Diplomacy & Crisis News

Dauer des Videos : 90'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Length of video : 90'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Dauer des Videos : 90'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Length of video : 90'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

In recent years, sovereignty has ceased to be defined solely by borders, armies, or economic output. According to the Burke International Institute’s Sovereignty Index, one of the most decisive indicators of state resilience in the 21st century is technical sovereignty—the capacity of a country to control its digital infrastructure, data flows, cybersecurity architecture, and technological decision-making without excessive dependence on external actors.   The Burke Institute’s methodology evaluates sovereignty across seven dimensions—political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive, and military—using open national statistics, global datasets from organizations such as the UN and World Bank, and structured expert assessments from hundreds of specialists worldwide. Within this framework, technical sovereignty emerges as a core pillar of modern statehood, particularly for small and medium-sized states exposed to external technological pressure.   The contrasting experiences of Albania and Montenegro illustrate two fundamentally different strategies for navigating this challenge.   Montenegro has chosen the path of structured integration. As a small Adriatic state oriented toward EU accession, it has aligned its digital development with European standards. Investments in 5G networks, smart city infrastructure, digital tourism management, and renewable energy are embedded within EU regulatory frameworks. Montenegro’s digital governance complies with GDPR, European cybersecurity norms, and EU data-protection regimes. This approach offers predictability, legal clarity, and access to shared European technological ecosystems.   From the perspective of the Burke Institute’s Sovereignty Index, Montenegro’s strategy strengthens institutional stability and information security, but it also constrains autonomous decision-making. Technical sovereignty here is partially delegated upward, embedded in supranational regulatory systems rather than nationally defined architectures.   Albania, by contrast, has pursued a markedly experimental path. Once known more for institutional fragility than innovation, the country has rebranded itself as a testing ground for radical digital governance. Following severe cyberattacks in 2022 that exposed deep vulnerabilities in state systems, Albania embarked on an aggressive reform agenda focused on internal control rather than external standardization.   The e-Albania platform now provides access to approximately 95 percent of government services in digital form. Unlike conventional e-government systems, this platform integrates artificial intelligence not merely as a service tool but as an analytical mechanism supporting administrative decision-making. Albania’s experiment with delegating procurement analysis and administrative optimization to AI has sparked international debate: does algorithmic governance dilute sovereignty—or does it strengthen it by reducing human corruption and external manipulation?   From a Burke Institute perspective, Albania’s approach represents an attempt to internalize technological control rather than outsource it. The critical question becomes infrastructural: where is data stored, who controls the servers, and under whose jurisdiction do the algorithms operate? Unlike Montenegro, Albania retains greater discretion to define its own data-protection standards, encryption protocols, and system architecture. This flexibility enhances autonomy but increases exposure to risk.   Energy sovereignty further complicates the equation. The Burke Institute emphasizes that technical sovereignty cannot exist without energy stability. Montenegro’s investments in solar capacity—such as plans for a 41.81 MW solar plant—directly support the resilience of its digital infrastructure. Albania, meanwhile, remains vulnerable to energy disruptions due to heavy reliance on hydroelectric power, which is sensitive to drought. In this dimension, Albania’s technological ambition currently outpaces its infrastructural base.   Cybersecurity provides another revealing contrast. Montenegro operates within EU cybersecurity frameworks, benefiting from standardized protection mechanisms but relying on external oversight. Albania’s independent path places it on the front line of cyber threats, where innovation and vulnerability coexist. The 2022 cyberattack demonstrated the risks inherent in experimentation—but also triggered institutional learning and rapid capacity-building.   In terms of global positioning, Montenegro represents incremental integration within a stable hierarchy. Albania has positioned itself as a technological outlier—a “laboratory state” experimenting with governance models that larger countries hesitate to test. According to the Burke Institute’s analytical framework, both strategies represent different configurations of sovereignty rather than a binary choice between dependence and independence.   Ultimately, the comparison raises a deeper question central to the Institute’s research agenda: is sovereignty best preserved through integration into reliable systems, or through the risky pursuit of autonomous control? Albania prioritizes speed and innovation, Montenegro stability and security. One accepts vulnerability in exchange for agency; the other accepts constraint in exchange for predictability.   The Burke International Institute’s Sovereignty Index does not prescribe a single path. Instead, it highlights trade-offs. For small states, technical sovereignty is not an absolute condition but a spectrum shaped by institutional capacity, energy security, cybersecurity resilience, and political will.   In the digital age, sovereignty is no longer seized by force—it is designed. Albania and Montenegro demonstrate that even the smallest states can influence their technological destiny. The question is not whether dependence can be eliminated, but who defines its terms.   Full methodology and comparative sovereignty rankings are available via the Burke International Institute.

A U.S. THAAD battery deployed in Seongju, South Korea. Credibly deterring Chinese coercion would require additional THAAD batteries integrated into a regional missile defense network. (Source: BBC)

On February 5, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction (New START) Treaty will expire, ending the last legally binding limits on U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. With it goes a framework that capped deployed warheads at 1,550 and delivery vehicles at 700—and, more importantly, the verification regime that anchored strategic stability for over a decade. Russia’s 2022 suspension, followed by repeated violations ranging from INF-style prohibited systems to novel delivery vehicles like the nuclear-powered Burevestnik missile, made renewal politically and strategically untenable. China, never a party to New START, has exploited this vacuum, accelerating a nuclear buildup from roughly 500 warheads in 2025 toward an estimated 1,500 by 2035.

The United States now confronts, for the first time, two near-peer nuclear competitors simultaneously; thus Washington’s response—preparing for nuclear “uploads” and reinforcing the credibility of the strategic triad—is necessary yet insufficient. Without ceilings on strategic arsenals, stability will increasingly hinge on whether escalation can be managed below the nuclear threshold, thereby making conventional deterrence in the Indo-Pacific—especially land-based missile defense and forward-deployed resilience—decisive. Yet this task cannot be carried by the United States alone. Allied burden‑sharing—particularly through alliance modernization that builds interoperable Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks atop ground‑based air and missile defense systems—is no longer optional; it is a prerequisite for credible integrated deterrence in the post–New START era, and a pathway toward a Pacific architecture deliberately designed to blunt Chinese coercion—modular, mobile, and resilient enough to deny Beijing the ability to localize risk or exploit allied hesitation, while pairing denial with calibrated punishment across cyber, space, and information domains to impose costs for grey‑zone aggression without crossing nuclear thresholds.

Strategic Unraveling: A Triangular Arms Race Begins

With New START gone, an unconstrained triangular arms race is already underway. Russia has modernized roughly 90 percent of its nuclear triad and can sustain a deployed arsenal near former treaty limits while diversifying delivery systems. China, meanwhile, represents the more destabilizing variable. It is constructing hundreds of new missile silos, deploying DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles, expanding dual-capable DF-26 systems, and fielding hypersonic glide vehicles designed to compress U.S. decision time and overwhelm regional defenses.

According to an Atlantic Council expert, U.S. strategy must adapt to this new reality: in the short term, Washington should upload additional warheads onto Ohio-class SSBNs, reintroduce multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on portions of the Minuteman III force, and deploy the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) weapon aboard B-52 bombers to restore counterforce leverage against two near-peer competitors simultaneously; in the medium term, rely on the Columbia-class SSBN, B-21 Raider bomber, and nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) to ensure the strategic triad’s survivability and credibility through the 2040s; and diplomatically, keep trilateral arms-control talks viable while investing in NC3 resilience and missile-defense architectures, including exploratory concepts like a continental “Golden Dome.”

The costs of adapting to the post–New START environment, however, are staggering. Congressional Budget Office estimates place U.S. nuclear modernization at roughly $946 billion by the mid‑2030s. Yet nuclear spending alone cannot manage escalation. INDOPACOM still faces an estimated $27 billion shortfall in conventional capabilities—especially missile defense, strike, and sustainment—leaving U.S. forces exposed in the opening phases of a crisis. Without resilient conventional forces, nuclear investments risk becoming instruments of last resort rather than tools of stability.

U.S. Typhon MRC (ground-launched SM-6/Tomahawk system for 1,500km precision strikes) launcher and C2 vehicle at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, Sept. 15, 2025 (Source: Asahi Shimbun).

The Indo-Pacific Front: Why Alliance Modernization—Especially Conventional Forces—Anchors Stability

Indo-Pacific allies routinely affirm their commitment to a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” yet capability gaps remain stark. Japan’s planned increase to 2 percent of GDP by 2027 masks persistent delays in force integration and C4ISR interoperability—revealing structural gaps that hardware spending alone cannot bridge. South Korea spends roughly 2.7 percent of GDP on defense, but much of that investment remains concentrated on peninsula-specific contingencies rather than scalable regional stabilization.

In the post–New START environment, burden-sharing defined merely as cost-sharing is no longer sufficient. What deterrence now requires is shared risk and shared resolve: allied decisions that visibly place national territory, forces, and political capital inside the same escalation ladder faced by the United States. Ground-based deployments, forward rotations, and interoperable data fabrics that turn disparate sensors into unified battle management matter precisely—converting alliances from siloed hardware buyers into networked deterrence partners.

This logic aligns with a growing body of strategic scholarship, most notably the work of James Fearon and Andrew Lim. They argue that the erosion of U.S. conventional superiority—driven by China’s A2/AD architectures and Russia’s precision-strike capabilities—has produced a destabilizing overreliance on nuclear deterrence. Their core claim, however, is not that nuclear forces have become obsolete, but rather that strategic stability increasingly depends on restoring a software-orchestrated conventional triad in which penetrating strike platforms, precision fires, and mobile retaliation function as intelligent nodes within JADC2-enabled data ecosystems. Within this framework, missile defense should not be understood as a standalone pillar of deterrence but as a survivability enabler—a means of preserving offensive forces long enough to execute credible second-strike conventional operations.

Building on this strategic imperative to reinforce the conventional triad, alliance modernization in Northeast Asia could acquire tangible form. Enhanced trilateral coordination among the United States, South Korea, and Japan would allow THAAD and SPY-7 sensors to feed advanced data-fusion layers into Typhon and HIMARS effectors, thereby transforming missile defense from a purely protective measure into the foundation of software-defined second-strike precision.

In December 2025, U.S. M270A2 MLRS units stationed at Camp Casey demonstrated rapid counterfire against DPRK artillery, while HIMARS rotations from Okinawa maintained continuous availability. Yet such precision fires are credible only insofar as their survivability is assured by layered defenses, since DPRK missiles or Chinese DF-26 strikes could saturate critical hubs—such as Pyeongtaek—thereby degrading the very conventional triad Fearon and Lim prescribe. To function as a true survivability enabler against high-altitude threats, therefore, South Korea’s single THAAD battery—deployed in 2017—must be augmented through PAC-3 integration, ensuring that HIMARS forces remain preserved for follow-on strikes.

Such augmentation, however, cannot occur in isolation. Effective trilateral cooperation requires orchestration through federated C4ISR networks, complemented by Japanese contributions. In this regard, Typhon basing on Japanese territory completes the Fearon–Lim precision‑strike leg. Despite the withdrawal from Iwakuni and persistent political opposition in Okinawa, the system remains central to the trilateral alliance’s mid‑range strike capability, particularly when reinforced by Tokyo’s mobile SPY‑7 radars paired with SM‑3 Block IIA interceptors—introduced after Japan’s 2020 pivot from the canceled Aegis Ashore program—which add agile command‑and‑control enablers to the overall architecture.

The resulting theater sequence is coherent and continuous: SPY-7 tracks Chinese launches, Korean THAAD defends critical bases, HIMARS suppresses transporter-erector-launchers, Type-12 missiles secure the littorals, and Typhon targets Shanghai–Beijing command-and-control nodes—all unified through software-defined battle management.

The calculus of global power is shifting. In early January 2026, Turkey moved to join a defense pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan that could fundamentally alter the balance of power from the Eastern Mediterranean to South Asia. Yet the most consequential dimension of this emerging alliance is not military. It is financial. Together, these three states sit at the core of the rapidly expanding Islamic banking system—an industry valued at approximately $4.5 trillion and growing at an annual rate of 10–15 percent annually. What is taking shape is not merely a regional alignment, but the foundations of an alternative financial and strategic architecture capable of challenging Western economic dominance and the centrality of the U.S. dollar.   For decades, Washington assessed the Middle East and South Asia primarily through military alliances and energy flows. That framework is increasingly obsolete. The Turkey–Saudi–Pakistan axis represents a far more disruptive phenomenon: the fusion of Islamic finance, strategic deterrence, and non-Western institutional design. According to the Burke International Institute’s Sovereignty Index—which evaluates political, economic, technological, military, informational, cultural, and cognitive sovereignty across 193 states—the combined sovereignty score of these three countries reaches 1,315.7 out of a possible 2,100, placing them among the most consequential regional blocs in the emerging multipolar order.   The strength of this axis lies in its complementarity. Pakistan contributes nuclear deterrence as the only Muslim-majority country with atomic weapons, possessing an estimated 165–170 nuclear warheads and a battle-hardened military establishment. Saudi Arabia supplies financial depth, controlling nearly one-third of global Islamic banking assets and maintaining the fiscal capacity to finance long-term military and technological programs. Turkey adds advanced defense production capabilities, including drone warfare systems proven in Ukraine, Libya, and Karabakh, as well as an increasingly autonomous military-industrial base with localization rates approaching 70–80 percent.   Formal trilateral defense coordination began with meetings in Riyadh in August 2023 and Rawalpindi in January 2024. The emerging framework mirrors collective-defense logic: aggression against one partner is treated as aggression against all. Turkey’s participation—while remaining a NATO member—introduces a structural contradiction into the Atlantic alliance and accelerates the erosion of traditional Western security architectures.   Yet the most destabilizing element of this alignment is financial rather than military. Islamic banking operates on principles fundamentally distinct from Western finance. Interest-based lending is replaced by profit-sharing and asset-backed transactions. Speculative instruments are constrained, leverage is limited, and ethical investment criteria are embedded into the system itself. During both the 2008 global financial crisis and the COVID-19 economic shock, Islamic banks demonstrated notable resilience precisely because they were less exposed to speculative excess.   For much of the Global South, this model offers more than ideology—it offers insulation. As Western economies cycle through recurring debt crises, inflationary shocks, and financial volatility, Islamic finance increasingly appears not as a niche religious system but as a viable counter-cyclical alternative. When paired with sovereign energy resources and credible military deterrence, it becomes a strategic instrument.   The Burke Institute’s data reveals why apparent weakness becomes strength within this alliance. Pakistan’s lower economic sovereignty score reflects decades of operating under sanctions, capital constraints, and external pressure—experience that now translates into institutional resilience. Turkey’s defense-sector localization surge demonstrates how external pressure can accelerate autonomy rather than dependency. Saudi Arabia’s low debt-to-GDP ratio and vast foreign exchange reserves provide the financial ballast necessary to sustain long-term systemic transition.   This bloc does not operate in isolation. China acts as a strategic amplifier. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has deliberately subordinated its financial sector to the “real economy,” rejecting speculative financialization in favor of industrial development. Since 2022, more than 100 senior banking executives and regulators have been targeted in anti-corruption investigations, while salary caps and regulatory controls have reinforced state authority over capital. Chinese banks increasingly channel investment into productive sectors rather than real estate speculation, aligning finance with national development priorities.   This internal transformation dovetails with China’s external de-dollarization agenda. Pakistan is already deeply embedded in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are exploring settlement mechanisms outside dollar-based systems. When Islamic banking instruments intersect with Chinese payment rails and BRICS financial infrastructure, the petrodollar system faces structural—not rhetorical—pressure.   The geopolitical context is equally significant. Confidence in American security guarantees has weakened across the Middle East. The muted response to the 2019 Abqaiq attacks, the withdrawal of air-defense assets, and Washington’s gradual regional disengagement signaled the limits of U.S. protection. For regional actors, diversification of security and financial dependencies has become a rational strategy rather than a hostile one.   Expansion scenarios further magnify the implications. Potential inclusion of the UAE, Qatar, Malaysia, or Egypt would elevate the bloc’s share of Islamic banking assets beyond 60 percent while linking it to critical maritime checkpoints, energy corridors, and demographic scale. At that point, the system ceases to be an alternative and becomes a parallel order.   The immediate threat to the West is not military confrontation. It is gradual erosion: reduced dollar demand, sanctions circumvention, alternative development models, and declining leverage over regional decision-making. Financial systems rarely collapse suddenly; they weaken through the accumulation of credible alternatives.   For Israel, this transformation carries direct security implications. The consolidation of a Turkey-centered axis endowed with financial autonomy and strategic depth risks reshaping Israel’s regional environment from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea. Any framework that strengthens Ankara’s independent leverage while diluting Western influence affects deterrence, intelligence cooperation, and regional balance—particularly as Israel confronts threats from Iran and its proxy networks.   The challenge facing Washington is conceptual rather than tactical. Military superiority alone cannot preserve financial hegemony in a world where parallel systems are deliberately designed to be sanction-resistant. The Turkey–Saudi–Pakistan alignment does not seek to defeat the West; it seeks to render Western pressure optional.   The era of unchallenged dollar centrality and singular security patronage is ending. What replaces it will not emerge through declarations, but through institutions. The question for the United States, Israel, and Europe is no longer whether this shift is underway—but whether they recognize its strategic depth in time to respond.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Policy and security seems to be evolving rapidly, while well established structures for safety and deep traditions of liberal rights are rusting into dust. The erosion of Ministerial Responsibility, a deep rooted tradition in Parliamentary Democracies, have come to a place of almost a lost art as policymakers in Commonwealth countries continue to take policy decisions that have hurt the public without anyone in power losing their position or being held to account. The fact that the Prime Minister of Australia is still sitting in his role without his party ousting him rapidly or him resigning due to negligence that lead to the country’s worst terror massacre it its history does nothing to improve safety.

As is the tradition, Ministerial Responsibility means that whether a Minister knew, or did not know of an incident that hurt the public, it is their duty to resign as they were the only one in power who could have ameliorated the situation. Like in many Western nations, clear mass incitements have taken place alongside actual attacks, and as like those in Australia and abroad, awareness of threats are ever present. As in law, an act could be considered intentional, in that they knew of the coming danger and ignored it with intent, or in considerations of negligence, where they were so derelict of their duty in that position of power that it lead to tragic results. In either case it is considered a crime in law, so for a politician it is a matter of honour to step down and remove the humiliation felt by the nation by placing the onus on their own shoulders, thus taking the mantle of the responsibilities of his role. This concept exists for all fiduciaries in all structures in society, for a Prime Minister or Minister of the Crown to not have the scruples to remove themselves simply shames the nation, the tradition, and erodes society.

This challenge to Western nations and the insecurity felt by the public often has links to events abroad. When considering adversaries to the West, the main challengers must be considered based on public support locals have for their Government, as local often determines actions abroad. When considering Russia and its conflict with Ukraine and NATO allies, the support the public in Russia has for its Government sets it apart from other adversaries of the West. Due to the war not disuniting policy positions in the country, the war will most likely continue as sanctions did not have the intended effect on the popularity of Russia’s Government, and urban based Russian citizens are often the last in line to be placed in the military. If the war can drag on until the West loses it patience, as is often the case, the catalyst for these wars will continue, especially if Western leaders are willing to sit in power after several bouts of corruption.

A recent example of a population not supporting its own Government is the recent removal of Nicolas Maduro from Venezuela. While the Chavistas in Venezuela still hold onto Government power and have structural control of the country, the pressure put on their Government to reform to be benefit of Western powers is paramount after Maduro’s ouster, spurned on by a population that detests its own Government. While the change in Venezuela comes in drips and drabs, the Government can only suppress popular support against their regime to a point, while knowing that any move will lead to conflict with the United States. The only thing that could really salvage their regime would be a popular uprising in support of it, in the streets of Venezuela and abroad, or an American policy that grows weary of pressuring the Chavista regime in Venezuela. The task of the moment is to cut sources of funding to their regime so that the policy can outlast the invisible and ever present deadline for Chavismo in Venezuela, operating to effect not only Venezuela’s Government, but those allies in Cuba, China and Iran. The ripple effect will determine the future in 2026.

Iran at the end of 2025 is experiencing yet another wave of protests, to which the West and irresponsible governments therein continue to ignore to the detriment of citizens there, regionally and abroad. Unlike Russia, the citizenry in Iran do not support their government for the most part, and is moving towards the next step in changing the government. While this has been the case since 2009, the lack of Western support for the people and support galvanizing around a government during wartime means that the only policy solution for their regime is further conflict. With this policy, it is difficult to find a country bordering the regime that is not in conflict with it, and this policy may take these situations so far that even with regime change, conflict would continue for generations. Actions in the West are also tied to Iran, with attacks in Australia coming after evidence was found linking violence in the West to the regime. While it should always be up to locals to change their Government, the world never gave proper support for Iranians, a clear policy display that would be needed towards a change that would calm conflict in the region, abroad, and inside Iran itself.

The question of future conflict with China really comes down to whether or not families would be content donating the lives of their young men for the sake of taking over Taiwan. In most scenarios, China would be successful in dominating Taiwan but at the cost of many lives, just off the coast of some of their biggest cities and communities. It would be difficult to avoid stories of massive losses due to proximity, but also most likely due to families all finding out their one or two sons have been lost, with no one to care for their parents and small children as a result. The second front of the war would likely be in the cold mountainous regions with India, but it would become a conflict involving all of China’s regions. An ongoing conflict would involve defense around Taiwan from the US Navy and Taiwan’s defense forces in the south, Indian Army and Air challenging for lost territory in the West, and Japanese forces challenging in the North East. The conflict would block all trade by sea, removing China’s economic engine in an instant. Having stable trade, even if tariffed or lessened, is a lot easier path than modern warfare, especially from an Army that has not been in an active conflict in generations. China is most likely to act if the West is seen as weak, more reason to have responsible Ministers who are honourable, as opposed to radical entities stripping Constitutional rights from groups in the West for the sake of Anarchy and old hatreds. Most Chinese families would not wish to donate their sons for the sake of war with Taiwan. War can be avoided by both sides, if they choose the right path.

In the end, the this year will be characterized by the US and world economy, and if resulting electoral results will strengthen responsibility and values in the West, or have local politics hinder and neglect public safety and well established rights. Voting truly matters, and the decline is already apparent from bad policy and decision makers filled with negligent narratives. It is time for citizens to take onus of their own duties, their choices in leadership, and the effect on their community and their reputation among civilized nations. Those like the Prime Minister were elected, recently, with a majority government, and this was after many of the violent protests and actions had taken places on the once peaceful streets of his nation. There is no future without being responsible to the past, and honouring the values inherited from several generations that sought peace, order, and good government.

At the edge of Davos, the 19th-century church-turned-‘USA House’ seems to be the architectural epitome of Weberian ethics and American techno-capitalism (Source: Financial Times)

The White House’s confirmation that President Donald J. Trump will attend the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2026 instantly reframed the meeting’s stakes. Davos has long been caricatured as a champagne-soaked conclave of globalist elites—precisely the kind of venue Trump once mocked. Yet his return is neither ironic nor accidental. According to the Observer, Trump now openly eyes a “U.S. conquest of Davos,” using the forum to sell American capitalism back to the very elites who once dismissed it as politically toxic.

This is not Trump’s first Davos gambit. In a virtual 2025 address to the World Economic Forum, Trump delivered a blunt carrot‑and‑stick message to global business leaders: bring production and investment to American soil or face tariffs on goods sold into the U.S. market. He promised lower corporate taxes and regulatory certainty for companies that manufacture in the United States, while warning that those that did not would “very simply… have to pay a tariff” on their exports—potentially generating hundreds of billions of dollars to strengthen the U.S. economy and reduce debt.

Davos 2026, however, will be about more than tariffs. Backed by corporate heavyweights such as Microsoft and McKinsey—each reportedly pledging up to $1 million to support the US Davos hub—the United States is set to stage a precise and confident showcase of its economic and technological clout. Most events will unfold in a 19th‑century English church just outside the forum’s security perimeter, reimagined as “USA House” and adorned with imagery celebrating the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. Its chosen themes—“peace through strength,” “digital assets & economic resilience,” and “faith‑based initiatives”—reflect a blend of economic patriotism and techno‑pragmatism, crafted to underline America’s central role in shaping the twenty‑first‑century order. Within this carefully choreographed setting, Trump’s appearance could fuse a revived American capitalist narrative with an emerging club-based techno‑geopolitical initiative called Pax Silica—turning Davos into a stage for a new convergence of power, capital, and innovation.

(Source: US Department of State)

What Is Pax Silica?

Formally launched by the U.S. State Department on December 12, 2025, through the adoption of the Pax Silica Declaration, the initiative brings together a core group of U.S. allies and trusted partners—including the United Kingdom, Singapore, Israel, and the Netherlands—around a shared set of mission values: securing supply chains, protecting sensitive technologies, and building collective resilience against coercive or non-market practices. Pax Silica builds directly on earlier U.S. industrial policy, most notably the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors(CHIPS) and Science Act of 2022, while extending those domestic commitments into a coordinated diplomatic framework. By embedding industrial policy within alliance coordination, it seeks to align private capital, public regulation, and strategic planning across borders, transforming what were once national initiatives into a shared geopolitical architecture.

Within Pax Silica, participation is not defined by ideological alignment, but by adherence to common standards governing compute infrastructure, semiconductor manufacturing, energy reliability, and critical minerals sourcing. In this regulatory- and incentive-based sense, the framework operates as a selective coordination mechanism, privileging those both willing and able to meet its governance and security thresholds. From this politico-economically selective base, Pax Silica articulates ambitions that extend beyond immediate supply-chain risk mitigation. As artificial intelligence consolidates its role as a general-purpose technology, the framework treats sustained control over the full technology stack—not only algorithms, but hardware, energy, and upstream inputs—as the foundation of future economic power. Its enduring objective is therefore neither wholesale decoupling nor indiscriminate reshoring, but a rules-based reordering of global production that channels investment, innovation, and growth through trusted networks capable of sustaining competitiveness and security over time.

The implications for Davos 2026 follow naturally. Pax Silica’s appeal lies in its club-based logic: privileged access to advanced innovation ecosystems, capital markets, and technology platforms for those inside the framework, paired with rising frictions and exclusion risks for those outside it. In this light, the initiative functions less as a formal alliance than as the organizing backdrop for debates over tariffs, reshoring, and AI leadership—precisely the terrain on which Trump’s return to Davos is likely to unfold.

Could Davos 2026 Herald the New Start of Trumpian Expansionary(Scalable) Club Diplomacy?

Davos 2026 convenes under the banner of “A Spirit of Dialogue,” yet its underlying imperative is sharply pragmatic: sustaining growth and trust as compute capacity and strategic supply chains increasingly function as instruments of state power. Within this environment, Pax Silica may emerge not merely as a discrete policy agenda, but as the principal institutional lens through which the global tech‑industrial divide is interpreted. By lowering coordination costs and harmonizing standards, its club‑based logic aims to expand participation over time—quietly furnishing a strategic framework that could, in turn, shape the context of Trump’s return.

As AI shifts from experimentation to scaled deployment, decisions involving compute capacity, data‑center siting, and energy infrastructure now dictate both national competitiveness and corporate valuation. Consequently, at Davos 2026, AI represents the central axis along which growth, capital allocation, and strategic dependence converge—precisely the set of issues poised to dominate the discussions among executives, investors, and policymakers.

For Trump, AI thus constitutes the most pragmatic policy lever. When filtered through Pax Silica’s logic of scalability, strategic leverage concentrates upstream—across compute, platforms, energy, and ecosystem governance—the very domains Pax Silica seeks to standardize among trusted networks. Given U.S. primacy in frontier models and cloud infrastructure, the Trumpian approach is likely to be integrative rather than coercive: aligning AI investment, infrastructure build‑out, and regulatory expectations within a shared framework that broadens participation while anchoring it in U.S.‑centered technological norms.

Under these conditions—and driven by the urgency of scaling AI governance among like‑minded partners—Davos 2026, when accompanied by Pax Silica‑themed events, is poised to act less as a forum for persuasion than one for consolidation. Within this elite nexus, asymmetric technological advantages can be translated into durable commitments—joint ventures, shared infrastructures, and long‑term partnerships—rooted in an American‑centered AI stack. Ultimately, Trump’s presence would amplify this dynamic, positioning Pax Silica as an emergent paradigm through which technological preeminence matures into enduring economic cohesion.

By Rachel Avraham   In the contemporary global debate on sovereignty, few countries embody the paradox of independence and unresolved historical justice as powerfully as Algeria. More than six decades after the end of French colonial rule, Algeria officially stands as a fully sovereign state — yet its political narrative, institutional memory, and diplomatic posture continue to be shaped not only by the trauma of colonization, but also by the unfinished moral and legal questions that surround it. Algeria’s story is not simply one of liberation; it is the story of a state that insists that sovereignty is incomplete without historical truth.   Across much of the post-colonial world, sovereignty has long been interpreted as a formal condition — the existence of borders, a national government, a flag, and a seat in international organizations. Algeria challenges this minimalist understanding. For Algiers, independence was never meant to be merely administrative separation from France; it was envisioned as a deeper, restorative process in which recognition of colonial crimes, acknowledgement of cultural erasure, and moral accountability would stand alongside political autonomy. What emerged instead is a long-term gap between legal sovereignty and historical justice — a gap that continues to inform Algeria’s strategic behavior at home and abroad.   The French colonial enterprise in Algeria was not a marginal episode of empire; it was one of the most entrenched settler-colonial projects of the twentieth century. Land confiscation, population displacement, systematic repression, and cultural assimilation policies were accompanied by mass violence during the war of independence. These realities explain why Algeria views memory not as a symbolic exercise, but as a sovereign right. Paris, on the other hand, has walked a cautious line — acknowledging suffering, yet often avoiding full juridical language such as “crime” or “responsibility.” This tension has produced what may be called a dual narrative: legal decolonization without comprehensive moral reckoning.   It is precisely within this contradiction that Algeria positions itself in the emerging global “parade of sovereignties,” where states increasingly link legitimacy not only to power or territory, but to ethical claims rooted in history. While many post-colonial states remain satisfied with nominal independence, Algeria argues that a sovereign nation cannot be fully whole so long as its past remains officially disputed or minimized. For Algiers, the struggle for independence did not end in 1962; it transformed into a campaign for recognition — archives, remains, apologies, compensation mechanisms, and the right to narrate its own history.   This posture is not without strategic consequences. Algeria’s insistence on historical justice shapes its diplomacy, fuels segments of its domestic political identity, and at times places it in friction with former colonial actors who prefer reconciliation without accountability. Critics argue that this approach can serve as a political instrument, reinforcing state legitimacy through memory narratives and allowing the ruling elites to frame sovereignty as a perpetual revolutionary project. Supporters counter that historical silence is the greater danger, because it leaves colonial violence unexamined and perpetuates structural asymmetries in international relations.   In a broader sense, Algeria exposes a deeper transformation underway in global politics: sovereignty is evolving from a purely territorial principle into a moral-political claim. From Africa to Latin America, states increasingly demand that independence be understood not as a single historical milestone, but as an ongoing process linked to dignity, memory, restitution, and epistemic autonomy — the right to define how history is written and whose suffering counts. Algeria stands at the forefront of this intellectual shift, presenting itself as both a survivor of empire and a claimant of historical truth.   Yet the challenge for Algeria, like for many post-colonial societies, lies in balancing memory with governance. The legitimacy derived from anti-colonial struggle must coexist with the responsibilities of economic reform, political accountability, and social development. A sovereignty narrative grounded solely in the past risks becoming static; one built on both justice and modernization can evolve into a constructive force. The country’s future relevance will depend on whether it can transform historical grievance into a forward-looking project that strengthens institutions rather than replacing them.   The Algerian case therefore invites a deeper reflection on the meaning of liberation in the twenty-first century. Independence may remove the colonial power, but it does not automatically resolve the ethical and psychological legacies of domination. Formal sovereignty establishes the state; historical justice completes it. Algeria’s insistence on this distinction is not merely an internal debate — it is a message to the international system that recognition, memory, and dignity are no longer peripheral themes, but foundational components of modern sovereignty.

The Soviet Made ZSU-23-4 Shilka is slowly becoming a low cost drone killer for Ukraine in 2026.

The notion that the best defence is a good offence applies in many situations, but it is crucial that you always have a good defence to start with if you wish to keep yourself safe and capable of providing any offence. This bit of boxing and martial arts advice can be applied to military defensive measures as well, as too much offense or too much defence may win battles, but may also end up losing you the war.

The initial phases of the Ukraine War came with the furied use of special weapons systems like Javelins and other high tech anti-tank missiles during the first months of the war. Over the skies above the field of battle, the use of large and sophisticated anti-air missiles to shoot down lower cost missiles and more numerous drones took shape. While very effective, it also depleted the number of high end defence missiles that could be used against Hypersonic missile threats in the future. With the international stockpile of advance defense missiles being limited, the Hypersonic threats would become more aggressive as the years went on, and targets became harder to defend, even with successful tactical results. It has come to the point where nations that have defended themselves appropriately are now supplying interceptors to those who are in disarray in how to address their own defensive posture. While the irony exists, it remains to be seen if any lessons will be learned.

An idea which I had commented on several times since 2022 became reality as an initiative in support of Ukraine’s Armed Forces took the older Soviet ZSU-23-4 system and modernised it for anti-drone warfare. While the depletion of NATO defense systems through the attrition of advanced missiles on simple targets was likely planned by Russian forces, installing a low cost remedy to drone swarms was always the solution needed since the first day of the war. Made famous in the West in the movie The Flight of the Intruder, and through generations of active service in the East, the ZSU-23-4 Shilka was a mainstay of the Soviet Armed Forces since the 1970s. The Shilka acted as the protector of their mobile divisions through the use of a radar guided set of X4 23mm anti-aircraft cannons, mounted on a modified BTR-50 chassis, with the weapons system and radar based in a rotating turret on top of the hull.

The new privately donated initiative took to using the large global stockpile of ZSU-23-4s, re-equipping their radar and sensors with systems designed to combat drones, and redeploying the modernised ZSU-23-4MI Shilkas in the field in Ukraine. While this system is far from the most advanced, and would work only against aircraft and drones, it might be the best long term solution for the vastness of Ukraine. The best protection often comes in simple numbers, as opposed to high tech and very costly solutions. With little to nothing being done to destroy the source of the drone threats since 2022 by NATO, there has never truly been an offense to speak of in combination with these defensive measures. As with boxing and martial arts, to win a fight, you have to decide to fight it, as defense only strategies welcomes more violence from the other side.

While simple low cost responses to threats start to emerge as battlefield solutions in 2026, the basic tenets of defending one’s society also comes from having a proper defence, or simply put, an appropriate level of safety on the streets of our nations. The many instances where thoughts and prayers are given after negligent policies results is an ever losing strategy. A coordinated narrative that downplays real threats in our streets likely comes from intent, not negligence, as it literally ignores the need for security. Slow, lacking, or absence in responding to known threats when the opposite is apparent is already the biggest threat to societies worldwide. As with a losing strategy, leaders who fail must be made to exit their roles, and it should be standard that their ties and links to the results should be formally and systemically investigated. If you wish to end a war, you have to fight the war, defensively and offensively at once. This starts with protecting yourself.

Az amerikai űrsikló program hajnalán a NASA elképzelése az volt, hogy a többször használható űrjárművet olyan sugárhajtóművekkel látja el, amelyekkel önállóan lesz képes átrepülni a leszállásra kijelölt kaliforniai Edwards légierő bázisról a floridai Kennedy űrközpontba, a következő felbocsátás helyszínére. A megvalósításnak számos technikai akadálya volt, ezért a figyelem egy olyan speciális szállítógép felé fordult, amely képes a hátára venni az űrsiklót és átszállítani az országon.

A NASA két óriást vehetett számításba: a légierő Lockheed C-5A Galaxy teherszállító gépét, és a Boeing 747-est, a Jumbo Jetet, amely öt évvel korábban mutatkozott be az utasforgalomban. Az 1973-ban lefolytatott tesztek eredményei az utóbbit hozták ki alkalmasabbnak. A Jumbo biztonságosabbnak bizonyult, képes volt az Egyesült Államok leszállás nélküli átrepülésére, rövidebb futópályát tudott használni, és az élettartama is hosszabb volt. A NASA 1974 júniusára végleg elengedte azt az elgondolást, hogy az átrepülésekhez sugárhajtóműveket helyezzen el az űrsiklón, és jóváhagyta egy Boeing 747-es beszerzését és átalakítását űrsikló-hordozónak. A kiválasztott Jumbo egy 1970-es gyártású, kilencezer repült órával rendelkező Boeing 747-100-as volt, amelyet addig az American Airlines használt utasszállításra. A 30 millió dolláros költséggel tervezett átépítésre a Boeing everetti üzemében, Washington államban került sor.

[...] Bővebben!

Az Air Base blogon, ha nem is túl gyakran, de időről időre előveszem a hajózás témáját is, (ami olvasóim körében, számomra is némiképp meglepő módon, kedvező fogadtatásra talált). A kereskedelmi hajózásra leszűkítve a kört volt már szó az SS Baron Gautsch katasztrófájáról, a Greenwichben kiállított Cutty Sark klipperről, a XVIII. századi holland Amsterdam vízen úszó, jól sikerült replikájáról, spliti, fiumei és londoni múzeumok gyűjteményéről vagy csak egyszerűen egy-egy tengeri kikötő forgalmáról. Így lesz ez most is, a tavaly nyáron készült fotóimból összeállított album formájában.

[...] Bővebben!

Az elmúlt évekhez hasonlóan 2025-öt is egy vegyes albummal zárom. Olyan válogatással az idei fotókból, amelyek a cikkekből, bejegyzésekből – egyelőre – kimaradtak.

Az Aeroparkban tett tavaszi látogatásom fókuszában a légimentők L-410-ese állt, de távolról a Malév Tu-134-eséről is készítettem fotót. Néhai nemzeti légitársaságunk 1987-ben az üvegorrú HA-LBElemérrel kezdte meg a típus kivonását, de a gépet szerencsére sikerült itthon tartani, ráadásul egy darabban

[...] Bővebben!

Sovereignty is often spoken of as something that can be defended, negotiated or restored. Syria, however, forces a far more uncomfortable question: what happens when sovereignty itself collapses — not in theory, but in practice?   After more than a decade of war, sanctions and fragmentation, Syria stands as one of the starkest examples of what the erosion of sovereignty looks like in the twenty-first century. The Sovereignty Index developed by the International Burke Institute places Syria near the very bottom of the global ranking — not as a political judgement, but as a reflection of structural reality. Across nearly every domain that defines a functioning state, Syrian sovereignty has been hollowed out.   Politically, Syria remains internationally recognized, but recognition masks a far more fractured internal landscape. Authority is uneven, contested and often symbolic outside Damascus. Multiple foreign military forces operate on Syrian territory, decisions of international institutions are selectively ignored, and large parts of the country remain outside effective central control. Elections and constitutional reforms have been announced, yet public trust is fragile and consensus elusive. Sovereignty, in this context, exists more on paper than on the ground.   Economic sovereignty has fared even worse. Syria’s economy has been reduced to survival mode. GDP per capita is among the lowest globally, foreign reserves are minimal, and dependence on imports for food, fuel and basic goods is overwhelming. The national currency circulates alongside dollars, euros, liras and rials, reflecting the breakdown of monetary authority. Economic policy is constrained not only by sanctions, but by the destruction of infrastructure, capital flight and demographic collapse. A sovereign economy cannot function when production, trade and finance are structurally incapacitated.   Technological sovereignty is virtually absent. Research and development spending is negligible, digital infrastructure is fragile, and national platforms barely function beyond limited government portals. Internet access remains inconsistent, public digital services are fragmented, and nearly all advanced equipment and software is imported. In Syria, technology does not empower the state; it merely patches gaps in an environment shaped by scarcity and instability.   Information sovereignty follows a similar pattern. State media operate under heavy control, but rely on foreign platforms and infrastructure. Cybersecurity capacity is rudimentary, national data systems are weak, and digital dependence is near total. Control exists, but resilience does not. In such conditions, information sovereignty becomes a tool of containment rather than a foundation for national coherence.   And yet, Syria’s story is not one of total erasure. Cultural sovereignty remains one of the country’s last enduring pillars. Ancient cities, religious pluralism, architectural heritage and culinary traditions continue to anchor Syrian identity. Despite widespread destruction, UNESCO sites, museums, crafts and collective memory persist. Cultural survival has become a form of resistance — not against external powers alone, but against the disappearance of the state itself.   Cognitive sovereignty, though severely damaged, has not vanished. Literacy remains relatively high given the circumstances, and the tradition of education endures even as institutions struggle. Universities operate under extreme constraints, research capacity is limited, and talent continues to emigrate. But the human capital that once sustained Syria has not been fully extinguished — it has been displaced.   Militarily, Syria retains armed forces and mobilization capacity, but autonomy is sharply limited. Equipment is largely imported, strategic decisions are coordinated with allies, and foreign military presence remains decisive. The army exists, but sovereignty over force is shared, negotiated and constrained. In this sense, Syria illustrates a crucial distinction: having armed forces is not the same as possessing military sovereignty.   Taken together, Syria represents a condition that is rarely acknowledged in international discourse: post-sovereign fragility. The state exists, but cannot fully govern. Borders exist, but cannot be fully controlled. Institutions exist, but cannot deliver. Sovereignty has not been surrendered — it has been exhausted.   As the International Burke Institute prepares to release the full Sovereignty Index for all UN member states later this year, Syria’s position will serve as a warning rather than an anomaly. Sovereignty is not destroyed overnight. It erodes through war, fragmentation, institutional decay and prolonged external dependency. Once lost, it cannot be restored by declarations alone.   From my perspective as an expert affiliated with the International Burke Institute and an active participant in initiatives aimed at strengthening sovereignty worldwide, Syria demonstrates the ultimate cost of state collapse. Sovereignty is not merely about independence from others. It is about the capacity to act, to protect, to provide and to endure.   Syria reminds us that sovereignty, when stripped of institutions, resources and cohesion, becomes a memory rather than a mechanism. Rebuilding it will require not only reconstruction funds and diplomatic engagement, but something far harder to restore: trust between the state and its people, and unity within a society that has learned to survive without either.

***

Fotó: Szórád Tamás

Kim Jong‑un looks so fat that if news broke tomorrow of his death from cardiac failure—amid cheese, cigars, and a stalled treadmill—the world would barely blink; many would simply shrug and say, “Well, that tracks.” Public appearances and open‑source estimates place the supreme leader at roughly 170 cm in height and around 130–140 kg in weight, a profile consistent with severe obesity. Add to that a long‑running pattern of heavy smoking, alcohol use, calorie‑dense diets, irregular sleep, chronic stress, and prolonged sedentary work, and the cardiovascular math becomes uncomfortably straightforward. In an ordinary political system these would remain private failings; in a hyper‑personalized autocracy where a single body doubles as the state’s command center, however, they become public risks—and the country itself ends up hostage to one man’s cholesterol.

Authoritarian regimes often project an image of durability. Measured against the resilience that flows from democratic accountability, however, autocracies tend to be more brittle than they appear: they look solid until they suddenly are not. Rather than eroding gradually, they are prone to fracture once critical thresholds are crossed. History offers a consistent pattern. When a leader’s health deteriorates at the top of a highly personalized system, the effects propagate outward through the state—from Joseph Stalin’s strokes and paranoia distorting late‑stage governance, to Mao Zedong’s physical decline hollowing out decision‑making at the end of the Cultural Revolution, to Hugo Chávez’s prolonged illness paralyzing succession and policy in Venezuela, and to Egypt’s King Farouk, morbidly obese, dying young of heart failure after years of excess.

Taken together, these precedents underscore a sobering lesson for today’s axis of autocracies. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea (often grouped as the so‑called “CRINK” states), and increasingly Venezuela all face succession risks that could generate abrupt discontinuity. Pyongyang, however, remains distinct. Extreme personalization of power, the absence of routinized succession mechanisms, and the centrality of nuclear weapons compress uncertainty rather than allowing it to unfold gradually. This makes any leadership shock uniquely costly: decisions that elsewhere play out over months could be forced into days, with nuclear security, alliance management, and great‑power signaling converging simultaneously.

Were Kim to die suddenly on an ordinary day, succession ambiguity, elevated military alert postures, and nuclear command questions would surface at the same time. The situation is further complicated by the lack of transparent health disclosure, delegated authority, or institutionalized handover—constraints that narrow elite bargaining space and push the system rapidly toward one of three familiar pathways. Two plausibly involve internal stabilization: the “Bloodline Restoration” Scenario, in which the Kim dynasty re‑consolidates power around a designated heir (possibly Kim Jong‑un’s daughter, Kim Ju‑ae); or the “Collective Politburo Governance” Scenario, in which elites coalesce into a technocratic leadership coalition. Absent either, the remaining outcome is the “Warlordization” Scenario—factionalized military chaos and internal collapse, with no coherent authority able to negotiate with or control events.

If Kim’s obesity‑related health risks intensify yet sheer luck keeps him upright through 2026, and President Trump floats a tongue‑in‑cheek confidence‑building gesture—say, an effective weight‑loss drug to keep Kim Jong‑un literally alive, repurposed as diplomatic leverage (sigh)—it would merely confirm how thin the margin for error has become.

And if Kim’s uncontrollable waistline were to achieve what special operations could not, even the most optimistically stable outcome—where President Trump still maintains a hotline with a familiar counterpart, the Kim dynasty—would read like a strange footnote. Washington would not be negotiating with a general or a committee, but with the dynasty’s next custodian—perhaps facing Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju‑ae, across the table—where a Barbie doll slides forward as an icebreaker, along with talk of opening a Toys“R”Us in Pyongyang.

Democracies outlast autocracies thanks to fewer fragile bodies at the top

For policymakers in democracies—where sustainable, healthy lifestyles are not only possible but institutionally supported—the contrast with autocracy carries a dry irony. When power is dispersed and institutions absorb shocks, one leader’s cholesterol no longer qualifies as a strategic variable. After all the grand theory and high geopolitics, the conclusion is stubbornly mundane: democracy lasts not because it is wiser, but because its risks are distributed across many bodies. It is, in the end, dispersed biological durability—not ideology or strategy—that makes democracy more endurable than autocracy.

Thus, this structural advantage is worth taking seriously in 2026 for decision‑makers in democracies. If there is a New Year’s resolution worth making, it is this modest one. Cut back on alcohol, drink more water. Walk between meetings. Treat exercise not as lifestyle branding but as occupational hygiene. Metabolic discipline is not self‑help; it is risk management. Strategic discipline, in turn, begins with bodily discipline. And because power is not trapped in one body, democracies retain a merciful escape hatch: if the job becomes unbearable or the public turns hostile, leaders can step aside, retire, or lose an election, rather than allowing a failing body to linger as a national‑security variable.

The world has no shortage of contingency plans. What it lacks are authoritarian leaders secure enough in both their institutions and their health not to turn their own waistlines into a geopolitical variable.

Several international and European human rights organizations along with hundreds of social media activists took part in a huge social media campaign in front of the European Parliament in an attempt to raise awareness regarding the human rights situation in Sudan and the use of chemical weapons against civilians following the report of France 24 ,the French channel together with a euronews report that showed members of EUB network which demonstrates the use of chemical weapons against civilians by the Sudanese Armed forces.

The media campaign in Europe comes as a continuous action to support the work of several human rights organizations which called upon the EU and international community to tell the Sudanese Armed forces to stop the use of chemical weapons and to call for ceasefire and peace as well as bring humanitarian aid to a suffering population.

It is also an action to inform young people in Europe and beyond about this forgotten crisis which caused the death of more than 150,000 people, the famine of more than 25 million people and the displacement of more than 14 million people.

Andy Vermaut, journalist and human rights defender, regretted that “Egypt, our neighbor across the sands, has aligned itself with the Sudanese Armed Forces, offering support that sustains the cycle of violence—support driven by borders and waters shared, yet prolonging the very chaos that drives refugees to their doors, over two million strong, fleeing homes turned to ash.”

According to Vermaut, “Iran extends its reach, arming the army with drones and weapons that tear through communities—exporting turmoil to a land already scarred by division, where ambition overshadows aid. Turkey and Qatar, too, lend their hands—through arms, through influence—turning Sudan’s internal strife into a theater of international ambition, where the powerful play games and the powerless pay the price; where alliances meant for stability instead fuel the fires of destruction.”

Vermaut continued, “And then there are the weapons that haunt our collective conscience: reports of chemical agents, chlorine gas deployed by the Sudanese army against its own people—choking the air of hope in places like Khartoum, violating every principle of human decency, echoing the horrors of wars we vowed never to repeat.”

Sadaf Daneshizadeh, representative of “Prosperous Iran”, joined this campaign by highlighting that “The Sudanese conflict must be analyzed not only as an internal crisis, but also within the broader context of regional dynamics. Several external actors, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, appear to be playing an indirect but significant role, notably through military cooperation and the transfer of capabilities, such as drone systems. These interactions, even when presented as strictly bilateral or defensive, contribute to the prolongation of hostilities and the worsening of the humanitarian situation.”

Manel Msalmi, women’s rights advocate and human rights advisor at Milton Friedman Institute, mentioned the report of France 24 and stressed the fact that “We all share a joint duty to uphold the rights and dignity of every individual, regardless of their location. We must not choose silence in the face of inaction; rather, we should raise our voices and ensure that the plight of the Sudanese people is acknowledged. To advocate for and support the Sudanese population, it is crucial to stay updated on the circumstances. This report aims to draw the world’s attention on the swiftly changing situation, underline the dangers of a further decline, and stress the immediate actions that are necessary to avoid further escalation.”

All the participants called for an immediate action, a ceasefire and a peace plan which guarantees access to humanitarian aid, food and shelter and put an end to the huge displacement crisis.