126 Stryker ICVV/DVH infantry carrier is the base variant for 7 additional configurations, which will be employed as part of coherent v-hulled Stryker Brigade Combat Teams: M1129 DVH Mortar Carrier, M1130 DVH Command Vehicle, M1131 DVH Fire Support Vehicle, M1132 DVH Engineer Squad Vehicle, M1133 DVH Medical Evacuation Vehicle, M1134 DVH Anti-Tank Guided Missile Vehicle, and the Infantry Carrier Vehicle DVH-Scout (ICVV-S). The ICVV-S is a new configuration that allows internal stowage of the Long Range Advance Scout (LRAS) surveillance system, which is mounted externally on the standard M1127 Reconnaissance Vehicle.

The Stryker DVH program retains a connection with overall Stryker modernization efforts. In a sense, it just prioritized one element of that plan for faster fielding, and made them the front-line vehicles for an SBCT in-theater. That will rise to 2 SBCTs by the end of 2012. After that, the Army says that:

“Once the Army decides on the appropriate future force structure, fleet mix and overall number of combat vehicles, the quantity of DVH Strykers and variants of Strykers will be finalized.”

America isn’t the only one upgrading its LAV-IIIs. Blast-protection efforts are underway for Australia’s ASLAVs, and in Canada via the near-term LAV LORIT program, and their longer-term LAV-III upgrade to the same base vehicle.

To date, however, the Stryker Double-V Hull remains unique to the USA.

Left Behind

Stryker M1128, Iraq
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Some Stryker typers won’t be getting the DVH treatment. The US Army does not plan to purchase Stryker DVH versions of the M1127 Reconnaissance vehicle (which does have an ICVV-S DVH counterpart), M1128 MGS assault gun, or the M1135 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle. Once the DVH vehicles are done, and the last set of M1135s are ordered and produced, overall Stryker production will end.

During the December 2010 Stryker DVH Configuration Steering Board, the Army decided not to pursue full-rate production for the standard M1128 Stryker Mobile Gun System, either. While the M1128’s 105mm gun offers potent firepower, the type already has significant weight and protection issues that haven’t been resolved. The Army decided that neither continued production nor DVH made sense for this type, unless the Stryker Modernization program gave the vehicle more base heft and power.

That seems less and less likely. According to US Army spokesperson Lt. Col. Peggy Kageleiry:

“Stryker Modernization has been replaced with a reduced-scope Engineering Change Proposal (ECP). The scope of the ECP for Stryker upgrades is still to be determined, but the following will be considered: buy-back Space, Weight, Power, and Cooling (SWaP-C) deficiencies, improve mobility and protection, and provide ability to accept future network and protection upgrades.”

Contracts & Key Events M1126 DVH Exchange
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Under the contracts, the GM General Dynamics Land Systems Defense Group partnership in Sterling Heights, MI will provide design and integration engineering services, test articles/prototypes, and procurement of materials, including long-lead materials, to support the modified hull design with related integrated system changes. The US Army says the contract objectives are an integrated solution that will provide improved protection levels to support operations in Afghanistan.

The Army’s Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) in Warren, MI manages these contracts.

FY 2017

M1126 DVH
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November 1/16: The first upgunned Stryker infantry carrier vehicle has been returned to the US Army. Designated as the Stryker Dragoon, the vehicle comes armed with a more lethal 30mm cannon and will be fielded with the Germany-based 2nd Cavalry Regiment in May 2018. Other new aspects of the upgrade include an integrated Kongsberg MCT-30mm Weapon System with a remotely-operated, unmanned turret; a new, fully-integrated commander’s station; and upgraded driveline component and hull modifications. Full rate production will commence following an abbreviated test phase in Spring 2017.

FY 2016

May 9/16: The US Army has awarded General Dynamic Land Systems a $329 million contract for the production, logistics product development, and test support for the Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) 30mm lethality upgrade. Upgrading the lethality and durability of the Army’s Strykers has become a recent priority for the service as the Pentagon looks to increase the vehicle’s operational capabilities. General Dynamic’s work on the project is expected to run until January 15, 2021.

March 4/16: An industry wide search is to be carried out by the US Army to seek increased capabilities for its Stryker units. The Army will look at different sensors, better ways to integrate capabilities, and ways to make vehicles more survivable. This will go beyond the current efforts to upgun the armored vehicle by adding 30mm cannons or Javelin missiles, and to add Double-V Hulls for extra durability. The new and improved vehicles are expected to reach operational capability by early 2018.

February 15/16: The US Army plans to upgun their 8×8 Stryker armored vehicles. The vehicles will be fitted with a 30mm automatic cannon, that comes with air-burst shells, for use in air defense activities. The gun would allow the vehicles to act as a mobile anti-aircraft gun, as the Army looks to increase capabilities of existing systems, while funds for any major programs are non-existent. The upgunning with the 30mm cannon was initially intended to destroy light-armored vehicles such as the Russian BMP, with the inclusion of the air-burst shells allowing for greater capabilities.

November 6/15: Lithuania has requested 84 Stryker Infantry Combat Vehicles from the US, with the State Department approving the potential Foreign Military Sale. The request also includes 30mm cannons – recently approved as an upgrade for some US Strykers stationed in Europe – and Remote Weapons Stations, as well as machine guns, communications systems and auxiliary equipment. The potential deal is estimated to value $599 million, with 30 US government or contractor personnel required to travel to Lithuania to help implement the introduction and sustainment of the Strykers.

October 6/15: The Army’s Stryker vehicles will benefit from a $411 million upgrade program for the vehicles’ main armament, with the 2016 NDAA bill including $314 million for modification work to the fleet to up-gun their 12.7mm cannons to 30mm guns. The remaining $97 million is earmarked for R&D, with the House and Senate Armed Service Committees criticizing the Army for an increasingly unacceptable per-vehicle cost to upgrade the Stryker fleet. A response to fears that the Strykers would be out-gunned by would-be Russian adversaries in Europe, the Army was given a provisional thumbs-up for the upgrade work in April, with the Hill stipulating that the upgrades will be limited to the Army’s European-deployed Strykers rather than form a fleet-wide upgrade program.

FY 2013 – 2015

May 5/15: The Army’s European-deployed Stryker mobile guns have been given a provisional thumbs-up for more powerful weapon systems. The current 12.7mm machine guns will be upgraded to 30mm autocannons, with the “high priority need” a reflection of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment’s requirement for increased lethality, according to a memo obtained by Breaking Defense earlier this month.

Jan 12/14: Good news, bad news. The good news: the Army wants to convert all 9 of its standard Stryker Brigades to the DVH configuration, using the DVH Exchange option.

The bad news is what you’d expect: no funding beyond the first 2 brigades they’ve already done, and the 3rd they hope to finish by 2016 (q.v. Sept 10/13). Which means GDLS Canada’s LAV-III/ Stryker manufacturing equipment will have to be placed in layaway mode for a future production line restart, to be triggered by either future US Army orders or foreign sales. Either way, however, a line restart always costs extra. Sources: Defense News, “US Plans Radical Upgrade of Stryker Brigades”.

Sept 10/13: 3rd brigade. The Project Manager for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team received the approval from the Army Acquisition Executive to begin buying a 3rd brigade of Stryker DVH vehicles to switch with an existing brigade. The initial 66 vehicle conversions of an eventual 337 have been awarded via a $118 million contract to GDLS. Deliveries will begin in July 2014, and the initial 66 will be complete by February 2015.

As of this order, the DVH Exchange pilot program had wrapped up in April 2013 after delivering 52 vehicles on time and under budget. Remaining brigade orders will be based on the availability of funding, using an incremental approach over FY 2014-2016. Sources: US Army, “Army gives green light for procurement of 3rd Stryker Double-V Hull brigade” | GD, “General Dynamics Awarded $118 Million for Stryker Double-V Hull Vehicles” | Yellowhammer News, “80 Anniston Army Depot jobs preserved with DVH Stryker announcement”.

Orders for 3rd brigade begin

Oct 15/12: DVH Exchange. The US Army announces that they’ve completed the 1st vehicle in their Stryker DVH exchange program. The exchange involves taking a standard Stryker variant, reusing common parts, refurbishing them, and inserting the parts into a vehicle on the DVH production line.

The Army is documenting the teardown and reuse process, in hopes of having clearer figures if the Army decides that it wants more Stryker DVHs later on. Obviously, they’re hoping to find out that this saves money, by using a lot of the old parts. Once they’ve had a chance to try and make this process more efficient, then cost it, they’ll be in position to present a case. US Army.

FY 2012

M1126 DVHs, Afghanistan
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March 4/12: Plans. The US Army clarifies its plans for the Stryker DVH: 760 total, to be delivered by the end of 2012, equipping 2 Brigade Combat Teams. When queried, however, Lt. Col. Peggy Kageleiry said that:

“…the Army has a current procurement target of 742 Double-V Hull (DVH) Stryker vehicles… which will be completed by December 2012. Procurement of 158 NBCRVs which are on contract in FY12 & FY13, will complete the current planned Stryker vehicle purchase. Once the Army decides on the appropriate future force structure, fleet mix and overall number of combat vehicles, the quantity of DVH Strykers and variants of Strykers will be finalized.”

With respect to performance in-theater, Lt. Gen. Bill Phillips, principal military deputy to the assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, says there have been about 40 land mine incidents for the DVH. In 38 of those incidents, all soldiers walked away with just minor injuries. In his words: “That vehicle has performed beyond our expectations.”

Jan 18/12: Industrial. GDLS’ newly-acquired Force Protection manufacturing facility in Ladson, SC, will be doing work on another v-hulled vehicle. About $10 million in new work is moving there, to install additional combat-related communication and protection equipment on 292 Stryker DVH (Double-V Hull) 8×8 wheeled APCs, which are getting ready to deploy to Afghanistan.

The new work begins in March 2012, and will occupy about 45 jobs until about February 2013. Force Protection.

Jan 17/12: DOT&E Report. The US Defense Department’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation issues his FY 2011 Annual Report, which includes the Stryker DVH program. The program get good reviews, based on tests. The modified Strykers retained the same basic mobility, proved their performance against land mines, and actually had better reliability than their flat-hulled counterparts. They were rated both operationally effective for performance, and operationally suitable for reliability.

Quibbles were minor, involving data collection for the M1126 ICVV’s operational assessment, and problems with the Stryker DVH driver’s compartment being too small for larger Soldiers. The Army is planning a driver’s compartment redesign, and will continue to test the other 7 DVH variants through Q3 2012. In the nearer term, February 2012 is expected to see the end of Styker ICVV-Scout operational testing, and M1129 Mortar Carrier Vehicle DVH developmental and operational testing, at Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona.

Oct 25/11: +177. General Dynamics Land Systems announces a $367 million order for another 177 Stryker double-V hull (DVH) wheeled APCs, raising the US Army’s buy to 2 full Stryker DVH Brigade Combat Teams. Work on Stryker DVH vehicles is performed in Anniston, AL and Lima, OH, as well as the main production facility in London, ON, Canada (W56HZV-07-D-M112, #0266, Mod.1).

The firm says that over 320 double-V-hulled Stryker vehicles have been produced so far, under a contract awarded in July 2010 for 450 double-V-hull vehicles. Deliveries will be complete by July 2013. DID checked with GDLS, and confirmed that this order brings the total number of ordered Stryker DVH vehicles to 742.

Oct 5/11: +115. General Dynamics Land Systems announces a $243 million contract to produce and deliver another 115 Stryker DVHs. General Dynamics will also provide production sustainment support and obsolescence management services. Work will be performed in Anniston, AL, London, ON, Canada, and Lima, OH. Deliveries will be complete by September 2012 (W56HZV-07-D-M112, #0266).

The firm says that about 300 double-V-hulled Strykers have been delivered so far, under a contract awarded in July 2010, with initial deliveries rolling out in May 2011. This order begins to go beyond the program’s original goal of 450. GDLS.

FY 2011

M1126, Mosul – no DVH
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June 1/11: A $40 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification “for Stryker double-V hull development and delivery of prototype vehicles.”

Work will be performed in Sterling Heights, MI, and London, Ontario, Canada, with an estimated completion date of July 30/12. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W56HZV-07-D-M112).

May 20/11: Deployment. Stars & Stripes relays the US Army’s statement re: Afghan deployments of the Stryker DVH, and also details combat statistics and criticisms related to the Stryker’s deployments in Afghanistan.

May 9/11: Deployment. US Army:

“In the coming weeks, Soldiers in Afghanistan will begin to see 150 new Strykers with a double-V hull, or DVH… The Stryker DVH, with enhanced armor, wider tires and blast-attenuating seats, went from conception to production in less than one year… “The rapid turnaround of the DVH is responsiveness at its best,” Col. Robert Schumitz, Stryker Brigade Combat Team Project Management Office, project manager, said… Engineers at General Dynamics Land Systems conceived of the double-V-hull design and tested it at Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz., Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., and the Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif… There are 140 Stryker DVH’s already in the Army supply chain, and plans are to field a total of 450 vehicles.”

April 12/11: +404. A pair of contracts worth $49.5 million revise earlier orders for 404 vehicles. The wording is confusing, but GDLS clarifies that: “The dod announcements are not new vehicles or contracts” – designating them as limit increases to existing contracts.

A $37.2 million firm-fixed-price contract revises the not-to-exceed amount and obligated amount for Double-V hull production cut-in to 178 Stryker vehicles. Work will be performed at London, Ontario, Canada, and Anniston, AL, with an estimated completion date of Feb 29/12. One bid was solicited and one received (W56HZV-07-D-M112).

A $12.3 million firm-fixed-price contract revises the not-to-exceed amount and obligated amount for Double-V hull production cut-in to 226 Stryker vehicles. Work will be performed at London, Ontario, Canada, and Anniston, AL, with an estimated completion date of Feb 29/12. One bid was solicited and one received (W56HZV-07-D-M112).

March 3/11: +15. GM GDLS Defense Group, LLC in Sterling Heights, MI receives an $18.7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract that will “provide for support for 19 Stryker flat-bottom vehicles and 15 Stryker double-V hull vehicles.” Work will be performed in Sterling Heights, MI, with an estimated completion date of Feb 29/12. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W56HZV-07-D-M112).

Dec 3/10: Support. A $91.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee/firm-fixed-price contract, for service to support performance specification changes to the Stryker vehicle. These changes will design and buy “necessary components to support the Stryker mine protection kit” for vehicles in the Afghan theater.

Work will be performed in Sterling Heights, MI (5%), and London, Canada (95%), with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/10. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W56HZV-07-D-M112).

Oct 27/10: +46. A $8.3 million firm-fixed-price contract cuts the modified double-v hull design into another 46 Stryker vehicles on the production line. Note that cut-in contracts pay for making the changes and for the new materials, not for the entire Stryker.

Work will be performed in London, Canada (50%), and Anniston, AL (50%), with an estimated completion date of Feb 29/12. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W56HZV-07-D-M112, #0256). This order brings the total to the program’s goal of 450 vehicles.

Oct 13/10: +45. A $9.5 million firm-fixed-price contract to cut the modified double-V hull design into the production of another 45 Stryker vehicles. Work is to be performed in London, Ontario, Canada (50%), and Anniston, AL (50%), with an estimated completion date of February 2012. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W56HZV-07-D-M112).

FY 2010

M1129 MC – no DVH
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Aug 10/10: Renovations may be more difficult than they first appear. A $20 million firm-fixed-price contract adds the modified hull design (double-V hull), into an additional 78 new-build vehicles, raising the total to 359. It also revises the obligated amount for the previous 281 vehicles (vid. July 9/10). Work is to be performed in London, Ontario, Canada (50%), and Anniston, AL (50%), with an estimated completion date of Feb 22/12. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W56HZV-07-D-M112). See also GD release.

Aug 6/10: A $9.8 million firm-fixed-price contract revises the obligated amount for the production cut-in of the revised Stryker performance and hull design into 281 new-build vehicles (vid. July 9/10). Work is to be performed in Sterling Heights, MI (30%), and London, Canada (70%), with an estimated completion date of Feb 16/12. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W56HZV-07-D-M112).

July 9/10: A $30.1 million firm-fixed-price contract directs production cut-in of the revised Stryker performance specifications, which incorporates a modified double-V hull design, into 281 vehicles. The new vehicles will be sent to Afghanistan. Work will be performed in London, Canada (70%), and Sterling Heights, MI (30%). Deliveries will begin in January 2011 to allow vehicles to be available for use by the Stryker brigade that will rotate into Afghanistan in 2011, and will be completed by February 2012. (W56HZV-07-D-M112). See also GDLS release.

June 1/10: The GM GDLS Defense Group, LLC in Sterling Heights, MI recently received a $29.1 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract buys 14 Stryker Double-V Hull prototype vehicles for government ballistic, performance/durability, and logistics testing and demonstration.

Work is to be performed in Sterling Heights, MI (41%); and London, ON, Canada (59%), with an estimated completion date of Nov 30/11. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by TACOM, CCTA-AI in Warren, MI (W56HZV-07-D-M112).

April 9/10: A $58.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for a modified hull design for the US Army’s Stryker vehicles to improve performance and survivability in Afghanistan. Work is to be performed in Sterling Heights, MI (41%), and London, Ontario, Canada (59%), with an estimated completion date of Nov 30/11 (W56HZV-07-D-M112).

March 11/2010: During US Senate testimony in early 2010, Gen. George Casey said that the US Army was planning to modify the Stryker vehicle with a double V-shaped hull designed to deflect land mine blasts from below.

The Stryker M1135 NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) reconnaissance and M1128 MGS assault gun variants would reportedly not be modified under the current plan. That could create field issues, since the M1128 is meant to act as firepower support in Stryker brigades.

Additional Readings

• General Dynamics Land Systems – Stryker ICV, DVH

• US Army – Army plans major Stryker upgrades. Outlines the next steps beyond the DVH program. A number of DVH vehicles will probably receive these retrofits as well.

• DID – Stryker DVH Armored Vehicles for Colombia. The country ordered 24 LAV-III DVHs in January 2012.

In the first nine months of this year, over 5,000 Afghans voluntary returned to Afghanistan from Europe. The recent signing of an agreement between Afghanistan and the European Union to allow deportations of those who have not been accepted as asylum seekers means the numbers of Afghans returning from Europe will rise. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica and Fazal Muzhary have been looking into the fate of recent returnees, who may have gone heavily into debt to fund their trip, and hearing from two young men who have just returned from Norway after trying to bicycle their way to a life in Europe.

This dispatch is part of a joint migration series by AAN and the Kabul office of the German foundation Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES).

In early October 2016, Afghanistan signed four new readmission agreements, with Germany, Sweden, Finland and the EU. (2) These new agreements are a response to the large influx of Afghan asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016, with over a quarter of a million Afghans arriving in Europe in this period (see AAN earlier reporting on Afghan migration here and here). Germany, one of the main countries pushing for a deal, received the bulk of the influx, with 180,000 asylum applications by Afghans in 2015 and 2016.

The agreements were partly in response to the trouble European countries faced in getting the Afghan authorities to cooperate with the deportation of failed Afghan asylum seekers. The agreements have widely been interpreted as a signal that European countries intend to significantly accelerate the rate of forced and voluntary returns.

Voluntary and forced returns

On 24 February 2016, a group of 125 Afghans arrived in Kabul from Germany (see here). This was the first group of voluntary returnees from Germany, after Europe’s ‘migration crisis’ in 2015. Germany hosts the highest number of Afghan refugees after Pakistan and Iran (for the number of Afghan refugees in Germany for the last 13 years, see here). Apart from having their trips back to Afghanistan paid, the German government – in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) – also provided each of the 125 returnees with 700 Euros to help with their reintegration. Around 70 Afghans from this group continued their journey to their home provinces; IOM also covered the cost of this second stage of the trip, as well as accommodation in guesthouses in Kabul ahead of the journey.

The rate of voluntary returns from Europe has been steadily increasing. Between 2003 and the beginning of 2016, IOM facilitated over 15,000 voluntary returnees from countries including the UK, Norway, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, France, Belgium and Australia, in other words, on average, a little over a thousand individuals per year. In the first half of 2016, over 4,000 voluntary returns including 440 families were assisted by IOM. In this period, the highest number of voluntary returns was recorded from Germany (51 percent) followed by Greece (26 percent) and Turkey (10 percent). The majority of the returnees belonged to the age group of 19-26 (40 percent, out of which 87 percent were male) followed by 27-40 (21 percent, out of which 74 percent were male).

In terms of the Afghan government’s stance when it comes to repatriations of Afghans from Europe, its focus so far had been on trying to prevent mass forced returns (or any forced returns at all). Recently, however, after a long negotiation process with the EU, the Afghan government had been forced to accept a series of readmission agreements in which it committed itself to readmit Afghan nationals who are found to have no legal basis for remaining in an EU member state (for more details see AAN reporting here). Although the agreements contain no indication of numbers (other than that it says that there will be no more than 50 non-voluntary returnees per flight in the first six months), an earlier leaked memo stated that “more than 80,000 persons could potentially need to be returned in the near future.”

The Afghan government does not appear to have a policy in place to deal with this potential influx of returnees from Europe, many of whom will have exhausted their economic means during their journey to Europe and their families may well have gone into debt or sold economic assets, such as land, to help send them (see previous joint AAN and FES study on this issue here http://aan.af/2452WyK). Although there seems to be a document called the Comprehensive Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programme, (AAN has not seen the document, but an advisor with the refugees’ ministry mentioned it in a conversation), it is yet to be incorporated into the Strategic Solutions for Afghan Refugees programme, a regional multi-year initiative, which aims to help facilitate voluntary returns and sustainable reintegration, while at the same time providing assistance to host countries. The programme, moreover, would need to be funded and implemented by IOM, or another agency.

The government and the refugees’ ministry may also be overwhelmed with returnees from another quarter: already this year (figures from early September 2016), more than 225,000 Afghans have returned from Pakistan and 245,000 people become IDPs this year. This means that, already, over one million people are anticipated to be ‘on the move’ internally and across borders in 2016 (see UN Humanitarian Flash Appeal from September 2016 here). The returnees from Europe, who, so far, have come in far more limited numbers and get help from IOM, do not seem to have been a priority and the Afghan government seems to have relied on the fact that they are already receiving some support from their temporary hosts in Europe. But as their numbers rise, the issue will become more pressing.

This is particularly relevant, as public opinion will probably not respond favourably. Many Afghans believe their government is not doing enough to persuade European governments, as well as Pakistan and Iran, to allow Afghans to stay, as long as the country is still in conflict and the economy weak. Although forced returns from Europe have been limited, they are likely to pick up in the near future. Voluntary returns, already at an all-time high, are also likely to sharply increase (particularly as pressure grows in European countries). The concerns are what will happen to those returning in the near future, whether voluntary or forced.

AAN spoke to two recent returnees from Europe – Muder Khan from Khost province and Rahmatullah from Samangan – who spoke about the individual experiences of those who have tried their luck in Europe, but end up being returned home.

The travel to Europe: taking the Arctic route

Both of these returnees were young men who had travelled to Norway via Russia in the autumn of 2015. This was at a time when Afghans overtook Syrians in terms of numbers of arrivals in Norway. They travelled via what the Reuters news agency has referred to as ‘the Arctic route’. According to Reuters, almost 22,000 people sought asylum at Norway’s borders in the first ten months of 2015, including 7,858 from Syria and 4,079 from Afghanistan – with a record number of arrivals at the most northern frontier of 196 per day in November 2015 (compared to 10 arrivals throughout the whole of 2014). The Norwegian directorate of immigration even sent a tweet warning in November 2015 that single Afghan men who have legal papers to stay in Russia, risk being sent back to Afghanistan if seeking asylum in Norway (see here).

Muder’s story

Muder Khan, a man in his late twenties from Khost province, made use of the so-called ‘bicycle loophole – a legal loophole that allowed people to cross the remote Arctic Russian-Norwegian border by bicycle (described in a Guardian article here). He had found a smuggler in Gul Bahar business centre in Kabul and left money with a friend, who was charged with paying the smuggler once he safely arrived in Norway. He then first travelled to Russia on a 40-day tourist visa arranged by the smuggler and then crossed the border with Norway by bicycle, again on advice of the smuggler. This northern route, across the Arctic Circle, was much less busy and faster than the Balkan route was in 2015 and 2016. He recollected the journey he undertook in October 2015 in his interview with AAN:

I left Afghanistan for Europe in October 2015 and arrived in Norway in November 2015. Initially, I wanted to go to Germany… but in the end, my target was just to get to Europe and to find a safe place. First the smugglers told us that the way through Ukraine would be easy, because we could fly to Moscow and from there go to Ukraine and from Ukraine to Europe… I had a 40-day Russian tourist visa with me. When the Russian soldiers stopped us in Belgorod [near the Russian–Ukrainian border] they asked us where we were going. The smuggler had advised us to tell them that we were going to a wedding party. But the Russian border guards still detained us. We were held for three days and three nights; then they released us. When we got back to Moscow, the smuggler told us that the route through Norway was much easier and that we could easily get to Europe from there.

I spent ten days in Moscow, after I returned back from the border with Ukraine. After that we went Murmansk where we stayed for a few days. After ten days the Russian soldiers [probably referring to Federal Border Service guards] provided bikes for us and from there we biked onto Norwegian soil. The Norwegian soldiers [at the other side of the border] welcomed us. When we showed them our documents, they took our passports and after checking them they took us to a city.

Rahmatullah’s story

Our second interviewee, Rahmatullah, is a Shia Muslim from Samangan province whose family lives in Karachi in Pakistan. He chose to leave Afghanistan via the Arctic route in mid-September 2015. He said he was, “too afraid of the smuggling route through Iran,” hence had chosen the route via Russia. He shared the following story with AAN:

I wanted to go to Europe through Russia. First I went to Moscow by plane. From Moscow we went to Murmansk by plane and from there I got into Norway. I arrived in Norway in October 2015. I had not decided to go to Norway in the beginning. I wanted to go to Austria and that was also what I had agreed with the smuggler. But when we got to Moscow, I found out that some of my friends tried to go to Austria through Ukraine and had faced a lot of problems. These friends told me not to go to Austria. And then the border was also closed.

Refusal, deportation and arrival

Both men received a negative response from the Norwegian government after which both claimed they were detained (see here for an overview of Norwegian asylum procedure and here what happens if the asylum claim had been rejected). Rahmatullah did not give any details on how he was arrested by the Norwegian police, but he told AAN that he spent two weeks in detention, before he was sent back to Afghanistan:

After I got a negative response from the Norwegian government, the police put me in jail. The reason they gave was that whoever receives a negative response from the Norwegian government, tries to flee the country. They thought I would escape from Norway. Therefore they did not let me out of the jail at all. After that, I hired a lawyer for my case. An Afghan and three Norwegians helped me to pay for the lawyer who worked on my case. When the police put me in jail, they told me that they would deport me in two weeks. My lawyer sent my documents to the UN, but since there was too much workload on the UN workers, they could not deal with my documents. The lawyer told me that after I was sent back to Afghanistan, he would still follow my case. I was deported on 21 June 2016. Since then I have been in touch with my lawyer. He said he is still trying [to get him back to Norway].

After a month in detention, the Norwegian government also sent back Muder Khan. He told AAN the following story of his arrival to Norway and stay in the country:

When we got onto Norwegian soil, for the first three to four months, the police treated us well, but later they put us in small rooms; there were 15-20 people in one room and the rooms were very cold. Other people who were with me in Norway had their applications rejected very quickly, but I only got my answer after eight months. The reason they gave for the rejection was that, since I am living in Khost province, which is not a secure province, I should better move to Kabul city.

This is not a surprising answer. “The courts in Europe accept that many are in danger in their home provinces, but they argue that these people can be safe in Kabul,” Liza Schuster told AAN. Schuster is a lecturer at the City University of London, who has researched what happens to Afghans post-deportation. (See also her recently published article, in which Schuster questions European court decisions, and argues that Kabul is not safe for people to be deported back to the city).

Muder Khan explained to AAN how he was returned to Afghanistan, without making it fully clear whether he was deported or returned willingly. This is what he told AAN:

After I got the rejection, they put me in jail for a month [he is referring to a centre for deportees or asylum centre as the jail]. The jail cells were small. I was kept in the cell from eight in the evening till nine in the morning. After I spent one month in jail, the Norwegian government deported me [NB he used the English term and it was not clear if he meant the return was voluntary or force]. They didn’t ask me anything or say anything or promise anything. I thought: even if I resist and say that I don’t want to go back to Afghanistan, it will not change the decision of the Norwegian government. So I kept silent and they sent me back to Kabul.

Muder Khan was sent back on 3 September 2016, ten months after he arrived in Norway in November 2015.

Both men had spent a small fortune to pay for their travel to Europe. Rahmatullah, a cook who had worked for international media companies in Kabul since 2010, paid 17,000 US dollars to reach Norway. Since he returned in June 2016, he lives in Kabul on his own, while his family is still in Karachi. He has no job and no money to pay his debts. He told AAN:

I am not happy with my life, because I cannot freely walk in the city as other people can [he is referring to threats he said he received from locals in Samangan, because he worked with international organisations as a cook]. I am waiting for the response from my lawyer, I hope he will help me get back to Norway. If nothing happens I may go to Karachi and join my family. I don’t feel safe here and I don’t want to stay here.

Muder Khan worked as an interpreter and contractor with the American military in Khost and as a project supervisor with MEC, earning 600 US dollars a month. He paid 13,000 US dollars for his trip to Norway. He is in Kabul. He told AAN he cannot go back to Khost province:

I am going from one friend to another [staying in their houses]. I have no job at all. Currently I am in debt for 7,000 US dollars to my friends who helped me. I also sold a car to finance my trip to Europe.

Support for those who return

Those who choose to return voluntary with IOM assistance generally receive several benefits, as opposed to those who do not join the scheme. A facilitated return often includes travel costs and in-airport support with check-in and arrival (deportees get this too), a medical assessment before travel, including basic treatment and referrals, temporary accommodation in Kabul and onward transportation to the provinces, information provision and counselling, often a small cash grant to address the most immediate needs during travel and on arrival (clothing, communication etc), and more extensive post-arrival counselling services, if required. Finally, to ease the reintegration, voluntary returnees can receive additional support in the form of training, business start-up funds, job referrals, and schooling and living cost assistance. These programmes are designed to allow returnees to finish their education, to learn a skill (like carpentry), start small business, or find a job to help ease their reintegration.

Both Rahmatullah and Muder Khan said there was little help on offer. Muder Khan, for example, said:

The Norwegians paid me 350 US dollars for travel expenses in Afghanistan. The police who deported me told me I can also submit an application [for a reintegration grant] to the Norwegian embassy to provide me with 1200 US dollars, but I have not submitted it yet… The Afghan government did not support me and I have no budget to start a business with, but still I am looking to find a job.

Rahmatullah, it seems, got his 1200 US dollars grant from the Norwegian government immediately:

When the Norwegian police deported me to Kabul, they gave me 1160 US dollars. The Norwegian government also paid the expenses for a hotel in Kabul where I stayed for 14 days. The Afghan government did not give me anything; instead the Afghan police at the airport insulted me by using abusive words against me.

The size of the assistance grant depends on the governments that are sending back the migrants. For example, the UK government pays only 100 pounds to returnees, the German government around 700 Euros and the Finnish around 1000 Euros. The grant money is intended to help people get through the first couple of weeks or months after their return.

However, many people, like Rahmatullah and Muder Khan, have sold their belongings and borrowed a lot of money from family and friends, or moneylenders. After being forced to return to Afghanistan, if they are not plugged into a support network, they risk facing serious challenges. According to Schuster, “Those without networks face destitution, or worse, and are often forced to risk trying to return to the dangerous provinces [they had left in the first place].” Her research on what happens post-deportation found that, for these reasons, 80 percent of those who are deported, are likely to migrate again. Schuster, believes deportation represents a crisis that must be resolved. In a recent co-authored article (“What happens post-deportation? The experience of deported Afghans” with Nassim Majidi, Migration Studies journal) she argues:

If someone is deported before debts can be repaid, and if they are unlikely to be able to repay it post-deportation, there is a strong incentive to re-migrate, even if that means increasing the original debt. Debts, whether to family members or to more formal lenders, cannot be written off and those lenders recognize that their best chance of repayment is through financing re-migration.

Although, according to Schuster, most undocumented Afghans in Europe work in the shadow labour market, making minimal daily wages, for Afghans this still represents more money that many of them could make in Afghanistan. The chance of landing a job in Europe is thus considered insurance that they would be able to pay their debts and financially support their families.

Some European governments believe that media campaigns would change the way Afghans think. The German government, for example, has channelled money through the refugees’ ministry in an effort to try to stem the mass exodus of Afghans, with a social media and billboard campaign (from March 2015) (see here). It uses graphic images and messages aimed at discouraging those wanting to leave, such as, “Don’t go. Stay with me. There might be no return!” The number of Afghans leaving the country, however, continued to increase in the second half of 2015, and coincided with the opening of the Balkan route (see AAN report here).

The relatively unsuccessful media campaign resulted in a change of narrative of some donor countries, which started to consider re-shuffling the development aid towards the provinces which were sending the highest numbers of migrants to Europe to try, not only to prevent migration, but also help returnees to reintegrate. However, the Afghan government’s policy, which until recently was exclusively focused on defying readmissions, requires some fundamental reshaping and rethinking. Afghanistan has just received a pledge of 15 billion US dollars for the next four years at the Brussels conference on Afghanistan (see AAN recent reporting here), but with the government, and in particular the refugees’ ministry in denial of the problem, and not ready to cooperate, it seems that Europe would be a driver of the reintegration process itself.

 

 

(1) In the past 15 years, Afghanistan has signed memoranda of understandings on returns and readmissions with several EU/Schengen member states. These allow the countries to return or deport Afghans who failed in the asylum application. Including with France (2002), UK (2002), Netherlands (2002), Denmark (2004), Switzerland (2005), Norway (2005), and Sweden (2006, until 2009).

The EU and Afghanistan signed the readmission agreement on 2 October 2016 after a year of negotiations and several last minute hurdles – including, on the Afghan side, refusals to sign and an attempt to involve parliament. President Ghani and Dr Abdullah both backed the agreement, while Minister for Refugees Balkhi said Afghans migrants should be allowed to stay, regardless of whether their claims for asylum were accepted or not.

See AAN recent reporting here.

 

More than 12,000 people have already signed a petition asking the Geneva-based giant Trafigura to sell only gasoline and diesel that comply with European standards around the world.
The Swiss trader business model of producing and selling highly polluting high sulfur fuels in Africa has also been politically critical. In Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, the responsible authorities and members of the government have had to answer many questions and criticisms about the health consequences of poor sulfur standards and poor quality fuels.

Swiss commodity trading companies take advantage of weak fuel standards in Africa to produce, deliver and sell diesel and gasoline, which is damaging to people’s health. Their business model relies on an illegitimate strategy of deliberately lowering the quality of fuels in order to increase their profits. Using a common industry practice called blending, trading companies mix cheap but toxic intermediate petroleum products to make what the industry calls “African Quality” fuels. These intermediate products contain high levels of sulphur as well as other toxic substances such as benzene and aromatics.

By selling such fuels at the pump in Africa, the traders increase outdoor air pollution, causing respiratory disease and premature death. This affects West Africa, in particular, because this is the region where the authorised levels of sulphur in fuels remain very high. West Africa does not have the re ning capacity to produce enough gasoline and diesel for its own consumption, and so it must import the majority of its fuels from Europe and the US, where fuel standards are strict, Public Eye`s investigation September 2016 analyse writes.

To draw attention to this swiss illegal traffic, thanks to Public Eye's "Return to sender" action, the container Irene Rainbow, with on board a container marked "Return to sender" ", Filled with polluted air from the Ghanaian capital traveled 7,000 kilometers separating Accra from the port of Anvers and was then transported to Geneva, where it was handed to Trafigura.

Tag: dirty dieselSwitzerland

In his latest contribution to the Centre for Security Governance blog, CSG Senior Fellow David Law discusses new initiatives and ongoing efforts by the Canadian government as part of its overall strategy of re-engagement with peace operations. This article is a follow-up to the CSG blog series which explored the security sector reform (SSR) dimension

Cable specialist SAB Bröckskes has put a broad range of new cable materials on the market for medical devices. In addition to the basic type with high-abrasion and tear strength, the bio compatible material series SABmed S contains an ultra-flexible …

GMT Rubber-Metal-Technic Ltd is an internationally recognised designer and supplier of rubber-metal anti-vibration mounts and shock-protection products for clients in the naval and marine industries.

Grants agreements worth a total of €1.4 million were signed today 28 October at the European Defence Agency (EDA) for three selected research activities to be carried out under the EU’s first Pilot Project in the field of defence research.

The grant agreements were signed at the European Defence Agency in presence of EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq, European Commission Deputy Director General Pierre Delsaux (DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs) and representatives of the three winner consortia.
 

Uncharted territory – An EU first

The signing marks an important step in EU defence integration since it’s the first time that the European Union is testing the conditions for defence research in an EU framework, funded by the EU budget.

The Pilot Project also paves the way for the launch, in 2017, of the European Commission’s Preparatory Action (PA) on defence research which, in turn, leads to a fully-fledged European Defence Research Programme (EDRP) as part of the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework (2021-2027). All of them - Pilot Project, Preparatory Action and the future European Defence Research Programme - should support R&T that is serving capability priorities identified by Member States in the Capability Development Plan and be taken up in future collaborative capability programmes.

DG GROW Deputy Director General Pierre Delsaux said: "EU funding for defence research was almost inconceivable a few years ago for EU institutions, Member States and the defence community. This Pilot Project is therefore the precursor of a new era."

Mr Delsaux thanked the European Parliament for its support on the Pilot Project and underlined that a lot of effort and intensive work done by both from the Commission and the EDA, to make the Pilot Project work. He also explained that there is still a long way ahead for EU funded defence research and that "the Commission, in accordance with its institutional role and in full compliance with the EU legal context, is ready to work on defining the optimal framework and overseeing the implementation of the defence research priorities set by the Member States."

EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq said: “Today’s signing marks an important milestone and opens a new chapter in the way defence research is funded in Europe. The European Parliament, the European Commission and the EDA have worked together, hand in hand, to set up this Pilot Project which is an important test bed for more defence research funded from the EU budget in the future”.

He particularly thanked German MEP Michael Gahler and other members of the European Parliament’s SEDE committee whose relentless efforts back in 2014 resulted in the EP earmarking funding for an EU Pilot Project in the field of defence research for the first time ever. “The EDA is now looking forward to advancing the activities and making the Pilot Project a success”.

Mr Domecq stressed the “additional boost” EU funding possibilities, such as the Pilot Project and the upcoming Preparatory Action, will give to defence R&T by complementing national research programmes and existing cooperative funding schemes. “Using the EU budget for funding defence R&T will help to generate critical mass, to network European research entities and to increase interoperability and standards. The Pilot Project has already shown to what extent EU funding in conjunction with priorities set by Member States at intergovernmental level can be a powerful catalyst to attract Primes and SMEs, Research Centers and Academia, from big and small Member States. Research in defence also has concrete and profitable spill-over effects for everyday life”, he said. “R&T is not nice-to-have. It is an essential prerequisite to develop the required defence capabilities of the future and thus to provide for our citizen’s security”, the EDA Chief Executive concluded.
 

EDA call for proposal

The three activities were selected following an EU-wide call for proposals organized by the EDA between 23 March and 23 June 2016. They cover the following topics:
 

• Inside Building Awareness and Navigation for Urban Warfare (SPIDER) - Grant: €433.225

 The objective of this activity is to provide a proof of concept for an innovative system to improve soldiers’ inside building awareness by introducing into buildings miniaturized sensors which can move and change position to provide better coverage and improved performance. The activity will analyse the possibilities that new technologies and pioneering concepts provide to this aim. The proposed system will be composed by two distinct sensor subsystems: a static outdoor subsystem (a network of radiofrequency sensors that can recognize humans inside the building) and a mobile indoor subsystem which will be based on mobile robots capable of sensing the interior of the building using video camera and range-finding sensors such as depth sensors. The robots will be controlled by operators through a secure communication system. A separate station will receive all information obtained by both outdoor and indoor sensors to reconstruct an indoor map of the building. By visualizing the indoor map, the soldiers will have a crucial awareness enabling them to safely navigate inside the building. The system will be designed to be highly robust to endure operation in hostile environments.

This activity was won by a consortium led by TEKEVER, a Portuguese technology company, and composed of IT Aveiro - Instituto de Telecomunicações (Portugal), Aralia (Spain) and the Bulgarian Defence Institute (BDI).
 

• Standardisation of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) Detect and Avoid (TRAWA) - Grant: €433.292

 The aim of this activity is to contribute to the development of standards for a performant and affordable detect and avoid (DAA) system usable on-board Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). In concrete terms, it will specify ‘well clear’ boundaries in exact terms so that specifications for DAA technical systems can be derived from them. It will also develop requirements for remote pilot HMI (Human Machine Interface) characteristics. In addition, a method will be provided through which it can be identified which RPAS types can be integrated into airspace together with other aircraft categories, and vice versa, given their DAA technology capabilities. The proposed solution will be complementary with on-going European activities of the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE), Eurocontrol and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in this field. It will in particular follow the EUROCAE ED78a standardisation process. The activity is an enabler for the widespread use of RPAS in non-segregated airspace in Europe because it supports the development of standards for the certification of DAA solutions and helps to identify technology capabilities which need to be developed by the European defence industry.

This activity was won by a consortium led by the Netherlands Aerospace Center (NLR) with the following partners: the German Aerospace Center (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt, DLR), Deep Blue (Italy), Tony Henley Consulting (UK) and EuroUSC (Italy).
 

• Unmanned Heterogeneous Swarm of Sensor Platforms (EuroSWARM) - Grant: €434.000

This activity will demonstrate, through a live experimentation, that typical military missions and tasks can be performed in exemplary scenarios by an unmanned, autonomous and heterogeneous ‘swarm’ system of systems, using emerging enabling technologies.

EuroSWARM’s main objectives are: - to develop key techniques for adaptive, informative and reconfigurable operations of unmanned heterogeneous swarm systems, namely: optimal task allocation and resource management; sensor fusion, cooperative guidance, robust sensor network; - to integrate the developed enabling techniques; - to validate the developed enabling techniques based on empirical simulation studies; - to demonstrate the proposed solutions based on a small scale of experiments.    

The activity is expected to deliver a control & command architecture for autonomous and heterogeneous swarms of sensors. The architecture will host a wide variety of piloted and autonomous swarm elements, such as unmanned air/ground/naval platforms, steerable mast, unattended remote-controlled sensors, protective devices (laser, jammer, smoke generators etc.). Any kind of weaponry is excluded from the system. Using static/mobile sensors and vehicles in an unmanned swarm-based autonomous system such as EuroSWARM can become a pilot for large scale usage to deal with critical European and global challenges such as border control or surveillance-security.

The activity was won by a consortium led by the University of Cranfield (UK) which also includes the French aerospace research agency ONERA (Office National d'Etudes et de Recherches Aérospatiales), the Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI and the University of Patras (Greece).    
 

Pilot Project implementation

The signing of the grant agreements fires the starting shot for the implementation phase of the three activities as off 1 November 2016. SPIDER and EuroSWARM will be delivered after 12 months (November 2017) while TRAWA will run for 18 months (May 2018).

The Pilot Project is run and managed by the EDA on behalf of the European Commission based on a delegation agreement signed between the Agency and the Commission in November 2015. As a result, the EDA is responsible for the project’s implementation and management.
 

More information:

• Details on the three projects (Pilot Project call for proposals)
• Factsheet ‘Preparatory Action for CSDP-related research’

 

The EUPOL police mission in Afghanistan is a major and long-standing contribution of the European Union to the rebuilding of the Afghani state. However, its current mandate will expire in December 2016 and discussions are currently ongoing about the possible future modalities of EU engagement to which the hearing on 9 November could make a valuable contribution.
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On 10 November, SEDE/AFCO Committees will hold a first joint exchange of views on the INI report “Constitutional, legal and institutional implications of the CSDP: possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty”. The report will examine the legal possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty as well as the necessary institutional set-up to make CSDP more operational.
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will take place on Wednesday 9 November, 9:00-11:00 and 15:00-18:30, and Thursday 10 November, 9:00-12:30 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply foraccess to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

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watch the meeting live
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