Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Briefing Paper

Bonn, 18. September 2023. Keine andere Initiative stand seit ihrem Start 2013 derart im Rampenlicht der Weltöffentlichkeit wie Präsident Xi Jinpings „Belt and Road Initiative“ (BRI). Weltweit haben sich kaum ein politischer Thinktank oder eine wissenschaftliche Einrichtung nicht mit diesem Vorhaben auseinandergesetzt.

Eine der Hauptadern dieser Neuen Seidenstraße bildet der China-Pakistan-Wirtschaftskorridor (CPEC) mit Investitionen im Wert von 62 Milliarden USD für die Errichtung von Kraftwerken, Infrastrukturen und Sonderwirtschaftszonen (SWZ). Die pakistanische Staatsführung bezeichnete das Projekt angesichts des beispiellosen Umfangs der Investitionen und Zusagen aus China als „Game Changer“ und „Fate Changer“ und erhoffte sich im Zuge einer verstärkten regionalen Vernetzung einen Wandel in der allgemeinen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung des Landes. Doch diese Einschätzung ist offenbar zu optimistisch, denn sie lässt außer Acht, dass mit den aktuellen geopolitischen Spannungen in der Region das Ziel einer regionalen Konnektivität und eines wirtschaftlichen Wandels über eine von China finanzierte Infrastruktur in weite Ferne gerückt ist.

Von den sechs Wirtschaftskorridoren der BRI weist der CPEC einige Besonderheiten auf. Erstens ist er der einzige Korridor, an dem der Landgürtel und die Meeresstraße in Gwadar aufeinandertreffen. Die Hafenstadt liegt strategisch günstig nahe des iranischen Hafens Tschahbahar und der Straße von Hormus – weltweit eine der strategisch wichtigsten Meerengen, über die täglich 30 Prozent der internationalen Seetransporte von Rohöl abgewickelt werden (S&P Global Commodity Insights, 2018). Zweitens ist der CPEC im Unterschied zu anderen BRI-Korridoren ein „Ein-Land-Korridor“, auf dem alle Infrastrukturprojekte ohne Drittstaatenbeteiligung durch Pakistan verlaufen. Drittens wurden auf dem Korridor mit dem Abschluss mehrerer Projekte bereits zahlreiche Zwischenziele erreicht.

Für 2023 haben die beiden Regierungen Feierlichkeiten zum zehnjährigen Bestehen des CPEC geplant. Chinas stellvertretender Ministerpräsident He Lifeng stattete Pakistan anlässlich der Gedenkzeremonie im Juli 2023 einen Besuch ab. In den vergangenen zehn Jahren konnten bedeutende Fortschritte erzielt werden: Insgesamt 26 Vorhaben mit einem Investitionsvolumen von 17 Milliarden USD sind bereits abgeschlossen. Aktuell laufen 30 Projekte im Wert von 8,5 Milliarden USD, weitere 36 Projekte im Wert von 28,4 Milliarden USD sind geplant. Bislang wurden mit CPEC-Projekten in Pakistan direkt oder indirekt 200 000 Arbeitsplätze geschaffen, mehr als 6 000 MW zusätzlich in das nationale Netz eingespeist, etwa 809 km Straßeninfrastruktur errichtet und 886 km Stromtrassen installiert. Mit zahlreichen abgeschlossenen Projekten, darunter auch der Bau der ersten U-Bahn-Linie in der zweitgrößten Stadt des Landes, Lahore, ist der CPEC in Pakistan also ein gutes Stück vorangekommen.

Während das Land bei der Energieerzeugung und beim Bau von Straßeninfrastrukturen wesentliche Fortschritte erzielen konnte, ist die Entwicklung der neun innerhalb des CPEC priorisierten SWZ nur langsam vorangeschritten. Auch bei den geplanten Eisenbahnprojekten gab es keine nennenswerten Fortschritte. So ist beispielsweise der Bau der als Main Line-1 (ML-1) bekannten Eisenbahnlinie zwischen Peschawar und Karatschi ins Stocken geraten. Nach Fertigstellung der ML-1 können die Züge auf der Strecke deutlich schneller verkehren, wodurch sich die Fahrzeit zwischen Karatschi und Peschawar um die Hälfte verkürzt. Außerdem würde die neue Bahnlinie laut einer Veröffentlichung der pakistanischen Regierung von 2021 mehr als 170 000 neue direkte Arbeitsplätze schaffen. Nach ihrer Inbetriebnahme wird mit einem Anstieg der Frachtmengen um das Fünffache, von 5 Millionen auf 25 Millionen Tonnen jährlich, und mit einer Zunahme der Passagierzahlen von 55 auf 88 Millionen pro Jahr gerechnet. Verzögerungen und Nachverhandlungen haben die Kosten für die ML-1 auf 9,9 Millionen USD ansteigen lassen, was einem Zuwachs um mehr als 3 Milliarden USD oder knapp 45 Prozent gegenüber der ursprünglichen Kalkulation entspricht. Bei der Entwicklung des Eisenbahnsektors im Rahmen des CPEC konnte Pakistan also keine spürbaren Fortschritte erzielen.

Was das Ziel der regionalen Vernetzung anbelangt, bietet Pakistan mit seiner Lage am Schnittpunkt zwischen Zentral-, Süd- und Westasien den idealen Standort als Handels- und Logistik-Drehscheibe. Auch die Weltbank hat dies bereits anerkannt. Das Land selbst hat in mehreren Strategiedokumenten die Absicht verkündet, sein Potenzial als regionale Handels- und Logistik-Drehscheibe zu nutzen. Die geplante Ausweitung des CPEC auf den Binnenstaat Afghanistan könnte durch eine verstärkte Konnektivität einen wesentlichen Beitrag zu dieser Zielsetzung leisten. Mit der Aufnahme Afghanistans käme Pakistan seinem langgehegten Wunsch nach einer Ausweitung seiner Handels  und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Staaten in Zentralasien näher. Darüber hinaus könnten zentralasiatische Binnenstaaten den pakistanischen Hafen von Gwadar nutzen. Pakistan bietet den Staaten Zentralasiens die kürzeste Landverbindung zu warmen Gewässern – die pakistanische Küste ist über Afghanistan etwa 2 600 km, über den Iran oder die Türkei dagegen 4 500 bzw. 5 000 km entfernt. Außerdem wollen China und Pakistan mit der Aufnahme Afghanistans in den CPEC die Stabilität in der Region sichern und ihre Wirtschaftsinteressen durchsetzen. Allerdings liegt noch kein konkreter Zeitplan vor, obwohl bereits alle drei Ländern dem Vorschlag zugestimmt haben.

Auch von der Aufnahme Indiens könnte ein Multiplikatoreffekt für die Initiative ausgehen. Dafür müsste Pakistan allerdings Indien einen Landzugang zu den Märkten in Afghanistan und Zentralasien gewähren. Sollte Indien einem Beitritt zum CPEC/BRI zustimmen, könnte dies auch eine Wiederbelebung von Initiativen wie der Gaspipeline zwischen Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan und Indien (TAPI) und dem Zentralasien-Südasien-Energieprojekt (CASA) mit Kirgistan, Tadschikistan, Afghanistan und Pakistan zur Folge haben. Die Verbindung zwischen energiereichen Staaten in Zentralasien und Staaten mit hohem Energiebedarf in Südasien bietet ein hohes Potenzial, und China verfügt über die entsprechenden Mittel, um derartige Initiativen zu fördern. Allerdings sind die Erfolgsaussichten sehr gering, da sich Indien bisher offiziell von der BRI ferngehalten hat. Neu-Delhi lehnt den CPEC ab, weil es die wachsende Rolle Chinas in seiner Nachbarschaft als Sicherheitsgefahr für die indische Vorherrschaft in der Region betrachtet. Vor diesem Hintergrund bleibt die geopolitische Lage, nicht nur zwischen Pakistan und Indien, sondern auch zwischen Peking und Neu-Delhi, weiterhin kritisch. Die aktuellen geopolitischen Spannungen in Südasien, die sich durch den Machtzuwachs Chinas in der Region weiter verschärfen, schaffen erschwerte Bedingungen für eine Stärkung der regionalen Konnektivität und des gemeinsamen Wohlstands.

Murad Ali ist ehemaliger Gastwissenschaftler im Forschungsprogramm "Inter- und transnationale Zusammenarbeit". Er ist Leiter des Department of Political Science der University of Malakand, Pakistan. Sie können ihn unter muradali.uom@gmail.com erreichen.

Climate change exacerbates the pronounced water scarcity in the Middle East and also acts as a threat multiplier, for instance in the areas of health, food security and livelihoods. Increasing competition over water and the failure to address related challenges intensify tensions and conflicts within and between countries. Water cooperation is necessary to address the enormous challenges in the region, but traditional intergovernmental water agreements are politically complex and, in many cases, not very promising. This study presents an alternative approach to boost inter-state water cooperation in the region. Looking into five prominent water-related action areas at national and local levels uncovers entry points for inter-state cooperation. These action areas are: (1) the water-energy-food-ecosystems (WEFE) nexus; (2) water-related ecosystems; (3) water knowledge through data collection, citizen science, awareness raising and social science expertise; (4) water-related disaster risk management at transboundary level; and (5) water cooperation in the context of displacement, migration and reconstruction. These action areas allow water cooperation to be reimagined and pursued via thematic entry points of both national and regional interests. This places emphasis on individual and shared benefits for the countries from measures implemented in a multi-level approach: at local level (sometimes in border regions), at national level (not least in dialogue with other states in the region) and at regional level.

As the European Union (EU) is repositioning itself as a global actor in a multipolar world it should embrace Global Public Investment to underline its ambition of promoting effective multilateralism.

There is an increased recognition of human mobility responses to climate change among policy-makers and stakeholders. At the global level, the Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) highlights this intersection of climate change and migration. In addition, follow-up processes to the Paris Agreement highlight human mobility outcomes from climate impacts. This policy brief argues that while there is a recognition of climate migration at the international and national levels, implementation at the sub-national level where pertinent migration is happening, is far from adequate. At the national level, Ghana and Senegal have signed on and engaged in follow-up processes of the GCM and the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, they have in different ways highlighted climate migration as a key policy area. For Senegal, there is a mandate to include climate change and migration along with three other priority areas for all development plans in the country. On the other hand, Ghana’s national migration policy identifies climate change as a key area for policy attention. These reflect recognition of climate change and human mobility as a policy issue at the national level. However, there appear to be gaps in the implementation of these mandates and policy frameworks locally. Hence, there is a need to further investigate the patterns, weaknesses and strengths of climate (im)mobility strategy implementation at the sub-national level. This policy brief presents insights based on case studies of two West African cities, Accra and Dakar, which are relevant to urban climate (im)mobility governance because human mobility patterns are well established internally and from countries in the West African region, as are the influences of climate change on these mobility patterns. Because cities attract migrants, they offer insights into sub-national climate (im)mobility governance. It is, however, important to note the difficulty of isolating climate change as a driver of human mobility since it interacts with several other drivers (Black, Bennett, Thomas, & Beddington, 2011; Ekoh, Teron, & Ajibade, 2023). Regardless of the drivers of human mobility, city authorities have a responsibility to support their resident populations, and with increasing climate threats, they have a duty to support climate adapta-tion and resilience building within the city. This policy brief outlines three major challenges associated with addressing the human mobility dimension of climate change locally, under existing frameworks and agreements:
(1) City authorities have limited competencies in governing migration, including climate-induced migration.
(2) Cities have limited resources and capacity to adapt to climate change and the associated (im)mobility dimensions.
(3) At the local level, human mobility and climate change are mostly treated as separate issues in the absence of an integrated policy framework on climate (im)mobility.
The recommendations in this policy brief are addressed to national governments, local authorities and donors; they highlight how to move from global and national recognition to action so that cities/local authorities are better prepared to support migrants:
• A whole-of-government approach is necessary at all levels to address the crosscutting issue of climate change and human mobility. This should be part of a new or updated national migration policy that gives local authorities/cities a clear role to play in human mobility and climate change.
• National governments and donors need to support local authorities and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations and civil society organi-sations, with funding and investment in capacity building towards the design and implementation of climate (im)mobility strategies.
• Urban action plans should clearly reflect climate (im)mobility strategies given current trends and projections of increased mobility towards cities like Accra and Dakar.

With a view to better analysing concrete challenges to address SDG financing in developing economies, this Study coordinated by IDDRI and prepared in cooperation with the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) focuses on the global picture and examines the state of play, recent initiatives, and prospects for financing the SDGs in Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, and Senegal. It seeks to answer the following question: how and under what conditions can partner countries further align their development plans and policies with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs to better finance their objectives? Key Messages: Alignment and effective SDG financing are possible when four main conditions are met:
- Avoiding SDG-incompatible finance. For many countries–notably OECD and BRICS countries– achieving the 2030 Agenda is just as much about financing more as it is about financing less and in a more sustainable way. Examples include less financing for approaches that compromise specific SDGs (e.g., fossil fuel subsidies) and making difficult policy decisions that require short-term costs to achieve long-term sustainability gains.
- Combining long-term financing with longterm planning. Development financing strategies provide public and private investors with clarity and predictability, and make it possible for those key actors to better grasp the sequence of investments across relief, recovery, and long-term structural transformation. Planning efforts should also seek to avoid lock-in situations and path dependencies where short-term recovery expenditure could hamper long-term goals of reducing inequalities or advancing environmental protection, and even increase vulnerabilities.
- Better understanding the cost and benefits of SDG financing at country level. A clear understanding of allocation and spending on public services and public investments that contribute to the SDGs can help identify funding shortfalls. Double-counting investment needs in particular should be avoided while synergies between different types of investment should be prioritized.
- Aligning SDG financing instruments with countries’ needs and priorities. SDG budgeting tools can be the cornerstone of strengthening financing for the SDGs in countries and establish more coherent links between the SDGs and development strategies, as well as their implementation. However, as case studies in Africa, Asia and Central America, these tools only prove relevant if they do not add complexity to the administration but are well integrated into and supportive of existing national or local processes and strategies. And international partners should fully align with such national strategies.

In 2015, the world embarked on an ambitious climate and development agenda with the adoption of the Paris Agreement (PA) and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Now, eight years later, both processes are at important milestones assessing the progress achieved so far. In December 2023, the UN climate conference in Dubai will conclude the first Global Stocktake (GST), a process for assessing collective progress towards the PA objectives. In September, the midterm review of the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will take place at the SDG Summit in New York. Still, no pleasant surprises are to be expected. It is already clear that progress to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement is way off track, as countries’ NDCs are far too weak to achieve the objectives of the Agreement. Similarly, at the mid-point to achieve the Agenda for Sustainable Development by 2030, no country is on track. Progress on the 17 SDGs has stalled over the past three years. On some Goals, the world has been backsliding, raising questions both about political will and about suitable options for changing course. Despite this disturbing state of affairs, calls for urgency have not resonated with policy makers. In the climate realm, the messages from the IPCC have become ever more alarming, UN Secretary-General Guterres has been exhorting countries to act, and the previous climate conferences in Glasgow and Sharm el-Sheik called on countries to enhance their NDCs – but very few actually did so. But how can we still make progress if all calls for urgency are in vain? It has long been argued that integration of the climate and sustainable development agendas is necessary to achieve both objectives. We argue that it is, in fact, indispensable and our only hope to close the ambition and implementation gaps.

One of the main features of today’s global trade system is the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs). The proliferation of RTAs in recent years has been coupled with broader and deeper coverage under these agreements. Broader coverage increasingly includes more policy areas that may be trade-related (tariffs and nontariff measures) or non trade-related (behind-the-border policies, intellectual property rights, movement of capital and people, competition policy, and others). In this regard, the scope of RTAs has been expanded by WTO members and signatories of RTAs from just 8 policy areas in the 1950s to 17 policy areas today. Deeper agreements include an increasing number of commitments within each policy area. They are also increasingly accompanied by legal requirements, such as stronger transparency and enforcement mechanisms. This chapter assesses the role of RTAs in boosting agricultural trade in Africa. Our analysis extends beyond estimating the overall impact of agreements on African trade to assess the relative importance of the detailed  agreements’ provisions, including both broader and deeper coverage, in boosting agricultural trade.

Chinese engagement with the UN development pillar reflects a notion of multilateralism that differs from established (Western) concepts. These concepts frame UN entities as actors in their own right, nurtured by core resources and drawing legitimacy from their neutrality. China seems to see the UN more as a platform for facilitating bilateral exchanges, thriving on individual member state contributions. The Chinese approach could help adjust the UN to changing political realities, but brings risks for its commitment to individual and human rightsChina’s approach receives low scores on conventional global governance indices. But it might well offer a mechanism for adjusting the UN to changing political realities. Beyond Chinese power and expertise, a stronger – and more explicit – focus on bilateral stakes might strengthen the UN’s relevance among an increasingly divided membership. It might also open avenues for drawing on development solutions from across the board, and overcoming outdated North-South assistance models. However, China’s approach also comes with a major risk. A UN built more directly around states’ discrete and immediate priorities will find it difficult to maintain its commitment to individual and human rights and a long-term focus on global public goods. In line with the UN Charter, it is in the interest of all member states to ensure that the global organisation provides a stable normative foundation for multilateral cooperation.

As world leaders are packing their bags to travel to Washington for the Spring meetings of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund, these discussions will offer the first opportunity of the year to collectively deliver on some of the propositions to reform the WB and the international financial architecture for sustainable development to make them fit for the poly-crises of the 21st century. The May G7 Summit in Japan, the June Summit for A New Financial Pact in Paris, the September Finance in Common Summit in Colombia, the SDG Summit in New York, the G20 Summit in India, the October World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) annual meetings, and the COP28 in Dubai at the end of the year, are other opportunities to move the reform agenda forward. Building a possible shared European vision on main priorities on the international development financial architecture is key for the European Union (EU) and its member states, given their political and economic weight in the international financial institutions (IFIs) and fora, and their responsibilities as key implementing actors in countries of operations.

Although the EU has now concluded numerous bilateral and regional trade agreements, the framework with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries is now to be signed after bumpy negotiations.

This chapter addresses the evolution of the relationship between masculinity and migration within a Zimbabwean historical, sociocultural, economic and political context. It discusses how migration transitioned from a gender-neutral to a masculinised and, later, feminised activity. The chapter argues that this gendered transition has varied and sometimes contradictory impacts on masculinity. The contradictions stem from men’s differential capacities (or lack thereof) to migrate and convert migration into a resource that can be channelled into performance of normative or socially approved masculinity. The chapter demonstrates how migration potentially resuscitates or erodes aspects of normative masculinity against a backdrop of the protracted economic crisis in Zimbabwe. The interaction between migration and masculinity is observable not only in homosocial relations but also in gender relations within marriages and family life. The chapter accordingly draws attention to contemporary migration, illustrating how its feminisation impacts on men who had hitherto enjoyed a monopoly on migration in the Zimbabwean context. The discussion of migration and masculinity in this chapter draws from qualitative research with Zimbabwean migrants in Germany and South Africa as well as with non-migrants in Zimbabwe.

Chinese engagement with the UN development pillar reflects a notion of multilateralism that differs from established (Western) concepts. These concepts frame UN entities as actors in their own right, nurtured by core resources and drawing legitimacy from their neutrality. China seems to see the UN more as a platform for facilitating bilateral exchanges, thriving on individual member state contributions. The Chinese approach could help adjust the UN to changing political realities, but brings risks for its commitment to individual and human rightsChina’s approach receives low scores on conventional global governance indices. But it might well offer a mechanism for adjusting the UN to changing political realities. Beyond Chinese power and expertise, a stronger – and more explicit – focus on bilateral stakes might strengthen the UN’s relevance among an increasingly divided membership. It might also open avenues for drawing on development solutions from across the board, and overcoming outdated North-South assistance models. However, China’s approach also comes with a major risk. A UN built more directly around states’ discrete and immediate priorities will find it difficult to maintain its commitment to individual and human rights and a long-term focus on global public goods. In line with the UN Charter, it is in the interest of all member states to ensure that the global organisation provides a stable normative foundation for multilateral cooperation.

Deutschlands feministische Entwicklungspolitik gibt einen neuen Impuls für gerechtere und inklusivere Gesellschaften weltweit. Wenn die Akteure internationaler  sammenarbeit Rechte, Ressourcen und Repräsentation aus der Perspektive eines gesellschaftsvertrags betrachten, können sie Projekte für mehr geschlechtergerechtigkeit so gestalten, dass sie ihr volles transformati-
ves Potenzial ausschöpfen.

Germany’s focus on a feminist development policy provides a new impulse for fairer and more inclusive societies. If the development community looks at rights, resources and representation from a social contract angle, it can design projects for more gender equity in a way that leverages its full transformative potential.

Energy production from fossil fuels is gradually phased out as many countries aim to transition to a low-carbon society. As society and technology are intertwined, phasing out fossil fuels impacts people and communities. Especially those who heavily rely on the fossil fuel industry will be worse off. Therefore, calls are being made for ajust transitionthat ensures the rehabilitation of workers, regions, and communities negatively affected by fossil fuel industry closures. We argue that spatial justice can help inform just transition’s theoretical and practical aspects. Therefore, a spatial justice approach should be a prerequisite for a just transition. The concept of spatial justice is intertwined with the social justice principles of procedural, distributive, and restorative justice, which are central to the current conceptual understanding of just transition. We use the case of the closure of peat-based electricity production in rural Ireland to demonstrate how a spatial justice approach can underpin a just transition and how it can help with practicalities like identifying and addressing the issues and concerns in local communities. To ensure a just transition, a spatial justice approach is needed to identify and address the deeper problems affecting the resiliency of rural and mono-industrial regions dependent on fossil fuels.

We examine and offer causal evidence on the link between trade exposure and social cohesion using rich micro tax data and a natural experiment of exchange rate liberalization in Uganda. Our results show that exposure to exogenous exchange rate shocks has significant albeit economically small effects on social cohesion: it reduces trust, enhances participation, and has ambiguous effects on identity. These effects operate largely through the expenditure channel (or household exposure) and to a lesser extent through the earnings channel (captured by worker and firm exposure).

Does conflict change who desires to emigrate? Surprisingly, we still lack globally comparable empirical evidence on whether the types of individuals who want to leave their country differ between peaceful and conflict-affected locations. In this paper, we address this gap. We analyze unique survey data with global coverage to assess whether individual-level determinants of international permanent emigration aspirations differ during intrastate armed conflict compared to peaceful times and regions. We argue that armed conflict acts as an equalizer that attenuates the effect which individual economic and demographic variables have on international permanent emigration aspirations in peaceful contexts. As a result, aspirations to relocate permanently to another country increase among those demographic groups which are less inclined to move in peaceful situations. Our results indicate that variables related to a longer-term economic cost-benefit analysis, such as income or age, significantly lose importance for international permanent emigration aspirations in conflict situations. This demographic-specific effect explains an overall increase in emigration aspirations during conflicts. On average, we find no evidence that conflict increases the aspirations of all respondents to permanently move to another country. In contrast to income and age, the effects of demographic variables such as gender, household composition, or marital status are not significantly different across contexts.

Increased policy coherence and integrated implementation are necessary to address pressing development problems that cut across different sectors. Meeting these demands, as called for by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, requires institutional innovation. Based on the comparative analysis of 137 countries, this paper investigates how governments have responded to this call and which contextual factors shape their institutional responses. We propose a four-dimensional typology to analyse the institutional set-ups for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), focusing on political leadership, horizontal integration across policy sectors, vertical integration across levels of government, and integration of societal stakeholders. We apply this framework to the descriptions of national SDG-implementation bodies provided by governments in their Voluntary National Review (VNRs) and use qualitative directed content analysis and regression modelling to investigate different driving factors of institutional design choices, including socio-economic development and political regime. Besides a strong commitment from the Centre of Government in most cases, our results show that ministries of the exterior and the environment have a dominant role, indicating that sustainability is not yet perceived holistically. Further, we find that the integration of subnational governments and societal actors is often under-institutionalised: while countries with higher levels of socio-economic development appear more likely to set up mechanisms suited to achieving cross-sectoral integration, political regime type seems to have little impact on institutional design choices for SDG implementation. Conceptually, this study offers a theory-led investigation of the institutional mechanisms for integrated SDG-implementation and the factors that drive institutional innovation or inertia. Empirically, by compiling the information in an original dataset, our study paves the way for future cross-national analysis on effective integrated SDG implementation and identifies entry points for inter- and transnational support of integrated SDG implementation in the context of development cooperation.

Am 26. April 2023 veröffentlichte das Entwicklungsministerium (BMZ) eine Pressemitteilung mit der Nachricht, dass das Bundeskabinett die Unterzeichnung eines internationalen Abkommens zwischen der EU, ihren 27 Mitgliedstaaten und den 79 Mitgliedern der Organisation der afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Staaten (OACPS) beschlossen hat. Zum Zeitpunkt der Abfassung dieses Artikels – Ende Mai und einen ganzen Monat nach dem Beschluss des Bundeskabinetts – haben sich die EU-Mitgliedstaaten allerdings noch nicht auf eine Unterzeichnung des Abkommens geeinigt.