Diplomacy & Crisis News

Six years ago, I testified before the United States Senate and suggested the return of mass and attrition as foundational force planning principles within the national defense strategy. I went on to note the need was urgent given our existing capability gaps against China and Russia in particular.

Fast forward to 2023 and a war of mass precision, at range and at scale, is taking place in Ukraine. Unfortunately, the US military did not use the intervening years to get well.

Congress and the Budget Control Act certainly did them no favors, either. But even worse is the seeming inability in Washington to plan beyond a preferred outcome, rather than a more likely—and bloody—reality. 

Policymakers should not be lulled into complacency by faulty assumptions of a technologically unmatched and better trained military, as years of prioritizing capability over capacity have created a brittle force. The war in Ukraine should also dispel any considerations that long and violent wars are unlikely. 

These myths become ever more apparent as China continues to achieve parity with—or exceed—the United States military in several modernization areas, including land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, shipbuilding, integrated air defense systems, and land-based (stationary and mobile) intercontinental ballistic missile launchers.

Furthermore, China has the world’s largest standing army, navy, coast guard, maritime militia, and sub-strategic missile force. As of 2020, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) had 355 battle force ships, and the US Navy had 296. In the years since, that gap has only widened. Modern projections indicate that by 2035, China’s navy will grow to 475 ships, while the United States will remain stagnant at just 305 ships as ship retirements take their toll on the aging fleet. China’s fleet is also undergoing rapid modernization, with the PLAN of the future consisting of increased quantities of modern aircraft carriers, destroyers, cruisers, and nuclear-powered submarines.

China’s widening lead in terms of sheer quantity is reinforced by its staggering industrial ability to produce warships. Information from the Office of Naval Intelligence reveals the ever-growing gap between the shipbuilding industries supporting the American and Chinese navies. The briefing notes that Beijing’s fleet is being built by a robust Chinese military-civil shipbuilding industry, “…more than 200 times more capable of producing surface warships and submarines,” than the American shipbuilding industry. If conflict broke out and losses had to be replaced, Washington would have to make tough choices with limited production capacity, while Beijing could start putting down hulls of all shapes and sizes.

The war in the Ukraine has prompted the US Army to move significantly faster in munitions production and surge their defense industrial base to keep pace with demand for shells. But this surge is the exception and not the rule when it comes to the investment portfolios of the Armed Forces faced with looming budget cuts.

Worse yet, the inadequate levels of precision munitions on hand for the US military lays bare the fact that Washington has allowed America’s defense industry to size and scale to just one war at a time. The consequences of this atrophy are now painfully apparent as horrific wars are simultaneously underway in Europe and the Middle East. Washington should not be forced to choose which of our allies it can support at any given time.

All of these signs indicate that it is time to dump the failed Pentagon one-war planning and adopt a “three-theater” force-sizing construct that accounts for the vast range of activities the military performs.

To remain a global power, the United States must preserve a favorable balance of power in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. Furthermore, Washington must remember that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to maintaining American security, and that the “ways and means of doing so differ from theater to theater,” as noted by my colleague Giselle Donnelly.

This means that not only must the active duty military grow—and budgets alongside it—but also be coupled with bolstered manufacturing ability to support those in uniform for a new era of protracted engagements. These engagements will require a strong industrial base to provide necessary capabilities for rapid repair in theater and sustained production. Just as equipment without soldiers to man them are essentially paperweights, so too are the armed forces without a robust and healthy industrial base necessary to maintain combat power.

Without a strong defense industrial base, America is destined to lose the next war more quickly.

Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she works on defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness.

This article was first published by the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Creative Commons.

As Israel prepares for a massive military operation against Hamas in Gaza, risks of an escalating regional conflict loom large. The most critical additional threat to Israel is from Hezbollah, the militant group and political party based across Israel’s northern border in Lebanon.

Hamas and Hezbollah are both backed by Iran and see weakening Israel as their primary raison d’etre. However, the two groups are not the same. Their differences will likely influence their actions – and Israel’s – in the days and weeks to come.

Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah has, to date, not gone to war purely for the Palestinian cause. That could change. Hezbollah has not yet fully entered the current conflict, but the group has exchanged fire with Israel, across the northern border with Lebanon. Meanwhile, Iran has said that an expansion of the war may be “inevitable”.

What is Hezbollah?

Named the “party of God”, Hezbollah bills itself as a Shia resistance movement. Its ideology is focused on expelling western powers from the Middle East and on rejecting Israel’s right to exist.

The group was founded in 1982 – in the middle of the 15-year Lebanese civil war – after Israel invaded Lebanon in retaliation for attacks perpetrated by Lebanon-based Palestinian factions. It was quickly backed by Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which supplied funding, weapons and training in an effort to expand Iranian influence in Arab states.

Hezbollah’s military force continued to develop after the Lebanese civil war came to an end in 1990, despite most other factions disarming. The group continued to focus on “liberating” Lebanon from Israel, and it engaged in years of guerrilla warfare against Israeli forces occupying southern Lebanon until Israel’s withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah then largely focused its operations on retaking the disputed border area of Shebaa Farms for Lebanon.

In 2006, Hezbollah engaged in a five-week war with Israel in an attempt to settle scores rather than with an aim to liberate Palestine. That conflict killed over 158 Israelis and over 1,200 Lebanese, mostly civilians.

From 2011, during the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah’s power grew further as its forces assisted Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, an ally of Iran, against mostly Sunni rebels. In 2021, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said the group had 100,000 fighters (though other estimates range between 25,000 and 50,000). It boasts a sophisticated military arsenal equipped with precision rockets and drones.

The group has also functioned as a political party in Lebanon and holds significant influence, often described as a “state within a state.” Eight members were first elected to the Lebanese parliament in 1992, and in 2018, a Hezbollah-led coalition formed a government.

Hezbollah retained its 13 seats at the 2022 election but the coalition lost its majority and the country currently has no fully functioning government. Other Lebanese parties accuse Hezbollah of paralysing and undermining the state and of contributing to Lebanon’s persistent instability.

What is Hamas?

“Hamas”, which translates literally as “zeal,” is an Arabic acronym for the “Islamic resistance movement”. The group was founded in 1987, in Gaza, as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, a prominent Sunni group based in Egypt.

Emerging during what’s known as the first intifada or uprising of Palestinians against Israeli occupation, Hamas quickly adopted the principle of armed resistance and called for the annihilation of Israel.

Palestinian politics shifted significantly after 1993’s Oslo accords, a series of agreements negotiated between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) with the aim of establishing a comprehensive peace agreement.

Opposed to the peace process, Hamas’s armed wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, established itself as the primary force of armed resistance against Israel. It launched a series of suicide bomb attacks that continued through the early years of the second intifada (2000-2005), before shifting to rockets as a primary tactic.

Like Hezbollah, Hamas operates as a political party. It won parliamentary elections in 2006, and in 2007, it gained control of the Gaza Strip in a bloody battle with rival party Fatah that left over 100 dead. Hamas has controlled Gaza ever since, showing little tolerance for political opposition. They have never held elections, and political opponents and critics are frequently arrested with reports of torture.

Over this time, Hamas’s armed wing has become increasingly sophisticated. Its arsenal now comprises thousands of rockets, including long-range missiles and drones.

How are Hamas and Hezbollah different?

Hamas has increasingly received funding, weapons and training from Iran, but it is not in Iran’s pocket to the same degree as Hezbollah, which is backed almost exclusively by Iran and takes its directives from the Islamic Republic.

What’s more, as a Sunni organisation, Hamas does not share the Shia religious link to Iran that characterises Hezbollah and most of Iran’s proxies. As a result, while Hamas no doubt benefits from Iran’s patronage, it tends to operate more independently than Hezbollah.

In contrast, Hamas has received support in the past from Turkey and Qatar, among others, and operates with relative autonomy. The group was also long at odds with Iran over their opposing stances in Syria.

Right now, this is very much a war between Israel and Hamas. Hezbollah remains, however, a threat to Israel. If activated by Iran, its full involvement would rapidly change the course of the conflict and likely open up a regional war.

Julie M Norman is an Associate Professor in Politics & International Relations & Co-Director of the Centre on US Politics at UCL.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image: Creative Commons. 

In the wake of the horrific attack on Israel staged by Hamas terrorists on October 7, the relationship between Qatar and Hamas is coming under intense scrutiny among American observers. Some have argued that the United States should punish or at least heavily pressure Qatar, possibly alongside Turkey, as a result of their relations with Hamas and the wider Muslim Brotherhood. But shaking the foundations of the U.S.-Qatar security relationship, which has served the United States well since 1996, would be very unwise.

First, it is important to put Qatar’s relationship with Hamas in its U.S. and Israeli context. Hamas was at the center of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policy of avoiding any serious discussion of a Palestinian state. It has been widely reported in the Israeli press that Netanyahu made remarks at a 2019 meeting with Likud leaders suggesting that Israelis who oppose a Palestinian state should support the (mostly Qatari) transfer of funds to Gaza because maintaining a separation between Gaza and the autonomous zones in West Bank under the Palestinian Authority would prevent it from being established. That was not Qatar’s motivation in providing funds to keep Gaza afloat in the absence of a normal economy, but Qatar was clearly acting with the knowledge and acquiescence of Israel’s leadership.

Second, Qatar has two larger neighbors, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which seriously considered undertaking an act of military aggression against Qatar in 2017 at the outset of their blockade of travel and trade with Qatar. The large U.S. base near Doha seriously constrained any plans for such aggressive action, even as President Trump briefly seemed to support the Saudi-UAE side. While these countries have normalized relations and reopened embassies subsequently, the same rulers remain in power, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia remains a mercurial figure. Even after Qatar’s military buildup in subsequent years, it remains heavily overmatched by its neighbors. Thus, it would be highly irrational for Doha to use the Al Udeid basing rights as leverage against Washington, and it would shake the Qatar-U.S. relationship to the absolute core if the latter sought to move the base to either of those countries.

There are also several well-known obstacles to moving U.S. air assets to Saudi Arabia or the UAE. The State Department already paused the sale of F-35 fighter aircraft to the UAE due in part to concerns about potential Chinese influence and presence. It is also doubtful that Saudi Arabia would completely fund a U.S. base the way Qatar has. As the Biden administration’s recent negotiations with MBS over potential normalization with Israel have shown, MBS makes “asks” of the United States, not the other way around. Finally, it bears remembering that Qatar allowed Al Udeid to be used for attack missions in Iraq, even after Qatari officials had stated their opposition to the 2003 invasion. The UAE limited the use of the Al-Dhafra base during the 2003 invasion to non-lethal refueling and reconnaissance missions. Though the invasion of Iraq was clearly a mistake, the flexibility provided by our arrangement with Qatar when the chips were down, even as they wisely counseled us against it, was critical to the undertaking.

Finally, Qatar is currently undertaking delicate negotiations on behalf of both the United States and Israel with Hamas to seek the release of Israeli, American, and other hostages. Qatar is also presumably continuing to act as an intermediary between the United States and Iran as we seek to avoid escalation into a wider regional war and maintain some of the forbearance they have shown recently in their nuclear program. There will be a time for Washington and Doha to discuss Qatar’s relations with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Still, there is no reason to shake the foundations of the bilateral security relationship at the moment. While there is no prospect of near-term normalization with Israel, they will continue to have contacts on the issue and any new framework for governance in Gaza. That may be more productive under a new Israeli government—the events of the last two weeks have demonstrated the bankruptcy of Netanyahu’s approach toward the Palestinian issue.

Greg Priddy is a Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Sven Hansche / Shutterstock.

Recently released documents show that the United States has conducted at least nine flight tests of a new long-range nuclear cruise missile meant to be carried by America’s B-52 and forthcoming B-21 Raider bombers. While details about this new missile, dubbed the AGM-181A Long Range Stand Off cruise missile (LRSO), remain limited, these successful tests suggest the weapon is well on its way to entering service before the close of the decade. 

While development on the LRSO has been no secret, discussions about this new nuclear-capable cruise missile have been rather muted in recent years. In fact, as far as Sandboxx News can tell, only one of the nine successful flight tests to date had previously been revealed. Word of the rest of these tests only reached the public in early October, when Air & Space Forces Magazine’s Editorial Director John Tirpak came across their inclusion in a 2022 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). Although the report was dated December 2022, it was only released some weeks ago. 

The LRSO is slated to replace America’s aging fleet of AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM). Its road to service began in 2017 with contracts awarded to both Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to develop competing designs. By 2020, the Air Force announced their decision to move forward with Raytheon’s design, moving Lockheed Martin into a support role rather than removing them from the effort. 

This new long-range weapon will be part of the venerable B-52 Stratofortress’ nuclear arsenal, but will also be carried internally by the forthcoming B-21 Raider – America’s new stealth bomber in active development. 

Although there were nine successful flight tests listed in the report, it appears as though the missile itself was only flown in four of them. The other five included things like captive-carry flight tests, where the missile is carried either internally or externally by aircraft to ensure its size, shape, dimensions, or mounting points don’t cause any unforeseen issues. Based on the information within the report, at least one of the successful flight tests was conducted with what was almost certainly an inert test article based on the W80-4 nuclear warhead. 

The Warzone was able to confirm this test via the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration’s Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which highlighted the test’s success. 

“The LRSO and W80-4 Life Extension Program joint test teams completed the first powered flight test of a LRSO Cruise Missile with W80-4 Warhead released from a B-52 aircraft. The missile successfully released from the aircraft, powered its engine, and executed all in-flight maneuvers,” the report states. 

The W80-4 warhead is a life-extension program for the “dial-a-yield” W80-1 warheads already in service. These weapons come with two different yield settings: they are able to produce a relatively small five-kiloton blast (about one-third the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945), or a much larger 150-kiloton blast – or about 10 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. 

This weapon is being designed primarily to serve as a long-range portion of the airborne leg of America’s nuclear triad, but the Defense Department has not ruled out the possibility of also fielding a conventionally armed variant for more tactical strikes. Early documents suggest plans to produce 1,020 missiles for service with 67 additional test articles, but it’s unclear if those figures have shifted in the years since the program’s announcement. 

Initially, plans called for this missile to enter service in 2030, but it now appears that the weapon could be ready much earlier. As a result, the hold-up may just be the W80-4 program, which is expected to be complete in 2027. 

Like the vast majority of new Air Force weapons and platforms, the LRSO is being designed with an open software and hardware architecture, which should allow the branch to take competing bids on upgrades and update efforts in the future from a variety of firms, bringing down the cost of keeping this new missile viable for years – or likely decades – to come. 

The B-52H is a highly capable and cost-efficient bomber, but it’s not sneaky. While the Air Force does maintain an inventory of nuclear bombs, air-launched cruise missiles make it possible for bombers like the modern B-52H to deploy nukes from stand-off ranges, or well outside the reach of enemy air defenses or even combat air patrols.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: Keith Homan / Shutterstock.com

In the wake of the shocking attack against Israel by Hamas, much attention has focused on the role of Iran, given its material, financial, and rhetorical support for Hamas. What is the nature of the coordination between Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah? How does Iran perceive its interests in this situation? Does Iran still view Hezbollah’s missile capabilities as a deterrent against a potential Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities? Or have Iran’s calculations potentially changed in a way which would make a large-scale attack by Hezbollah more likely than that would imply? On October 17, the Center for the National Interest hosted a discussion of these issues and more.

Dr. Raz Zimmt is an expert on Iran at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). He holds a master’s degree and a PhD in Middle Eastern history from Tel-Aviv University and was selected as an Alice and Paul Baker Research Fellow at the INSS. His PhD dissertation focused on Iranian policy towards Nasserism and Arab radicalism between 1954 and 1967. He is also a research fellow at the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel-Aviv University. He is the author of the book “Iran From Within: State and Society in the Islamic Republic” published (in Hebrew) in 2022. In addition, he is the editor of “Spotlight on Iran,” published by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. His main research interests are the politics, foreign relations, society & social media of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Greg Priddy, Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center, moderated the discussion.

Image: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock.

How the war in Ukraine ends is clearly the most important geopolitical question confronting the international community today. I do not claim to know how the war will end. That is because the mechanisms by which interstate hostilities normally cease—negotiated settlements and military victory—appear nowhere in sight.

Two intractable issues preclude the possibility of a peace agreement. The first is that Ukraine (understandably) demands the return of all the territory seized from it by Moscow beginning in 2014. This includes the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Crimea. For its part, Russia sees this territory as a crucial buffer against Western encroachment and, therefore, has no intention of ever returning it to Ukraine. Absent Moscow’s willingness to return this land, there remain no grounds for a negotiated settlement.

The second issue involves that which arguably ignited the war in the first place—NATO’s intention to eventually extend membership to Ukraine. Moscow demands that the West renounce any present or future plans to incorporate Ukraine into NATO. Yet Ukraine and its Western allies refuse to accede to that demand, seeing it as morally reprehensible, an unacceptable violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, and counterproductive to their own national interests. Absent the West’s willingness to take NATO membership off the table, there remain no grounds for a negotiated settlement.

The possibility of an outright victory also appears unlikely for the foreseeable future. Because each side senses an existential threat from the other, Ukraine from Russia and Russia from the West, we can expect them to fight to the death. When it appears that one side is gaining the upper hand, the other side makes the necessary adjustments to even the playing field, with Moscow mobilizing more troops and increasing its defense spending and the West boosting its military support to Kyiv. Such has been the story since the war first broke out early last year, and the most important reason it has settled into a bloody stalemate today.

The caveat here, of course, is if the West eventually tires of supporting Ukraine and lets it go its own way. That possibility, though, shows no sign of materializing any time soon, if it ever does. The United States has demonstrated a remarkable ability to remain committed to unwinnable conflicts, as this one appears to be. Moreover, abandoning Ukraine would likely be seen as the greatest act of great power cowardice since the Munich debacle.

One thing is abundantly clear, though: this war is potentially even more dangerous than the Cold War. If Putin senses an existential threat to Russia or to his own survival, might he consider using nuclear weapons if the West continues to back him into a corner over Ukraine? This possibility represents one terrifying answer to the question of how the Ukraine war ends.

Nilay Saiya is an Associate Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs at Nanyang Technological University.

Image: Shutterstock. 

Projecting how a war will end can be a fraught enterprise. Hoping for the complete collapse of the Russian military and a putsch overthrowing Vladimir Putin is pure fantasy at this point. It is also absolute hubris to argue that the next “new” weapon will transform the conflict, providing either Ukraine or Russia a free run at the opposition. 

Initially, it was the grand hopes of artificial intelligence and cyber operations, with cyber providing a “thunder run” opportunity for Russia to open the gates of Kyiv. At this point, a laughable conjecture is offered by very serious pundits. AI has also proven just as frustrating, playing a more significant role in battle coordination behind the scenes or for facial recognition of the dead rather than facilitating the emergence of a modern AI general to lead the military.

While the precision strike complex has transformed modern combat since the 1980s, enabling the massive destruction of armor on the battlefield, mines and layers of trenches remain the natural obstacles. Active surveillance facilitated by drones and satellites helps keep constant eyes on the battlefield, lessening the fog of war. Yet, this has been true since the advent of old-fashioned balloons and reconnaissance aircraft, as old as World War I.     

The latest hope is delivering the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMs). An advance in the range from the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), an ATACM can reach 190 miles behind the front lines while HIMARS can reach forty-three miles. Unfortunately, these are not transformative weapons because the United States has too few, and Ukraine needs to advance further to hit critical targets deep in Crimea. 

Instead of advanced weapons transforming the war, we are witnessing the continuation of the security dilemma. As John Herz argued, advances in security cause a perceived decrease in the opposition’s security, facilitating a constant action-reaction search for a way out of the conflict spiral. Sadly, conflict spirals never end. Likewise, no magic weapon will facilitate the termination of this war. 

Advanced or even primary weapons supplied by the West will not win the war for Ukraine, nor will emergency supplies from North Korea or Iran deliver victory to the Russian side. All these developments will achieve is the revival of the military-industrial complex worldwide. There is no magic solution; the only thing left is to settle for a political solution or the slow attrition of either side’s will to fight. As Margaret Mead argued so long ago, war is a social invention, a poor and inefficient one that will only facilitate constant suffering and death until humans develop a better way. 

Brandon Valeriano specializes in military innovation and cyber security. He teaches at Seton Hall University and is also a Senior Fellow at the Royal Danish Defense College, the Marine Corps University, Gray Space Strategies, and the Cyberspace Solarium Commission 2.0.

Image: Shutterstock. 

Both China and Russia are eager to assert their own authoritarian models of national “greatness.” Related to this goal is knocking down the international order forged by the United States and its allies after World War II, an open, rules-based international system that brought prosperity to so many nations (including China once Beijing embraced it). 

But national greatness, whether political influence, soft power, or military might, is largely a function of economic power. By participating in (and in many cases gaming) the open, capitalist trade and economic system, China has built economic power. China and the world are now economically interdependent. Many depend on China’s exports, and global companies want to keep access to the Chinese market. 

Meanwhile, Russia has lost it. With a GDP the size of Italy and the hemorrhaging of its best and brightest after the invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s economy is a literal Potemkin village. Once weaned of dependence on Russia’s oil and gas, nobody needs Russia’s economy. The only way for Russia to assert influence in the world and to maintain the fiction of “greatness”—is by destructive military actions. 

Now, China risks losing its true source of power and influence—its robust, entrepreneurial, globally entangled economy. President Xi Jinping is reining in entrepreneurs and free speech, frightening away foreign businesses, investors, and Chinese entrepreneurs. China is losing business abroad as many countries and companies work to decouple from China’s corrupting, surveilling, and stealing state-run economic apparatus. China’s birth rate is dropping, growth is slowing, and political leadership is congealing around a “strongman” more focused on control at home and saber-rattling abroad than economic prosperity.

Most observers predicted that China’s rise would eclipse America’s economic and political influence in the world. That’s the story of American decline and China’s rise promoted by Xi Jinping. Conventional wisdom also sees this dynamic as the most likely source of a military clash between China and the United States. An “empire” in decline threatened by a rising power leads to conflict.

But this doesn’t describe the current reality. The United States and its allies are working hard. So far, they are keeping the economic high ground by making disruptive innovations like the fastest chips and artificial intelligence that drive new businesses and maintain national security. Russia’s innovation economy is gone, and China is chasing its own away, exposing the fragility of a system propped up by state spending, and political versus market direction.

However, this is not all good news. As we have seen, an increasingly isolated and diminished power like Russia chooses to lash out militarily. A China beginning to lose the underpinnings of its new-found international influence could prove even more dangerous—and more eager to assert its “greatness” through military adventures and political and economic coercion. 

Avoiding war requires a delicate balancing act. We in the United States must acknowledge the aspirational and identity-based yearnings of the Chinese people: namely, the desire to be recognized as a great nation and to rise economically.

We need to say to China: we welcome your rise as a great nation, a great culture and people. We have no desire to keep you “down.” But we don’t welcome political and economic coercion of other nations and peoples, acts of military force. We will, working with allies (that we still have), check and contain these efforts at every turn.

John Austin is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institution and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

Image: U.S. Department of Defense.

One of the more closely guarded mission sets within the U.S. military is Personnel Recovery (PR). As defined by the Department of Defense’s Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), the PR mission is the “sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.” In simplest terms, when a U.S. service member goes missing in combat, is captured, or in some other way becomes isolated from other U.S. forces, the military sets in motion its personnel recovery efforts.

Those efforts range from preparing service members on how to become and behave as a prisoner of war – through committing to the U.S. military’s Code of Conduct – to classified rescue missions to bring them home. In between those benchmarks fall the diplomatic and civil efforts, as well as Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training, part of which involves training a service member to resist and escape captivity.

There are also highly classified programs that fall within the category of the personnel recovery mission set, the existence of which only a few in the entire Department of Defense (DOD) are aware. The U.S. military takes the PR mission very seriously, as we want our military to keep faith with the individual service members and make every effort to bring them home.

The various components of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) can all play a role in the PR mission, as required. For example, when Army PFC Jessica Lynch was injured and captured in Iraq, she was rescued by a combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, with support from the Marines. Similarly, when wounded Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell was forced to escape and evade following compromise by enemy forces in Afghanistan, he was rescued by a contingent of U.S. Army Rangers and Afghan National Army soldiers. Both operations are good examples of the PR mission as executed by U.S. SOF combined with conventional forces.

Further, PR missions are almost always supported by the U.S. intelligence community through the provision of on-the-ground human and technical intelligence reporting, as well as satellite imagery and other methods of support. The whole U.S. national security and defense structure in a given theatre, in other words, becomes involved in trying to bring home a lost or captured service member.

Here, it is worth placing a special emphasis on the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and its unique role in the PR mission. AFSOC’s Special Tactics Pararescuemen (PJs) are widely considered the premier force in the U.S. military when it comes to rescuing lost service members (in particular, downed U.S. pilots). The PJs are in fact the only DOD force specifically trained to conduct both conventional and unconventional rescue operations. Their primary function is to be personnel recovery specialists.

What differentiates the PJs from other SOF units that also conduct PR missions is both the advanced medical training they receive, as well as the broad range of technical rescue disciplines on which they train. These techniques range from technical extrication of trapped personnel from damaged/wrecked airframes, to rope rescues and water rescues, and everything in between. Therefore, PJs are of special importance when it comes to personnel recovery.

In contrast, a Navy SEAL element, for example, would primarily act as a direct action force in a combat PR mission. Similar to the Lynch and Luttrell rescues, the SEAL element would essentially be assigned to raid a target location, neutralize any on-scene enemies, and effect the rescue of the U.S. service member. Ofte a PJ contingent of one or two personnel will accompany a SEAL or other SOF element on such a raid, to take primary control of the possibly wounded U.S. service member who has just been rescued. The PJs would then be the primary responsible party for treating, packaging, and transporting the patient through the exfiltration process.

The PR mission is a complex and difficult one, and a mission that requires integration across different U.S. military components – both conventional and unconventional – as well as other parts of the larger U.S. government. Diplomacy could be involved, and both intelligence collection and special activities are also almost always required. Few operations will focus the mind in a combat zone like the rescue of missing U.S. personnel. Such missions become an “all hands” effort and are carried out with a sense of purpose and urgency that differentiates them from other more run-of-the-mill operations.

Frumentarius is a former Navy SEAL, former CIA officer, and currently a Captain in a career fire department in the Midwest.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: U.S. Military/Creative Commons.

In August, Washington and Manila announced their intention to begin conducting joint maritime patrols before the end of the year around the West Philippine Sea—the Philippines’ official name for the parts of the South China Sea that are within its exclusive economic zone. A few weeks later, Australia and the Philippines made a similar announcement. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, said the decision marked ‘a watershed moment for relations between Australia and the Philippines’.

Beijing has been gradually increasing its hostile behaviour towards Filipino and Vietnamese vessels in the contested waters. In August, the Philippines published a video showing a China Coast Guard vessel firing a water cannon at several Philippine Coast Guard ships conducting a resupply mission at Ayungin Shoal in the Spratly Islands.

The incident, along with many others over recent years, offers insights into China’s hybrid tactics in the region. But more importantly, it’s a call to Manila and its allies to strengthen their deterrence posture and face Beijing’s assertiveness.

The patrol announcements represent a positive step in responding to China’s aggression in the South China Sea. It’s important for Australia to increase its presence in this way in a region it defined as ‘the most important geostrategic region in the world’ in its 2023 defence strategic review. Notably, Japan and Vietnam—two of China’s closest neighbours—have also announced plans to increase their presence in the South China Sea.

Tokyo has been keen to support Manila in its efforts against the China Coast Guard and China’s maritime militia. Japan recently provided a grant for a satellite communications system to be installed onboard the Philippine Coast Guard’s multi-role response vessels, enhancing their maritime domain awareness capabilities.

Japan has embarked on a major program to modernise its naval capabilities with a staggering increase in its defence budget as part of its ‘strengthening [of] the defense architecture in the southwestern region’. This will also include equipping Japanese air and ground defence forces along the Ryukyu Islands with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile units to form a stronger defensive barrier to Japan’s south.

Positioned on the front line of China’s growing ambitions in the South China Sea, Vietnam will also have an important role to play. Hanoi has regularly expressed concerns over Beijing’s behaviour in the region and the potential consequences, and the defence cooperation agreement it recently signed with the US could have a strong impact on the region’s security dynamics and support a more assertive role for Vietnam and its allies.

All these countries, including Australia, must strengthen their presence in the South China Sea to defend the international norms enshrined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which Beijing is undermining with its claims. As the late Australian Rear Admiral James Goldrick argued, ‘to accept China’s claims … acquiesces to Chinese coercion through the use of armed force’. The war in Ukraine is a compelling example of what could happen if these claims aren’t properly contested by China’s neighbours.

At the end of the day, presence (with ships and sailors) is the decisive element for success in any maritime competition. As US naval strategists J.C. Wylie and James Holmes put it: ‘The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with a gun.’ If allies don’t maintain a presence in the region, China’s home-ground advantage will remain unchallenged.

Following Rear Admiral Wylie, Professor Holmes claimed: ‘You must be on the scene to control something. Or you have to leave no doubt in the minds of important audiences … that you will inevitably show up to take control should the antagonist buck your will.’ The determination shown by Japan, Vietnam and others is a good starting point in the quest to mount a credible deterrent posture, but building a more cohesive coalition must be the next step. As Goldrick argued, ‘Australia must be there for the long haul … Making an effective case for the South China Sea not to become a “closed sea” is fundamental.’

Australia’s defence strategic review says that ‘deterrence is about compelling an actor to defer or abandon a planned strategy or activity by having in place steps and responses to change its risk assessment and, therefore, decision-making’. Now Canberra, Manila and the rest of their allies must live by this and show up in the contested regions. They must be there to deter Chinese aggression, making the point that Beijing won’t succeed in its quest to claim the South China Sea for itself. And they must remain there with determination, for as long as it takes.

Gonzalo Vázquez Orbaiceta is a junior analyst at the Spanish Naval War College’s Center for Naval Thought. The views expressed in this article are his own.

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Shutterstock.

In late September 2023, a Russian government document relating to its preparations for a very large civil defense exercise involving a nuclear war scenario was leaked to the Russian press. It reportedly described the planned October 3 Russian civil defense exercise indicating that, “Russia will stage its first nationwide nuclear attack exercise across 11 time zones in preparation for potential nuclear war.” The document reportedly stated, “In some constituent entities [regions] of the Russian Federation, as a result of emergencies or other types of physical impact, complete destruction of life support facilities and up to 70% of the housing stock is possible.” The reference to the destruction of “life support facilities” apparently means the loss of electricity, communications, water, and transportation.

The leak of such a document before the Russian Grom strategic nuclear exercise (which usually happens in late October but sometimes as late as December), is apparently unprecedented. The large Russian civil defense exercise is normally held every year in early October. It could be an unannounced part of the Grom strategic exercise. Grom usually involves simulated large scale strategic nuclear strikes and sometimes involves simulated non-strategic (tactical) nuclear strikes and strategic air and missile defense operations.

The content of the leaked document was not reported in the major Russian state media outlets that publish in English, which is also unusual considering its being leaked to the press. The inclusion of a damage estimate to Russia in the leaked document is also particularly unusual. The actual civil defense exercise itself was also not reported in Russia’s state media but was reported in the Russian press. “In some areas, schoolchildren were taught how to wear gas masks. In other areas officials were forced into bunkers. The exercise was based on the assumption of a giant nuclear attack from the West.”

The Russian press frequently gloats over the massive destruction its simulated Russian nuclear strikes inflicted in its Grom exercises as well as other Russian nuclear exercises. (In a 2010 Russian large nuclear exercise, a Russian press report proudly declared that, “…throughout the world, the mushroom clouds rose skyward.”) Russia’s pro-regime media treatment of a nuclear war usually ignores the consequences for Russia from retaliatory nuclear strikes.

The document reportedly stated that the Putin regime had “…taken a decision to develop measures aimed at increasing the readiness of civil defence forces and means to take measures to protect the population, material and cultural property on the territory of the Russian Federation, including general evacuation from danger zones.” Russian officials have bragged about its civil defense measures before, but a nationwide exercise just before Grom in the current political environment is ominous. Just before the exercise, Deputy Chairman of the Russian National Security Council Dmitri Medvedev said that the West was “actively pushing us to World War III.” The leaked document reportedly said that the nuclear scenario assumed that martial law had been declared in Russia and that there was a full military mobilization.

President Putin considerably increased Russian spending on civil defense in 2005. During this time period, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was the head of Russian civil defense. Russia has reportedly built some 5,000-7,000 bomb shelters in Moscow. A 2017 report of the Defense Intelligence Agency said Russia had 289,000 civil defense personnel, a large increase from the 20,000 in 1996 and 18,250 in 2008.

Since its initial attack on Ukraine in 2014, Russia has enhanced its nuclear capability and its civil defense efforts. In 2018, Rossia-24, Russian state television “…instructed viewers to stock up on food and water in case a war breaks out with the United States, playing on fears that a U.S.-led airstrike against Moscow’s ally Syria could lead to a military escalation.”

Threats of general nuclear war have been common from the Putin regime since its attack on Ukraine in February 2022. A couple of days after the civil defense exercise President Vladimir Putin declared Russian nuclear retaliation “…will be absolutely unacceptable for any potential aggressor, because seconds after we detect the launch of missiles, wherever they are coming from, from any point in the World Ocean or land, the counter strike in response will involve hundreds – hundreds of our missiles in the air, so that no enemy will have a chance to survive. And [we can respond] in several directions at once.” (This was in response to a question from Sergei Karaganov, a former Kremlin advisor who in 2023 advocated a nuclear attack against NATO, saying “…if we correctly build a strategy of intimidation and deterrence and even use of nuclear weapons, the risk of a ‘retaliatory’ nuclear or any other strike on our territory can be reduced to an absolute minimum.” If the initial attack did not get the desired result (NATO capitulation on Ukraine), he advocated hitting “… a bunch of targets in a number of countries in order to bring those who have lost their mind to reason.” Putin’s threat is included in paragraph 19 of his June 2023 nuclear doctrine and involves a nuclear attack on the West before Russia even knows that the attack against it is nuclear and with the attack involving as few as a single missile launch.

In the October 2022 Grom exercise, Russia’s Minister of Defense General of the Army Sergei Shoigu told President Putin that Russia’s nuclear exercise was “a training session” which involved “delivering a massive nuclear strike by strategic offensive forces….” Russian state television stated it was practice for an attack on the U.S. The 2019 version of the Grom exercise had the announced involvement of about half of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces (about 250 missiles) which were reportedly launched. The distinguished Russian journalist Alexander Golts noted, “We’re talking about rehearsing ways to conduct all-out nuclear war. Such a war will start with the use of non-strategic forces (cruise missiles) and end with a mass nuclear strike, which will mean the death of everything living on Planet Earth,” and there was no room for “misinterpretation” about this. Hyperbole aside, Golts outlined the essence of Russian nuclear escalation strategy. He also pointed out another notable fact about Putin: “The world that Putin inhabits is far removed from reality.”

A common political objective of Russian nuclear exercises (and Russian nuclear threats) is to scare the West because of the belief among Russia’s leaders that Western fear of nuclear warfare can be exploited to allow Russia to win against Ukraine and then NATO. Russian nuclear strategy is similar to that of Sergei Karaganov but not quite as extreme.

The Australian Financial Review suggested that the purpose of the “evacuation drills” was to prepare for a “nuclear ultimatum,” quoting the editor of state-run RT to the effect that the “ultimatum” was imminent. If the Australian Financial Review is accurate in its assessment, the “ultimatum” would likely come after an expanded version of the Grom exercise. It is noteworthy that Russia began its attack on Ukraine after what amounted to an ultimatum against NATO aimed at reviving the Soviet Union.

The British Defense Ministry noted that the October 2023 Russian civil defense exercise involved a scenario of “…large-scale international armed conflict,” that civil defense in the Soviet Union and Russia goes back decades, and that it is “…unlikely that Russia had significantly changed its posture of national preparedness in recent months.” Certainly, there are reports of large scale Russian civil defense nuclear exercises in the recent past. For example, Russia’s Civil Defence Department Director Oleg Manuilov said that the 2016 exercise involved “…more than 40 million people, more than 200 thousand professionals (sic) rescue units and 50 thousand pieces of equipment.”

Reportedly, on civil defense day “…Russia traditionally hosts festive events: solemn commencement ceremonies for students of the Ministry of Emergencies of Russia, exhibitions of special fire and rescue equipment, relay races, etc.” This does not exactly seem to be a description of the October 2023 exercise which reportedly assumed an all-out nuclear war. This exercise comes after a report earlier this year in The Moscow Times that, “Bomb shelters across Russia are undergoing systematic inspections and repairs following a Kremlin order to upgrade the country’s crumbling Soviet-era infrastructure, according to current and former officials who spoke to The Moscow Times.”

What is most dangerous about Russian civil defense is that in the context of Putin’s world of political fantasy it is a potential crutch on which he might convince himself that he could fight and survive a nuclear war even if he was wrong about his belief that the West would not retaliate against his initial small nuclear strikes. It is important to remember that in 2015 the Russian military leadership was claiming that “Moscow’s layered air defense grants 99% effective defense against air attack…” due to the deployment of S-400 and SA-20 air defenses. The Putin regime has been making nuclear threats since 2007. However, the scope of Russian aggression supported by these nuclear threats vastly increased after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In 2016, the deputy head of Russian civil defense Andrei Mishchenko said, “The Moscow underground facilities will be able to protect 100% of the population of the city.” Although this is likely an exaggeration and certainly while civil defense can significantly reduce casualties, even the Russian civil defense leadership recognizes that most Russians don’t know where the shelters are located. However, they almost certainly tell Putin what he wants to hear, which is the military dominance of Russia’s armed forces.

There is nothing wrong with having strong civil defense capabilities but its implications in the light of Putin’s nuclear irresponsibility are quite ominous. The idea of nuclear war without Russian casualties due to active and passive defenses is just the sort of fantasy that the self-isolated President Putin might believe as he pursues his expansionist agenda. This is the man who believed that Russia would capture Kiev in two days. Indeed, in 2014, Putin stated, “If I wanted, Russian troops could not only be in Kiev in two days, but in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw or Bucharest, too.” In 2014, he also said that “We’ll strangle all of them [NATO] ourselves!”

In Putin’s neofascist fantasy world, Russia’s scripted military exercises are reality and his nuclear threats will prevent any effective opposition. Hopefully, he has learned something from his failure in Ukraine, but it is dangerous to depend on this. He is pursuing victory in Ukraine on the basis of his willingness to accept great casualties. His self-isolation results in his constant reinforcement of failure.

In light of the current crisis, the United States should be maximizing its nuclear deterrent capability but it is not. For the first time in a major nuclear crisis situation, the Biden Administration has done nothing to enhance the U.S’ nuclear deterrence posture. Worse yet, in June 2023, the Biden Administration announced it would not numerically match Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities. It said it was going to deter Russian nuclear escalation by space and cyber capabilities and by arms control. Concerning nuclear deterrence, the level of technical fantasy in the Biden White House rivals that in Putin’s Kremlin, almost in exactly the opposite direction.

Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commissions.  He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Image: Free Wind 2014 / Shutterstock.com

Israel’s intention in ordering the evacuation of civilians from Gaza City is to create a free-fire zone where anyone who remains can be assumed to be a member of Hamas. The next phase of its coordinated air, ground and naval offensive in Gaza will be putting in ground troops to secure northern Gaza, which will allow specialist units to start searching and destroying the Hamas tunnel system.

This phase could be costly in terms of Israeli lives because Hamas fighters underground will have access to the surface to inflict casualties on Israeli troops—in much the same way as Islamic State fighters did in Mosul when they inflicted heavy casualties on advancing Iraqi soldiers.

Gaza tunnel entrances are hidden under houses, mosques and schools, while the territory’s narrow streets and alleyways are expected to be infested with booby traps and command-detonated improvised explosive devices. It will also be difficult and dangerous for the Israel Defense Forces to clear a path through collapsed buildings and areas blocked by rubble.

Use of tunnelling is not a new insurgent tactic. Australia had experience of it in South Vietnam where A Company, of the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, was ambushed from and uncovered the famous Cu Chi tunnel system. Insurgent forces that lack the capability to take on regular forces head to head can use tunnels to fight a survivable war of attrition that may eventually lead to war weariness and a negotiated settlement.

Once Israeli Special Forces get into the tunnel system, their aim will be to kill Hamas leaders, destroy Hamas fighters and weapons—particularly the rocket arsenal—and free any Israeli hostages held in the tunnels. However, it will be a costly process because Hamas is intimately familiar with the environment and has had time to booby-trap the tunnels and prepare defensive positions underground.

Indeed, Hamas has spent two decades building the labyrinth of deep, defensive tunnels to resist any ground assault by Israeli troops. It started building them in Gaza even before Israel withdrew its troops from Gaza in 2005. Hamas ramped up the construction after both Israel and Egypt imposed a blockade on the area in 2007.

The extensive tunnel network is believed to be as much as 30 metres beneath the surface in some places and is an integral part of the Gaza defences Hamas has spent years preparing.

After the last flare-up of fighting between Israel and Hamas in 2021, the IDF claimed to have destroyed more than 60 miles of tunnels. Hamas responded, saying that only 5% was damaged and that its underground infrastructure comprised 300 miles of tunnelling.

Daphne Richemond-Barak at Reichman University in Israel, an expert on the tunnel system, said the tunnels beneath Gaza were deeper and more sophisticated than the cross-border tunnels used to access Israeli territory.

She noted: ‘The tunnels inside Gaza are different because Hamas is using them on a regular basis. They are probably more comfortable to be in for longer periods of time. They are definitely equipped for a longer, sustained presence. The leaders are hiding there, they have command-and-control centres, they use them for transport and lines of communication. They are equipped with electricity, lighting and rail tracks.’

Jonathan Conricus, an IDF spokesperson, said in a briefing last week: ‘Think of the Gaza Strip as one layer for civilians and then another layer for Hamas. We are trying to get to that second layer that Hamas has built. These aren’t bunkers for Gazan civilians. It’s only for Hamas and other terrorists so that they can continue to fire rockets at Israel, to plan operations, to launch terrorists into Israel.’

Even if the Israeli forces are able to destroy the tunnels and clear Hamas out of northern Gaza, they will then have to decide whether to occupy the territory—which could take large numbers of troops—or to withdraw.

Tom Beckett, executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the Middle East, said: ‘If the IDF attempts to mount a garrison large enough to control Gaza while continuing to protect the country from threats emanating from the West Bank, southern Lebanon and Syria, its capacity will soon be stretched thinly.’

Israel had clearly become complacent under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about its ability to contain the Hamas threat and control Israel’s Palestinian population. The latest round of violence shows once again that Israel will at some point have to engage in a negotiated settlement with the Palestinian leadership, whoever that may turn out to be.

Even if Israel decides to force more than a million Palestinian civilians out of northern Gaza on a permanent basis, it still has to contend with the more than three million disaffected Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem.

Clive Williams is a visiting fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. He was an infantry platoon commander in Vietnam in January 1966 when his platoon discovered a well-concealed entrance to what is now known as the Cu Chi tunnel complex. During that operation, several Australian soldiers were killed by Viet Cong operating from the extensive tunnel complex. They fired at the advancing diggers and were then able to reappear in ‘cleared areas’ from concealed tunnel entrances to cause more casualties.

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock.com