Of the attitudes of the international community towards Israel, one of the most maddening is criticism of Israeli reaction to the terrorist rocket attacks launched by Hamas -- and the lack of international condemnation of those rocket attacks themselves, deliberately launched against civilian targets.
We criticize the West for its lack of sustained outrage against Hamas
targeting civilians.
We note that no country would tolerate such attacks without taking strong
measures to stop such attacks.
But does Israel itself bear any of the responsibility for the failure of the international community to condemn these deliberate terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians?
In a 2012 article, Where 8,000 Rocket Launches Are Not a Casus Belli, Evelyn Gordon blames this on the indecisiveness of the IDF in retaliating against Gaza rockets as: the rotten fruit of a government policy that for years dismissed the rockets as a minor nuisance for reasons of petty politics: For the Kadima party, in power from 2005-2009, admitting the rockets were a problem meant admitting that its flagship policy, the Gaza pullout, was a disaster. A 2011 report for the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, The Missile Threat from Gaza:From Nuisance to Strategic Threat, by Israeli missile defense expert Uzi Rubin notes how Israeli leaders at the time played down and even dismissed outright the Hamas rocket threat:Translation:
According to Peres, "Palestinians need to be told: Qassams Shmassams, we will persevere. We will not move from here." The deputy prime minister also accused that "our response stimulates the other side to strike. A series of measures must be taken to eliminate the Qassam." Peres declined to elaborate on what means he meant.According to Rubin, Olmert qualified his comment about shelters with "...though there may be extreme situations in which we will have a limited response capability."
Also according to Rubin, Vilnai visited the Jewish areas near Gaza the very next day in order to correct the negative impression his comments made.But the fact remains that Israeli leaders initially played down the threat of Qassam rockets coming out of Gaza.
For years.
The lack of a strong Israeli response to the Hamas rocket attacks took the US by surprise.
In a 2011 interview, former US envoy to Israel Dan Kurtzer said that PM Sharon's failure to respond to Hamas rocket attacks following the 2005 Disengagement was a major mistake: Kurtzer, in an interview with The Jerusalem Post, said that immediately after Israel left the Gaza Strip he told Washington “to expect a very serious Israeli response to the first act of violence coming out of Gaza.”Instead, according to Kurtzer, "Sharon argued that the rockets were landing in fields, 'not really that bad,' or were being fired by dissident elements, and not the Gaza leadership" -- setting the tone for excuses of Israeli leaders who followed.
As Gordon points out, one of the motives of the Israeli government in initially downplaying the rocket attacks was to defend the Disengagement itself.
But the Begin-Sadat Center report gives other reasons as well. After all, it was not just the leadership that showed disinterest:
the same Israeli public that withstood so determinately the suicide attacks from the West Bank, demonstrated a lack of unity and determination in contending with the Gaza rocket campaign.The initial rocket attacks started in 2001 and need to be understood in the context of the Second Intifada that was creating a crisis at the time. Life in Sderot was "was calmer and more secure at the time than metropolitan areas like Netanya, Hadera or Jerusalem":
In hindsight, the scant attention paid to the campaign at its onset in 2001 is easy to justify against the backdrop of violence of the Second Intifada and the suicide terror offensive raging at the time through the heart of Israel's major cities, an offensive which reached its peak in April-May 2002. This absorbed all the attention of the general public as well as Israel's political and military leadership. The few hits, the negligible damage and the insignificant casualties inflicted by the primitive rockets launched at the time from Gaza were justifiably regarded as a minor nuisance compared to the ongoing terror campaign against Israel's traffic, public transportation, shopping malls and civic centers. [emphasis added]But that does not explain the continued lackadaisical response the following year when Operation Defensive Shield was succeeding in combating the Second Intifada.
According to Rubin, both local as well as national leaders played down the threat during the first 3 years. Even when Israel took steps to invade nearby launching areas in Gaza and fired on rocket production areas that were further away,
At the same time, active defense – that is, anti-rocket systems that could destroy Gaza rockets in flight – was shunned repeatedly until about five years into the campaign when the shock of the Second Lebanon War prompted Israel's incumbent minister of defense [Amir Peretz] to initiate the development of an active defense system against short-range rockets. The failure to do so earlier is another indication of the low significance attributed to the rocket campaign against the south of the country by the political leadership of the time. [emphasis added]The Second Lebanon War came to an end in mid-August, 2006 and Israel was focusing on the failure to secure an undisputed victory. During this time of soul searching, the priority was on rebuilding the IDF, recovering from economic losses, and repairing damage in northern Israel. The needs of the Israeli communities near Gaza were put on the back burner.
The decision to start development on Iron Dome was not taken until February, 2007 and Israeli bureaucracy delayed not only the development of Iron Dome but also the government-sponsored building of shelters.
The report gives several reasons for this:
Today, we proudly point to Israel's system of shelters against terrorist attack from Gaza.
But according to Rubin:
In his 2005 report on the status of the school and kindergarten sheltering program in Sderot, the State Comptroller condemned the government's mishandling of the situation, calling it "a continuous debacle." This harsh term could well describe the government's handling of the entire sheltering program in southern Israel.Israel has come a long way since that 2011 report, especially in terms of Iron Dome, which is now in demand by other countries facing similar threats.
But we tend to forget the initial slow response by Israel to the Qassam threat, and that may have served in part as an initial excuse by the international community to downplay the dangerous threat that Hamas rockets increasingly pose to Israeli civilians.
First
@nbcsnl now
@nbc 'Nurses'
airs a viciously antisemitic episode filled with lies about Orthodox
Jews.
"A dead goyim leg ... from an arab, a woman, G-d forbid
an Arab women ... Israel ... without this next step you won't walk
again".
Lies and libels lead to VIOLENCE!
pic.twitter.com/BvRA4Xiq9e
Hétfőn a kispesti Pannónia úti Általános Iskolában jártunk, ahol a Pannónia Hét alkalmából szervezetünk programokat a felsősök számára.
Önkénteseink egyaránt érkeztek felnőttekhez és gyerekekhez, hogy egy kellemes délutánnal tegyük kicsit szebbé a téli napokat.
Novemberben Kerepesen és Tatabányán is afrikai hangulatot varázsolt a Magyar Afrika Társaság önkéntes csapata.
Október 26-án, immár másodszor, még napsütéses időben találkozhattunk Pécelen a szűrőnap felnőtt és gyerek résztvevőivel.
Tegnap este megérkezett Kampalába Kiss Anna, s ma kora reggel már tovább is indult Flaviával és Geofryval együtt Manafwa irányába.
Holnap (10.17. pénteken) indul újabb malawi missziójára Dr. Bodnár Judit és Dr. Lendvai Domonkos.
This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared to the previous day. The Mission recorded a significant level of fighting during the night of 5-6 August in Donetsk region. The SMM analysed craters in Krasnohorivka, Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove) and Sakhanka. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas. The Mission noted the absence of 12 towed howitzers from permanent storage sites in “LPR”-controlled areas. It faced four freedom-of-movement restrictions, all in areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM received concrete responses to recent incidents by the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination, but no such information regarding incidents that took place in areas not controlled by the Government.
The SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.
On the evening of 4 August, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard in two minutes 14 undetermined explosions 6-8km north-north-west of its position. On the night of 5-6 August, the SMM heard 42 undetermined explosions, including 30 assessed as anti-aircraft cannon rounds, 7-10km north of its position.
On night of 4-5 August, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west of its location. Earlier that evening, the SMM had heard in one minute 20 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds, explosions assessed as automatic-grenade-launcher and recoilless-gun rounds as well as heavy-machine-gun bursts 700-1000m north of its position 7km north of Horlivka. While in Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-east of its location.
The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 21:39 and 21:48 on 4 August recorded 11 rocket-assisted projectiles fired from west to east and one undetermined explosion at unknown distance north-west of its position. During the night of 5-6 August, in about three hours, the camera recorded 118 undetermined explosions as well as bursts of tracer fire (in sequence) from south-west to north-east, west to east and east to west.
Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard within 50 minutes in the afternoon 94 undetermined explosions assessed as rounds of different weapons (82mm and 120mm mortar, automatic grenade launcher), as well as heavy-machine-gun fire 4-6km south-east of its position. In the course of the day, whilst positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions at locations ranging from 2 to 6km west, west-north-west and north-north-west of its position.
In one hour in the morning, whilst in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 10-12km north-west, and four undetermined explosions 10-12km north-north-east of its position. In the night hours of 5-6 August, within just over two hours around midnight from the same location, the SMM heard 42 explosions, including 30, which it assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-east of its position. In Horlivka, on the same night, the SMM heard 43 explosions, including 27 it assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 7-9km north-west of its position.
In Luhansk region the SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with no ceasefire violations recorded during the night of 4 August. Positioned 2km north of “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5-15km west of its position. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (65km west of Luhansk), within about 20 minutes, the SMM heard over a dozen bursts of small arms 2km east of its position.
The SMM followed up on civilian casualties and conducted crater analysis. At the Kalinina hospital morgue in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM accompanied by Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), observed the body of a woman with extensive shrapnel injuries to her head, neck, limbs and torso. According to the autopsy report, she had succumbed to shrapnel injuries she had received due to triggering a booby trap while working in her garden in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district on 4 August.
On 4 August, in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM saw four fresh craters, all of which it assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds. The SMM assessed the first crater near an abandoned house as caused by a round fired from a westerly direction. The second crater was in the backyard of a house inhabited by an elderly woman and the SMM assessed that the round had been fired from a south-westerly direction. The last two craters were located near a road in the same area and the SMM assessed that one round had been fired from a north-north-westerly direction and the other – from a north-westerly direction. According to residents, the shelling had taken place between 06:00-06:35 on 3 August. No casualties were reported.
In Sakhanka (“DPR”-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw three fresh craters. The first crater was 20m away from an electricity sub-station and the SMM assessed it as caused by a projectile fired from a westerly direction. The SMM saw shrapnel damage to the sub-station. The SMM assessed the second crater, which was located in a field at the outskirts of the village, as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a north-westerly direction. The third crater was located in the backyard of a house inhabited by a middle-aged woman and the SMM saw two broken windows. The SMM assessed it as caused by a projectile fired from a north-north-westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that the shelling had occurred on 3 August at 22:30. No casualties were reported.
In Molodizhne (“DPR”-controlled, 20km south of Donetsk) the SMM saw nine fresh impact sites in a “detention” facility guarded by armed “DPR” members. One impact had caused the south-east part of the flat roof of an administrative building to partially collapse. The remainder of the impacts had struck the hard surface of the yard. The SMM assessed four of the craters as caused by 122mm or 152mm artillery rounds fired from a south or south-westerly direction, while a fifth had been caused by a projectile of unknown calibre fired from a northerly direction. The SMM was unable to analyse the remainder of the craters as they had been tampered with. According to the “head” of the facility, the shelling had occurred around midnight on 4 August. He also told the SMM that two “detainees” had sustained minor injuries. Medical personnel at the Dokuchaievsk hospital who treated them told the SMM that one had a shrapnel injury to his ankle and the other - to his chest and jaw. Both had been released back to the facility less than two hours after their arrival to the hospital. Near the facility, the SMM saw a two-storey house with a shattered window and spoke to a resident living in the house who stated that the window had been shattered by shrapnel around midnight on 4 August.
In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the SMM visited two residential properties reportedly shelled on the night of 4-5 August. At the first, the SMM saw a crater in the asphalt surface on the yard of the house, and minor shrapnel damage to the nearby east-facing wall. The SMM saw the tail fin of an 82mm mortar round stuck in the asphalt and assessed that the round had been fired from an east-south-easterly direction. At the second location, a five-storey apartment building, the SMM saw a direct impact on the east-facing wall and assessed it as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from an east-north-easterly direction. No casualties were reported at either location.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.
In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 120mm) westbound on the M04 (E50) road near government-controlled Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk), and two tanks of unknown type in “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk).
Beyond the respective withdrawal line but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed 13 stationary tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).
The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw 11 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM21 Grad 122mm). The SMM also observed that one area continued to be abandoned, as it had been since 26 February, with 12 MLRS (BM21 Grad 122mm) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) missing. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM noted the presence of eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).*
The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At “LPR”-controlled sites the SMM noted that 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were missing.
The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) with 12 armed “LPR” members on board travelling west and one stationary combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) on a tank (T-72) chassis.
The SMM continued to insist on accountability and responsibility for violations related to impediments to SMM monitoring and verification. The SMM continued to follow up on the incident of 2 August when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position near Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative presented the SMM with details of the investigations and disciplinary measures taken against the perpetrators. With regard to the shots fired at the SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle near Lobacheve on 30 July (see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2016), the representative informed the SMM that the person responsible had been identified and he had disobeyed direct orders.
In relation to the violation near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 29 July 2016) in which armed individuals had threatened the SMM at gunpoint, Mr. Zakharchenko continued to refuse to meet the SMM in order to indicate effective steps taken in response.*
The SMM reminded the JCCC of continued restrictions and impediments to monitoring and verification, including in the areas near Zolote and Petrivske, and reminded the JCCC of its obligations under the Addendum to help ensure these and other violations were remedied as a matter of urgency. The SMM likewise reminded the JCCC that many of these restrictions were caused by mines, which the signatories of the Memorandum of September 2014 had insisted should be removed, and the Trilateral Contact Group's decision of 3 March, stipulating that the JCCC should be responsible for overall co-ordination of mine action, with the support of the SMM.
The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM revisited an area in Debaltseve (“DPR”-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) where it had seen UXO assessed as an MLRS round (BM27 Uragan, 220mm; see SMM Daily Report 5 August 2016). A local farmer stated that “emergency services” had visited the site on 4 August and declared the rocket safe. He also showed the SMM another UXO on a footpath in the area, which the SMM assessed to be a 122mm artillery shell. The SMM informed the JCCC of the location of both pieces of UXO.
The SMM observed a new mine hazard sign 2km west of government-controlled Lobacheve (18km north-west of Luhansk) on the side of the road, which connects Lobacheve to government-controlled Lopaskyne (24km north-west of Luhansk). The sign read “Mines” in Russian and was hand-written on white cloth, which was hung on a movable wooden barrier.
The SMM continued to observe queues of pedestrians at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. In the morning between 09:09 and 10:09 the SMM saw 203 people (mixed gender and age) leaving government-controlled areas through the government checkpoint. In the same time period, the SMM saw 265 people (mixed gender and age) entering government-controlled areas through the same checkpoint. At 10:22, the SMM saw some 450 people still queuing to leave government-controlled areas. The SMM saw no traffic in the opposite direction. Between 15:45 and 16:15 the SMM observed 115 people (mixed gender and age) enter government-controlled areas through the government checkpoint. Within the same time frame, the SMM saw 132 people (mixed gender and age) proceed in the opposite direction.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Denial of access:
Conditional access:
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
Related Stories
This report is for media and the general public.
On 6 August at 07:51hrs the SMM heard an explosion approximately 3.9km east of its location in Luhansk city.
The SMM went to the site from where it had heard the explosion located at the intersection of Karpynsky and Vatutyn Street in Luhansk city, 500m north-east of SMM’s accommodation. The site was cordoned off, by so-called “LPR” “police” and the SMM could assess from a distance of approximately 15-30 meters, that an explosion had likely been caused by an improvised explosive device (assessed as approximately 1kg of high explosives) placed next to or in, a lamp post about two meters away from the vehicle, which was damaged and downed, at the side of the road. The SMM saw a black sport utility vehicle “Toyota Landcruiser Prado” severely damaged with windows shattered and front and side airbags deployed.
“LPR” “police” members at the site told the SMM that there were two casualties, without giving further details. Mr Vladislav Deynego, “LPR” member, told the SMM that Mr Plotnitsky was “in a bad condition and not able to receive visitors.” At the time of writing, the SMM could not reach personnel at either of the two hospitals in Luhansk city for confirmation.
The SMM will continue following up to confirm the information, and observe further developments.
Related StoriesWARSAW, 6 August 2016 – Michael Georg Link, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), today criticized the call by the Prosecutor General of Tajikistan for the reintroduction of the death penalty, and expressed concern over recent discussions related to removing the bans on capital punishment in some other OSCE participating States.
“Countries in the OSCE have committed themselves to consider the complete abolition of capital punishment, not to reconsider that abolition,” the ODIHR Director said. “Yesterday’s call by the Prosecutor General in Tajikistan for the reintroduction of capital punishment in that country is completely out of place in a region where most of the countries recognize the inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading nature of a punishment that fails to act as a deterrent and makes any miscarriage of justice irreversible.”
Tajikistan’s Prosecutor-General, Yusuf Rahmon, told a press conference yesterday that perpetrators of premeditated murder, terrorists and traitors must be punished by death. His words followed similar statements by other leaders, among them President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and President Viktor Orban of Hungary, suggesting that the reinstitution of the death penalty should be opened for discussion.
Tajikistan suspended the application of the death penalty in 2004, while Turkey and Hungary completely abolished capital punishment, in 2004 and 1990, respectively.
“Rather than reversing its course, it is my hope that Tajikistan will take further steps toward the complete abolition of the death penalty,” he said. “It is also my hope that Turkey, remains with the vast majority of the OSCE participating States and will continue to act as a strong advocate for the global abolition, as it has in recent years.”
Related StoriesKYIV, 5 AUGUST 2016 –OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Madina Jarbussynova, on Friday concluded an official visit to Ukraine aimed at raising awareness of human trafficking and the risks encountered by the most vulnerable groups as a consequence of the current crisis.
During her five-day visit, she met with representatives of the Donetsk Oblast state administration and female Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Kramatorsk. Ambassador Jarbussynova also travelled to Kharkiv to talk to relevant civil society representatives about the situation on the ground, how to prevent the expansion of the conflict-driven human trafficking phenomenon, and to evaluate existing mechanisms of identifying, referring and assisting victims of trafficking in human beings.
“More than one-and-a-half million citizens have been displaced – a vast number that demands a comprehensive response,” Jarbussynova said. “This vulnerable group can easily find itself in situations where human trafficking may occur.”
In Kyiv, the OSCE Special Representative met with Ukrainian authorities to discuss progress in anti-trafficking measures and review future plans.
“The Government of Ukraine has recently demonstrated a high level of commitment to addressing human trafficking, particularly in enhancing its victim identification efforts and in filing cases to relevant courts”, said Jarbussynova.
At the same time, she noted that there are still considerable gaps in the National Referral Mechanism for victims, and that long-term, sustainable measures should be sought.
The Special Representative travels regularly to Ukraine, engaging with high-level authorities and holding training sessions together with the Special Monitoring Mission and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator to strengthen the capacity of the Ukrainian institutions and OSCE monitors to spot human trafficking trends and to report on alleged cases.
Related Stories