Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Latest News

Seit dem Jahr 2019 unterläuft das UN-Entwicklungssystem (UNDS) eine ambitionierte Reform, die es kohärenter machen und auf die heutigen Anforderungen nachhaltiger Entwicklung ausrichten soll. Erfolge in der Reformumsetzung stoßen vor Ort jedoch auf systemische Hindernisse, für deren Überwindung es noch stärkerer Anstrengungen bedarf.

The current energy crisis stemming from the war in Ukraine has shown that long-term climate mitigation needs to be coupled with the reduction of poverty and inequality; it is obvious that climate change is a global problem, and one that needs to be addressed in combination with social justice. In a recent article in an EJDR  special issue, we make the case that the relationship and effects of social protection and social cohesion are critical in this sense.

Refugees rarely flee in isolation. Instead, their everyday lives and mobilities are fundamentally shaped by the broader set of social relations in which they are embedded, particularly by their families. Drawing on interviews with sixty displaced people living in Germany and in-depth case studies of the trajectories of refugees from Eritrea and Syria, we reconstruct the role that families and other social relations transgressing national borders have played in their mobility to Germany and how their lives have been rescaled since initial displacement. Based on central ideas from figurational sociology, which we link with scholarship on forced migration, transnationalism and family relations, our paper identifies four specific family figurations in displacement that represent typical mobility patterns and constellations of ‘doing family’ in transnational spaces: the lone yet connected traveller; the reunited nuclear family; the transnationally separated family; and the transnationally extended family. We argue that family figurations in displacement are, on the one hand, decisively shaped by specific family relations and distinct displacement trajectories with various phases of family separation and reunion. On the other hand, they are fundamentally configured by migration regimes and asylum systems that substantially constrain the opportunities to live dignified local or transnational family lives.

This chapter assesses the political impact of the Sustainable Development Goals on global governance. We start by discussing the range of expectations for global governance arrangements, considering the stated objectives of the goals. We then assess the early performance of governance arrangements in terms of shifts in policy and practice against these expectations. Our research shows the impact of the Sustainable Development Goals is largely discursive, with limited transformative outcomes on governance practices. The High-level Political Forum, created to assess global progress towards the implementation of the goals, has failed to provide political leadership and promote coherence across the United Nations system. Our research also shows that the Sustainable Development Goals initiated peer-learning among governments and other actors, yet with limited evidence that this has led to structural transformation towards sustainability. As certain ambitions of the Global Goals have been part of ongoing debates in global governance, our review finally highlights that observable changes often reflect long-term reform trajectories that are not causally linked to the launch of the goals.

This paper examines whether heterogeneities in financial development among Vietnamese provinces matter for firm growth in Vietnam. Using a nationally representative firm survey that covers more than 41,000 firms for the period 2009 − 2013, we estimate the impact of provincial financial development on the growth rates of firms by accounting for sectoral differences in growth opportunities. We find that province-level financial development promotes the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per worker of small firms, and reduces the growth rate of the wage-to-sales ratio. Our results imply that firms grow faster in provinces with a higher level of financial development. Moreover, the effect of financial development on growth rates is larger when firms operate in sectors with better growth opportunities.

If asked in which international arena the great power conflict over global order has become most salient in recent years, most would probably point to the United Nations Human Rights Council or the Security Council. In contrast, the U.N.’s development cooperation has so far been spared diplomatic conflicts of similar intensity. But as China has become more articulate about “building international relations of a new type” which will be less dominated by Western powers and norms and give greater voice to developing states, tensions are rising in this field too. It was a major success for China when in 2019 a Chinese candidate, Qu Dongyu, was elected director-general of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Three years into Qu’s tenure, a worrisome, multi-pronged diplomatic brawl has erupted between FAO leadership and Western members, highlighting the challenging path for China toward a new type of international relations.

Urbanisation offers great potential for Africa’s economic and social development: citizens earn twice as much in large cities compared to rural areas, and young urbanites receive on average between 2.5 and 4 years more education than their rural  counterparts. At the same time, the rapid rise of the urban population is putting a strain on Africa’s cities. While on average, city dwellers have better access to services than their rural counterparts, more than half of all citizens in sub-Saharan  African metropolises live in informal settlements without adequate access to basic infrastructure. Citizens have long demanded participation in urban governance that goes beyond elections in order to voice their concerns. Although participatory  processes have become increasingly evident in many African countries in some cities and neighbourhoods, they are still far from being institutionalised at scale. This policy brief asks why participatory approaches have not been successful thus far and analyses the challenges regarding a political mobilisation of civil society organisations (CSOs), which often face weak and fragmented state institutions. It argues that participatory processes need to be thoroughly embedded in politics in order to move beyond  particularistic gains towards a structural improvement of relations between citizens, CSOs, and local governments.

The governance of ocean and polar regions is among the most relevant challenges in the combat against global environmental degradation and global inequalities. Ocean and polar regions are climate regulators and very much affected by climate change. They are an important source of nutrition for life in and above the sea. At the same time, they are subject to an increasing number of geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. Due to the lasting virulence of many security issues, economic conflicts, legal disputes, new technological developments and environmental crises in global marine areas as well as the intricate overlap of sovereign, semi-sovereign and global commons territories, the relevance of ocean and polar governance is bound to rise: as frontiers both in global competitive strategies as well as most fragile eco-systems whose collapse would have catastrophic consequences. This thematic issue sketches important trends in research on ocean and polar governance, and identifies avenues for future research. In this editiorial, we first provide an overview of governance challenges for ocean and polar regions and their relevance for geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. In a second step, we present the eight contributions that make up the thematic issue by clustering them around three themes: the impact of (re-)territorialisation on governance and the construction of authority, the effectiveness of regimes of ocean and polar governance, and, challenges to norm-creation in ocean governance.

Europe is facing some heat. Literally – with another heat wave grasping the continent – and figuratively with threats to the global order through Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Profound shifts are happening – with political answers too quick for some, and painfully slow when looking at evidence on the ultimate challenge: human-made climate change and its effects. We have seen indicators for disruptive change in the global order before: terrorism (after 2001), a financial crisis (2008), a global pandemic (since 2020), and, after a long build-up, the drastic effects of a climate crisis coming into focus with numerous extreme weather events. This blog is about the future of globalisation, in times of uncertainties and while we find ourselves with multiple challenges in a volatile, if not “reeling global order”. Let’s get to the fundamental then.

Die Weltwirtschaft steuert in Richtung ökologischer Nachhaltigkeit. Aufgrund einer immer stringenteren umwelt- und klimapolitischen Regulierung setzen sich neue nachhaltige Techno­logien und Geschäftsmodelle durch. Diese wiederum verändern Wettbewerbs­bedingungen und Standortvorteile. Kluge Strukturpolitik antizipiert solche Veränderungen; sie lenkt und fördert die heimische Wirtschaft dahingehend, dass sie frühzeitig die Chancen dieses Strukturwandels nutzt. Das gilt auch für die Wirtschafts- und Beschäftigungsförderung in der Entwicklungs­zusammenarbeit. Mit einer Fokussierung auf ökologische Strukturpolitik als Entwicklungsmotor könnte die deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ihr in Teilbereichen – z. B. Förderung erneuerbarer Energien, Ökostandards in Lieferketten – bereits angelegtes besonderes Profil weiter ausbauen. Im vorliegenden Impulspapier schlagen wir sieben Themen vor, die in Zukunft ein stärkeres Gewicht bekommen sollten. Diese reichen von der Gestaltung wirtschafts­politischer Rahmenbedingungen (z. B. öko-sozialer Fiskalreformen) bis hin zur Nutzung spezi­fischer neuer Marktpotenziale in Bereichen wie nachhaltiger Stadtentwicklung, Bio­ökonomie und grünem Wasserstoff. Allen Themen ist gemeinsam, dass hier ein beschäftigungswirksamer Struktur­wandel sowie klima- und umweltpolitische Ziele synergetisch miteinander verknüpft werden.

Der russische Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine zeigt, dass das multilaterale System zu schwach ist, um Frieden sicherzustellen. In diesem Interview beurteilt Anna-Katharina Hornidge die Lage. Sie ist die Direktorin des Deutschen Instituts für Entwicklung und Nachhaltigkeit (IDOS – German Institute of Development and Sustainability), das bis Ende Juni Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik hieß. Aus ihrer Sicht stehen wir in einem globalen Konflikt, bei dem irrationale Ansprüche rationale Entscheidungsprozesse behindern. Anna-Katharina Hornidge im Interview mit Hans Dembowski.

Action-oriented summits like the 2018 Global Climate Action Summit and 2019 UN Climate Action Summit, have become a major feature of global climate governance. Their emphasis on cooperative initiatives by a host of non-state and local actors creates high expectations, especially when, according to the IPCC, governments’ policies still set the world on course for a disastrous 2.7 °C warming. While earlier studies have cautioned against undue optimism, empirical evidence on summits and their ability to leverage transnational capacities has been scarce. Here using a dataset of 276 climate initiatives we show important differences in output performance, with no improvement among initiatives associated with more recent summits. A summit’s focus on certain themes and an emphasis on minimal requirements for institutional robustness, however, can positively influence the effectiveness of transnational engagement. These results make an empirical contribution towards understanding the increasingly transnational nature of climate governance.

Nur wenige internationale Übereinkünfte, die von den jeweiligen Zeitgenossen als historisch wahrgenommen werden, sind dies auch in den Augen späterer Generationen. Sie sind stets Produkt und Ausdruck ihrer Zeit, können aber auch über diese hinausweisen, indem sie erwartete und angestrebte Zukünfte verhandeln. Wenn nur wenige Jahre später die Welt schon wieder anders erscheint, versuchen sich dann neu zusammengesetzte Kohorten internationaler Diplomatie am nächsten »historischen« Wurf. Dabei geht allzu leicht das Gefühl für die miteinander verknüpften institutionellen und programmatischen Pfadabhängigkeiten verloren. Ohne das Wissen um bereits früher erzielte Verständigungen und Fortschritte kann aber auch das Bewusstsein für die notwendigen nächsten Schritte schwer gedeihen.

Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine proves that the multilateral system is too weak to safeguard peace. Anna-Katharina Hornidge, the director of the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) – assessed matters in an interview with  D+C/E+Z. According to her, we are witnessing a global conflict in which irrational aspirations are pitted against reasoned deliberation. (Anna-Katharina Hornidge interviewed by Hans Dembowski)

Prof. Dr. Anna-Katharina Hornidge hatte von 2015 bis 2020 eine Kooperationsprofessur zwischen der Universität Bremen und dem Leibniz-Zentrum für Marine Tropenforschung (ZMT) mit dem Schwerpunkt Entwicklungs- und Wissenssoziologie inne. Seit 2020 ist sie Direktorin des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Bonn und Professorin an der Universität Bonn.

In this policy brief, we analyse the direct effects and implications of the war in Ukraine on energy security, industrial supply chains, food security and environmental protection in the EU and in developing countries. Section 2.4 also considers the ramifications of the war on Ukraine’s own environment. We also explore several integrative policy approaches to mitigate these implications, namely policy coherence, social protections measures and international cooperation.
Throughout our analyses, we consider existing and potential policy measures, and in doing so refer to the EGD’s many dimensions. We argue that the EGD is instrumental in setting the EU and its partners on a sustainable path, and key to addressing multiple crises in the short and long term. Moreover, successful implementation of the EGD can help the EU weather the shock of the war, while facilitating sustainable development that leaves no one, and no country, behind.
Key messages:
• The European Green Deal (EGD) is instrumental in addressing some of the implications of the war in Ukraine. It can facilitate an integrated response that considers the global concerns raised by the concurrent geopolitical, health and socio-environmental crises, in both the short term and the long term. The war’s effects on food security, energy security, industrial supply chains and environmental protection should be addressed with due attention to immediate threats, and with a view to speeding up the nascent sustainability transformation in order to avoid exacerbating future disruptions. To achieve this, three approaches are essential: enabling policy coherence between sectors and institutions, designing adequate social protection measures, and advancing international cooperation.
• To simultaneously address energy security and the climate crisis, the energy transition should be accelerated worldwide. Domestically, the EU can ratchet up production of renewable energies, phase-out fossil fuels (including liquefied natural gas (LNG)), and make energy efficiency improvements across all sectors and industries. The EU should avoid response measures that create lock-ins to pathways that are incompatible with the green transition. In parallel, the EU has the capacity to build strong international partnerships to assist other interested countries in their own energy transitions and support them to become key trading partners of renewable energy sources.
• Global supply chains, particularly industrial supply chains, have been disrupted by the war and related sanctions. Ukraine, Russia and Belarus supply much of the world’s key raw materials, such as neon, nickel, aluminium and palladium, and crucial goods, such as iron-derived products and fertilisers. The energy price spike and inaccessible transportation routes have further exacerbated the disruptions. As companies relocate their production and seek new suppliers, the EU should aim to incentivise low-carbon options, boost innovation and material efficiency, and support developing countries in building their own green industries.
• Food security has also been adversely affected by disrupted supply chains. In particular, developing countries reliant on food imports face serious challenges due to record high prices. The EU has already put measures in place to support short-term food security, both domestically and beyond. To mitigate future crises, it should develop long-term measures to transition the EU food system towards sustainability and support the development of resilient food systems in developing countries.
• The war in Ukraine poses a serious threat to global environmental governance, particularly with regard to environmental protection and biodiversity conservation. The war will likely influence supply chain-driven deforestation and ecosystem degradation, in part due to increasing food insecurity. The EU can support effective and smart agriculture to minimise or avoid land conversion for food or energy production, both domestically and in developing countries. In addition, the EU can play an active role in assisting Ukraine in its ever-more precarious environmental situation, and to support neighbouring countries like Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary that may suffer from trans-boundary pollution.
• The war in Ukraine has exposed the urgent need for effective coordination and coherence between EU policy frameworks. To implement the EGD, internal and external trade-offs between core issue areas, such as food and environmental protection or energy and industrial supply chains, and between short-term and long-term effects, need to be minimised. Simultaneously, synergies need to be enhanced. Currently, however, the content and implementation of the EGD still follows a sectoral and siloed approach that contradicts the EU’s policy coherence ambitions. More than ever, the realisation of the EGD’s objectives requires an integrated approach to facilitate efficient alignment with long-term global agendas, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.
• In the short term, social protection can help vulnerable households cope with increases in food and energy prices, through mechanisms like cash transfers, in-kind transfers and subsidies. To promote longer-term resilience, social protection can support the just transition and independence of energy and food systems by way of facilitating structural changes, for example, in terms of employment. This will require increased spending on social protection systems anchored in equity concerns.
• With regards to its international cooperation, the EU still needs to define the goals it seeks to attain under the external dimension of the EGD. These will need to be translated into concrete actions in close dialogue with the EU’s partner countries. Moreover, international cooperation must be aligned to support long-term strategies to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement in a synergistic fashion. This requires a policy space for accountability and learning, through continuous monitoring and evaluation of pertinent international cooperation activities and partnerships. The EU also has the important role of building trust between partner countries and demonstrating international leadership in the face of Russia’s geo-political belligerence.

The governance of ocean and polar regions is among the most relevant challenges in the combat against global environmental degradation and global inequalities. Ocean and polar regions are climate regulators and very much affected by climate change. They are an important source of nutrition for life in and above the sea. At the same time, they are subject to an increasing number of geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. Due to the lasting virulence of many security issues, economic conflicts, legal disputes, new technological developments and environmental crises in global marine areas as well as the intricate overlap of sovereign, semi-sovereign and global commons territories, the relevance of ocean and polar governance is bound to rise: as frontiers both in global competitive strategies as well as most fragile eco-systems whose collapse would have catastrophic consequences. This thematic issue sketches important trends in research on ocean and polar governance, and identifies avenues for future research. In this editiorial, we first provide an overview of governance challenges for ocean and polar regions and their relevance for geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. In a second step, we present the eight contributions that make up the thematic issue by clustering them around three themes: the impact of (re-)territorialisation on governance and the construction of authority, the effectiveness of regimes of ocean and polar governance, and, challenges to norm-creation in ocean governance.

The advancement of governance architecture in the Arctic region and dealing with the “Arctic development paradox” have been among the most significant challenges of the circumpolar North for decades. The common denominator of both issues is the growing necessity to frame solutions that credibly and effectively support the Arctic’s social and environmental systems in the face of climate change and globalisation. The current status quo seems deficient, which is why understanding the main impediments is subject to public and academic discussion. This article contributes to these debates by referring to the concept of governability to demonstrate how transregional activities advance the development of more coherent governance in the Arctic. The article explores approaches applied by transregional organisations and cooperation programmes that constitute the governance system in the European Arctic. Specifically, it scrutinises governing interactions developed by the Barents Regional Council and the Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme to overcome the normative trap of the Arctic development paradox. This research follows a semi‐structured, exploratory approach, which facilitates identifying key elements of a structurally and conceptually led response that resounds in each case. Combined with a synoptic literature review, this article answers two questions: First, how do the transregional actors approach the Arctic development paradox in their cooperation strategies and programmes, and to what extent do these approaches differ? Second, what kind of recommendations do they provide to overcome the Arctic development paradox?

Bus rapid transit (BRT), an innovative transit solution from the Global South, represents a more affordable and easier to implement mass transit mode in comparison to railway systems. Despite these advantages, many cities struggle to implement BRT due to different challenges from the need of an institutional framework and financing to the managing of competing transport modes and public opposition from car users and informal bus operators, as well as the design of BRT components (e.g. the quality of the infrastructure, vehicles and service). When these challenges are not solved, already implemented BRT systems struggle to successfully perform and expand their network to increase the service coverage. This paper studies the case of Jakarta’s BRT, which has become the largest BRT network in the world and reaches 82% of the city’s population. This study shows how Transjakarta has been able to face the different challenges for the phasing-in, good performance and expansion of its network, and presents lessons for the future of BRT within an integrated transit network that includes other mass transit modes, as well as formerly informal feeder services.

The socio-economic well-being of urban areas depends on a well-functioning transportation system that makes it easier for people to access goods and services. Most urban areas in emerging economies are expanding in size and human population, resulting in increased demand for transportation and mobility. But these urban areas are characterised by high motorisation and inadequate public transportation resulting in traffic congestion, accidents and increasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Urban rail (metro, tram, suburban) can be the solution because trains can move a large number of people at high speed at short intervals, provide reliable services because of its spatial isolation, contribute minimal GHGs when the source of energy is renewable, and has a low accident rate. However, urban rail is expensive and require many technical and technological capabilities often unavailable in emerging economies because they are technological latecomers. This paper examines how two emerging economies, China and India, have been developing local capabilities through an industrial policy to ensure increased urban rail development.