The National Interest

Summary and Key Points: Seventeen B-1B Lancer bombers from Ellsworth Air Force Base (AFB) in South Dakota may temporarily relocate to Grand Forks AFB in North Dakota next year as Ellsworth prepares to host the first B-21 Raider bombers.

-This move is expected to last about ten months, during which time Ellsworth will undergo significant construction projects, including a complete runway rebuild.

-The relocation would mark the return of bombers to Grand Forks for the first time since 1994. Approximately 800 airmen would accompany the B-1Bs, and the mission of the bombers would remain unchanged during the move.

Seventeen of the United States Air Forces Rockwell B-1B Lancer bombers could be heading to a new, albeit temporary home next year. The bombers are likely to be relocated a bit further north – as in moving from Ellsworth Air Force Base (AFB), South Dakota, to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota.

The bombers could be at their new home for ten months, during which time Ellsworth AFB will prepare for the arrival of the first Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider long-range strategic bombers.

Ellsworth is home to the twenty-eighth Bomb Wing (BW), which is assigned to the Global Strike Command's Eight Air Force, and is one of the two B-1B Lander wings. It has hosted the B-1B Lancers since 1986, which replaced the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress fleet. It currently operates twenty-seven Lancers.

Ellsworth will be the first Main Operating Base and formal training unit for the B-21 Raider, while Whiteman AFB, Missouri, and Dyess AFB, Texas, are the preferred locations for the remaining home bases – and could receive aircraft as soon as they become available. Whiteman is home to the air service's fleet of Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit bombers, while Dyess is home to another B-1B bomb wing, the seventh BW. 

Construction projects for the bomber hangers and other facilities are well underway at Ellsworth. Construction on the base's 95,000-square-foot Low Observable Restoration Facility began in 2022, and it and other facilities are on track to be completed by the end of this year. The current plan also calls for a complete rebuild of the runway to accommodate the B-21 Raiders, with that work to be completed by October 2025.

The base, which is located near Rapid City, is already one of the largest employers in the state and according to a 2017 estimate it had an annual economic impact of over $350 million. Ellsworth AFB faced the possibility of closure in 2005, and it was even briefly on the Pentagon’s list of military bases that should be closed or relocated.

The deployment of the B-1Bs to Grand Forks would be the first since 1994, "when the last of the B-1Bs assigned to the former 319th Bomb Wing (since redesignated the 319th Reconnaissance Wing) left the base," The Jamestown Sun reported. "The Ellsworth B-1Bs do not carry nuclear weapons, and Grand Forks Air Force Base no longer has nuclear weapons storage capacity."

According to Air & Space Forces magazine, any final decision on the relocation will be based on the ongoing environmental review, which includes the impact of moving not only the aircraft but the personnel from Ellsworth to Grand Forks. In total, around 800 airmen from the twenty-eighth Operations Group would accompany the B-1B bombers. The bomber's mission would be unchanged during the relocation.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and 4 Points You Need to Know: The B-21 Raider, currently in low-rate initial production and undergoing flight testing, is exempt from a law that typically requires a waiver for purchasing untested weapons systems in large quantities.

-This exemption, meant to avoid conflicts of interest due to Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall's past ties with Northrop Grumman, raises concerns about the Air Force potentially rushing to procure the B-21 without adequate testing.

-Critics argue this approach violates best acquisition practices and could lead to costly design flaws, citing historical examples like the Navy's T-45 trainer program.

-The Air Force, heavily reliant on the B-21 as it phases out older bombers, faces significant risks if the Raider fails to meet expectations.

The B-21 Raider, a stealth bomber in low-rate initial production and currently undergoing flight testing, is exempt from a law that requires a waiver for the purchase of certain quantities of untested weapons systems. That exemption raises worries that the U.S. Air Force might be rushing to purchase an unvetted aircraft. 

Specifically, the B-21 “is exempt from a Title 10 requirement that a defense secretary seek a waiver for a low-rate initial production (LRIP) buy of more than 10 percent of total production for a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP),” according to Defense Daily. 

The exemption stems from the need to avoid a conflict of interests. The Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office manages the B-21 project, and the Office reports to the Air Force Secretary. Because Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall used to consult for B-21 designer Northrop Grumman, he is recused from all decisions relating to the B-21.

“The B-21 is managed as a highly sensitive classified program per 10 USC 2430, and is not a traditional Major Defense Acquisition Program,” the Department of Defense told Defense Daily. 

Title 10 is meant to limit the purchase of weapons like the B-21 that are yet to be properly vetted. As Sen. David Pryor explained on the Senate floor in 1994, “Fly Before You Buy is not a new concept. It was first promoted in the wake of the Vietnam War after thousands of American soldiers lost their lives because of weapons that failed to perform as expected.” The senator continued, “operational testing is of little or no use if it is conducted after the weapon system has been purchased. We simply cannot afford to buy now and fix later. Time and time again, DoD has purchased weapons before operational testing has shown that they work.”

The Navy’s T-45 trainer is one example of a system that was purchased before being tested. The Navy purchased over one-third of their T-45 needs before Boeing performed operational testing on the jet. Of course, the original T-45 was no good. The thing needed new wings and a new engine, and the already purchased T-45s needed to be refitted. Obviously, the military, like any customer, prefers that product design flaws are discovered before an item is shipped and accepted.

Some observers worry the Air Force is making a similar procurement mistake with the B-21.

“The Air Force is violating best acquisition practice in the case of the B-21 program,” said a senior fellow at the Stimson Center in an email to Defense Daily. “The first test flights of the program have only just begun, so it is too early to be talking about production in any quantity.” 

The fellow advocated for Northrop Grumman to build a few test aircraft, perform operational tests, and ship the B-21 to the Air Force only once the bomber performs as promised. “Buying aircraft in any significant quantity before testing is complete creates a huge amount of risk because the early aircraft will almost certainly include a large number of design flaws that will only be revealed through testing.”

Obviously, the Air Force has a lot riding on the B-21. Two of the service’s existing three bomber classes, the B-1 and the B-2, are being phased out to make room for the upcoming Raider. The B-21 needs to perform, otherwise the Air Force could find itself with a gap in bomber capabilities. 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Ukraine's surprise offensive into Russia's Kursk region, involving up to 10,000 troops, has dramatically shifted the dynamics of the ongoing conflict. The operation, which captured over 1,000 square kilometers and 82 settlements, aims to force Russia to realign its forces, drawing them away from Ukrainian frontlines.

-The psychological impact on both Ukrainian and Russian populations is significant, with Russia's inability to defend its territory undermining President Putin's standing.

-While the offensive doesn't alter Russia's numerical advantage, it signals a momentum shift in the war, potentially affecting the longevity of Western support for Ukraine.

After more than two years on the defensive, Ukrainian forces have flipped the script, pouring over the Russian border and seizing control of more than 1,000 square kilometers of territory in a week. And unlike Ukraine’s previous and usually short-lived raids across the border, this time, Ukrainian forces are settling in for a fight, fortifying defensive positions throughout the occupied Kursk region in what Ukrainian officials are calling a “buffer zone” to protect against continued airstrikes launched into Ukraine from the area. 

This surprise offensive went on for days before Ukrainian officials shed any light on its objectives. We now know that the theory posited by many analysts throughout the week – that this incursion is meant to force a realignment of Russian forces after months of steady but grinding advances deeper into Ukrainian territory – is true. 

Behind the rifles of thousands of battle-hardened troops, Ukraine has taken hundreds of Russian soldiers prisoner and captured dozens of towns and villages, but the biggest blow of this ongoing offensive may be to the reputation and standing of Russian President Vladimir Putin. 

In the early morning of August 6, Ukrainian forces numbering as many as 10,000 according to some reports, launched a surprise offensive in western Russia that had been planned and staged behind a veil of complete secrecy. The attack was such a surprise that it not only took Russia’s border troops completely off guard, but Ukraine’s Western allies as well – at least if statements made by various government officials are to be believed. 

Ukrainian troops and armored vehicles moved quickly, crossing the border on multiple vectors and rapidly capturing town after town. As news of the offensive reached the media, it was accompanied by social media posts uploaded by Ukrainian troops, showing them pulling Russian flags down.

In one video, vetted by the New York Times, a Ukrainian soldier can be seen standing on the shoulders of another, breaking a Russian flag off of its wooden post and tossing it aside. That video was confirmed to be taken in Sverdlikovo, just a few miles inside Russia. Another video, filmed about five miles further west in the town of Daryino, shows a similar scene, with one Ukrainian soldier tossing a Russian flag in the mud as another one flexes his muscles. 

“The first days of the Ukrainian operation in the Kursk region should be assessed as very successful, although its ultimate goals remain unclear,” Ruslan Pukhov, the director of the security research group CAST out of Moscow, told the New York Times. “In moral terms, the Russian Federation has taken a powerful blow.”

This effort was arguably only successful thanks to the immense degree of secrecy surrounding it, but in hindsight, it’s beginning to get easier to see how it came together. A drone battalion from Ukraine’s 22nd Mechanized Brigade was spotted near the Russian border in July after more than a year of fighting on the front lines some 80 miles to the West. Troops from the 82nd Air Assault Brigade, last known to be fighting elsewhere in the Kharkiv region, were spotted near the border soon thereafter. Before long, troops from the 80th Air Assault Brigade seemed to join them. 

This amassing of forces, despite its secrecy, didn’t go unnoticed by Russian intelligence. According to Andrei Gurulyov, a prominent member of Russia’s parliament and a former senior ranking officer in the Russian Army, a report on the buildup was submitted to Russian leadership nearly a month before the assault. 

“But from the top came the order not to panic, and that those above know better,” Gurulyov acknowledged on Russian State Television. 

While the attack has since become something of a morale lightning rod for the embattled Ukrainian population, for many of the troops taking their fight for survival to Russian soil, the combat was just like any other day in this conflict. 

“Grenades and mortars look the same wherever you are,” explained a 43-year-old Ukrainian soldier named Ivan, who’s fighting in Russia. 

Ivan’s experiences over the past few weeks serve as a grim reminder that even this successful operation has come at a significant cost. He and his unit were advancing into Russian territory at an average of an astonishing 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) a day, fighting their way across open fields and railway lines, and rotating in fresh troops under cover of darkness as each night fell. But after three days of fighting off their back foot, Russian forces finally started to get their bearings and unleashed an onslaught of air-dropped glide bombs onto the Ukrainian forces on the third night, despite the obvious collateral damage done to Russian territory. 

These glide bombs have proven highly effective for Russian forces in recent months. They’re similar in function to America’s own JDAM-ERs, made up of satellite guidance kits and expandable glide-wings mounted on inexpensive gravity bombs. They’re exceedingly difficult to intercept, offer a high degree of precision, and can be dropped from 40 miles out. 

Ivan’s unit instantly lost a dozen men when the first wave of bombs hit, with several others injured.

“Everything was burning. Arms here, legs there,” Ivan recounted. 

Ivan himself took shrapnel to the groin and chest, forcing him to be evacuated back to Ukraine for medical treatment and allowing him to share a few scant details about the ongoing operation with journalists from The Economist. But after nearly 30 months of fighting for its survival, Ukraine is no stranger to loss. Even as Russian glide bombs rained down, the offensive progressed – and the following day, on August 10 – some Ukrainian units had pressed a full 40 kilometers (about 25 miles) into Russia, rapidly approaching the city of Kursk, which serves as the capital of the Kursk Oblast. 

More Ukrainian soldiers have shined some light on how Ukraine has managed to capture more territory in a week than Russia has in months: A 28-year-old paratrooper from Ukraine’s 33rd Brigade named Angol made it 30 kilometers (a bit more than 18 miles) into Russia before being injured – he isn’t sure if he was hit by artillery, a glide bomb, or even friendly fire, such is the haze of battle on the front lines. 

According to Angol, even amid the heavy fighting, Russian troops were on the run, enabled by covering airstrikes and artillery fire as they fled their defensive positions, abandoning equipment, weapons, and ammunition as they ran. 

It seems the Russian troops defending the border believed the red line drawn by Putin, which has seen Western governments disallow the use of their weapon systems to attack Russian territory, would be enough to insulate them from the fighting. As thousands of battle-hardened Ukrainian troops tore through the region, they seemed to continue taking Russians by surprise even days into the offensive. 

“We sent our most combat-ready units to the weakest point on their border,” an unnamed member of Ukraine’s general staff deployed to the region told the press. “Conscript soldiers faced paratroopers and simply surrendered.” 

And surrender they did. By August 13, seven days into Ukraine’s surprise invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that 74 Russian settlements were now under Ukrainian occupation and that “hundreds” of Russian troops had surrendered. By the following day, the number of Russian towns and villages inside of Ukrainian control had expanded once again, to 82. 

In one engagement, Ukrainian forces captured 102 soldiers out of Russia’s 488th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment at once. 

“They captured and cleared a sprawling, concrete and well-fortified company stronghold from all sides – with underground communications and personnel accommodation, a canteen, an armoury and even a bathhouse,” an unnamed source told Reuters.

According to Russia’s state media, more than 132,000 Russian civilians have now fled their homes in the Kursk region to avoid the fighting.

“Russia brought war to others, and now it is coming home,” Zelensky said in his speech. 

It’s worth noting that despite the hesitation of Western leaders to allow Ukraine to take the fight onto Russian soil, it’s evident that this offensive has involved the widespread use of American-supplied vehicles, arms, and munitions – in what some argue could be seen as a violation of yet another of Putin’s “red lines.” However, U.S. officials don’t see it that way. With countless long-range strikes launched into Ukrainian territory from the Kursk region, both Ukrainian and American officials have deftly taken to calling the offensive a “self-defense” action. 

“They are taking actions to protect themselves from attacks,” Sabrina Singh, the Pentagon’s deputy press secretary, said on Thursday.

And while Ukraine’s progress into Russia has slowed in recent days, those protective actions have not. On the night of August 14, Ukraine launched its largest long-range drone attack into Russian territory to date, engaging weapons storage facilities and warehouses across four different Russian Air Force installations. Some sources suggest these attacks were aimed at reducing Russia’s available inventory of glide bombs. 

Russia claimed to have shot down 117 drones and at least four missiles during the attack; the true outcome of these airstrikes remains somewhat murky. 

It now seems evident that the offensive has multiple overlapping objectives. As the Atlantic Council contends, the attack’s most obvious goal is to force Russia to realign after months of grueling but steady progress.

“By attacking across the lightly defended border and seizing Russian territory, Ukrainian commanders believe they can force the Kremlin to withdraw troops from the front lines of the war in Ukraine in order to redeploy them for the defense of Russia itself,” the Atlantic Council’s Peter Dickinson postulates. 

This has seemingly been confirmed by former Ukrainian defense minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk, and to some extent, it seems to be working. 

“Russia has relocated some of its units from both Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions of Ukraine’s south,” Dmytro Lykhoviy, a Ukrainian army spokesman, told POLITICO on Tuesday.

The U.S.-based think-tank Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has been tracking and reporting on claims posted by pro-Russian military bloggers, who may regularly trade in Kremlin-sourced disinformation, but also often provide more detail into ongoing operations than official Russian channels. According to the ISW’s analysis, at least some Russian irregular warfare units have been pulled from the Donetsk front in eastern Ukraine to be redeployed in a defensive posture inside Russia.

“Russian military command has determined that possible disruptions to the offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and other less-critical frontline areas are an acceptable risk to adequately respond to the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast,” the ISW assessed. 

But despite these changes, thus far, there’s been little shift in Russia’s overall defensive posture, even as Ukraine appointed Major General Eduard Moskalyov as the new military commandant of captured Russian territory. 

“Their commanders aren’t idiots,” said The Econimist’s unnamed Ukrainian general-staff source. “They are moving forces, but not as quickly as we would like. They know we can’t extend logistics 80 or 100 km.”

Ultimately, whether this offensive can force a redistribution of Russian forces across the conflict’s front lines depends on several factors, some of which are easier to quantify than others. 

The psychological impact of Ukraine’s rapid advance into Russia, on both the Ukrainian and Russian populations, can’t be overstated. For Ukraine, the rapid progress serves as a desperately needed morale boost after years of Russia gobbling up Ukrainian territory. On the other side of the border, however, this attack has brought the war home for the Russian people, and perhaps even more importantly, shined a spotlight on Putin’s inability to defend Russian soil and sovereignty amid a conflict his government still refuses to call a war. 

Even now, Moscow is referring to the new defensive effort inside Russia as a “counter-terrorism operation,” and Putin himself described the attack as nothing more than a “large-scale provocation” – both seemingly intentional ways of framing the offensive as less severe than a foreign military capturing Russian land. 

To some extent, the value of this operation may ultimately be dictated by how Russia chooses to respond. If Ukraine succeeds in fortifying captured positions and digging in, Russian forces will have no choice but to respond, reducing the depth of seasoned warfighters on other frontlines throughout Ukraine. If Russia doesn’t mass enough forces to push Ukraine back, however, the seized territory could quickly become a bargaining chip in future peace negotiations. 

From a geopolitical perspective, Ukraine’s attack – and Russia’s apparent inability to respond – has further reduced Russia’s military standing among global and even regional powers. Once seen as the world’s second strongest military force, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated conclusively that its Cold War-era warfare doctrine struggles to function on the modern battlefield; that its centralized command structure adapts on the battlefield very slowly; and Russia’s emphasis on fielding small batches of high-profile platforms aimed at securing global prestige or lucrative foreign sales, has come at the cost of significant atrophy across the breadth of its conventional forces. 

While cynical to say as Ukraine continues to fight for its very survival, this entire conflict has already proven to be a massive strategic loss for Russia and certainly for Putin’s legacy. Once seen as a strategic mastermind and the only man who could return Russia to a romanticized vision of its former Soviet glory, there seems to be little hope of Putin emerging from this war as anything more than the man who sacrificed a sizeable portion of Russia’s military power and hundreds of thousands of lives, to capture about 20 percent of a nation the size of Texas that lies on Russia’s border. 

Ukraine’s rapid success in taking Russian territory doesn’t change Russia’s massive numerical advantage in troops and military hardware; undo its territorial gains; or mean Western governments are giving Ukraine free reign on how to use its Western weapon systems. Nevertheless, it does mark a significant shift in the war’s momentum. And now, with Western-sourced F-16s starting to take to the sky – something many consider to be a momentum-shifting victory in itself – the timing couldn’t be better for Ukraine to once again shock the world, and the Russian military, with what it’s capable of. 

Since the conflict’s onset, Russia has been watching the clock wind down on Western support for Ukraine, knowing full well that it was only a matter of time before partisan bickering and concerns about dollars spent would sour public perceptions of the effort. All it needed to do was outlast the Western public’s attention span and financial tolerance, and once the flow of weapons and munitions dried up, Ukraine was as good as conquered. 

But now, with more than 132,000 Russians displaced from their homes, and drone and missile strikes raining down deeper into Russia and in greater numbers than ever before, that waiting game may have just been turned on its head. Now, the question becomes: which population will fold first, those providing support, or those being forced to flee their homes?

While the idea of Russian civilians on the run isn’t something anyone should celebrate, it reminds me of an old story I used to tell my Marines when we’d find ourselves in a bad situation of our own creation:

A group of construction workers would meet in the parking lot of their job site every afternoon to break for lunch, and every day, one of the guys would open his lunch box and sigh with disgust. 

“Egg salad sandwich again,” he’d lament, shaking his head and slamming the lunch box shut. 

Finally, one of his coworkers asked him, “If you hate egg salad sandwiches so much, why not ask your old lady to make you something different?” 

And he replied, “What are you talking about? I’m not married… I make my own sandwiches.” 

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Top 4 Points You Need to Be Aware on the B-21 Bomber: The B-21 Raider, a sixth-generation bomber being developed by Northrop Grumman for the U.S. Air Force, is designed to serve multiple roles, including battle management, intelligence collection, and interception.

-Smaller and more radar-resistant than its predecessors, the B-21 incorporates modular systems for future upgrades.

-The Air Force plans to procure at least 100 units by the decade's end, but past experiences with programs like the B-2 and F-22, where budget cuts drastically reduced production numbers, raise concerns.

-The Raider's procurement could face similar risks, despite its importance in countering potential threats from adversaries like China and Russia.

The B-21 Raider is being developed by Northrop Grumman to serve the U.S. Air Force as a battle manager, intelligence-collection platform, and intercept aircraft. Initially debuted in late 2022, the sixth-generation bomber is expected to sport a range of enhancements over its predecessors. 

The service released images of the upcoming airframe in 2023, showing a bomber much smaller than the B-2 Spirit. Sandboxx News suggests that the B-21’s wingspan could be roughly 15% shorter than previous bombers, a significant advantage that will make the new aircraft harder for enemy radar to detect. The Raider will incorporate modular systems that will enable seamless upgrades as future technologies become available, imitating the F-35 Lightning II’s open-system architecture.

Considering the Raider’s capabilities, it is only logical that the platform comes with a hefty price tag. The Air Force hopes to introduce at least 100 of these bombers by the end of the decade. Some analysts want the service to acquire far more Raiders than that, believing the aircraft is crucial to maintaining operational readiness for potential conflicts with China, Russia, or other adversaries. 

Earlier this year, Northrop Grumman reported a $1.6 billion pre-tax charge on the Raider program. More recently, though, the Air Force said it is seeing a drop in the per-unit cost of the B-21 following negotiations with the manufacturer. In 2022, the Air Force said it would remain under the average procurement cost of $692 million per unit.

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall noted that the service is planning for other aspects of the Raider program, not just constructing the bomber. From building the facilities needed to operate and maintain the B-21, to training pilots and the crew members who will work on it, many more details need to be finalized and funded. 

“I’ve seen programs get into trouble because there was too much focus on the platform and not enough on all the things that are necessary to support it,” Kendall said. “Hopefully, we will have avoided that in the case of the B-21.”

While B-21 Raider procurement plans appear promising, the Air Force has a history of cutting new platforms. 

In the 1990s, the U.S. halted the B-2 bomber program at just 20 planes. The Air Force originally wanted to build 75 of these airframes, but budgetary constraints and other priorities limited the output, and the B-2 program didn’t live up to its potential. A similar story played out with the F-22 Raptor, the world’s first fifth-generation jet. The Air Force initially wanted to procure 750 Raptors, but the total was cut in 2009 to 187 due to high costs, the arrival of the newer F-35, and the country’s shift to the War on Terror.

The Air Force and U.S. lawmakers should be wary of similarly cutting the Raider program. While drones and other systems associated with future wars cannot be ignored, America must also prepare for the current threat climate. Maintaining a superior stealth bomber fleet will be critical if a war with China erupts over the next decade.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Everything You Need to Know: The U.S. is advancing in the race to produce the world’s first sixth-generation stealth bomber with the B-21 Raider, as China and Russia develop their H-20 and PAK-DA programs.

-Despite concerns over costs, recent negotiations have lowered the Raider's per-unit price, making it more feasible. The B-21, smaller and stealthier than its predecessor, the B-2 Spirit, will serve as an intelligence platform, battle manager, and interceptor, with modular systems for future upgrades.

-The Raider’s introduction is crucial for U.S. national security, particularly as China progresses with its own stealth bomber development.

The race to produce the world’s first sixth-generation stealth bomber is on. As the United States moves to introduce its B-21 Raider, China and Russia continue to develop their H-20 and PAK-DA programs. 

The United States has long fielded superior bombers. The B-2 Spirit, B-52 Stratofortress, and B-1 Lancer are still lethal aircraft, providing the U.S. Air Force with long-range strike and deterrence capabilities. But the Raider’s timely introduction is crucial, and while some analysts argue that the B-21 program is too expensive to justify, the new bomber is worth the high price tag.

Following negotiations between the Air Force and manufacturer Northrop Grumman, the per-unit cost of the B-21 Raider has gone down. This was first reported back several months ago. 

The service’s secretary, Frank Kendall, told the Senate Appropriations subcommittee months ago that the cost decline indicates negotiations are headed in the right direction. The Raider program was expected to cost roughly $692 million per unit in 2022 when the bomber debuted. While the Air Force has yet to announce the specific decrease in price, the service has said that lower costs will not mean lower procurement rates.

While this news is positive for Raider advocates, Northrop has yet to comment on Kendall’s remarks. The manufacturer reported a hefty charge on the Raider program toward the end of 2023, citing increased production costs and other economic disruptions. Kendall has warned that “[I]’ve seen programs get into trouble because there was too much focus on the platform and not enough on all the things that are necessary to support it,” adding that “hopefully, we will have avoided that in the case of the B-21.”

Around this time, the Pentagon’s undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, William LaPlante, said that the Raider would be produced at an intentionally low rate in case of looming budgetary cuts. He also noted that lessons learned from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program brought about new measures to ensure lower costs and a smoother production process.

The Raider is designed to be the Air Force’s intelligence collection platform, battle manager, and interceptor aircraft. In 2022, the Raider was officially unveiled at Northrop’s production facilities in Palmdale, California.

Smaller than its Spirit predecessor, the B-21 will be more difficult for enemy aircraft and radar to detect—an essential attribute.

The new B-21 Raider bomber is also expected to incorporate modular systems that will enable upgrades to the airframe as new technologies emerge—similar to the F-35 Lightning II.

Regardless of the Raider’s final price tag, this new bomber fleet is essential to U.S. national security. Its timely introduction is crucial, considering the progress Beijing has made toward its own H-20 stealth bomber. As U.S. defense secretary Lloyd Austin said during the unveiling of the Raider: “America’s defense will always be rooted in deterring conflict. So we are again making it plain to any potential foe that the risk and the cost of aggression far outweigh any conceivable gains.”

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Great Power Competition, sometimes called the Second Cold War, is unfolding on a global scale. The United States is not competing with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China, nor is the United States competing with Vladimir Putin’s system in Russia. Today, we are competing along a possible “kinetic front” in East Asia (Taiwan and the Nine Dash Line), Ukraine, and Israel. Additionally, there is arguably a “second front” in the realm of technology, encompassing the battle over artificial intelligence, telecommunications, subsea cables, and microchips. Perhaps the most underappreciated yet critical front, a “third front” in this Great Power Competition, is the “Global South,” or the developing world. During the First Cold War, the developing world was a major front, so it is not surprising that the Global South is again a significant theater or—in a scenario where the United States does not end up in a full Great Power War—is the central theater of competition over the next forty years.

The Global South is a notion that comprises many regions, including Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Pacific Island States, South Asia, Central Asia, some post-Soviet countries, and the Middle East. Historically referred to as the “Third World,” this term is now widely considered to be outdated or even offensive. The “Global South” is a term recently popularized by the CCP—which has spent decades attempting to ingratiate itself within this theater—although the term’s appropriateness is debated. Alternative terms such as the “developing world,” “G-77,” or “new non-aligned countries” have been suggested, though none have proven to be completely satisfactory.

While the United States and allied national security community have focused extensively on the first two fronts—potential military conflicts and technological competition—the third front in the Global South remains critical yet underappreciated. This region represents some of the world’s leading sources of strategic materials, consumer markets, potential allies—as well as current or potential partners in security burden-sharing. China has been actively making inroads in the Global South for well over twenty years, with relationships dating back more than fifty years—some based on Chinese manipulation of anti-colonial sentiments. Russia, in some cases, has relations going back much further, with some lingering, popular appreciation for the Soviet Union’s support during these nations’ anti-colonial struggles.

China views the Global South as a pivotal market and partner in challenging the liberal world order. By leveraging the concerns of the Global South about the current international system, China aims to undermine the influence of the United States. The Chinese leadership, often accusing the United States of initiating a “new cold war,” advocates for the “democratization of international relations.” This narrative is part of China’s broader strategy to reshape the global order around its own interests rather than U.S. ones. Beijing’s asymmetric response emphasizes “non-alignment” and a commitment to helping countries protect their sovereignty, avoiding alignment with major power blocs or external dictates. This approach is presented as a counter to U.S. efforts to restore the appeal of liberal democracy, which China portrays as an outdated “cold war mentality” that threatens Chinese ambitions, both on a regional and global scale.

China’s engagement with the Global South, particularly through initiatives like the Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative (GDI), underscores its ambition to present itself as a benign provider of international public goods in areas such as poverty alleviation, food security, and digitalization. Over seventy countries have joined the GDI, with over 100 supporting its goals, showcasing China’s role as a development leader. This commitment contrasts with the alleged global protectionism of the United States, which is accused of failing to provide adequate economic support. 

Chinese scholars argue that China’s readiness to mobilize the developing world, especially in regions with historical tensions with Western powers, positions it as a critical player in a post-American global order. This strategy is evident in China’s diplomatic stance on issues like Gaza, where it promotes “peace plans” without concrete proposals or direct condemnation of terrorist actions. China’s investment in these regions is part of its vision of “great changes unseen in a century,” emphasizing the growing economic and geopolitical significance of the Global South and its potential to reshape the international landscape.

China is not only a “Near-Peer Hard Power” competitor but also a “Near-Peer Soft Power” competitor. China can now begin to fill any vacuums left by the United States, which it did not have the capacity, power projection capability, or readiness to do just two decades ago. The economic landscape has shifted dramatically. In 1973, China’s economy was worth $138 billion compared to the United States’ $1.43 trillion. By 2023, China’s GDP had soared to nearly $18 trillion, while the United States’ increased to $27 trillion. Despite the United States maintaining a larger economy, China’s 2023 GDP growth rate of 5.2 percent per annum outpaces the United States’ meager 2.5 percent annually. When the West leaves a void, China now has the financial potential to fill it.

The challenge for the United States lies in offering a compelling alternative to China’s pervasive influence. Over the past decade, the United States has sought to discourage the Global South from engaging with Chinese initiatives like Huawei’s telecom solutions, Sinovac vaccines for COVID-19, or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—often without providing a viable alternative. This “strategy,” has left many countries with little choice but to turn to China. We cannot fight something with nothing.

Meeting the aspirations of countries in the Global South with a credible, positive, forward-looking agenda is crucial. Failure to do so will result in these nations increasingly aligning with China, which is not in the United States’ interest.

It would be detrimental to the interests of U.S. interests if every developing country’s largest trading partner were China. If Chinese companies manage their ports, if their elites study in Beijing instead of Boston, and if Huawei or other Chinese technology companies dominate their telecom systems, there will be repercussions for U.S. national security. Developing countries may vote with China and against the United States on vital international issues such as the conflicts in Israel and Ukraine, support Chinese candidates for leadership positions in international organizations, and endorse Chinese-led initiatives in multilateral forums.

The United States must present better value propositions in the Global South to remain relevant. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union heavily invested in countries in the Global South, motivated by strategic interests and ideological goals. In the 1990s, Peter Rodman’s More Precious than Peace provided a compelling narrative of America’s engagement in the developing world through a Cold War lens, outlining how this competition allowed developing countries to claim a pivotal role in international political questions. American policy faced a twofold challenge at the time: “to guide the underdeveloped regions of the world through a transition to full-fledged participation in the international system and to do so in the face of a Soviet attempt to suborn them as allies in a radical assault on that international system.”

But this is not your grandparents’ developing world. It is more affluent and more free, and their governments enjoy a lot more options. Foreign aid is a very small part of the puzzle, along with private capital, trade, investment, remittance flows, domestic capital, and the ability to raise taxes in a society with much more significant sources of money than fifty years ago. So, the “theory of change” is not necessarily about more foreign aid or the threat of cutting foreign aid off. These countries do not want to be pawns in someone else’s game, nor do they want to be a hegemon’s vassal state.

Since the turn of the century, the developing world has also experienced substantial poverty reduction and progress across a range of social and economic metrics. Most of these countries now also have cell phone penetration rates that are approaching those of the United States. Additionally, these societies are often more free than in the past and boast more active civil societies. The percentage of free countries worldwide has increased from 30 percent in 1973 to 43 percent in 2023.

Hence, over the past thirty-five years, the developing world has prioritized different things than those in the developed world, including the United States. China and sometimes Russia increasingly offer the Global South what these countries actually want, including the development of energy and mineral resources, infrastructure, ports, and, oftentimes, hard security. The United States and the West have to be sure that we are also offering what these countries actually want as opposed to what our political system finds congenial or easy to deliver. The United States should take advantage of its strong international network, including the European Union, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Canada, and Mexico. Such American allies should be able to play a role in formulating a strategy for more proactive engagement.

Certainly, there are fragile and failed states in the Global South that present unique challenges. These fragile and failed states often are sources of mass migration, breeding grounds for terrorism, and areas where sustainable development progress is extremely difficult to achieve. Fragile and failed states are a problem all to themselves and worthy of a longer discussion somewhere else.

However, this does not change the fact that the United States must update its playbook to move beyond the strategies of the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War era. It must adapt to these new realities in order to participate in the great power competition for the Global South, which is largely non-military. This involves engaging more proactively with the Global South in areas including trade, infrastructure, digital connectivity, education, and economic development.

Telecommunications, in particular, is a key sector. China has become a leading subsea cable provider and owner as part of its “Digital Silk Road.” Chinese state-owned and subsidized firm HMN Technologies (Huawei) is now the fourth-largest cable provider globally and has seen the fastest growth over the past decade, completing over 108 projects. Areas of investment also include emerging critical technology fields such as internet services, where Huawei has provided internet access for hundreds of millions. Today, Huawei subsidiaries own up to 70 percent of all 4G networks in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

China’s dominance in telecommunications poses a strategic threat to the United States. Allowing Beijing to control significant digital infrastructure flows increases its influence and potential for surveillance—a reality that has already begun to manifest as China assists despots in the developing world to oppress citizens and dissidents through China’s model of digital authoritarianism. The United States must counter this by increasing investment in digital infrastructure in the Global South, promoting American telecom companies, and offering secure and competitive alternatives to Huawei’s technology.

China has also developed a global network of strategically vital ports under its “Maritime Silk Road”—the oceanic counterpart of the “Digital Silk Road.” Beijing now owns or operates ports and terminals at nearly 100 locations in over fifty countries, spanning every ocean and every continent. The Chinese have ownership in about twenty-three ports in Africa alone. This effectively leaves China in control of ports at the heart of global supply chains, which could be leveraged for geopolitical gain. The United States must respond by investing in port infrastructure projects, offering favorable financing terms, and creating public-private partnerships to support port development in the Global South.

China has dwarfed the United States as Africa’s largest trade partner since 2009. Today, one-fifth of the region’s total goods exports go to China, mainly consisting of raw metals, mineral products, and fuel. The current volume of U.S. trade with African states is only one-fifth the size of trade between Africa and China. To date, fifty-two out of fifty-four African countries have also signed an agreement or understanding with the BRI. China has invested at least two-and-a-half times as much in African infrastructure projects as the entire Western world combined. China’s economic influence through trade and investment creates dependency, potentially leading to political alignment with Beijing. To address this, the United States must boost its economic engagement by increasing trade with African nations and supporting American businesses to enter these markets. Expanding the scope and scale of the Development Finance Corporation’s (DFC) operations and fostering sustainable development partnerships is the first step out of several that would help counterbalance China’s economic clout.

A significant aspect of China’s influence in the Global South also revolves around trade and debt. The DFC committed $9 billion across about 130 transactions last year, while China’s BRI undertook $90 billion across about 210 deals. As a result, many developing countries have become ensnared in Chinese debt traps. This economic dependency translates into political leverage for Beijing. In this new era of great power competition, the United States must reconfigure its foreign aid model to adjust to these realities. This involves rethinking the balance between development loans and grants and preserving open and market-based economies at home and abroad while resisting unfair economic practices. Development aid is not merely a charitable act; it is a strategic investment in future allies. Countries that build their capacities with American support are less likely to fall into Chinese debt traps and more likely to engage in fair and transparent governance.

Another key element of changing global dynamics is where the elites of the Global South choose to study. Higher education remains one of the most effective tools of soft power, fostering good governance, functional and accountable institutions, and an empowered civil society. China’s increasing number of foreign students highlights its recognition of the impact of educational exchanges on shaping future leaders’ perspectives and loyalties. In 2003, there were fewer than 1,300 African students enrolled in Chinese universities. In 2017, there were more than 80,000. According to the 2020 data from UNESCO’s Global Education Monitoring Report, China is the largest provider of scholarships worldwide. For public funding, the United States doesn’t even make the top ten. In 2020, China granted 12,000 academic scholarships to African students, while the United Kingdom offered 1,000. The United States’ Fulbright program offered just over 200. 

U.S. programs have been hampered by resource limitations, regulators’ unrealistic expectations, and visa restrictions. However, the United States’ competitive advantage remains its high quality of education, fair and transparent recruitment processes, and exposure to civic-minded curriculum. Indeed, in 2023, there were 290,000 Chinese nationals studying at U.S. colleges and universities, overwhelmingly without scholarships, by far the largest share of foreign students in the United States. The United States must leverage these values to ensure that more students from developing countries are exposed to its liberal educational system over China’s controlled and regimented environment.

Furthermore, a key element of changing global dynamics is where countries in the Global South source their military equipment. India and Russia, for instance, have maintained a close defense relationship for decades. The Indian Army is equipped with Russian-made tanks and rifles, while its air force uses Sukhoi fighter jets and Mi-17 helicopters. Despite deepening ties with the United States, India remains the largest buyer of Russian arms. This relationship has contributed to India’s reluctance to condemn Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. Although New Delhi indirectly called on Moscow to respect international law, it stopped short of criticizing Russia. This demonstrates countries purchasing military equipment from China or Russia often find themselves geopolitically aligned with these powers for times to come. The United States must provide better alternatives to ensure these nations support American geopolitical interests instead.

China’s vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic also significantly enhanced its influence; it claimed to have distributed 2.2 billion vaccine doses worldwide by September 2021. Unlike OECD countries, where vaccine distribution prioritized domestic needs over international diplomacy, China and Russia leveraged their autocratic systems to withhold vaccines in their own societies in order to gain geopolitical advantages abroad. By offering vaccines to countries like the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Brazil, China sought to secure diplomatic concessions, such as the non-recognition of Taiwan and the inclusion of Huawei in their telecom systems. There are rumors that Paraguay considered switching recognition from Taiwan to the PRC over this issue. This approach highlights a shift in global power dynamics, where countries like China, once incapable of producing vaccines, now use low-quality vaccines as strategic tools for diplomatic gains, disregarding the traditional norms of global health diplomacy embraced by OECD nations.

Ignoring the Global South is dangerous for American national security. The growing influence of China in these parts of the world is not merely an economic challenge—it is a strategic threat that can significantly reshape global power dynamics. Most countries would prefer to collaborate with the United States, but without a more attractive offer than what China provides, they will inevitably turn to Beijing.

The field of play in the global power competition has shifted, but the importance of the developing world is greater than ever. The United States must once again leverage its moral convictions and strategic insight to address this new era of challenges as effectively as it did during the Cold War. America’s long-term interests are best served by supporting the rise of partner countries that will, when push comes to shove, uphold a rules-based liberal world order. Renewing its commitment to engagement in the Global South is crucial for U.S. foreign policy to counter China’s “alternative vision for global governance.” By doing so, it can build resilient partnerships, promote good governance, and secure its interests in a rapidly changing global landscape. The stakes are high, and the time for action is now.

Daniel F. Runde is a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is also the author of the book The American Imperative: Reclaiming Global Leadership Through Soft Power (Bombardier Books, 2023).

Image: Shutterstock.com.

From advanced microchips to the green energy transition, critical minerals such as lithium, copper, and rare earth elements (REE) have become crucial inputs to the evolution of the global economy and modern life as we know it. They have also become the source of intense competition between the United States and China, both of which view ensuring access to such critical minerals as central to their pursuit of technological—and, in turn, geopolitical—influence. One country that has emerged as a pivotal element of this competition is Kazakhstan, whose wealth of critical minerals and foreign policy balance between East and West could serve as key indicators for how this technological tussle between Beijing and Washington is likely to play out. 

Kazakhstan is no stranger to geopolitical competition and maneuvering between large powers. Historically aligned with Russia, Kazakhstan only gained independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Major deposits of oil, natural gas, and uranium within Kazakhstan attracted attention from the West, with the United States and European companies investing billions in the country to bring its energy supplies out from the Russian orbit and onto global markets. This enabled Kazakhstan to become a leading economic player in Central Asia and build ties with the West while also retaining a strong working relationship with Moscow. 

The economic emergence of China brought a new player into the mix, with Beijing showing interest in Kazakhstan’s vast natural resources to fuel its energy-hungry economy. The country became a vital link to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with Chinese President Xi Jinping formally announcing the global infrastructure and trade strategy during a visit to Kazakhstan’s capital of Astana in 2013. China invested heavily in road, rail, and pipeline development in Kazakhstan as both a resource destination and transit corridor for trade to Europe and beyond.  

The country’s geographic location in the middle of the vast Eurasian supercontinent and its economic ties with major regional and global players has been reflected in Kazakhstan’s “multi-vectoral” foreign policy, which aims for a balance among eastern and western power centers. Kazakhstan is simultaneously a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Russia and China, and a prominent member of the C5+1 initiative between the United States and all five Central Asian states (as well as similar initiatives with the EU, Japan, and other entities). The country also serves as a critical node of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), which seeks to enhance trade connectivity between Europe and Asia.

The global geopolitical context has only strengthened Kazakhstan’s importance as a swing player when it comes to resources and trade. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 turbocharged European efforts to reduce their dependence on Russian energy. The Caspian region on Europe’s eastern periphery will be a key source of diversification. Kazakhstan has plugged its oil exports into Europe-bound pipelines, while the TITR has attracted significant interest from both the United States and EU as a means to bypass reliance on Russia as an energy provider and Eurasian transit hub in its own right. 

In the meantime, the disruptive impacts of climate change and the need for critical minerals to power the global energy transition to renewable forms of energy have heightened interest in Kazakhstan from a whole host of players. Building on the C5+1 diplomatic platform initiated back in 2015, the United States hosted the first-ever heads-of-state summit between President Joe Biden and all five Central Asian leaders on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly last year. During that summit, a critical minerals dialogue was launched and followed up on at the working level, with Kazakhstan serving as a vital link. The country has also signed multi-billion dollar agreements with the EU and UK on critical minerals cooperation. 

However, China still remains a major player in Kazakhstan when it comes to critical minerals investment and trade, which is in keeping with Beijing’s dominant role within the global supply chain of such minerals. This is of substantial concern for Washington, given the importance that critical minerals play in not only the green energy transition but also semiconductors and other technological uses. Beijing’s willingness to leverage this supply chain for political purposes, such as a temporary embargo of REE exports to Japan in 2010 and its recent export controls of gallium and germanium last year, has only emphasized the need for the United States and its allies to diversify their supply of critical minerals to more friendly nations. 

This brings us back to the unique and potentially pivotal role played by Kazakhstan. While the country cannot be neatly grouped into the Western or pro-Western bloc of allies for the United States, such as EU nations, Australia, Japan, and South Korea, the foreign policy orientation of Kazakhstan has proven to be pragmatic and willing to work with the West, even as it continues to engage with countries like China and Russia across the economic, diplomatic, and security spheres. For example, Astana recently hosted an SCO summit that promoted energy and security cooperation among its members, while the country has simultaneously been complying with Western sanctions targeting Russia even as it avoids passing sanctions of its own. 

Taking all of this into account, the United States would be well served to acknowledge Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy and work within it rather than against it. Kazakhstan has increasingly taken on the role of a middle power, leveraging its strategic position to balance relationships with major global players. Given its geographic position, Kazakhstan is unlikely to abandon or substantially weaken its relationship with China, Russia, or other non-Western players. However, the Kazakh government—particularly since the election of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in 2019—has proven to be highly responsive to measures that facilitate economic development and regional connectivity while also positioning the country as an important player in the global energy transition. 

Thus, it would be more effective for the United States to emphasize constructive carrots with Kazakhstan, such as investment and technological cooperation, as opposed to counter-productive sticks like sanctions and the maintenance of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. This Cold War-era holdover has restricted economic, trade, and political ties. The United States and its Western partners can also support Kazakhstan’s commitment to a balanced foreign policy while building upon their own diplomatic visits, dialogues, and summits at both the high-level and working-level in support of greater economic cooperation. They can also buttress Astana’s own diplomatic efforts to mediate and combat security instability throughout the region. 

If this approach is followed, Kazakhstan could play a highly influential role in not only helping the United States facilitate the global energy transition—which includes enhancing energy security for Europe while also ensuring a stable supply chain for critical minerals—but also in enhancing Washington’s position in its broader geopolitical competition with Beijing. As this competition between the United States and China heats up, whichever country is better able to maneuver the nuances of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy balance could unlock access to critical resources, transcontinental trade, and all of the strategic benefits that such access would entail. 

Eugene Chausovsky is a Senior Director at the New Lines Institute. Chausovsky previously served as a Senior Eurasia Analyst at the geopolitical intelligence firm Stratfor for more than ten years. His analytical work has focused on political, economic, and security issues pertaining to Russia, Eurasia, and China, as well as global connectivity issues related to energy and climate change.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: Despite being officially retired in 2007, the U.S. Air Force continues to fly a fleet of around 45 F-117 Nighthawks, extending their operations until at least 2034.

-The F-117s are used primarily for research, development, and training, serving as "red air" aggressors and surrogates for stealthy cruise missiles in exercises.

-Their unique stealth characteristics make them valuable for testing new low-observability technologies and defensive sensors.

-The Nighthawk may also be contributing to the development of future aircraft, such as the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) sixth-generation fighter. The fleet is being gradually phased out, with jets transferred to museums.

The F-117 Nighthawk was a revolutionary aircraft, one of the first in the world to incorporate stealth features. But with the onset of the F-22 Raptor, the F-117 became redundant and was retired. Or so it seemed. 

Despite the Nighthawk’s official retirement from active duty service in 2007, the U.S. Air Force still regularly flies a fleet of about forty-five F-117s. 

Why would the Air Force still fly a jet that was retired during the George W. Bush administration?

The Air Force confirmed its intention to extend F-117 operations to 2034, which would mean that the jet will serve for 26 years after being officially retired. Obviously, such an extension would be unorthodox, but it is not without adequate reason.

“A portion of the remaining F-117A fleet, flown by Air Force test pilots, has been very actively used for research and development, test and evaluation, and training purposes in recent years,” The War Zone writes. “This has included using the jets as ‘red air’ aggressors and as surrogates for stealthy cruise missiles during large-scale exercises.”

The F-117 still has value for training. As an aggressor aircraft, the F-117 can teach pilots how to engage with low-observability aircraft. It can be used as a cruise missile surrogate in cruise missile training. “Despite their age, [the F-117] still offer important benefits when used in these roles given that their radar, infrared, and other signature profiles are likely to be extremely dissimilar to what pilots and air defense system operates are used to encountering in these contexts,” according to The War Zone. 

Research and development may be the main draw in keeping the F-117 around. Thanks to the Nighthawk’s stealth characteristics, the jet can be used as a control variable in testing for new low-observability coatings and technologies. It can also be used as a control in developing defensive sensors built to detect stealth aircraft. 

The F-117 may even be playing a role in developing new aircraft. Studying the Nighthawk might help developers incorporate stealth features into upcoming aircraft, perhaps including the Next Generation Air Dominance sixth-generation fighter. 

The F-117 won’t fly forever. The Air Force is expected to divest their F-117 fleet at a rate of two to three jets per year. How many jets the Air Force is still flying today is unclear. In 2019, the service said that fifty-one F-117s were still flying, but that up to a dozen would be transferred to museums in 2020. All of the remaining Nighthawks are flown and stored at the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy faces critical challenges, including a declining fleet size, shipbuilding delays, and maintenance issues, which undermine its readiness and ability to defend America.

-Experts like Dr. Seth Cropsey, Bryan Clark, and others warn of the Navy’s deteriorating state, highlighting the impact of poor leadership, underfunding, and mismanagement. As geopolitical threats from China, Russia, and other adversaries rise, the Navy’s ability to meet these challenges is in question.

-Calls for substantial investment and a broad-based naval building program are urgent to restore U.S. maritime strength and ensure national security.

Since 2017, I have written about the decline of the U.S. Navy. We have far fewer ships than we need to defend America. The shipbuilding industry is struggling to produce an ever-decreasing number of ships. Even if Congress appropriated more funds the shipbuilding industry does not have the capacity to provide more ships, faster. Ships are late in delivery and beset with problems.  We have advanced weaponry that works well as proved by recent use in the Middle East, but far too few to last in a sustained conflict. Our enemies overseas see weakness and become bolder. As good as our missiles are, ships carry limited numbers. Experts warn that we will run out of missiles far sooner than we will run out of targets. A third of our ships at any given time are not ready for sea due to maintenance issues.

The Navy’s goal is to have seventy-five ships ready to deploy on short notice at any given time. We barely have fifty ready. The Navy set this goal two years ago and recently admitted the goal will not be met. We have little surge capacity, and the so-called ready reserve fleet is deficient having too few ships. The last mobilization readiness stress test ended in failure.

The Navy’s leadership in recent decades has been marked by embarrassing failures. Examples include building whole ship classes like the Zumwalt and LCS which turned out to be complete failures, collisions at sea, and loss of a sub for 3 years due to a collision with an undersea mount. The Navy lost a capital ship, the USS Bonhomme Richard which burned pier side, a 3-billion-dollar loss to the USMC with no replacement. That failure exacerbates the Navy’s failure to provide the USMC with the Congressionally mandated 38 amphibious ships.

A worsening suicide rate, scandals like Fat Leonard and Red Hill, and an unseemly devotion to politicizing the Navy by celebrating “Pride,” promoting DEI, and diverting resources to fight climate change are all examples of Navy leadership failures.   The Navy has a recruiting crisis being dreadfully shorthanded and now forced to send ships to sea significantly undermanned, a recipe for disaster. The Navy recently reported a shortage of 18,000 sailors for shipboard assignment and for two years running will have missed recruiting goals by thousands. FY 2022 by more that 3000, FY 2023 by more than 10,000 and on track to miss in FY 2024 by another 6700. These shortages are cumulative and impossible to recover from. These shortages persist despite the Navy lowering standards to try to make the goals.

CBO, GAO, CRS, and Heritage Foundation all warn of the severe risk our nation is creating by having a weak Navy. There are increasing doubts that we can win the next war. Our enemies China, Russia, Iran, the DPRK, and radical Islam are all taking advantage of the perceived weakness by being more aggressive. Russia’s war on Ukraine has no end in sight. Iran is waging a war against the state of Israel, and this is bleeding our inventories dry of arms we will need to fight a looming future conflict with China. China grows ever more aggressive against Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, and other Pacific nations as it asserts its hegemony against its far weaker neighbors while the U.S. mostly sits idly by tolerating their “wolf warrior” tactics.

Prominent naval experts share my concerns.

Dr. Seth Cropsey began his career as assistant to the Secretary of Defense and was later commissioned as a naval officer. He served as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration and acting assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict in the George H. W. Bush administration. Following 15 years as a senior fellow at Hudson Institute, Mr. Cropsey founded Yorktown Institute in 2022 and is the Institute’s president. He says in a recent article:

“The U.S. Navy is a ship without a rudder. The longer the service is allowed to decay, the more precarious America’s strategic situation will become. Turning things around won’t be easy. The best solution would be to retain every combat ship in the current fleet and encourage allies to pitch in with their own industrial bases. This expansion will require substantial funding, particularly in the workforce.”

Bryan Clark is a senior fellow and director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at Hudson Institute. He is an expert in naval operations, electronic warfare, autonomous systems, military competitions, and wargaming. Mr. Clark recently made observations regarding the Navy’s management of the USS Constellation Class Frigate:

“The Navy chose a ship design already in use by navies in France and Italy instead of starting from nothing. The idea was that 15% of the vessel would be updated to meet U.S. Navy specifications, while 85% would remain unchanged, reducing costs and speeding construction. Instead, the opposite happened: The Navy redesigned 85% of the ship, resulting in cost increases and construction delays. Construction of the first-in-class Constellation warship, which began in August 2022, is now three years behind schedule, with delivery pushed back to 2029. The final design still isn’t completed.”

Eric Labs is a longtime Navy expert at the Congressional Budget Office. He says the shipbuilding industry is in its worst state in 25 years:

“Navy shipbuilding is currently in “a terrible state” — the worst in a quarter century,” “I feel alarmed,” he said. “I don’t see a fast, easy way to get out of this problem. It’s taken us a long time to get into it.”

Bryan McGrath is a retired naval officer who commanded a Destroyer and helped lead the effort to craft the nation’s maritime strategy 2007. Since retiring in 2008, McGrath has been a key Navy consultant on strategy, concepts of operation, and capability development to both the Navy and the defense industry. He said in early 2024:

“The U.S. Navy is too small for what is asked of it, and what is asked of it is insufficient to meet the nation’s needs. We have too few ships, submarines, aircraft, aircraft carriers, people, sensors, weapons, and networks. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is growing faster than any navy has since the U.S. buildup to the Second World War, while the U.S. remains committed to efficient peacetime production levels that ignore the reality of this competition. Relative to the threats it faces, American naval power is weaker than at any time since the start of World War II. While the U.S. Navy remains the world’s most powerful seaborne combat force, not even the Soviet navy posed as dangerous a threat as China’s PLAN does today. The nature of that threat presents the prospect of a PLAN so powerful it could dominate the Western Pacific, destroying the legitimacy and effectiveness of America’s network of friends and allies by raising questions about America’s will and capability to support that network. The ability to dominate a region of the world responsible for 65% of global GDP represents a profound threat to U.S. national security and prosperity, and that of like-minded nations globally. A broad-based naval building program is required to meet China’s challenge, and all elements of the modern, balanced fleet should expand.”

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. Professor Holmes recently wrote in National Interest:

 “The U.S. Navy has been breaching the principle of continuity for decades, and to its own peril. At present, for example, surface combatants—guided-missile destroyers and cruisers—have to withdraw from a battle zone when they exhaust their missile inventories. They have to steam back to a specially equipped port to rearm. The logistics fleet cannot rearm them at sea for fear of damaging munitions or vertical launchers as the recipient and delivery ships sway with the waves. Depending on where the theater of conflict lies, the simple feat of rearming could mean voyaging thousands of miles—perhaps even all the way to a U.S. seaport. Such a journey would deduct whatever fraction that ship contributes to the fleet’s overall fighting strength—96 vertical launch siloes’ worth of missiles in the case of a destroyer, the surface navy’s workhorse—for weeks at a time.”

CDR Salamander is a retired Navy Commander and a former Commanding Officer of a Destroyer. He’s been writing an insightful column for many years on all things related to the Navy. I highly recommend his Substack which can be found at this link.  Recently he wrote about the Navy’s amphibious forces. He asks, “What has the 29-year old BOXER been up to? Well, earlier this month: 

"The amphibious assault ship USS Boxer is underway for a long-delayed deployment after a maintenance and overhaul period of almost four years. The ship has been conducting workups for the last several months with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The Boxer last deployed in 2019. The Navy struggled to get the ship back to sea after a $200 million planned overhaul and maintenance availability in 2020. Wait … less than a couple of weeks later – what do we see?  The trouble-plagued USS Boxer has returned to San Diego after experiencing a new equipment problem during its first deployment in five years.”

Brent Sadler is Senior Research Fellow, Allison Center for National Security at the Heritage Foundation. In July 2024 He wrote: 

“Our nation’s maritime strength has been ebbing for years, but few policymakers have taken notice let alone real action—until now. More and more members of Congress are speaking up, with many determined to fix what has turned into a national strategic vulnerability. For example, Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) recently announced plans to increase defense spending by $55 billion to get industry “on a footing to deliver a 355-ship” Navy. It’s a long-overdue change. Barely 0.4 percent of our trade is conducted on U.S. ships, leaving our security and prosperity in the hands of Chinese state enterprises that are increasingly dominating every aspect of maritime activity. To reduce our overreliance on unfriendly nations, Congress must revive a critical industry that will require action in workforce, shipyards, shipbuilding, and shipping. Regaining American competitiveness is key. A successful renaissance in American shipping will allow us to build momentum and set conditions for a sustained revival in America’s maritime industry.”

As the old saw goes, “A word to the wise is sufficient.”  We must rebuild our Navy. We are a maritime nation. Our lives and economy depend on the sea. There is no time to waste. Contact your Congressional representatives now!

CAPT Brent Ramsey, (USN, Ret.) has written extensively on Defense matters. He is an officer with Calvert Group, Board of Advisors member for the Center for Military Readiness and STARRS, and member of the Military Advisory Group for Congressman Chuck Edwards (NC-11).

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Summary and Top Points You Need to Know: The U.S. Navy maintains carrier superiority over China, but Beijing has demonstrated its ability to track American carriers, raising concerns. In 2015, a Chinese Kilo-class submarine shadowed the USS Ronald Reagan for over 12 hours near Japan, highlighting China's growing submarine capabilities.

-Despite these advancements, U.S. submarines and multi-layered defense systems remain superior, making it unlikely that a Chinese submarine could successfully attack or sink a U.S. carrier.

-While China's naval modernization is significant, the defensive architecture of U.S. carriers ensures robust protection against potential threats in the Western Pacific.

-The U.S. retains carrier superiority over its adversaries, both in the size and capabilities of its fleet. 

But while China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy may not currently have a carrier fleet that can compete with the U.S., it has demonstrated the ability to track American carriers. Indeed, Beijing’s ability and its willingness to track the exact locations of U.S. naval carriers is concerning – these powerful warships are not invulnerable to certain sophisticated weapons.

Back in 2015, a Chinese submarine closely tracked an American aircraft carrier near the coast of Japan. The Chinese Kilo-class fast attack sub shadowed USS Ronald Reagan for more than 12 hours in what was considered to be “more than a brief encounter,” according to officials.

Beijing claimed that the American vessel was sailing in Chinese waters. The incident was reminiscent of an encounter in 2006, when a Song-class submarine surfaced undetected within torpedo range of the Kitty Hawk carrier.

While more recent Chinese provocations over the South China Sea have involved fighter jets harassing American aircraft, Beijing has been further developing its submarine capabilities in order to track American ships more diligently. 

In the past, Chinese submarines were considered to be a generation behind the U.S. in terms of specs and capabilities. They were quite loud, making them easier for U.S. warships to spot. But China has allocated a lot of resources and funds to modernizing its naval assets over the last decade, and its submarines could be far more capable now.

Despite this growing threat, American submarines remain superior to their Chinese counterparts. 

As explained by Forbes, “If the threat is from undersea warships, the carrier can rely on Virginia-class submarines that greatly outclass their Chinese counterparts, plus antisubmarine sensors and rotorcraft deployed on both destroyers and the carrier itself. The architecture of the defensive perimeter dictates that if an enemy penetrates one layer of protection, it will then face another, and another. So even if the adversary can find a carrier in the vastness of the Western Pacific, the likelihood its weapons will reach the carrier and do serious damage is not great. The likelihood the carrier could actually be sunk is minimal, given its design features.”

Essentially, even if a Chinese submarine is successful in tracking a U.S. carrier for a period of time, it would not necessarily be able to carry out an actual attack.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: One week into Ukraine's Kursk operation, its objectives remain unclear, underscoring Ukraine's exceptional operational security and strategic planning. The operation has flipped the narrative of Russian superiority, revealing significant Russian military failures and strengthening Ukraine's negotiation position.

-With approximately 1,000 square kilometers liberated and Russian forces in disarray, Ukraine has not only bolstered its defense but also gained moral and strategic advantages.

-The operation justifies continued Western support, as its success could lead to a new strategic situation globally, further weakening Russia's position and challenging Putin's narrative of victory.

One week into Ukraine’s Kursk operation we still have no idea as to what its objectives are. This fact actually underscores the brilliance of the operation because our ignorance reveals the quality of Ukrainian operational security (OPSEC) and intelligence preparation of this battlefield (IPB). Indeed, the success of this operation to date, like any successful operation, now creates many more potential objectives than might have been previously imagined by Ukrainian planners.

Undoubtedly this action strengthens Kyiv’s hands if a negotiation comes about, and it certainly puts the lie to an unending stream of media reports claiming that Ukraine is steadily being ground down through Russian attrition. That outlook, after all, represents Putin’s articulated theory of victory, perhaps the only open left to him to validate his ongoing aggression against Ukraine.  Thus, this operation flips the script of Russian superiority even as it shows just how resourcefully Ukraine is defending its territory against Russian aggression. Indeed, perhaps the most telling outcome of this operation is that it strips away the brutal façade of Russia’s aggression. As of this writing, Ukraine has liberated about 1000sqKM of Russian territory, hundreds if not thousands of Russian forces have surrendered, Ukraine now controls 74 settlements, and 133,00 people have been evacuated from these territories and no credible military response is yet in sight.

These figures highlight glaring Russian failures in leadership, command and control, intelligence, morale, training, etc. Indeed Chief of the General Staff , General Gerasimov either lied to Putin or was himself deceived when he briefed Putin that only 1000 troops crossed the border and were then killed.  Thus, two years after the war began, the Russian army has poorly if at all addressed the sources of its disarray. All this continues to underscore the ongoing failures of Russia’s unprovoked aggression and the quality of Ukraine’s defense of its territory.

This context frames the discussion surrounding Ukraine’s objectives in this operation. Whatever they may be; this action has overturned Russia’s supposed negotiation posture as Putin now virtually screams that Ukraine in flipping Russian aggression back on Moscow is merely doing its Wester masters’ bidding.  Since nobody but he and his toadies believes this canard, it is no surprise that he also angrily declared that Russia cannot negotiate with people who commit such atrocities as invading foreign countries, taking prisoners, forcing evacuations, etc.  Of course, this screed merely repeats Ukraine’s reasons for not negotiating with Putin as long as he occupies parts of Ukraine and undermines his previous insistence that talks are only possible if Ukraine first recognizes Russia’s conquests. It is, perhaps, no surprise therefore, that Putin’s Western claque has gone silent since August 6 when this operation began, as all their rhetoric has been exposed as useful idiocy for Putin.  

But beyond torpedoing the myths of Russia’s looming victory unraveling Putin’s complacent theory of victory this operation, as noted above, has now generated numerous options for Ukraine to the point where in conversations with other analysts they raise the question whether this is the beginning of the end, either for the war or for Putin.  While we cannot succumb to wishful thinking; there is no question that to date this operation has enormously strengthened Ukraine’s morale, negotiation posture, and probably persuaded more Western onlookers that Ukraine actually can and should win this war.  It has also highlighted the continuing insufficiency of Russian military learning that clearly has not been enough, and the glaring deficiencies cited above.

This offensive also fully justifies the past, present, and future shipment of weapons, money, training, and political support. Ukraine remains the unprovoked victim of aggression even though Putin, having long since bet the farm on his aggression seems to know no reply other than doubling down on failure and threatening escalation. Thus, it seems unlikely that negotiations will occur anytime soon. For Putin negotiations in the absence of victory puts his domestic position at risk or so he appears to think, perhaps, because as we can now see, genuine negotiations not only undermine his narrative but also vindicate President Zelensky’s and Ukraine’s resistance to Putin.

Regardless of how this operation ultimately plays out, it has already inflicted serious damage upon Russia and is likely to harm it even more, not least because it has also exposed the disorganization and disarray inherent in Russia’s campaign.  Consequently, the gains that now redound to Ukraine from that operation go beyond the front to justify increasing Western support for the results of that support are ever more evident here. And thus, those gains now accruing to Ukraine and the losses accumulating on the Russian side can, if this operation keeps succeeding, bring about a wholly new strategic situation on the ground and in world affairs. The ramifications of this war have long been recognized to be global. Hence, if this operation, as appears to be the case now, continues to succeed, then its repercussions will be global too. But they will be to Ukraine’s benefit and to Russia’s deserved ignominy.

Dr. Stephen J. Blank is a Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is an internationally renowned expert on Russian and Chinese defense policy. He is the author of "Light from the East: Russia's Quest for Great Power Status in Asia" (Taylor & Francis, 2023). He was a Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

There is irony in what appears to be an Iranian hack of the electronic files of Donald Trump’s campaign. Details are unclear and unconfirmed, but a day after Microsoft issued a report about efforts by hackers in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard to target a senior official in an unnamed U.S. presidential campaign, the Trump campaign stated that it was a victim of that effort. 

In what may or may not have been a result of such a hack, internal campaign documents—including a vetting file on eventual vice-presidential nominee JD Vance—were then sent to Politico, the New York Times, and the Washington Post. Trump campaign spokesman Steven Cheung declared, “Any media or news outlet reprinting documents or internal communications are doing the bidding of America’s enemies and doing exactly what they want.”

The irony comes from comparing that complaint with Trump’s posture toward such hacking by foreign adversaries during his first presidential campaign. “Russia, if you’re listening,” said Trump in a campaign speech in July 2016, “I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing”—a reference to emails of his opponent, Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton. 

The Russian regime evidently was listening because shortly afterward, its hackers pulled documents from Clinton’s personal account as well as accounts of her presidential campaign. Russia conveyed the resulting large haul of documents to WikiLeaks—the operation that has divulged wholesale much stolen classified material related to U.S. national security—as its instrument for disseminating the Clinton material. Trump repeatedly and publicly expressed his delight with the Russia-WikiLeaks caper, saying, “I love WikiLeaks.”

Trump’s response to this operation was part of how he and his campaign welcomed, exploited, and facilitated Russia’s extensive and multifaceted interference in the 2016 election. Among other things, Trump or senior people in his campaign replayed material from Russian internet trolls and met with a Kremlin-connected Russian lawyer to seek dirt on their Democratic opponents. At the same time, the chairman of Trump’s campaign repeatedly met and shared polling data with a Russian intelligence agent. Trump brushed off any criticism of his use of the Russian election interference, saying this was just another form of “opposition research.”

The Founding Fathers were deeply worried about how partisan motivations could open the door in this way to foreign interference in American politics. The worries extended to interference by putative allies as well as adversaries. A price of the alliance with France during the Revolutionary War had been French meddling that exploited divisions between factions within the Continental Congress.

The Federalist Papers, which emphasized the evils of factionalism, drew attention to how those evils included the encouragement of foreign interference. Several of the earliest essays in the series—written by John Jay, who was in charge of U.S. foreign affairs between the Revolutionary War and the adoption of the Constitution—warned of damaging transnational alliances between foreign powers and American political factions.

The damage continued during much of the Federalist Era, which was plagued by intense partisanship. Policies toward France and Britain—the two foreign powers that then mattered most to the United States—were corrupted by how Federalists and Democratic-Republicans mixed their partisan affinities to one or the other foreign power with their domestic political objectives.

The growth of national power freed the United States, for most of its subsequent history, from significant foreign interference in its own elections. It became more common for the United States, as a superpower, to interfere in other countries’ domestic politics rather than the other way around. 

But over the last three decades, this pattern has changed. Foreign interference in U.S. electoral politics has again become significant. 

One reason involves technology. Hacking and trolling are tools for interference that did not exist in pre-internet times.

Another reason is partisanship, which has become at least as intense and poisonous as it was in the Federalist Era. The dissipation of an earlier Cold War consensus that had guided much of U.S. foreign policy means that the outcomes of U.S. elections matter more to foreign regimes than they did before. The identification with a party that many Americans feel more than with the nation as a whole has fostered an “anything goes” attitude toward political competition that leads to excesses such as Trump’s version of “opposition research.” 

The same sort of self-identification also breeds affinities with foreign factions and regimes of a similar political persuasion. Americans had traditionally played little role in transnational political movements, but that is no longer the case, at least on the Right. The sort of transnational factional alliance about which Jay warned is now a reality.

Congressional testimony earlier this year by Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines on foreign threats to the 2024 elections mentioned Russia, China, and Iran as regimes worth watching. Haines named Russia as the most active foreign threat to U.S. elections, with goals of discrediting U.S. democracy, exacerbating internal divisions within the United States, and impeding Western support for Ukraine. 

Intelligence directors shy away, especially in public testimony, from anything that starts to touch on partisan politics. Still, unquestionably, Russia’s goal this year, as it was in 2016 and 2020, is to help elect Donald Trump. Trump’s authoritarian-envy positive views of Russian president Vladimir Putin, which have helped to make the Republican Party—despite its traditional anti-Moscow posture from Cold War days—more favorably inclined toward Russia than the Democrats are, would be enough to influence Moscow’s choice. There also is the prospect that a second Trump term would likely mean less Western support for Ukraine.

Iranian leaders probably would like to see Trump lose, given that his policy toward Iran in his earlier term was unmitigated hostility and a rejection of diplomacy in favor of unrestricted economic warfare. The policy was bad news for everyone involved and led to an accelerated Iranian nuclear program and a more aggressive Iranian regional posture, and certainly was at least as bad for the Iranians themselves as for anyone else. An exception to this Iranian preference may come from some hardliners in Tehran who would welcome playing off hardliners in the United States to strengthen their own domestic position. 

Iran probably also has other objectives, such as general gathering of information, that would involve targets beyond Trump. Shortly after the Trump campaign announced that Iran had hacked it, Kamala Harris’s campaign revealed that it, too, was the target of a “foreign actor influence operation.” However, whether this involves Iran is something the FBI is still investigating.

Haines said China’s influence operations are aimed at cultivating favorable positions toward China at all levels. So far, these efforts do not appear to be aimed at helping one presidential candidate over the other. This reflects the Chinese expectation that Washington will take a hard line against them regardless of who wins the election in November.

Intelligence directors and other U.S. officials also shy away from any mention of Israel in the same breath as adversaries such as Russia, China, and Iran. Still, in omitting mention of Israel, Haines said nothing about the foreign state that has for years been the most active and successful foreign influencer in U.S. elections. The lobby that is involved recently demonstrated its continued clout by pouring millions into a couple of primary races and ousting two members of Congress who had dared to criticize Israel’s conduct in the Gaza Strip. 

Although that lobby for years strove to keep its fingers in both American political camps and to some extent still does—that recent demonstration of clout was in Democratic Party primaries—there now is a pronounced partisan tilt to its influence. The Republican Party has become the Israel-right-or-wrong party as politics within Israel have moved ever farther to the extreme Right. Trump and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu are in a strong electoral alliance. 

The Israeli government conducts most of its influence efforts in the United States openly. But more recently, it has also employed covert methods, using fake social media accounts and fake news sites to influence American politicians and the American public in the same manner that Russia, China, or Iran might. 

The covert Israeli operations that have come to light so far are aimed at nurturing U.S. support for the Israeli military assault on the Gaza Strip. But any Israeli influence efforts, either overt or covert, that may get closer to presidential politics would certainly be in support of Trump, who, during his term in office, gave Israel and Netanyahu almost anything they wanted, with nothing in return except political support for Trump himself.

Interference by any foreign government in U.S. politics and elections entails several harms. For one thing, U.S. elections are supposed to determine the composition of a government that is of, by, and for the American people. This is less the case to the extent that non-Americans have an influential role.

Foreign interference also skews U.S. policy toward the countries that are interfering. U.S. policy toward, say, Iran ought not to be shaped by anything the Iranian regime might do to influence thinking, much less political outcomes, in America. The same goes for U.S. policy toward Russia, China, Israel, or any other foreign country.

A corollary to this harm is that an American politician who benefits from foreign interference may shape policy toward the foreign country in question out of gratitude for the help or as an implied quid pro quo. Trump’s still partially opaque relationship with Putin and Russia ought to be a source of worry in this regard.

A foreign country meddling in U.S. politics is a single-issue form of influence. The meddler cares only about his own country’s objectives and not about any collateral damage to U.S. interests. When the core of the Israel lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), abandoned its pretense of not taking sides in U.S. partisan politics and formed its own political action committee, its initial list of endorsees in 2022 included dozens of election deniers—Republican members of the House of Representatives who had voted against certifying results of the 2020 presidential election. The collateral damage was a direct blow to U.S. democracy.

Intelligence agencies and the media can do only so much to uncover harmful foreign interference in U.S. elections. Mitigation of the problem requires adherence by politicians to a code of conduct, according to which acceptance of such foreign help is simply wrong. Such an ethos existed during the Federalist Era, despite breaches of the code, and was part of how the nation was eventually able to overcome both the foreign meddling and the intense partisanship of the time.

Some political leaders of both parties have exhibited such an ethos closer to our own time. In 1992, a group of Republican Congressmen urged President George H.W. Bush to try to salvage his faltering re-election campaign against Bill Clinton by asking the Russians or the British for information about Clinton’s protests against the Vietnam War as a young man while in London and Moscow. Bush and his senior aide, James Baker, immediately rejected the idea as improper. In 2000, when information surfaced that Al Gore’s presidential campaign and the Democrats possibly received Chinese financial contributions, Clinton and Gore made clear that U.S. elections must be free from any foreign interference and cooperated with the subsequent investigation.

Contrast that with the approach of Trump, who, according to Robert Mueller’s report, repeatedly impeded the investigation of the Russian interference in the 2016 election. It is only when such a destructive approach to the subject is eradicated that the harms from foreign interference in America’s elections will be overcome.

Paul R. Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier, he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA, covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. His most recent book is Beyond the Water’s Edge: How Partisanship Corrupts U.S. Foreign Policy. He is also a contributing editor for this publication.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Top Line Points You Need to Know: The Soviet Union's Project 705 Lira (NATO: Alfa) submarines, introduced in 1971, were groundbreaking due to their use of titanium hulls and lead-bismuth cooled reactors.

-These innovations allowed the Alfa-class subs to achieve exceptional speeds of over 40 knots and dive to depths of 350 meters, with a crush depth of 1,300 meters.

-Designed during the Cold War to compete with American submarines, the Alfa class featured a double-hull construction, minimal crew requirements, and impressive capabilities.

-However, initial issues with hull cracking were eventually resolved. Despite their advanced design, only seven were built, with the last decommissioned in 1996.

The modern submarine is a sophisticated machine that must meet demanding mechanical specifications. The specifications are demanding because the mission profile is somewhat unnatural.

Submarines must host a crew of sailors at, and beneath, the sea for extended periods of time.

While at sea, the submarine is often tasked with clandestine and highly sensitive operations. And always, the submarine must have the capacity to hone its various weapons systems (including nuclear) on land and/or marine-based targets. Accordingly, the mechanical specifications imposed on submarines are demanding.

Naturally, submarine manufacturers have spent the last century innovating, pushing for technological advancements, and trying to improve their machines and their war-fighting capacity.

In the 1970s, the Soviet Union was locked in a global Cold War with the United States. The two countries raced to create and field more advanced weaponry than each other. The most apparent venue for the tech race between the two Cold War powers was of course in space. Known as The Space Race, competition to be the first fueled intense tech development – culminating in America’s Apollo program and men walking on the moon.

But the Cold War competition raged simultaneously in other, less visible venues. Aerospace development, for example, where Soviet manufacturers like Mikoyan and Sukhoi raced American manufacturers like Boeing and Lockheed to field the most advanced fourth-generation, and later fifth-generation, fighters. The competition also extended to tanks. Intercontinental ballistic missiles. Aircraft carriers. And submarines.

To gain some sort of edge on the Americans, the Soviets experimented and pushed. The result, in one instance, was rather novel: building a submarine hull from titanium.

In 1971, the Soviets unveiled their Project 705 Lira submarine (NATO reporting name Alfa). Project 705 was a nuclear-powered attack submarine notable for two things: the use of a titanium hull, and for being one of the fastest military submarines ever built. I

In fact, the Alfa-Class was second in speed to only one other submarine model, a Soviet prototype known as K-222.

The Project 705 Lira marked the first time that titanium was used in the hull design of a submarine. Titanium is a chemical element that can be reduced to produce a lustrous transition metal with valuable properties: low density, high strength, and resistance to sea water. Understandably, given titanium’s properties, the Soviets were keen to experiment with the material in their submarine design.

While the Project 705 did not sail until 1971, the idea was first proposed in 1957. The project was conceptualized to meet a set of demanding requirements (in the name of competing with American submarine design).

The requirements held that the new submarine must have sufficient speed to be able tp pursue any ship; the capability to evade anti-submarine weapons; the ability to succeed in underwater combat; low detectability; minimal displacement; and as small a crew as possible.

To meet the array of proposed requirements, a titanium alloy hull was selected. The idea is that a titanium hull would allow for low drag, low weight, and as a result, high speeds and deep dives. The design was meant to serve as an interceptor, which would stay in a harbor, or on a patrol route, and then race to meet an enemy as needed.

The Alfa-Class hull, like most Soviet nuclear submarines, was constructed as a double hill. With the double hull design, the internal hull is built to withstand the water pressure imposed during deep dives, while the external hull protects the internal hull and provides a more ideal hydrodynamic shape.

The titanium hull, like so many novel technologies, proved difficult at first. The lightweight alloy was prone to cracking – and the first Project 705 submarine was decommissioned on account of hull cracking. But the Soviets were able to improve their metallurgy and welding technologies sufficiently to eliminate hull cracking on all future Project 705 submarines.

To propel the titanium-hulled Project 705, a lead-bismuth cooled beryllium-moderated reactor was installed. The liquid metal cooled reactor had several advantages including: higher energy efficiency; did not need to be refueled – ever; lighter and smaller than water-cooled reactors. The lead-bismuth cooled reactor, and its weight and energy advantages, was a conceptual fit with the titanium hull – both were geared towards making a smaller, faster vessel.

The finished product was a submarine measuring 81 meters in length, with a 9.5-meter beam, and a 7.6-meter draft. The Project 705 displaced 2,300 tons when surfaced, and 3,200 tons when submerged. The submarine could operate regularly at depths of 350 meters, with a crush depth of about 1,300 meters. Most impressively, the Project 705 could achieve speeds in excess of 40 knots – all while carrying a complement of torpedoes, and/or cruise missiles, and/or mines.

In all, seven Project 705 Alfa-Class submarines were commissioned, one of which remained in service until 1996.  

Harrison Kass is a prolific defense write with over 1,000 pieces published. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons. Image is of a Akula-Class sub. 

Summary and Key Points: The Soviet Union's Project 705 Lira (NATO: Alfa) submarines, produced between 1968 and 1981, were groundbreaking for their use of titanium hulls and lead-bismuth-cooled fast reactors, allowing unprecedented speed and depth. These subs could reach 41 knots and dive to 1,148 feet, making them elusive targets.

-However, they were plagued by flaws, including excessive noise and the high cost and difficulty of working with titanium.

-The lead boat, K-64, suffered a reactor failure, leading to its decommissioning.

-Despite their innovative design, the Alfa class was ultimately too expensive and flawed to sustain, with all units decommissioned by 1996.

Between 1968 and 1981, the Soviet Union produced a total of seven Project 705 Lira (NATO reporting name Alfa) nuclear-powered attack submarines.

The boats were cutting edge when they were produced, and in addition to the then-revolutionary use of titanium for the hull, each of the subs utilized a powerful lead-bismuth cooled fast reactor (OK-550 or BM-40A, 155-MWt) as its power source.

That greatly reduced the size of the reactor, and in turn reduced the size of the submarine and allowed for high speeds. The submarines displaced 2,300 tons surfaced/3,200 tons submerged and were just 267 feet in length and had a beam of 31 feet.

The submarines were reported to be the world's fastest and deepest diving of their era and could reach a top speed of 41 knots submerged.

The boats could get to top speed in just about sixty seconds and do a 180-degree reverse at full speed in as little as forty seconds.

However, surfaced, the Alfa-class boats could only achieve around 12 knots. It should be noted that the Soviet's experimental nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine K-222 reached a submerged speed of 44.7 knots – but it was only a prototype.

Thanks to the use of titanium, which can tolerate higher pressures better than steel, the boats had a testing depth of 350 meters (1,148 feet), well below the reach of NATO anti-submarine weapons of the time. This could enable an Alfa-class sub to "theoretically" sit below the reach of NATO vessels while launching its own weapons.

In addition, the titanium hull proved more resistant to corrosion and also made the submarine even harder to detect as it is paramagnetic.

The boats, which featured a very high level of automation, required a rather small crew, which was made up exclusively of thirty-two officers and warrant officers. Originally it had been planned that just sixteen officers could operate the submarine.

In addition, the tiny crew was housed in the central compartment of the submarine, while the forward section contained the weapons system and electronics. It was only accessed for maintenance, as were the rear reactor and propulsion compartments. Many of the operations were completely automated, such as torpedo loading. That would have increased crew survivability in the case of war because the forward and aft compartments could be sealed off during combat operations.

The Project 705 Lira was also the first submarine to be equipped with an escape capsule; it even provided a safe exit for the entire crew from maximum depth. Such features became standard on Russian boats.

Despite its advanced features and capabilities, the Alfa-class boats had some notable Achilles Heels – first, they were loud. The noise generated from the boats was easily detectable. Another problem is that at the time, working with titanium wasn't easy. Russia had an advantage in that it was a major supplier of titanium, but bending and shaping the metal panels proved difficult. Titanium is also very unforgiving and there was also a high risk of imperfections within the metal that could have resulted in a catastrophic failure – especially for a submarine operating under extremely high pressures.

In the end, Project 705 Lira or Alfa-class was simply too expensive to mass-produce. In fact, after the lead boat, K-64, suffered a major reactor problem in 1972 – just a year after she entered service – the submarine was towed back to Severodvinsk where it was deemed too expensive to repair. Instead, K-64 was split in half and used to train Soviet submariners.

The remaining six boats continued in service – until April 1990 when five were decommissioned and scrapped. The final boat was eventually decommissioned in July 1996 and also scrapped.

You catch the Alfa-class submarine in the fictional movie the Hunt for Red October where one of the subs had a prominent part. 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military hardware, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The decommissioned Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk, once a proud member of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, caught fire while undergoing renovations in China for conversion into a military-themed tourist attraction.

-Anchored near Shanghai, Minsk had served as the centerpiece of a now-closed theme park for 16 years before the fire broke out on August 16, causing extensive damage to its superstructure.

-Despite no casualties, the fire has cast doubt on the future of the project. Minsk was a Kiev-Class carrier active from 1978 to 1994, but it now faces an uncertain future as a potential tourist attraction.

Even decommissioned Soviet/Russian military equipment is faring poorly these days. Minsk, a decommissioned Soviet aircraft carrier that was sold to the Chinese for conversion into a tourist attraction, caught fire last weekend.

For eight years, Minsk has been anchored in a lagoon near Shanghai along the Yangtze River. The aircraft carrier was undergoing renovations for conversion into a tourist attraction that would be a part of a new military-themed park. Minsk had already spent 16 years as the central attraction at a now-closed theme park.

The fire started on August 16 and was extinguished within 24 hours, according to reports. 

“Images on social media showed thick smoke and large flames burning on the deck of the carrier,” CNN reported, “with later pictures showing extensive damage to the ship’s superstructure and charred metal on its flank below the main deck.”

According to local fire officials, the fire resulted in no casualties. The cause of the fire is under investigation.

The fire reduces the likelihood that Minsk will become the centerpiece of a new theme park. “It’s a pity that a fire has made the prospects of this project full of too many uncertainties,” one official said.

Before being decommissioned and sold to China, Minsk was a proud member of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The second of four Kiev-Class carriers, Minsk served from 1978 until 1994. Unlike American aircraft carriers of the same era, Minsk was conventionally powered, with an endurance of 13,500 nautical miles. An American contemporary had an endurance of about 25 years.

Minsk was smaller than her American contemporaries, too. Measuring 896 feet long, with a 161-foot beam, Minsk displaced 41,380 pounds when fully loaded. For propulsion, the carrier relied on four shaft geared steam turbines capable of generating 140,000 horsepower and a top speed of 32 knots.

Minsk was loaded with a variety of weaponry: four twin SS-N-12 Sandbox SSM launchers; two twin SA-N-3 Shtorm SAM launchers; two twin SA-N-4 Gecko SAM launchers; two twin 76 mm guns; eight AK-630 30 mm Close In Weapons Systems; ten 533 mm torpedo tubes; one twin SUW-N-1 ASW rocket launcher; and two RBU-600 anti-submarine rocket launchers.

The carrier boarded sixteen Yak-38M fighter aircraft and eighteen Kamov-25/27 helicopters. Again, American contemporaries were more impressive, with the ability to carry more than 100 fighter jets. 

While Minsk may never recover from the fire to serve as a tourist attraction, its sister ship, Kiev, is currently an attraction at the Binhai Aircraft Carrier Theme Park in Tianjin.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points You Need to Know: The Royal Netherlands Navy's Walrus-class submarines, introduced in the 1980s, are renowned for their silent operation and effectiveness, particularly in anti-submarine warfare.

-Initially designed for Cold War missions against Russian submarines, these diesel-electric boats have since excelled in various roles, including intelligence gathering and anti-piracy missions.

-Featuring advanced internal systems and an innovative "X-form" rudder configuration, the Walrus-class submarines have proven highly effective in international exercises, even "sinking" a U.S. aircraft carrier during a 1999 exercise.

-Despite plans for a replacement, two Walrus-class submarines will remain in service until the mid-2030s.

Throughout the 20th century, the Royal Netherlands Navy made several unique contributions to military submarine design, notably the snorkel, and in 1942, Dutch submarines operating in the Far East sank more Japanese vessels than their American counterparts.

During the Cold War, the submarines of Royal Netherlands Navy continued their proud traditions – and in the 1980s introduced Walrus-class submarines.

Specifically designed for hunting Russian submarines during the Cold War, the boats of the Walrus-class earned a good reputation in the early post-Cold War world.

The diesel-electric submarines have been used in a number of international military exercises, but have also been tasked with many highly classified intelligence gathering operations, and even have been deployed in anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia.

Due to a fire that broke out during the construction of the lead boat, HNLMS Walrus (S802), the first of the class to enter service was actually the HNLMS Zeeleeuw (S803) – a fact that has led to some confusion over the name of the class.

The boats feature notable internal improvements over the preceding Zwaardvis-class, including more powerful machinery. The three diesel generators have SEMT-Pielstick PA4V200 12-cyliner engines that deliver 4,700 kW (6,300 shp), while one electric motor provides 5,150 kW (6,910 shp) to a single shaft. On the surface, the submarines can reach a top speed of 13 knots, while submerged the boats have a maximum speed of 9 knots.

Displacing 2,490 tonnes (2,450 tons), each of the Walrus-class submarines are 222 feet (67.5 meters) in length, have a beam of 27 feet, seven inches (8.4 meters) and a draught of 21 feet, eight inches (6.6 meters). The submarines have a double-deck hull configuration that features a "teardrop" from. It is constructed of high-tensile steel and has a minimum number of apertures and welded joints.

The Walrus-class is unique in that its dive planes and rudders are arranged in an "X" configuration, rather than a vertical-horizontal cross. That "X-form" after-plane configuration requires a complex computerized control.

The submarines of the Walrus-class are equipped with four 21-inch (533mm) torpedo tubes, and each can carry up to twenty torpedoes or forty mines, as well as the UGM-84 Harpoon surface-to-surface missile.

The submarines were in high demand by NATO as they are noted to be extremely silent. During the multi-national "Joint Task Force Exercise/Theatre Missile Defence Initiative 1999" (JTFEX/TMDI99) HNLMS Walrus successfully penetrated the U.S. Navy screen and "sank" several ships, including the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) before escaping.

While the Dutch Ministry of Defense had announced plans to begin the development of a new class of submarines in November 2014 to replace the aging Walrus-class; in early April 2022, the Dutch parliament announced that at least two of the Walrus-class boats would be extended in service until the mid-2030s.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military hardware, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points You Need to Know: The U.S. Air Force (USAF) boasts a formidable fleet of aircraft, but concerns are rising about its aging capabilities, especially in light of modern threats like China. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall emphasizes the urgent need for modernization, not just in aircraft but in areas like electronic warfare and battle management.

-While the USAF still fields top fighters like the F-22 and F-35, much of the fleet comprises older models like the F-15 and F-16, which may struggle against advanced air defenses.

-The USAF plans to retire 310 aircraft in fiscal 2024 to reallocate resources for newer, more capable systems.

The US Air Force (USAF) possesses a dazzling lineup of aircraft. Everything from the U-2 Dragon Lady to the A-10 Warthog. The C-130 Hercules and the KC-135 Stratotanker. The F-15 Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon, F-22 Raptor. The F-35 Lightning II.

By roughly any metric – quantity, quality, variety, specialization – the US Air Force has accumulated the most impressive and capable collection of aircraft in human history.

Yet, despite the USAF’s impressive spread, concerns are mounting that the fleet is out of date – too old to participate effectively in a modern conflict, namely, a war with China.

Does the USAF need to upgrade? Or are calls for modernization just hawkish alarmism?

Given the extensity of the existing fleet – and given the costs of modernizing – the idea that the USAF would need to substantially upgrade its fleet is concerning to anyone mindful of US military spending (or the federal deficit).

The simple fact is that the US spends more on defense than any nation on Earth. Actually, it’s not even close: the US defense budget has ballooned to $900 billion per year, threatening to eclipse the $1 trillion threshold.

Meanwhile, the only country that even comes close to approaching the US in defense spending – China – spends less than $300 billion per year in defense, about a third of the US total. So, the US spends about three hundred percent more than it’s closest competitor in defense spending.

Russia, long the primary bogeyman of US foreign policy, spends less than one-tenth of the US defense budget – and Russia ranks third in world defense spending.

The United Kingdom, Germany, and France – six, seven, and eight on the world defense spending rankings, respectively – spend less than $200 billion per year, combined.

The point is that the idea that America’s lavish defense spending may not have been sufficient to keep pace with the modern threat environment is disheartening.

“Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall insists the service needs to modernize rapidly to face the threat of China,” Chris Gordon reported. “But modernization does not just mean fielding new aircraft, Kendall and other service leaders argue – the Air Force also needs to retire its aging airplanes.”

“The truth is the Air Force needs things like electric warfare, battle management, intelligence, cyber capabilities, all of these things,” Kendall said last year. “It doesn’t just need airplanes.” Kendall elaborated that, “as the character of warfare changes,” systems like electric warfare, battle management, et cetera, will become increasingly important, likely competing with “traditional platforms.”

“We’re having to divest some of [traditional platforms] to free up resources to move forward,” Kendall said. “There’s been resistance to that in the past.”

Kendall is referring, in large part, to the increasing sophistication of air defense systems and the resultant inadequacy of legacy fighters – like the F-15 and F-16, which make up the bulk of the USAF fighter fleet – to operate against those air defense systems.

But, most of the US fleet requires that air superiority has been established to operate successfully. Otherwise, modern radar, modern SAMs, and modern air superiority fighters would pick off the US’s fourth-generation fighters (and support aircraft, of course).

What the US needs is aircraft that can operate against sophisticated air defense systems. That means stealth aircraft to evade detection. And it means aircraft with radar and missile systems advanced enough to compete against fifth-generation fighters.

The US does have aircraft meeting the above description. The F-22 Raptor is still the world’s preeminent air superiority fighter. And the F-35 is the world’s preeminent fighter with respect to radar, data fusion, situational awareness, and interconnectivity. But legacy equipment still makes up the majority of the USAF fleet – a force composition that US war planners are beginning to address.

“In fiscal 2024, the Air Force plans to retire 310 aircraft, including even more A-10s and E-3s, as well as 32 older F-22s,” Gordon wrote.

“I know it’s hard, locally, in particular, to divest aircraft,” Kendall said, referring to the reluctance of lawmakers to retire aircraft and in effect take away jobs and resources from local constituents.

“If it can, Kendall said, the Air Force wants to replace retired aircraft with similar systems, such as replacing an aging fighter unit with new fighter aircraft,” Gordon wrote. “If not, Kendall said the Air Force wants to convince lawmakers that a new unit something with “longevity.”

“These are operating problems we have to solve to be able to be effective against the threat that is emerging and moving forward fairly rapidly,” Kendall said. “China is not wasting any time.”

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are from Shutterstock. 

Summary and 3 Points You Need to Know: China's military modernization has focused on developing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems to keep U.S. forces out of the Indo-Pacific, enabling Beijing to deploy its growing aircraft carrier fleet to dominate the region.

-With three carriers, including the advanced Fujian, China aims to use these vessels as command centers in potential conflicts, particularly over Taiwan. As China's ambitions grow, so will its carrier fleet, posing a significant challenge to U.S. power projection.

-The U.S. should counter by establishing its own A2/AD defenses in the Western Hemisphere to deter Chinese expansion and protect American interests closer to home.

China’s military has been on a modernization craze for over a decade. Beijing has done two interesting things in their drive to offset apparent U.S. military strengths. The first is to build a robust arsenal of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) weapons and spread those weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific. 

In fact, China has invested heavily in more than just A2/AD. The world’s second-largest economy (in GDP terms) has built counterspace weapons, cyberwarfare capabilities, and other assets, all designed to do one thing: prevent the Americans from deploying forces into China’s near-abroad. 

In other words, China has perfected a strategy of denial to their region.

Once China’s military has denied the American military access to the Indo-Pacific, Beijing plans to deploy its growing aircraft carrier fleet to bully its neighbors into submission. 

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) currently possesses three aircraft carriers. The first two carriers displace 60,000 tons and are based on old Soviet designs. The third carrier, the Fujian, displaces 80,000 tons and is indigenously designed and built by China.

What’s more, the Fujian incorporates new technologies. (Some of these, such as the electromagnetic catapult system – EMALS – were pilfered from the Americans via industrial espionage.) These new technologies have helped make the Fujian one of the most advanced carriers outside of the Western world. 

Indeed, it makes China’s third carrier a significant power player in the region, and a real challenger to American and British designs. 

The Fujian is not going to be the last advanced Chinese aircraft carrier. 

In 2012, China’s now-disgraced former president, Hu Jintao, declared the People’s Republic of China will become a “great maritime power” in its own right. Presidents Hu and Xi Jinping may not have agreed on much. But on the matter of China evolving to become a dominant naval power in the Indo-Pacific, they certainly did concur.

Thanks to China’s massive manufacturing sector (which they have in part courtesy of greedy Wall Street-types and short-sighted Western politicians), they can create a fleet of these advanced boats. The question remains, however, in the era of A2/AD, how can the PLAN avoid the same complications that A2/AD poses to U.S. flattops from imperiling the PLAN’s own growing fleet of carriers?

Beijing’s logic is simple. With the Americans repelled by China’s denial systems, they will have free reign over the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait. 

They may even have dominance in the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan, though that’s a harder sell, given South Korea’s military presence in the Yellow Sea and Japan’s presence in their eponymously named sea. And until the local governments deploy methods that could significantly threaten China’s growing aircraft carrier fleet, with the Americans pushed beyond the horizon, the PLAN thinks that it can rely upon its carrier fleet.

PLAN doctrine envisions their growing aircraft carrier fleet to be used as floating command centers. In any invasion of Taiwan, then, the carriers will be used to coordinate and command the overall invasion of the embattled island democracy. 

Given these factors, the size and disposition of any Chinese aircraft carrier force would be contingent on the overall ambitions of China’s rulers. 

Their fleet will grow as their ambitions increase. 

What’s more, their fleet will grow relative to what they perceive to be the weakness of the U.S. fleet that will remain China’s primary global challenger. Interestingly, the Chinese may suddenly find themselves faced with problems that the U.S. carrier fleet currently finds itself facing in the Indo-Pacific, should the PLAN try to move beyond the third island chain in the Pacific and penetrate deeper into the waters of the Western Hemisphere.

Toward that end, Washington should take far more seriously the concept of hemispheric defense. Rather than building more expensive flattops, the U.S. military should start honeycombing the Western Hemisphere with a comprehensive network of its own A2/AD systems that can keep China’s growing aircraft carrier fleet just over the horizon.

One thing should be clear, though. China’s strategy of denial in their near-abroad, coupled with their mass production capabilities, are building a considerable military threat to the Americans. At some point, the Americans will find their traditional forms of power projection useless in regions closer to China’s shores. 

Over time, too, the objectives of China’s force will shift considerably away from denying the U.S. military access to the Indo-Pacific, and toward penetrating waters nearer to the United States. 

America’s military is primed only for expeditionary missions. 

Soon, the United States will find itself living in a contested region, with Chinese warships prowling the waters just off America’s coast and throughout the Western Hemisphere. The time is now for the United States to start implementing a rapid plan of comprehensive hemispheric defense.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's iconic Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, in service since 1975, are set to be extended due to rising global tensions and delays in the Ford-class replacement program.

-Vice Adm. Kenneth Whitesell confirmed plans to extend the lifespan of these carriers, given their crucial role in naval operations and the current strain on fleet resources.

-While the Ford-class carriers promise advanced capabilities like reduced crew requirements and an electromagnetic catapult system, production delays and budget overruns have slowed their deployment. Consequently, the Navy will continue to rely on the proven Nimitz-class carriers until the Ford-class is fully operational.

At some point, the iconic fleet of Nimitz-class aircraft carriers will be phased out of the U.S. Navy’s inventory. But it will be a while before the class at large. The lead ship debuted in 1975, but the Navy has plans to extend the venerable warships.

Despite being almost 50 years old, Nimitz-class vessels are still in high demand. As incidents flare in the Middle East and tensions rise in the Indo-Pacific, some pundits suggest the U.S. does not have enough aircraft carriers. I would argue that 11 supercarriers, by far the world’s largest inventory, is sufficient, but regardless, it seems unlikely the U.S. would enter a drawdown period when existing carriers are already overtaxed.

“Extending Nimitz, extending Ike, it’s going to happen for every Nimitz-class carrier. At least one extension,” said Vice Adm. Kenneth Whitesell in 2023, as reported by Aviation Week.

Geopolitical tensions are one reason the Nimitz class is likely to be extended. Delays to the upcoming Ford class is another. To avoid reductions in overall fleet quantity, the Navy will need to keep Nimitz vessels in service at least until replacements are available for deployment. But the Nimitz’s replacement, the Ford, has faced production issues. So while the $120-billion-plus Ford program is being sorted, the Navy will invest in Nimitz extensions.

“Carriers are the linchpin of everything we do in naval aviation,” said Rear Adm. Michael Donnelly, Aviation Week reported. “Our requirements are designed and aligned within our air wings to provide the capability out to the [combatant commands] for our ability to conduct the mission. Our ability to get the carriers out on time, whether it is new procurement or maintenance, is essential.”

The Ford is a heralded vessel. But like many weapons projects that introduce new technology, the class has been slow to get off the ground. Its lead ship, USS Gerald R. Ford, was delayed and over budget, deploying some 15 years after being named. The ship was supposed to cost $10.5 billion but ended up costing $13.3 billion. And while the Ford is quite advanced in several respects, the ship is not yet capable of hosting the F-35C. Understandably, the Navy has reservations about replacing the tried-and-true Nimitz with a glitchy Ford.

On paper, the Ford is a revolutionary design. It is built around automated features that should reduce crew requirements and decrease costs over the lifetime of the ship. The Ford was designed to offer a higher Sortie Generation Rate than the Nimitz as a result of the EMALS electromagnetic catapult system – a theoretical upgrade over the steam-powered catapult found on the Nimitz. While the EMALS hasn’t worked perfectly, the concept should be easier and cheaper to operate once it is refined.

In the meantime, the Navy will no doubt continue relying upon their proven Nimitz-class carriers.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Summary and Key History You Need to Know: In the late 1990s, Boeing's X-32 competed against Lockheed Martin's X-35 in the U.S. Department of Defense's Joint Strike Fighter program, aiming to create a versatile fifth-generation fighter for multiple branches and allies.

-Boeing emphasized simplicity in its design, focusing on stealth and speed with a single-engine cycle and delta wing shape. However, the X-32's Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) system proved less efficient than Lockheed's lift-fan design.

-Ultimately, the X-35 outperformed the X-32 in stealth and supersonic flight, leading to its selection as the F-35 Lightning II, now a key asset in global air power.

The late 1990s saw a flurry of revolutionary advances and experiments in military aerospace. In that decade the U.S. Department of Defense initiated the Joint Strike Fighter program. The idea was to develop a fifth-generation warplane for use by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as by multiple U.S. allies.

America’s premier fifth-generation warplane, the F-22 Raptor, was for the U.S. Air Force’s exclusive use. Congress explicitly forbade the Air Force from selling any variation of the F-22 to allies, including the Israeli Air Force. The F-22 was so advanced that its technological capabilities had to be kept a state secret.

The JSF program was meant to move capabilities forward while not being so complex and sensitive that its use would be limited. This was also done to tamp down on the onerous costs the F-22 program imposed. Sharing the JSF across multiple branches and foreign militaries meant the supply chain would be diverse and funded by multiple sources. 

The program would eventually yield the F-35 Lightning II. 

Lockheed Martin’s F-35 was not a lock to be the airframe selected. When it was the X-35, the future Lightning II had stiff competition from the Boeing X-32. 

As part of their bid to win the JSF race, Boeing built two prototypes, the X-32A and the X-32B. The X-32A first flew in September 2000, and the X-32B took flight in March 2001. The X-32B’s Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) capability made it appealing to the Navy for aircraft carrier operations. 

The X-32’s design focused heavily on stealth capabilities and speed, placing it firmly within the fifth-generation family of fighter aircraft. Beyond that, Boeing focused on simplicity. The X-32 was built with a Rolls Royce single-engine cycle for both conventional flight as well as vertical lift. In so doing, Boeing planned to significantly reduce maintenance costs for the X-32. 

They designed this almost beetle-looking warbird with a simplified airframe shape: a delta wing with a single, large canopy that gave pilots greater situational awareness and visibility while in combat.

An interesting development came in the form of the STOVL lift system. Rather than go with the standard lift fan system, which was, as Boeing surmised, needlessly complex, they decided to simplify again. But too much oversimplification ended up getting in the way of the engine’s efficiency.

More problems were found during testing of the X-32B’s STOVL flight systems. Boeing’s engineers needed to concoct methods for overcoming the increased heat and structural stress when the plane went vertical. 

The bird was nowhere near as sophisticated as the F-22. Still, the X-32 was a stealth warplane. What’s more, it had speed. To enhance its flying, the bird was equipped with advanced avionics, too. 

Nevertheless, the Air Force concluded that the X-35 performed better in both stealth and supersonic flight.

Boeing’s simpler lift-fan system for STOVL in the X-32B was nowhere near as efficient or reliable as the one Lockheed included in their prototype. 

There are those who today insist that the X-32 was the better of the two. This author is not convinced. 

While the F-35 Lightning II has many problems that its supporters refuse to address, it remains a powerful warbird. When compared to its Boeing counterpart, it is obvious that Lockheed got the better of Boeing, and the Pentagon made the right choice. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.

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