The National Interest

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in some of the largest tank engagements since the Second World War.

Throughout the conflict, Russia has suffered tank losses that many analysts consider staggering, given the perceived disparity in equipment, manpower, and training at the outset of the war. 

Many of these losses have not come during large tank engagements. Instead, they result from Russia’s apparent inability to conduct combined arms warfare.

Tanks may appear to be unstoppable machines, but when left unsupported by infantry, air cover, and artillery fire they are very vulnerable. 

This video from the fall of last year shows one such tank, apparently alone on the road, being attacked by kamikaze drones. 

The tank showed in the video is a T-90M. This is one of the newer variants of the T-90, a line of tanks first introduced in 1992 and now serving as Russia’s main battle tank. Originally, the T-90 was designed to replace three tanks then in service with the Soviet armed forces: the T-64, T-72, and T-80.

Each of these tanks was created and manufactured by a different firm, leading to a huge logistical burden as almost none of their parts were interchangeable. 

While the overall design of the T-90 is derived from the T-72, several upgrades have made it a capable, modern tank. The M variant was introduced in 2016 and has major advantages over previous designs. Its turret is welded instead of cast, increasing its armor capabilities.

Four cameras mounted on the exterior of the tank increase the commander’s situational awareness by providing a 360 degree view. An upgraded fire control system combined with enhanced gunner’s sights aid in engaging targets. Upgraded armor, to include explosive reactive armor, and infrared jammers increase the tank’s survivability. In all, the T-90 is an impressive machine. 

These upgrades were apparently not enough for the crew, however, as the tank can be seen covered in sandbags. This form of up-armoring is as nearly as old as tanks themselves. There are many iconic photos of the Sherman tanks of the U.S. Army stacked high with sandbags, logs, spare tracks, and even concrete. The idea is that anti-tank rounds will detonate against the exterior armor instead of the steel of the tank itself, potentially saving the crew from what would otherwise be a deadly blow. In practice, however, most extra armor is only somewhat beneficial against slower rounds. Against modern, armor-piercing munitions, it is little more than ornamentation. 

The current conflict in Ukraine is not the first drone war, but it has resulted in serious innovations in drone warfare. The video above is a good example of how first-person view drones are used in kamikaze attacks on Russian equipment. Drone teams usually operate by using one machine as a spotter, finding likely targets and guiding the attack drone in. Operators in Ukraine have become skilled at targeting the weak points on Russian vehicles. The attack in the video shows the drone striking the rear of the tank, a vulnerable location where the engine sits.

Russia’s loss of tanks is proceeding at an alarming rate. The T-90 is their mainstay tank. Only the T-14 Armata is more advanced, and this war has exposed it as a paper tiger. As the conflict has progressed, Russia has had to field older tanks that are not nearly as capable as the T-90.

Battlefield observers have spotted T-64s, T-72s, and T-80s, the three tanks the T-90 was meant to replace.

Earlier last year, analysts even saw a T-62, a tank that dates back to the 1960s.

#Ukraine: A Russian T-90M tank with "special" sandbag addon armour was hit by a FPV loitering munition of the Ukrainian 11th National Guard Brigade East of Oleshky, #Kherson Oblast- leading to the detonation of ammunition onboard and a turret toss. pic.twitter.com/g86gR4QHrw

— ???????? Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) September 13, 2023

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: This article delves into the persistent threats and belligerent actions coming from North Korea toward the United States, Japan, and South Korea, with a specific focus on its nuclear arsenal and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities. It offers insights into the historical context of North Korea's nuclear program, its withdrawal from the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and its extensive nuclear testing. Moreover, the article sheds light on North Korea's suspected offensive chemical and biological weapons program, which dates back to the 1960s and includes the acquisition of dangerous agents like anthrax, cholera, and bubonic plague. 

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s government has threatened nuclear war and kinetic war with Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. in recent months. Pyongyang has also increased the pace of missile launches in the region, indicating that the nation is willing and capable of provoking its adversaries.

While analysts mostly focus on the threat of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, Pyongyang’s arsenal of chemical and Biological weapons is also a worry. 

North Korea turned to the Soviet Union after World War Two to give its nuclear program a start. It paid dividends when the USSR built the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, finishing construction by the mid-1960s.

North Korea did ratify the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, but it did not abide by the Treaty for very long, withdrawing officially in 2003. Since that time, Pyongyang has carried out several increasingly sophisticated nuclear tests.

In addition to its nuclear stockpiles, the DPRK is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and is believed to oversee an offensive biological and chemical weapons program. 

According to author Robert Collins, a former intelligence analyst with the U.S. Forces Korea Command, Pyongyang started to research biological weapons in the 1960s. Around this time, a germ weapons research organization was developed under the National Defense Science Institute, which led to the DPRK’s acquisition of anthrax, cholera and the bubonic plague. In an interview with The Hill, Collins added that Pyongyang’s hackers endanger South Korean chemical plants: “These hackers have also hacked into South Korea’s Chemical Accident Response Information system for the purpose of understanding where the South’s chemical plants are located and how much damage would result locally if they were subject to explosions.”

Seoul outlined the DPRK’s possession of anthrax, smallpox, and the plague in a 2018 white paper released by South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense. Analysts believe that North Korea in a future war could weaponize its stocks of phosgene, sarin, mustard and V-type chemical agents. At least 12 facilities are believed to be responsible for developing these chemical agents, according to industry experts.  

According to IHS Jane, a 2017 analysis of Pyongyang’s biological weapons capabilities cites the following evidence:

-“On 17 June (2015), the RoK MND issued a report that stated North Korea possesses an assortment of biological agents - including anthrax and smallpox - and the ability to weaponize them within 10 days. The report also stated that the North did not yet possess warheads to employ bioweapons.”

-“During June 2015 North Korea announced that it has created a vaccine, known as Kumdang-2, that could treat Ebola, HIV, ‘a number of cancers,’ and MERS. Kumdang-2 was reportedly manufactured from ginseng grown in fertilizer made from ‘rare-earth elements’ and ‘micro-quantities of gold and platinum.’ Most serious researchers have significant reservations concerning these claims.”

-“In the aftermath of Kim Jong-nam's death in February 2017 due to toxic nerve agent VX, South Korea's MND was quoted by Yonhap News Agency as saying that North Korea's military is probably operating a regiment-level biochemical weapons unit.”

As Pyongyang continues to make nuclear threats, a detailed analysis of the country’s true nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities is important. But its stockpiles of chemical weapons should also be considered a grave threat.

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. You can email the author at Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: North Korean State Media. 

Summary: The article discusses North Korea's global reputation as a troublemaker due to its threats and nuclear program. Despite its small size and underdevelopment, North Korea maintains a large military, including 200,000 special operations forces, a significant proportion compared to its total military size. These special forces consist of various units, including airborne, reconnaissance, light infantry, and maritime forces, with the ability to infiltrate and disrupt enemy territories. While their capabilities are acknowledged, experts debate the overall proficiency of North Korean special forces, considering the country's military standards. 

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), known by most of the world as North Korea, has long been a troublemaker on the global stage.

With constant threats against its Southern neighbor, general saber-rattling, and a growing nuclear program, it creates constant pressure on the U.S.-led world order. 

While it is a small, underdeveloped nation by nearly every metric, it nonetheless possesses one of the largest standing armies in the world, counting 1.3 million soldiers in its ranks.

Perhaps more impressive are North Korea's special operations forces, or special forces, which experts estimate at 200,000 soldiers. This may not seem like very many compared to the total size of its force, but consider that it means 15 percent of the country’s soldiers belong to the special forces as opposed to only 3 percent of the U.S. military. 

The Special Forces moniker usually encompasses an array of specialized units and teams. For example, Special Operations Command in the U.S. military encompasses everything from Army Green Berets who specialize in unconventional warfare such as training a partner military how best to deal with an insurgency to Navy SEALs who perform high-stakes missions like hostage rescue.

North Korea’s Special Forces also encompass several different units. Their airborne forces use old Antonov An-2 aircraft to carry out infiltration and assault missions. First introduced in 1947, this venerable craft is capable of both airdropping units as well as landing on remote stretches of highway to allow infiltration. The Reconnaissance Brigades operate similarly to the Spetsnaz of the former Soviet Union, training to infiltrate South Korea and then using direct action to attack and destroy key targets across South Korea in an attempt to cripple its economy and industry and disrupt command and control in the event of war.

Light Infantry Battalions of the DPRK are a more typical version of the Reconnaissance Brigades. These lightly armed and armored troops advance ahead of conventional forces using stealth and speed to strike behind enemy lines to disrupt communication and infiltrate rear areas. Finally, the Maritime arm of the DPRK Special Forces is thought to operate somewhere in between the Light Infantry and Reconnaissance forces, infiltrating along the coast to carry out attacks behind enemy lines. North Korea’s fleet of submarines, including 24 Romeo-class diesel boats as well as at least 45 midget submarines make an ideal platform for covertly inserting these forces. 

Size isn’t the only factor on the battlefield and just because the DPRK is fielding a large number of special operators does not mean they are up to snuff. While the U.S. Department of Defense has acknowledged that “North Korean SOF personnel are among the most highly trained, well equipped, best-fed, and highly motivated forces in the KPA.” Given the state of DPRK forces, this is not a high bar to clear, however, South Korean and American planners certainly are aware of the threat these forces pose.

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. You can email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: North Korean state media. 

In November 1896, the popular weekly British magazine “Punch” published one of its regular satirical caricatures. Titled “Turkey Limited,” it announced the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire into a limited company in an attempt to rein in the Sultan’s poor finances. In the caricature, a perplexed Sultan Abdul Hamid II reads the news from a prospectus on some wall and ponders the benefits he will receive from such a development. 

Arcane to modern audiences, the caricature laid bare the poor state of the Ottoman Empire—centered in modern-day Turkey—and its gradual fall from a geopolitical powerhouse after the capture of Constantinople and the defeat of the Byzantine Empire to the “Sick Man of Europe,” as it would be known following the publication of that November 1896 edition of the Punch. 

Today, almost 130 years after British and European audiences laughed at the expense of the poor Sultan, Turkey finds itself in a similar position but now as the sick man of NATO.

Over the past eight years, Turkey has been steadily moving away from the United States and the West. Looking back, the failed coup d’etat against Erdogan in 2016 was the tipping point for the relations between Turkey and the West. 

Whether stemming from a desire to chart a more independent foreign policy course or out of mistrust for Washington, NATO, and Europe, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has managed to offend neighbors and allies with alarming ease while at the same time cozying up with pariah states and terrorist organizations, including Iran, Russia, and Hamas. 

In a relatively short amount of time, Turkey purchased S-400 air defense systems from Moscow, got expelled from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, launched aerial and naval incursions against Greece, threatening war with a fellow NATO member, continued to militarize the illegal state of Northern Cyprus, and harbored terrorist leaders from Hamas. 

Although the Turkish economy has somewhat stabilized, it faces challenging times ahead, making large-scale defense spending and manufacturing much harder for Ankara. 

But as a NATO member, Turkey continues to wield power and influence in the transatlantic alliance. Its recalcitrance to Finland’s and Sweden’s membership bids following the Russian invasion of Ukraine wasted precious time. With Erdogan in power for the foreseeable future and no reasonable alternatives in the opposition, Turkey will likely continue down the path of anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism until something breaks. 

Patience in NATO for a member that is acting as an adversary is running low. Turkey is a powerful country and regional player. Utmost efforts need to be made to ensure that it remains within the West. But its behavior is quickly outweighing its usefulness to the United States and NATO.

Once the sick man of Europe, Turkey is now the sick man of NATO. And as strong organisms often force out weak parts in order to survive, NATO should consider expelling weak links that hold it behind and run against its ideals and policies. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

Another year, and the war in Ukraine continues.

Both sides are in a difficult position, but Kyiv is in a more difficult position than Moscow right now. The Ukrainian counteroffensive failed, and Kyiv must now revitalize interest in its cause among the United States and the rest of its Western partners. 

So, what should the Ukrainian strategy be for 2024? What New Year resolutions should the Ukrainian leadership make?

Now, after the failed Ukrainian counteroffensive and subsequent failed Russian offensive, the two sides are once more in a state of relative stalemate.

To make things clear, the war in Ukraine hasn’t—at least yet—reached a stalemate. The two sides haven’t exhausted their means, and the upcoming spring and summer fighting seasons can decide the fate of the conflict.  

In 2024, Kyiv should try to achieve an operational breakthrough somewhere on the battlefield, preferably in the south, to get within firing distance of Crimea. It’s vital now for Ukraine to show some success on the ground; otherwise, it risks losing some, if not most, of its key Western partners that enable Kyiv’s defense. 

However, Kyiv should also dedicate much effort and resources to training its forces. All the weapons in the world won’t compensate for poorly trained units. Defense is easier than offense. The Ukrainian military is no longer trying to stop the onrushing Russians. In its first counteroffensive in the fall of 2022, the Ukrainian military achieved a resounding success in the east and south because it caught the Russians off guard. A few months later, in the summer of 2023, that wasn’t longer the case.

The Kremlin is on guard now and has mobilized to prevent a catastrophe in Ukraine. Western intelligence estimates put the number of Russian troops in just southern Ukraine to over 300,000. So, against an entrenched adversary, the Ukrainian military must focus on combined arms operations and brigade-level coordination if it wants to achieve real operational progress. 

Ukraine can do a lot to advance its cause. But the U.S. and the West should be more active in their military assistance as well. 

Although the U.S.-led international coalition has committed tens of billions of dollars worth of weapon systems to Ukraine, it has often done so with significant delays. Time and again, the West has been reluctant and slow to provide Kyiv with weapon systems that end up becoming vital to the Ukrainian efforts. 

For example, at around this time last year, there was a heated debate among NATO members about sending main battle tanks to Ukraine. Germany, the country of origin of the populous Leopard 2, wouldn’t budge until the U.S. made a move. The breakout came after the United Kingdom decided to send a squadron of Challenger 2 tanks, prompting the U.S. to commit 31 M1 Abrams, which forced Berlin to greenlight Leopard 2 and Leopard 1 exports to Ukraine.

The result? The Ukrainians didn’t have their complete Western tank fleet ready for the start of the counteroffensive, which played a part in its failure. This is just one instance of the problematic security aid lifeline to Ukraine. 

For the Ukrainian strategy to retain hopes of success in 2024, Kyiv must also get the weapons it needs. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense and national security journalist specializing in special operations. A Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), he holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Pakistan’s senior air force official announced plans to purchase Chinese stealth fighters last week, potentially making Pakistan the first foreign partner to purchase 5th generation fighters from China.

During an induction ceremony for a variety of new military equipment held on January 2, Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu announced the forces’ intentions to purchase Chinese FC-31 Gyrfalcon fighters, according to reporting by Defense News. This reporting was seemingly confirmed by a post on the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Facebook page shortly thereafter.

The FC-31 is China’s second indigenous stealth fighter, which is currently in development for service aboard Chinese aircraft carriers, but has had an eye toward the export market since its inception.

The United States has long maintained a complex and often strained relationship with Pakistan – a country that was seen as a strategic partner at times throughout both the Cold War and the Global War on Terror, but that has also been accused of harboring and supporting terrorist regimes. Today, Pakistan’s primary fighter is the American-sourced F-16 Fighting Falcon, with the country having about 85 operational platforms.

Pakistan’s hostile relationship with neighboring India, which has also been the source of tensions with the United States, has served to deepen military cooperation with China. Pakistan’s relationship with China is often described as “all-weather,” with deep strategic ties extending throughout economic, diplomatic, and military sectors.

The acquisition of FC-31 fighters would make Pakistan the first third-party country ever to purchase stealth aircraft designed outside the United States. Stealth, or low observable, aircraft designs are meant to delay or prevent detection by adversary systems, allowing them to operate inside contested airspace with greater survivability. The US has long maintained a monopoly on stealth aviation, as the only nation on the planet operating stealth aircraft from 1983 until 2017, when China’s first stealth fighter, the Chengdu J-20, entered operational service.

Today, it’s estimated that China has somewhere north of 250 J-20s built, giving it the distinction of operating the world’s second-largest fleet of stealth aircraft. The Shenyang FC-31 Gyrfalcon is the nation’s second stealth effort, developed independently of Chengdu’s J-20 program.

The fighter was meant to be a lower-cost 5th-generation entry with an emphasis placed on the export market, but analysts were quick to point out that the smaller and lighter design may eventually see service aboard China’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers as a replacement for the country’s long-troubled fleet of 4th-generation J-15s. In October 2021, those suspicions were confirmed when a modified carrier-capable iteration of the FC-31, dubbed the J-35, took flight for the first time. According to reports, the Chinese air force has also expressed interest in the platform as a lower-cost addition to its J-20 fleet.

To date, there has been no official word as to when this J-35 could see operational service, though some estimates suggest it could be as soon as 2026.

While China’s larger twin-engine J-20 is meant to fill an air-superiority role akin to the F-22 Raptor, the FC-31, and its Naval J-35 variant, are smaller twin-engine aircraft designed to compete with multi-role fighters like the F-35. In keeping with China’s longstanding approach to aviation design, both the J-20 and FC-31 borrow heavily from foreign fighter designs, with the J-20 often described as an amalgam of the long-defunct Soviet MiG 1.44 stealth fighter program infused with Lockheed Martin-derived low-observable design techniques.

While Russian officials have accused Chengdu of stealing elements of the MiG 1.44’s design, evidence to that effect has largely been circumstantial to date. China’s efforts to steal American stealth fighter designs, however, have been thoroughly confirmed, with a Chinese National named Su Bin ultimately charged with the cyber theft of secrets related to the design of many American military aircraft – including the F-22 and F-35 – in 2014.

In Su Bin’s e-mails to his Chinese government contacts, which were later entered as evidence in his trial, he openly gloated about how the stolen documents would “allow us [China] to catch up rapidly with U.S. levels … [and] stand easily on the giant’s shoulders.”

Su was ultimately sentenced to 46 months in Federal Prison for the theft in July 2016.

That is to say that the FC-31’s aesthetic similarities to America’s F-35 aren’t necessarily a coincidence. Because of the lack of transparency within Chinese state media, details about the FC-31’s actual capability set remain nebulous at best.

Current FC-31s in testing are reportedly powered by two Russian-sourced RD-93 afterburning turbofan engines that are each capable of producing about 18,300 pounds of thrust, though China has expressed plans to use domestically-sourced equivalent WS-13s that may increase power output to a combined 39,200 pounds of thrust with afterburners lit.

With an estimated maximum takeoff weight of 56,000 pounds, that could place the FC-31 on similar performance footing as the slightly larger and more powerful single-engine F-35. The American jet is powered by a Pratt & Whitney F135 afterburning turbofan engine that can pump out around 43,000 pounds of thrust under afterburner in a platform with a maximum takeoff weight of some 65,000 pounds. However, it’s important to note that the F135 is not just a more powerful engine, it’s also more advanced when it comes to reducing both radar and infrared (heat) signatures.

Broadly speaking, the FC-31, like its J-20 sibling, is not expected to be able to match America’s F-35 or F-22 in terms of preventing detection, thanks in large part to America’s multi-decade head start on the technologies involved in fielding truly stealth platforms, but that doesn’t mean the FC-31 wouldn’t represent a significant leap in low-observability over fourth-generation airframes like China’s J-15 or Pakistan’s F-16s.

In other words, the FC-31 may not be able to match the F-35 pound for pound, but could likely outperform many of the older 4th generation aircraft it might run across in a 21st century conflict.

That is, of course, if the aircraft ultimately lives up to China’s claims.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

When will Russia finally collapse? - Policymakers and analysts are getting impatient.

Predictions of Russia’s collapse appear to be wrong.

Instead of getting weaker, Vladimir Putin’s realm seems to be getting stronger.

One critic of the collapse argument puts it this way: “[T]wo years on, Russia looks in alarmingly robust condition.”

If that’s true, it obviously makes sense to negotiate with the Kremlin now, before it gets even more powerful and more stable. That may be a bitter pill to swallow, for Ukraine and its supporters of course, but what’s the alternative?

The alternative is obvious. In fact, Russia is not getting structurally stronger and more stable, and almost all theories of system breakdown lead us to expect something deeply destabilizing to happen in Russia. When? There’s the rub. It could be tomorrow; it could be five years from now. Either way, collapse is coming, though perhaps not “two years on.”

The case for Russia’s getting stronger rests on peculiar interpretations of the existing evidence regarding the Putin regime, the war, the economy, and the Russian population.

Putin may be exuding confidence—though why should we expect anything less from him or any leader?—but appearances can be deceiving, especially as Putin’s public persona is as often inclined to cluelessness as to self-confidence. He’s arrested his liberal and right-wing critics and built up the security apparatus, and his propaganda machine remains as active as ever. Are these signs of strength?

Yes, for obvious reasons, and no, because all these measures wouldn’t be necessary if he didn’t feel threatened. By whom? By important political and economic elites, who are unhappy with the war and its effects on the Russian economy and armed forces. The Prigozhin coup attempt is a case in point. Its very occurrence testified to dissatisfaction within the army. More importantly, the attempt could not possibly have been made without the knowledge—and blessing?—of the security services.

So, yes, Putin survived the coup. But its very happening means that his position was and is precarious.

That’s important because Putin’s weakness means his regime’s weakness, since he’s its essential core. All authoritarian, totalitarian, fascist, and dictatorial systems are hyper-centralized by definition. That can be their strength, if the supreme leader is a Platonic philosopher king, but more often than not it’s a fatal weakness. Supreme leaders are resistant to change and reform.

Their centrality encourages buck-passing, attempts at local power-building, and sycophancy. Most important perhaps, they are prone to strategic mistakes, especially as they age and lose their ability to project invincibility, infallibility, and charisma.

Putin’s most significant error was to pressure Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to back out of an Association agreement with the European Union in late 2013, thereby sparking the Revolution of Dignity that led to Yanukovych’s flight and then the launch of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The Jamestown Foundation's Janusz Bugajski makes the case for viewing the war as disastrous for Russia: “Russian leaders are trying to convince Western leaders that Ukraine is losing the war in order to terminate military assistance for Kyiv. In reality, the war is disastrous for Russia. Although the Ukrainian counteroffensive stalled in Donbas and Zaporizhzhia for the winter, after defeating Russian forces in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson, the Russian army is being decimated, and its navy has been pushed back from the western part of the Black Sea. During two years of combat, Russia has lost at least 315,000 killed or severely wounded, from a ground force of some 360,000 that invaded Ukraine. It has also sustained huge losses in equipment, including 2,200 out of some 3,500 tanks and a third of its armored vehicles.” These are not just incidental problems. Together, they bespeak a fundamental, structural decimation of Russia’s armed forces.

The situation with the economy is just as alarming. The opposition Russian economist Vladimir Milov has shown that the state has invested enormously in four sectors (ammunition, railroads, military security, and machine building) directly connected to the war, while reducing or only minimally increasing investments in consumer goods sectors. Putin’s claims that GDP is growing and inflation is low, therefore, conceal the reality that average citizens are being sacrificed on the altar of militarism. As Milov points out, “Russians have become significantly poorer in the last five and especially in the last two years.”

Yale University’s Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and his colleagues have convincingly shown that sanctions have worked and that “[R]ussia is no longer remotely an economic power and has suppressed the minimum reporting of transparent national income statistics that is required to retain IMF membership. With industrial might below that of Chile, Putin’s Russia survives merely by seizing assets. The increasingly state-dominated economy is cannibalizing its own companies to maintain Putin’s war machine.”

Finally, we come to the Russian population. Yes, they’re inactive, and yes, that makes them morally complicit in Putin’s crimes. But a significant minority, perhaps as many as one fifth, oppose the war and Putin’s fascist regime. They are largely urban, educated professionals resident in Moscow and St. Petersburg. At present, they’re cowed. But as soon as an opening appears, as it inevitably will, they will make themselves heard—as do all urban, educated professionals the world over.

The empirical case for a strong Russia is thus weak. Meanwhile, the theoretical case for collapse is strong, because Russia is exceedingly vulnerable to the structural forces that generally lead to systemic collapse. It’s important to remember that structures are like tectonic plates. We can predict that earthquakes will inevitably happen where two plates meet, but we cannot say exactly when. And we can say which regions—or states—are in greater or lesser degrees of trouble and increasingly face the prospect of collapse.

What are the structural forces besetting Russia?

The above analysis identified them. The brittle regime is one. The parlous condition of the military is another. The sinking economy is a third. The protest potential of Russia’s educated, urban elites is a fourth. We know from history that such states are prone to break down or, at the least, to experience massive popular protests and regime change. The Soviet Union and its East European satellites in 1989-1991 immediately come to mind.

But so, too, do scores of countries worldwide—such as Argentina, Nicaragua, Egypt, Syria, Zimbabwe, and Libya. Some states, such as the Ayatollahs’ Iran, weather the storms of repeated upheaval and survive. Others, such as the Shah’s Iran, do not. Besides invoking platitudes such as “it all depends on state strength or elite cleverness,” we cannot know what the exact outcome will be.

But we do know that, in most cases, the “contradictions” that structural forces produce come to the fore when “sparks” or “triggers” take place. These can be assassinations, earthquakes, fires, natural disasters—or wars, especially unsuccessful wars that strain already impaired economies, militaries, regimes, and populations. It was World War I that destroyed the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian empires and World War II that almost destroyed the Soviet Union, especially after Joseph Stalin’s massive structural changes weakened the Soviet system and made it prone to collapse.

Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine is probably just such a spark. The regime, army, and economy have gotten weaker, and there is no reason to expect things to get better anytime soon. This means that, the longer the war takes, the likelier the structural forces will grind against one another, the greater the contradictions, and the likelier Russia’s breakdown becomes. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, in Russia and the West, time is not on Putin’s side. He’s not getting any younger, and his regime is not getting any stronger. The West should therefore refrain from negotiating with Putin until his country and regime weaken beyond easy repair.

So, don’t be taken in by his forced bravado. The tune he’s singing is his swan song. As to when Putin Russia will meet its end, it may be sooner than you think. Indeed, consider holding your breath.

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

All images are Shutterstock. 

Summary: This article considers the capabilities of modern air-defense systems like the Russian S-200, S-300, and S-400, suggesting that while these systems could potentially target the SR-71 at its historical speed and altitude, an upgraded SR-71 with advanced jamming technology would likely remain immune to their missile threats.

During the Lockheed SR-71 "Blackbirds" nearly 25 years in service, the high-speed aircraft set numerous speed records, and on July 28, 1976, a Blackbird reached an impressive 2,193.167 miles per hour. Flying at roughly 36.55 miles per minute, or 3,216.4 feet per second, it was faster than a bullet fired from the World War II-era M1 Garand rifle, which had a muzzle velocity of 2,800 feet per second.

Moreover, the aircraft still holds the record for a cross-country flight, traveling from Los Angeles to Washington, D.C. in just 64 minutes, 20 seconds.

The SR-71 achieved a record top speed of 2,193 mph – and while other aircraft could reach such extreme speeds in theory – but would melt due to the atmospheric friction and heat – the Blackbird could maintain it for extended periods. It was able to cruise along at more than 2,200 mph (Mach 3+ or more than three times the speed of sound), and at altitudes greater than 85,000 feet.

In addition to flying fast, the SR-71 also set an altitude record – reaching 25,929 meters. It flew so high that pilots navigating by sight couldn't even rely on ground features such as roads and instead needed to look at the mountains, rivers, and major coastlines to get their bearings.

The SR-71 earned its reputation for incomparable speed. No aircraft could catch it, and neither could missiles.

As previously reported, while a dozen Blackbirds were lost to accidents during its service history, not a single aircraft was shot down by an enemy. Though the aircraft carried radar countermeasures to evade interception efforts, the Blackbird's great protection was still its combination of very high speed and high altitude. It also had a low radar cross-section, which gave a very short time for an enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) to acquire and track the aircraft.

By the time a SAM site could track the Blackbird, it was out of range. In theory that made it almost invulnerable. Moreover, if a SAM site was able to track the SR-71 and fire a missile, the aircraft flew high enough to evade it. Yet, those on the ground still tried their best, and during its service history, the SR-71 reportedly evaded some 4,000 missiles fired its way.

Some 800 missiles were fired at Blackbirds over Vietnam alone­but not a single one was lost to enemy fire. One came close, and a CIA A-12 did take a piece of shrapnel from an SA-2 missile that exploded 100 meters away. In addition, SR-71 pilots did report that missiles launched without radar guidance and no launch detection had passed as close as 150 yards (140 m) from the aircraft.

Though the SR-71 has been retired, at least a few experts believe the high-speed aircraft would still be able to get the job done even against the best air-defense systems in service today.

The AviationGeekClub.com recently quoted Damien Leimbach, former United States Air Force Avionics Technician on U-2 aircraft, who said via a post on Quora that "The S-200, S-300 and S-400 are amazing platforms, and given their stated performance, the 300 and 400 could probably hit a target at the SR-71's speed and altitude. But that is not the same as hitting an SR-71."

Leimbach explained that while the Russian-made air-defense systems "could" shoot down the version of the SR-71 that existed in the 1970s or 1980s, it likely couldn't come close to hitting an upgraded SR-71.

The SR-71 was designed as a long-range, high-altitude, strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Its mission equipment for the plane's aerial reconnaissance role included signals intelligence sensors, side-looking airborne radar, and a camera. If the aircraft were in service today it would also have the latest jamming technology.

"It would have received the same jamming and Electronic Warfare upgrades as other planes have," noted Leimbach, who further suggested, "Would these EW jammer upgrades make the plane immune from those missiles? Yes it would."

Leimbach said he spent 6 years, recently, working on the sibling of the SR-71, the U-2 and as an electronics specialist he claimed to have been directly responsible for installing and maintaining the AN-ALQ 221 jammer that made the high flying, but slow moving, U-2 Dragon Lady immune to those missiles."

"The U-2 and the SR-71 don't just take pictures. They listen to cell phones. They monitor radios. And they also listen to, record and analyze the frequencies, pulse rates, variable modes and power outputs of enemy SAM systems like the S-200, 300 and 400," Leimbach noted.

The electronics specialist also noted that the S-300 is Russian technology from the 1970s, which made it about as sophisticated as American tech from the 1950s, while the S-400 is just an upgraded version. Both are very good, but the U.S. has had a lot of time to develop countermeasures.

To his point, "If (Russia's) modern weapons can't even take down the U-2, they could not shoot down the SR-71."

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

Su-25 and Su-34 fighter jets often work in packs during combat operations, Russian state media outlets confirmed last year. The Russian military is likely employing its Su-34 platforms to “cover” the Su-25 as it flies low-altitude attack missions. Analysts studying Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine believe the Su-25 has suffered the most losses over the last two years. In March, widely circulated cellphone footage depicting a downed Su-25 fighter was shared on social media.

While the airframe’s journey to the ground was not documented, the remnants of the platform indicate it most certainly fell from the air.

Regardless of the Su-25’s track record so far in Ukraine, Moscow still depends on the Soviet-era fighter.

In the 1960s, the Soviet Air Force established a competition in order to find its next battlefield close-support aircraft.

Manufacturer Sukhoi developed the T-8 prototype around this time, which evolved into the Su-25 fighter. The ground-attack airframe took its first flight in the early 1970’s and after five years its certification trials were completed.

The USSR’s desire to develop its own close-support airframe followed America’s endeavor to create its A-10 Thunderbolt II “Warthog” tank-busting jet. While the Warthog and the Frogfoot were designed to accomplish similar missions, the two airframes sport quite different capabilities.

Both the Su-25 and A-10 are heavily armored and are often referred to as “flying tanks.” 

However, the Frogfoot is smaller, lighter and faster than its American counterpart. Earlier variants of the Russian jet featured two R-95Sh non-afterburning turbojets.

The aircraft is equipped with self-sealing, foam-filled fuel tanks that provide a total fuel capacity of around 3,600l. Additionally, the provision of four PTB-1500 external fuel tanks which are carried on the underwing pylons can extend the range of the jet.

According to Air Force Technology, the Frogfoot can climb at a rate of 58m/s. “The maximum speed of the aircraft is 950km/h. The combat radius and ferry range of the aircraft are 375km and 7,500km respectively. The normal range of the Su-25 is 750km, while its service ceiling is 7,000m. The take-off and landing roll of the Su-25 are 750m and 600m respectively. The aircraft weighs around 10,740kg and its maximum take-off weight is 17,600kg.”

The Soviets used the Frogfoot extensively during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s.

Since Afghan-fighters trained on U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles were able to shoot down many of the S-25s, the fighter proved to have some significant vulnerabilities. Particularly, shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles (SAMS) wreaked havoc on the Soviet fleet.

The Frogfoot also saw action during the Iran-Iraq War and the subsequent Abkhazia War, where the jet was flown by Georgia’s Air Force.

The Su-25 was exported widely in the 1980s and many of these “flying tanks” ended up in former Soviet states following the collapse of the USSR. Additionally, the Su-25 serves with Air Forces in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South Africa. 

In late February, Ukrainian forces took out a Russian Su-25 airframe and captured its pilot as “revenge” for earlier airstrikes. This incident, along with other reports of Su-25 losses throughout the war, indicate that Russia’s “flying tank” is not performing as well as the Air Force intended.

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Meet the Qaher-313 Stealth Fighter: In late February last year, Iran’s defense ministry revealed that the country was ready to convert its “fifth-generation” stealth fighter into an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The televised announcement was made by Brigadier General Afshin Khajefard, who said the Qaher platform had reached full technological maturity. Iran’s announcement follows a series of lethal drone shipments it has sent Russia over the last year or so.

While Tehran has emerged as quite the prolific drone manufacturer, the country has lagged behind in terms of airplane capabilities.

The Iranian Air Force still flies a version of the aging F-14 Tomcat, suggesting that the Qaher’s purported abilities are exaggerated at best. 

The first mockup of the Qaher-313 fighter was first revealed in 2013 as the regime’s first fully indigenous stealth platform.

According to the defense ministry, the Qaher was developed and designed fully by the Iran Aviation Industries Organization, a division of the Ministry of Defense.

The first jet prototype was revealed almost four years later. Iranian officials boasted that the Qaher could sport a 2,000 kilogram bomb or at a minimum six air-to-air-missiles.

Additionally, Tehran’s former defense minister claimed that the platform had a small radar-cross section, is capable of flying at very low altitudes and can carry a litany of homegrown munitions. 

For many reasons, industry experts and aviation buffs widely dismissed Iran’s dubious claims. At this time, Iran released some footage and photographs of its new premiere fighter. Perhaps laughably, in one video an Iranian pilot is seen crouched down in the cockpit of the jet, which is clearly way too small to actually fly a human being.

Without space for a pilot, the Qaher definitely can’t carry the internal payload as Iranian officials have claimed. Iran also did not possess the analytical and sensor technologies required to develop the capabilities the fighter was purported to have. 

Initial analyses of the available footage of the Qaher highlighted the airframe’s sharp edges, angles and twin tail form, similar to the American-made F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation platforms. As observed by The Aviationist editor David Cenciotti, “The aircraft sports fixed canards and air intakes a bit too small to feed a modern jet plane’s engine; air intakes resemble those used by modern [unmanned aircraft] designs,” adding that “They are located above the wing meaning that at high AoA — angle of attack—the intakes would get turbulent or no air at all for the engine.”

Another serious design flaw appeared to be the nose section of the Qaher. The nose was so tiny that hardly any radar could fit inside it. Additionally, the airframe did not possess a nozzle, which would result in the melting of the entire fighter by the engine’s afterburners.

While the Qaher certainly didn’t make the cut as an actual fifth-generation stealth fighter jet, the plane could be revived as a new UAV flown by Iran.

Tehran’s drone arsenal has become an increasingly lethal enterprise for the regime. In fact, Iran has steadily ramped up its UAV development alongside the expansion of its ballistic missile program.

Over the last decade or so, Iran has mastered the development and shipment of cheap, less advanced but deadly drones to its region-wide proxy groups. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in Iraq, the Houthi rebels in Yemen and sporadic Iranian-aligned groups in Syria all receive consistent deliveries of these combat UAVs.

Most recently, Iran has provided Russian Forces with a variety of lethal drones, including the Shahed family. Due to Tehran’s deliveries, Moscow has been able to carry out a litany of barrages targeting a range of residential buildings, critical infrastructure and personnel in Ukraine.

Drone warfare has arguably monopolized Russia’s ongoing military intervention in Ukraine, fueling Iran’s ambition to become a UAV manufacturing powerhouse. Weakened economically by sanctions, Tehran has been turning to its sale of drones to fund its military apparatus. If successful, the future drone-turned Qaher could be another cash cow for the Iranian regime. 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

The U.S. Air Force recently deployed F-22 Raptors to the Middle East as part of a broader effort to combat Russia’s increasingly provocative behavior in the region.

Over the last year, Russian fighters have engaged in malign behavior targeting American unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) quite frequently. This week, the U.S. military said that Moscow’s fighters have “harassed” American drones over Syria for the third day in a row.

Three MQ-9 Reaper drones were the target of Russia’s harassment, versatile primary offensive strike UAVs for the Air Force. According to the head of the U.S. Air Forces Central Command Lt. Gen. Alex Grynkewich, “Russian aircraft flew 18 unprofessional close passes that caused the MQ-9s to react to avoid unsafe situations.” While these types of provocations over Syrian airspace are significant, Russian fighters have also intercepted a Reaper drone over the Black Sea a few months ago. 

By sending over Raptors in response to Russia’s hostile behavior in the region, the U.S. military is telling Moscow to watch out.

As the world’s first ever fifth-generation fighter platform, the F-22 is widely considered to be the most sophisticated of its kind to ever fly the skies. Russian pilots should consider another time in history when these formidable fighters were sent to protect American spy drones against Soviet aircraft one decade ago. 

In 2012, a pair of Iranian Air Force Su-25 pilots attempted to shoot down the U.S. drone which was operating roughly 16 miles from Iran’s coastline. The U.S. Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator UAV was designed primarily for patient reconnaissance and did not pose a threat to any airframes.

In fact, if attacked, the drone would struggle quite a bit to defend itself. For this reason, the Iranian pilots considered the Predator to be an easy target. Flying Soviet-era Su-25 “frogfoots,” the Iranian pilots reportedly closed in on the drone and opened fire using their 30mm cannons. The Su-25s failed to destroy the drone.

However, the message they were sending was received by the U.S. Going forward.

The Pentagon decided to send F-22 Raptors or F-18 Hornets to escort Predator drones involved in intelligence surveillance reconnaissance missions on the move. 

In 2013, Iranian pilots would again try to take down a Predator drone close to the Iranian shoreline. This time, however, F-22 Raptors were nearby. A pair of Iranian F-4 Phantom pilots began to close in on the Predator, likely scoping out how to best take it down. Unbeknownst to the Iranian pilots, an F-22 piloted by Lt. Col. Kevin “Showtime” Sutterfield was eying the F-4 Phantoms the whole time. Then-Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh explained what happened next:

“He [the Raptor pilot] flew under their aircraft [the F-4s] to check out their weapons load without them knowing that he was there, and then pulled up on their left wing and then called them and said ‘you really ought to go home.’” 

While Russia does fly more modern fighters than the Su-25 these days, no airframe in its arsenal would be completely safe around an F-22 Raptor tasked with protecting an American UAV. The redeployment of Raptors to the Middle East does not bode well for Moscow’s future provocations in Syria’s airspace. 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

The news that the U.S. Department of Defense failed to inform the American public that its Secretary of Defense was hospitalized in Walter Reed for four days represents a stunning breach of transparency standards. It is also a measure of reputational damage from which Secretary Lloyd Austin will never recover. He must be forced to resign.

The original admission – dropped at the end of a Friday to minimize exposure – that the Secretary received multi-day treatment for an unidentified elective surgery introduced immediate and intense scrutiny from national security reporters. It drew a formal admonishment from the Pentagon press.

The issue may have died there, but the subterfuge further grew the story. Additional reporting revealed some critical details not released by the Pentagon in its Friday announcement: Austin was in in-patient intensive care, generally reserved for those in immediate danger. Meanwhile, his Deputy Secretary of Defense, Kathleen Hicks, was vacationing in Puerto Rico.

Many questions now must be answered: Who was adjudicating the Pentagon’s support for the war in Gaza? Who was coordinating with Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant on behalf of the U.S. military? Who approved the Jan. 4 strike into Baghdad that killed a militia leader believed responsible for attacks on American troops? Who coordinated that strike and its aftermath with defense officials in the Middle East? These are the kinds of actions that require leadership from inside the Pentagon. Why did the Deputy Secretary of Defense remain on vacation with the Secretary incapacitated?

Further, still – what is the health status of our Secretary of Defense? Only a severe condition would introduce multi-day hospitalization amidst multiple crises in the Middle East, a log-jammed war in Ukraine, and new Chinese threats against Taiwan. The statement Austin released late Saturday in an attempt to tamp down the controversy reveals he is “on the mend” – whatever that means – and looks forward to “returning to the Pentagon soon.” How long is he out? This seems much more serious than elective surgery – the line the Pentagon press officers are sticking with. What is his medical status at age 70?

More questions still: What did the Pentagon press officers know, and when did they know it? Surely, they are aware of the protocol for publicly announcing medical procedures for cabinet officials. Who was in on the deception? The Secretary of Defense travels with an entire operations center around him at all times: note-takers, communications experts, and intelligence analysts. These people all report to defense officials, who report to other defense officials. It’s hard to believe the Pentagon’s press office was unaware that the Big Boss was in the hospital. In fact, hiding the Secretary of Defense during a tumultuous work week for the American military surely involved the collusion of multiple senior officials.

The Pentagon could have avoided all these questions and all of this controversy with a press statement upon Austin’s entering the hospital and updates throughout. U.S. Air Force Major General Pat Ryder held two press briefings during Austin’s hospital stay – he could have provided updates on his boss’ condition from behind the podium. More importantly, he should have told us who was running the Pentagon. It’s unclear how the nation is to believe anything coming out of the Pentagon press office in the coming months.

The American Secretary of Defense walks the earth with the most essential information any of us can have. He renders decisions on behalf of this country that kill many people in other countries. Lloyd Austin represents American power to much of the world. He runs an enterprise that costs American taxpayers north of $840 billion and employs more than three million workers. We get to know where our Secretary of Defense is at all times. We get to know when he’s on vacation. We get to know when he’s in the hospital.

Lloyd Austin cannot recover from this breach of trust. In fact, he cannot be trusted any longer. If he wants to keep his hospital visits private, he should be allowed to do so – as a private citizen.

Joe Buccino is a retired U.S. Army Colonel public affairs officer and the former communications director of U.S. Central Command. He also served as the spokesman for Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Image: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com

Summary: This article discusses the historical significance of the Soviet Foxtrot-class submarines during the Cold War. One notable incident occurred in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis when a Foxtrot-class submarine almost launched a nuclear torpedo against U.S. forces. The Foxtrot-class, designed to address the shortcomings of its predecessor, played a critical role in the Soviet Navy, with specifications including displacement, size, and armament details. Despite technological obsolescence by the 1970s, Foxtrot submarines remained formidable and was exported around the world.

During the Cold War, one Soviet-designed submarine perhaps gained the most notoriety. In October 1962, four USSR Foxtrot-class diesel subs armed with nuclear weapons were deployed as part of the USSR’s massive Cuba strategy. Unbeknownst to the U.S. at the time, the B-59 Foxtrot nearly launched a nuclear torpedo against American anti-submarine warfare forces.

The Captain of the Soviet vessel mistakenly believed they were under attack. Eventually, the Captain learned that American ships were actually signaling, not attacking, the SSN and backed down. However, it was truly a close call. It was at this moment, when Washington and Moscow came concerningly close to all-out nuclear war, when the Foxtrot-class rose to global prominence.

As the former Soviet Union’s most successful post-Second World War diesel-electric attack submarine, the Foxtrot-class played a critical role in the Soviet’s Navy. These vessels were designed to replace the USSR’s aging Project 611 submarines, which were designated as the Zulu class by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Zulu ships had capabilities similar to the American GUPPY fleet-boat conversions. In the late 1950’s, six Zulu submarines were converted and became the first ballistic missile vessels ever to enter service across the globe.

One was armed with a single R-11FM Scud missile while five other ships in this family were equipped with two Scuds each. Perhaps the Zulu-class’ most recognizable trait is that it served as the basis for the Foxtrots.

Project 641 (NATO codename “Foxtrot”) was developed with the Zulu shortcomings in mind. Specifically, Soviet officials wanted to rectify the perceived lack of strength of these vessels. Each Foxtrot displaced 2,000 tons when surfaced and more than 2,500 tons when submerged. The ships measured 295 feet and were powered by three Kolomna 2D42M diesel units of 2,000 horsepower output, three Electric motors with two generating roughly 1,300 horsepower, with the third outing about 2,700 horsepower.

The first Foxtrot-class keel was laid down in 1957 and commissioned one year later. The last submarine in this class was completed in the early 1980’s. Each boat was built for the Soviet Navy at the Sudomekh division of the Admiralty Shipyard (currently Admiralty Wharves), Saint Petersburg.

While the Foxtrot was larger in size than its Zulu predecessors, each ship in this class had 2 of its 3 decks dedicated to batteries. This enabled underwater endurance for up to 10 days, which stymied the submarines’ speed. The Foxtrot could only travel at an average rate of 2 knots at its maximum submerged time capability.

By the time the last Foxtrot models were laid down in the early 1970s, the submarine family was deemed technologically obsolete. One of the last active service Project 641 vessels- the Zaporizhia- was captured by Russian forces during the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Notably, when the submarine was seized, the Black Fleet did not want the Cold War sub. Instead, the Russian military offered to return the submarine back to Ukraine.

In terms of armament, the Project 641 submarines were quite formidable. The family of ships in total carried twenty-two torpedoes. During the Cold War, the Foxtrot class was a regular component of all four Soviet Navy fleets. In the late 1960’s, India became the first foreign client of this submarine series.

Eight new-build ships were delivered to the Indian Navy and were later renamed as the Kalvari-class. Libya would follow suit a few years later, procuring six boats between the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Around this time, Poland also received a pair of these ships which they operated until 2003.

During the height of the Cold War, several Foxtrot submarines were sent to Cuba from their base on the Kola peninsula to patrol the Caribbean. In one incident, U.S. Navy destroyers dropped practice depth charges near these Soviet submarines to force them to surface and be identified. While three of the four Foxtrots were forced to surface, one was able to evade U.S. detection. Since B-59 was too deep to establish radio contact, the ship believed war had broken out between Moscow and Washington.

Both the captain and political officer onboard the submarine firmly believed that the signaling charges were actual depth charges and that the vessel was under attack. This line of thinking forced both individuals to strongly advocate for arming and firing the nuclear-tipped torpedo onboard. Miraculously, the flotilla admiral Vasily Arkhipov was on B-59 and refused to give his consent to launch the nuclear weapon. By overruling the two other officers on board, Akhipov can be commended for single-handedly preventing the outbreak of nuclear war at this time.

The Foxtrot-class may no longer be in service, but the Soviet submarines will always be remembered for the critical role it played during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Summary: The article highlights the anticipated Type 095 submarine by China's navy. It emphasizes its advanced features, potential applications in escorting aircraft carriers, and its significance in marking a turning point in China's submarine capabilities. Despite historical setbacks, China is steadily advancing its naval strength, possibly evolving into a formidable blue-water submarine force. 

China is working to become a peer of the United States with respect to geopolitical power and influence. And although the US enjoys advantages that China will have a difficult time mitigating (including the world’s most favorable geography and the world’s most robust military budget), China has unrivaled latent economic potential and a revisionist ambition that has alerted American observers. Naturally, the US is beginning to pay closer attention to China’s ability to wage war.

China has the world’s largest population: 1.4 billion people. And while China’s population is aging, reducing its ability to wage war, China still enjoys a unique ability to field a large army, navy, and air force. China, to augment the abilities of their profound human capital, is investing in the development of cutting edge military technologies.

Examples include the recently developed J-20 Mighty Dragon, a fifth-generation fighter that many believe incorporates American technology attained through industrial espionage; the H-20 stealth bomber, which is in the early stages of development; the Fujian aircraft carrier, equipped with a magnetic catapult system comparable to the US’s Ford-class carrier; hypersonic missiles, which the US currently does not possess (and would have a difficult time defending against); and a planned third-generation nuclear attack submarine: the Type 095.

The Type 095 program will complement the ongoing Chinese shipbuilding spree – which has been one of the largest shipbuilding efforts in human history.

Presently, the US still maintains a naval edge over China, respecting fleet quality – but the Chinese have recently surpassed the US with respect to quantity, raising the hackles of the Indo-Pacific region in the process.

The Type 095 is of particular concern to observers – understandably, given that the submarine is a mysterious and fear-inspiring machine, something like the military equivalent of a shark, lurking beneath the ocean's surface. And considering that submarines can deliver nuclear ordnance, submarine-related anxiety is well warranted.

Today, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy Submarine Force (PLANSF) operates a fleet of 56 submarines.

China “possesses both a nuclear-powered submarine fleet and a robust diesel-electric submarine fleet,” the Nuclear Threat Initiative explains. “While the PLAN is currently developing its nuclear-powered submarine capabilities, its diesel-electric submarine fleet remains the backbone of China’s submarine forces. While its growth is declining, the United States government reports indicate the fleet could grow to between 65 and 70 submarines by 2020s.”

The most pressing contemporary concerns are the Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarine and the Type 093 Shang-class submarine. China operates six Type 094s, which is consider China’s first sea-based nuclear deterrent, boasting 12 JL-3 SLBMs with a 6,200 mile range. The Type 093, meanwhile, represented a significant advancement in China’s underwater sub warfare capability, with six 533mm torpedo tubes that can launch either anti-submarine or anti-ship torpedoes.

But despite the adequacy of the Type 094 and Type 093, the most pressing concern of tomorrow, for China’s adversaries, will be the Type 095.

The Type 095 is expected to have an improved hull design, with a significantly reduced acoustic signature. Relative to the Type 093, the Type 095 will have an improved nuclear reactor, vertical launching system (VLS) cells, and more advanced sensors (including active/passive flank array sonar and low-and high-frequency towed sonar array).

Reports indicate that the Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industrial Corporation will be building the Type 095 at a new plant in Huludao of the Liaoning province. The program is shrouded in secrecy, but expectations are that the Type 095 will be used to escort Chinese aircraft carrier task forces.

Here’s what else is speculated about the Type 095 program: “one commentator found it likely that the Type 095 would have electronic noise-cancellation technology, like your noise canceling headphones, a shaftless drive, and a single hull,” Caleb Larson reported. “All of these would be a huge step forward for China’s submarine program.”

Indeed, the Type 095 indicates that the Chinese could be turning a significant corner with respect to submarine technology. “For many years, China was the subject of ridicule in naval circles,” Larson wrote. “The Korean War put the  brakes on Chinese naval innovations, and the Cultural Revolution also hindered naval advancement.” Yet, “despite these setbacks, China has steadily developed its naval capabilities.”

And while China was initially focused on near-shore capabilities, “like smaller diesel submarines, shore-based missile defense, or fast littoral boats, China is now possibly capable of fielding a true blue-water submarine force.”

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

BRICS+ leaders met in St. Petersburg in November 2023 as part of the Fifth International Municipal Forum amid the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. The organization, which has invited Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates to join in 2024, has taken pains to project the image of a coherent international organization.

Russian politicians capitalized on the meeting to challenge perceived Western digital hegemony. Dmitry Gusev, a Russian Duma member in charge of digital affairs, announced a request had been sent to Russia’s Digital Development Ministry to work on creating “a single inclusive BRICS+ cyberspace,” with a unified technical system. This BRICS+ internet would be separate from the Western-dominated current system and in line with the “traditional values” and national laws, but no specific details were included. BRICS+ itself is a nebulous enough entity that the most significant challenge would be getting the constituent members to agree to such a proposal, to say nothing of the technical hurdles.

The proposal is part of a broader effort to challenge American financial and technological hegemony, and it echoes proposals made earlier this year by Russian politicians to create a common BRICS+ currency and shift away from the dollar as a global reserve currency. But, just as these currency proposals face massive and potentially insurmountable challenges, so do proposals to build a separate internet.

RUNET

Russian efforts have hitherto focused on moving more internet infrastructure in-country and increasing internet censorship. These policies have had mixed success but point to the potential future of the Internet in an era of great power conflict.

Proposals for a separate “BRICSNET” are not new: Russia proposed creating a separate internet for what was then called the “BRICS” in 2017 when the Kremlin’s National Security Council began exploring the idea of creating a sovereign internet system. Implementation focuses on creating an alternative network of domestic DNS servers, which could function if Russia is cut off from the global Internet. DNS functions as the Internet’s phonebook, resolving the domain names that users enter into their browsers with the IP addresses that host the domains. The thirteen authorities for the DNS root server networks, which operate as the highest tier in the DNS system, were assigned to organizations that functioned as early internet exchange points in the United States, the UK, Sweden, and Japan.

Russia has stepped up testing of its internet system since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It is difficult to ascertain how successful these tests have been, as the testing has also led to the cutoff of government services. Tests in early July 2023 led to reports of massive interruption in online services for Russia’s state-owned railway system and their Agricultural Authority, despite claims by authorities that the tests were successful.

The organization that controls the DNS system is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a nonprofit corporation headquartered in Los Angeles. The problem with breaking away from ICANN and creating a separate BRICSNET is that many developing countries are increasing partnerships with the system. Over the past two decades, the organization has opened offices and engagement centers in Istanbul, Brussels, Singapore, and Montevideo. As a result, the developing world continues to integrate its DNS infrastructure with ICANN, which announced that Kenya would be the location for Africa’s first root server cluster in December 2022. The further digitalization of economies in the global south will make them more dependent on ICANN DNS infrastructure, not less.

BGP Barriers

If DNS is the Internet’s phone book, then Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is its global trade route system. Attempting to create a national DNS system is a challenge, but for a genuinely separate internet system, BRICS+ would likely need to create alternative protocols for data transmission.

BGP functions as the highway of the Internet, and data streams flow according to various transmission protocols for data to move most efficiently. Flows must occur between different Tier One Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for the system to function. Creating a “separate internet” would involve not only creating root DNS servers but also a system for ISPs and separate routing protocols located at the border of national internet infrastructures so as not to be reliant on the current system.

The competition for constructing undersea cable networks that facilitate global internet traffic is a natural arena for great power competition, but one where the prize is access to markets as internet demand grows in the developing world and access to some of the data flowing for intelligence purposes. China is increasingly aggressive about expanding its market share in internet infrastructure, but these cables do not constitute a separate global internet.

Another complication for a BRICSNET is that search engines, cloud technology, Internet of Things (IoT), and other emerging technologies that are upending traditional network technology are still concentrated in the United States. Cloud infrastructure, in particular, is U.S.-dominated, with China’s Alibaba and Tencent Cloud only controlling 6 percent of the global market, less than a fifth of the share of Amazon Web Services.

The War on Internet Freedom

More worrying are the moves by authoritarian states, including current and prospective BRICS+ members, to share best practices to challenge Internet freedom. While China had the foresight to create the Great Firewall as the Internet was being introduced in the 1990s and early 2000s and the creation of “chokepoints” was possible for traffic flowing into the country, retroactive creation of such a leviathan of censorship is practically impossible. Iran has also managed to establish chokepoints, which enabled internet shutdowns in 2022 amid the backdrop of anti-government unrest. The unregulated, ad-hoc expansion of the Internet throughout much of the developing world would make retroactively creating such chokepoints extremely difficult, however.

Russia has attempted to make up for previously lax internet policies by blocking various Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) since the Kremlin began its sovereign internet initiative. Still, international VPN providers have refused to comply. The only country with more VPN downloads in 2022 than Russia was India, highlighting that citizens in developed countries are not the only ones concerned about shielding their browsing from internet censors.

The policies have devolved into a wack-a-mole since the invasion of Ukraine, where VPNs are blocked, and users seek new ways of bypassing the censorship. Independent analysis published in November 2023 by digital rights groups has found that nine of sixteen popular services have been blocked in Russia to varying degrees. Still, VPN services continue to introduce new technologies to subvert bans. Russian lawmakers recently indicated that they plan to attempt to ban VPN services that are refusing to comply with blacklists from being displayed in search results.

Russia’s efforts to create its own home-grown domestic network of certificate-issuing authorities for TLS, the key infrastructure that secures HTTP traffic for the World Wide Web, have been partially successful. Russian citizens are increasingly forced to download government-issued TLS certificates created by a firm that works closely with the FSB to perform basic internet functions. Russia’s largest bank estimated that 25-30 percent of domestic devices had downloaded the certificates as of June 2023. 

These restrictions continue to spread globally: Belarus’s authorities attempted a mass shutdown of internet service during violent protests against fraudulent Presidential election results in 2020 and was partly successful. China’s Great Firewall continues to roll out new technologies to detect and block encryption, and authorities in Russia have stated that they are developing machine learning systems for the same end. 

The Internet is an American Citizen

Boastful proclamations aside, building an entirely separate internet would be a task for a super-civilization. Just as much of the rest of the world remains dependent on the U.S. defense of global trade routes, global internet systems also continue to rely on American technology and expertise. Proposals for a separate BRICS+ internet have thus far gone nowhere for a reason: they are nigh impossible from a technical and organizational standpoint.

Despite a contested cyberspace, global internet traffic is growing by 27 percent per year, with more people reliant on the worldwide network than ever before. The Internet remains humanity’s most significant engineering project, providing ever-more stunning innovations in trade, communication, and debate. Fevered great power dreams of dividing the Internet do not accord with reality. Nonetheless, the desire to replicate “best practices” among authoritarian states to clamp down on internet access and civilian encryption are developments that should be taken seriously by all who care about a free and open internet.

Luke Rodeheffer is the founder and CEO of Alpha Centauri, a cyber security and due diligence firm.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the greatest superpower of all? That is the question being asked once again by foreign policy pundits in Washington, as elsewhere—bearing in mind, as America and the world enter into 2024, that changes in the global balance of power do not develop linearly and tend to run contrary to earlier predictions. The new year found the United States engaged diplomatically and militarily on three global fronts: responding to Russian aggression in Ukraine by strengthening the Western alliance; containing the Chinese geo-strategic and geo-economic surge and, in particular, its threat to Taiwan’s independence; dealing with the threat posed by Iran—and its regional proxies—to America’s allies in the Middle East, amid the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas War.

One way of assessing the American responses to these challenges is to see them as part of an effort by an embattled global hegemon to maintain the international order it had established, together with its allies, in the aftermath of World War II. It was within this order that America gained a dominant position in the “unipolar moment” following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the ushering in of the era of globalization.

This international order seems, so far, to have withstood the test of strategic and diplomatic challenges that ensued following the costly U.S. military fiascos in the Greater Middle East. True, the Americans failed to remake the Middle East through regime changes and nation-building. This, in turn, led to the humiliating withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, which raised doubts about the ability of the U.S. to maintain its global leadership position. And yet other aspects of recent events proved that America can still shape the global agenda. 

Thus, while the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing fears of the return of the Great Recession did seem to pose a threat to U.S. global economic supremacy when China was pumping its economic muscles, it actually served as a stress test for the ongoing U.S.-led economic globalization and trade liberalization.

However, it had taken time for Americans and Western Europeans to recognize the economic and military costs resulting from American military interventions in the Middle East as well as from trade liberalization policies in the form of rising financial budget deficits and socio-economic dislocations. These effects helped produce the political backlash that brought about the rise of populism, leading eventually to Brexit and later to the election of U.S. President Donald Trump and the rise of critics of globalization elsewhere.

Political changes that reflected growing isolationist and protectionist public sentiments, therefore, constrained American politicians from pursuing grandiose strategic designs or even limited military interventions abroad. They also made it more difficult to promote globalization as a central form of geo-economic policymaking. This explains American reluctance to react more assertively in response to the Russian attack on Georgia in 2008 and its invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the effort on the part of Washington to avoid a military conflict with Iran through the signing of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Tehran.

At the same time, the rising geo-economic status of China has ignited bipartisan anti-China attitudes in Washington, increasingly constraining U.S. engagement with China and replacing the reigning free trade agenda with a more-or-less economic nationalist paradigm. The latter became even more dominant during the coronavirus pandemic and following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Indeed, Putin’s aggression—coupled with the continuing global rise of China—helped convince Western elites that economic interdependence in itself doesn’t necessarily help resolve national conflicts; if anything, it tends to aggravate them. Hence, the pursuit of national interest should be central to U.S. foreign policy. Washington faced the acute re-emergence of great power competition, being forced to revitalize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and establish a meshing network of similar military partnerships across the Pacific. At the same time, America used its military production base as well as economic power to punish Russia for its aggression in Ukraine and limited China’s access to new technologies that could be applied for military purposes.

The new balance of power that reflects this continuing great power competition and seems increasingly driven by nationalist and protectionist pressures will dominate the geo-strategic and geo-economic map of 2024.

At its center will remain the United States and its Western allies—still powerful, even as they face an evolving axis of authoritarian regimes led by Russia and China, including North Korea as well as Iran and its proxies—whose aim is to weaken America’s global position and the international order it has been trying to defend.

As 2023 ended, the United States was challenged to maintain its global position as its partners—Ukraine in Europe and Israel in the Middle East—were under pressure from anti-Western powers that were aggressively seeking to overthrow the status quo. In Europe, after the failure of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, Russia is now in a better position to preserve its hold over those parts of Ukraine, and in particular Crimea, that are presently under its control. Growing resistance among isolationist Republicans to increasing U.S. military and economic aid to Ukraine plays directly into the hands of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, who may well hope to see Donald Trump again in the White House in 2024.

If that happens—and with America’s European allies unable or unwilling to replace Washington as Ukraine’s supporter of last resort—there will be growing pressure on Kyiv to agree to a ceasefire and eventually make a diplomatic deal with Moscow. While it’s possible that Ukraine would be invited to join the European Union (EU) and perhaps even NATO at some point in the future, any agreement between Russia and Ukraine would leave Putin in a stronger position, especially if a second-term President Trump, as many expect, would take steps to weaken American commitment to NATO.

Under these circumstances, standing up to Iran’s challenge in the Middle East assumes global as well as regional importance. Much would depend on President Joe Biden’s evolving response to the currently successful effort by Iran and its regional allies and proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the rebel Houthi regime in Yemen, to challenge the American position in the Middle East. Indeed, Hamas’ attack on Israel succeeded in sabotaging an American strategy of normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel and creating an Arab-Israeli partnership aimed at containing Iran and its camp.

Hamas’ assault, coupled with Hezbollah’s strikes against northern Israel, has shattered the latter’s deterrence and, by extension, America’s effort to shift the balance of power in the region in its favor. Hoping to repair it, the Americans have deployed two aircraft carrier strike forces, air assets, and a marines’ contingent to the Middle East as a warning to Iran to refrain from turning the Gaza war into a regional conflagration. But when it comes to dealing directly with Iran, the Biden administration has refrained, until recently, from responding to strikes by its proxies against American forces in Syria and Iraq—or, for that matter, to the Houthis’ threat to international shipping—through direct military attacks on Iranian targets. 

The Iranians may be translating this American caution as weakness and assuming that notwithstanding Biden’s rhetoric and the deployment of the U.S. aircraft carriers, the American president is worried about the potential fallout from direct U.S. military intervention. That could lead to war with Iran at a time when the United States is confronting Russia in Ukraine and is worried about the threat of a Chinese attack against Taiwan. The Iranians reckon that the Americans don’t have the military resources to fight on three fronts and that the American people don’t want to be drawn into a new quagmire in the Middle East. They wonder, therefore: When push comes to shove, would Biden be ready to pull the trigger?

At one point, President Biden may have no choice but to demonstrate to the Iranians that they are wrong—if he, indeed, wants to reassert the balance of power that collapsed on October 7. If not, Iran and its proxies could succeed in establishing a new balance of power in the Middle East in which Israel is damaged, Hamas isn’t destroyed, and the normalization of relations between the Israelis and the Saudis is stalled. 

While all this would not amount to Iranian “victory,” it would provide Tehran with more power and encourage the Gulf Arab states to appease it, as well as strengthen the position of Russia and China. Iran has been expanding its ties with Russia and providing it with drones and other weaponry, while China has been trying to increase its influence in the Middle East and even succeeded in mediating a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran aimed (among other purposes) to end the civil war in Yemen. 

Both Russia and China are trying to build up their geo-economic stature by increasing diplomatic and economic ties with oil-producing Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The perception that America is in decline in the Middle East would encourage them to make deals with Moscow and Beijing, in addition to Tehran. Given this perspective, if Biden refrains from pulling the trigger in the emerging duel with Iran, he will increase the chances that the Islamic Republic will be able to attain a dominant role in the Persian Gulf and the Levant and thus would be in a stronger position to achieve its long-term goal of evicting the United States from the Middle east altogether—and in the process, eliminating what it views as America’s proxy, Israel. Before this comes to pass, the perception of American weakness would debilitate Washington’s leverage over the Arab oil states and allow Beijing and Moscow a wider strategic opening in the region. 

If the opposite happens, on the other hand, there is no reason why a more assertive U.S. strategy vis-à-vis Tehran will not allow the Administration to revive its original strategy of co-opting Saudi Arabia into a partnership with Israel aimed at containing Iran and its proxies. This would be all the more meaningful if the Saudis could play a role in the reconstruction of post-war Gaza, together with other Sunni Arab states with a stake in regional stability. 

As for the balance with China, it is true that America has been forced to shift more attention and resources in response to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. This has been a blessing for China since this diverts American focus from the Indo-Pacific region and presumably contradicts earlier American pledges to “pivot” from the Middle East and the Atlantic to the Pacific. That American position, as put forward at the time by Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State, reflected Washington’s recognition that America’s wars in the Middle East had provided an opportunity for China to expand its power while weakening that of America. But things have changed again.

Washington may remain preoccupied with Ukraine and fall into a military quagmire in the Middle East. This outcome could send a message to American allies and partners in Asia, in particular members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), that they may not be able to count on Washington for their security and that they, therefore, need to appease China.

Some in Washington are thus concerned that China may take advantage of America’s attention being diverted to Ukraine and the Middle East and use this opportunity to attack Taiwan. But even if that doesn’t happen, the American presidential election would be dominated by attacks on Beijing, with Republicans accusing President Biden of being “weak” on China, which would increase pressure on the Biden administration to strengthen ties with Taipei, a move that is likely to ignite Sino-American tensions. The latter would be inflamed further if Trump -promoting an economic nationalist and anti-China agenda—returns to the White House.

Having said all this, it will remain the case that American policies in the Middle East (and Ukraine) would affect its position in East Asia. An erosion of the American commitment to Ukraine and a failure to contain Iran’s ambitions for dominance will send a message of weakness to Beijing and could encourage it to test American resolve in the Indo-Pacific. 

Alternatively, signaling strength, the evolving American strategic cooperation with India, Australia, and Japan—the “Quad”—may become a nucleus of a NATO-like regional security grouping. Together with an Arab-Israeli partnership—expanding the I2U2 or “Western Quad” of India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States, and utilizing Saudi economic power and Israel’s technological edge—this could help shore up the global balance of power in America’s favor. In this context, the initiative put forward by Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India—to build a rail and shipping corridor linking India with the Middle East and Europe, would fit in as the model of an ambitious project aimed at fostering economic growth and political cooperation, strengthening the American geo-strategic position. 

As it enters 2024, the United States has the largest and most advanced economy and by far the largest and most powerful military. Even those cheerleading for China today agree that that country will not become the world’s largest economy before 2050—and even that proposition is very “iffy.” Moreover, no one expects any of America’s potential global competitors (whether friendly like the European Union and India or hostile like Russia and China) to overspend the United States on defense and overtake it in the military sphere any time soon. It just ain’t gonna happen.

It can, therefore, be accepted as a given that there is no great power—or even a combination of powers—ready to challenge the United States for global supremacy at this time in history. At the same time, while the United States will probably remain Number One for quite a while, the trifecta of challenges that it now faces around the world, in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Pacific, will make it more difficult for the United States to secure its military hegemony on its own.

As a consequence, the notion of a U.S. monopoly in the international system will have to be replaced with the concept of a like-minded oligopoly. The choice that Washington will face is between continuing to strive for dominance or working together with other powers—NATO in Europe, the Israeli-Arab partnership in the Middle East, and the Quad in Asia—to contain threats to the international system. In that case, the United States will be first among equals (or primus inter pares)—aside from being Number One, it’s the next best thing.

Dr. Leon Hadar is a contributing editor with The National Interest, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia, and a former research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He has taught at American University in Washington, DC, and the University of Maryland, College Park. A columnist and blogger with Haaretz (Israel) and Washington correspondent for the Business Times of Singapore, he is a former United Nations bureau chief for the Jerusalem Post.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Summary: In joint exercises between the Royal Thai Air Force's JAS 39 Gripen fighters and the People's Liberation Army Air Force's (PLAAF) Su-27s, the Gripen demonstrated superior performance, excelling in beyond visual range (BVR) combat. The Thai fighters achieved 88% of their kills at 19 miles or greater, highlighting their effectiveness in long-distance engagements. The PLAAF's Su-27s faced challenges, with Thai pilots downing 41 Su-27s while losing only nine Gripens. The outcome underscored the Gripen's capabilities and revealed the PLAAF's learning curve in missile avoidance strategies.

Though Thailand has remained the oldest U.S. ally in Asia, the ties have been "complicated" by a 2014 military coup, and Bangkok sought to strengthen its relations with China while it has made several defense procurements.

Beginning in August 2015, Thailand further held the "Falcon Strike" joint exercises with the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) – with the Falcon Strike-2023 joint exercise between Chinese and Thai air forces lasting 21 days in Thailand, where participating troops from both countries carried out training subjects including air support, land assault, joint air defense, and large-scale deployment, which effectively enhanced their combat and joint operational capabilities.

Thailand employs aircraft of Western origins and adopts combat tactics based on a Western model, which analysts have warned could be good additions to the PLAAF's domestic training program.

However, it was during the inaugural event that was noted for highlighting the capabilities of the Royal Thai Air Force's Swedish-built JAS-39 "Gripen" multirole fighter.

The JAS 39 Gripen (Griffin) was initially designed to replace the variants of the Saab 35 Viggen and Saab 37 Draken combat aircraft. Development began in the late 1970s when the government in Stockholm began to explore the development of an aircraft that could be capable of fighter, attack, and recon missions. After evaluating a number of existing foreign aircraft including the American F-16 and F-18 fighters, the Swedish Parliament decided in June 1982 to move forward with the Swedish project.

Development of the Gripen was part of a joint effort by an industrial consortium that consisted of Saab, Saab Microwave Systems (formerly Ericsson), Volvo Aero Corporation, Saab Avitronics, and FFV Aerotech, the Gripen was the first Swedish multirole combat aircraft – capable of conducting interception, ground-attack, and reconnaissance. The single-engine, multirole-combat aircraft was designed with a single pilot, but the B and D versions were also developed featuring a longer canopy for a crew of two.

The fourth-generation multirole fighter was first flown in December 1988, and it entered operational service with the Swedish Air Force in 1997. A total of 204 aircraft in three batches had been ordered by Swedish Air Forces, which to date has taken delivery of 74 aircraft.

A total of 158 Gripens were produced as of 2016, and it was exported around the globe. Current operators include Brazil, the Czech Republic, Hungary, South Africa and Thailand, while the United Kingdom's Empire Test Pilots' School also operates Gripens in a training capacity.

It was the dozen in service with the Royal Thai Air Force that likely took Beijing by surprise.

The Royal Thai Air Force, which was established in 1913 as one of the earliest air forces of Asia, is actually older than the PLAAF – and while not as large, is still one of the most capable and equipped in the region. It has historically employed U.S. hardware and is seeking to procure F-35 fighter jets from Lockheed Martin to replace some of its aging F-16 models.

However, as noted, it has a dozen Swedish-made Grippens in service – an aircraft that is considered one of the best non-stealth fighters in the world today. That fact was brought home in the first-ever joint exercise between the Chinese and Thai air forces.

According to a report from Aviation International News, an early December 2019 report from inside China revealed previously unreleased technical details of PLAAF's Russian-built Su-27s losing a majority of engagements in a November 2015 joint exercise with the 701 Fighter Squadron of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), which operates eight Saab JAS-39C and four JAS-39D Gripens.

David Axe had previously written for The National Interest that the PLAAF flew the Shenyang J-11, an aircraft derived from the Soviet-designed Sukhoi Su-27, and manufactured by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC). It is unclear if the PLAAF fighters were in fact Su-27s or the similar J-11s – but the outcome was the same.

"The JAS-39 performance was at its worst inside the within visual range (WVR) envelope. Over a two-day period, PLAAF pilots shot down 25 Gripens at a loss of only one Su-27. The Su-27 has an advantage over the performance of the JAS-39 due to its more powerful Salyut AL-31F engines, and the Swedish aircraft was handicapped in that it was equipped with the older-generation AIM-9L Sidewinder instead of the current-generation Diehl IRIS-T missile," the trade magazine of record reported.

The situation changed greatly once the exercise transitioned to beyond visual range (BVR) combat, where the superiority of the JAS-39 became readily apparent. Thai pilots flying the Swedish aircraft shot down 41 Su-27s over a period of four days with a loss of only nine JAS-39s.

The Royal Thai Air Force's Gripens achieved 88 percent of its kills at 19 miles or greater, while the Su-27 had just 14 percent of its kills at this range. The RTAF also had 10 kills at a distance of more than 31 miles compared with zero long-distance kills by the Su-27. Chinese pilots were simply not experienced in avoiding missile shots, while they failed to take evasive actions for missiles with different ranges.

Moreover, as AIN also reported, "In subsequent exercises, the PLAAF fared better by sending the Chengdu J-10A - and then in 2019 the J-10C - in place of the Su-27."

Perhaps Beijing's pilots learned valuable lessons as well. That should be the bigger concern – especially as Thailand holds future Falcon Strike exercises.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. Contact the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

As the U.S. presidential elections loom later this year, current polls point to the possibility of another term for Donald Trump. Given the tumultuous impact of Trump’s previous presidency, this prospect raises significant concerns for the Middle East. His signature approach, characterized by unorthodox personal diplomacy and off-the-cuff statements, has contributed to regional instability. Despite the changes in the region during his absence, Trump’s possible return poses unique challenges. The “Trump Effect” on diplomatic relations is further complicated by the escalating U.S.-China rivalry. Trump’s direct and provocative tone could force Middle Eastern states to choose sides and potentially exacerbate conflicts. Fortunately, regional actors are more accustomed to Trump’s unique style and have better diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, Trump’s return could have significant repercussions for the Middle East, as the United States is still the most powerful actor in the region.

In certain respects, Trump’s approach to the Middle East was not much different from Obama’s or Biden’s. The U.S. military presence in the region, counter-terrorism policies, and support for regional allies are issues on which all three presidents have pursued similar policies. Where Trump differed was on Iran, on which he sought economic and diplomatic containment, unlike Obama and Biden, who tried to reach a diplomatic agreement with Tehran regarding its nuclear program. However, even with this exception, all three presidents aimed, at least notionally, to reduce the U.S. imprint in the region.

Nevertheless, Trump’s handling of the region’s problems problems was radically different. Most issues in the Middle East require skillful statecraft that maintains a delicate balance of interests with no clear, definitive solutions. Trump was a bull in a china shop. He conducted personal diplomacy, the content of which was unknown to American diplomats and sometimes even to his own inner circle. He made conflicting promises to different leaders. He made erratic statements and took unexpected and radical steps. And with his indifference to issues not directly related to U.S. economic interests, he gave the impression that U.S. leadership in the region was in free fall. In this way, Trump fanned the flames of the Qatar crisis in 2017, Turkey’s aggressive foreign policy, the Turkish-UAE rivalry, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, and the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

Trump’s re-election in November 2024 will not turn back the clock in the Middle East. The region has changed a lot without him in Washington. Middle Eastern leaders have grown more accustomed to his unique character and style. Nevertheless, this may not be enough.

The Trump Effect

When Donald Trump came to the White House in 2017, the region was already plagued by terrorism, civil wars, and middle-power rivalries. While he did not greatly alter U.S. policies, his “unique and disruptive style” had a gasoline effect on the region.

Trump conducts diplomatic relations through personal contacts, often keeping the State Department and his aides in the dark. Of course, this appeals to Middle Eastern leaders, who like to conduct business through personal contacts. However, personal diplomacy can lead to policy inconsistencies. More importantly, someone as mercurial as Trump can intentionally or unintentionally give confusing impressions or vague promises. During the 2017 Qatar crisis, Saudi and Emirati leaders thought they had Trump’s blessing on sanctions against Doha. Similarly, in 2019, President Erdoğan exchanged messages with Trump and received a partial green light for a new military operation against the Kurds—an operation at odds with stated U.S. policies. Believing they had convinced Trump of their cases, Middle Eastern leaders took risky and destabilizing steps.

Trump’s impromptu statements can be extremely dangerous for stability and diplomacy. His tweeted support for sanctions during the three-year-long Qatar crisis further complicated the crisis. His threats to cripple the Turkish economy have also had a devastating effect on Turkey. He could tweet an unsubstantiated idea that Saudi Arabia would fund the reconstruction of Syria as if it had been agreed upon. This may be his way of negotiating, but it rarely had the effect he intended.

With little attention to the details of any policy issue and overconfidence in his instincts, Trump can make major decisions without much planning, such as recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and its claim over the Golan Heights. Likewise, he can easily break his own promises and policy statements. In the first months of his presidency, Trump bombed Bashar al-Assad despite having previously expressed sympathy for the Syrian leader. He even asked his aides to assassinate Assad, as he later ordered the killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani.

The intensification of the U.S.-China rivalry could draw Trump’s attention in a very dangerous way. Whether in the nineteenth century or during the Cold War, rivalry between the great powers has always had hazardous repercussions in the Middle East. As China’s political influence in the region grows, Trump may adopt a “you are either with us or against us” approach. This rivalry could polarize the region, create new blocs, and turn frozen conflicts into armed confrontations.

For years, Beijing was only an economic partner and not interested in the region’s political problems. More recently, China has increased its political activism in the region. China imports more than half of its crude oil from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Chinese firms have also undertaken $126 billion worth of construction projects in the region. China is also investing in Egyptian ports and the Suez Canal. Chinese investments in Egypt from 2017–2022 increased by 317 percent. But compared to the sheer scale of economic ties, China has been a political dwarf in the Middle East. It seems that Beijing has recently decided that political influence is necessary to protect its economic interests. More importantly, regional actors are welcoming China, known for its commitment to stability and the status quo, as an alternative great power. While hedging their bets in the struggle for global hegemony between the United States and China, regional powers also use their burgeoning relationship with China as leverage in their relations with the United States.

China’s mediating role in the Iran-Saudi normalization last year was an important event that demonstrated China’s political capacity. But, China’s activism in the region did not start in 2023. Chinese warships visit ports in the region. The Chinese military has even conducted exercises with the Egyptian army. Strengthening economic ties are also intensifying diplomatic contacts between China and the region. Chinese leaders and delegations now visit Middle Eastern capitals and fairgrounds more frequently.

In response to China’s activism, the Biden administration aims to consolidate its traditional influence in the region through diplomatic engagement and political-economic projects. President Biden is putting diplomatic pressure on Abu Dhabi to abandon China’s 5G technology and stop the construction of the secret Chinese port in the UAE. Biden has actively supported normalization between Israel and Arab countries as a way to strengthen U.S. influence in the region. As a landmark project, the India-Middle-East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is expected to facilitate the region’s integration into the Western economic-political system. Although the October 7 attack and the Israel-Hamas war have shelved Biden’s Middle East policies, he has mostly emphasized diplomacy and economic incentives to balance the growing Chinese influence in the region.

But Trump’s style could be much more direct and provocative. Through open threats, blackmail, and gunboat diplomacy, he could force Middle Eastern states to choose sides. An intensified great power rivalry could create new fault lines and new blocs. Even if Biden is re-elected, the U.S.-China rivalry will likely grow in the Middle East. But under Trump’s leadership, this rivalry may be much more difficult to contain and manage.

By now, regional actors will be more accustomed to Trump and his style. Middle Eastern leaders can, therefore, act more wisely in a second Trump era. First, they have realized that Trump may not back up his words with action. This may make them think twice before jumping on Trump’s tail. Indeed, in response to U.S. inaction against Iran’s harassment of maritime traffic in the Gulf, the UAE opened a dialogue with Iran while Trump was still in the White House. Similarly, regional actors may be more cautious before escalating tensions, as in the Qatar crisis.

Second, the regional actors have now better experience in regional diplomacy and negotiation since Trump left power. Hence, even if a second Trump presidency causes a lack of leadership in the Middle East, the regional actors might establish regional mechanisms to maintain stability. The intensification of regional diplomacy after the October 7 Hamas attacks and the Gaza war also indicates that there is an inclination for dialogue and cooperation. As the tensions escalated, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman talked with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, visited Cairo to meet with his Egyptian counterpart. For an Organization of Islamic Countries Summit over the Israel-Hamas crisis, Raisi traveled to Riyadh and met with Prince Salman and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. All these indicate that the regional actors want to maintain the status quo by containing and managing regional instabilities through diplomacy. In this respect, compared to Trump’s first term, the region might act more responsibly in a second era.

Middle Eastern leaders are now familiar with Trump’s approach. However, familiarity with unpredictability does not necessarily equate to prudent management of it. The United States is still the most powerful actor in the region, with a vast network of military bases and more than 40,000 troops. Therefore, Donald Trump’s possible return to the presidency could bring a sense of unpredictability and volatility to the Middle East. The intensifying great power rivalry between the United States and China adds another layer of complexity. Under Trump’s leadership, this rivalry could escalate further, creating new fault lines and potential conflicts. Whatever Trump intends to accomplish in office, it will be his execution that should concern all alike in the Middle East.

M. Hasim Tekines worked in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He now regularly writes about Turkey and Middle Eastern politics.

Image: Lev Radin / Shutterstock.com. 

Summary: The Sukhoi Su-37 was a single-seat, twin-engine aircraft designed as a technology demonstrator to enhance the capabilities of the Su-27M. Developed with thrust-vectoring nozzles, advanced radar, and upgraded avionics, the Su-37 showcased remarkable maneuverability and air combat capabilities. Despite being a highly agile dogfighter, it required skilled pilots and faced challenges in handling. The program came to an end in 2002 when the prototype crashed due to a software malfunction. The legacy of the Su-37 lives on in the modernizations of the Su-27, such as the Su-30MKI and Su-35BM.

Last May, images of a "platoon" of Russia's highly-touted BMPT "Terminator" armored fighting vehicles circulated on social media. The Terminators, which were developed to support Russia's tanks and other armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) in urban environments, had reportedly been sent to the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine.

Yet, rather than living up to the hype the name brings – something along the lines of an unstoppable fighting machine seen in the 1984 science fiction classic The Terminator or its 1991 sequel epic Terminator 2: Judgment Day, the actual vehicle has apparently seen all the success of the other forgettable sequels (which we won't even bother to name here).

However, it isn't the only "Terminator" in the Russian arsenal – as there is also the Sukhoi Su-37 (NATO reporting name "Flanker-F"), a single-seat twin-engine aircraft designed by the Sukhoi Design Bureau that served as a technology demonstrator.

The aircraft was developed to enhance pilot control of the Su-27M (later renamed Su-35), a further development of the Su-27. A sole example was built to test a variety of new features and upgrades to improve the capabilities of the Su-27.  It was originally the eleventh Su-27M (T10M-11) produced by the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Association before having thrust-vectoring nozzles installed.

As previously reported, some of the initial tests of the Su-37 were simply on new radar systems, and these proved incredibly capable. The new radar, N011M Bars, could lock onto and track twenty targets – whereas the old radar on the Su-27 could only handle fifteen. Pilots interfaced with this new radar as well as upgraded avionics using four full-color LCD multi-function displays that provided additional functionality, as well as greater clarity in bright sunlight.

However, by far the most significant improvement, however, was the addition of thrust vectoring nozzles to the engine. The Su-37 was initially equipped with two experimental Lyulka-Saturn AL-31FP engines – a derivative of the AL-31F turbofan of the Su-27 – until the newer AL-37FU engines were available. In 2001, the prototype was fitted with AL-37FU engines, updated avionics, and a fly-by-wire control system.

Claims were made that the Su-37 had virtually no angle-of-attack limitations, which would have made the aircraft an agile dogfighter. Moreover, its maneuverability was touted for being able to evade enemy missile attacks, while the thrust vectoring nozzles could be deflected both synchronously and differentially depending on a performed maneuver. Aircraft could perform aerobatics at speeds nearing zero.

The prototype was demonstrated at numerous air shows around the world, making its debut at the Farnborough Airshow in September 1996, where it employed the "Super Cobra" maneuver, a variation of Pulgachev's Cobra whereby the pilot pulls the aircraft to near vertical without gaining any altitude, slowing their airspeed to nearly zero and causing a pursuing aircraft to overshoot. In the Super Cobra, Russian Pilot Yevgeni Frolov would begin the maneuver but carried it past the vertical, until he then pushed the nose straight up and held the position momentarily before allowing it to fall back to level flight.

The Su-37 appeared at the Paris Air Show in 1997, where it was reportedly amazed spectators and was actively presented to export customers. Even with its capabilities, the aircraft received no production orders.

In addition to being touted as a capable dogfighter, and its primary role was air superiority, the Su-37 had secondary air-to-ground capability.

It was equipped with 12 wing and fuselage hardpoints and could carry missiles with a maximum weight of 8,000 kg. The fighter aircraft could carry a mix of short-range R-73E and R-77 missiles for air combat and various IR and radar-homing missiles for a ground attack role. The Su-37 was further fitted with a GSh-301 30-mm cannon, with 150 rounds.

Though it was a highly maneuverable aircraft, it reportedly required a skilled pilot at the controls – and it wasn't easy to fly.

In 2002, the Su-37 prototype crashed due to software malfunction, while its horizontal stabilizer broke off in flight, likely due to exceeding g-limits multiple times throughout its life.

The crash brought an end to the Su-37 program.

Yet, Sukhoi later introduced several modernizations of the Su-27, notably the Su-30MKI and Su-35BM and each made use of the technology developed for the Su-37, including the thrust vectoring engines, improved radar systems, and avionics.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author at Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary: This article discusses Ukraine's acquisition of 60 F-16 fighters from the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway to bolster its defense against the Russian invasion. It provides an overview of the F-16's history, specifications, and capabilities. The debate over the F-16's suitability for Ukraine's current situation is explored, considering factors like training, maintenance, and the threat posed by Russia's S-400 missile systems. While some view the F-16s as a significant upgrade for Ukraine's air force, others raise concerns about their effectiveness in the ongoing conflict. The article highlights the potential long-term impact and NATO's technological alignment with Ukraine through the F-16 acquisition.

When Russia first invaded Ukraine back in February 2022, the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies immediately pledged support for Kyiv.

From main battle tanks (MBTs) and munitions to cash funds and anti-tank weaponry, the U.S. has provided billions of dollars worth of military equipment to aid Ukraine’s defensive efforts.

While NATO allies have agreed to send over many of the items requested by Kyiv, some were more challenging to provide. For more than a year, Kyiv asked the White House to deliver modern fighter jets to the front lines.

The Biden administration repeatedly refused this request. However, a surprise policy reversal in 2023 was a turning point. The U.S. president told allies that he would support an international coalition to train Ukrainian pilots on Western fighter jets, paving the way for fourth-generation airframes to make their way to the frontlines eventually.

Today, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway are offering Ukraine 60 F-16s in the near future.

Will these airframes actually make a difference in a war that has been characterized as a never-ending stale-mate?

The F-16 was derived from the 1970s Lightweight Fighting Program and has remained a critical component of America’s aerial arsenal over the years. Following lessons learned during the Vietnam War, U.S. officials required an airframe with more robust combat performance.

After much trial and error, the YF-16 prototype was developed by General Dynamics and rolled out in 1973. Over the next year, America’s NATO allies Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands reached an agreement with the U.S. to order the winner of the LWF competition. By 1976, the YF-16 was declared the winner. The airframe’s lower operating costs, maneuver performance and greater range made it a standout.

Additionally, using the Pratt & Whitney F100 turbine engine for power was a plus since its use in the F-15 would mean lower engine costs for both programs.

The compact, multi-role fighter jet is highly maneuverable and can perform both air-to-combat and air-to-surface missions. Each Fighting Falcon features the Boeing joint helmet-mounted system and other enhanced technologies like up-look reticles and optical/inertial trackers.

In terms of ordnance, the F-16 is well-stocked. The F-16 possesses nine hardpoints for weapons payloads, one at each tip, one centerline under the fuselage, and three under each wing.

These fighters can carry an array of air-to-surface missiles, including Maverick, HARM and Shrike. Additionally, the fighters are equipped with Boeing Harpool and Kongsberg Penguin anti-ship missiles. To complement its hefty weapons-carrying capabilities, the Fighting Falcon is quite the racehorse.

The fighter can fly over 1,500 miles per hour with an operational ceiling of 50,000 feet. Moreover, the airframe has an operational range of over 500 miles.

Initially, analysts pointed to extensive training time and delivery processes as reasons not to deliver F-16 Fighting Falcons to Ukraine. Additionally, these fourth-generation fighters require much more maintenance than the average Soviet-era fighter Kyiv’s pilots are used to flying.

Last year, a report by the U.S. General Accounting Office ranked the F-16 as one of the most challenging U.S. Air Force planes to maintain. Another key factor analysts point to when explaining why Fighting Falcons are not suited for Russia’s current invasion in Ukraine is the wrath of Moscow’ S-400 Surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs), which could leave the F-16 “completely unmatched.”

Proponents of providing Fighting Falcons to Ukraine claim that while these jets will not abruptly alter the course of the war, they are a major step up for the older planes Kyiv is currently flying and will, in the long run, prove to be a significant asset for the country’s defensive efforts. Down the line, if Kyiv uses these fighters to aid specific operations, it will have a better chance of success. Specifically, Ukraine’s pilots could use F-16s to gradually take apart Russia’s air defense umbrella around the battlefield to make room for more open-air operations.

As detailed by Reuters, the addition of F-16’s “locks Ukraine onto a technological path that NATO is currently on, what Ukraine has now is a dead end; It’s not going anywhere. If you want to have an air force in 10 years, it’s going to have to be F-16s or something similar.”

Since Ukraine launched its highly anticipated counter-offensive this summer, little significant movement has been documented on the ground. In fact, since February 2022, Russia has maintained about one-fifth of Ukraine in its grip while the front lines have remained relatively stagnant.

Hopefully, adding the 60 Fighting Falcons will help push Kyiv’s efforts further.

However, the true outcome that the delivery of these fighters will provide remains up for debate.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.  You can email the author at Editor@nationalinterest.org.