Armed militants have overrun Afghan Local Police (ALP) and a public uprising unit’s posts in the Mirza Olang village of Sayad district in Sar-e Pul province on 6 August 2017. Dozens of civilians were reportedly killed. There is another dimension, however, that created widespread international media reporting about the incident: claims by local officials that Taleban and Daesh fighters – usually fighting each other – had committed the atrocities in a “rare joint” operation. AAN’s Obaid Ali explored the insurgents’ configuration in this area and found no Daesh presence there (with input from Thomas Ruttig).
On 3 August 2017, the Taleban carried out a large-scale assault against positions of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and public uprising units stationed in Mirza Olang village, roughly 15 kilometers south of Sayad district. Its population mainly consists of Shia Hazaras. Afghan media, quoting local officials (see for example here), reported a large number of civilian casualties. (The Taleban denied that allegation, see here.) On 8 August 2017, the release of 235 hostages was reported, but provincial authorities said more were still “trapped.” A local ALP commander told AAN about 40 families were caught up in the fighting and their fate remains unclear.
UNAMA stated that it was investigating the reports. If the reports about the civilian killings are confirmed and local Taleban commanders are responsible, it would represent a departure from the repeatedly declared official Taleban position that the Shia minority is not considered a target and would be tantamount to another war crime.
The Taleban attack on ALP and uprising positions in Mirza Olang, however, corresponds with patterns observed in other provinces more generally. In Baghlan province, for instance, the Taleban conducted a large-scale offensive against ALP and public uprising bases led by a Hazara commander in 2016 who refused to surrender his security checkpoint at Surkh Kotal (read previous AAN analysis on this here). ALP units have also been targeted in Zabul and Uruzgan provinces, in some cases over long periods of time (AAN analysis here, here and here).
Sayad district borders Qush Tepa and Darzab, both also highly contested districts of neighbouring Jawzjan province in the west and southwest and Belcheragh district of Faryab and Kohistanat district of Sar-e Pul in the south. Kohistanat was captured by the Taleban in July 2015 and remains largely under Taleban control. The militants consider Mirza Olang a strategic area from where they can threaten Sayad’s district centre as well as the highway leading to Kohistanat district of Sar-e Pul further in the south. Both districts have been in the focus of Taleban activity in this remote northern province for a number of years. Their most recent attack on Sayad occurred in April this year. Kohistanat has been largely controlled by the Taleban since summer 2015, and its district centre has changed hands several times over the past two years, in July 2015 and again in late July this year, only to be reclaimed by Afghan government forces two days later (reporting here and here).
Eyewitness: how the resistance collapsed
The ALP and public uprising units in the village are led by Hazara commanders. In total, they were able to muster only under 70 fighters from the Hazara community: 36 from the ALP unit and from the 30 public uprising forces.
Gul Hussain Sharifi, the leading ALP commander in Mirza Olang, told AAN the Taleban had been besieging the security checkpoints for two years. According to him, the local government ignored several requests to send in reinforcements. For the recent clash, he added, the Taleban had gathered fighters from all around the province, and the limited number of the local security forces were not able to defeat them. After a day and half of intense clashes, one ALP member and four public uprising fighters were killed. Eventually elders from the village approached him, asking him to retreat with his fighters as otherwise all of them would be captured or killed by the militants. (According to established guidelines, elders vet the ALP members from their villages.)
In early morning of 6 August 2017, Sharifi told AAN, he and his fighters and members of the public uprising group members fled to provincial centre all along with their families. That led to the collapse of the security checkpoints, after which point other villagers also fled the area. Only ten families along with four elders stayed in the village. According to Sharifi, some families who intended to flee got stuck in the Mirza Olang valley where fighting was going on. He said that “35 civilians who wanted to flee from the village were shot dead by militants.”
Habib Qasemi, another ALP commander in the area who resisted against the Taleban in the recent assault and managed to flee to provincial centre, told AAN that over the past two years most of the public uprising fighters had left their jobs due to a fear that the area will fall into the militants’ hand. In that period, he said,their number dropped from 150 fighters to only 30. He said that “this is not enough force to protect this strategic area.”
Taleban structures in Sayad
The Taleban had established a strong, multi-ethnic foothold in Sar-e Pul at least by 2012 (see AAN analysis here), starting from first pockets in 2009 (see this AAN report, p4). The province is another example where they successfully recruited and integrated non-Pashtuns; most of the positions in the local Taleban structures are held by them (AAN’s previous analysis on this here). This leaves limited potential space for Daesh-affiliated groups, and there have been no reports that such cases were successful over the longer term.
A recently published report by Kabul-based The Liaison Office and German institute BICC mentions two cases from late 2015 when “influential local commanders—a Tajik affiliated with Hizb-e Islami in Kohistan and an Arab described as Salafi Taliban—had independently ‘invited’ Daesh to their respective area to increase their power base“ through “Urdu-speaking Pakistani guests.” Reportedly, the ‘guests’ left the province again after about a month, and there was no indication that “a link had been created with [Daesh’s Afghan headquarters in] Nangarhar and the Daesh Shura.” The report also mentions that the Taleban’s difficulties with guaranteeing a steady flow of supplies to local commanders might encourage them to look for other sponsors.
In the case of Sayad, Mullah Nader leads the Taleban in the district. He is an Aimaq from Al-Malek village in Sayad and served as a group leader during the Taleban’s Emirate in the 1990s. After the fall of the Taleban regime in 2001, he laid down his weapons and ran a small business (most likely drug smuggling) in Kohistanat district. He was arrested by government forces in 2003 and later managed to escape. He has been reported active in the area again at least since 2010 and re-established the Taleban movement in the province by mobilising fighters from his town and his network of drug smugglers. Since then he has served in different posts in the Taleban’s shadow administrative and military structure. Recently, Mullah Nader has been appointed as the Taleban’s shadow district governor for Sayad.
According to sources close to the Taleban in Sar-e Pul, he has strong family relations with Sher Muhammad, another Taleban mid-level commander in Sayad. Sher Muhammad (alias Ghazanfar) is also an Aimaq, from Kandah village of Sayad. He received a religious education in Sar-e Pul and is currently leading a small group of 25 fighters, mostly his relatives and villagers.
After the recent attack and the killings in Mirza Olang, many media outlets quoted Sayad’s district governor Sharif Aminyar, claiming that Ghazanfar is Daesh-affiliated. Speaking to AAN, provincial council member Aref Sharifi also said there was no difference between Daesh and the Taleban in the district and that both groups cooperated and conducted coordinated offensives against security forces.
The recent attack on the Sayad security posts was led by Mullah Nader. Ghazanfar and his fighters fought with them under the Taleban banner. The Taleban also claimed Ghazanfar as their commander after the recent fighting in Sayad (read here), indirectly, though perhaps not intentionally, assigning responsibility to him for the killings of civilians in Sayad.
According to sources close to Taleban in Sar-e Pul, before the fighting, Ghazanfar had reportedly visited Daesh-affiliated commander Qari Hekmat in his area of operation in Qush Tepa district of Jawzjan. According to onging AAN research, Hekmat is an Uzbek and former Taleban commander who had been expelled from the movement after a dispute over taxation with the Taleban shadow provincial governor and ‘unauthorised kidnappings’ and subsequently declared allegiance with Daesh. He largely controls Qush Tepa district. (The Jawzjan insurgency will be discussed in more detail in an upcoming AAN’s dispatch.) It is possible that Ghazanfar even declared allegiance to Daesh as the New York Times reported.
According to those sources, however, Mullah Nader reached out to Ghazanfar and brought him back to Sayad with his group of 25 fighters and under the Taleban banner.
Conclusion
The Taleban’s large presence, their obvious intention to eliminate rival groups and their superior manpower and resources limit the space for Daesh to establish a footprint in areas such as Sayad, and in fact in most areas of northern and north-eastern Afghanistan (read our previous dispatch on this here and here). With Salafist influences and sympathies for Daesh spreading among some limited religious circles and younger fighters, or due to funding and supply issues, local commanders might find it opportune to signal readiness to ally to Daesh, or at least explore the option. This seems to have been the case with commander Ghazanfar. His case and research quoted above also show that the Taleban are still able to rein in such commanders in most cases. In this light, to interpret the Sayad attack as a joint ‘Taleban-Daesh’ operation stretches the facts too far.
I wrote the following article for The National Interest.
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The Zapad-2017 military exercise that will take place in September in Russia and Belarus has already begun to draw attention in the Western press. In recent days, media outlets have published somewhat panicked accounts about the unprecedented numbers of Russian troops conducting drills on the borders of vulnerable eastern European countries like Poland and Lithuania. Others are arguing that once Russian troops enter Belarus to participate in the exercise, they are likely to stay behind “in order to give Moscow a more-advanced forward base in Europe” or, in the less carefully chosen words of some Ukrainian officials, to occupy Belarus possibly as a prelude to an invasion of Ukraine from the north. Given this level of excitement about a military exercise still six weeks away, it may be useful to analyze what we actually know about the upcoming exercise and its predecessors.
The Zapad exercise is a regularly scheduled event that has been held quadrennially since 1999. What’s more, it is part of an annual rotating series of large scale exercises that serve as the capstone to the Russian military’s annual training cycle. The series rotates through the four main Russian operational strategic commands (Eastern, Caucasus, Central and Western) that give name to the exercises. Similar major strategic operational exercises were held in the fall throughout the Soviet period as well. In other words, everyone has known that this exercise would be held in the early fall of 2017 since at least four years ago. The only uncertainty was regarding the scope and exact parameters of the exercise.
These aspects remain uncertain at the present time. Official Russian sources have indicated that the total number of troops involved in the exercise will not exceed 13,000, while Western officials and analysts have been quoted as sayingthat as many as 100,000 Russian personnel may be involved. Previous Zapad exercises have been on the larger side, with Zapad-2013 involving approximately 75,000 troops and personnel. Part of the discrepancy in numbers may stem from a disagreement over who should be counted. The highest Western numbers usually include not just members of the Russian armed forces, but also personnel from security agencies and civilian officials who may be involved in parts of the exercise. Furthermore, the Russian military may choose to conduct other related exercises that are not technically part of Zapad-2017 and would therefore not be included in the official declaration on the number of troops involved.
What we do know is that the total number of Russian troops on Belarusian territory is not expected to exceed 3,000 personnel. … <To read the rest of the article, click here>
The temporary capture of Janikhel district centre by Taleban forces in late July 2017 stands out in the relatively static, mountainous and geographically and tribally fractured region of eastern Paktia and Khost. There, most district centres continue to be in government hands, while many areas outside of them are more or less under Taleban control. However, the situation has become more fluid over some time. Although the capture was a raid and show-of-force, rather than an attempt to seize and hold a district centre, it seems to reflect a more aggressive approach on the part of the insurgents in that area. As AAN Thomas Ruttig and Fazal Muzhary find, the Taleban’s increased footprint in and stronger hold on parts of this area close to the border with Pakistan is also the outcome of a long-term neglect of an area that, for a long time, has been taken for granted as being pro-government.
What happened in Janikhel?
Early on 25 July 2017, after two days of fighting, a large group of Taleban fighters overran the centre of Janikhel district. The district itself is a small, mountainous strip of land at Paktia’s border with Khost province, close to Pakistani Waziristan and with a number of important local roads running through it. On 5 August 2017, government officials reported they had recaptured the district centre (media report here). Local observers based in the region and in Kabul told AAN that a large government force was deployed and this convoy made it to and retook the district centre. Later, Afghan officials were flown in to see the success.
This followed some days of ANSF fighting their way up to Reshpegi Kandao, a pass about three kilometres away from the district town on a winding route leading uphill through forested and mountainous area that had been heavily mined by the Taleban. Fighting seems to have finished now (ie as of 7 August 2017) and the insurgents returned to their previous positions. They are mainly in Kotkai, a plain towards neighbouring Musakhel district (in Khost province), where they have established several bases over recent years. They might have left the district centre, the observers believe, in order to avoid attracting airstrikes to the area.
The exact number of casualties of the fighting on both sides is not clear. Both the Afghan government and the Taleban have claimed to have inflicted considerable casualties on each other. Government sources, after the recapture of the district centre, claimed 140 insurgents were killed and over 120 more wounded. Provincial police spokesman Sardar Wali Tabasum said that at least sixteen ‘Pakistani militia forces’ were among those killed during the initial days of the fighting. The Taleban claimed they only lost one killed. According to Abdullah Hasrat, the spokesman for Paktia’s governor, five Afghan security forces were killed and another four wounded, but local people told Azadi Radio (see here) that they saw dead bodies of 12 security forces one day after the fall of the district centre to the Taleban. The Taleban claimed 15 ANSF killed and 15 more were captured alive – a fact earlier denied by Hasrat. In a video released on 30 July 2017, they were shown sitting in a semi-circle being questioned about their provinces of origin and whether they had been treated well (which all of them said was the case). The video also showed some dead bodies of ANSF fighters.
According to the observers, the Taleban carried away large amounts of weapons, including a number of US-made Humvee military vehicles. (Such vehicles are sometimes used as car bombs during attacks, such as that on 20 July 2017 in Gereshk, see here, probably because the Taleban lack the means to keep them operational.)
The district centre fell to the Taleban on the second day after the fighting broke out. On the first day, the pro-government defenders had beaten back the attackers. They set up additional security posts around the centre, which is located high in the mountains, and, as the local observers confirmed, apparently did not see the second wave of attackers coming and were surprised by it. (That there was a surprise effect is surprising in itself, but not unprecedented, as AAN has reported, for example, from Kunduz province – see here.)
The Taleban had pulled together fighters from several districts of Paktia and Khost, as well as from Waziristan on the other side of the Afghan-Pakistani border, local observers told AAN. Waziristan is where most of their bases still are. The comparatively small, closely knit local tribes of Paktia and Khost on the Afghan side have been reluctant to allow them to operate permanently on their territories, and due to the short distances, cross-border raids are effective enough. But there are also areas held by the Taleban inside Afghanistan, for instance, Janikhel’s Kotkai plain, about ten kilometers away from the district centre that has been under Taleban control for several years. According to one local journalist, who did not want to be named for reasons of personal security, the Taleban fighters mainly came from the Haqqani and the Mansur networks, the two traditional Taleban sub-groups in the Afghan southeast (more background on them here).
A member of the provincial council told the German news agency dpa that the fighting has displaced 250 families.
The run-up to the events
It appears the attack was a raid and show-of-force, rather an attempt to seize and hold territory. It reflects a more aggressive approach on the part of the insurgents, particularly in the eastern, mountainous parts of Paktia and Khost, but also in the two provinces’ capitals, Gardez and Khost. (1) For many years, the situation has been relatively static in this mountainous, geographically and tribally fractured region. Most district centres continue to be in government hands, while many areas outside of them are more or less under Taleban control. (As local journalists pointed out to AAN, there is also an economic factor behind the Taleban control of the area, which exports locally gathered pine and walnuts to Pakistan. The Taleban levy taxes on these to generate one important local source of income for their fighters.) This has changed slowly over a number of years with a growing number of significant incidents.
On 20 May 2017, there was an assault by three attackers, one of them being a suicide bomber, on a bank branch office in Gardez, the Paktia’s provincial capital. This caused the death of three people and injured 30 more. Almost simultaneously, a suicide bomber with a very strong explosive device hit a convoy of the Khost Protection Force (KPF) – a local US-run private militia that is not part of the regular government forces – that had stopped in Khost city for shopping. The attack killed 18 people and was claimed by the Taleban. After the withdrawal of most US forces from the region and the closure of a number of their forward bases, the 4-6,000 strong KPF is the Taleban’s main local adversary. They have been effective in pushing back the Haqqani network’s influence in the three Dzadran districts of Paktia (Waza Dzadran, Shwak and Gerda Tserai). (2) This was followed on 18 June 2017 by a coordinated attack on the police headquarters in Gardez. This reduced much of the compound to rubble and killed at least nine people. Gardez, and its outskirts, has been the scene of string of smaller attacks, such as assassinations, often with the use of magnetic bombs. The latest of these incidents happened on 2 August 2017 against a vehicle of a local intelligence official killing two people.
There was also new fighting in Dand-e Pattan in June and Dzadzi Aryub in July 2017, two border districts that, for many years, were known as staunchly pro-government and safe areas, but where conditions have deteriorated over the past years. Taleban activity has also been registered closer to Gardez, as fresh AFP photos of armed insurgents in Ahmad Aba district show (see one here). This increased presence has been met by frequent drone and other air strikes, for example, on 8 July 2017 in Mamozai, Zurmat district, also close to Gardez and a traditional Taleban stronghold (see this news article as well as 2016 AAN reporting about that area) and in Waza Dzadran on 1 August 2017.
The surprise factor of the attack on Janikhel is astonishing because its district centre has fallen to the Taleban at least once before, almost a year ago, on 27 August 2016 after a siege of almost two weeks. People in Baghlan province had then protested (see here) and demanded that the government send additional forces to rescue the besieged soldiers, who were mainly from their province. After the rescue, the district fell to the Taleban.
The Taleban left after ten days, pushed out by air attacks, but torched the district governor’s office building, the houses of government employees and local policemen, as well as other administrational buildings as they retreated (read here). At the time of this latest Taleban attack, the buildings were almost reconstructed, but then destroyed again, as a demonstration of the incapacity of the government to defend the place.
Furthermore, Janikhel has had a pattern of regular Taleban attacks going back in time to at least as early 2007. (3) The Taleban claimed to have captured the district centre first in late 2008. In a 2009 pre-election assessment, UNAMA counted the district as one of three “high risk districts” in Paktia, together with Zurmat and Gerda Tserai, the home village of the Haqqani family. It is, incidentally, since 2001 the only district centre in Paktia that was ever captured by the Taleban, and one of only a few in Loya Paktia (all the others are in Paktika, such as Omna that was taken in September 2016, and Wurmamay that was held for around two weeks in October 2016). [Corrected 8 August 2017: Three districts in Paktika, Naka, Dila and Omna, are the only districts in the region fully, ie including the district centre, controlled by the Taleban.]
Why now, and why Janikhel?
Janikhel, although small and not very populous (official statistics estimate around 100,000 inhabitants), is of strategic importance for the region of eastern Paktia and Khost. The first reason is that the second-largest road connecting the two provincial centres, which the local population mainly uses, runs through the district. (There is also a more direct main road, further to the south.) Second, it is the junction of a number of smaller roads – and insurgent routes, including the one over the Reshpegi Pass – leading to other hotspots in the region, for example, to Waza Dzadran (Paktia), which is controlled by a local rival of the Haqqanis, and Sabari (Khost) districts. Sabari, with its old, madrassa-based ideological Hezb-e Islami and later Taleban networks (the former often under the latter’s command) is another geographical origin of the insurgency in Loya Paktia, which started with the anti-Soviet resistance in the 1980s.
Even more importantly, Janikhel connects – through mountain passes in the border district of Dand-e Pattan – the Haqqani network’s logistic bases over the border in Parachinar (4) with the areas on the Afghan side of the border that are already widely under Taleban control (Dand-e Patan and Janikhel in Paktia; Sabari, Musakhel and Qalandar; the latter three being in Khost province) with other areas further inland, where the Taleban have lesser influence, but is showing an increased activity, such as Ahmad Aba and Sayyed Karam districts near Gardez and further on to Logar and Kabul. Janikhel may also have been chosen for the July raid because its centre sits on a forested mountain range (with even higher mountain tops around it) that is more difficult to defend and further out of reach of the KPF, than the other three districts.
Government neglect, tribal fragmentation…
Local politicians claim that they had seen the attack coming. Mujib Rahman Chamkani, a member of parliament from Paktia province, told AAN that he and his fellow MPs from the province had been telling the government to block the flow of the Taleban from the adjacent districts, which he said had destabilised Janikhel for the last five years, but no action had been taken. The last time he raised the issue, he said, was two weeks before the district fell. He said that they visited “all four security branches: the National Security Council (NSC), Ministry of Defence, National Directorate of Security (NDS) and the Ministry of Interior.” But local intelligence operatives, he claimed, told the central government that their information was incorrect. Chamkani added: “We got a call from the president’s office, who told us a day after our meeting that the situation in Janikhel was normal and the district was not in danger of falling to Taleban.”
According to Chamkani, there are Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers, Afghanistan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) forces deployed to this district. Altogether, he estimated this to total some 300 to 500 men. (Provincial spokesman Hasrat told AAN he could not disclose the number of the deployed forces.) Chamkani, local residents and observers told AAN that the Taleban had clearly outnumbered the government forces.
Chamkani further told AAN that ALP members from his home district (also called Chamkani) told him that they had wanted to come to the rescue of Janikhel, but ran out of fuel half-way there. The local officials, he added, did not give the ALP “enough food, ammunition and fuel for the vehicles or motorbikes.” The governor spokesman rejected these claims as baseless. Other observers also spoke of poor coordination between the various regular and irregular pro-government forces in the area.
As AAN has reported previously from other parts of Afghanistan, what is seen locally as government neglect often leads to theories about possible collusion between government officials and the insurgents. As Chamkani put it: “This [the lack of supplies and coordination] makes one doubt the security officials, [and suspect] that they might have a cooperation with the Taleban or may not have the serious intention to prevent the Taleban from attacking this district.”
However, this is only the latest manifestation of the area’s strained relations with the central government, the origins of which reach back to the first years after the overthrow of the Taleban regime by the US-led 2001 military intervention. This is particularly true for the Pashtun tribe of the Mangal that constitutes almost 100 per cent of the population of Janikhel, Musakhel, Qalandar and Lajja Mangal districts, as well as large parts of Dand-e Pattan, Chamkani and Mirzaka. In the early years, the Mangal and most other tribes of Loya Paktia professed an open pro-government position. The Mangal were particularly well-organised under a central tribal council that resided in Janikhel centre. In 2003, the council decided unilaterally to stop growing poppy (which was not a major, but a visible crop, locally) in response to the anti-narcotics policies adopted by the donors and the new Afghan central government, and in exchange demanded development projects for their area. The decision was committed in writing to the UN mission in Afghanistan. However, neither donors, nor the central government of then President Hamed Karzai, responded to this initiative; the UK – as lead nation for the international community’s anti-narcotics drive – concentrated its funding almost entirely on Nangrahar, which then was a larger growing area.
Another political decision of the Mangal Central Shura very likely contributed to the tribe’s neglect by the Afghan government. During the 2003 ‘constitutional consultation’ in the run-up to the Constitutional Loya Jirga over the turn of 2003 to 2004, the tribe unanimously opted for a restoration of the Afghan monarchy; a decision that clearly angered Karzai. The Mangal council also complained that they were ‘consulted’ about a constitution, the draft of which the government refused to publish.
The failure of the Mangal council to attract projects and funds led to its delegitimisation within the tribe and to the fragmentation of the Mangal tribal leadership in general (and, also, to the resumption of poppy production). By 2009, there were around a dozen Mangal shuras each claiming to represent the entire tribe. Local observers also point to the frequent changes of the Paktia provincial governor (two alone since November 2016), leading to discontinuity and ever-changing realignments and intrigues among the provincial and district administrations and the MPs from the province.
Tribal fragmentation, Taleban gains…
Janikhel district, and the wider Mangal-populated areas of Paktia and Khost illustrate how weak administration, neglect by the central government (even if partly only in local perception) and disintegration of the tribal structure turned an area with a pro-government population into a recruiting ground for the local Taleban, particularly the Haqqani network. According to observers, the Haqqani network has seen an influx of young Mangal men in recent years, motivated largely by joblessness and lack of perspectives. The fact that no Mangal has risen up to the Haqqani network’s leadership, and that the network continues to be dominated by the clan that has given it its name (from the Mezai subtribe of the Dzadran), has not prevented this trend.
The temporary fall of Janikhel illustrates how vulnerable many district centres in Loya Paktia are, even though the Taleban rarely make any serious attempts to capture them. The attack, though ultimately repelled, was a successful show-of-force that had both propaganda (the video that was released) and material value (the military hardware that was captured). It also showed that the Taleban have the initiative and are able to force the government into a reactionary mode. On the other hand, it also illustrates that the insurgents are still not strong enough to keep and hold a district centre in this part of Loya Paktia.
For the time being, the fighting in Janikhel seems to have been more about control over the insurgency supply routes, than over the actual district centre itself. However, it does indicate a more aggressive approach and comes on the back of a slow spread of territorial control of the Haqqani network in eastern Paktia and Khost. This spreading control has been fostered by the slow, long-term fragmentation of institutions of tribal leadership that had earlier guaranteed a considerable degree of tribal unity and, at least a tacit support for the central government. This might be the most concerning development in the region, as it might be irreversible.
(1) Together with Paktika, further south, Paktia and Khost used to be one province until the 1970s (called Paktia); Khost and Paktika were established as separate provinces under President Daud (1973-78). Therefore, to this day, these three provinces are often referred to as Loya (Greater) Paktia (or P2K in NATO language). Provincial borders between them do not count for much with the local population, nor the insurgents, particularly for those tribes now spread over several provinces. As a result of the breakup of the original province, several tribes were split, including the Dzadran (to which the Haqqani family belongs; they now live in three districts each in all three provinces) and the Mangal (the main population of Janikhel) were split. This spread the central government’s dealings with them over three different provincial administrations, thus making it more difficult.
(2) The KPF is, according to different sources, between 4,000 and 6,000 strong and run by the CIA and operates across the provincial boundaries of Loya Paktia. In late 2015, the Washington Post, in an investigative report described severe human rights violations committed by the force (read here).
(3) The earliest attack was reported by Pajhwok News Agency on 3 April 2007 (not online; in the author’s archive).
(4) According to independent Pakistani media reports (see, for example, here), the Haqqani network leadership relocated to Parachinar before the 2014 Pakistani anti-Taleban military operations. Jalaluddin Haqqani, the founder of the Haqqani network (the remnant of the 1980s Loya Paktia network of the Hezb-e Islami/Khales mujahedin party), is known for his long-standing relationship with the Pakistani intelligence service ISI (more AAN background here).