Defence`s Feeds

EU defence officials gathered in Warsaw on June 17-18 for the first conference under the fourth phase of the EU’s flagship defence and sustainable energy initiative, aiming to reduce military dependence on fossil fuels while reinforcing operational resilience.

The two-day event brought together around 140 participants from 25 countries (23 EU Member States, Norway and Serbia) under the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS), managed by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and funded by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER). Hosted under the Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU and by Poland’s Ministry of Defence, the conference set the tone for the programme’s next four years, which will run until September 2028.

While the new phase — CF SEDSS IV — formally began in late 2024, the Warsaw conference marked the community’s first full plenary in the new phase, after a decade of steady progress. With the EU targeting climate neutrality by 2050 and proposing a 90% net emissions reduction by 2040, ministries of defence are being urged to take a more proactive role.

“Energy sustainability and defence resilience go hand in hand. Less fossil fuels, smarter energy management, more energy efficiency and stronger critical energy infrastructure contribute to stronger defence,” EDA’s Director of Industry, Synergies and Enablers (ISE), Sean White, told the conference. “A greener, more energy-secure and resilient Europe starts with us.”

Krzysztof Zielski, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, underlined: “Our task today and in the years ahead is not simply to adapt to change, but to shape the future of defence energy strategy with responsibility and resolve. In doing so we honour our duty not only to our nations, but to the stability of Europe as a whole.” The forum exemplifies the impact of unity between science, industry and defence, he said.

Katarzyna Smyk, Head of European Commission Representation, Poland, also underscored the significance of this initiative, stating: “The energy transition presents a unique opportunity for EU military forces to enhance their capabilities and maintain superiority. Equally important is the necessity of enhanced civil-military cooperation to bolster the resilience of critical energy infrastructure. In this framework, the CF SEDSS remains an excellent platform to contribute to reaching these important results.”

In his keynote speech, Paweł Wronka, Representative of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces said: "The military supports the protection of critical energy infrastructure. We face cyber attacks daily. Energy, as a strategic factor, is vital for the country to operate."

Renewables, digitilsation

Speakers highlighted that energy transition offers critical gains: reducing dependency on fossil fuel imports, improving supply resilience, and mitigating vulnerabilities exposed by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. The event also addressed threats to critical infrastructure, including hybrid attacks in European sea basins.

The conference launched a comprehensive work programme including six plenary sessions, energy technology exhibitions, and crisis-response exercises focused on critical infrastructure. Key areas include energy efficiency, renewables, protection of critical energy infrastructure, battery storage, smart buildings, and digitalisation.

Innovative projects are already underway. In the forum’s previous phase, the Symbiosis Project began work on how offshore renewables such as wind farms can co-exist with military activities in the maritime domain — a  model of civil-military cooperation.

The new phase seeks to build on these achievements, leveraging over 50 project ideas and 15 studies generated since the Forum’s launch in 2015. The conference also served to reinvigorate cross-border collaboration after a period of limited in-person engagement. Officials praised the event as a springboard for deeper cooperation and a symbol of continuity amid shifting security dynamics.

More about the CF SEDSS

• Consultation Forum Sustainable Energy
• EDA and EU Commission sign grant for new phase in green defence
• Green fingers: EU defence energy community ends phase with new proposals

European Union Member States have approved 11 new projects under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the sixth and final wave of the initial phase of the framework. These projects, which involve 19 Member States, aim to strengthen defence cooperation and capability development. 

The sixth wave of PESCO projects cover a wide range of needs, from broader strategic areas such as air and missile defence and cyber doctrine to more specific applications such as soldier systems and field medical facilities. Member States are also addressing key shortfalls by introducing unmanned aerial systems, improving interoperability through equipment standardisation, and boosting protection of vital undersea infrastructure. For more details of projects coordinated by Germany, Finland, France and Italy, please see here.  

New projects 

Germany (coordinating Member State) 

• Joint European Electromagnetic Warfare Convergence Initiative (JEEWCI) 
• Substitute for Lead in Infantry Ammunition (SLIA) 
• Common Handheld Optronic Interface (CHOI) 
• Infantry Navigation without GNSS (InfNav without GNSS)
• Future (unmanned) Air-to-Air Refuelling Capability 
• Unmanned Air Transport of Injured Soldiers (UNATIS) 
  
  

France (coordinating Member State) 

• Modular Seabed Vessel (MSV)
• Medical Treatment Facility Role 2 Forward – Capability Development (MTF R2F–CD) 
  
  

Finland (coordinating Member State) 

• Quantum Enablers for Strategic Advantage (QUEST)
  
  

Italy (coordinating Member State) 

• Directed Energy Systems (DES) 
• Next Generation Dismounted Soldier System (NGDSS) 
  
  

More demanding times 

From 2018 to 2025, PESCO has generated a total of 83 collaborative projects spanning the five operational domains of land, maritime, air, space and cyber. Eight have now closed, with 75 still ongoing. The projects have ranged from protecting space assets to monitoring undersea infrastructure. The European Defence Agency (EDA), which is part of the PESCO secretariat, believes the projects encourage a shared, intergovernmental approach to defence planning. All 26 participating Member States have taken part in various initiatives, working together to address capability gaps and fulfil their more binding commitments set out in PESCO. 

Compared to when the framework was first launched in December 2017, the second phase of PESCO (2025–2029) will take place in a much more dynamic and challenging security environment. Given Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, there is now an urgent need to close capability gaps, especially those that cannot be met by a single country alone. In response to this, in November 2024, Ministers of Defence signed four letters of intent to work together on key capability areas highlighted in the most recent Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) report. CARD gives an overview of Member States’ defence plans and serves as a basis for deciding potential joint projects.  

The letters of intent focused on: Integrated Air and Missile Defence, Electronic Warfare, Loitering Munitions, and the European Combat Vessel. These initiatives, particularly those with a long-term focus, are strong candidates to become future PESCO projects. 

Existing tools such as the European Defence Fund (EDF), which co-finances multinational defence projects using money from the EU’s long-term budget, will continue to support PESCO projects, while discussions held at the European Council of EU leaders in February 2025 have built political momentum and given clearer direction to the EU’s defence ambitions. 

Looking ahead, the new projects also consider future defence challenges, such as the impact of quantum technologies and ensuring reliable access to ammunition. 

About PESCO 

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is a legally binding initiative within the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It aims to deepen defence cooperation among participating EU Member States, enhancing the EU's capacity to act as a security provider. All Member States except Malta are part of PESCO. 

Participation in PESCO is voluntary but entails binding commitments, including increasing defence spending, harmonising requirements, and pooling resources in defence equipment acquisition, research, and utilisation. EDA, along with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS), is part of the PESCO secretariat, facilitating project implementation and ensuring coherence with other EU defence initiatives.  

Through collaborative projects, PESCO seeks to enhance interoperability and effectiveness of forces, strengthen Europe’s industrial and technological base, and ultimately increase the overall security of European citizens.  

At the EDA Steering Board held in Brussels today, EU Ministers of Defence endorsed the European Defence Agency’s synthesis of projects, actions and proposals for short-term joint acquisitions of defence equipment, in line with the initial list of priority areas set out in the European Council (EUCO) conclusions of 6 March 2025 and the White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030.  

The EDA synthesis underscores the urgent need to enhance readiness and address critical capability gaps and shortfalls. It offers new lines of actions aligned with the agreed priorities, including restoring superiority in the air domain, strengthening land forces, and enhancing strategic enablers. It also emphasises that long term capability development should not be neglected. 

Ministers provided strategic guidance on how and where EDA can best support Member States in taking the work forward, in the short term and with a view to longer-term capability development projects. This includes more systematic aggregation of demand, harmonisation of requirements, and joint procurement. 

This was the first EDA Ministerial Steering Board chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, in her capacity as Head of the European Defence Agency. It also marked the first Steering Board of André Denk as the Agency’s new Chief Executive. 

French Touch, a team of innovators and military personnel from France, won first place on 15 May at the European Defence Innovation Days’ first ‘Makeathon,’ a competition for unmanned ground vehicles. The winners were awarded €10,000 in prize money. 

The competition, organised by the European Defence Agency (EDA) with support from the Polish Ministry of Defence, was structured to include a spending cap of €25,000 and a weight limit of 75kg on each robot’s development. The competition aims to foster cooperation, cross-border knowledge sharing and to cultivate a mindset of continuous innovation.  

The Makeathon focused on three main tasks: logistics, object recognition, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) sample collection. Judges tested the teams on their technical performance and autonomy around a course set out in a field next to the European Defence Innovation Days’ exhibition centre in Krakow, Poland. Points were awarded based on task completion. Tasks included monitoring a simulated gas leak and testing water quality, and correctly identifying military targets. 

"You built machines, yes. But you also built bridges between military and civilian worlds," said Nathalie Guichard, EDA's Director of Research, Technology and Innovation, as she presented the prize.

French Touch developed a robot over two months using in-house design and manufacturing. Like all of the teams, the ground vehicle included a robotic arm, sensors and a camera for AI recognition. The team, which included members from French military AI specialists AMIAD, French procurement agency DGA, and the navy and air force, built the system from scratch. They used CNC-machined aluminium parts for the red, white, and blue robot, weighing under 50 kg. It was powered by four 1,000-watt motors and used for block delivery and water pH analysis. 

Poland’s Impuls team came second with a 38 kg rover made from polyamide composites. Built by students from the Kielce University of Technology, the robot used cameras and AI for semi-autonomous operation. The team focused on improving coordination and machine control. 

 

Third place went to another Polish team, the Legendary Rover Team, affiliated with Rzeszow University of Technology. Known for participating in Mars rover contests, the team upgraded its previous design with a new manipulator arm, wheel system and an electric drive.  

Dutch team DykstrAV, supported by robotics company Avular and formed by students from multiple universities, placed fourth. Their robot featured a modular design with a black-box electronic unit. Despite early navigation issues, the robot completed two of the three tasks using a mix of autonomous functions and manual control. 

Ukraine continues to prioritise rapid innovation on the battlefield and is ready to share further knowledge with the European Union, Deputy Defence Minister Valerii Churkin told attendees at the European Defence Innovation Days event in Poland on 14 May 2025. 

“To innovate fast, you have to be as close as possible to the frontline,” Churkin said at the start of the three-day event in Krakow. “So that's why we're asking you to join Ukraine, come to Ukraine, develop with Ukrainian companies, establish joint ventures.” Twelve Ukrainian companies were among the nearly 90 exhibitors that filled the hall at the European Defence Innovation Days. 

Newly appointed EDA Chief Executive André Denk opened the event by saying that the European Defence Innovation Days is not just a conference but a platform to “connect and match bold ideas with bold action.” 

Since 2014, and especially after Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine’s Armed Forces have seen engineers, software developers, and business analysts join their ranks. These professionals have helped foster a bottom-up innovation culture, with most combat brigades now operating their own workshops to design and produce battlefield solutions. 

“What accelerates innovation is the existential threat. When your life depends on it, you develop so much faster,” Churkin said. Ukrainian units have established direct links between the front line and engineers, enabling faster prototyping and iteration of military technologies.  

To coordinate this rapid development, Ukraine has launched digital platforms such as Iron Bench, which connect private sector developers with military end-users. These systems provide near-instant feedback on battlefield tools and tactics, encouraging agile development. 

However, challenges persist. Chief among them is standardisation. Ukrainian forces employ a patchwork of Western and domestic technologies, which often lack compatibility in terms of frequency, command protocols, and user interfaces. 

“We’re now working on unified interfaces and protocols for drones and other systems to ensure our integration,” Churkin said. 

Senior European officials, defence experts, and industry representatives gathered in Kraków on 14 May for the European Defence Innovation Days. Drawing over 1,000 delegates from across Europe, the biannual forum is an initiative of the European Defence Agency (EDA), with support from the Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU in this third edition. Attendees also included military personnel, as well as researchers and investors from across Europe. 

Newly appointed EDA Chief Executive André Denk opened the three-day gathering by stressing that the European Defence Innovation Days was not just a conference but a platform to “connect and match bold ideas with bold action.” 

“In an era of great power competition and rapid technological advances — where speed often means strategic advantage — we cannot afford to fall behind,” Denk said. “The reason we are gathered here is one: to accelerate capability-driven innovation, ensuring that the best ideas don’t get stuck in the lab, but are translated into capabilities,” he said. 

The defence community must break down silos, connect the military with innovators, bridge the gap between the public and private sectors, cultivate a defence innovation mindset, and inspire cross-generational collaboration, delegates said. 

“We need to adapt to the changing environment,” said Marcin Gorka, Director of the Department of Innovation at Poland’s Ministry of National Defence. “The way we are developing capabilities ... is very static. We need to be able to change from talking about our specific requirements to talking about the operational challenges we need to address.” 

The event showcased Ukraine as a case study in rapid innovation under extreme conditions, with the participation in Krakow of Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Defence Valerii Churkin.  

Ukraine's advantage has not just been in the technology it has reduced, but in its ability to regularly outpace Russia in the innovation cycle, said Kaja Kallas, Head of the European Defence Agency, in her role as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. “Ukraine's experience underlines what you can do when you get everyone working together,” Kallas said during a video message to the conference. 

The event also aims to underscore EDA’s own role in fostering innovation. HEDI — the Hub for EU Defence Innovation — is the Agency’s platform to ensure ideas can become deployable capabilities. The European Defence Innovation Days features a live exhibition with almost 90 stands. Highlights include mock-ups of soon-to-launch satellites and Ukrainian combat robotics. There are two new features this year: a competition known as a makethon for Unmanned Ground Vehicles, and a start-up pitching competition, offering €10,000 and €15,000 prizes, respectively. 

EU Member States have appointed today General André Denk as the new Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA), upon recommendation of the Head of the European Defence Agency / High-Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. André Denk’s mandate will officially start on 16 May 2025. 

With German Major General Denk’s appointment, it is the first time in EDA’s history that a high-ranking military official will guide and manage the Agency.

“I am glad to appoint General André Denk as the new Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency. He brings a wealth of operational experience and a deep understanding of Europe’s defence needs. His leadership is a real asset, and I look forward to our work together. With war at our borders and hybrid threats across the Union, the EDA’s work to develop joint military capabilities and boost innovation in the defence sector has never been more important. Under General Denk's leadership, the Agency will play a key role in ensuring Europe’s readiness for the challenges ahead,” said Kaja Kallas.

“The European Defence Agency is uniquely positioned to support Member States across the entire capability development cycle, and beyond. The Agency brings together the expertise, networks and insight needed to strengthen military cooperation, innovate and support Europe’s defence industry. I am both honoured and energised by my appointment and the challenges ahead. I look forward to working for the shared interests of our Member States and our Union — now more vital than ever,” said André Denk.

André Denk has been Deputy Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency since February 2023. In this role, he deputised for the previous Chief Executive on all matters of political significance and led EDA’s efforts on joint procurement for 155mm ammunition in support of Ukraine and/or for the replenishment of Member States’ stocks. 

Before joining EDA, he was Director Logistics of the EU Military Staff and was previously commander of the Joint School of Logistics in Germany.   
 
Throughout his military career, he undertook many international deployments under European Union, United Nations and NATO mandates - including in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, and as chief of staff of the EU Training Mission in Mali. 
 
Born in Rotthalmünster, Germany, in 1967, General Denk joined the German armed forces in 1986. He holds a diploma in mechanical engineering and in addition, graduated from the German Command and General Staff College as well as from the French General Staff College.

In addition to German, he is fluent in English, French, Serbian and Croatian.  
 
See full CV. 

Background

The European Defence Agency is composed of all 27 Member States of the European Union.

It was established through a Council Joint Action (2004/551/CFSP) on 12 July 2004. This action formalised the Agency's creation and its mandate to support EU Member States in developing their military capabilities. The Lisbon Treaty later enshrined the EDA's role within the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 

EDA is the only European Agency whose Steering Board meet at Ministerial level. Its Steering Board, composed of all 27 Ministers of Defence, meets twice per year and is chaired by the Head of the European Defence Agency / HRVP Kaja Kallas. 

EDA saw its role and core missions refined and consolidated on the occasion of its long-term review. It acts as the intergovernmental defence nexus at EU level. 

As part of preparations for the Operational Experimentation (OPEX) campaign in Rome in June and July 2025, the European Defence Agency has carried out a series of system acceptance tests to assess the readiness of unmanned aerial and ground systems. 

The OPEX campaign, hosted by the Italian Army, provides a platform to deploy autonomous systems in realistic operational settings. It focuses on testing advanced unmanned aerial and ground systems in field-like conditions, helping to accelerate their integration into future EU defence capabilities. Before taking part, however, each system must first demonstrate compliance with clearly defined technical, reliability, operational and safety standards. 

That is why over the past weeks, EDA experts travelled across the European Union to evaluate the proposed solutions of six companies involved in the project: Beyond Vision from Portugal, ALTUS LSA from Greece, Schiebel from Austria, Alisys from Spain, Sieć Badawcza Łukasiewicz PIAP from Poland, and ARX Robotics from Germany. 

These tests represented a milestone in the campaign, ensuring that the selected systems are prepared to support the development and validation of future autonomous solutions for European defence logistics.    

HEDI puts innovation to the test

Beyond its technical objectives, the OPEX Campaign is designed to serve as a strategic enabler for the rapid adoption of emerging technologies across the EU defence landscape.

EDA’s Hub for European Defence Innovation (HEDI) is bringing together industry innovators, operational end-users, and experts in an immersive, scenario-based environment, introducing a new EU-wide tool that accelerates the delivery of capabilities quickly, playing a role in making innovation frameworks operational and sharpening the technological edge of European defence.  

About EDA

EDA supports its 27 Member States in improving their defence capabilities through European cooperation. Acting as an enabler and facilitator for Ministries of Defence willing to engage in collaborative capability projects, the Agency has become the ‘hub’ for European defence cooperation, with expertise and networks that span the entire spectrum of defence technologies.     

Latvia’s Minister of Defence Andris Sprūds visited the European Defence Agency on 10 April 2025.

On this occasion, the Minister met with EDA’s Deputy Chief Executive André Denk who provided him with an updated overview of the most relevant work strands of the agency in the fields of capability development and prioritisation, defence innovation, EDTIB engagement, and support to Ukraine.
 
EDA’s Deputy Chief Executive also commended Latvia for the country’s excellent cooperation and involvement in key EDA’s activities, including the signing of three Letters of Intent to join forces with other EU nations on key military projects – ie. Integrated air and missile defence; electronic warfare; loitering munitions. 
 

The Incubation Forum for Circular Economy in European Defence (IF CEED) selected three projects to integrate circularity in defence. Proofs of concept or similar tangible results will be delivered within the next 15 months in the fields of critical raw materials, textiles, and eco-management.  

The three projects will receive a combined funding of approximately €800,000. They were evaluated based on criteria including innovation, viability, and alignment with the objectives of IF CEED and the scope of the call for proposals.  

Run by the European Defence Agency (EDA) to make the defence sector more sustainable, IF CEED is funded by the European Commission to bring together experts from the military, industry, and universities to develop projects that reduce waste, recycle materials, and use resources more efficiently in defence. Its goal is to make defence supply chains greener and less dependent on outside resources, focusing on areas like raw materials, textiles, and eco-friendly management.  

Three projects: MICRAM, REGEN and CEDSEMAS  

The first project, known as MICRAM, aims to identify suitable electronic waste from which materials can be extracted using a hydrometallurgical process. The recycled critical raw materials are transformed into advanced materials such as aerogels and films. These form the basis for tactical clothing, stealth systems, and shelters, while also providing microwave radiation shielding.  

The recovery of critical raw materials such as nickel, and their transformation into advanced textile materials supports the development of stealth technologies, minimising detection risks for military assets such as communication systems or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). These shielding materials also protect personnel’s health and extend the lifespan of electronic systems.  

This project brings together AITEX and FECSA of Spain, Italy’s Tor Vergata University of Rome, and Łukasiewicz – Institute of Non-Ferrous Metals of Poland.  
 

The second project, known as REGEN, aims to recycle the soft aramid layer from end-of-life body armour and turn it into new fibres for making ballistic vests using a disruptive solvent-based technology. It focuses on safely removing harmful coatings and using recycled and virgin fibres to create high-quality protective fabrics.  

Recycling aramid fibres reduces reliance on imported materials for ballistic protection, strengthening the resilience of defence supply chains and lowering environmental impact. It also supports sustainability and could lead to cost savings over time.  

This project brings together FECSA and AITEX of Spain, and Uplift360, the Institute of Science and Technology, and LIST, all from Luxembourg.  


The third project, known as CEDSEMAS, is a program designed to help the defence sector to manage its environmental impact. It aims to create tools and training for military personnel, setting up an electronic platform for collaboration, and implementing a coaching program to integrate eco-management and audit schemes into military installations.  

Smarter resources use reduces environmental harm, helps armed forces comply with sustainability standards, therefore improving resource management, and contributing to greater operational efficiency.  

This project brings together CRES of Greece and AEOLIKI of Cyprus

About EDA

EDA supports its 27 Member States in improving their defence capabilities through European cooperation. Acting as an enabler and facilitator for Ministries of Defence willing to engage in collaborative capability projects, the Agency has become the ‘hub’ for European defence cooperation, with expertise and networks that span the entire spectrum of defence technologies.  

 

Additive Manufacturing —commonly known as 3D printing—is a process that creates three-dimensional objects by depositing materials layer by layer from a digital model. And it is no longer science fiction. From manufacturing spare parts on site where the parts are needed to reverse engineering and bionic designs, additive manufacturing is already reshaping the defence sector. For sure, additive manufacturing technology has the most game-changing potential for military logistics and this has been recognised by EDA and its contributing member States.   For two days from 8 April 2025, over 400 military, industrial experts and gathered at the 3rd European Military Additive Manufacturing Symposium in Bonn, Germany.  The event was organised by the German Association for Defence Technology – Centre for Studies and Conferences with support from the European Defence Agency (EDA). Key Notes were provided by EDA, AM Machine Manufacturer, Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and from Armed Forces User perspective. The event aimed to foster cooperation by bringing together Armed Forces, Industry, and Academia to address military use cases and to align those with European industrial capabilities and competences. New innovations were presented bringing potentially operational advantage to Armed Forces in future. A manufacturing revolution with military applications

Additive Manufacturing (AM) – a so called Emerging Disruptive Technology (EDT) - allows manufacturing of parts with complex structures, lighter wight and almost no design limitations than those made through traditional methods like milling and drilling. Industrial sectors like automotive, aeronautics and medical exploring for some time the advantages of AM technology. The biggest advantage of AM for military use is the significant reduction of so-called lead time, the time till a needed part has been made available where it is needed. AM technology can be used for on-site production and has a positive impact on the so called “military logistic footprint” and the operational availability of military assets.

“Additive Manufacturing is a prime example of the successful transition of a promising technology from research to military capability development under the umbrella of the European Defence Agency,” said Giuseppe Dello Stritto, Head of the Land and Logistics Unit at EDA.

EDA has already taken significant steps through key initiatives such as the Additive Manufacturing for Logistik Support (AMLS) project, aiming at developing common standards for interoperability among Member States, and the AM Village, designed as a capability workshop that connects military, industry, and academia AM experts to identify the most suitable AM technologies for military use cases and to foster military – industry cooperation. The 3rdedition of AM Village is scheduled to take place in Albacete, Spain, on 16-20 March 2026.

About EDA  EDA supports its 27 Member States in improving their defence capabilities through European cooperation. Acting as an enabler and facilitator for Ministries of Defence willing to engage in collaborative capability projects, the Agency has become the ‘hub’ for European defence cooperation, with expertise and networks that span the entire spectrum of defence technologies.

In the European Defence Agency's 20th anniversary year, 2024 was another successful cycle as part of wider efforts to develop EU armed forces and support capability development.

Highlights of EDA's annual report include: 

• More than 40 Capability projects, 128 Research & Technology (R&T) projects, and 28 EU-funded projects under the European Defence Fund (EDF). 
• More personnel and a growing budget.
• A strengthened mandate from EU Ministers of Defence through the 2024 Long-Term Review, expanding EDA’s role in capability development, joint procurement, and innovation. 
• Agreement by Member States to cooperate on integrated air and missile defence, electronic warfare, loitering munitions, and a European combat vessel. 
• Joint procurement of 155mm artillery ammunition on behalf of Member States and Ukraine.
• An expanding innovation portfolio through HEDI.
• Deepened cooperation with Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United States. 

Over the past two decades, EDA has helped armed forces work more closely and invest more effectively together. The Agency continues to look ahead and prepare for future defence needs.  

Download the full 2024 report here 
 

Under the auspices of the Polish EU Presidency, EU Ministers of Defence and key decision-makers gathered in Warsaw on Thursday 3 April for an informal council meeting. The meeting included senior NATO and EU officials, such as the NATO Deputy Secretary-General, the EU Commissioner for Defence and Space, the Chairwoman of the European Parliament SEDE Committee, and the EDA Deputy Chief Executive. 

Chaired by High Representative/Vice-President Kaja Kallas and Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz, participants exchanged views on strengthening Europe’s defence industry and rearming the continent. They also discussed the EU’s role in supporting Ukraine and efforts to bring a just peace to end the war.

Ahead of the informal council meeting, the Polish EU Presidency hosted a conference on the White Paper on the future of European defence.  Following a presentation by European Commissioner Andrius Kubilius, EDA’s Deputy Chief Executive André Denk took part in a panel discussion on the development of defence capabilities in the EU. 

“EDA helps Member States’ cooperate on defence innovation and capability development. We offer the right framework to make the best use of the intergovernmental approach and know-how at EU level. EDA has proposed robust solutions and stands ready to do more, at the speed and scale that our Member States require,” said André Denk. 

Participants also acknowledged EDA’s growing role in coordinating defence efforts among Member States. In recent years, the Agency has acted as a facilitator and, at times, an intermediary in joint procurement initiatives. Aggregating demand for common procurement is now a core EDA task and the result of the Agency’s Long Term Review adopted by the Ministers of Defence last year.    

Left to right: Head of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and High Representative Kaja Kallas, Deputy Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency André Denk, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. 

EDA’s broader role

Founded in 2004, the Agency helps foster defence cooperation across Europe. It serves as the central hub for EU countries aiming to develop their defence capabilities together. EDA’s activities span from harmonising requirements and developing operational capabilities to research, technology, innovation, training, and supporting Common Security and Defence Policy operations. The agency also works closely with the European defence industry to strengthen Europe’s technological and industrial base.

Today, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission have presented a White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030. The Commission has also presented, as part of the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, a detailed defence package providing financial levers to EU Member States to drive an investment surge in defence capabilities.

While the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 strengthens pan-European defence capabilities with new financial means, the White Paper frames a new approach to defence and identifies investment needs. These measures aim to respond to the short-term urgency of supporting Ukraine, but also to address the pressing long-term need to boost Europe's security and defence at EU level.

“What we invest in defence is how we value our defence. And for the past few decades, we haven’t put a high enough price on it. We must spend more. At the same time, the value we add by working together is priceless” said Kaja Kallas, High Representative and Head of the European Defence Agency (EDA).

With 20 years of experience as the EU agency facilitating cooperation on defence, EDA stands ready to support Member States in delivering on current and future joint EU initiatives aimed at strengthening EU defence capabilities and bolstering the European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB).

Read more: Commission unveils the White Paper for European Defence and the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030

A nearly two-year research effort developed by the European Defence Agency has made progress in developing smart camouflage technologies aimed at enhancing the stealth and survivability of military vehicles and equipment.

With modern surveillance technologies such as visible, radar and thermal detection becoming more advanced, there is a growing need for adaptive camouflage.

That is why the goal of the advanced solutions for camouflage of land Systems using smart and adaptive materials (ASCALS) project seeks to find new materials, and ways to apply them, for active and adaptive camouflage in the visible, infrared and radar ranges.

Collaborative effort across six Member States

The first phase of the project was executed by a consortium of 10 industrial and research entities, led by Adamant Composites (Greece) and comprising 10 industrial and research entities: the University of Luxembourg; TNO, MIS7 and Bolidt (the Netherlands); the Military Institute of Engineer Technology (WITI) and LUBAWA S.A. (Poland); CITEVE, INEGI, CINAMIL (Portugal) and the Swedish Defence Research Agency. 

ASCALS’s first phase aimed to develop materials that can dynamically adjust to different environmental conditions. With a budget of 1.3 million euros, the project focused on creating materials that can change their optical, thermal, and radar signatures to help ground-based military systems remain hidden.

The project explored innovative materials designed to adapt to various detection methods:

- Electrochromic materials: These can change their colour and reflectance on demand, helping systems blend into different environments.

- Liquid crystals: These materials can alter light transmission and reflection, particularly in infrared light, making it harder to detect objects.

- Phase-change materials: These advanced materials control heat emission, allowing systems to better manage their thermal signature and blend into varying temperatures.

- Graphene and electrolyte structures: By using the exceptional properties of graphene over infrared and radar signal reduction, the combination with an electrolyte allows the potential for controllability.

- Controllable meta-surfaces: Through an array of patches controlled by a custom app, the reflected radar signal is dynamically adjusted to the operational needs.

These adaptive materials can quickly adjust to changes in the environment, making them highly effective in real-time camouflage.

ASCALS II

ASCALS I has set the stage for the next phase of development. ASCALS II will focus on advancing these technologies further, with the goal of field-testing them on military platforms by 2027, subject to the interest and support of Member States. The results of ASCALS I show promise for military ground systems, and the technologies could even be adapted for use on air and maritime platforms in the future. 

About EDA

EDA supports its 27 Member States in improving their defence capabilities through European cooperation. Acting as an enabler and facilitator for Ministries of Defence willing to engage in collaborative capability projects, the Agency has become the ‘hub’ for European defence cooperation with expertise and networks allowing it to address the whole spectrum of capabilities.

Further information

• CapTech Ground Systems webpage
• CapTech Materials and Structures webpage

Today, at the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency (EDA), the 27 EU Ministers of Defence approved the Agency’s 2024 Long-Term Review (LTR). As strategic guidance given to EDA, the 2024 LTR outlines five core tasks for the Agency with a stronger focus on supporting Member States through the full development cycle of military capabilities. Ministers agreed to increase the number of EDA’s core tasks from three to five, with dedicated taskings on aggregating demand towards joint procurement and enabling collaborative defence research, technology, and innovation. Ministers were also briefed on preliminary opportunities stemming from the 2024 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and marked the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the Agency.

AN AGENCY FIT FOR THE FUTURE

Ministers of Defence endorsed an update of the Agency’s mandate to fully reflect the deteriorated security environment in Europe and the evolving role of the Agency within the EU defence landscape, marking 20 years since its establishment. Reflecting the dramatic geopolitical changes since 2017, when the last iteration of the LTR was approved, the 2024 LTR outlines how the Agency can support Ministries of Defence (MoDs) along all the capability development cycle, including limited off-the-shelf acquisitions, when Member States so decide.

The LTR also bolsters EDA role to voice MoDs’ joint positions at EU level and ensure the coherent alignment of current and future EU defence initiatives, policies, and legislation. The LTR also calls for the Agency to reinforce mutually beneficial cooperation with NATO through the conclusion of an Administrative Arrangement and fully leverage synergies with EU stakeholders to reflect defence needs.

Head of European Defence Agency and HR/VP, Josep Borrell said: “The European Defence Agency must have a more strategic role if we want to live up to the level of ambition that we have set for EU Defence in the Strategic Compass. The EU needs to develop defence capabilities to address the full range of threats we are facing. With a stronger and clearer vision, focused on capability development and the launch of concrete projects, the Agency can play a key role in building stronger and better equipped armed forces.”

EDA Chief Executive, Jiří Šedivý said: “This renewed and strengthened mandate ensures that Ministries of Defence have an Agency that is fit for the future. Ministers of Defence have endorsed a review that enhances the Agency’s ambitions, visibility, and support for Member States. With expanded tasks and a stronger intergovernmental voice, Ministers signal the Agency's crucial role in bolstering EU defence capabilities.”

INITIAL LOOK AT THE CARD(s) AND MARKING 20 YEARS OF EDA

Ministers were also presented with a preliminary assessment on the possible actionable collaborative opportunities stemming from the third CARD cycle. This Steering Board was used as an opportunity to allow Ministers to provide early guidance to help sharpen and finalise the opportunities to be highlighted in the final CARD Report which will be presented in November. 

Before the Steering Board was formally opened, Head of Agency, Josep Borrell, and EDA Chief Executive, Jiří Šedivý and Deputy Chief Executive, André Denk, marked the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the Agency. Created in 2004, EDA has played a pivotal role in greater European defence cooperation, and made tangible contributions to EU defence planning, capabilities, training and innovations.

Further information 

1. 2024 EDA Long Term Review Document
2. Fact Sheet – EDA Long Term Review
3. Timeline – EDA 20 Years Promoting European Defence Cooperation

Reposting an article that was published today on War on the Rocks. Co-authored with Elizabeth Wishnick, Paul Schwartz, and Brian Waidelich.

There is widespread consensus among analysts that, although Russia and China have been moving toward closer cooperation through the entire post-Soviet era, the trend has accelerated rapidly since 2014. The specter of a Russian-Chinese partnership is deeply threatening to the United States, not only because it makes U.S. military planning more challenging, but also because it raises the possibility of two formidable adversaries joining forces to counter U.S. interests and potentially working in concert to attack U.S allies.

The strategic partnership, first established in 2001, was boosted in the mid-2010s by Russian leaders’ belief that Russia needed to seek out alternative relationships to survive its sudden confrontation with the West. China was the obvious candidate because it had a suitably large economy, was friendly to Russia, and was not planning to impose sanctions in response to the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Xi Jinping’s rise to power also has contributed to a deepening of the partnership, as China under Xi shares President Vladimir Putin’s concern with regime security and the two leaders increasingly align on issues of global and regional security. Moreover, the two countries had a record of cooperation dating back to the early 1990s that could serve as a basis for expanded cooperation.

This article summarizes a CNA report that tested this proposition. To do so, we focused on measuring military cooperation, specifically on military diplomacy and other political aspects of the defense relationship, military-technical cooperation, and exercises and joint operations. Our goal is to provide an analysis of the dynamic of the cooperative relationship in the period since 2014, including a discussion of what the relationship allows the two partners to accomplish together that they cannot do alone, and what analysts can infer about where this bilateral relationship is headed.

To read the rest of the article, please click here.

I was back on the Blog Talk Radio show Midrats this week, talking about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s strategy, what might happen next, and consequences for Russia’s domestic politics. The recording is now available on the show’s website. The show description is as follows:

Episode 621: Russian Military SITREP with Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg

For over 11-years, once a year or so today’s guest has joined us on Midrats to discuss the latest military and national security developments with Russia.

With the war waging in Ukraine and in the process of transitioning to a new phase, there couldn’t be a better time to hear from Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg who will be with us for the full hour in a wide ranging discussion about the buildup to war, and the important takeaways so far.

Here are the abstracts from the latest issue of our Russian Media Analysis newsletter. You can also download the full text PDF version.

1. INVASION OF UKRAINE: NATO STRATEGY

Russian analysts are still focusing on the issue of NATO membership for Ukraine. Many point out that the ongoing war, while leading to a de facto defense arrangement between the “collective West” and Ukraine, has also hindered it from formally joining the alliance. Many authors believe that this is a benefit to Russia, although it has come at the cost of NATO unity and an amplification of arms supplies to Ukraine.

2. INVASION OF UKRAINE: EU STRATEGY

Connected to, although distinct from, the issue of Ukraine’s NATO ambitions, is the desire by its political leadership to join the EU. While Russian commentators are broadly pessimistic about how much defense cooperation there now is between Ukraine and the West, they are more optimistic that Ukraine’s EU bid will remain stalled for the foreseeable future. Although both sides have made many symbolic gestures to signal an agreement for membership down the road, concrete steps are harder to find, and the internal political machinations of the EU will further slow down integration.

3. INVASION OF UKRAINE: RESPONSES TO WESTERN SANCTIONS

More than a dozen articles offer responses to international sanctions against Russia, featuring reactions ranging from optimism to pessimism, and including skepticism and determination to wreak economic havoc on the West. Some serve to reassure the Russian public that even though foreign industries are leaving, they will still be able to access certain goods. Others discuss the prospect of more serious sanctions, such as EU bans on Russian oil and gas imports, or a U.S. sea-route trade embargo against Russia. The authors argue that such measures would introduce a number of cascading effects that would harm countries “hostile to Russia.”

4. INVASION OF UKRAINE: RESPONSES TO NATO MILITARY AID

The details and implications of NATO and U.S. military aid and efforts to arm Ukraine are the subject of several articles. It is evident that there is concern for the unified support that Ukraine is getting from the West, but there remains a confidence in the narrative surrounding Russian capabilities against the perceived lackluster quality of provisions going to Ukraine.

5. INVASION OF UKRAINE: U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Several articles address U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s decision to cancel a Minuteman III missile test following President Putin’s announcement that Russia put its nuclear forces on a “special combat regime duty.” While some experts characterize the test cancellation as an effort to avoid nuclear escalation, one article suspects that it helped avoid drawing attention to the stagnant U.S. nuclear modernization process. An additional article takes issue with the optics and messaging that the U.S. is responsibly conducting nuclear policy, when it has conducted “mock nuclear strikes” in recent exercises and increased the frequency of nuclear-capable aircraft flights near Russia’s border.

6. INVASION OF UKRAINE: PERCEPTIONS OF A NO-FLY ZONE

As Ukraine’s request for a West-enforced no-fly zone remains unmet, Russian commentators caution against the implementation of anything remotely close to it and highlight the escalatory nature of such potential actions by NATO and the U.S..

7. INVASION OF UKRAINE: UKRAINE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONSPIRACY

A recent issue of the Ministry of Defense newspaper posits the conspiracy theory that “Ukraine’s scientific establishment has sufficient competencies to create a nuclear explosive device.” The content of this article appears to be drawn from a TASS report that cites the Russian intelligence agency SVR as a source of claims that Ukraine had an advanced missile and nuclear weapon program.

8. INVASION OF UKRAINE: THE BIOLABS CONSPIRACY

Coverage of the conspiracy theories about U.S. DTRA reference laboratories in Ukraine continues to proliferate across Russian media sources. It now includes official newspapers as well as MOD and MFA officials. Coverage has also begun to note statements made by Chinese government officials on this issue.

9. CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

A number of articles in the Russian press assess the state of the Russian-Chinese relationship as well as China’s diplomatic and economic relations with the United States and the broader West. Many commentators are quick to point out that China is resistant to following along with the West’s sanctions regime against Russia, although also acknowledging that there remains much to be desired in terms of China’s closeness to Russia itself.

10. SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES AND NATO

The ambitions of Scandinavian countries to join NATO continue to be a worry for Russian commentators. Yet given the scale of hostilities in Ukraine, experts are quick to note that parallels with Ukraine-and any potential Russian reaction to new Scandinavian member-states-are improper. Although Russia assesses the membership of Sweden and Finland to NATO in a very negative light, it is clear that this issue is not an existential one compared to Russian perceptions of Ukraine’s or Georgia’s entrance into the alliance.

11. IRAN AND THE JCPOA

Russian commentators have maintained a close watch over U.S. actions and engagement with other OPEC+ and oil suppliers ever since the U.S. sanctioned Russian oil. Analysts have focused on the U.S.-Iran relationship and the relevance of Iranian oil to the JCPOA negotiations. They remain critical of U.S. moral flexibility and assert that the “special military operation” in Ukraine has had a profound impact on long-term global security, as is evidenced by the changing oil environment around the globe.

12. FOREIGN ACQUISITION OF U.S. ARMS

Several articles focus on and are critical of the proliferation of U.S. weaponry abroad. They include the legal sale of arms to Egypt and the resulting arms capabilities of the Taliban after the U.S. exit from Afghanistan.

13. U.S. STRATEGY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

Amidst the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian media maintain a close watch on U.S. policy developments in other areas of the world, especially the Indo-Pacific region.

14. INFORMATION WARFARE

Two articles address alleged acts of “information warfare” against Russia, tending to take on a defensive tone about Moscow’s leadership and the progress of the “special military operation.” The first article responds to recent quotes from U.S. Department of Defense spokesman John Kirby, who noted Russia’s history of use and potential future use of chemical and biological weapons. The second article details alleged activities from the 72nd Center for Information and Psychological Operations (CIPO) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which the article claims was trained by the UK.

15. U.S. AND EUROPEAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Several articles report on developments of U.S. and NATO capabilities and weapons systems. One article reports on funding cuts to the U.S. Air Force’s first hypersonic missile, the AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW). A second article reports on a reorganization of the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment that puts combat groups on the first and second island chains of the Pacific at a moment’s notice. A third article reports on Germany’s decision to purchase 35 American F-35A fighter jets to replace the Tornado fighter-bombers it uses to carry American B61 nuclear weapons.

Here are the abstracts from the latest issue of our Russian Media Analysis newsletter. You can also download the full text PDF version.

1. Invasion of Ukraine: Putin’s speech

In a February 24 speech, carried in full by Krasnaya Zvezda, Russia’s president Vladimir Putin gave remarks that sought to provide background and justification to Russian actions in Ukraine. As his past speeches, this one offered an extensive overview of his grievances against the United States and the West and what he perceives as disregard for Russian interests in the post-Cold War order.

2. Invasion of Ukraine: Justifications

Five articles provide various justifications for Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. Several identify defending the people of the Donbas region as the primary factor for the invasion, echoing President Putin’s justification of protecting people “who have been subjected to abuse [and] genocide by the Kiev regime for eight years.” Others argue that the main reason for the invasion is to protect Russia from the military threat posed by Ukraine’s increasing ties to NATO. Articles also claim that there are Western information operations concerning the motives of Moscow’s military actions.

3. Invasion of Ukraine: Russian Domestic Perceptions

The views of the Russian population on the conflict are still undergoing initial polling, and divergences are expected across polling companies. One company, Russian Field, conducted a poll that Novye Izvestiya reported as being particularly supportive of the conflict. The poll was on the larger side, with 2,000 respondents across Russia.

4. Invasion of Ukraine: Discussions of Western Strategy

A large number of articles discuss Russian perceptions of Western strategy towards Russia and towards the conflict in Ukraine. Articles published before the invasion focus on the role of the United States in fomenting the conflict, and highlight US weaknesses that made Vladimir Putin decide that now was a good time to push to renegotiate the post-Cold War global order. Articles published in the early days of the invasion argue that the West is in the process of realizing that it underestimated Russian power and resolve and is looking to salvage its position.

5. Invasion of Ukraine: Nuclear Issues

Several articles discuss nuclear issues. An article in Topwar.ru argues that the US is potentially considering the infliction of a first disarming strike against Russia. An article in Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (NVO) discusses the possibility of Belarusian and Ukrainian nuclear weapons. In Gazeta.ru, Irina Al’shaeva writes about the “special combat duty regime” requested by Russia’s president Vladimir Putin for the Russian strategic forces. A Novye Izvestiya article points out that open source researchers have been tracking the movements of the US Boeing E-4B AWACS aircraft on the flight from Lincoln, Nebraska, after the Russian initiation of the Russian war in Ukraine.

6. Invasion of Ukraine: The Threat from NATO

Russian media also focused on the direct threat that NATO poses to Russia and to regional stability in Europe. The articles focused on the destabilizing effect of NATO force deployments near Russia’s border, NATO’s history of using military campaigns to achieve its geopolitical goals, and the risk of a broader conflict between Russia and NATO.

7. Invasion of Ukraine: NATO Enlargement

The potential further enlargement of NATO is both a cause and consequence of the conflict with Ukraine in the eyes of several Russian writers. Framed as a genuine threat to Russia, articles discuss the possibility of Scandinavian states joining the alliance as well as states in the Balkans such as Kosovo. Other writers reiterate the Russian line that NATO was never supposed to expand in the first place.

8. Invasion of Ukraine: Responses to NATO Military Aid

Russian media reflect a variation in attitudes on NATO military aid in Ukraine. Numerous commentators doubt the utility of Western assistance and dismiss it as disinformation; they say that the West is only providing older arms and materials, and criticize the selfish nature of overall Western involvement in the conflict. Other journalists express legitimate concern about the impact that such significant aid could cause in Ukraine. There is an unprecedented coordination of support, and it seems there is some surprise among journalists about the swift nature of such collaboration.

9. Invasion of Ukraine: Ukrainian EU and NATO Membership

Ukrainian membership in EU and NATO is still a point of interest in the media, especially amidst an active invasion in Ukraine. Several articles posit that an acceptance of Ukraine, if it occurs at all, is in the very distant future, especially considering the presence of Russian troops. Others highlight Ukraine’s application as a forced response to Russian assistance in Donetsk and Luhansk and caution that Georgia and Moldova may be likely for EU candidate status as well. Overall, there is a shared opinion that Ukrainian membership in EU and NATO is not out of the question but has been made significantly more complex with current Russian activity in Ukraine.

10. Invasion of Ukraine: Responses to Western Sanctions

Numerous articles in the Russian press discuss the recent sanctions imposed on Russia and largely dismiss the significance of their long-term impact on Russian society, stating that they are more damaging to the West. Media commentators even welcome the challenge, stating that such independence will fix issues of Russia’s import dependence and brain drain. Additionally, the Russian media analyze the challenges that the imposed sanctions will cause for specific Russian industry, such as shipbuilding and aviation capabilities and technology and computer chip development.

11. Invasion of Ukraine: Russia’s Future in the New Order

Several articles focus on how Russia and its role in the world will change in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine. These articles suggest that sanctions will cause some pain but the sacrifice will be worthwhile to achieve the goal of ending the threat posed by an anti-Russian Ukraine and restoring Russia’s greatness and sovereignty. The possibility of increasing internal repression to ensure national unity is also discussed in a positive light.

12. Invasion of Ukraine: Role of Neighboring States

States in the immediate vicinity of Ukraine are seen as potentially vital interlocutors in both the positive and negative sense for several Russian commentators. Poland and the wider east-central European NATO member-states are viewed as having taken a turn towards a decisive rearmament and preparation for future conflict. Meanwhile, Belarus holds its position as a key Russian ally, underlining its important role for Moscow as a constituent part of the Russian-Belarusian “Union State” and very likely a further consolidation of de facto Russian control over more elements of Belarus’ statehood and independence.

13. Invasion of Ukraine: Turkey’s Position

Russian commentators remain concerned about Turkey’s role in the Russo-Ukrainian War and the geopolitical fallout from the conflict. Perspectives vary, from those who note Turkey’s unwillingness to go along with the full spectrum of sanctions proposed by European and North American states, to others who reiterate the concern about the longer-term designs of Turkey’s leadership in the broader Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and even Central Asian states. Observers are particularly wary of Turkey’s naval presence, which for some is described as a genuine threat to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, alongside Turkey’s ability to block passage through the straits. The growing role of Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 combat drones also add impetus to commentator concerns.

14. Invasion of Ukraine: The Biolabs Conspiracy

Several articles once again raise the conspiracy theory about the role of US DTRA reference labs in the former Soviet Union states, but this time in Ukraine, referencing recent coverage in the UK newspaper Expose. In an article in Sovetskaya Rossia, Valentin Kasatonov argues that “US military biolabs in Ukraine” are the reasons for Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. In Topwar.ru, Yevgeniy Fedorov provides more conspiracy theories that the labs are a part of growing NATO infrastructure in Ukraine.

15. China’s Geopolitical Position

Russian commentators have noted the parallels between Russia’s ongoing intervention into Ukraine—and the West’s reaction—and China’s presumed geopolitical designs for Taiwan. Some argue that while such parallels exist, they do not necessarily mean that China intends to support Russia’s goals in Ukraine. Indeed, they argue that it is possible that this could be a major test of the strength of the Russian-Chinese relationship at the highest levels. Others are more sanguine about the relationship and argue that this provides a potential test-case for a future Chinese effort to retake Taiwan.

16. Russia-Nicaragua Relations

Although most commentary in Russia remains focused on events in Eurasia and Eastern Europe, some look to other parts of the world as a means of shoring up the global picture of Russia’s alliances and international relationships. An article in NVO looks to the political regime in Nicaragua. It argues that there is a friendly face in this Central American country, and that Russia can use it as “something [with which] to respond to US pressure in Europe” by further improving relations with this “soft underbelly of the United States.”

17. Information and Hybrid Warfare

Several articles discuss how Russians understand the US/NATO approaches to information warfare and hybrid warfare. An article by Aleksandr Bartosh focuses on what he explains is a hybrid warfare in US and NATO strategies. An article in Krasnaya Zvezda focuses on the Western concept of “cognitive warfare.” In an article in Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur’er (VPK), Sergey Korotkov argues that the “heat of information (hybrid) war [against Russia] has reached a critical point.” In another VPK article, Leontiy Shevtsov analyzes what he calls “US and NATO information warfare operations.”

18. Shortcomings of the US Military

One article responds to US Navy chief of staff Michael Gilday’s recent comments that the Navy needs a fleet of more than 500 ships to meet its commitments in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy, noting that US shipbuilding capacity will be a major obstacle to reaching that goal. A second article examines the evolution of US aircraft carriers, and argues that the capabilities of current air wing configurations to counter an enemy are “significantly lower than they were” in the 1970s and 1980s. A third article examines US missile and air defense capabilities, arguing that capabilities were inefficiently developed due to US overconfidence in its pilots and aircraft.

19. US and European Military Capabilities

Three articles discuss developments of specific US and European capabilities and systems. One article discusses the US Navy’s public launch of its Snakehead underwater drone, “which apparently is being created in analogue to the Russian Poseidon submarine platform.” A second article discusses the US Space Force’s Deep space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) project, which “will allow the delivery of accurate strikes against enemy satellites, and will also complete the formation of a unified system for coordinating the actions of the US armed forces around the planet.” A third article discusses the “Eurodrone” project between Germany, France, Italy, and Spain.