Diplomacy & Crisis News

And Beijing should stop perpetuating the self-serving notion that it is.

Photo by John Pemble via Flickr

On the eve of the Israeli elections back in March, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu proclaimed that there would be no Palestinian state under his watch. This created an international outcry and he quickly walked the statement back after a great success on election day.

On Wednesday, he met with European Union Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini and, for the first time since the election, outright proclaimed his commitment to a two-state solution. “We want a peace that would end the conflict once and for all… I don’t support a one-state solution, I don’t believe that’s a solution at all, I support the vision of two states for two peoples.”

Netanyahu has, however, taken numerous steps in recent days to imply otherwise:

• On Jerusalem Day, he vowed that Israel’s capital city would never be divided.
• He appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Silvan Shalom, a man who does not support a two-state solution, to be responsible for negotiations with the Palestinians (should they resume down the road).
• He appointed HaBayit HaYehudi’s Ayelet Shaked as Justice Minister. Less than one year ago, Shaked proclaimed in a Facebook post that “the entire Palestinian people is the enemy… including its elderly and its women, its cities and its villages, its property and its infrastructure.”
• His newly reappointed Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon launched a three-month trial program that would have segregated buses for Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank. Netanyahu nixed it after one-day, deciding ultimately that it was “unacceptable.”

But words matter, and how Bibi talks about the future matters. When he speaks to a delegation from the EU, his words are reported. Israelis now know that he is (still) committed to the peace process (again), at least on paper.

Wonder what he says to international delegations when the cameras are not rolling? This week, we might have gained some insight.

Wisconsin Governor and presumptive GOP presidential candidate Scott Walker visited Israel last week on a five-day “listening tour.” He released no itinerary and spoke to no press. But he did allow his trip to be livetweeted by one of his tour guides, Matt Brooks, Executive Director of the Republican Jewish Coalition.

Walker met with Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog, Jewish Agency chairman Natan Sharansky, Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett, Knesset Speaker Yuli Edelstein, National Infrastructure Minister Yuval Steinitz, Israel Defense Forces and former Deputy Chief of Staff Uzi Dayan, U.S. Ambassador Dan Shapiro and of course Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu. Peter Beinart astutely points out that Walker, despite going on this educational trip to Israel, never met with any Palestinians (Israeli citizens or otherwise).

What that means is that Walker got a very Jewish Israeli side of the conflict. That’s fine — he is entitled to speak with whoever he wants. And likewise, he is not required to meet with anybody he doesn’t want to speak with.

But here’s where we get some insight into what Netanyahu and his allies are likely saying behind closed doors. Walker came home last week and paid a visit to Sean Hannity. When the subject of his trip to Israel came up, Walker’s comment on the two-state solution was that, “it’s not the time for that now.” He declared that Israel would “need defensible and secure borders and they’re a long way off from having that happen.” He continued: “We were looking there and you could see [from] a helicopter up in the air you could see how close the threats were from Hezbollah, the Islamic State, down to the problems in Gaza.”

Walker’s fresh perspective on the two-state solution is not exactly nuanced. The fact that Israel needs “defensible and secure borders” could realistically be an argument in favor of a two-state solution. While some argue that the settlements act as a safety net, functioning like a “bulletproof vest for Israel” (that’s according to Silvan Shalom, Israel’s new point person or Palestinian negotiations), they also keep Israel from having a true border, which can then be fully defended and secured.

While talking about the two-state solution, Walker also brings Hezbollah and the Islamic State into the mix, with a vague mention to “the problems in Gaza.” Maybe Walker believes that a two-state solution will be more viable once we see a major shift toward stability and peace in the Middle East. If that is the case, then “long way off” should be taken quite seriously.

Walker pontificating on the future of Israel and the Middle East, however, is not really the point. The point is that Walker just went on a listening tour to Israel and while there, he met behind closed doors with top Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Netanyahu. And the first real comment Walker made following his trip was to say that the two-state solution is not viable, at least for the foreseeable future.

Did he hear from these top Israeli leaders how much they yearn to find a way toward a two-state solution, and then return home and and offer Hannity a completely different take? Maybe. But probably not.

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.

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From left front: Falah Mustafa Bakir, Qubad Talabani, and President Masoud Barzani meet with President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden (third and fourth from right front) in the White House, May 5, 2015.

After a perilous roller coaster ride in 2014, the question of independence for the Kurdistan Region moves back to the front burner.

With the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) latest victory in Ramadi, contentions its rapid advances had stalled must be revisited. In the wake of the visit to Washington by Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) president, Masoud Barzani, the question of KRG priorities and strategies might once again be changing.

The Islamic State’s blitzkrieg into Mosul last summer, and the failure of the Iraqi Army to do anything but flee, created a new capital for the self-described caliphate.  It caused a humanitarian disaster for Yezidis, Christians and others. And it fomented an urgency among many in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, who sensed that Baghdad could not defend the country, and so the Kurdistan Region (KR) would have to defend itself – independently.

ISIS’s pivot to Kurdistan later in the summer, threatening its capital, Erbil, was frightful and sobering. Even with the dedicated efforts of the Region’s militia (the peshmerga), the KRG and its people recognized it needed significant outside help from Europe, the United States and elsewhere to defend itself.

In September 2014, Haider al-Abadi became Iraq’s prime minister, replacing Nouri al-Maliki, in whom the KRG had no confidence. In December, Erbil and Baghdad reached an agreement that was supposed to resolve the struggle over oil exports and finances between Baghdad and Erbil. But it is not clear that the KRG believes Baghdad has lived up to its end of the agreement.

In May 2015, Barzani brought specific goals and a clear message to Washington. He spoke at the Atlantic Council and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). At each, he was pressed on the relevant issues:  does he believe he will get the necessary weapons that have been promised?  what is the status of Baghdad-Erbil relations?  What role do Iran and Turkey play in all this calculus? What is the status of the extra-constitutional extension of his term limits? And will – or when will — the Kurdistan Region make a formal move toward independence?

Barzani’s answers were clear. The Kurdistan Region is grateful, he emphasized, for the U.S. and allied air strikes against ISIS, and for humanitarian aid for the 1.5 million refugees. But, he continued, the peshmerga need the weapons that Western states have promised, in order to fight ISIS. Washington is debating whether to deliver the weapons directly, or continue to deliver them through Baghdad. Barzani said after his meetings at the White House, he was confident they would be received.

The defeat of ISIS is the first priority, Barzani clarified. Defending the Region but allowing ISIS to survive in Syria or other parts of Iraq would not be sufficient, he said, since they would remain a threat. The defeat of ISIS, Barzani explained, is a necessary step before the inevitable task ahead. The Kurdistan Region needs and is entitled to self-governance. After the defeat of ISIS, it will hold a referendum for the people to decide whether to voluntarily remain part of Iraq.  On May 6, Barzani elaborated:

“Right now our country is in a fight against ISIS. The fight is not over. But the – that’s why the issue of referendum has been delayed. Of course, the referendum will take place. The first step for that has taken place, when the parliament in Kurdistan approved the establishment of the Commission for Elections and for Referendum. That was the first step. It will take place when the security situation is better, when the fight against ISIS is over. And of course, the people of Kurdistan have to be given the opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination for them to tell us and to tell the rest of the world what do they want, what’s their dream, what’s their aspirations.”

Barzani repeated this plan two days later:

“Of course, right now, the priority for all of us is fighting ISIS, to continue to push them out and away from our areas. But the process for the referendum to take place for the people of Kurdistan to determine their future and for the people of Kurdistan to exercise the right to self-determination is a process that has happened.  It will not stop and we will not step back on that process. We are determined, and we insist on continuing the path.”

What does the KRG need for independence?

The KRG and the Kurdistan Region need what any new or existing country needs: self-identity, security, an economy and international recognition. None of these is without complications.

Self-identity the Kurds have, but with some qualifications. The Kurds themselves have a clear awareness of their history and geography. They were promised, and then denied, their own state after World War I. Since the 1991 Gulf War, and especially since 2003, they have governed themselves with considerable autonomy, some material success, and efforts toward democracy. But most of the Middle East’s 30-35 million Kurds live outside the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, in neighboring Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Assyrians in Iraq, even before the rise and expansion of ISIS, had demands for their own autonomy, including in “disputed territories” controlled by the KRG.

Security is a more difficult matter. The risk from ISIS persists. Western air strikes on ISIS have provided vital assistance. Risks of terrorist attacks from ISIS inspiration continue as well, as arrests this week and in recent months demonstrate.

More significant security concerns may be related to the question of international recognition. Most critically, the KRG can only move forward if it knows that it has the support of the United States, or Baghdad, or both. It must know how Turkey and Iran will react toward their own Kurdish areas, and toward the KR itself. The name of a new country may be challenged, as Greece challenged the newly independent “Macedonia” after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Ideally, there will need to be at least an informal arrangement with the Kurdish areas in Syria. At the Atlantic Council and CFR, Barzani emphasized that any process would have to be diplomatic and peaceful, but that a vote on independence was inevitable.

Peshmerga soldier battles the Islamic State, December 2014.

Finally, security and international recognition are essential for any newly-independent Kurdistan economy. The KRG will have to provide its own funding; this means exporting oil. Since the KR is landlocked, that means exports through Turkey or Iraq. The United States and others will need to permit such sales on the world market, and the KRG will need legitimate buyers.

The new government will also need local and international legitimacy. After the celebration, the citizens’ demands will include real democracy.  The Barzani and Talabani families have done much in setting the KRG in the right direction, and in continuing to pledge a democratic future.  They will be challenged to sustain and improve their respectable treatment of religious minorities; to balance internal security concerns with protections for ethnic minorities; to minimize corruption; to resolve finance, oil, border, security questions within transparent rule of law, to develop a rich civil society, free and fair elections, and capable political parties, and to nurture a political environment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in law and in fact.  This was a difficult list for Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s; it may prove Herculean amidst the challenges of the Middle East.

Change of Plans?

A resurgence of the Islamic State, though, might force the KRG to reprioritize its “defeat Daesh, then vote on independence” strategy. Erbil may rely on good relations with the current Iraqi prime minister, but can it rely on the next one? Will Baghdad be able to coordinate support from Shiite militias, Sunni tribes, the Iraqi Army, and Western air strikes? Will Baghdad devote more resources to protecting Karbala and Najaf, at the expense of Sunni or Kurdish areas?  If Baghdad cannot protect major cities like Mosul and Ramadi from ISIS – will the Kurds decide they are better off alone?

Barzani laid out his priorities (without a specific timeline): defeat ISIS, then a referendum.  There is no evidence so far that the Obama administration is ready to give up the Bush/Obama commitment to a single, unified, peaceful, democratic Iraq.  But last summer the facts on the ground changed quickly and frequently. The question now will not be how vigilant are Erbil, Washington, and others, but how agile.

Photo 1:  WhiteHouse.gov, https://www.flickr.com/photos/whitehouse/17384259745/

Photo 2: Voice of America, http://gdb.voanews.com/80D2A2EC-6AE0-47ED-ADC4-381FC85F54D2_mw1024_s_n.jpg

Road to South Ossetia’s capital, Tskhinvali, courtesy Nir Nussbaum/Flickr

Just over two months ago, newspapers and other media outlets provided substantial coverage of Russia’s activities in Crimea, more specifically the “celebration” marking one year since Russia’s annexation of the region. Someone in the Kremlin perhaps saw an opportunity to take advantage of the media hubbub: That same day, March 18, Russia also effectively grew by about 50,000 people and 3,900 sq. km.

This sudden growth spurt comes as a result of a Treaty on Alliance and Integration signed by Russia and South Ossetia. “A joint defense and security zone will be created between our two countries, our customs agencies will be integrated, and border crossings for our citizens will become open,” Vladimir Putin said.

The EU, unsurprisingly, did not see it that way. A statement issued by Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, noted:

Like previous agreements signed between the Russian Federation and the two Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, this “treaty” – which includes references to a transfer of powers in some areas – clearly violates Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, principles of international law and the international commitments taken by the Russian Federation, including the 12 August 2008 Agreement and its Implementing Measures of 8 September 2008 and has no legal standing.

One commentator wondered whether the agreement was political homework for South Ossetia’s politicians, set by the Kremlin. There was disagreement among those in parliament; RFE/RL reported on dissent in the ranks over the degree of cooperation expected by Russia, just one week before the treaty was signed. But whoever gained top marks from the Kremlin would likely succeed in future political endeavors, a tempting carrot to dangle.

Was this treaty entered into willingly? There’s a short summary of the history of South Ossetia over at FPRI. Given many South Ossetian’s misgivings about Georgia, the biggest benefit in choosing Russia as a protector is clearly security: The 2008 conflict demonstrated Russia’s might in the region. However, as Larisa Sotieva noted, “Albeit rarely, some have even been heard to question what difference it would make – to lose ones’ identity as a nation to Georgia or to the vastness of Russia?” When you believe yourself to be between a rock and a hard place, which do you choose?

Georgia too is feeling the repercussions, and in such a way that should concern Western leaders. Although it issued a nicely-worded statement on South Ossetia, the EU has not delivered tangible benefits (such as visa-free travel to EU states) for Georgians. Ghia Nodia, a political scientist at a Georgian University warns that “Putin looks like a strong guy who’s getting his way, so people think, what exactly are the benefits from Europe? Maybe it’s silly to resist Russia so much.”

While the events of March 2015 may not have registered on the global radar, it seems that calling them a “blip,” an anomaly, is misguided. But getting drawn into another conflict over a territory that seems to have sealed its own fate with open eyes is also not a path many wish to go down.