Crisisgroup

To mark the 20th anniversary of International Crisis Group, we are publishing a series of 20 essays by foreign policy leaders forecasting the “Future of Conflict”.

At the epicenter of the new escalation of Israeli-Palestinian violence is a deep dispute over Jerusalem's Holy Esplanade -- known to Jews as the Temple Mount, and to Muslims as the Haram al-Sharif, site of the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

David Cameron’s announcement that the UK will be sending troops to support UN blue helmets in Africa was welcome news. The UN has long struggled to secure enough of the right forces for its missions, since few countries with elite trained and equipped forces commit them to peacekeeping operations.

Boko Haram is evolving under the pressure of combined military operations by the Lake Chad Basin states, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. It has suffered significant conventional military defeats and lost most of the territory it loosely controlled in late 2014, but, despite this, it is not a spent force and continues to exact an unacceptable humanitarian toll.

Among the three principal politicians who have struggled for power in Côte d’Ivoire since 1995, President Alassane Ouattara, 73, is the only one still in the game and is most likely to win the presidential election on 25 October.

The Taliban takeover of Kunduz in Northern Afghanistan this week is the visible part of an insurgency iceberg that has grown larger, more destructive, and more threatening to the Afghan coalition government and to the Obama administration’s Titanic-like exit strategy.

As the world marks Polio Day today, Pakistan remains the greatest impediment to a polio-free world. The country has more polio cases than any other, reflecting a double policy failure: to prioritise the health of its citizens, and to curb violent extremism. Pakistan's deadly conflicts increase the likelihood the disease could spread to other countries.

Los apuñalamientos, tiroteos, protestas y choques en Jerusalén, Cisjordania, Gaza e Israel constituyen una de las mayores amenazas para el presidente palestino, Mahmud Abbas, y su estrategia de negociaciones bilaterales, diplomacia y cooperación con Israel en materia de seguridad. La agitación -su causa inmediata fue el establecimiento de más restricciones al acceso palestino a la mezquita de al Aqsa- refleja el sentimiento de los palestinos de que sus dirigentes han fracasado, que deben defender sus derechos nacionales incluso desafiando a sus líderes si es necesario, y que la era de Abbas está llegando a su fin.

Seul survivant politique parmi les trois hommes qui se disputent le pouvoir depuis 1995, Alassane Ouattara est favori pour remporter aisément l’élection présidentielle du 25 octobre. Henri Konan Bédié, leader du Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) et ancien chef de l’État, a volontairement écarté son parti de la compétition pour faciliter la victoire du président sortant. Laurent Gbagbo, son adversaire en 2010, est en prison. Ses sept concurrents du moment n’ont ni l’envergure, ni le soutien d’un grand parti qui leur permettraient de gagner. L’enjeu n’est donc pas tant le résultat d’une élection à priori sans surprise que sa suite et les choix qu’effectuera le président Ouattara pour les cinq prochaines années s’il est réélu.

Since the Islamic State began seizing significant amounts of territory in northern Syria and Iraq, policy makers and analysts have focused primarily on the question of whether America should arm the Kurds to fight the jihadi group.

La Comisión ha demostrado su enorme utilidad en contextos en los que las instituciones públicas ordinarias no funcionan, o están cooptadas por poderes oscuros.

The stabbings, shootings, protests and clashes now spreading across Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza and Israel present one of the greatest challenges yet posed to the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and his strategy of bilateral negotiations, diplomacy and security co-operation with Israel. The unrest – its proximate cause was increased restrictions on Palestinian access to al-Aqsa Mosque – reflects a sense among Palestinians that their leadership has failed, that national rights must be defended in defiance of their leaders if necessary, and that the Abbas era is coming to an end.

Por fin se empezará a discutir en el Congreso un marco legal para el sometimiento de las Bacrim. Pero para que sea realmente útil se necesitaría una propuesta más audaz. Parece haber un nuevo aire de optimismo en la lucha contra las denominadas bandas criminales (Bacrim). Hace unas semanas fue abatido Pijarbey, el jefe de los Libertadores del Vichada. Pocos días después cayó Megateo, el líder de una disidencia del Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) que para muchos era una organización criminal. Y, según la prensa, la fuerza pública ya está muy cerca a Otoniel, la cabeza de los Urabeños.

长期以来，随着南海的日益军事化，亚太地区稳定与安全的局势变得紧张，而穿梭在这片海域的一艘艘不起眼的渔船所造成的风险却往往更直接、更频繁，也更缺乏管控。然而，如果能加以适当管理，渔业或可为区域协商与合作创造初始环境。

At a time of heightened tensions between the U.S. and China, it comes as little surprise that a new and important book on the bilateral relations, published by a think tank affiliated with the Chinese Foreign Ministry, should have the foreboding title The Twilight of a Feast on Power: The U.S. “Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific” and China’s Countermeasures. Although the book, published in July, largely tracks a familiar narrative of the irreversible decline of the U.S. cast against the unstoppable ascent of China, it also contains a notably nuanced interpretation of Washington’s intentions. The book’s key finding is important: “The objective of the U.S. policy towards China is ‘hedging’ but not ‘containment.’” China’s rise is presenting opportunities, challenges, and uncertainty, it notes, which compel Washington “to take actions to guard against and mold China” as it tries to ensure China’s development benefits rather than threatens American interests. This is a more sober assessment than the usual indignant howls about American containment pervasive among China’s foreign policy analysts a couple years ago and still popular in the nationalist state media. The book, authored by a group of researchers at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)—of whom only one, Ruan Zongze, is named— theorizes that Washington’s “rebalancing” has matured alongside its views of China. Lawrence Jackson—Zuma Press Presidents Hu and Obama toast during a State Dinner in the State Dining Room of the White House, 2011. The Obama administration, like several of its predecessors, initially had high hopes that China would become an active partner in the established system of global governance. But as it became clear that the “China dream” was following a different vision, Washington redefined China as “a potential challenger to U.S. global leadership, military rival, and rules-defying economic competitor,” write Ruan Zongze, Zhao Qinghai, Liu Feitao, Shen Yamei, and Cui Lei. Yet following rounds of ups and downs, the Obama administration ultimately positioned China as “a competitor that is nonetheless modifiable.” According to the book, the bilateral ties were stressed by friction over Asia’s maritime disputes but bolstered by Washington “responding positively”—although not accepting outright—Beijing’s proposition of establishing “a new type of major power relations.” Such “oscillations” were typical of a relationship between “neither enemies nor friends,” say the authors. Viewed from Washington, however, bilateral ties appear to have been in linear deterioration. As Xi Jinping tightens his grip on power, clamps down on civil society, projects China’s formidable economic might in apparent challenge to America’s global influence, and flexes his muscles over China’s maritime claims, more and more voices in the U.S. foreign policy establishment are doubting whether a cooperative relationship is possible. Although they are still in a minority, a growing chorus questions the fundamental wisdom of engagement with Beijing, arguing it has failed to either bring about domestic political liberalization or shape China into a responsible stakeholder in the U.S.-led liberal world order. Mainstream opinion in the two capitals nevertheless seems to be converging on the broad outlook. “Sino-U.S. competition is a reality and will be unavoidable at times, but it can be controlled and managed,” The Twilight concludes Reaching a similar conclusion, after surveying a few hundred attendees of a Washington conference on global security challenges, Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New American Security deduced that “most Washingtonians see growing but manageable competition with China.” But even if both countries are becoming more clear-eyed about the competitive nature of their relationship, their ability to manage the rivalry peacefully will hinge on reconciling yawning divisions on key flashpoints, most notably the maritime disputes that pit China against Japan in the East China Sea, and against several Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea. The Twilight rehashes the prevailing Chinese narrative that Washington has exploited these East Asia security faultlines to hype the “China threat” in order to “control allies and check China.” It argues that the loudly advertised return of U.S. forces to Asia has emboldened certain countries, namely Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, to advance their maritime claims at China’s cost. With the rebalance, the book pronounces, Washington “no doubt threw oil on the fire.” In sharp contrast, the widely-held view in the U.S., and among the aforementioned countries, is that it is China that has ratcheted up tensions. For them, actions such as declaring an East China Sea air defense identification zone, deploying an oil rig to waters disputed with Vietnam, and enlarging reefs in the South China Sea into potential military outposts have pushed frightened neighbors to seek support from Washington. While conceding the U.S. is welcome as a security guarantor by some regional nations, The Twilight’s authors declare Washington’s sway is waning. Faced with domestic woes, distracted by crises in the Middle East and Ukraine, and unable to meet Asian allies’ expectations or secure Southeast Asian nations’ unreserved cooperation, the book says the U.S. rebalance is only delaying its decline in the Asia-Pacific from “the only superpower” to a mere “swing force.” Next to a decaying America, the book portrays a triumphant China, taking its place in history to forge “an Asian community of common destiny.” China’s “new Asian security concept” that promotes “security for all, by all, and of all” is a compelling alternative to U.S. alliances that pursue “absolute security of a single country,” the authors write. China’s “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”—ambitious development plans—will propel the economic takeoff of Asia, Europe, and Africa, it predicts. “Asia has woken up and calls for Asian people to take charge of Asian affairs,” The Twilight provocatively proclaims. Despite the melodramatic triumphalism in the pages, however, one of the authors, Cui Lei, allowed for more subtlety. At the book launch late July in Beijing, he counted some of the Obama administration’s achievements: credible economic recovery, progress on forging a 12-economy Trans-Pacific free trade deal, normalizing relations with Cuba, and reaching an agreement with Iran to thwart its nuclear program. “The U.S. will not realize all of its strategic goals with its rebalance, but that does not mean it is declining.” For years, Beijing’s foreign policy has been partially based on the unspoken assumption that America’s decline in Asia is as inevitable as China’s eventual regional supremacy. Although this new CIIS book does not challenge that narrative, a growing number of China's foreign policy thinkers realize that the sun may not have quite have set for America the superpower; China’s leadership in Asia is far from ordained; and its policy settings need to be adjusted for medium to long-term co-existence rather than unchallenged regional authority.

The release on 16 September of the long-awaited report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on its Sri Lanka investigation (OISL) is a dramatic advance that can help the country respond to its painful legacy of war. The report is a compelling examination of the abuses committed by all sides during the lengthy civil conflict and the steps required to pursue justice, accountability and reconciliation as part of democratic recovery. The UN Human Rights Council (HRC), which mandated the report, should demonstrate the same leadership by endorsing and supporting its conclusions and recommendations at the present session.

L’image de havre de paix dans une région en proie aux conflits dont bénéficiait le Cameroun a volé en éclats depuis l’irruption de Boko Haram en 2013 au nord du pays. Ce mouvement, devenu l’Etat islamique en Afrique de l’Ouest en mars 2015, revendique son affiliation à Daech. Néanmoins, l’apparition brutale et sanglante de ce djihadisme africain est moins liée à l’essor de Daech en Irak et en Syrie qu’aux bouleversements du paysage religieux de l’Afrique en général et du Cameroun en particulier.

The signing of the nuclear accord between Iran and the P5+1 answered a question that has bedeviled the U.S.-Iranian relationship for 36 years. Decades after the 1979 uprising that ousted Washington’s ally, Shah Reza Pahlavi, and led to the 444-day captivity of American hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the United States is no longer intent on effecting regime change and settling scores. The nuclear accord signifies a belated acceptance of, and accommodation with, the Islamic Revolution and the clerical order it spawned. What does this mean for Iran? That a relaxed leadership can now look inward to fix the country’s ailing economy. But what if it also decides to invest further into Iran’s power projection in the region?

La imagen de Camerún como una isla de paz en medio de una región tumultuosa terminó en 2013, cuando la violencia de Boko Haram cruzó la frontera nigeriana. Este grupo está afiliado al llamado Estado Islámico o Daesh, e incluso se rebautizó como Estado Islámico de África Occidental a principios de este año. Pero la forma brutal de yihadismo africano que representa difícilmente se explica por el auge del Estado Islámico en Irak y Siria. De hecho, es en parte una consecuencia del cambiante panorama religioso africano, que afecta y no poco a Camerún.

The image of Cameroon as an island of peace amidst regional turmoil ended in 2013, when Boko Haram’s violence first crossed the Nigerian border. The militant group is affiliated with so-called Islamic State or Daesh, and even renamed itself Islamic State in West Africa earlier this year. But the brutal form of African jihadism it represents is hardly a result of the Islamic State’s rise in Iraq and Syria. In fact, it is in part a consequence of Africa’s changing religious landscape – not least in Cameroon.