Diplomacy & Crisis News

Uncle Sam is getting his rear-end kicked by the Russians and Chinese (heck, even the North Koreans are starting to outdo the Americans) in the all-important realm of hypersonic weapons. Indeed, it’s possible that China is even already creating working defenses against hypersonic weapons (meaning that Beijing is doubling up on success whereas the Americans are still languishing in the design phase).

But a new U.S. defense project between the Department of Defense and contractor Kratos is desperately trying to change that with a new project. Given how key hypersonic weapons are, and will continue to be, the Kratos effort must be assessed. 

Kratos Saves the Day?

Under the rubric of “MACH TB 2.0,” Kratos is attempting to “enhance the United States’ capabilities in hypersonic technology through rapid, affordable testing,” according to Kalif Shaikh at Interesting Engineering, a trade publication. 

Both the Kratos leadership and the top brass at the Pentagon believe that one of the key reasons that the Russians and Chinese have surpassed the Americans in developing a reliable, real-world hypersonic weapons capacity has to do with the extreme costs of hypersonic weapons development and testing. 

In fact, when it comes to testing hypersonic systems, the United States is far behind the curve. Wind tunnels are key elements behind testing hypersonic systems. Guess where the world’s most powerful wind tunnel is for testing hypersonic systems? China.

Kratos is leading a group of powerful defense contractors, including the likes of Leidos and Rocket Lab, all of which are keen on expediting the R&D cycles of American hypersonic weapons. Kratos believes that it can reduce the risks and costs associated with hypersonic weapons development by accelerating the delivery of these systems in the field. One way to do that is by deploying advanced flying testbeds to allow for researchers to assess the efficacy of their hypersonic systems in real-world conditions.

Is the Problem Fundamental or Can It Be Resolved Quickly?

Pentagon insiders (and those at Kratos) do not believe that the United States lacks the fundamentals to achieve parity with both Russia and China in hypersonic weapons. They think the problem is taking all the disparate pieces the Pentagon has been assembling for hypersonic weapons research and development and accelerating those projects. There might be something to this theory. 

After all, hypersonic weapons have been researched since the last part of the Cold War. It’s not really new technology. The Americans, however, did not develop these systems, which left a gap for both Russia and China to fill.

So, it might very well be that this is an application problem rather than a fundamental inability to compete. Of course, the United States is being shown up by its rivals, notably China, in multiple other domains. Yet, the Americans are right to give the Kratos team a chance to see if it can accelerate the American development of hypersonic weapons. If Kratos is right, then the United Statees could achieve real parity with China and Russia in hypersonic weapons in the five years or so.

There are some problems with this outlook. 

Fundamentally, the defense industrial base is broken and the procurement systems for these weapons systems are increasingly corrupt and inefficient. The quest for greater weapons has been hindered by defense firms’ massive profit seeking—even at the expense of national readiness. 

Should the Kratos team be wrong, and the problems affecting America’s hypersonic weapons development are far more fundamental and systemic, then the United States will find itself in a world of hurt, as Chinese and Russian hypersonic weapons threaten the homeland in ways that conventional missiles simply cannot. 

A global arms race is occurring, and the Americans are in the unenviable position of being on the defensive. Hopefully Kratos can help overcome these problems soon. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

In September of last year, it was reported that Russia had launched an astonishing 8,060 drones developed by the long-time Russian ally, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. 

At the time, it was an extraordinary number. The reporting back in September 2024 highlighted the importance that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of all shapes and sizes had for both sides fighting in Ukraine (the Ukrainians use overwhelming numbers of Turkish-produced drones). 

The Iranian drones that Russia loves are the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 one-way attack unmanned aerial systems. In an October 2022 assessment by the Council of Foreign Relations, the bulk of the drones Iran handed over to Russia belonged to the Shahed-136 model. That’s the specific Iranian-built drone we’ll be analyzing here.

Back in March, the Russians signed a licensing agreement with Iran that allowed them to domestically produce these systems. According to a November 2024 report by Iran International, a website that advocates the end of the Islamist regime in Iran, the presence of large numbers of cheaply produced Iranian drones “supercharged Russia’s 1,000-day fight in Ukraine.” 

An Iranian Nightmare in Ukraine 

With Russia now mass producing the Iranian drones indigenously, the Russians will likely continue enjoying the boost that the drones gave their forces when the Iranians first sold the drones to Russia. As the fight over control of the Russian enclave of Kursk, located just across the border from Ukraine has shown, Russian drones are wreaking havoc on the entrenched Ukrainian forces operating there. 

The Shahed-136, also known as “Witness” (or, Geran-2, meaning “Geranium-2” in Russian), is a delta-winged loitering munition designed for long-range attacks. The brilliance of the system lies in its relative simplicity that allows for cheap mass production and lower maintenance costs compared to other, more sophisticated drones. It has a range of a little more than 1,200 miles and can carry a warhead weighing between 88 and 110 pounds. Shahed-136 drones typically have a subsonic cruising speed of 111 miles per hour.

The basic tactics underlying the deployment of these systems involve the saturation of enemy defenses with swarms of cheaply produced Shahed-136 drones, thereby overwhelming an enemy’s air defenses and allowing for the attacking force to achieve dominance over a contested area. Another tactic involves stealthy, surgical strikes, since these drones’ relatively small size and low-flying capability makes it more difficult for defenders to see and defend against them.

Iranian Shahed-136 drones have also been used by the Iranian-backed Houthis in their efforts to terrorize international shipping—and the mighty United States Navy—in the Red Sea and Strait of Bab El-Mandeb. That Tehran is the producer of this specific drone should not surprise anyone. Being a relatively small power under immense international sanctions has meant that the Iranian regime has had to innovate unique asymmetrical warfare capabilities. 

No Easy Defense 

The Shahed-136 is particularly vexing for nations on the receiving end of its attacks. The drone poses significant defensive challenges, as both the Houthis out of Yemen and the Russians fighting in Ukraine have shown. Drones have proven that only layered air defense systems have a chance at reliably countering the threat that drone swarms pose to defenders. 

Such systems, however, are expensive to maintain—especially when compared to the relative cost and the overwhelming lethality of the Shahed-136 drones. What’s more, the risk of Iran proliferating these systems to other actors, particularly non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations beyond the Houthis, is a real complicating factor when it comes to defense.

Iranian weapons designers have already learned a great deal from the experience of their systems in various theaters of global warfare. They are applying those lessons learned to future iterations both of the Shahed-136 and other, more advanced Iranian drones. 

It is obvious that drone warfare will continue to evolve and to increasingly dominate the future of modern warfare. The Iranians understand this. As do the Turks and Russians. We shall see if the Western world truly understands this new reality. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock.

Almost every president since the end of the Cold War had his foreign policy legacy defined by a war no one could have foreseen. For George H.W. Bush, it was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Bill Clinton sought to deflect Bush’s 90 percent popularity after the successful 100-hour ground war by focusing on bread-and-butter issues. In 1992, Clinton campaign consultant James Carville summarized the strategy with the famous quip, “It’s the economy, stupid.” Clinton genuinely hoped to focus on the economy. He extricated U.S. forces from Somalia following the “Black Hawk Down” incident but found himself drawn first into Bosnia and then more reluctantly into Kosovo. George W. Bush, too, sought to be a domestic president but, after the 9/11 attacks, ordered U.S. forces into Afghanistan and, more controversially, into Iraq. Barack Obama pledged to end “dumb war[s],” but not only remained in Afghanistan and returned to Iraq but then involved the United States in Syria and Libya.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dominated the Biden administration’s foreign policy. Joe Biden did not send U.S. forces into the theater, but he did provide Ukraine with weaponry and other forms of support for their war effort. For all his talk about his genuine interest in Africa, Biden has paid little attention to the world’s deadliest conflict, the civil war in Sudan. He staked out the middle ground in the Israel-Hamas conflict, meddling diplomatically and virtue signaling with humanitarian schemes while otherwise standing largely aloof. Biden also claimed to be “the first president in this century to report to the American people that the United States is not at war anywhere in the world.” However, he omitted U.S. involvement off the coast of Yemen.

While the COVID-19 Pandemic overshadowed Donald Trump’s first term (thanks to a Chinese lab leak), he is correct in saying that he did not involve the United States in new wars. His second term will likely not be so placid.

Several wars loom, all of which could impact Trump’s legacy, whether he chooses to involve himself or not.

Turkey And Syria Vs. The Kurds

After Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Turkish-sponsored Sunni Islamist group that previously aligned with Al Qaeda rampaged through Syria and ended Bashar al-Assad’s dynasty after nearly a quarter-century. Trump celebrated. “I think Turkey is very smart...Turkey did an unfriendly takeover, without a lot of lives being lost,” he said.

Trump’s assessment of Turkey’s wisdom may be premature. While Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Bakr al-Jolani) seeks to win international recognition, he does so less because he has yet to consolidate control and more because recognition will bring access and control over the nearly $400 billion that Syrians will need to reconstruct their country.

The broader issue that could impact the Trump administration is what the new Syrian regime will mean for the Syrian Kurds. Trump may not care about the Kurds personally—he certainly did not hesitate to betray them during his first term—but the stakes are arguably higher. Both Al-Sharaa and Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani are pawns of Turkey; both trade sovereignty and nationalist causes for cash and power. Both will turn on Syrian Kurds to remain in the good graces of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 

In the past, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad was a brake on Turkish ambitions. With him gone, Turkey and its proxies may seek to overrun Syria’s Kurdish regions. The short-term impact of this could be the release of thousands of Islamic State prisoners. They will tip the balance inside Syria toward militancy. They could spread throughout not only the Middle East—destabilizing Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—but also become another tool by which Erdogan could blackmail Europe, as he did with Syrian refugees. It will only be a matter of time until some cross the southern border. What happens in Syria does not stay in Syria.

Azerbaijan Vs. Armenia

Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev took advantage of U.S. distraction during the 2020 election to launch an attack on Nagorno-Karabakh, a self-governing and democratic ethnic Armenian territory that Azerbaijan demanded to subordinate itself to Azerbaijan’s direct rule. On November 9, 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin imposed a ceasefire sparing about half the region’s territory and enabling 120,000 indigenous Armenians to remain in the rump region. With Putin preoccupied with the Ukraine War and with Secretary of State Antony Blinken signaling moral equivalency and weakness, Aliyev finished the job in September 2023, driving the entire 1,700-year-old Armenian Christian community into exile. Blinken’s refusal to describe that episode as “ethnic cleansing,” preferring instead to describe events in the passive voice as “depopulation,” leads Aliyev to believe he can continue his anti-Armenian jihad. In recent weeks, Aliyev has demanded the European border observation team evacuate and Armenia stop arming itself. His rhetoric about Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan” mirrors the late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s quip about Kuwait being Iraq’s “nineteenth province.”

The Caucasus could become even bloodier if Ukraine falls. Since 2018, Armenia has pivoted toward the West. Putin has a long memory. If given the opportunity, he will exact his revenge on Armenia. The same holds true for Moldova, which has also oriented itself increasingly toward Europe and NATO. Russia has already tightened its grip on Georgia. Trump must consider whether he is fine with the reconstitution of the Soviet Union.

China’s Proxy Wars In Africa

Trump would not be the first president to ignore African conflicts, but he may be the first for whom doing so would put the United States at untenable risk. China is no stranger to the continent. In 2017, it opened its first overseas naval base in tiny Djibouti in the Hord of Africa, just a few miles from Camp Lemonnier, where the Pentagon still stations its Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.

During the Biden administration, China consolidated its strategic position without any serious U.S. pushback. Rather than counter China’s economic and military inroads, the State Department often facilitated them.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) may be one of the world’s most dysfunctional states. Still, it nevertheless will be indispensable for the twenty-first-century economy. The lithium-ion batteries (upon which so many technologies depend) require cobalt, tantalum, germanium, and other rare earth elements that the DRC possesses in abundance. Some geologists estimate that Congo’s mineral wealth is worth up to $24 trillion.

China has taken a two-pronged approach to the DRC. It has bribed successive presidents for lucrative and exclusive mining concessions and simultaneously sold high-tech weaponry to support its investment in President Félix Tshisekedi, who now seeks an unconstitutional third term. Meanwhile, U.S. officials still celebrate Tshisekedi as a democrat. Under Michael Hammer, the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa recommended lifting UN reporting requirements on Congolese military purchases, thus injecting an opacity that only benefits Beijing.

Tshisekedi is not an intellectual. He appears to believe that a top-shelf, multibillion-dollar military can buy victory, regardless of his regime’s corruption and general incompetence. Such a dynamic can lead rulers like Tshisekedi to pull the trigger. He has grown increasingly bellicose toward Rwanda, a pro-Western neighbor that has previously fought to protect itself from genocide-era terrorists who now call the DRC home. Anti-Rwanda rhetoric can both distract Congolese from Tshisekedi’s own mismanagement and also serve China’s interests as Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame has taken a balanced approach that has effectively blocked Beijing’s ambitions. If a third Congo War erupts—and odds are it will—Trump will be forced to deal with a conflict that could disrupt the twenty-first-century economy just as much as the Arab oil embargo disrupted the twentieth-century economy.

Chinese interference in the Horn of Africa is an even greater threat. Somaliland, an unrecognized country that is nonetheless the region’s only democracy, also possesses rare earth deposits. It hosts an airfield that, prior to Somalia’s collapse into chaos, was an emergency landing strip for NASA’s space shuttle program, a deep water port that today is one of Africa’s top-ranked facilities, and several hundred miles of strategic coast along the Gulf of Aden. While countries like Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates take a transactional approach between the United States and China, Somaliland stands on principle and openly sides with Taiwan. 

China, alongside the Somali government in Mogadishu, has responded by sponsoring an insurgency in Somaliland’s Sool region. The Biden team bizarrely sided not with democratic, pro-Western, pro-Taiwan, and reasonably transparent Somaliland but rather with Mogadishu and Beijing. If Trump does not side unequivocally with Somaliland and recognize it, expect China to increase its efforts to destabilize the country. Simply put, it is impossible for Trump to stand up to China without working to checkmate its projects in Africa.

China Vs. Taiwan

The one possible conflict for which Trump’s team recognizes the need for preparation is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Make no mistake: Taiwan is not China. Historically, it has been distinct for most of the last 500 years. Even Mao Zedong recognized that Taiwan was as distinct from China as Korea.

Taiwan, however, is not simply the single island that many Americans picture. It also includes several outlying islands—some in the Taiwan Strait and some further afield. Trump’s advisors must not assume, as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy-designate Elbridge Colby does, that China would “go big” with an immediate effort to conquer Taiwan’s main island. After all, the Taiwan Relations Act does not cover the islands Matsu or Quemoy, the epicenter of the Eisenhower-era Taiwan crises, let alone those further afield like Taiping or Dongsha. 

For Beijing, Chinese “salami slicing” tactics in the South China Sea have been a success. Why should they change them now? Rather than simply address a theoretical invasion of Taiwan proper, Trump needs to determine in advance whether he will stand down should that invasion come in slow motion. After all, if China occupies Dongsha or Matsu absent American pushback, it is conditioning the American public for inaction.

Every president enters office with an agenda, but reality quickly intrudes. Biden allowed problems to fester, and the weakness and vacillation of aides like Blinken only encouraged irredentists and adversaries.

The foreign policy crises Trump does not expect and that his aides hope to ignore will likely define Trump’s legacy in ways he does not now imagine. Trump side-stepped wars in his first administration. He may not be so lucky in his next one.

Michael Rubin is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum.

Image: M2M_PL / Shutterstock.com.

If there is one untold, or completely misunderstood, geopolitical story of the twenty-first century, it is the rise of Turkey as a great power. Possessed of an Islamist political ideology and a commitment to restoring Turkey’s long-dead Ottoman Empire, the country that sits at the “Crossroads of Civilization,” between Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia, is the only great power that has seen its political power and military strength enhance since the dawn of this century. 

One area where Turkey is showcasing its newfound power and potency is in the realm of indigenous weapons. Turkey is a global leader in drone technology and its Bayraktar TB2 Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) is a perfect exemplar of Turkey’s military technological prowess. The TB2 is known for having reshaped the dynamics of contemporary warfare with its affordability, effectiveness, and adaptability.

The History of TB2 Drones

Built by Baykar Makina, a Turkish defense contractor for the Turkish Air Force, the Bayraktar TB2 has become a massively popular system both in Turkey’s Armed Forces and as an export model. It has enjoyed extensive service with the Ukrainian Armed Forces as they war against their neighbor, Russia, for control over the eastern portion of Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula (both of which Russia views as its own). 

A common theme of Turkey’s development as a major military technological power is that Ankara is consistently denied access to key American and NATO military assets. And because Turkey is prevented from gaining access to advanced Western technologies, Ankara has endeavored to become militarily self-sufficient. That is precisely what has occurred over the last decade. 

So, again, after the Americans embargoed Turkey from purchasing armed drones (because the West did not want those systems being used by Turkey against U.S.-backed Kurdish fighters in the Middle East), Turkey’s domestic drone industry was catalyzed into action. The TB2 made its initial flight in August 2014. By 2021, the drone had logged over 400,000 flight hours globally. 

The Specs

Turkey equipped the TB2 with advanced systems allowing for both autonomous and remotely controlled operations. Constructed predominantly of carbon fiber and Kevlar, this V-tail-signature craft has proven itself time and time again over the last decade, meaning that Turkey has become an unmanned aerial vehicle-producing superpower. The TB2 carries a payload of up to 330 pounds.

TB2s integrate electro-optical, infrared cameras, and laser designators (and laser range finders), making these birds a perfect ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) craft as well as effective for targeted strikes.

It has an operational altitude of 25,000 feet and an endurance of 27 hours, meaning that the TB2 can remain over targets for a protracted time, augmenting the user’s real-time battlefield information flow (granting greater situational awareness upon the force deploying the TB2).

Over the years, TB2s have participated in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. They were used to neutralize enemy air defenses on behalf of Turkish-backed elements fighting in war-torn Libya. In the brutal Nagorno-Karabakh war, Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan deployed TB2 drones so well that many believe these systems led to Armenia’s defeat in that conflict. 

A Powerful Export Model

As noted above, though, the TB2 drones became most well-known internationally for their use by Ukrainian forces against the invading Russians, giving the TB2 positive press.

In all the conflicts these drones have fought, they have performed brilliantly, making them a key system that Turkey produces. What’s more, the relatively cheap price of individual TB2s (around $5 million), makes these drones an attractive purchase for nations operating under constrained defense budgets.

Nearly twenty-four foreign nations have purchased these drones from Turkey, boosting Turkey’s arms industry as well as Turkey’s national influence and prestige. 

Thanks to the unqualified success of the TB2 program, Turkey has invested in a new round of systems augmenting the capabilities of the TB2. For instance, the even more advanced Bayraktar TB3 has been developed as well as the Akinci, promising greater strike and surveillance capabilities—at affordable rates—than what the legendary TB2 provided.

Turkey has arrived as a great regional power and its indigenous arms industry proves this. It is now only a matter of time before Turkey exerts its power beyond its present borders. Indeed, it has already started enhancing its power in the Middle East. The Bayraktar TB2 (and subsequent drone systems) are but a few of the symbols proving Turkey’s return to greatness. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Flickr.

Boeing is set to move full-rate production (FRP) for its electronic warfare (EW) kit that will be employed on the U.S. Air Force's fleet of F-15E Strike Eagle and F-15EX Eagle II aircraft. On Monday, the aerospace firm was awarded a $615 million Pentagon contract for the F-15 Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS) FRP, which will see the multirole aircraft updated with the kits through the end of 2030.

"This contract provides for procurement of Group A and Group B kits, system engineering program management, and interim contractor support lay-in material," the Department of Defense (DoD) announced.

The EPAWSS was developed in a partnership between BAE Systems and the U.S. Air Force to replace the analog F-15 Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS) and promises to increase the survivability of the F-15 from modern air defense platforms. Initial operational and test evaluations were conducted last year.

"BAE Systems is currently on schedule in support of Boeing's F-15 EPAWSS LRIP [low-rate initial production] activities and is looking forward to supporting Boeing in the FRP [full rate production] phase of the program," Kevin Fournier, EPAWSS program director at BAE Systems, said in a statement, per Breaking Defense.

A highly capable electronic warfare (EW) suite, EPAWSS is an all-digital radar warning, geolocation, situational awareness platform that was developed to aid in the detection and to counter surface and airborne threats in what BAE Systems describes as " highly contested, dense signal environments." It further provides radio frequency (RF) electronic countermeasures (ECM), while it is smaller and lighter than previous EW platforms employed in the F-15. The number of chaff and flare dispensers has also been increased with a full dozen holding 360 cartridges.

"EPAWSS is a leap in technology, improving the lethality and combat capabilities of the F-15E and F-15EX in contested, degraded environments against advanced threats," Explained EPAWSS test director Maj Bryant 'Jager' Baum. "EPAWSS has set the baseline for EW within the fighter community."

The installation of EPAWSS could help deliver on Boeing's efforts to transform the F-15EX into an Air Force version of the U.S. Navy's EA-18G Growler – the EW variant of the carrier-based F/A-18 Super Hornet.

Upgrading the Eagle Fleet

The U.S. Air Force inventory currently includes 218 F-15Es, and according to a December 2023 Pentagon Modernized Selected Acquisition Report (MSAR), 99 of the Strike Eagles will receive the upgrades – while all of the planned 98 F-15EX Eagles IIs that the service is acquiring will be equipped with the EPAWSS.

The numbers are a significant reduction noted in an April 2022 Select Acquisition Report (SAR), which stated that the procurement quantity would include "217 F-15E and 144 F-15EX aircraft." However, the Air Force scaled back on the upgrades citing the high costs. The totals could still be adjusted depending on how many F-15EXs the Air Force ends up acquiring, while it is also likely the oldest F-15Es (with the most flight hours) won't receive the enhancement given that their remaining service life.

"Used 34 years as a hybrid number for life-cycle since EPAWSS on F-15E has a 24 year while F-15EX has a 44 year life-cycle expectancy," the DoD's MSAR stated.

The work will be carried out at Boeing's facility in St. Louis, Missouri, and by BAE Systems in Nashua, New Hampshire. It was not stated how the work would be divided, but it is likely that Boeing would handle the installation of the EW suite in all of the F-15EX aircraft.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

At the tail end of 2024, two new Chinese stealth fighter demonstrators were revealed. The separate designs put forth by manufacturers Shenyang and Chengdu stunned aviation buffs and military experts alike. Both airframes featured qualities that would make them stealthy, high-performance next-generation platforms. While additional information surrounding these planes has yet to be publicized, their overall design falls in line with what experts have already assumed about China’s future aerial objectives. One of the combat aircraft depicted in leaked videos of the flights is likely a successor to the PLAAF’s current fifth-generation program. The Chengdu J-20 is widely considered to represent one of the most formidable jets of its kind to ever fly the skies. The “Mighty Dragon’s” design, from its fuselage shape and engine intake shape to its paint design and stealth, mirrors the American-made F-22 and F-35 platforms. If a full blown war were to erupt over the South China Sea, the J-20 platform would undoubtedly lead the PRC’s aerial strategy.

A brief overview of the J-20 platform

When the J-20 was first introduced to service, China became the second country ever to release a fifth-generation stealth aircraft. The aircraft was initially endorsed by the PLAAF in the early 2000’s and entered service in 2017. By 2019, considerable numbers of J-20s became operational. Initially, the fifth-generation platform flew with Russian AL-31 engines. The PRC later turned to its domestically produced WS-15 engine, an important transition as the Chinese engine is remarkably more capable than the Russian import as it allows the J-20 to enter a super cruise regime while unlocking the supermaneuverability granted by thrust vectoring.

Specs & capabilities- how does the J-20 compare to its American near-peers?

In terms of capabilities, aviation buffs believe that the J-20 features a sensor suite that parallels the F-35’s Electro-Optical Targeting System. The twinjet all-weather Mighty Dragon has a reported range of 1,200 miles, a servicing ceiling of 55,000 feet and a maximum speed of Mach-2.55. While these characteristics make the Chinese fifth-generation jet a formidable threat to its American near-peers, the extent of the jet’s capabilities remains unknown. A research fellow for airpower and technology at the United Kingdom-based Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security called the Mighty Dragon “a qualitatively greater threat than any previous non-Western combat aircraft.”

The race to produce sixth-gen platforms is underway

In total, the PRC plans to increase production of the J-20 to match and even exceed the number of American-made Raptors in service today. If the Mighty Dragon reaches this production goal, the potential for incursions over Taiwan will heighten. The PRC remains steadfast in its ambition to seize control of this First Island Chain Nation in the near future. In addition to acquiring more J-20’s, China’s military is prioritizing the production of sixth-generation platforms. The upcoming H-20 Xi’an stealth bomber is Beijing’s counter for the American-designed B-21 Raider. China is also working to develop a next-gen fighter program as made evident by the recent flights of stealth fighter demonstrators.

Maya Carlin is a National Interest security contributor, an analyst with the Center for Security Policy, and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. 

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

China is reportedly developing two stealth bombers: the H-20 strategic bomber and the JH-XX tactical bomber. If China is capable of finishing either project, the military implications for the region could be significant, giving China a tool that to date only the Americans have ever possessed.

The Stealth Bomber

Only one country has ever developed and fielded a stealth bomber – the US and their B-2 Spirit. And when the B-2 was first delivered, in 1993, the aircraft was a legitimate game changer. Suddenly, the US possessed the ability to fly undetected, across enemy lines, and deliver either nuclear or conventional ordnance; the B-2 added another layer of sophistication to the US’s nuclear triad, which constituted the US’s nuclear deterrence strategy.

Times have changed, however. The B-2’s stealth technology is no longer cutting-edge; it’s radar cross section is no longer as impressive. Air defense systems have grown more sensitive, challenging the B-2’s ability to operate undetected. Accordingly, the Air Force is working on an updated stealth bomber, the B-21, which will presumably feature a smaller RCS.

Respect is still due: The B-2 was ahead of its time; over thirty years later, no nation has offered an equivalent technology. But now China is reportedly working to do just that, with not one stealth bomber but two.

China’s Efforts

Little is known about the Chinese efforts to field a stealth bomber. Details are exceedingly scant. But what is understood is that the H-20 project will offer a strategic option while the JH-XX will offer a tactical option. What does that mean? The H-20 will have a larger combat radius, perhaps upwards of 5,000 miles, and will feature advanced radar systems like the AESA. The H-20 would serve in a similar capacity as the B-2, giving the Chinese a credible method for delivering nuclear weapons via air, hence creating a credible nuclear triad.

The JH-XX meanwhile can be expected to have similar features but will be a smaller, regionally focused bomber that may include fifth-generation fighter technologies i.e., thrust vectoring, data fusion, network connectivity, supercruise, and an internal weapons bay. Granted, that’s not much to go on. Yet, the existence of the project has been confirmed through official channels; according to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2019 China Military Power report, “The PLAAF [ People’s Liberation Army Air Force] is developing new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets…stealth technology continues to play a key role in the development of these new bombers, which probably will reach initial operational capability no sooner than 2025.”

The report added that the JH-XX “will have additional capabilities, with full-spectrum upgrades compared with current operational bomber fleets, and will employ many fifth-generation fighter technologies in their design.” That’s not a lot to go on. The significant takeaway is simply that the Chinese are working on a stealth bomber, an ambition that is consistent with Xi’s overarching ambition of enhancing Chinese military prowess and revisionism.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Russian state media reported that an airstrike was carried out on Wednesday in the Ukrainian-occupied Kursk region involving a Sukhoi Su-34 (NATO reporting name Fullback). The fighter-bomber launched guided glide bombs at ground targets, while it was escorted by a Sukhoi Su-35S (NATO reporting name Flanker-M).

"The crew of a Russian Aerospace Forces Su-34 multi-role supersonic fighter-bomber delivered a strike on a cluster of Ukrainian military manpower and armored and motor vehicles near the border in the Kursk Region," the Russian Ministry of Defense said in a statement to Tass.

"After completing the combat mission, the entire group successfully returned to the base airfield. According to the intelligence report, the targets were successfully hit," the Defense Ministry added.

The airstrikes were allegedly carried out on a "Ukrainian stronghold," and the Kremlin claimed multiple Ukrainian personnel were killed and several vehicles destroyed. Kyiv has not commented on the strike or confirmed that it suffered any losses.

Replenishing the Losses

It was just weeks ago that the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), a subsidiary of the military-industrial conglomerate Rostec, announced that it had delivered a new batch of Su-34s multirole fighters to the Russian Aerospace Forces.

UAC didn't state how many fighters were delivered in the latest consignment, but it has been reported that Moscow's rate of attrition has been outpacing production throughout the ongoing conflict. Last month, Stavros Atlamazoglou, writing for The National Interest, cited Oryx open-source data that found thirty-seven Su-34s had been to that point.

Russia was believed to have around 163 operational Su-34s at the start of the conflict nearly three years ago. Though the Kremlin didn't confirm the loss of one in October, Russian military bloggers (mil-bloggers) acknowledged that a Su-34 was shot down by an American-made F-16 Fighting Falcon. It marked the first successful air-to-air kill involving the F-16 in Ukraine.

Russia's Fullback

The Sukhoi Su-34 multirole strike aircraft is a twin-engine, twin-seat, all-weather supersonic medium-range fighter-bomber, initially developed for the Soviet Air Forces in the 1980s. A derivative of the Sukhoi Su-27 (NATO reporting name Flanker), the Su-34 was developed to operate in all weather conditions and conduct attack, bombing, and fighter missions.

The development of the aircraft was one of the Kremlin's many programs that were forced on the backburner following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis that followed. The Su-34 program was only revived in earnest in the early 2000s, with eight pre-production aircraft built for trials and evaluations. The aircraft formally entered service in 2014 – although there are reports that the strike aircraft was employed during the Russo-Georgia War of 2008.

As Atlamazoglou further emphasized, the aircraft was designed with "an enhanced cockpit with additional armor to withstand anti-aircraft ground fire," while it also is equipped with "advanced electronic warfare countermeasures to jam or defeat enemy anti-aircraft missiles." The Su-34 is capable of reaching Mach 2 (approximately 1,500 miles per hour) and is able to carry 18,000 pounds of ordnance on its 12 hardpoints. It can conduct air-to-air attacks beyond visual range (BVR), but also be employed in a fighter-bomber role – which appears to be how the Kremlin is now mostly using the aircraft.

Though it can strike targets up to 160 miles away, that doesn't seem to be far enough for the fighter-bomber to avoid hostile air-defense fire, or enemy aircraft as noted in the October encounter with the F-16.

Thus while the Su-34 remains among Russia's most capable multirole aircraft, and it has been widely used in the ongoing war, it clearly isn't invincible. The question now is whether Russia will be able to replace the losses – especially as Ukraine is to receive additional F-16 Fight Falcons and French-made Mirage 2000s.

The Su-35S

As previously reported, the Sukhoi Su-35 has been touted as one of the most advanced 4++ generation aircraft systems, combining many fifth-generation elements. It is also a heavily upgraded derivative of the Su-27 aircraft and was originally intended for export.

As UAC failed to initially find foreign buyers, the Su-35S first entered service with the Russian Aerospace Forces in 2014 and made its first combat deployment in Syria in 2015 – where it was employed to provide cover for other Russian aircraft on bombing missions.

While sharing broadly the blended wing-body design of the Su-27, the Su-27M/Su-35S can be visibly distinguished from the basic version by the addition of canards, which are small lifting surfaces, ahead of the wings. The Su-35's large and powerful Saturn AL-41F1S engines provide it the ability to supercruise for a long time, while it can reach supersonic speeds without using an afterburner.

The engines are also noted for employing three-dimensional thrust vectoring, which makes the Su-35 very maneuverable. Currently, it is the only production fighter to use two-plane thrust vectoring nozzles.

Designed primarily to be an air superiority fighter, the Su-35 has secondary air-to-ground capability and can carry an enormous amount of weapons. It has 12 wing and fuselage hardpoints, which allow for it to carry ordnance with a maximum weight of up to 8,000 kg (17,630 pounds), including a variety of air-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-radiation, and anti-ship missiles, as well as a number of TV, laser-, and satellite-guided bombs. The Su-35's armament also includes a GSh-30-1 30mm autocannon with 150 rounds.

The multirole aircraft can further be equipped with an electronic warfare pod, which provides it with powerful jamming capability. It has been reported that its advanced jammers can reduce the performance of enemy radars, and can blind onboard radars found on missiles, notably the AIM-120 AMRAAM.

Russia is reported to have around 120 Su-35s in service, while at least six are believed to have been lost in the fighting in Ukraine. It would seem that the Su-35S may have a new role – namely protecting the Su-34 when it carries out its ground attacks.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Even one of the greatest weapons of mass destruction has what could be described as a "shelf life." On Tuesday, the United States Department of Energy announced that its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) had completed a program to keep the B61-12 nuclear bomb in service for decades to come.

The B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) was initiated in 2008, with a specific focus on upgrading the family of B61 gravity bombs, "which are deployed from U.S. Air Force and North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) bases." The latest modification of the original bomb, the B61-12 is a twelve-foot-long, approximately 825-pound, air-launched nuclear gravity bomb that utilizes an inertial navigation system (INS) to make a precision strike on a target.

According to NNSA, the B61 has already been in service for more than five decades, yet remains both "the oldest and most versatile weapon in the enduring U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile." The B61-12 LEP is meant to further extend the service life of the bomb stockpile by at least another 20 years. That will include refurbishing, reusing, and if necessary even replacing some of the nuclear and non-nuclear components.

As a result, instead of entirely fresh ordnance, the B6-12s are a combination of new and refurbished components from earlier variants including the B61-3, B61-4, B61-7, and B61-10. On December 18, 2024, NNSA completed the Last Production Unit (LPU) of the B61-12 LEP – the culmination of an effort that began almost 20 years earlier.

"Completing the B61-12 on schedule is the latest example of what we've been saying for several years now: NNSA is delivering capabilities at the pace and scale needed by our Department of Defense partners and our deterrence requirements," said Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby. 

The total cost of the program was reported to be approximately $9 billion.

Upgrades to Continue

The B61-12 LPU came three years after the First Production Unit (FPU) was achieved in November 2021, and 17 years after its design and development was first initiated.

"NNSA's program managers and experts from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, the Pantex Plant, the Savanah River Site, the Y-12 National Security Complex, and the Kansas City National Security Campus worked in close collaboration with NNSA on the design, development, qualification, and component production," the Department of Energy explained.

"Completion of the last B61-12 testifies to the successful collaboration we've had with our U.S. Air Force and Department of Defense partners. The momentum built through B61-12 production and delivery will continue into delivery on the other six active weapons modernization programs and on additional programs that will become active in the coming years," explained Dr. Marvin Adams, deputy administrator for Defense Programs at the DoE. "Achieving LPU in FY 2025 demonstrates our ability to execute, not only to our partners and stakeholders in DoD and Congress but also to our adversaries and allies. This demonstration is itself a contribution to deterrence and assurance."

Even as the B61-12 LEP has reached its end, NNSA will look to the B61-13, which will further build on this last upgrade effort. It is scheduled to reach its FPU in the department's fiscal year 2026 (FY26).

An Air-Launched Nuclear Weapon

The B61-12was first integrated with the U.S. Air Force's F-15E Strike Eagle, where it is carried externally, and the weapon is also being certified to be carried on the Air Force's B-2 Spirit strategic bomber, as well as the F-16C/D fighter.

Last March, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) confirmed that the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II achieved its nuclear certification to carry the gravity bomb in October 2023, becoming the first fifth-generation nuclear-capable aircraft. With that certification, the conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant stealth fighter further became a "dual-capable" aircraft able to carry both conventional and nuclear weapons internally.

However, it was noted at the time that the F-35A can only carry the upgraded B61-12 variant – but that is essentially a moot point now that the program has reached its LPU. In addition, the certification did not extend to the stealth jet's sister variants, the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B and carrier-launched F-35C. It remains unclear if and when those variants could receive the certification – and as the F-35A can carry the current variant, it is expected it will be certified for the B61-13 as it enters service.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Uncle Sam is getting his rear-end kicked by the Russians and Chinese (heck, even the North Koreans are starting to outdo the Americans) in the all-important realm of hypersonic weapons. Indeed, it’s possible that China is even already creating working defenses against hypersonic weapons (meaning that Beijing is doubling up on success whereas the Americans are still languishing in the design phase).

But a new US defense project is desperately trying to change that. This author remains highly skeptical about the endeavor. Given how key hypersonic weapons are, and will continue to be, the effort by the Defense Department and the defense firm known as Kratos, must be assessed. 

Kratos Saves the Day?

Under the rubric of “MACH TB 2.0” Kratos is attempting to “enhance the United States’ capabilities in hypersonic technology through rapid, affordable testing,” according to Kalif Shaikh at Interesting Engineering, a trade publication.

Both the Kratos leadership and the top brass at the Pentagon believe that one of the key reasons that the Russians and Chinese have surpassed the Americans in developing a reliable, real-world hypersonic weapons capacity has to do with the extreme costs of hypersonic weapons development and testing. 

In fact, when it comes to testing hypersonic systems, the United States is far behind the curve. Wind tunnels are key elements behind testing hypersonic systems. Guess where the world’s most powerful wind tunnel is for testing hypersonic systems? If you guessed the United States, you’d be wrong—it’s actually in China. 

Kratos is leading a group of powerful defense contractors, including the likes of Leidos and Rocket Lab, all of which are keen on expediting the R&D cycles of American hypersonic weapons. Kratos believes that they can reduce the risks and costs associated with hypersonic weapons development by accelerating the delivery of these systems in the field. One way to do that is by deploying advanced flying testbeds to allow for researchers to assess the efficacy of their hypersonic systems in real-world conditions.

Is the Problem Fundamental or Can It Be Resolved Quickly?

Pentagon insiders (and those at Kratos) do not believe that the United States lacks the fundamentals to achieve parity with both Russia and China in hypersonic weapons. They think the problem is taking all the disparate pieces the Pentagon has been assembling for hypersonic weapons research and development and simply accelerating those projects. There might be something to this theory. 

After all, hypersonic weapons have been researched since the last part of the Cold War. It’s not really new technology. The Americans, however, ignored the need to develop these systems which left a gap for both Russia and China to fill.

So, it might very well be that this is an application problem rather than a fundamental inability to compete. Of course, the United States is being shown up by its rivals, notably China, in multiple other domains. Yet, the Americans are right to give the Kratos team a chance to see if they can simply accelerate the American development of hypersonic weapons. If Kratos is right then the US could achieve real parity with China and Russia in hypersonic weapons in the five years or so.

There are some problems with this outlook. 

Fundamentally, the defense industrial base is broken and the procurement systems for these weapons systems are increasingly corrupt and inefficient. The quest for greater weapons has been reduced to little more than massive profit motive by defense firms—even at the expense of national readiness.

Should the Kratos team be wrong, and the problems affecting America’s hypersonic weapons development are far more fundamental and systemic, then the United States will find itself in a world of hurt, as Chinese and Russian hypersonic weapons rise that can threaten the homeland in ways that conventional missiles simply cannot. 

A global arms race is occurring, and the Americans are in the unenviable position of being on the defensive. Hopefully Kratos can help overcome these problems soon. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Recent geopolitical developments in the Middle East prove true Vladimir Lenin’s infamous quote that, “There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.” That’s because about a month ago the entire geopolitical framework that has existed in the Mideast for decades was completely upended in a relatively short amount of time. 

For the first time since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which loosed the Islamic Republic of Iran from its strategic box, the Iranians have been placed on the defensive and their overall strategic position in the region is utterly crumbling. 

As a result of these incredible actions in just a little more than a month, Iran is desperately flailing about in a spasmodic attempt to restore its unstable regional security situation. Recent days have seen pronouncements about rapid Iranian nuclear weapons development meanwhile since last month news about Iran’s mysterious drone mothership has slowly leaked out to the West. 

Earlier this week, Iran’s state-controlled Channel 3 made an ominous prediction that, “In the coming hours, the world will witness unusual scenes and developments.” 

No one knows for sure what that means. It is likely just another desperate act from a regime that, let’s face it, is about to feel the squeeze from the incoming Trump administration if President-Elect Donald Trump’s running commentary on Tuesday, January 7, about Iran and the hostages being held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip are any indicator. 

A Drone Mothership is Born

Regardless, Iran is clearly doing everything in its power to restore its unstable and rapidly deteriorating security situation. An area that should cause some alarm among Western security officials is Iran’s drone carrier, the Shahid Bagheri. This vessel is a modified container ship. Specifically, it is an augmented 24-year-old container ship named the Perarin. The ship was transformed at the Iran Shipbuilding & Offshore Industries Complex Company near Bandar Abbas in Iran.

Significant structure modifications were needed to make the old container ship into a weapon of war. An angled flight deck and a specialized ski-jump takeoff ramp were installed on the boat. Of course, the ship retains its original superstructure. Angled decks for launching and recovering drones was, therefore, necessary. Those modifications included white markings to guide flight operations, indicating that the Iranians are serious about precision in their onboard drone operations. 

Designed to carry a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including medium-range altitude, long-range endurance drones, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) drones, and one-way attack drones, the vessel’s capacity suggests she will carry a significant and lethal array of drones. One can assume what kind of drones will be present onboard this ship, but the Iranians have been characteristically mum about the details. Although, the fact that there is a ski-jump ramp indicates the likelihood that the Iranians plan on launching jet-powered drones and/or heavier, longer-range systems from this boat. It’s a significant force multiplier.

The Shahid Bagheri apparently left its port the week of November 12. Its whereabouts are not publicly known (it is very likely that US intelligence has a clear understanding of where this boat is, though). The ship is a perfect example of Iran’s method for keeping up with larger military powers that are competing with the Islamic Republic. By taking existing civilian technology, like the container ship, and converting it into a relatively cheap drone carrier, the Iranians just enhanced their naval power projection significantly on the cheap. 

A Master of Asymmetrical Warfare on the High Seas

By having the Shahid Bagheri (other drone carriers are under construction, too), the Iranian Navy can engage in destabilizing military operations against international shipping passing through the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb, and the Red Sea. 

Shahid Bagheri’s role in asymmetrical warfare will be crucial for keeping Iran in the great geopolitical game, especially in light of its recent bad luck at the hands of Turkey and Israel in places like Syria. 

There are, of course, downsides to this jerry-rigged vessel. While it is insanely cheap and gives the Iranian Armed Forces significant capabilities boost, the vessel was not originally designed as a military ship. Therefore, there are inherent limitations to the ship. This is especially true in light of Iran’s serious lack of protective escorts for the drone carrier. 

Beyond that, though, this ship is relatively easy to spot and track for most modern intelligence agencies. So, its threat is likely still limited. Indeed, it was tracked as it left its homeport by the civilian Western satellite firm, Maxar Technologies. 

Where Shahid Bagheri can do the most amount of damage is in the waters surrounding the Middle East. If, however, Tehran gets it in its head that this boat can be used to project military power across distances, such as the Atlantic Ocean, they would find whatever advantages the ship gave their navy utterly negated.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Fait historique remarquable, les génocides n'ont entraîné que peu de vengeances. Pour que les survivants n'enclenchent pas le cycle infernal des représailles et que les coupables soient châtiés, les institutions judiciaires s'emploient à monopoliser la punition tant au plan national qu'international. (...) / Génocide, Idées - 2025/01

Toutes les guerres se finissent un jour. Celle qui a dévasté la Syrie depuis 2011 a connu un dénouement provisoire avec la chute d'un régime en place depuis 1970. Si la Turquie fait figure de grande gagnante de ce bouleversement, la passivité des soutiens internationaux du pouvoir déchu (Russie et (...) / Syrie, Dictature, Proche-Orient, Printemps arabes 2011- - 2025/01

Few remember the Vought A-7 Corsair II. The Navy attack jet simply lacked the cultural presence to make any sort of staying impact – despite serving for one quarter century. The reason, I suspect, is because the A-7 was quite ugly.

Making an Impact

While the average member of the public may not track military aircraft, most seem to have a general awareness of the basics. Many aircraft gain some mainstream traction either through their use in entertainment, or through some sort of policy/budgeting debate. The F-14 and F/A-18, for example, were featured in the Top Gun franchise and resultingly gained presence amongst the general public. To a lesser extent the A-6 gained exposure through Flight of the Intruder; the F-16 through Iron Eagle. Other aircraft, like the B-1, the A-10, and the F-35, were in the news frequently—thanks to development or budgeting debates—enough to have become somewhat recognizable. Still, other aircraft simply serve before being decommissioned and, ultimately, fading entirely from the public’s conscious. The A-7 is one such aircraft.

As a quick aside, the A-7 was featured in a film, The Final Countdown, starring Kirk Douglas and Martin Sheen, albeit in a limited role.

Anyways, the A-7 was a capable aircraft, despite its lack of cultural staying power. Carrier-compatible, the A-7 entered service in 1967, at the beginning of the Vietnam War, as an intended replacement for the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk. The A-4 stayed in service, however, meaning that the A-7 never did serve as a direct replacement for the A-4. Nevertheless, the A-7 was integrated into the Navy as a valuable attack aircraft.

The distinguishing performance feature of the A-7, perhaps, was its subsonic flight speed. In an era where jets were being made to push the speed envelope, to break the sound barrier, the A-7 was designed to fly about as fast as a commercial airliner. The reason: subsonic jets could be made smaller and cheaper and were simpler to maintain.

Derivative of a Gunfighter

The A-7 was derived from Vought’s F-8 Crusader, a single-engine, supersonic, air superiority jet that was known as “The Last of the Gunfighters.” The F-8 was first flown in the 1950s, and served with the US Navy until 1976. The A-7 would adopt the general layout of the F-8, only shorter, with a stubbier nosecone—making for an ungainly appearance. Yet, despite the A-7’s appearance, the jet would perform admirably. Notably, the A-7 could perform rapid aileron rolls, even when weighed down with its impressive six-ton payload, which happened to make for double the payload capacity of the A-4. In addition to a massive payload capacity, the A-7 had impressive range—again double that of the A-4—making the A-7 an effective candidate for bombing missions.

The pilots noted that the A-7 was easy to fly, with excellent forward visibility. Although the jet was not perfect, lacking stability on crosswind landings, suffering from poor stopping performance, and lacking adequate thrust (which would later be addressed with an upgraded TF30-8 engine). The pilots also gave the A-7 a nickname, perhaps the most enduring feature of the now-obscure aircraft: “SLUF,” which stands for “Short Little Ugly F****.”

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

After the collapse of the Assad regime, the current sanctions laws are in desperate need of reform. The Syrian people have long suffered from the effects of blanket economic restrictions that crippled the economy and gave rise to widespread black-market activity and cronyism. The broken licensure system hindered humanitarian operations and paralyzed essential infrastructure in the energy, health, and education sectors. At the same time, targeted sanctions, colloquially known as “smart” sanctions, were actively evaded using a complex network of shells that Assad publicly boasted about for years.

World leaders—particularly in the United States and Europe—should devise a sanctions reform strategy to address these issues. The U.S. Treasury’s issuing of General License 24 (GL 24) is a first step towards reforming sanctions, signaling to regional partners and Syrians a shift in policy while supporting the reconstruction of Syria post-Assad. For the incoming Trump administration, it is key to any new Middle East security architecture, especially as the outgoing administration expands its military footprint through Operation Inherent Resolve, which has long followed a misguided “by, with, and through” defense policy in Syria and Iraq.

Sectoral, Targeted, And Terrorism Sanctions On Syria

The Assad regime was one of the first members of President Jimmy Carter’s list of states sponsoring terrorism published in 1979. However, it was not until the Syria Accountability Act of 2003 that Washington ramped up sectoral sanctions. With Assad’s intransigence and continued regional destabilization, the Bush administration issued executive orders that extended export controls to cover the transportation, banking, and telecommunications sectors. This included listing the Commercial Bank of Syria as a primary money laundering entity, bringing correspondent banks and Exim operations to a halt. Executive Orders 13441 and 13460 reinforced these initial sanctions, leading to a first wave of capital flight and foreign direct investment.

As the Syrian uprising spread in 2011, the scope of trade restrictions expanded to include the central bank and energy sector, forcing foreign firms to declare force majeure and halt production-sharing agreements. Those contracts were a major source of ill-gotten gains as Assad’s investment funds, like Al-Mashreq, were actively used to divert oil revenue and enrich his family. The regime’s persistent collocation of its criminal regional enterprise to official government institutions resulted in a complex web of export controls under the broad aegis of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies Act. In 2017, the U.S. Congress introduced the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which aimed at protecting civilians from Assad’s criminal enterprise.

A deluge of terrorism-related sanctions has also applied to multiple military factions in Syria since 2012. Some of the designations are multilateral, issued by the United Nations Security Council, such as Resolution 2253. Others are unilateral U.S. designations under the authority of Executive Order 13224, such as the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation for entities and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) for individuals—including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa. Notably, GL 24 draws a thin line authorizing HTS-related transactions for public services while banning military transactions.

In general, terrorism sanctions require an audit and a potential remedy through a step-for-step model. As the designations are aimed at national security, they should not be extended to the Syrian economy at large, nor should they constitute a barrier to the express issuance of sanctions waivers.

Biden’s Legacy In Syria

Historically, the Biden administration did not ramp up pressure against the regime and signaled that sanctions are reversible. According to sources who spoke on background, Biden’s National Security Council (NSC) actively blocked reform to Syria sanctions by pressuring Congress to freeze all Syria-related bills, especially in 2024. The subsequent delays in the U.S. Congress to update and advance Syria legislation caused friction in the bipartisan agreement against the Assad regime.

The administration did not enforce multiple bills that had passed through previous National Defense Authorization Acts. Officials also ignored existing IEEPA law requiring sanctions evaders to face civil or criminal penalties. As a result, Assad hid his assets as the Ultimate Beneficiary Owner, using nominee shareholders to pierce the U.N. procurement system and buy time for the ten-year sunset clause on penalties to lapse. It took two years for the U.S. treasury to close the controversial 50 percent loophole that Bashar al-Assad’s wife, Asma, abused.

On Captagon, Secretary Blinken deflected requests to designate the regime as a major illicit producer and transit state despite the large body of evidence. The designation would have stripped Assad of revenue, stopped him from procuring precursor chemicals, and given jurisdiction to the U.S. judiciary and Drug Enforcement Agency. The U.S. Department of State also missed an opportunity to reveal Assad’s net worth by limiting its reporting to open-source information. The State Department’s Office of Sanction Coordination hesitated on the Arab gas project and sent mixed messages until it was stalled. Ultimately, regional geopolitics focused on flawed security considerations dominated U.S. Syria policy every time.

On Caesar, the White House has been treading water in reform and renewal. The Caesar code goes well beyond sanctions, requiring accountability and elimination of chemical weapons. It contains economic recovery provisions that facilitate USAID assistance. Hence, it represents a roadmap for transitional justice supported by Syrians. After the collapse of the regime, Caesar’s secondary sanctions are effectively moot as the extraterritorial reach to deter Assad’s re-normalization is no longer applicable. In addition, the names of regime war criminals need an update and expansion as part of a broad legal redefinition of the government of Syria.

The Urgent Need For Licensure Reform

Despite the embedded exemption for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the scope of the authorization is limited. While GL 24 authorizes energy-related transactions essential to early recovery, it is limited to donations and requires special licenses for commercial exports. Hence, the current Export Administration Regulations (EARs) enforced by the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) still constitute a significant barrier to stabilization and reconstruction.

A series of waivers are necessary for NGOs to achieve aid localization and overcome procurement hurdles. According to humanitarian stakeholders, the World Health Organisation, and the United Nations, the situation in Syria is dire. Hence, the general license was warranted and supported by precedent. It will help reverse derisking and overcome ambiguous compliance issues, especially as humanitarian organizations are often stretched in human resources and face clearance hurdles that delay their operations. That said, it is not a perfect or permanent solution.

Wider sanctions reform serves multiple purposes. First, it alleviates the compliance concerns of regional states and companies for an emergency crisis response. Second, it allows USAID to increase its assistance to the Syria Recovery Trust Fund and provide paired expertise for capacity building. This would help implement vital International Humanitarian Law modalities like Cash and Voucher Assistance for Internally Displaced Persons. Third, it would align the U.S. policy stance with regional and international partners who signaled their readiness for speedy humanitarian assistance at scale.

Ultimately, the warped worldviews held by the White House NSC, colored by frustrations from the Obama era, complicated the Syria crisis and prolonged Assad’s control. The incoming Trump administration is left with the tall task of sanctions reform. This will entail restructuring the U.S. deployment in Syria and Iraq, as well as redefining the legal definition of the government of Syria under ambiguous circumstances. However, before embarking on such a wide regional realignment, an urgent disaster response is needed from the United States and the West, given their roles as the largest humanitarian donors to Syria.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him on X: @langloisajl.

Abed Al-Thalji is a policy analyst focused on Sanctions & Foreign Affairs. He holds an MSc. in International Trade from Gothenburg University’s School of Business, Economics, and Law.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Alors que l'envoyé spécial de M. Emmanuel Macron, l'ancien ministre Jean-Marie Bockel, remet fin novembre son rapport sur la reconfiguration du dispositif militaire français en Afrique, Paris apprend par surprise la décision du Sénégal et du Tchad de mettre un terme aux accords de défense qui les (...) / Afrique, France, Tchad, Sénégal, Relations internationales, Armée - 2025/01

Depuis six mois, l'obstination de M. Emmanuel Macron à ignorer le désaveu électoral dont il a été l'objet provoque une situation de blocage politique et d'instabilité ministérielle. Pour se maintenir au pouvoir, il cherche à créer une coalition de « troisième force » allant de la droite au centre gauche. (...) / France, Politique, Démocratie, État - 2025/01

La loi du 16 juillet 1949 encadrant la littérature pour la jeunesse, plusieurs fois modifiée, concerne aussi les ouvrages destinés aux adultes qui pourraient être vus ou lus par des mineurs. Si les sanctions restent rares, l'autocensure prend le relais. Les éditeurs préfèrent modifier en amont ce qui (...) / Société, Enfance, Livre, Industrie culturelle - 2025/01

Arab nationalism is, for all practical purposes, dead. The so-called “Arab World” has lost its unifying concern, Israel, and its outside support. It has disintegrated into geopolitical blocs, with three major non-Arab powers, Turkey, Iran, and Israel, competing for domination of the Levant region. Indeed, the heyday of twentieth-century Arab nationalism, when Egypt sought to unite the Arab people and Arab nationalist movements dominated the politics of the region, has been long over.

Egypt gave up its role as the leader of the Arab World after the signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1978, just before Iran emerged as the prime revolutionary force in the region. In 1991, the radical Arab regimes lost their key global backer, the Soviet Union, and the region came under American hegemony.

In the aftermath of the disastrous U.S.-led Iraq War, today’s Middle East looks very different, including in terms of its place in the international system. The United States has begun to disengage from the region in the aftermath of the Iraq War, and Russia has ceased to be a Middle Eastern power after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Regional powers are now in charge,

In a way, much of what has been referred to as the Levant, a sub-region that borders the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to the west and Iraq to the east, has been balkanized with Iran, with its hegemonic objectives, Israel, led by a nationalist government, and Turkey, whose leader daydreams about reviving the Ottoman Empire, maintaining spheres of influence.

In that context, the Arab Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, are playing a secondary role in this new balance of power. In 1973, they assisted their Arab brethren in their attack on Israel. Now, they are cooperating with Israel to contain Iran.

Israel’s sphere of influence includes, in addition to the West Bank and Gaza, also the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, much of southern Lebanon, and Syria’s Golan Heights and Mount Hermon.

After the loss of its proxies in the Gaza Strip (Hamas) and Syria (Assad), Iran still maintains its influence in Lebanon through the weakened Shia Hezbollah group and in Iraq through its Shia allies and regards Israel as its chief strategic rival in the region.

Turkey, like Israel, has been a beneficiary of the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, hoping that the Islamist regime in Damascus would embrace it as a military and economic patron, which it probably would.

Turkish Armed Forces and its ally, the Syrian National Army, have occupied areas of northern Syria since the Syrian Civil War, a mini-state under the dual control of the local council and Turkish military administration.  

At the same time, Turkey has been concerned over what it sees as the threat of Kurdish nationalism in Syria, where during the Syrian Civil War, the Kurds established the Autonomous Administration of North and East of the country backed by the United States.

The Kurdish population of Syria is the country’s largest ethnic minority, the majority of whom were originally Turkish Kurds who crossed the border during the twentieth century and are concentrated around the Syria-Turkey border. Many of them seek political autonomy for what they regard as Western Kurdistan, similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq.

From that perspective, both Turkey and Israel face a challenge from two stateless peoples, the Kurds in the case of Turkey and the Palestinians in the case of Israel, who seek political independence.

Yet both Ankara and Jerusalem insist that full political independence for those people would pose an existential threat to them. At best, both peoples have been offered a limited form of political autonomy.

And then there is the large Druze minority in Syria as well as Assad’s sect, the Alawites, that had ruled Syria during his regime. One can expect continuing ethnic and sectarian tensions in the country in the coming years that may involve the Israelis (on the side of the Druze), the Iranians (on the side of the Alawites), and the Turks (on the side of the Sunni majority).

At the same time, President-elect Donald Trump, who may come under pressure from Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to join Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear military facilities, would probably decide to refuse the invitation to inject U.S. military forces into the region and its many conflicts.

And if the Iranians end up acquiring a nuclear military capability, it is more likely than not that the Turks would have to consider the nuclear option as well, raising the specter of a mutually assured destruction (MAD) posture involving three regional powers.

Leon Hadar is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the National Security Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Washington’s partners must create a new allied consensus.