Diplomacy & Crisis News

Three months after a genocidal, anti-semitic terrorist group slaughtered 1,200 of its citizens in a barbaric fashion, Israel sits in the docket of the International Court of Justice, accused of committing genocide because it hasn’t defended itself from future attack as pristinely as the world demands.

The court is holding hearings this week on an application that South Africa filed in late December, asking the court to begin proceedings against Israel for committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza.

“Acts and omissions by Israel,” South Africa wrote, “... are genocidal in character, as they are committed with the requisite specific intent... to destroy Palestinians in Gaza as a part of the broader Palestinian national, racial and ethnical group,” putting Israel “in violation of its obligations under the Genocide Convention.”

It is a quintessentially Orwellian affair, a spectacle of the victim as the perpetrator, and it fits within a longstanding pattern of the global community holding the singular Jewish state to a singular human rights standard. No one should buy it.

In its “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” the United Nations General Assembly defined genocide as action “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”

Ironically, it is Hamas, created in 1987 as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has set out to commit that very crime—against Israel and the Jewish people.

In its covenant of 1988, Hamas states, “Our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious...  The Movement is but one squadron that should be supported by more and more squadrons from this vast Arab and Islamic world, until the enemy is vanquished and Allah's victory is realised [sic].”

“The Islamic Resistance Movement,” it continues, “is one of the links in the chain of the struggle against the Zionist invaders,” and it “aspires to the realisation of Allah's promise... The Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees.”

Some thirty-five years later, the group has lost none of its genocidal luster. After October 7, when Hamas’ terrorists beheaded men, slaughtered babies, raped women, desecrated bodies, and, in some cases, took videos of their deeds. The group's deputy foreign minister, Ghazi Hamad, vowed to repeat such attacks until Israel is destroyed.

Where does Israel fit into this maelstrom?

The Jewish State unilaterally withdrew from Gaza in 2005, leaving it to the Palestinian Authority. Two years later, Hamas seized Gaza in a violent coup and ruled its two million residents with an iron fist, brooking no dissent and murdering those who work with or seek peace with Israel.

Israel responded to the barbarism of October 7 as one might expect, vowing to destroy the terrorist group so it could never again attack the Jewish state. What Israel is promising is nothing more than any responsible government would pursue in the aftermath of such an attack by such a group.

Israel’s military campaign is multi-faceted, arduous, and, yes, bloody. What began with heavy bombing has morphed into a harrowing firefight. But, notwithstanding the charge of genocide that Israel’s critics around the world are so quick to level, who’s really trying to boost civilian casualties?

While searching for Hamas operatives, Israel’s military has dropped leaflets, made phone calls, and sent texts, warning Palestinians to flee areas where it plans to mount operations. That is no different than what Israel has done for years during its multiple wars and skirmishes with Hamas.

Hamas, as usual, embeds its fighters and weaponry in schools, hospitals, and mosques, purposely boosting civilian casualties to swing global public opinion against Israel. Hamas has told Palestinians to ignore Israel’s warnings to flee or has prevented them from doing so. One Hamas official suggested that civilians serve as human shields, sacrificing themselves to protect Hamas’ assets.

This week’s spectacle in The Hague is part of a larger international picture, marked by an obsession with the Jewish state.

With war raging in Ukraine and elsewhere and autocrats brutalizing their people all over the world, the General Assembly last year condemned Israel fourteen times and the rest of the world just seven.

Meanwhile, the UN’s Human Rights Council remains a cesspool of anti-Israeli activity that has 1) made Israel its only permanent agenda item and 2) condemned and subjected it to more special sessions and commissions than any other country. The council has passed no resolutions to condemn human rights abuses in such nations as Algeria, China, Cuba, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Zimbabwe.

Are innocent Palestinians dying in Gaza? Yes. Is Israel seeking to wipe out the Palestinians, as per the charge of genocide? No. The allegation is either rooted in willful blindness or moral bankruptcy—or both.

Lawrence J. Haas is a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council and the author of, most recently, The Kennedys in the World: How Jack, Bobby, and Ted Remade America’s Empire (Potomac Books).

Image: Creative Commons. 

Summary: This article discusses the Alaska-class battlecruisers, which the United States developed before World War II to counter German "pocket battleships." These ships were initially designed to be heavily armed cruisers powered by all-diesel propulsion. However, they faced a complex design process with numerous alterations. The Alaska-class battlecruisers did not fulfill their intended role due to changing military priorities, but their design would have been dominant in World War I.

Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, the U.S. wanted to emulate Germany’s hybrid “pocket battleships.”

These heavily armed cruisers were innovative for the time, powered by all-diesel propulsion and constructed by welding.

The Deutschland, Admiral Scheer and Admiral Grad Spee were deployed to the Atlantic before World War II erupted and put in a position to attack Allied merchant traffic.

The U.S. desired its own warships that could better counter this German trio, which resulted in the development of the Alaska-class battlecruiser.

However, when these new ships entered service, they were rendered technologically obsolete.

Following World War I, the U.S., Britain, France, Japan and Italy all signed the Washington Naval Treaty along with other similar agreements.

These treaties dictated that the displacement of heavy cruisers was limited to 10,000 tons. In the late 1930s, it was rumored that Japan was beginning to design its copycat version of Germany’s pocket battleships.

U.S. intelligence on the matter suggested that the new vessels would be way more potent than America’s heavy cruisers.

In 1940, the U.S. passed the Vinson-Walsh Act- also known as the Two-Ocean Treaty, which immediately increased the size of the Navy by 70%.

Around this time, the General Board requested that the Bureau of Construction and Repair carry out a study involving the types of naval vessels up for consideration in an expanded building program.

While building a new cruiser class was expensive, costing $74 million per vessel in 1941 dollars, the Navy required new boats to fight a two-front war.

A litany of alterations and modifications made to the initial Alaska-class design made the whole process “torturous,” according to historians. The CA2-D cruiser was the first Alaska design to surface.

As detailed by Naval General Board, “It was also the largest. At 850′ in length at the waterline and with a waterline beam of 99′ (Overall beam was 104′ 6″). This resulted in a standard displacement of 38,700 tons, greater than that allowed for treaty battleships (Though at the time of the CA2-D design the “Escalator Clause” was in effect, allowing for battleships of up to 45,000 tons).”

The Alaska ships’ larger size enabled for a more formidable armament. Her primary firepower would have been a dozen guns in four triple turrets. The CA2-D cruiser featured two mounts on the centerline that fired over primary turrets. Additionally, dual-purpose guns were fitted to give them enhanced firing arcs to cover targets forward and aft of the vessel.

Four-shaft General Electric steam turbines, eight Babcock & Wilcox boilers, and double-reduction gearing powered the battlecruiser. This propulsion system was good for roughly 150,000 horsepower, a maximum speed of 33 knots, and a range between 12 and 14,000 nautical miles.

The Navy completed its first two Alaska-class cruisers in late 1944.

The Alaska and Guam did not receive their first mission until 1945, when the two boats were used for shore bombardment and escort duty.

By the time the few Alaska-class ships entered service in the Pacific Theatre, Japan was largely already defeated thanks to the Navy’s aircraft carriers and submarines.

A planned third ship- the Hawaii- was never completed. The Alaska supported the landings on Okinawa and the Alaska was deployed to protect the Essex-class aircraft carrier.

Ultimately, these ships never filled the role they were designed to fulfill. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, the U.S. military shifted its focus to prioritize the construction of aircraft carriers instead of hefty battleships and cruisers. Carrier-borne aviation had become the leading tenant of warfare at the time, rendering the Alaska-class cruisers as dated.

By 1947, the ships were decommissioned after only serving for less than two years. While the ship’s record is short, analysts and military experts still debate the right designation for the Alaska-class.

As explained by the National World War II museum, “Due to the uniqueness of the Alaska-class design, these ships were not classified “CA” as typical for heavy cruisers, but instead “CB” for large cruiser. Also, as a nod to their not-quite-battleship, not-quite-cruiser roots, instead of being named after US states or cities, the ships were named after US territories with the USS Alaska (CB-1) being the first. The rest of the class would be the USS Guam (CB-2), USS Hawaii (CB-3), USS Philippines (CB-4), USS Puerto Rico (CB-5), and USS Samoa (CB-6).”

Although the Alaska-class tragically did not live up to expectations, if these vessels had been introduced in World War I they indeed would have dominated the seas.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

“I follow the Moskva down to Gorky Park, Listening to the wind of change, An August summer night, soldiers passing by, Listening to the wind of change.”

In 1990, the German rock band “Scorpions” released their single “Winds of Change.” An instant worldwide hit, the song called for the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany. 

Soon after its release, the Soviet Union collapsed, and Europe let out a long sigh of relief. The specter of nuclear warfare a distant memory, the Continent focused on its economy to enter the future. 

More than 30 years later, trouble once more came from the east. Russia fully invaded Ukraine, casting cold shadows over Europe and prompting action among its countries.

The latest proposal to come out from Brussels is to allocate almost $110 billion for the creation of a common defense fund. 

This week, European Union Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton revealed a plan to create a massive defense fund for the members of the European Union. Funds from the €100 billion fund would boost joint weapons procurement program and ramp up domestic arms and ammunition production. 

“I believe we have to have a huge defense fund to help to accelerate, even probably in the amount of €100 billion,” Breton, who also leads the European Union’s defense policy, said on Tuesday. 

For the European official’s proposal to go forward, the member states would first have to agree, and then the European Council would have to greenlight the final course of action. 

However, the European Union official’s proposal has been getting some flak from the defense ministers of individual member states. 

“I’m not happy when I see some defense ministers saying we will not be able to deliver, this is not the kind of information you give when there is a war on your Continent,” the European Union official added. 

Perhaps the most sought-after piece of ammunition right now are 155mm artillery shells. The Ukrainian military depends on its Western partners for a steady flow of such munitions for both its offensive and defensive operations against the Russian forces.

At certain points during the fighting, especially around its counteroffensive, the Ukrainian military was expending more than 7,000 artillery shells on a single day.

To be sure, that number is lower during defensive operations, but still, the Ukrainian forces need thousands of artillery shells every day. 

The European Union has promised to deliver 1 million artillery shells to Ukraine by the spring of 2024. However, with the deadline looming, the European defense industry is struggling to meet the gargantuan demands of the Ukrainian conflict. 

The war in Ukraine has shown how fragile is the ammunition production chain in the West. The United States, NATO, and the European Union are “suffering” from prolonged periods of relative peace and haven’t had to create the necessary infrastructure to produce large numbers of quality ammunition quickly. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense and national security journalist specializing in special operations. A Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), he holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Although it is still early, the Ukrainian military should already be working on its new counteroffensive. 

Right now, the conflict in Ukraine resembles a soccer match that has gone on to extra time. Both sides are tired and have made most of their substitutions. But there is no winner yet, and the prospect of a penalty shootout doesn’t really appeal to either side. So, both sides will try to score that golden goal in extra time and claim the prize. 

In military terms, that goal is an operational breakthrough. Both sides failed to achieve that in the latest round of operations. The Ukrainian counteroffensive faltered, opening the way for the Russian military to launch its own large-scale offensive, forcing the Ukrainians to abandon their operation and focus men and resources on the defense. Thus, 2023 came to an end. 

Last June, the Ukrainian military launched its long-awaited large-scale counteroffensive in southern Ukraine and the Donbas. 

The Ukrainian military, in close cooperation with NATO, spent months preparing several heavy brigades for the operation.

A renewed flow of Western military aid equipped the Ukrainian formations with advanced heavy weapon systems, including Challenger 2, Leopard 2, and Leopard 1 main battle tanks, AMX-10 RC tank-killers, M2 Bradley and CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, and many artillery pieces. 

In addition, thousands of Ukrainian troops underwent basic and combined arms training by NATO instructors. With Russian morale and discipline in shambles, hopes for the Ukrainian counteroffensive were high. Its goal was to punch through the Russian defenses and sprint to the coast of the Sea of Azov, thus severing the land bridge that connects Russia with the occupied Crimea and preparing the stage for the liberation of the Peninsula. 

And yet, the Ukrainians failed. 

Miles upon miles of dense Russian minefields, trenches, anti-tank obstacles, heavy artillery fire, drones, and even tactical airstrikes stopped the Ukrainians in their tracks, allowing only for some tactical gains in the south and around Bakhmut, in the Donbas. 

But the extensive Russian defensive efforts—the most comprehensive Europe has seen since the end of World War Two—weren’t the only reason the Ukrainian counteroffensive failed to achieve its goals. In many ways, the Ukrainian field grade level didn’t perform as needed.

Tactically, the Ukrainians fought bravely and with skill, clearing minefields and capturing Russian trench systems.

But without an adequately trained command system to coordinate and take advantage of such tactical success, there is no operational breakthrough. 

Moving forward, the Ukrainian military should spend more time and resources training not only its ground troops but also the senior leaders who lead them. Combined arms operations—connecting mechanized units, long-range fires, electronic warfare, and air power—are difficult. But it can also be highly rewarding and break an enemy. 

Proficiency in combined arms operations is one of the great advantages of the U.S military and NATO. So, they should be more open in training their Ukrainian counterparts and prepare them for the next round of counteroffensive.

The Ukrainian conflict has a long way to go. However, a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive could shorten the war significantly. Kyiv needs to sit down with its Western partners and plan the conditions to achieve that result and win. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense and national security journalist specializing in special operations. A Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), he holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

Despite setbacks related to ongoing hardware and software upgrades, Lockheed Martin recently completed production on the 1,000th F-35 Lightning II, solidifying its position as the most successful stealth aircraft production line in the history of aviation. In fact, there are more F-35s flying today than all other stealth aircraft throughout history, combined.

While Lockheed Martin announced plans to deliver its 1,000th jet by the end of 2023, delays related to Tech Refresh 3 – a hardware and software upgrade meant to pave the way for even more sweeping improvements to come – prevented the company from achieving that delivery milestone.

However, acclaimed aviation journalist Tyler Rogoway, who runs The Warzone, confirmed its completion with Lockheed Martin via e-mail on Wednesday.

“We continue to produce F-35s at rate and have jets in various stages of the final production process. Once these jets receive the necessary TR-3 hardware and final TR-3 software is available, they will continue through the production process, including parking, until they are delivered,” Lockheed Martin told Rogoway.

Despite a troubled development cycle that led to a series of high-profile production delays and significant cost overruns, the broadly capable stealth fighter that emerged from that acquisition debacle has been lauded by pilots and Defense officials alike as the most technologically advanced tactical aircraft ever to see service.

The jet was designed to prioritize the attack (or air-to-ground) mission set. Yet, its combination of stealth and data-fusing-onboard-computer power has made it a stand-out performer in air-to-air combat as well, racking up a 20:1 kill-to-loss ratio in its first appearance in the Air Force’s Red Flag air combat exercises in 2017.

To date, F-35s have accumulated over 773,000 hours in the air spread out across 469,000 total sorties.

And while the F-35 program certainly still has its critics, a long line of countries have chosen to shell out billions of dollars to secure their own stealth fleets. Nine countries were initially involved in the development of the fighter and today, the list of countries operating or purchasing the F-35 has expanded to 17.

The completion of the 1,000th F-35 places the fighter in elite company, as few fighter designs have ever reached four-figure production runs.

According to Aerotime, the F-35 is the seventh most widely operated fighter in service on the planet today, only trailing behind far older 4th generation jets like the F-15 and Su-27 families of fighters and a few even older 3rd generation platforms like the MiG-21.

But as advanced as the F-35 may be, it is on the cusp of yet another major upgrade that has, once again, produced cost overruns and technical delays.

Tech Refresh 3 (TR-3), now underway, aims to dramatically increase onboard processing power and onboard memory, paving the way for greater sensor fusion and a laundry list of upgrades to come, including new sensors, a variety of new weapons and electronic warfare capabilities, increased power production and more.

The first F-35 to fly with Tech Refresh 3 installed took off on January 6, seemingly paving the way for TR-3 aircraft to start making their way to fleets around the world.

For now, the US Air Force has made it clear that it won’t take delivery on any new fighters until Tech Refresh 3 has been incorporated and is functioning properly, which may take months.

But even with a little pragmatic financial rain on Lockheed Martin’s parade, achieving the milestone of building the 1,000th fighter remains significant for military aviation history.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Real Clear Defense.

There are two prevailing interpretations of the recent Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea.

The first interpretation is that these are proxy attacks, sponsored by Iran, aimed at undermining freedom of the seas and the American-led international rules-based order. By disrupting shipping and trade flows, Iran gets to extract a price from the West for supporting Israel against Hamas and Islamic Jihad, their proxies in Gaza. Certainly, the relevant weapons are being provided by Iran, which suggests that Iran sees strategic benefits in these attacks.

Iran’s autocratic allies and sponsors also benefit: The Chinese, who originated much of this missile technology, certainly cannot be unhappy to see American and allied naval resources tied up in the Red Sea, when they might otherwise be in the Taiwan straits and the South China Sea. They’ll also be delighted to have an opportunity to test missile and drone technology in a live-fire scenario against American convoy defenses. And Russia, of course, benefits both from American resources being diverted from the Ukraine conflict and from the increased oil prices that emerge from chaos in the shipping lanes. But here Chinese and Russian interests diverge: The Chinese are highly dependent on hydrocarbons from Iran and other Persian Gulf states. This Chinese reliance on maritime commerce goes a long way toward explaining why Iranian missiles are being used to shut down the Bab al-Mandeb, but not the Straits of Hormuz.

The second interpretation of these attacks rests on the desire to harm Israel by disrupting shipping to and from Israeli ports. While the Houthis may well desire to attack Israel as an expression of solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza, their local fight for territory and influence in Yemen, against Saudi proxies, is surely their first priority. Firing missiles at Israel, Saudi Arabia, and at international shipping invites reprisals from powerful Western enemies.

There is a third interpretation that brings the situation into clearer focus: Prior to the events of October 7th, 2023, an alliance between Israel and the Arab states, against Iran, was emerging. The Gulf states desperately need Israeli technology, expertise, and capital in order to move their economies off of a hydrocarbon base. Israel is potentially a significant exporter of LNG, following discoveries in the Leviathan natural gas oil field, which aligns Israeli economic interests with other energy exporters. Hamas, an Iranian proxy, shattered that emerging alliance.

The attacks on shipping in the Red Sea are, more than anything, a direct assault on the Egyptian economy, and thus on the government of Egypt, which has been at peace with Israel since 1979. Canal revenues last year were $9.4B; the total budget of the Egyptian government is around $97B. Given the ongoing budget deficit and inflation crisis in Egypt, a prolonged disruption of canal traffic could easily destabilize the government. This action by Iranian proxies gives the Iranians enormous leverage against the current Egyptian government, at relatively modest cost. By contrast, the Israeli economy is far less dependent on trade through the Bab al-Mandeb.

In addition, these attacks offer the possibility of doing significant harm to the Saudis. Starting in the 1980s, a pipeline was built from the oil fields in Eastern Saudi Arabia to the port at Yanbu, located on the Red Sea, to allow exports to bypass the Straits of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb. This pipeline was attacked in 2019 by the Houthis, and could be attacked again. The combination of attacks on this pipeline and attacks on shipping in the Bab al-Mandeb opens the possibility of closing the Red Sea entirely to the export of Saudi oil and natural gas. The same logic plays out with regard to the Straits of Hormuz and the possibility of attacking the pipeline in Abu Dhabi that was constructed to bypass this maritime chokepoint.

Given this pattern of establishing proxies near maritime chokepoints, it is not surprising that Iran is sponsoring terrorist and insurgent activities in Morocco, with the intention of establishing a capability to close the Straits of Gibraltar. 

In point of fact, the Iranians seek to dominate the Persian Gulf, at the Strait of Hormuz, and the Red Sea and Suez Canal, at the Bab al-Mandeb. In addition, Iranian geostrategic influence has extended across the Fertile Crescent, via Shi’ite militias in Iraq; through Syria by virtue of support for the Alawite Baathist regime during the recent civil war; and into Lebanon and to the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean, thanks to support for Hezbollah. Prior to October 7, the Iranian war in Yemen was fought primarily, but not exclusively, by Iranian proxies against Saudi proxies, with some incidents of direct attacks by the Houthis on Saudi Arabia. However, since mid-October, Iranian proxies have launched a campaign of repeated attacks on American outposts in Iraq and Syria. Iran is using the occasion of the Hamas-Israel war to attempt to dislodge the U.S. military presence from the area.

Overall, the Iranian strategy appears to be one of encirclement of Jordan, Kuwait, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. In addition, Iran seeks to destabilize Jordan and the West Bank in Israel – given their large Palestinian populations – through a continuation and intensification of the war in Gaza. For Iran, the attack on Egypt’s economy by shutting down revenue from the Suez Canal opens the possibility of undermining Egypt’s relationship with Israel. A glance at a map of the region reveals that breaking the Egypt-Israel detente is a grand prize in this strategy of encirclement.

Meanwhile, Israel faces its own Iranian effort at encirclement. The war on Hamas in Gaza, the strikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the attacks on Iranian-backed militias in Syria are all aimed to break this localized Iranian strategy. Obviously, Israel’s military efforts serve the objective interests of the Saudi and Gulf State elite, though they cannot publicly admit it.

To the north of the Fertile Crescent, Turkey reaps as many benefits as possible by being an economic middleman for Putin’s Russia. Erdogan’s anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism remain, for the moment, largely performative; other than making provocative comments about Israeli genocide directed at the Palestinians, Erdoğan has kept Turkey out of the recent conflict in Israel.

Now the Arab Gulf states are in an incredible bind: Their leaders know that they need Western support against an Iran that is likely to go nuclear in the near future, and some of them can see the value in at least a quiet alliance with Israel. But their people – and many of their leaders – hate the Jews and have been indoctrinated over generations to seek the genocide not just of the Jews in Israel, but also worldwide. Any overt alliance with Israel is out for the foreseeable future, since any such move would endanger their regimes. Iran has successfully driven a wedge between their adversaries.

One thing is clear: While the West must support Israel to achieve a decisive victory in Gaza, by securing the death or unconditional surrender of both Hamas’ leadership and their supporters, this is only one small piece of a much broader war. Israel will need strong Western support against an all-out attack from the north by Hezbollah. How this may be accomplished is open to question. The United States just announced the withdrawal of the Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group from the Eastern Mediterranean, thereby reducing the American presence once again in the Middle East. By withdrawing this naval presence from the Eastern Mediterranean, the current administration in Washington is inviting Iran to intensify its proxy wars against Israel while signaling to the Saudis a fecklessness that endangers American interests throughout the region.

Furthermore, stopping the attacks in the Red Sea will require an ongoing naval and airborne commitment to protect shipping, combined with both direct attacks on the Houthi forces and renewed support for Saudi proxies in Yemen. And most importantly, if the United States and its European allies want to see an end to these proxy attacks on freedom of the seas, Western interests, and Western allies, it will be necessary to show the leaders of Iran that the kinetic consequences will not be limited to their proxies and catspaws.

So far, deterrence has failed with regard to Iran; this needs to be remedied. Reestablishing deterrence is an existential issue for the allies of the United States in the Middle East. The only practical way for this to occur is through punishment – not just for Iranian proxies, which we presume are operating to advance Iran’s geostrategy of encirclement, but also for the source of these many attacks: There need to be direct and dire consequences for Iran.

These consequences should start with strong Western sponsorship for insurgencies, within Iran, by ethnic minorities including (but not limited to) the Kurds, the Azerbaijanis, and other disaffected religious and ethnic groups. In addition, a serious economic price needs to be extracted through attacks on the oil terminals that the Iranians are using to dodge international sanctions. Punitive strikes on Iranian nuclear and military facilities, as well as critical infrastructure and missile production hubs, are certainly called for. Such punishments are beyond the capacity of the Israelis and will require resources from the United States. If the Iranians can use proxies to attack Western interests and allies, surely the United States can facilitate attacks by proxies of our own.

Michael Hochberg earned his PhD in Applied Physics from Caltech and is currently the President at Luminous Computing, a company building supercomputers for machine learning. He founded four companies, representing an exit value over a billion dollars in aggregate, spent some time as a tenured professor, and started the world’s first silicon photonics foundry service. He co-authored a widely used textbook on silicon photonics, and has published work in Science, Nature, National Review, The Hill, American Spectator, RealClearDefense, Fast Company, etc.

Leonard Hochberg taught at Stanford University (among other institutions), was appointed a Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and co-founded Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (i.e., STRATFOR). He has published work in Social Science History, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Orbis, National Review, The Hill, American Spectator, RealClearDefense, etc. He is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and serves as the Coordinator of the Mackinder Forum-U.S. (www.mackinderforum.org).

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

In domestic politics, economics, and international clout, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi enjoyed a successful 2023. At home, his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won most state elections. Regionally, India passed China to become the most populous country — and India’s GDP growth rate underscored her aspiration to replace China as the world’s factory. Globally, Modi was courted by all sides. Even space cooperated when India landed a craft on the moon.

Foreign affairs took center stage. In 2022, India refused to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and increased purchases of Russian oil. In 2023, India seemed more adept at balancing its competing alignments. In May, Modi met with fellow leaders of the Quad while at the G7, where he was an invited guest. In June, India signed a landmark defense cooperation agreement with the United States, and Modi received red-carpet treatment at a state dinner in Washington.

But in July, India hosted the ‘other side’ at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — which includes Russia and China and just added Iran. In August, Modi attended the landmark BRICS summit in South Africa. Here, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grew to include many states unfriendly to the United States, and discussed reducing their dependence on the US dollar.

In September, the G20 summit in Delhi came full circle. In the absence of Russia or China, India’s relationship with the United States took center stage. The event, which India billed as a meeting focused on the Global South, produced three notable pronouncements.

Unlike 2022, references to Ukraine in the joint declaration were more limited and buried in a long list of climate and developmental goals. US President Joe Biden announced funding to develop a new trade route connecting India to Europe via the Middle East. Finally, in a boost to India’s leadership aspirations, the African Union was made a member.

The afterglow of the G20 was short. Weeks later, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau charged that Indian officials were complicit in the murder of a Canadian naturalized citizen active in the Khalistan movement, which seeks an independent Sikh state in India’s Punjab. India responded with indignation and diplomatic retaliation, while Indians largely attributed the charge to Trudeau’s ostensible political dependence on the Canadian Sikh community.

Then in December, the United States charged an Indian official with attempting to hire an assassin to kill another Khalistan activist, a US citizen. With CIA director William Burns heading to Delhi to discuss the matter, the charge that India kills Sikh activists overseas had the potential to upend the Modi government’s diplomatic progress. Notably, India’s loud protests at the Canadian charges have been replaced with muted assurances that the actions were not government policy, reflecting the much higher costs of conflict with the United States.

Domestic politics intruded on foreign policy in other ways. India jeopardised its bid for soft power by banning rice exports over political concerns about food price increases at home.

Even more brazenly, India scheduled a G20 working session on tourism in Kashmir — a region claimed by Pakistan, with an active insurgency and whose special autonomy the Modi government controversially revoked. Official invitations to the G20 used ‘Bharat’ — the Sanskrit-derived Hindi name preferred by Hindu nationalists — rather than ‘India’. This sparked speculation the BJP was getting ready to drop the name ‘India’, though both names are recognized in the Constitution.

If Indian agents are assassinating Khalistan activists, it speaks to something larger. Even if operations were not sanctioned by political leaders, they suggest an out-of-control security apparatus empowered by the arrogance and paranoia that characterizes the Modi government at its worst. The Khalistan movement has no real support in India today, so a campaign of assassinating diasporic activists is a vast overreaction.

This arrogance and paranoia continue to target dissenting voices and inconvenient news. Through official and unofficial means, film icons, novelists, internet users, civil society organizations, and even opposition politicians felt the pressure.

In May, a horrific gang rape committed during ethnic violence in the BJP-ruled border state of Manipur was covered up by local police and an internet blackout until a video of the crime went viral worldwide. In 2023, Reporters Without Borders downgraded India’s ranking on press freedom again, from 150 to 161 of 180 countries.

In March, Indian National Congress leader Rahul Gandhi was expelled from Parliament after his conviction on spurious defamation charges, a conviction later suspended by the Supreme Court.

Gandhi’s expulsion galvanized the fractured opposition into a new alliance. But this alliance failed to hold in November’s state elections, a reminder of the obstacles to forging a united front against Modi in 2024. Congress did beat a regional party to take power in the southern state of Telangana and had earlier defeated the BJP to recapture neighbouring Karnataka, but the party lost power in three northern Hindi-speaking states, arguably because of its refusal to share seats with its putative allies.

The odds strongly favor Modi’s reelection to a third consecutive five-year term, which no one since the first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, has achieved. But it is not a foregone conclusion. In India’s fractured party landscape, elections are won and lost as much by party alliances as by shifts in popular sentiment.

Popular sentiment is more closely tied to food prices and other domestic issues than international triumphs. And hubris could yet lead the Modi government to commit a fatal error. But unless Modi flies too close to the sun, it is difficult to see him falling in 2024.

Arun Swamy is Professor of Political Science at the University of Guam.

This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2023 in review and the year ahead.

This article was first published by the East Asia Forum.

Today, America prizes air superiority in its approach to warfare, but there’s a growing sentiment among many within the defense apparatus that dogfights, or close-quarters air-to-air combat, is a thing of the past. Advanced sensors and highly effective air-to-air weapons that can reach beyond visual ranges suggest air combat will now take place at longer distances than ever, making the need for aerobatic air superiority jets a thing of the past.

This sentiment can be found in statements made by many modern fighter pilots, but might be best reflected in this post from an F-16 pilot that went viral in aviation circles shortly after it went up:

The Raptor is about as cool as it gets, and it is the greatest air superiority fighter the world has ever seen, but like the F-15C that it was originally designed to replace it is an airplane without a real mission in modern conflict,” Air Force F-16 pilot Rick Scheff famously explained in an online discussion.

“When was the last time an American fighter killed another fighter in an air-to-air engagement? Go look it up, I’ll wait.”

Objectively speaking, there’s some real truth to Scheff’s statement. It seems inevitable that dogfights of a sort will break out any time two nations put a large volume of tactical aircraft into the same airspace, but it is hard to deny that there have been no fights between global powers for the better part of 80 years.

But those who disagree with the idea that close-quarters air battles are a thing of the past would posit that this period of relative peace and stability in our world is an exception. They would argue that Vietnam is a good example of how dogfights occur when airpowers tussle, and that we should be careful not to assume that the days of airpowers going to war are over, simply because it hasn’t happened lately.

To be clear, there are valid points to argue on either side of this debate, but it’s important not to lose sight of the complexity of the air war over Vietnam when using it as the foundation for an argument about dogfights. The truth is, America’s difficulties over Vietnam can’t be summed up in a single sentence about a lack of guns in the F-4 or the failures of a certain missile platform.

America’s troubles in the skies over Vietnam began well before the first shots of the conflict were fired, and continued well into the fighting. Some of the issues were technological, while others were bureaucratic and even political. The truth is, America lost aircraft and pilots over Vietnam not because of a single incorrect conclusion (“dogfights are over”), but rather because of a litany of errors that were – largely – made with the best of intentions.

There are lessons to be learned from the dogfights of Vietnam. We must look at them with clear eyes, to ensure we’re learning the right ones.

Tactical Figther Wing, on June 3, 1967. The F-105 was “a very poor plane in a dogfight” but it packed a fast-shooting 20mm cannon — early models of the F-4 did not have a gun. (US Air Force photo via National Archives)

During the Vietnam War, American fighter pilots saw a significant downturn in kill-to-loss ratios as compared to figures from the Korean War. Some argue US pilots over Korea came home with a 10:1 kill ratio (or 10 enemy fighters shot down for every U.S. fighter lost). However, that figure was originally meant to be specific to the F-86 Sabre, and nevertheless, modern historians believe it to be inflated. Real figures were likely closer to a still-impressive 8:1.

At times during the Vietnam War, on the other hand, that ratio had diminished to less than 1:1. That means that during some periods, the North Vietnamese were shooting down more American fighters than they were losing. While the overall ratio was significantly better, likely closer to 5.5:1 across the total force, the harsh reality of air combat over Southeast Asia can perhaps best be appreciated when looking at the hard numbers.

Between February 1962 and October 1973, the United States lost 1,737 fixed-wing aircraft in combat, with another 517 going down due to other issues in Vietnam. Throughout the entirety of the war, it was exceedingly rare for a week to pass without an American aircraft being lost in the fight, and at times, it happened daily.

The U.S. Air Force lost 40 percent of its entire fleet of F-105 Thunderchiefs over Vietnam. Additionally, a bit more than 12 percent (about one out of every eight) of F-4s built for all services met their end over Vietnam’s jungles. It’s very important to note, however, that the Air Force and Navy weren’t taking these losses lying down. In fact, the Air Force improved its tactics so dramatically over the course of the war that in the final five months of it, its fighter pilots were downing the enemy at a rate of 15:1.

This sort of picking nits is important for the sake of an accurate historical record. However, it doesn’t erase the fact that in the late 1950s and early 1960s, America seemed to incorrectly believe that close-quarters dogfighting was a thing of the past thanks in large part to the advent of (this will sound familiar) improved sensors and highly capable air-to-air weapons.

Such was the belief that new air-to-air missiles like the AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-7 Sparrow would render previous forms of dogfighting obsolete that America’s Mach 2-capable F-4 Phantom II came through production without so much as an onboard cannon, which was considered standard equipment for fighters until that time.

“That was the biggest mistake on the F-4,” John Chesire, who flew 197 combat missions in the Phantom during two tours in Vietnam, told Air & Space Magazine.

“Bullets are cheap and tend to go where you aim them. I needed a gun, and I really wished I had one.”

It wasn’t long before this line of thinking put American pilots into some pretty tough situations, as they tried to do battle with the notably slower and less advanced MiG 15, 17s, 19s, and 21s swarming the skies over Vietnam. Their ability to take tight turns and orient their noses at the faster-moving American fighters before they could swing around gave them opportunities to score gun kills. And to make matters worse, America’s new missiles didn’t always quite work as advertised, costing pilots valuable opportunities to down their opponents when they could.

While a lack of guns didn’t do the F-4 any favors, that was just one of many variables that eventually conspired against American pilots in dogfights over Vietnam. As explained by Benjamin Lambeth in his book, The Transformation of American Air Power (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs), America’s emphasis on winning the nuclear fight – fielding fast-moving fighters designed to intercept Soviet aircraft at long distances or carry heavy nuclear payloads – left its pilots at a disadvantage against harder-cornering platforms like the MiG-17 and 21. But the disadvantage extended well beyond turn performance.

The F-4 Phantom II offered poor visibility to the rear from inside the cockpit, making it tough to keep an eye on slower-moving opponents as they passed by. To make matters worse, the J-79 engines that could propel the F-4 past Mach 2 were known to produce a heavy smoke trail when not flying under afterburner. Contemporary reports suggest the smoke trail left by American F-4s would remain visible for as far as 30 miles, giving Vietnamese fighters, and crews on the ground, ample opportunity to spot and track the American jets as they flew through contested airspace.

Once the fight was on, American F-4s had a very narrow window of opportunity to leverage any advantage they might have. According to one declassified performance comparison between American and North Vietnamese aircraft, “only in range and first-shot capability does the F-4C enjoy a substantial advantage over the MiG-21 throughout the envelope.”

In other words, if the F-4 didn’t win a fight with its first shot, it was likely flying at a disadvantage from then on. Of course, that’s where problems with America’s air-to-air missiles became even more evident.

Between 1965 and March of 1968, of the 224 AIM-7s fired at enemy aircraft during air combat, only 20 resulted in kills for a success rate of just 8.9 percent. Other missiles faired better, but not much, with the AIM-4 recording a success rate of 10.7 percent and the AIM-9B coming in at 16 percent. The common perception that American air-to-air missiles failed to function as well as expected is entirely accurate. Yet, it’s certainly worth noting that the AIM-9 matured as a result, and eventually the AIM-9L provided an 80 percent success rate for the Brits in the Falklands War.

Not all of the blame can be placed on the hardware, however: Aircrew failures (like not keeping the target illuminated by radar until impact) were faulted for about 33 percent of the AIM-7’s misses. It’s also important to note that these weapons weren’t designed for this sort of combat. They were primarily intended to engage Soviet bombers at long ranges, not win dogfights over the jungles of Vietnam.

The AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missile was capable of engaging enemy fighters at ranges as far as 12 miles when intercepting head-on, which could have given the F-4 the “first shot” opportunity it needed to win more fights. However, the rules of engagement American pilots were given required that they make visual identification of targets before launching a weapon. Visual identification, of course, can only occur within visual range.

So, while America’s pilots had beyond-visual-range weapons at their disposal, they were effectively barred from using them. Once pilots had closed to within visual range of their opponents, they were now at a disadvantage to the MiG’s tight turn radius and guns.

But this limitation wasn’t just an issue when it came to weapons employment. It also eliminated the American opportunity for surprise in its air attacks. American fighters needed to be close enough to see their enemies before they could fire, but that inevitably meant their Vietnamese opponents could see them too. The F-4 was faster and had a longer reach than its opponents, but policy forced the pilots to surrender those advantages to their less advanced opponents.

The North Vietnamese famously produced far more flying Aces – pilots with at least five kills – than America’s Air Force or Navy, but that fact dismisses an important difference between these two aviator groups: American pilots were rotated into and out of the fight, often after 100 missions, whereas their opponents continued to fly combat sorties over their home turf throughout the conflict’s entirety. It’s sort of like comparing football stats between one player’s rookie season and another player’s entire career.

When the war began, America sent its most highly experienced aviators into the fight. But by 1966, the Air Force was sending pilots home after either 100 missions over North Vietnam or one year of combat over South. While this rotation was valuable to combat burnout and maintain morale, it also produced a pressing need for new pilots in the cockpit at frequent intervals. As a result, many pilots arriving in-country didn’t have any real tactical experience behind the stick before they were thrust into the thick of it.

Air Force F-4s were further hampered by tactics, as they often flew in a World War II-era formation referred to as a “fluid four.” This formation resulted in wingmen being too close (between 1,500 and 2,000 feet away at a 45-degree angle) to provide any real protection for the other aircraft and effectively limited the “attacking” portion of the formation to just the flight leader.

Using four aircraft to deliver one jet’s worth of ordnance was a stark contrast to the Navy’s “fluid-two” formations of two aircraft both leveraging their full loadouts.

“The wingman was always just another airplane in the air. I would have preferred to have gone into Route Package VI, under the conditions [in which] we were operating, with two highly qualified crews [flying Navy fluid two] rather than four… I had to spend 90 percent of my time keeping somebody in the flight from getting shot down [and] could not go about the business of MiG-CAP,” One Air Force flight leader later recounted.

Before the Vietnam War, the United States had placed a huge emphasis on safety during training; so much so that it all but forbade the realistic training pilots needed to win dogfights over Vietnam. Further, most of the training F-4 pilots had for air combat was done against other F-4s, which flew nothing like the MiGs they were squaring off against in Vietnam.

This lack of realistic training meant many American fighter pilots were sent into the fight with very little dogfighting experience in general, and next to none against aircraft like the ones they’d be flying against.

Addressing this serious shortcoming eventually led to the establishment of the Air Force’s first-ever aggressor squadron – a group of pilots flying jets like the T-38 and later the F-5E Tiger, tasked with mirroring opponent tactics to provide a more realistic idea of what air combat would be like. Soon thereafter, the Air Force’s first-ever Red Flag training exercise, a massive operation meant to simulate complex air combat, was born to help rectify the lack of experience Air Force pilots had before heading into combat.

Likewise, the Navy made significant changes to how it prepared pilots for air warfare. In 1969, the US Navy created the Navy Fighter Weapons School, which later became the Navy Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor program, but is known to many simply as Top Gun.

While there’s room for debate as to what will come of dogfights in the next great conflict, the establishment and continued investment into both Red Flag and Top Gun following the Vietnam War prove without a doubt that the U.S. learned some valuable lessons from the fight that went on to help make America the most dominant air power in the world today.

Dogfights may seem like a thing of the past, but without any large-scale conflict to draw new data from, we’re left to rely on the hard-earned lessons of the past. Can America afford to come into the next big air fight using the same unfounded certainty we brought with us into Vietnam? Maybe the next large-scale war won’t see dogfights happen at all, but an aircraft that’s capable of scrapping with the best of them when a scrap arises.

This is a lot like the flak jacket I strapped on each day during my deployment to Mozambique, Africa. It was something I probably wouldn’t need that day… but still preferred to have it, just in case.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Amid the chaos of last year’s House of Representatives Speaker fight, Congressional aid to Ukraine became a casualty. When Kevin McCarthy, a supporter of the Ukraine war effort, was ousted, that support was not shared by his successors and several of his colleagues. Since then, aid to Ukraine has become more divisive and stuck in limbo.

Likely contributing to this are perceptions of Ukraine’s chances of victory. While Ukraine is still resilient against Russian attacks, its stamina is not infinite; the average age of its soldiers is 40, and it has a much smaller population than Russia. There are some on Capitol Hill who are calling for reductions in armaments sent to Ukraine, while others believe the U.S. has already failed to adequately equip Ukraine to defend itself. This is consistent with the fact that globally, aid to Ukraine has gradually decreased in the last year.

But what that faction in Congress fails to acknowledge or understand is that it is infinitely more dangerous for Ukraine to be defeated and have Russia on the doorstep of the West. If Ukraine’s efforts are exhausted and Russia prevails, the U.S. will have to heavily arm the six countries that make up NATO’s eastern flank—Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania—unless it wants to send troops and fight its allies’ war for them.

The frontline state that has received the most assistance thus far is Poland, due to its large, shared border with Ukraine. Poland has upheld its two percent of GDP commitment to defense spending and has been the United States’ most indispensable NATO partner since the war in Ukraine began. Likewise, the United States has signed five-year defense cooperation agreements with each of the three Baltic countries, which include “integrated air and missile defense... participation in international military operations and exercises, infrastructure development and training,” according to the Pentagon.

However, Finland’s recent accession to NATO doubled the alliance’s border with Russia overnight, providing a buffer against the vulnerability of the three small Baltic countries. But as a result, Moscow has escalated the rhetoric it used for years to dissuade Finland from joining NATO in the first place, graduating from implicit threats of aggression to overt ones. As Vladimir Putin commented as early as 2016: "What do you think we will do in this situation? We moved our forces back [from the border], 1500 kilometers away. Will we keep our forces there?"  

Now, Russia’s permanent diplomat to international organizations, Mikhail Ulyanov, has stated that Finland would be the “first to suffer” in the event of a war between Russia and NATO. “Since they are our neighbors, if, God forbid there is some escalation, they will be the first to suffer,” Ulyanov told RIA Novosti, a state-owned news outlet.

He also described the defense cooperation agreement between Finland and the United States, in which Finland allowed U.S. troops to be stationed and military equipment to be stored at Finnish bases, right on Russia’s doorstep, as “already a serious challenge” to Moscow.

In response to the defense agreement with the U.S., Finland’s ambassador to Russia was also warned that Moscow will "not leave unanswered the buildup of NATO military potential on our border, which threatens the security of the Russian Federation, and would take the necessary measures to counter the aggressive decisions of Finland and its NATO allies."

Given those threats, Finland is likely the most urgent candidate to receive new U.S. equipment. In preparation for the need to defend a massive NATO border with Russia, Helsinki is already scheduled to receive 64 of the F-35A, the most advanced combat aircraft currently available. The F-35A is an invaluable asset to the U.S. and its NATO allies for its ability to collect and share more information than other tactical aircraft due to its virtual invisibility to enemy radar, and for its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Given its long border with Russia, Finland is also a logical candidate for M1A1 Abrams tanks. The M1A1 is superior to any tank fielded by the Russian military.

Thankfully, Ukraine is still holding its own and not backing down in the face of Russian aggression. It is focusing much of its efforts on ousting the Russian army from the country’s easternmost regions, and has gained a foothold on the eastern side of the Dnipro River. Even Russian military leaders have admitted to this being the case. Maintaining this foothold will likely be the deciding factor in Ukraine’s ability to recapture Crimea, which was illegally annexed by Russia in 2014.

However, there are also reports that the Ukrainian army has sustained heavy losses. And though they have made these strides ahead of winter, this year’s winter is predicted to be harsher than the last. Their fortunes could turn, and their progress could be reversed under the wrong mix of circumstances.

This is the wrong moment for members of Congress to reduce arms transfers to Ukraine on the table. Conditions of war are changeable, and Congress cannot afford to assume that if Ukraine is lost, the cost of defending the West will not become far greater.

Sarah White, M.A. is Senior Research Analyst and Editor at the Lexington Institute.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

All images are Creative Commons. 

How did the U.S. get its hands on MiG-29 fighters? Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine back in February 2022, there has been a resurgence in interest surrounding Moscow’s airframe arsenal. From MiG-29s and MiG-31s to Su-35s and Su-57s, the Kremlin has deployed a range of aging airframes to the frontlines of the war. Much of Russia’s Soviet-era equipment being used in battle is less capable than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO-delivered).

However, one airframe developed by the USSR and still flown today that has garnered the respect of many aviation buffs is the MiG-29.

Considered one of the most capable Eastern Bloc fighters of the late Cold War period, the ‘Fulcrum’ is a highly respected jet.

Interestingly, the U.S. ended up with 21 MiG-29s in the mid-1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Following lessons learned in the Vietnam War, U.S. officials understood the need to produce an air superiority platform. Existing American airframes like the F-105 Thunderchief were considered subpar to the Soviet’s more advanced and maneuverable MiG fighters. To rectify this, U.S. engineers got to work to create the “F-X” program, which ultimately culminated in the introduction of the formidable F-15 Eagle.

The Soviets couldn’t let the U.S. gain air superiority without a fight and worked to create its own Eagle counter. By the end of this decade, the Soviet General Staff directed engineers to produce a fighter capable of reaching speeds over Mach-2.0 (times the speed of sound) with heavy armament abilities. Eventually, a workload split resulted in this effort and two programs emerged- the Su-27 and MiG-29.

The Su-27 was designed to carry out deep air-to-air missiles against NATO high-value assets, while the Fulcrum was crafted to replace the preceding MiG-23 fighter. When the Fulcrum embarked on its maiden flight in the late 1970s, its elevated capabilities became quite concerning to U.S. officials.

Essentially, it was becoming clear that the Soviets were catching up to America’s aircraft technology. The Fulcrum features seven external weapon hardpoints and can carry up to two R-27 air-to-air medium-range missiles, six R-73 and R-60 air-to-air short range missiles, four pods of unguided rockets and a vast array of munitions.

As detailed by Airforce Technology, “The R-27 medium-range air-to-air missile is supplied by the Vympel State Engineering Design Bureau, based in Moscow. The R-27 is available in two configurations: the R-27R, which has a semi-active radar homing head and inertial navigation control with a radio link and the R-27T missile, which is fitted with an infrared homing head. The missile can intercept targets with a speed of up to 3,500km/h at altitudes from 0.02-27km, and the maximum vertical separation between the aircraft and the target is 10km.”

In addition to its impressive armament, the MiG-29 was one of the first Soviet airframes to extensively use lightweight aluminum titanium alloys, which reduce overall weight and complexity. These fighters also achieved high-angle-of-attack capability due to their widely flared wing leading edge root extension. Countries around the world noted the impressive traits embodied by the MiG-29 and set out to acquire the fighter. Export models of the Fulcrum were sold to India, Iran, East Germany, Peru, Iraq, Poland, Sudan, Syria and others.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the U.S. had the opportunity to acquire the once-feared MiG-29 fighters. Over two decades, more than one thousand Fulcrums were produced in the USSR.

In fact, the peak annual production rate of single-seat aircraft was reached in the late 1980’s. Following the breakup of the country, huge swaths of military equipment- including airframes- were left outside Russia. The majority of these airframes were left in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Concerned that such numerous nuclear-capable weapons were spread over multiple sovereign states, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program was created in order to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction. By the late 1990s, the U.S. used funds from this program to purchase 21 nuclear-capable MiG-29 Fulcrum airframes from the Republic of Moldova- a former Eastern Bloc component.

Moldova indicated that the Islamic Republic of Iran was interested in acquiring these formidable fighters, which urged the U.S. to act swiftly. Ultimately, the U.S. paid $40 million in addition to providing humanitarian assistance in the Fulcrum transaction.

While preventing Iran from receiving modern MiG-29 variants was a leading factor in America’s decision to buy these fighters, the secondary reason was that U.S. engineers were able to closely examine an adversary’s airframe.

During the Cold War, the MiG-290 Fulcrum was feared as a competent platform. Dissecting such a significant aircraft was undoubtedly the cherry on top for U.S. officials.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

The B-21: A Critical Component of Today’s Air Force— America needs the B-21 Raider stealth bomber now.

The Air Force’s newest bomber, the B-21 “Raider,” is built around the most sophisticated and easily maintained stealth technology ever developed. The kit and capabilities inside the jet will allow the United States to hold virtually any conventional or nuclear target in the world at risk. Unfortunately, the Pentagon’s plan to acquire just 100 B-21s, coupled with the proposed rate of acquisition, is insufficient to deter our peer adversaries, much less assure victory, should war arise.

Let’s start with the current state of the Air Force and why its need is so great.

The Air Force has withered significantly since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. In 1987, the service had 4,468 fighters and 331 bombers, and that fleet was so new that it was easy to keep those weapons systems ready for combat. On any given day, more than 80 percent of the fighters and B-52 bombers were mission-capable.

The defense funding cuts that followed the Soviet Union’s collapse led to a gradual reduction in capacity. Coupled with the withering effects of the Global War on Terror and the service’s mismanagement of the surge in funding since 2017, the Air Force now possesses just 2,038 fighters and 140 bombers. By any standard, today’s fleet is the oldest, smallest, and least ready in Air Force history.

The average fighter is now twenty-six years old, and the average bomber is forty-nine. That makes maintaining these jets a challenge. Just 60 percent of the service’s combatant aircraft are mission-capable. If tensions between the US and China escalate to war, the Air Force will have less than a third of the combat-capable fighter and bomber assets when it was last prepared to fight a peer adversary.

Unfortunately, the distances and basing challenges associated with a fight with China are markedly more challenging than those we faced with the Soviet Union. The plethora of allied bases in Europe, coupled with the relatively short distances involved, allowed fighters to handle the majority of the combat sorties required to take on the Warsaw Pact. Bombers, staging out of bases in England, were just 1,300 nautical miles from targets surrounding Moscow - a round trip that our B-52s could accomplish without air refueling.

The basing options for a fight with China are much more limited. The somewhat survivable base closest to mainland China is Anderson Air Force Base in Guam. Fighters sortieing out of Anderson to protect Taiwan would fly 1,700 NMs one way. If hostilities go full-bore, Anderson would be inundated by China’s deep magazine of long-range, precision missiles, forcing bombers to be staged out of the U.S. B-2s flying out of Whiteman AFB, Mo. would fly more than 6,700 miles to hit targets near Beijing.

That twenty-eight-hour round trip would limit mission-capable bombers to flying one sortie every thirty-six hours. Executing a viable operational plan against China would require a fleet of more than 210 mission capable bombers, while still holding a nuclear alert posture. The total demand would require a fleet of more than 300 bombers. Unfortunately, the service is woefully short of that number.

The Air Force has 112 operational (non-training) B-2s, B-1s, and B-52s. With a 60 percent mission capable rate, it could launch a maximum of sixty-seven bombers at any given time—without withholding assets for nuclear alert. The service’s current strategy for the B-21 is to procure 100 total jets at a rate of 10 jets a year, and it will be lucky to declare its first squadron as operational by 2027.

Unfortunately, China’s military rise has far exceeded expectations, and one of the service’s most senior leaders believes it could move on Taiwan as early as next year. To deter that move and be prepared for war should deterrence fail, the Air Force must move immediately to accelerate the fielding of the Raider, increase the rate of production to twenty jets a year, and acquire a fleet of at least 225 jets.

America needs the B-21 now more than ever, and we need to move mountains to bring it to bear as quickly as we can.

John “J” Venable is an F-16 fighter weapons school graduate and Senior Research Fellow for Defense Policy at the Heritage Foundation. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Images: Creative Commons.

Summary: The DF-26, also known as the "Guam Express," is an IRBM with a range exceeding 3,100 miles. It can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads and is capable of targeting ground or naval targets. The article highlights concerns about the DF-26's ability to target U.S. military installations in the Indo-Pacific, including Guam, and its potential to be used in a first-strike scenario in a nuclear exchange and attacks against U.S. naval assets like aircraft carriers.

With China’s “rise” to peer-status seeming more and more like an inevitability, US observers are paying particularly close attention to China’s warmaking abilities. America still has the world’s largest military budget, and world’s most capable fighting force. But the Chinese are working to close the gap – commiserate with their increasing territorial assertions throughout the Indo-Pacific region – and indeed, in some respects, have opened up a gap themselves.

China has made great strides to improve their military capabilities. In the air, the Chinese have unveiled a fifth-generation fighter, the Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon, which is understood to be a espionage-enabled clone of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Meanwhile, at sea, the Chinese are engaged in one of world history’s most ambitious shipbuilding sprees. In fact, the Chinese have surpassed the US in terms of ship quantity, and may now boast the world’s largest navy. Most notably, the Chinese recently launched it’s first supercarrier, the Fujian. America still has eleven supercarriers – far more than any other nation on Earth.

But the Chinese are demonstrating a willingness to match American capabilities. Or at least nullify American capabilities – with weapons that the American carriers cannot (at least according to many experts), at present, defend against, like the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which the Chinese have begun to stockpile.

The Dong Feng-26 (DF-26), or “East Wind-26,” is an intermediate-range ballistic missile. Produced by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and deployed with the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, the DF-26 has a range exceeding 3,100 miles and the ability to execute precision strikes with either nuclear or conventional ordnance. The DF-26 can target ground targets or naval targets - like aircraft carriers.

Overall, the capabilities of the DF-26 are particularly concerning to the Americans. The DF-26 has the range required to target US military installations in the Indo-Pacific, including critical installations at Guam (accordingly, the DF-26 has been referred to as the “Guam Express”). The ability to load the DF-26 with a nuclear warhead makes the missile an ideal candidate for first strike scenarios in a nuclear exchange with the US.

And, the fact that the DF-26 can be toggled to target naval targets is especially concerning. In a conflict with China, the US would rely heavily upon their carrier force – which, with the support of a Carrier Strike Group, and its own airwing, would be difficult for Chinese forces to nullify with their own naval or air forces.

Yet, the DF-26 could offer something of a magic bullet for Chinese forces hoping to strike US carriers from the equation. Of course, the DF-26 can target any US vessel – not just aircraft carriers, although the carrier is the crown jewel of the US fleet.

“China has made major additions to its stockpile of an anti-ship ballistic missile sometimes referred to as a “carrier killer,” indicating its role in a potential conflict would almost certainly be beyond just flattops,” Business Insider reported.

As a Congressional report indicated, “China increased the number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles from 300 in 2021 to 500,” demonstrating that China places a high value on the DF-26 in a potential conflict with the US.

“With an increase in DF-26 stockpile over the past year, China is clearly investing in a capability that can defeat defenses and effectively batter a variety of targets,” Business Insider reported. “That could spell trouble  for not only US aircraft carriers that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) would target should the two titans got to war but also other American ships as well.”

Some observers question whether the DF-26 indeed poses a legitimate threat to US ships, suggesting that perhaps the DF-26 has been over-hyped.

It’s true that the missile's effectiveness has not been concretely demonstrated; for example, there has been a test against a non-cooperative naval asset.

But the fact that the Chinese military has allocated its finite resources towards stockpiling 500 of the DF-26s suggests that the Chinese believe in the capabilities of the weapon (or its just an expensive bluff). Writing the DF-26 off as an over-hyped, unproven piece of tech could be Western wishful thinking.

And if the DF-26 is indeed a capable killer of US vessels, the Chinese will have a relatively cheap way to thwart expensive and difficult-to-replace US vessels.

“In a war at sea the PLA, if it had the inventory to do so, would be perfectly happy to trade a missile (or several), costing perhaps in the order of US $20 million each, for a destroyer that would cost billions to replace,” former US Navy submarine commander Tom Shugart wrote on X.

If the DF-26 is in fact legitimate, the US may be forced to rethink its strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: This article discusses Russia's S-500 air defense system and its potential impact on the conflict in Ukraine. Since February 2022, Ukraine has received significant military aid from the US and NATO, including advanced equipment. Russia's inability to achieve its offensive objectives in Ukraine is partly attributed to Ukraine's well-equipped forces.

Since February 2022, Ukraine’s arsenal of military equipment has dramatically ballooned. The U.S. and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have provided billions of dollars’ worth of aid to support Kyiv’s defensive efforts against Moscow. From main battle tanks and munitions to anti-tank weapons and infantry fighting vehicles, Ukraine possesses some of the best military equipment available.

In fact, Russia’s inability to accomplish its offensive objectives can be attributed to Ukraine’s tough defense. The Kremlin is banking that its superior air-defense system will ward off the well-equipped Ukrainian forces in battle.

While the S-500 is widely touted by Russia’s military to be a fifth-generation killer, the system’s true capabilities are still up for debate.

Russia’s S-500 “Prometheus” air defense system can be linked back to 2010, shortly after its S-400 predecessor was introduced to service.

Russian media outlets claimed that the S-400 was successfully tested in the late 1990s and was scheduled for deployment by the Army in 2001.

By 2003, however, the air defense system had still not been officially introduced. Over the next few years, the S-400 would undergo an array of testing procedures that would delay its entry to service until 2007.

Designated by NATO as the SA-21 Growler, the S-400 was designed to replace Russia’s earlier S-300 and S-200 variants. The former Soviet Union developed both preceding models as a series of long-range surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs). Trials of the original S-200 began in the mid-1950s, although the system was given the moniker S-25 Berkut initially. By the mid-1960’s, the first S-200s were in service.

The S-300 (NATO reporting name SA-10 Grumble) was produced in the late 1970’s. Designed to defend against air raids and cruise missiles, the S-300 is still considered to be one of the most effective anti-aircraft missiles deployed today.

While Russia’s earlier air defense systems are already quite capable, the introduction of the S-500 was intended to counter more modern threats.

Specifically, Moscow desired a new variant capable of defeating fifth-generation aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 as well as low orbit satellites, in addition to ballistic and cruise missile threats that preceding SAM variants could already counter.

The S-500’s trajectory followed a similar path as many other Soviet and Russian weapons, marred by countless delays to service.

In fact, the S-500 wasn’t officially tested until May 2018, when Russia conducted “the world’s longest surface-to-air missile test” by striking a target positioned roughly 300 miles away.

Russia’s new S-500 air-defense system consists of four 40N6M long-range surface-to-air missiles or two 77N6 interceptors in tubes mounted on a launch vehicle.

As detailed by the Center for International and Strategic Studies, the 40N6M long-range missiles can travel at a range of up to 400km, while the 77N6 series interceptors can reach approximately 600km. “The system features four radar vehicles per battery, including the 91N6E(M) S-band acquisition radar, 96L6-TsP C-band acquisition radar, 76T6 multi-mode engagement radar, and 77T6 anti-ballistic missile engagement radar.9 This radar complex reportedly allows the S-500 to detect ballistic and airborne targets at up to 2,000 and 800 km, respectively.”

Notably, the Kremlin has alleged that its new S-500 system is the only weapon capable of intercepting the country’s Kinzhal “hypersonic” missiles. This air-launched ballistic missile can reportedly be equipped with both nuclear and conventional warheads. While the Kremlin has frequently claimed that the Kinzhal is indeed a hypersonic weapon, Kyiv claimed to have shot down one of these missiles with its American-designed Patriot system over the summer.

In April 2022, the S-500 Prometheus commenced serial production, according to Russian state-run media outlets. This announcement was circulated by the Russian government-owned news agency TASS and was later corroborated by the CEO of the air-defense system’s manufacturer. However, international sanctions levied against Moscow are negatively impacting work on the air defense system. The U.S. and its NATO allies have waged heavy economic sanctions on Russia for its illegal attempt at annexing Ukraine.

Now that the invasion has been ongoing for nearly two years, Russia has sunk the majority of its resources into sustaining its war effort. Moscow’s lack of essential munitions, main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and other key weaponry demonstrates the imposition of these sanctions.

A consortium of NATO allies have agreed to deliver 60 F-16 Fighting Falcon airframes to Ukraine in the near future. Opponents of this deal have suggested that these jets would be too vulnerable against the S-500 air defense system. Now that Kyiv will soon be flying these fighters, the true extent of the S-500’s capabilities will be documented - as Moscow could send in the S-500 for air defense duty, which most experts argue still has not occurred yet.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Shutterstock or Creative Commons. 

Is the war in Ukraine becoming the transformative event of the 21st century?

Putin's illegal invasion is draining his armed forces by the day, and some experts think he could lose the war.

And we know one thing: social media will be one of the best ways to get a sense of who is winning or losing over the longterm: 

In a video shared to social media back in the late spring of last year, an M982 Excalibur extended-range guided artillery shell could be seen easily slicing through a Russian D-20 152mm towed howitzer on the left bank of the Dnipro River in the Kherson Oblast.

The U.S.-made Excalibur is a GPS and inertial-guided munition that is capable of being employed in close support situations within 75 to 150 meters (250 to 490 feet) of friendly troops.

It was a prime example of "one shot, one kill."

The type of weapon that fired the round isn't known, but it was likely from a UK-supplied M777 155mm howitzer.

The M982 Excalibur can be used in poor weather with bad visibility, while the high-explosive round can also be delayed to penetrate buildings or bunkers. It has been widely employed to target Russian artillery.

Yet, it may have been a bit of "overkill," and some commentators to the post from Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) – which shared the video – suggested the M982 Excalibur ordnance was likely as costly as the platform it took out.

Russia had more than 1,000 of its D-20 152mm howitzers in service when it launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine last year, and an untold number have already been destroyed.

Not clear in the video was whether the platform seen targeted by Kyiv's forces was still operational or if it had been disabled. The gun-howitzer is typically operated by a crew of eight soldiers; yet, none appeared present at the time of the strike.

It has been suggested that the crew spotted the drone that recorded the incident and which likely acted as a spotter for the Ukrainian artillery. It is also possible the gun was disabled and was used as a decoy – in which case, Kyiv wasted one of the expensive Excalibur rounds.

As noted, the Kremlin had more than 1,000 D-20 howitzers in service, but Kyiv's forces also had a significant number in its arsenals, and it has likely bolstered its strength from those captured by Russian forces.

The D-20 has a proven combat record, first seeing service in the Vietnam War, while it was later employed by Syrian forces in the Six-Day War and later in the Yom Kippur War. However, it wasn't until the Soviet-Afghan War that Kremlin forces first fired the D-20 in anger.

It is now being used by both Russian and Ukrainian forces.

In addition, the Ukrainian Army has begun to receive a number of M1981 artillery pieces, a derivative of the Soviet D-20. Both are manually loaded howitzers. The M1981 was designed by the Romanian Arsenalul Armatei (Army Arsenal) and was first manufactured under license at the Romanian Reșita plant. It weighs 5.7 tons, features a longer rifled barrel (34 calibers long), but can use the same ordnance as the Soviet-developed weapon.

#Ukraine: A Russian D-20 152mm towed howitzer was destroyed by the Ukrainian army with a direct M982 Excalibur hit on the left bank of the Dnipro River, #Kherson Oblast. pic.twitter.com/ecIDxIzEli

— ???????? Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) May 27, 2023

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Since 2021, the Biden administration’s key defense concept has been “integrated deterrence.” The administration’s first strategy document, the March 2021 Interim National Security Guidance (INSG), provided a partial rationale for developing this concept when it identified the threats posed by both China and Russia and the challenge of deterring their “aggression.” To deter these adversaries and prevent them from “directly threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the global commons, or dominating key regions,” the INSG asserted, the United States would have to “work with like-minded partners” and “pool our collective strength” to “counter threats to our collective security, prosperity, and democratic way of life.”

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin subsequently built on this in speeches from May and July of 2021. During an address to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii on May 3, 2021, Austin affirmed that the “cornerstone of America’s defense is still deterrence,” which “meant fixing a basic truth within the minds of our potential foes: that the costs and risks of aggression are out of line with any conceivable benefit.” But to achieve this in the twenty-first century, the United States must undertake “integrated deterrence.” This would mean not only “us[ing] existing capabilities, and build[ing] new ones, and us[ing] all of them in networked ways” but also doing so “hand in hand with our allies and partners.” A similar definition was then offered during an address in Singapore on July 27, 2021, where the Secretary of Defense described “integrated deterrence” as “using existing capabilities, and building new ones, and deploying them all in new and networked ways – all tailored to a region’s security landscape, and growing in partnership with our friends.”

Yet the exact content of this neologism and how it differed from the multitude of adjectival forms of deterrence that have punctuated U.S. defense strategy in recent decades remained a mystery that was not resolved until the administration’s almost simultaneous release of its National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Security Strategy in October 2022. These documents, in combination with an examination of the administration’s approach to the war in Ukraine, provide a clearer picture of that “integrated deterrence” has less to do with the deterrence of immediate threats than with the dissuasion of adversaries using not primarily military instruments but diplomatic and economic ones and greater burden sharing with allies.

As such, “integrated deterrence” is less than meets the eye. While seeking to integrate military, diplomatic, and economic instruments of national power and encourage greater burden-sharing with allies may be sensible, “integrated deterrence” does not contain a theory of coercion that explains how the United States will seek to manipulate risk, make credible threats to prevent adversary actions or apply force in the pursuit of well-defined goals.

The October 2022 NDS presented a three-pronged approach to counter what it termed the U.S.’ “most consequential strategic competitor” (i.e., China): “integrated deterrence,” “campaigning,” and “building enduring advantages.”

“Integrated deterrence” was defined as “developing and combining our strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.” “Campaigning,” meanwhile, meant “the conduct and sequencing of logically-linked military initiatives aimed at advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time” so that the Department of Defense could “operate forces, synchronize broader Departmental efforts, and align Departmental activities with other instruments of national power, to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors’ military preparations, and develop our own warfighting capabilities together with Allies and partners.” Finally, “building enduring advantages,” entailed “undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, getting the technology we need more quickly, and making investments in the extraordinary people of the Department, who remain our most valuable resource.”

Satirist James H. Boren once described such “bureaucratese” as “mumbling with professional eloquence.” Such mumbling, he argued, was defined by “mixing tonal patterns with multisyllabic words for the purpose of projecting an image of knowledgeability and competence without regard to either knowledge or competence.”

Deconstructing in plain language what this “mumbling” means in practice reveals that it has little to do with deterrence as it is conventionally understood.

On the one hand, a core and admirable thrust of administration statements on “integrated deterrence” is to show that it seeks to communicate that “deterrence is distinct from the nuclear deterrent,” that the United States will utilize “all aspects of national power, not just the military, to communicate intent” and to “ensure that U.S. signals are coordinated with those of allies and partners.”

However, on the other hand, there is a lack of clear connection between the neologism and concepts central to deterrence, such as the manipulation of risk, establishment of credible threats to prevent adversary actions, or the application of force to achieve well-defined goals. Rather, as Van Jackson argues, “integrated deterrence” via its emphasis on greater burden shifting to allies and advanced conventional capabilities “backstopped” by its nuclear deterrent “is best understood as referring to escalation avoidance in contingency planning for limited war.”

That “integrated deterrence” is not concerned with a theory of coercion is indicated by some administration officials’ statements surrounding the war in Ukraine. Soon after the Russian invasion, anonymous Pentagon officials were quoted by the Washington Post that the U.S.-led response showed that the “model of integrated deterrence comes out smelling pretty good.” The rationale here, according to an anonymous official, was that the U.S. response leveraged its “primacy in the global financial system” and its alliance networks “in ways that can absolutely pummel aggressors.” This line of argument was subsequently deployed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks during a briefing in March 2022 on the administration’s 2023FY defense budget request. Here, Hicks asserted that the U.S.-led response to Ukraine had enhanced deterrence by making the “costs and folly of aggression” by adversaries “very clear.”

This line of argument, however, ignores the basic fact that Russia invaded Ukraine despite U.S.-led efforts to deter it from doing so. The official was perhaps referring to the administration’s effective marshaling of a U.S. and allied diplomatic and economic response to that fact. Significantly, the administration, both in its pre-invasion attempts to deter Vladimir Putin and post-invasion efforts to assist Ukraine, has studiously avoided consideration of the direct application of U.S. military capabilities. There are, of course, good reasons for this (e.g., concerns about risking escalation to a direct Russia-NATO confrontation), but it begs the question as to what role the administration sees American military capabilities playing in “integrated deterrence”?

What, then, of “campaigning”? The NDS tortuously defines this as “the conduct and sequencing of logically-linked military initiatives aimed at advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time” so that the Department of Defense can “operate forces, synchronize broader Departmental efforts, and align Departmental activities with other instruments of national power, to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors’ military preparations, and develop our own warfighting capabilities together with Allies and partners.” In plain language, as two analysts from the Hudson Institute note, this appears to be drawn from U.S. Marine Corps doctrine and refers to the “orchestration of military activities alongside economic, diplomatic, and information actions to achieve specific goals.”

Finally, “building enduring advantages,” is arguably the most straightforward, entailing “undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, getting the technology we need more quickly, and making investments in the extraordinary people of the Department, who remain our most valuable resource.” This amounts to a sensible focus on the material and human elements of capability acquisition and development necessary to counter perceived challenges/threats.

What does this “mumbling” mean for how we might understand the evolving U.S. defense posture?

“Integrated deterrence” suggests three major—and interlinked—dynamics. First, “integrated deterrence” appears not to be directly concerned with deterrence but rather dissuasion. The distinction between the two concepts is important. Deterrence, as Michael Mazzar states, “is the practice of discouraging or restraining someone” from “taking unwanted actions, such as an armed attack” and is designed “to stop or prevent an action” from taking place. Dissuasion, in contrast, is a broader concept that seeks to shape a (potential) adversary’s long-term behavior, “discouraging that country from embracing policies and building forces that could produce political confrontation, military competition, and war.”

Dissuasion, therefore, acts “not by threatening direct military retaliation as an ever-present reality”—as most theories of deterrence hold—but rather “by making clear that it will thwart and frustrate hostile steps through countervailing measures of its own.” Key to successful dissuasion is an element of reassurance: the dissuader must be able to assure the adversary that if it avoids “embracing policies and building forces” that could produce conflict, the dissuader will not proceed with countervailing measures. Dissuasion can thus be viewed as a kind of “pre-deterrence” as it is designed to address less immediate challenges through the leveraging not only of military but diplomatic and economic instruments of national power to convince a potential adversary not to pursue certain military and strategic actions that may make conflict more likely.

This, arguably, is what the United States undertook after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Here, it endeavored not only to supply Ukraine with what it required to defend itself but also sought to ensure that the conflict did not spread beyond Ukraine and/or escalate to a Russia-NATO conflict. The administration, as Janice Gross Stein argues, combated Russia’s “strategy to manipulate uncertainty”—through its repeated threats of nuclear escalation—with “a strategy to reduce uncertainty” based on the establishment of “boundary conditions” (e.g., communicated to Russia that the United States did not seek war between Russia and NATO) to guide the American response. Indeed, as reported by Politico, President Joe Biden, as early as October 2021, had identified three guidelines for the U.S. response should Russia not be deterred from invading Ukraine: “Support Ukraine—nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine, bolster NATO, and avoid a war with Russia.”

Second, the “integrated deterrence” construct suggests that the administration is concerned primarily with escalation management and burden shifting rather than deterrence. Concerning the former, the NDS (and Nuclear Posture Review, NPR, released with it) seeks to subordinate U.S. nuclear strategy to overall defense strategy where U.S. nuclear capabilities become a “backstop” to its advanced conventional capabilities. As such, “integrated deterrence” envisages U.S. nuclear capabilities as providing a “defensive mission meant only to complement offensive but non-nuclear ones.” The objective, as the NPR states, is to “strengthen deterrence and raise the nuclear threshold of our potential adversaries in regional conflict by undermining adversary confidence in strategies for limited war that rely on the threat of nuclear escalation.”

Concerning the latter, “integrated deterrence” (as detailed in policy documents such as the NDS) clearly emphasizes the role of allies and partners in both deterrence missions and force planning. Not only are “allies” mentioned 141 times in the eighty-page NDS, but the document asserts that a central task is to “anchor” American strategy in them. Such “anchoring” will be attained through prioritization of “interoperability,” enabling “coalitions with enhanced capabilities,” and developing “new operating concepts” as well as “combined, collaborative force planning.” As Van Jackson notes, this constitutes a major shift in U.S. strategy as allies “have historically featured in force planning as sources of political legitimacy, or providers of territorial access, but their expected battlefield contributions were typically treated as marginal.” “Integrated deterrence,” however, canvasses the possibility that future deterrence contingencies will not only be “all-domain but all-coalition.”

Taken together, the themes of dissuasion, escalation control, and burden shifting evident in “integrated deterrence,” combined with the contours of the U.S. response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, indicate that under the current administration, the United States is more risk-averse than in the immediate past and constitutes a tacit admission that it is no longer confident of U.S. military superiority (across the spectrum of capabilities) in possible conflict scenarios with great power rivals.

Dr. Michael Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies at the Centre for Future Defence and National Security, Deakin University, and an Adjunct Professor at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Congress’s latest defense bill represents an enormous failure to take the threat of China seriously—and it’s primarily the fault of certain Wall Street-friendly Republicans who were allowed to hijack the process.

Not long ago, House Republicans could have credibly argued that they were Capitol Hill’s toughest China hawks. Despite that track record, lame-duck Financial Services Committee Chairman Patrick McHenry (R-NC) and a few cronies were allowed to strip out virtually all of the important China-related national security provisions from this year’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

This outcome only benefits the special interests who want to keep making money in China. And it comes with severe national security consequences for the American people.

Most concerningly, McHenry removed a bipartisan Senate amendment that would require disclosure for some U.S. investments into military technologies in China. The broadly supported amendment passed with ninety-one votes, and a similar effort in the House has drawn high-level bipartisan cosponsors, indicating a similar level of support. The top China national security experts from both parties went to bat for the provision, as did prominent conservative groups, including the Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action for America.

But while Speaker Mike Johnson could have gone over McHenry’s head to protect this provision, the latter’s fringe pro-China demands prevailed. It was a pyrrhic victory. President Biden’s weak executive order on outbound investments into China will— eventually —partially reduce the amount of U.S. pensions and investments being used to fund our own destruction. And McHenry, who announced his retirement from Congress the same month he killed bipartisan China legislation, will be remembered for helping Wall Street hide its financing of Chinese warships and fighter jets. However, he succeeded in squandering Congress’s best shot to address these dangerous investments in China for at least another year.

Shockingly, McHenry was also allowed to remove sanctions on China for fentanyl trafficking, as well as a measure to enhance scrutiny over China’s purchases of American agricultural land. He wasn’t alone in his malfeasance. Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee Chairman and Democrat Gary Peters inexplicably blocked a House measure that would stop taxpayer dollars from being used for genetic testing equipment from BGI, a company that shares customers’ genomic data with the Chinese military.

The NDAA also reflects broader failures in the Indo-Pacific, such as the missed opportunity to complete the Compacts of Free Association with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia. These critical pacts grant the United States a military monopoly over a large swath of the Pacific, and our armed forces have long relied on these privileges as part of our regional strategy. Heading into the new year with the Compacts expired, and no resolution in sight will only help China’s effort to supplant the United States and shift the military balance across the Pacific in the CCP’s favor.

Some useful provisions for deterring China did make it into the NDAA, however. It authorizes six multi-year procurement authorities for six munitions critical to any fight in the Pacific, a significant change that could speed up production and drive down costs. This is important because the United States faces a munitions supply crisis as it confronts multiple security threats in different military theaters. The bill also adds Taiwan to a list of countries eligible for expedited munitions sales, authorizes the San Antonio-class amphibious ship requested by the Marine Corps, and includes essential planning and funding for the defense of Guam and Hawaii, along with coalition-building in the Indo-Pacific.

House Republicans also succeeded in establishing the sea-launched cruise missile nuclear program (SLCM-N) as a program of record, over the objections of the Biden administration. Despite the administration’s protests and the political appointees in the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), SLCM-N is critical to establishing an effective deterrent against China’s ever-expanding nuclear arsenal.

These overdue incremental achievements are welcome, but make no mistake: the Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Budget is a gift to Xi Jinping. The NDAA is always one of Congress’s most significant opportunities for national security action. To their credit, both the House and Senate came to the table with proposals to address urgent threats from China. But almost none of them survived the closed-door negotiations, and it is shameful that Congress couldn’t even agree that we should scrutinize— much less prohibit —the financing of Chinese weapons that will be aimed at U.S. soldiers.                                                                                                                         

Time is short. This year, China’s military aggression toward Taiwan has increased to unprecedented levels. Almost immediately after President Biden’s concessionary summit with Xi Jinping, aggressive Chinese actions in the South China Sea nearly brought it to the brink of armed conflict with the Philippines—a U.S. treaty ally.

China couldn’t have asked for a better outcome in this year’s NDAA, but the American people should demand one. Congress should fix this —quickly.

Bryan Burack is a Senior Policy Advisor for China and the Indo-Pacific in the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. Wilson Beaver is a Senior Policy Analyst for Defense Budgeting at Heritage’s Center for Defense Policy.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: The article discusses the F-111 Aardvark, a Cold War-era strike aircraft known for its sweep-wing design and two-seat configuration. It served in the Vietnam War and remained in the US Air Force's fleet until the late 1990s, while the Royal Australian Air Force used it until 2010. The article explores whether the US retired the F-111 too early. The F-111 was a Cold War-era strike aircraft, distinct for its sweep-wing format and two-seat configuration. The F-111 debuted during the Vietnam War and served venerably for decades. The US Air Force didn’t retire the F-111 Aardvark until the late 1990s. Yet, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) kept imported F-111s in service until 2010, raising the question: did America retire the F-111 too early? The answer depends on your perspective and your priorities.   

Initially, the F-111 was designed with an A-variant and a B-variant. The A-variant was to be used with the US Air Force; the B-variant was to be used with the US Navy. The B-variant was scrapped before entering production, however, while the A-variant became the F-111 that would serve for multiple decades.

Nicknamed “Aardvark” because of the airframe’s distinctively long nose, the F-111 debuted a variety of then-novel technologies. Most notably, the F-111 was the first sweep-wing aircraft ever to enter production. The sweep-wing, which became familiar to the general public thanks to the sweep-wing F-14 Tomcat featured so prominently in Tony Scott’s Top Gun, is a wing that can pivot back and forth, mid-flight, to change the shape of the aircraft.

The result is an aircraft that can operate in a straight-wing configuration (creating maneuverability at low speeds) and a swept-wing configuration (to achieve supersonic speeds). The Aardvark’s wings could sweep between 16 degrees and 72.5 degrees.

Sweep-wing technology never became the standard for military jets. The majority of military aircraft feature fixed wings. Yet, several prominent jets incorporated sweep-wings, including the Su-17, MiG-23, Tu-22M, Su-24, Tu-160, B-1 Lancer, Panavia Tornado, and of course, the F-14.

The F-111 introduced more than just swept-wings; The F-111 had afterburners on turbofan engines, a terrain-following guidance system – and an escape capsule for ejecting the entire two-person crew together. The afterburners and terrain-following guidance have become standard features in military aviation.

While the F-111 debuted several new features, the jet did resemble a contemporary: the A-6 Intruder, best remembered for the film Flight of the Intruder, featured Danny Glover and Willem Dafoe. Like the F-111, the A-6 could operate in all-weather conditions and was designed to penetrate enemy defenses, using terrain-following guidance and drop bombs. But where the A-6 was slow and bulbous, the F-111 was sleek and fast, with swept-wings and supersonic top speeds.

The F-111 entered service in time to join the American effort against the North Vietnamese. However, the F-111’s first deployment did not go well. Debuting in March 1968, F-111s began crashing. The cause of the crashes was a mystery. After a third F-111 crashed in just two months, the new jet was grounded and the problem was diagnosed: a hydraulic control-valve rod for the horizontal stabilizer sometimes caused the F-111 to defy the pilot’s inputs and pitch up dangerously.

When the entire fleet was inspected for the horizontal stabilizer flaw, 42 jets were found to feature the problem. The F-111 fleet would not become operational again for three years.

Once the horizontal stabilizer problem was sorted, the F-111 became an asset to US efforts, effectively delivering ordnance during Operation Linebacker and Operation Linebacker II. The North Vietnamese came to fear the F-111 specifically, referring to the strike aircraft as “Whispering Death.”

The F-111s were still in service when the US commenced Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The F-111 served admirably, completing 3.2 successful strike missions for every unsuccessful strike mission; the F-111s success ratio was better than any other strike aircraft that the US used during the conflict. Yet, just a few years after outperforming newer and more heralded strike aircraft, the F-111 would be retired from service – more than a decade before the Australians would retire the F-111 – begging the question: did the Americans retire the F-111 too early?

The answer comes down to how much you want to spend on defense. The F-111’s performance was still adequate to warrant inclusion in the US’s force structure. But the Cold War era jet required a lot of maintenance time for each hour of flight time – meaning that the jet was rather expensive to maintain. And by the late 90s, the US had versatile airframes (like the F/A-18 Super Hornet and F-15E Strike Eagle) that could slot in and perform the F-111s functions reasonably well.

Maybe the F-111 was better at its sole and specific strike function. But the versatile airframes were more cost-effective – which counted for more in the cost-conscious post-Cold War era.

Keeping the F-111 in service would have given the US a broader depth of strike options – but in the unipolar moment of the 1990s, the cost was hard to justify.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

HIMARS artillery systems are powerful weapons of war and, when sent to Ukraine, were considered a game changer on the battlefield. 

Since being introduced, social media lights up anytime we get footage of these systems being used in action.

We know one thing: Putin might want to shut off his smartphone if he comes across any of these videos. 

Back in April, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense showed that it had a true sense of humor when it posted a short video clip to social media.

In the 34-second-long video, three U.S.-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) launchers could be seen firing multiple rounds toward Russian positions.

"Stop, HIMARS time!," @DefenceU captioned the post to Twitter – a reference to the 1990 song "U Can't Touch This" by rapper MC Hammer, which had the line "Stop, Hammer Time!"

That riff has become a popular meme on social media, and while still considered somewhat of a "novelty song," the track has been seen millions of times since it was first posted to the video-sharing service 14 years ago.

Some commentators on social media also noted, perhaps intentionally, that the HIMARS video featured a background of a clear blue sky.

At the same time, the launchers were positioned on a yellow field that comes into focus as the rocket lit up the early morning sky.

It briefly appears reminiscent of the Ukrainian flag.

Ukraine's Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi also shared the footage to his Telegram channel and wrote "Ukrainian artillery proves its effectiveness. It destroys thousands of units of soldiers and enemy equipment. Along with foreign weapons, Ukrainian soldiers skillfully combine domestic artillery systems that affect hostile objects on the battlefield. The 27th, 43rd and 107, jet and artillery brigades have repeatedly proved their productivity. They provide powerful fire support during various military operations."

Syrskyi added, "I am proud of our artillery! Glory to Ukraine and our heroes!"

The lightweight rocket launchers have been seen as a potential game changer for Kyiv, as they have a range of 50 miles, and have already been used with great success to strike Russian ammunition depots, bridges, and other high-value targets.

The video was shared on social media back in April just days after the United States Department of Defense (DoD) announced at the time that it would provide a $2.6 billion security aid package that included additional ammunition for the HIMARS. 

Stop, HIMARS time!

???? Ukrainian Land Forces pic.twitter.com/Kimu4edhjh

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) April 9, 2023

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Russia’s Ukraine invasion is often referred to as a “drone war,” which is apt considering the prevalent role unmanned aerial vehicles have played.

Since February 2022, Kyiv has relied on a combination of foreign-supplied and domestically produced drones to support its defensive efforts.

Moscow has also manufactured its own UAVs, although Russian forces largely depend on continuous influxes of Iran-designed drones. 

These relatively cheap and easily manufactured aerial weapons have grown to symbolize modern warfare. 

Late last year, open-source intelligence group Ukraine Weapons Tracker published a video showing one of these drones at work.

In the footage, a Ukrainian first-person view loitering munition appears to strike a Russian TOS-1A thermobaric multiple rocket launcher. The short clip culminates in a powerful detonation of the rockets on board. 

Since the onset of the invasion, Ukrainian engineers have been working hard to design more advanced and capable drones that can be manufactured right in Kyiv. Over the summer, the New York Times identified two new drones used by Ukraine in the war — the Bober and the UJ-22 Airborne. 

Although little information is available about these drones, both were used in barrages targeting Russian territory. The box-like Bober UAV was identified in several videos of attacks on Moscow. Named after the Ukrainian word for Beaver, this UAV is likely being deployed amid Kyiv’s counter-offensive efforts. 

According to state sources, Ukraine’s UJ-22 UAV can fly for six hours at a range of 500 miles. 

In the video shared by Ukraine Weapons Tracker on X, a Russian TOS-1A appears to be destroyed by the Ukrainian-launched UAV.

Often referred to as a “vacuum bomb,” this weapon disperses gaseous clouds of chemicals in the air, which creates a vacuum that can ignite a powerful ripping effect on soft materials when reversed.

This horrifying system dates back to the Cold War and was first used by the Russian Army in Chechnya. It is typically fitted onto a T-72 main battle tank, which is capable of holding up to two dozen unguided thermobaric rockets. 

As detailed by The Drive,“Once the target is hit, the first explosive charge allows the fuel container to open and disperse a cloud of fuel, and the second charge ignites the incendiary fuel cloud which results in the fiery explosion and a subsequent oxygen-sucking vacuum. The detonation of the rockets causes such a rapid and drastic change in air pressure that taking shelter within a trench or cave, behind a reinforced barrier, or, in some cases, even inside of an armored vehicle would fail to protect a human.”

The destruction of the TOS-1A in the footage above is a win for Kyiv. In recent months, Russian Forces have been trying to retake the offensive in the war, which proved to be a painful feat.

While Kyiv managed to breach Russia’s main line of defenses back in August, it has struggled to expand that gap into a major breach that would enable its troops to advance forward. 

#Ukraine: A Ukrainian FPV loitering munition struck a Russian TOS-1A thermobaric multiple rocket launcher- leading to the powerful detonation of the rockets on board. pic.twitter.com/ObqLSp0l2O

— ???????? Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) October 13, 2023

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Video on Social Media Presents View From Within Su-25 Cockpit in Ukraine: A video shared on social media last year offered the view from within a Ukrainian Su-25.

Though just 26 seconds long, the clip provided a glimpse of what it is like for Ukrainian pilots to fly low and fast while firing at an enemy position.

Several missiles can be seen launched, while the aircraft's Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) lit up like a Christmas tree, suggesting the aircraft was facing threats from numerous radar systems including airborne, early warning, and even short-range.

The video was posted by the open-source military intelligence monitor OSINT Technical (@Osinttechnical) and has since been seen more than many times.

Though the GPS coordinates were blurred out, at the end of the clip the aircraft appears to pass over a bombed-out urban center – indicating that this particular sortie may have taken place in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine.

Developed during the Cold War for the Soviet Ground Forces, the Sukhoi Su-25 Grach (Russian for "Rook" – NATO reporting name "Frogfoot") is a subsonic, single-seat, twin-engine jet aircraft that was designed to provide close air support.

It has been described as Russia's "flying tank," and is broadly analogous to the United States Air Force's A-10 Thunderbolt II. 

However, it is actually employed by both sides – as noted in the recent video.

Powered by two Soyuz/Tumansky R-195 turbojet engines, the Su-25 has a maximum speed of Mach 0.79 or 975 km/h (606 mph), and a range of 1,000 km (620 miles).

It has eleven hardpoints with the capacity to carry up to 4,400 kg (9,700 pounds) of ordnance, including rockets, air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, and a variety of bombs, including the BETAB-500 concrete-penetrating bomb.

It is also armed with a 30 mm Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-30-2 autocannon with 250 rounds, as well as SPPU-22 gun pods for two 23 mm Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-23 autocannons with 260 rounds.

It first entered service in 1978 and was used extensively during the Soviet-Afghan War to strike at Mujahedeen positions.

Nearly two dozen were lost in combat operations, including nine that were destroyed on the ground.

The Su-25 also proved successful against armored vehicles during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), with only one confirmed to have been lost in combat. As a result, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein decorated all of the Iraqi Air Force's Su-25 pilots with the nation's highest military decoration.

During the Gulf War of 1991, the air superiority of the coalition forces was so great that the Iraqi Air Force never stood a chance.

As a result, seven Su-25s were among the more than three dozen Iraqi aircraft that fled to Iran, while two were shot down in the early stages of the conflict.

Low-level Ukrainian Su-25 operations in the east from fin_foin. pic.twitter.com/gvTgCf9kG2

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) March 30, 2023

More than 1,000 of the Su-25s were produced between 1978 and 2017.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, both Russia and Ukraine maintained a number of the ground attack aircraft. Some of the Ukrainian Air Force's Su-25s have been modernized, and a number of previously "retired" jets were made airworthy and returned to service.

Kyiv has also received at least a dozen from the Bulgarian Air Force, and as of 2022, it has thirty-one Su-25s in its air fleet. These continue to be used to conduct attacks against Russian positions as seen in the video.

Russia has maintained even more Su-25s, and the ground attack jet is operated by Russian Aerospace Forces, as well as by the Wagner PMC, the mercenary group that was supporting  Kremlin's war effort in the Donbas region until last year.

The Russian Navy also operates an adapted version of the Su-25UB two-seat trainer, the Su-25UTG, a carrier-capable variant that has been used to carry out deck-landing training aboard Moscow's sole aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov.

Despite its age, the Su-25 will likely continue to be employed by both sides in the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs<