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Hate Politics and the Critical Faith Theory

mar, 05/04/2022 - 17:43


Hate Politics and the Critical Faith Theory

As the midterm elections get closer, the debate on whether or not it is appropriate to teach the Critical Race Theory (CRT) in schools is likely to intensify. It is the most contentious and indeed most misconstrued sociopolitical issue facing America since the ‘abortion debate.’

According to the right-wing politicians and their supporters, it is a sinister movement driven by certain ‘woke mobs’ that are bent on destroying America by rewriting school textbooks in order to poison the young minds into self-hating monsters. And that self-hating generation, the right-wing groups warn, will reject values of self-reliance, hard-work, and patriotism.

In reality, CRT is an academic concept that is more than four decades old that argues racism is not merely the byproduct of individual bias or prejudice. It is a value implanted and sustained in systems and policies that shape and drive critical institutions such as the education, political, legal, and financial systems for othering or disenfranchising certain segments of American society.

This article advocates and affirms the importance of teaching CRT in schools in order to cultivate enlightened generations that are not afraid to trace back sources of the dysfunctional impulses that fuel societal division. The U.S. constitution spells out legal protection against race and faith-based discrimination. It is within this framework that this article makes the case for what I call Critical Faith Theory (CFT)- the other side of the same coin or the prevalent Islamophobia based systemic discrimination.

 

Systemic Racism Cannot Be Ignored

Pathways to opportunities and failures are often paved by the choices people make as individuals; and there is no argument over that. That said, throughout history and indeed in various parts of the world, systemic conveyor belts were set up to facilitate the advancement of certain societal elites and steer others toward failure based on their race, faith, and economic class.    

It is not by sheer coincidence that public transportation systems in America are designed to keep suburbs where most jobs are located as exclusive economic islands. “From funding, planning and infrastructure, to design and policing, many transit agencies essentially have built two systems with different standards for “choice” and “dependent” riders (that is to say white and Black),” argues Christof Spieler, senior lecturer at Rice University.

Imagine this recurring scenario in many inner-city neighborhoods across America. A young Black man who grew up in a disadvantaged neighborhood decides to look for an opportunity.  He borrows a car from a family member and heads off to a suburb nearby.  On his way back, he is stopped by the police for an expired license plate. Fortunately, he survives that potentially deadly encounter, but not without setting in motion a chain of problems for him and the car owner.

The police officer asks for a driver’s license, car registration, and insurance. The young man ends up with a hefty ticket for an expired license plate and for not having insurance; but that is not enough. The car is impounded because the owner, though living at the same address, was someone other than the driver.  

Since neither the young man nor the family member whose car he borrowed have insurance, they are required to purchase high risk insurance (SR-22) that costs roughly 5 times the ordinary insurance; but that is not all. They still must pay for towing and the cost of each day that the car remains in the police impound lot.

In most cases when the poor people face such overwhelming financial burden, they end up losing their vehicles. And if they fail to pay those tickets on time, arrest warrants are issued, and nightmare scenarios ensue. 

Consequence of Racialized Islam

In her well-researched book, The Racial Muslim, Sahar Aziz offers a profoundly piercing argument that the civil rights and civil liberties of American Muslims have been steadily violated. Politicians, media, think tanks, and various hate groups have played noteworthy roles. Liberals erroneously rationalized that “eroding the civil liberties of Muslims was….a small price to pay for securing the nation.”

Moreover, conservatives, especially after Donald Trump was elected president in 2017, became ”bolder and more aggressive in their attempts to expel, exclude, and prosecute Muslims.” The so-called Muslim ban was not merely a misguided executive order or a divisive slogan, it was a deliberately crafted dog-whistle to project Muslims as the most dangerous threat facing America.          

Campaign To Criminalize Islam and Muslims

Unlike all other forms of bigotry, Islamophobia in United States is not simply expressed in hate speech, discrimination, vandalism, and threat of violence, all Islamic institutions—including mosques—are in the crosshairs. The paranoia that Sharia was going to replace the U.S. Constitution took hold of many people in many critical institutions.                  

Lawmakers used to routinely make outlandish claims against Muslim communities in the US and accuse their mosques of being centers for radicalization. The most belligerent among them was retired Congressman Peter King who chaired the House Committee on Homeland Security. Among the many Islamophobic statements he made are:

There aretoo many mosques in this country (and) we should be looking at them more carefully and finding out how we can infiltrate them.”

Congressman King used to hold Joseph MacCarthy-like hearings on “homegrown Islamic terrorism” in order to sustain the post 9/11 othering of Muslims. In one such hearing, retired Congressman Keith Ellison told a story of an American-Muslim hero whose story was smeared because of his faith and name [video]

Not even The Council on American–Islamic Relations (CAIR), which is the leading Muslim advocate for justice and mutual understanding is safe. Despite its exemplary record, certain conservative law-makers, media, think tanks, and a wide array of hate groups relentlessly target it with vicious smearing campaigns.  

When CAIR National recently discovered it was being spied on by an anti-Muslim organization named Investigative Project On Terrorism led by notorious Islamophobe Stephen Emerson, it followed the dollars. 

Over $100 million in funding came from various organizations, including some household investment company names such as Charles Schwab and Vanguard. 

Global Islamophobia

In the West, though countries such as Germany launched a critical initiative against hate crimes and included Islamophobia as a subcategory of the law-enforcement statistics of “politically motivated criminal acts” other European countries are instituting policies that target Muslims.

Countries such as France and Sweden that are considered some of the most liberal in Europe have been instituting policies that are unapologetically Islamophobic and inflammatory political rhetoric intended to turn public opinion against Muslims and Islam. This latest database on anti-Muslim Hatred published by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights underscores an alarming trend.

Likewise in the East, countries such as China and India have been resorting to more repressive policies that pave the way for ethnic-cleansing. China holds between 1 and 3 million Muslims of the Uyghur minority in concentration camps for what it calls reeducation. India instituted a policy citizenship revocation and the current ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) supports the Hindutva extremists who routinely attack Muslims in mobs.      

Policies Cannot Be Neutral On Hate

Hate speech directed toward Muslims is widely tolerated. Should you as a reader find this claim incredulous or mere hyperbole, you should not hesitate to put it to test. Take any of caustic Islamophobic tropes and bigoted attacks that the former President and some of his supporters in Congress and media continuously spew at the only hijab-wearing Muslim law-maker, Rep. Ilhan Omar, and imagine her being a Jewish representative.          

Those of us advocating for the CRT and CFT are not bringing fabricated claims for historical revisionism; we are merely asking for a level playing field. Students are already taught about antisemitism in schools and the systemic bigotry that led to the Holocaust. Why not expand that teaching to include how systemic racism is othering minority communities such Blacks and Muslims?     

Interpreting Through the Fog

jeu, 31/03/2022 - 18:39

Getty Images

With the War in Ukraine having been part of the international dialogue over the last month, the language and policies that were once thought to be something of the past has become part of our immediate future. Defense spending and policies on oil and gas had to meet the reality of the current situation, and when not altered, was accepted in part as a failed approach. It is clear now that bad foreign policy decisions can lead to horrific consequences, and that freedom and democracy must not only be enshrined in Constitutions, but be acted upon as a way of life as a covenant between just nations.

There have been some movement towards effectively helping Ukraine beat back Russia’s assaults on their nation. The move to provide Ukraine with not only shoulder launched short range anti-aircraft missiles, but also longer ranger S-300 type systems and medium range systems like the 1970s era SA-8 Gecko has made the skies over Ukraine’s Western cities dangerous for Russian aircraft. Even old systems like the SA-8 and SA-13 have created a major problem for modern Russian aircraft. Anti-tank weapons has made the invasion of Ukraine costly, with only the most protected tanks being able to contend with the different types of rockets designed to obliterate Russian Armour.

Slight changes towards providing Europe with North American energy is a move in the right direction, but slow and not effective in the immediate term. There needs to be a serious human rights discussion on reality vs. ideology. The effects of these decisions on Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia must be carefully considered when taking policy decisions on energy. Neglecting reality will just lead to a future conflict without fail. No one wants to donate their citizens to a future war in the cold fields of Ukraine or deserts of Iraq any longer. For this to occur, intelligent policies must become paramount.

Strategic losses seen on raw film and video has been one of the most useful ways to interpret the changing winds of war during this conflict. With so little reliable information being produced and focused information from different sides of the conflict being highlighted or actively blocked, the only information that can be relied upon is a knowledge of the region and the weapons used therein.

Losses of systems that are required by Russia to win a modern conflict in Ukraine shows how difficult it has been on Russian forces. With numerous BMP and BMD light armoured vehicles being destroyed, and older T-72 type tanks making up much more of Russia’s tank arms than expected, it seems as if Russia was not as well equipped as many would have thought against a country on its own border. Losses of modern attack helicopters like the KA-52s and low flying SU-33s jets by shoulder launched missiles or dated anti-aircraft systems from the Cold War also show the difficulty in challenging Ukraine’s armed forces, which was one of the best armies during the Cold War era.

Losses of ground based artillery and anti-aircraft systems are likely why challenging larger cities has been a complex exercise for Russia. Launching a siege or bombardment is required before entering a city, and when photos of lost 2S3 Akasiya and 2S19 MSTA are found, there is certainly a problem in their campaign. Losing vital anti-aircraft systems like the SA-11/17 BUK to drones has been surprising but has occurred on a few occasions. Seeing ultra modern Pantsir systems stuck in the mud, or seeing two separate SA-15 Gauntlet systems being dragged by farm equipment may be why drones and ballistic missiles from Ukraine are constantly harassing Russian forces, as those two systems are designed to defend the skies over Russian tanks and artillery. Trying to dominate the second largest country in Europe next to your own is difficult, but to do it with lost equipment in a region that was designed to repel a NATO attack with old systems that are as effective against modern equipment as it was against equipment from thirty years ago is almost impossible.

While it will become apparent that Russia made a mistake in invading Ukraine, the chance that an end to hostilities will restore all of Ukraine’s territory is not likely. Poor policy decisions in 2014 and the simmering conflict in the East of Ukraine will likely not be of interest to the West a few short months after the end of the wider conflict. Empowering Russian allies and enriching petro economies with poor human rights records will create similar conflicts in other regions of the world, and the current disinterest in those regions during the current conflict in Ukraine will result in repeated conflict and violence. Preventing a global conflict will not just come from sanctions and protests, but from policy decisions that seek long term solutions, not just ads for the next election.

 

Generational Differences in Russian Resistance

mer, 30/03/2022 - 21:07

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s relentless invasion of Ukraine shocked the international community. Individuals around the world are observing horrors unfold as Russian troops continue their siege on major Ukrainian cities. Information regarding the invasion is nearly impossible to ignore, with coverage flooding in from every major news outlet. In Russia, the story looks different. Russia’s censorship of media prevents citizens from gaining access to accurate information. Independent media is virtually non-existent; the Kremlin indoctrinates Russians with propaganda spread through state-controlled television. Despite the breadth of this disinformation campaign, it has had varied results. Most notably, there’s been a generational gap regarding perceptions of Russia’s behavior. Older generations tend to be more supportive of the Kremlin, whereas younger generations tend to be more resistant to Russian disinformation. A 2022 survey conducted by an independent organization in Russia found that 75% of Russians aged 66 or older support the war in Ukraine. Comparatively, only 29% of those aged 18-24 support the war. The disconnect comes from two sources: Soviet Nostalgia and social media.

Soviet Nostalgia refers to Putin’s desire to bring back the sphere of influence once held by the Soviet Union. In a 2005 State of the Union Address, he declared the collapse of the USSR to be the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”. Putin’s yearning for the days of Soviet power have guided much of his policy – it motivated him annex Crimea in 2014. Putin’s most recent invasion of Ukraine follows this same logic. He believes that because of their shared history, Russia has a right to Ukrainian territory. Older generations of Russians vividly remember the days of the USSR. They can envision a time when Ukraine and Russia existed under one regime. As a result, they are more susceptible to Putin’s Soviet Nostalgia.

Many older Russians pinpoint 1991 as the start of their financial duress. Putin has repeatedly blamed the economic disaster accompanying the downfall of the USSR on western influence. The overnight emergence of a privatized economy created hyperinflation, and increased poverty quickly followed. Putin amassed heavy support in the 2000 elections from older Russians who believed Putin would “lead them out of [the] shame and poverty” brought on by the West. He continues to spin narratives of a return to soviet economic success, despite taking little concrete action to improve the Russian economy. These narratives appeal directly to Russians who suffered financially in the early 1990s. They more easily believe that recreating the Soviet Union’s former prestige will result in economic progress.

Older Russians’ disengagement with social media heightens their vulnerability to Putin’s narratives. Their consumption of information consists almost exclusively of state-controlled media. State media circulates propaganda painting Ukrainian leadership as a neo-Nazi regime. It describes Russian troops as liberators of Ukraine, while censoring any coverage of devastation created by the war. Older generations who don’t utilize sites like Facebook or Twitter don’t have access to alternative information. A Russian in Moscow, interviewed by Aljazeera, told journalists that older Russians are “drowning in propaganda…” and thus support Putin’s actions. Younger generations, on the other hand, frequent social media. Putin’s regime severely restricted sites including Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter in early March 2022. However, prior to this restriction, younger Russians engaged with outside accounts of Russian behavior. As such, they struggle with conflicting narratives.  Katya, a 20-year-old Russian, told Aljazeera that state television programs “blatantly lie” about the situation in Ukraine. She and her peers rely heavily on social networks and platforms like Telegram, attempting to discern the truth.

Younger Russians’ disconnect from the Soviet era further distances them from Putin’s influence. 18- to 24-year-old Russians were born into a post-Soviet world – they cannot envision a Soviet world the same ways their grandparents can. They have only ever known Ukraine as a sovereign nation. Propaganda promoting a return to former Soviet glory fails to significantly impact these younger generations.

Hopeful images of resistance in Russia have emerged in recent weeks: rallies led by college students on university campuses, a news reporter interrupting a broadcast to counter propaganda, and anti-war protests in major cities across the country. While the war in Ukraine rages on, the intergenerational battle of public opinion within Russia rages alongside it. Older generations continue to engage with Putin’s disinformation campaign, stubborn in their belief that Russia has been mistreated by the West. Younger Russians find creative new ways to access genuine news: through VPNs, alternative platforms like Telegram, and word of mouth. The burden of resistance weighs heavily on younger shoulders, as they fight to see an end to senseless violence.

Brazil Election 2022- Parallels between Trump and Bolsonaro

mar, 29/03/2022 - 17:09

In October of 2022, Brazilians will go to the polls to determine if Jair Bolsonaro remains president of Brazil. After three years as president, Bolsonaro has earned a reputation at home and abroad as an erratic far-right populist leader. Initially being elected in 2018, Bolsonaro won the presidency on his conservative values and disdain for political correctness. His opposition to abortion was applauded by the country’s sizable evangelical population, and his tough-on-crime stance was well received by many Brazilians concerned with rising violence in the country. His values and posturing have often echoed those of US President Donald Trump, and as a result, he has at times been referred to as the “Trump of the Tropics”. Indeed, from the beginning of his tenure as president on January 1st, 2019, to his current rhetoric revolving around the upcoming election, Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro share much in common.

Bolsonaro secured the presidency in October with 55% of the vote. As an outside anti-establishment candidate, he was able to win over many Brazilians fed up with the poor state of the country following the presidencies of Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer. The economy was in recession, and the Petrobras Scandal led to targeted accusations against many high-level Brazilian politicians, including then-president Temer. While Bolsonaro was able to ride this wave of discontentment to victory, over the past year his image has begun to sour for many Brazilians. By the end of 2021, the approval rating for Bolsonaro had fallen below 30%. The reasons for Bolsonaro’s struggling public image can largely be chalked up to three factors: the deforestation of the Amazon, mishandling of the Covid-19 crisis, and the worsening state of the Brazilian economy. Bolsonaro’s damaging environmental policies in the Amazon rainforest have drawn scorn from heads of state around the world. His decisions to ignore six offerings of Covid-19 vaccines from Pfizer elicited anger from many Brazilians as the virus ravaged the country. But the biggest contributing factor to the discontentment towards Bolsonaro is by far the worsening state of the economy. As of late 2021, 14% of the Brazilian population was unemployed, and that figure will likely not go down in 2022 as the GDP is expected to grow by only 1%. Inflation has surged with the national currency, the Brazilian Real, trading at an all-new low against the dollar. Many believe the root of the new-found inflation is due to Bolsonaro’s decision to massively expand the Bolsa Família, a cash transfer program for the poor that he has utilized to win votes among the lower class. This expansion of the budget deficit (surprising for such a right-wing politician) has caused Bolsonaro’s relationship with the business elite to also go south, resulting in a loss of favor from one of his biggest voting blocs. The end result of all these factors is that 70% of Brazilians think the economy has worsened, and 41% say that the state of the economy will be the biggest influencer in how they cast their vote, which puts Bolsonaro in a difficult position for the October election.

The biggest challenger to Jair Bolsonaro is Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Former union leader and leftist president of Brazil from 2003-2010, Lula will be the chosen candidate for the left-wing Partido dos Trabalhadores, the Worker’s Party of Brazil. Lula’s campaign for office is mainly based off his hope that he will serve as a moderating force against Bolsonaro’s reckless decision making. He has specifically taken aim at Bolsonaro’s reckless behavior regarding the Covid-19 pandemic. Lula faces some big obstacles in his way as well, largely due to the recession occurring during his tenure as president and possible involvement in the Petrobras Scandal. One-quarter of Brazilians say that they will not vote for either Bolsonaro nor Lula, which means those votes will likely go to centrist contenders such as São Paulo governor João Doria, former health minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta, or former governor Ciro Gomes. Many anticipate that these contenders will split the vote, resulting in a second-round between Lula and Bolsonaro.

It is against this backdrop that we approach the Brazilian presidential elections. Just like Donald Trump in the lead up to the 2020 US elections, Bolsonaro is laying the groundwork to challenge unsavory results in October. During a campaign rally last September, he announced “Only God will remove me” showing his disdain toward democratic transitions of power. He has claimed, without proper evidence, that the country’s electronic voting system is rife with fraud. He has dismissed federal police chiefs probing into his family affairs. Finally, he has used national security laws to persecute his critics. Many of these moves were blocked as unlawful by the supreme court, resulting in a massive protest outside the courts. Bolsonaro’s false claims about election fraud, dismissal of disloyal appointees, and willingness to spur on his followers into rallies against the judicial system hold many parallels to the behavior Donald Trump exhibited as president and leading up to the 2020 US election.

However, while Bolsonaro and Trump share many characteristics in common with their populist undemocratic behavior, Brazil is a country with a much younger and weaker democracy than the United States. The reason that is relevant is because there is a much greater risk that Bolsonaro will be able to flout the rules in Brazil and be able to get away with it. Bolsonaro is an open and avowed supporter of the military dictatorship that ruled Brazil from 1964-1985 and as explained above, has been known to stretch his presidential powers while in office. It is for these reasons that a loss for Bolsonaro may result in a strong rejection of the results by him and his supporters. The most extreme event of a coup is unlikely, but there is a good chance that violence and upheaval will take place in Brasília, testing the strength of Brazil’s democratic institutions.

 

 

Graham Nau is the Assistant Editor at the Foreign Policy Association.

Closing The Skies

mar, 22/03/2022 - 19:39

 

The debate of the day is being highlighted by Ukrainian President Zelinsky’s direct and open communications with semi-supportive world leaders over the next few days while he addresses their legislative bodies, and in turn, their citizenry. While Ukraine’s Armed Forces and locals taking up arms have fought hard and have done a measurable amount of damage to Russian Armour, the situation on the ground has notably changed due to their effective resistance. The importation of anti-tank weaponry has been incredibly effective for close in combat and has made invading cities an assured kill box for Russian tanks and support vehicles. In turn, Russia, who faced similar obstacles in the earlier Chechen conflicts, have resorted to tactics they saw as effective in later Chechen conflicts by using long range artillery and missile systems to punish towns, cities and the remaining population. Russia has essentially been trying to put in a siege of all major cities in Ukraine in range of their artillery systems.

Ukraine has only a few options in bringing an end to this conflict on their end and that of their allies, but friendly gestures will not save more lives. If Western Allies do not help immediately to Displace Russia’s military funding, defend the skies over Ukraine from artillery strikes on their populations, and create disarray in Russia’s artillery units, then the only outcome will result in close in combat with anti-tank rockets as a last resort.

The most stark policy development lately has been the lack of effort from European and other Western countries to displace Russian oil and gas in their economies. Partial restrictions, especially from oil and gas producing nations, in the importation of Russian products is partially contributing to continued violence. While European countries are closely tied to Russian oil and gas imports, the refusal of North American oil and gas to immediately increase production and actively displace Russian oil and gas for Europe is indirectly funding hundreds of Russian tanks and missiles. By allowing a large and consistent funding source to Russia, you are allowing the war to continue. It is not a solution to displace Russian energy products with oil and gas from conflict zones and those that have themselves created refugee crises of hundreds of thousands of people, or who shell civilians themselves. Ignoring violence will result in another future war. It is simply displacing violence, not oil.

The recent debate on the importation of MiG-29 fighter jets from Poland to Ukraine and its resulting failure injected a great blow to the confidence Ukraine has in the support it has been receiving from abroad. The request Ukraine has asked for, to help close the skies over the country to Russian attacks, may only have one effective solution. Ukrainian jets have been targeted by S-400 anti-aircraft systems based in Belarus that has caused a tremendous amount of damage. Most likely the sophistication of the S-400 and its long range would render Ukrainian responses in the air mute. While Starstreak, Stinger and Igla MANPADS is an incredibly powerful low level defense for Ukraine, the need for systems that can target high flying aircraft and incoming cruise missiles and artillery is needed to blunt the siege on Ukrainian cities.

While the ability to ship items to Ukraine through its Western borders is still open, Ukraine’s allies who are not willing to implement a no-fly zone should rapidly implement a missile umbrella over major populations centres. It has been demonstrated that even older Soviet era systems like the SA-8 and SA-13 have stood up to aircraft like the SU-25, and MANPADS have even destroyed modern aircraft like the Russian SU-34. Older and very effective systems that are known to the Ukrainian forces should be pushed into the country immediately as their effectiveness in numbers is a game changer. With more modern systems possessed by Ukraine like the SA-11 and SA-15, additional systems should be given to Ukraine supported by Western systems that operate in a similar fashion. SA-15 type systems are designed to target cruise missiles and other artillery, and any system that can stop a Russian barrage may make a Russian siege a futile exercise.

The intense response by Ukraine has pushed the tactics of Russia’s invasion into one where Russian Armed Forces have decided to preserve themselves by using their artillery systems to bombard targets before sending forces in to take over major metropolitan areas. The result of using artillery shells and multiple launch rocket systems is what is creating a human rights disaster as those weapons are not precise and are used to destroy large sections of the city as was the case in Grozny during the Chechen wars. While only used on a few occasions, Ukraine needs long range counter artillery battery systems like an MLRS, or Katyusha type artillery and systems like the SS-21 Tochka and SS-23 Oka to respond to Russian artillery units surrounding major cities. While drones have committed some impressive attacks, surprisingly without being shot down, they can also provide a firing solution to counter artillery while focusing in on valuable targets. The lack of effective Russian air cover over their units also means that sending combat capable drones to Ukraine would likely help tremendously, as Russian Armour and mobile air defense have been lost to drone attacks by Ukraine. Even the most modern systems like the S-400 would not be able to defend against a swarm of drones and could act to deplete the missile site of missiles against human pilots if needed.

It appears to be the case that the most modern and impressive of Russia’s military equipment was designed not solely to support the local army, but to encourage sales of their military technology abroad. Newer systems that have seldom been used in real combat are not working as planned possibly, and the best equipment is so few in numbers that it is not being used on the battlefield. While T-90 tanks have been destroyed by anti-tank rockets, a tank designed to protect its crew with high tech systems against such equipment, the majority of the tanks are upgraded T-72 tanks, followed by other Soviet era equipment that one would have thought would have been scrapped or sold abroad by the 2020s. The most modern of systems are Russian designed anti-air systems like the S-400, as the Soviet Union was designed more to defend against invasion as to not repeat the past during the Second World War. That technology however is still effective, and Ukraine possessed many older systems that have shot down modern Russian aircraft.

Ukraine was always the best and first line of defense against NATO during the Cold War, and the Soviet Union planned their defense and accompanying technologies out for generations. Forces in the Ukraine SSR were the tip of the spear for defending the Soviet Union, and much of that Cold War defense technology works incredibly well to this day. Russia’s armed forces are linked to their Soviet heritage, and is the best defensive force in the world. It was never going to be easy invading Ukraine, at a point one of the best defensive forces in the world with the best defensive force in the world. Ukraine was the site of some of the biggest Soviet victories against the Germans in the Second World War. For the Soviets, Ukraine was created to defend a future attack.

The Ukraine War and the Testing of America

lun, 21/03/2022 - 19:38

How much danger does this pose to us?

 

Ukrainians’ courage and conviction constantly amazes Americans watching the awful news from that nation.  We should take their inspiration to heart.  Not only will watching become more painful, but we will feel our own repercussions.  Some are scarier, and closer to reality, than we might think. 

We understand that Putin cannot afford to lose this war.  He apparently could not leave Ukraine in peace either.  Its independence and liberalization posed a standing rebuke to his rule.  In a certain logic of Russian leadership, any rebuke can lead to ouster or death.

As a possible path to winning, Putin can cast free nations as weak and hypocritical, so long as he continues his attack and the West continues to tiptoe around his red lines.  If we allow Ukraine to be crushed, in this view we reveal the emptiness of our claims of principle.  We “forcefully” pushed our Liberal World Order, starting with color revolutions and progressing to NATO expansion, but cower when force pushes back.  The West is no different from any other regime.  Our rules based order is only an order based on our rules.  Any advance in that perception is a win.

This logic might see America as the font of the trouble.  It is not incorrect: America cannot but stand as a rebuke to any dictator in the world.  This nation conceived itself on a principle, that all persons are equally endowed with rights we couldn’t give away, and that governments’ purpose is to secure those rights.  We rejected a standing government on this premise.  Thus, as John Quincy Adams said, “wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or will be unfurled, there will (America’s) heart, her benedictions and her prayers be.”  We believe all people have unalienable rights and cannot help but favor any who claim them, anywhere on the planet.  Promoting freedom is aggression for any dictator, and the most powerful nation identifies itself this way. 

This zero-sum logic leads to a clear, if we hope distant, danger.  Putin follows that logic in his warning not to “interfere in the Ukraine invasion and his alert of Russian nuclear forces.  On March 9, the Duma formalized his claim that the West is waging “economic warfare” on Russia, the same kind of sham threat he invoked for the invasion.  Putin points the nuclear gun at us, just as he pointed the invasion gun at Ukraine. 

If nuclear wars were deterred by the fear of Mutually Assured Destruction, Putin also saw America’s moral power destroy a Russian state.  He needs to erode that power.  Today he might settle for embarrassing us – if China brokers a peace, an effective dictatorship shows up free societies’ fecklessness.  But ultimately, the only difference between our threat of freedom and his threat of nuclear warfare is who gets destroyed.  In this calculus, a nuclear strike on an American target might help.  Saddling a free society with the choice whether or not to retaliate and risk Armageddon could make free society look either incompetent or immoral.  Putin could get a win.  It is an evil, but strategic, logic.

In Fiona Hill’s words, “yes he would, and he wants us to know that.”  We cannot know why, whether as negotiating maneuver, as key to some grand purpose, or simply to bully.  Michael O’Hanlon points out precedents in US-Soviet behavior.  Lawrence Freedman assesses Putin’s objectives as still strategically defensive.  But Americans cannot dismiss the threat because we think Putin would be crazy to act on it.  And people do copy others’ methods.  The question is how to deal with a strategically logical bully.

Would America abandon a nation under attack precisely for its freedom because Putin points the nuclear gun at us?  Are Americans ready to live under a nuclear threat over Ukraine?  How about for our creed?  We need to think about how we carry our founding tenets.  Our creed is the one thing American cannot afford to lose.  We must ensure its viability and our fidelity. 

This imperative puts certain demands on our responses.  First, our interest is not only to stop Putin but to keep fidelity to our principles.  Stopping him is urgent and imperative but he is not the only threat.  Losing a fully democratic – not just democratizing – Taiwan to PRC coercion would be at least as damaging as losing Ukraine.  Second, any compromise to our principles must be carefully weighed, or rejected outright.  Putin’s raw aggression may justify some easing of scruples, but engaging Venezuela to replace Russian oil – keeping prices down to limit our costs – risks moral debasement.  Third, we need to make clear that our sanctions aim at Putin’s regime, not the Russian people.  We must mount our opposition with judiciousness and clarity lest we paint ourselves as Putin would, interested really in power, not freedom.  Fourth, again, our standing rebuke will draw nuclear threats.  Our own nuclear force is a deterrent, but dictators will test it and confrontation always risks war. 

There is a logic that says Putin will eventually raise another threat, and not stopping him now will create a bigger problem later. By this logic we should defy Putin’s warnings, whether by setting a “no-fly zone” or sealing off western Ukraine from Russian troops.  Tempted as we may be, are we prepared for nuclear brinkmanship, unscrupulous countermoves, and casualties?  Have we devised ways to manage China relations, absorb economic costs, and deal with other painful effects?  The logic of calling the bluff is balanced by logics of prudence and preparation.  Convictions are meaningful only when followers shoulder the burdens, and we must acknowledge the burdens to truly shoulder them. 

Far from least, Americans need to commit at home as well as abroad, in our own lives and with each other, to realize our national identity of the self-evident truths.  We are tired, of pandemic, shortages, the presumptions of experts, the selfishness of the secure, the institutional callousness and personal meanness or condescension.  We are polarized by self seeking factions and their careerist leaders.  But the choices we demand, the equality we deserve, all rest on the creed we all share.  America cannot be the nation conceived in 1776 unless we validate its premises.  Tests are coming. 

A Strong Hand and Outstretched Arm

ven, 11/03/2022 - 17:31

In this photo taken from video and released by the Russian Defense Ministry Press Service on Friday, Feb. 4, 2022, tanks and armored vehicles move during the Belarusian and Russian joint military drills at Brestsky firing range, Belarus. (Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP, File)

There have been several theories and muted responses to how to manage the Russian attack on Ukraine, but to this point the people of Ukraine have been mostly failed by the international community. Without truly committing to an effective plan of action, or delaying vital responses with full knowledge of the consequences, Ukraine has been effectively given to the winds.

Ukrainian leadership have been voicing a consistent message to us since well before this recent conflict, being met with deafening silence. When Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over Ukraine by what was thought to be a BUK-M1 missile system in 2014, the victims were mostly ignored by the rest of the world after a few weeks. An incident like having an airliner full of innocents being destroyed would have contributed to the end of a regime as it did in the past with Korean Airlines Flight 007, but now victim’s families of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 and Ukraine International Flight 752 need to beg for the most basic application of justice, and are ignored in many cases by their own Government.

Following the details of how assistance to Ukraine is being applied, International Lawyer Mark Warner has shared information demonstrating that some of the aid is limited. It could be the case that due to the interests of some in power, aid is restrained to the point of being knowingly ineffective. Sanctions being put in by banks often ignore funds related to Russian oil and gas production. In a callous move, Russian oil and gas bans have been applied to crude oil that is not currently being imported, but ignore refined products that are still flowing to nations worldwide.

Oil and gas is the industry that runs money to Russia’s power elite, and as a result fuels the military with political leverage, petrol and ammunition. Effectively, each litre of gas you put in your tank is like giving a handful of bullets to a Russian soldier in Ukraine. The continued limitation of other oil producing nations in ignoring their ability to displace Russian fuel and dilute Russian leverage contributes greatly to the conflict at this very moment. Every delay in limiting the conflict results in lives lost.

The initial attack on Ukraine was done using common modern techniques, with cruise missiles and air to surface missile systems targeting Ukraine’s Air assets and their Air Defence network. Despite much bravado from international experts claiming the superiority of Russia’s military, much of Russia’s experience was based on using high tech missile systems and air power in Syria. Ground force operations were mostly clouded by their several difficult on the ground missions in Chechnya, many that were lost until the Russian Armed Forced decided to raze Grozny to the ground on their third major attempt. While more complex anti-tank equipment is making a great difference in the battles in Ukraine presently, they still lack many of the systems they have been asking for well before this conflict began. As has been pointed out by Ukraine’s leadership, they not only need ammunition, they need certain types of systems to stand up to Putin.

In this situation, the financial sanctions and displacement of Russian finances need to not only be done in a meaningful way, but rapidly. Delays are tantamount to death in the current siege of Ukraine, and masking real help with virtue is as bad as not helping at all.

To manage the threat of Russian Armour by inexperienced soldiers or average citizens, the anti-tank systems given to people need to be simple to use and effective. Advanced NATO systems will not be easily used by those without experience, and RPG-7 or other simple systems need to be sent to Ukraine to help over the next few days.

While Stinger and SA-7/SA-14 shoulder launched MANPADS are being used in Ukraine right now against air threats, they are not wholly effective against the protection of the SU-25 ground attack aircraft, faster attack aircraft and standard countermeasures. Shoulder launched missiles cannot stop long range missiles like the OKA or Iskander missiles that are being used to target Ukraine’s defenses. Systems like the 2S6 Tunguska and TOR-M1 and NATO systems like the Roland and the Patriot systems are what is needed desperately in Ukraine at this very moment. None of the coming supplies seem to address this crucial need, and with so many delays in supplying Ukraine’s Armed Forces with lethal weapons while ground is being lost, there is little chance that Russia’s Armed Forces would allow the transfer of those critical weapons systems to the front.

The lack of assistance to Ukraine over the period from 2014 until 2021 is notable, as it demonstrates the clear and present ignorance on foreign policy issues of those outside of Eastern Europe. The knowledge of the coming war in 2022 was at no point met with enough physical assistance in effectively blunting an attack, and initially rode on a narrative of hopelessness as an excuse for absent policy. Despite the knowledge and experience from countries like Poland in assisting Ukraine’s defense posture and the incredible aid given to Ukrainians fleeing the violence, intended delays and crumbs of assistance from those outside of the region has not reflected the language coming from average citizens all over the world claiming their support for the Ukrainian people. With so little attention acknowledging other human rights atrocities in the last few years, future generations will surely not look kindly on us.

Sun Tzu’s Seven Searching Questions for the War in Ukraine

jeu, 10/03/2022 - 19:03

Ukrainian civilians practice throwing Molotov cocktails to defend the city of Zhytomyr as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continued on March 1, 2022.

Most of you will have heard of Sun Tzu- the Chinese author and military tactician who rose to prominence in the 4th century BC. Some of you may be familiar with his most prominent work- The Art of War. 

By now, you have heard about Vladmir Putin’s unwarranted aggression and despicable drive towards conquest in Ukraine. This expansionism has led to levels of violence in Europe that have not been seen since World War II,  and has forced the entire global community into a heightened state of military readiness. When troubling times like these arise, it can be useful to turn to trusted sources of guidance, and Sun Tzu’s Art of War is no exception.

While the Ukrainian force have achieved early successes in slowing Putin’s advance, the bulk of the fighting is yet to take place and the end result is far from determined. In the very first chapter of The Art of War Sun Tzu provides Seven Searching Questions through which he suggests we evaluate the outcome of a conflict. 

First, we are told to ask “Which sovereign is imbued with the moral law?” I understand this as a way of assessing morale and discipline. Which leader has the ability to rally and unify their nation behind their efforts?

Here, there can be little doubt that the advantage goes to the Ukranians, who have shown a resolve beyond the world’s highest expectations. Reports suggest that Ukranians both young and old, men and women, have rallied in support of their nation’s defense and have begun to form local militias and take on the auspices of military order. On the other hand, there are consistent reports about the lack of both training and low morale among Putin’s forces on the front and growing domestic dissent from all walks of life in Russia. The Ukranians appear far more unified behind President Zelensky than the Russians seem committed to Putin, and the loyalty that Zelensky has earned comes from respect rather than through fear.

Second, we are asked, “Which of the generals have the most ability?” There is no misunderstanding about  what Sun Tzu is asking here, but we do not yet quite know the answer as it pertains to this conflict.

There have been reports that Putin’s forces have been consistently undersupplied and that Putin’s generals struggle to communicate honestly with him. More than that, Putin’s forces have underperformed relative to their numerical advantage. Needless to say, these failures have resulted in the slow Russian advance that we have seen in the early days of the conflict. The quality of Ukrainian tactical leadership, however, is yet to be fully put on display. The United States and other democratic partners can aid Ukrainian generals by supplying timely, relevant battlefield information. With full engagement from democratic partners, Ukrainian generals may rise to the occasion, but we would be overly optimistic to assume that Putin will not address these early failures in tactics and logistics over time.

Third, Sun Tzu asks “With whom lie the advantages of the heaven and the earth?” Here, we are being asked to assess the battleground on which the conflict is being fought and the impact that weather will have on the fighting. 

Though Sun Tzu’s words may need parsing, there is no doubt that the Ukrainians, fighting from their homes (sometimes too literally) have a better sense of the terrain and are better prepared to use it to their advantage. Urban warfare is notoriously bloody, just as it is notoriously difficult for the aggressor. Similarly, as winter turns to spring, mud will increase the difficulty of Putin’s heavy artillery movements. Both literally and figuratively, the heavens and earth side with Ukraine’s defense.

Fourth, Sun Tzu asks us “On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?” Unfortunately, this question continues the trend of Sun Tzu’s most direct questions resulting in our most murky answers.

Where the Ukrainian resistance is concerned, the idea of “discipline” as Sun Tzu means it is tough to evaluate. The formal Ukrainian military’s early success in deterring Putin’s aggression suggests that the troops are disciplined, but as the fighting takes place more and more in the streets, individual Ukranians defending their homes will likely lack a formal sense of “military discipline”. Russia’s sense of military discipline is more conventional, but there are serious questions about what that discipline entails and from where it originates. Certainly some (though not all) Russian soldiers on the front lines of the fighting have shown the “discipline”(however corrupted that sense of discipline may be) to carry out war crimes. However, if this discipline is derived from fear that Putin’s regime will punish desertion, it may falter as the Putin regime shows increasing signs of domestic cracks. Ultimately, time will tell if the righteousness of the Ukrainian cause will make up for their lack of formal military training. In either case, Ukraine’s democratic partners can bolster Ukrainian discipline by highlighting the righteousness of their cause in opposition to Putin’s growing list of war crimes. 

Fifth, we are asked the most direct question- “Which side has the stronger army?”

Putin has the stronger army– barring direct involvement from Ukraine’s democratic partners.  For those of us hoping to see a successful resistance to Putin’s aggression, this is by far the most challenging obstacle to overcome. This advantage is so flagrant that it has allowed Putin’s forces to maneuver in ways that would be easily punishable by a more heavily equipped foe- most notably the ever growing military caravan that has begun to surround Kieve. A Ukrainian resistance might still prove successful, but it will take place with a disadvantage of both soldiers and weaponry

Sixth, we are asked “On which side are the officers and men more highly trained?”. For those of us not seated in  the Pentagon, Kieve, or Moscow this is yet another difficult question to answer, but there are publicly available reports that can shed some light on the matter.

Reports suggest that Ukraine’s forces are relatively small, but highly effective. Many regiments of the Ukrainian army have undergone training with American partners following the 2014 invasion of Crimea, and stand prepared to face Putin’s offensive. Russian forces, on the other hand, appear to be largely conscripts, some of whom were brought to the front lines under false pretenses. The size and munitions possessed by Putin’s forces may eventually overwhelm the smaller Ukrainian force, but reports suggest that the average Ukrainian soldier has undergone more rigorous training than the average Russian fighting to advance Putin’s wicked cause. As the conflict rages on, democratic partners can aid the Ukrainian cause by providing tactical assessments and training exercises to maintain a heightened degree of readiness.

Seventh, Sun Tzu asks what might be his most important question, “In which army is their greater consistency in both rewards and punishment?” Yet again, we are being asked to consider the military motivation of both armies. 

More than that, we are being asked to evaluate how the stakes presented by the conflict will inspire the fighting that takes place on the ground. The stakes for the Ukrainian people could not be more clear- they are fighting for the future of their homeland as a free, independent, and democratic nation. As the fighting continues, their fighting will be inspired by the destruction of their homes and their desire to avenge loved ones who were killed or wounded in this senseless conflict. Both reward and punishment are crystal clear for Ukrain’s resistance. Individual Russians on the front lines are fighting for something somewhat less clear. Many are being told that they are fighting a “denazification” campaign, though that justification falls apart upon meeting with any honest intellectual resistance. Beyond that, individual Russians are fighting and dying for the deranged ambitions of a tyrant who has led their nation to economic ruin and global disrepute. 

On the basis of Sun Tzu’s Seven Searching Questions, the Ukrainians have three clear advantages- a “sovereign imbued with moral law”, “the advantages of heaven and earth”, and “greater consistency in both rewards and punishments”. Putin’s invading force has one clear advantage- its superior size. 

The remaining three matters – good generalship, discipline, and training all remain to be seen. However, in each instance Ukraine’s democratic partners can support the Ukrainian effort without a direct military intervention- through intelligence, international support, and armed assistance respectively. If the world’s democracies can turn these “toss-ups” into Ukraine’s favor, The Art of War may provide a pathway for Ukraine’s valiant defenders to win the day over Putin’s imperialistic ambition.

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

U.S. Policy Options in Japan Regarding a Rising China

mar, 01/03/2022 - 20:12

 

ZHUHAI, CHINA NOVEMBER 18, 2019: Fishing vessels in the South China Sea. Artyom Ivanov/TASS (Photo by Artyom IvanovTASS via Getty Images)

      China rapidly grew into the world’s second largest economy after opening its doors in 1978. The emerging power’s economic success allows it to continually improve its conventional and nuclear capabilities. A rising China poses a threat to U.S. allies in East Asia, most notably Japan. Japan falls under the umbrella of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence – if China acts against Japan, the United States will be obligated to respond. Japan’s alliance with the United States remains its main defense. The Trump administration weakened the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Japan, both in the eyes of the Chinese and the Japanese. As such, the current U.S. administration must reconsider its policy options to negate a rising China. Biden should consider three policy options: encourage Japan to develop nuclear weapons, increase U.S. conventional forces in defense of Japan, or adopt a grand strategy of neo-isolationism. I ultimately recommend that Biden reinforces the U.S. conventional commitment to Japan, while emphasizing the defensive nature of that commitment.

        The development of a Japanese nuclear arsenal would create an effective deterrent against China. A nuclear threat must be credible in order for deterrence to work. The previous administration’s behavior towards U.S. allies weakened the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence to Japan. Trump’s administration pulled out of multiple agreements, including the Paris Climate Agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. China may feel more empowered against Japan if it believes that the United States will not retaliate. By developing a nuclear arsenal, Japan would be less reliant on the United States. China would see the development of nuclear weapons as a credible threat and be less likely to act aggressively. The United States could continue supporting Japan without shouldering as much of the cost of defense. The development of Japanese nuclear weapons would also benefit U.S. relations with North Korea. In 2017, North Korea tested missiles able to reach mainland United States. Japan is situated approximately 700 miles from North Korea — if a nearby U.S. ally acquires nuclear weapons, it would deter North Korea from acting aggressively towards the United States.

         Encouraging nuclear development in East Asia comes at a great risk for both the United States and the international community. It could create a security dilemma domino effect – if Japan builds up its arsenal in response to insecurity created by China, China and North Korea will become increasingly insecure. These two nuclear states would in turn increase their own nuclear capabilities. Even current non-nuclear states could see the spread of nuclear weapons as a threat – South Korea may consider acquiring nuclear weapons. Encouraging nuclear development in Japan risks creating an arms race across Asia. The creation of more nuclear weapons, whether or not they are intended offensively, would increase the likelihood of nuclear war. The more weapons that circulate in the region, the higher the possibility that someone will use them. 

         Alternatively, the United States could decide to increase the capability of conventional forces dedicated to protecting Japan. This policy route would act within the boundaries of international norms; it does not threaten the use of nuclear weapons. Since the focus will be solely on conventional capabilities, this policy will reinforce the United States’ military commitment to Japan without encouraging proliferation. Additionally, this option greatly reduces the risk of igniting a nuclear arms race. Nuclear states will not be faced with an immediate nuclear threat, and the security dilemma on nuclear level will be much less severe.

         Increasing conventional capabilities does risk creating a security dilemma on a conventional level. The reinforcement of the U.S. conventional commitment to Japan could provoke China, who may decide to respond with conventional warfare. Considering the strength of Chinese forces, a conventional strike could be debilitating for Japan. On top of the economic costs of reinforcing conventional forces, the United States may have to face the human cost of a war with China. Conventional wars have the potential to turn nuclear, especially when nuclear states are involved. Considering both China and the United States possess nuclear weapons, a conventional war involving between the two has an increased probability of escalating.

         The United States could adopt a grand strategy of neo-isolationism, which would prevent U.S. involvement in an East Asian war. Neo-isolationism infers that the United States would step back from its alliances in Europe and Asia. The United States would no longer bear the burden of protecting Japan. It cost the United States nearly $34 billion to keep military forces in Japan from 2016 to 2019, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office. By ending alliances, the United States could reallocate billions of dollars to domestic issues. Because of the size and survivability of U.S. nuclear weapons, the United States would still maintain a sufficient nuclear deterrent against its adversaries.

         A shift to neo-isolationism would critically impact the United States’ reputation. The international community generally dislikes when states withdraw from prior commitments, as exemplified by Trump’s time in office. The United States would lose access to the various benefits of alliances – the economic benefits of trade, additional military aid, and support from the international community. The most significant cost of neo-isolationism is the loss of influence in the international community. Right now, the United States acts as a global hegemon. The respect and economic power held by the United States allows it to impose its influence globally. If the United States resigns from its commitments, it would have a harder time influencing other states to act within its interests. The United States would thus resort to military power to exert influence, which would be costly and inconvenient.

         The damage done to U.S. alliances by the Trump administration begs the question – how will the Biden administration address this issue? Will it continue down a treacherous road towards isolationism, or will it re-emphasize its commitments? In his first year of presidency, Biden has sent mixed messages. He rejoined the Paris Climate Accords and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but he withdrew forces from a 20-year commitment in Afghanistan.  Biden’s alliances in East Asia will deeply impact how China behaves throughout the rest of this administration. As such, Biden’s administration should consider the second policy option. Reinforcing the U.S. conventional commitment to Japan will emphasize the United States’ dedication to its alliances without risking nuclear proliferation. Biden should simultaneously emphasize the defensive nature of this commitment to avoid exacerbating the security dilemma in Asia.

Why Americans must say NEVER AGAIN

lun, 28/02/2022 - 18:06

Americans must never for Khojaly, Rwanda, Bosnia and other genocides and crimes against humanity.    

On February 26, Azerbaijanis around the world remember the 613 innocent Azerbaijani men, women and children who were slaughtered in Khojaly for the crime of being Azerbaijani.  Rabbi Israel Barouk wrote in Khojaly: A Crime against Humanity, “Of those who perished, 56 people were killed with particular cruelty: burning alive, scalping, beheading, gouging out of the eyes and the bayoneting of pregnant women in the abdomen.”  He noted that an additional 1,275 people were taken hostage.  Many of those who were held hostage were raped and tortured in the cruelest manner.

Many Americans may wonder, why should they care about what happened in Khojaly?  After all, Azerbaijan is very far away from America and it happened in the 1990’s.  However, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., one of the greatest leaders of the American Civil Rights Movement, once stated, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.   We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny.   Whatever affects one directly affects us all indirectly.”  

This means that if there is no justice for the Azerbaijani victims, then there will be no justice for us either, as injustice knows no national borders.  For today, it could be innocent Azerbaijani civilians.  Tomorrow it could be another nation and then the following day, it could be my people. 

Then UN Secretary General Jan Eliason stated in 2015, “It is important that we examine why we continue to fail to prevent mass atrocities, despite lessons learned, despite knowledge of causes and drivers and despite our assurances of never again.  Genocide can only happen when we ignore the warning signs and are unwilling to take action.”  

As then Israeli President Reuven Rivlin stated at the UN General Assembly that same year, “On this day we must ask ourselves honestly, is our struggle, the struggle of this Assembly, against genocide, effective enough? Was it effective enough then in Bosnia? Was it effective in preventing the killing in Khojaly? Of Afghans by the Taliban? Is it effective enough today in Syria? Or in the face of the atrocities of Boko Haram in Nigeria? Are we shedding too many tears, and taking too little action?”

He concluded, “I am afraid that the United Nations “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” has remained a merely symbolic document. It did not succeed in realizing its commitment and fulfilling the objective that underpins the establishment of the United Nations Organization.”

Furthermore, if we continue to turn a blind eye to mass atrocities across the world, whether in Khojaly, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Syria, or some other place, then tomorrow a genocide could take place in America too, as ADL head Jonathan Greenblatt already warned it could happen in his recent book titled “It could happen here.”

According to Greenblatt, “None of us want to believe that America could end up like Germany in the 1930’s. As the American author Sincair Lewis ironically titled his 1935 novel—published before the full horror of Hitler became apparent—It can’t happen here. Even today, nobody wants to believe that illiberalism, fascism and violence could unfold on our shores. But I wrote this because we must confront that possibility.”

Greenblatt stressed that genocides become possible “when an underlying social context of hate arises and solidifies over time. From inside that context, hate seems normal and not especially dangerous. Someone shouts a slur at you or spits on you on the street or they refuse to serve you at a restaurant, or they break off a friendship with you. Life might be unpleasant, but it is not intolerable. And then, one day, the unthinkable happens.”

As Greenblatt wrote in his book, “America is a society saturated in hate. The ADL’s own data shows that the United States saw over eleven thousand incidents of extremism or antisemitism in 2019-2020, from coast to coast. Across society, hate is at an all-time high, with numerous groups emerging across the ideological spectrum. Hate groups are also more emboldened than they’ve been in recent memory.”    Thus, what began as ignoring Khojaly, Rwanda and other genocides abroad could lead to the unthinkable happening in America in the future, unless Americans start to care about crimes against humanity and to act against them.   Therefore, as Americans, we have a moral duty to remember what happened in Khojaly, as well as all other instances of genocide and crimes against humanity.  

Why Compromise in the Donbas Is Unhelpful || GLOBAL POLICY JOURNAL

mar, 22/02/2022 - 16:27
Seemingly sensible proposals to Kyiv to partially satisfy Moscow’s demands in Eastern Ukraine are counterproductive. They ignore the record of compromising with Russian revanchism, and underestimate the unexplored potential of serious sanctions. They also do not take into account the political mood that has emerged in Ukraine since the start of the war in 2014.

In recent months, a popular idea to lower tensions between Russia and the West has, among some experts, become to ask Kyiv to seek compromise with Moscow. In the seeming absence of better options, Ukraine should succumb to permanent unofficial Kremlin control of the Donets Basin (Donbas) currently occupied by Russia. This would satisfy Moscow for now and be in the Ukrainians’ own best interest.

Indeed, Ukraine’s hopes for Western direct military assistance, NATO and EU membership, or a US mutual aid pact are unrealistic. Thus, reaching a compromise with Russia may be Ukraine’s currently “best bad” option, and might appear as useful to be pursued by the West. Yet, such a compromise is, for three reasons, only on the surface a suitable instrument to lower tensions in Eastern Europe.

First, compromising with post-Soviet Russia’s disregard for the sovereignty and integrity of other successor states of the USSR is neither a new nor a successful strategy. The most telling – because it’s the longest – story is that of Moldova. In 1992, Russia intervened militarily in an inner-Moldovan conflict. Ever since, a Moscow-supported pseudo-state in Transnistria, and Russian regular troop detachment, stationed without consent from Chisinau, have been undermining Moldovan sovereignty. A similar story has been ongoing in Georgia since 2008, if not before. Russia has not been sanctioned for its destructions of the Moldovan or Georgian states, and has thereby been encouraged to continue.

When Russia started its military aggression against Ukraine in late February 2014, the West initially also refrained from any substantial material action. It instead encouraged Kyiv to not deploy its troops in Southern Ukraine to defend Crimea. The minor Western sanctions imposed after the peninsula’s annexation were too little too late.

The result of the West’s restrained behaviour was neither a resolution of the Crimea issue nor an achievement of peace. In March 2014, Moscow launched a broad hybrid attack on mainland Ukraine involving various Russian state agencies, paramilitary groups, proxy organizations, and regular troops. Alongside thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians, over 200 hundred EU citizens on flight MH17 became victims of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The looming new escalation between the two countries suggests a need to urgently ease tensions. Some think that this can be only achieved via Western pressure on Ukraine to agree to Russia’s interpretation of the Minsk Agreements on Donbas. The resulting concessions by Kyiv might temporarily satisfy Moscow, and buy some time for Ukraine. Yet, such an appeasement would have grave collateral effects, and may have repercussions.

An ad hoc Russian political triumph in the Donbas would be a merely partial, or even elusive success for the Kremlin. Obtaining permanent control over the Eastern Donets Basin has an only instrumental purpose. It does not play – like the annexation of Crimea – an essential role by itself for the Kremlin. Moscow does not need the Donbas as such but sees it as a mean to destabilize and influence Ukraine. A Western compromise on the Donbas would not satisfy Moscow’s original wish to turn Ukraine as a whole into something approximating the “people’s republics” in the eastern part of the country. 

Ukrainian concessions on the Donbas would not meet the Kremlin’s larger demand to fundamentally renegotiate the European security order. Moscow’s plans for Ukraine are the most important, but not only expressions of the Kremlin’s desire that the West recognizes a Russian special sphere of interest. Worse, it would demonstrate to Moscow three older inferences. (A) Military posture or/and escalation works. (B) Ukraine’s independence remains incomplete. (C) The West can be made to function as an accomplice to Russian attempts to subvert the integrity of post-Soviet states.

A second defect in Western debates on how to deal best with Russia is an underestimation of the social impact of economic measures. This is a serious Western instrument to contain Russia without employing military means. Some, however, suppose that such sanctions will not be imposed, others that they may not help to sufficient degree. This assumption is fundamental to the conclusion that Western pressure on Kyiv is the only way out of the current quagmire.

One cannot know for certain, in advance, the effects of substantive individual and sectoral sanctions on the Russian political leadership and system. Yet, there are indications that restrictive economic measures may be more effective regarding Russia than in relation to, say, North Korea or Iran. The current Western sanctions imposed on Russia are, despite much European fanfare, limited. Many of the measures target individuals and a number of companies. Most sanctions do not directly hit the Russian economy as a whole. The somewhat more significant general restrictions imposed by the EU in the summer of 2014 are not properly sectoral, but rather sub-sectoral. They only concern the EU’s sale of certain narrowly defined high technologies and financial services to Russia.

Assuming a significant impact of serious Western sanctions on Russia’s economy and, in extension, its behaviour is plausible in view of what we already know today. It can be extrapolated from some well-researched consequences of the existing individual and sub-sectoral measures that have been in place since 2014. Two detailed studies published in 2021, by Erik Andermo and Martin Kragh in the journal Post-Soviet Affairs as well as by Anders Aslund and Maria Snegovaya in a report for the Atlantic Council, have demonstrated considerable negative indirect repercussions for Russian economic growth of the limited Western sanctions that have been in place during the last seven years. While these minor measures have not led to a Russian economic decline, they have prevented a likely higher economic growth since 2014. These studies indicate that Russians would have had billions of dollars more income without the rather modest sanctions adopted seven-and-a-half years ago.

The seemingly considerable potential of unused Western sanctions should be seen in connection to two other recent empirical studies by Maria Snegovaya, a Russian political economist living in Washington, DC. Snegovaya has demonstrated a correlation of Russian expansionist sentiments with the income from energy exports, as well as the country’s related general socio-economic situation. The aggressiveness of Russian presidents’ foreign policy rhetoric is positively related to the level of oil prices and export revenues. Moreover, Russia’s population’s mood is more enterprising in foreign affairs in times of good socioeconomic development. While these studies do not address the issue of sanctions, they indicate that economic performance and their social effects are important issues for the foreign political thinking of both, the elite and population of Russia.

A third miscalculation in many Western deliberations about Ukraine concerns the domestic repercussions of further Ukrainian compromises on its political sovereignty and territorial integrity. To be sure, a joint Western insistence that Kyiv consents to an implementation of the Minsk Agreements leaving the occupied Donbas territories under informal Moscow tutelage is possible. Yet, the larger challenge for Kyiv and the West would be how to make Ukrainian society and especially those parts of it that have been involved in the more than seven-year war effort settle with such a solution.

There are today numerous Ukrainians who have contributed and sacrificed a lot for the defence of the fatherland. Millions have invested their money, time, nerves, energy, and health while thousands have lost their beloved in the war. Many Ukrainians would thus hardly agree to a fishy peace deal with Russia. In fact, a significant part of Ukrainian society is already today unhappy about what they perceive as Kyiv’s not hawkish enough stance vis-à-vis Russia and the two so-called “people’s republics,” in the East.

Historical experience suggests that a dubious compromise between Kyiv and Moscow could not only lead to Ukrainian riots. In the worst case, protests against concessions towards Russia could turn into a, now, real and not, like hitherto, pseudo-civil war in Ukraine. In summer 2015, then President Petro Poroshenko, hardly a dove, started, under Western pressure, a process to change Ukraine’s Constitution allowing for a special status of the occupied East Ukrainian territories. This led to disturbances in front of Ukraine’s parliament leaving several people dead and dozens injured.

Since then, the aversion against any Ukrainian allowances in the war with Russia has grown rather than declined. One suspects, moreover, that the enormous domestic risks from a fundamental Ukrainian policy change regarding the Donbass war are fully understood in the Kremlin. Perhaps, an escalation of inner-Ukrainian tensions has been a major or even the major purpose of the entire Russian enterprise, in the first place.

The stark choice facing the Ukrainian leadership is even bleaker than many in the West might recognize. The alternative is not only and not so much between a self-sacrificing war, on the one side, and denigrating peace-deal with Russia, on the other. Instead, Kyiv’s possible partial satisfaction of Moscow’s appetite entails secondary domestic and foreign dangers that could turn out to be, in their sum, larger than the hazards of a new armed escalation today.

Why Compromise in the Donbas Is Unhelpful | Global Policy Journal

Past Absolute Corruption

lun, 21/02/2022 - 16:08

It was always interesting speaking with those who escaped tyranny when I began my studies. My intention was not to educate myself on the nature of those regimes nor even challenge those ideas in my youth, but to understand the effect on individuals who survived the physical and mental struggle of a failed society. I was told that in my country, everyone believed everything they were told by the Government, where as in her country of Czechoslovakia, no one trusted anything they Government ever said. This view of the world is meant to not only keep one’s life from becoming suspect to the tyranny of their Government, but also to maintain one’s own sanity in a place that was a physical and mental prison, designed to enshrine corruption above and beyond a person’s natural rights.

While literature classes in an English speaking atmosphere often encourages students to follow novels based on British traditions and society, it was more useful to me to study places similar to where my family originated from. With a diverse background also came a diversity of places that were subject to different types of tyranny. While these places differed greatly, tyranny often crushes one’s humanity in a similar fashion. The works of Czech author Milan Kundera was notable, as a person who wrote about life under Communism post the Prague Spring. As described by my colleague at the time, their society was one where people only communicated in whispers, and were weary of neighbours, friends and family as the secret police loomed over every action of every citizens. The beginning of tyranny was as interesting as its end, with Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago showing how the makers and helpers of society will always be turned into criminals by a One Party State, and with the Polish filmmakers Kieslowski’s film Blanc/White showing an emergence from a gray and dead Communist Poland at the end of the Cold War, with the spirit of Solidarnosc giving light to freedom of the country and the individual.

I found out once studying comparative policy between the EU and Latin America that Milan Kundera was popular as well in the South America. While not under Communism, many countries in Latin America also suffered from military dictatorships well into the late 80s and beyond. Despite there being little in common between Czech and Latin American culture on the surface, the isolation and torment of living under a dictatorship in Latin America in those years can be clearly understood by those living under Communism in places like Prague in 1968, Budapest in 1956, Warsaw and Gdansk in the early 80s and East Berlin in the late 80s.

Lessons from this era of tyranny is not lost in modern times. Some tenants of free thinkers are sacrosanct, and movements like Solidarnosc in Poland has proven that persistent, peaceful and coordinated protest movements can heal a society. Latin American academic Guillermo O’Donnell studied the transition of military dictatorships into democratic nations during his studies, and he showed that there are different aspects of democracies that need to all function in order to produce a healthy and free society. Institutions and grassroots movements need to be married to clear and unwavering property rights and an open society built on free speech. The basic rules of laws should never be suspended, as those with unchecked power will corrupt them without fail. A free media should in a manner be part of the checks and balances on a society, as when a media is controlled or works for the Government, they tend to decay the checks and balances instead of functioning to challenge those in power to ensure a free society.

Democracies work in order to create methods and guarantee rights so that citizens never have to live in silence. If a society is crumbling, a Government will promote individuals operating on a level of subsistence just to maintain their food, shelter and basic needs so opposing views remain powerless. The checks and balances function to relieve pressures in society so that citizens can be confident that a small, elite group cannot choose to extinguish their rights, their property and their lives. Without these values to release pressures and tensions in a democracy, a country will vacillate violently between oligopolies, kleptocracies, military dictatorships, and one party states. Democracy is not just about voting ever few years, its about being able to be a human and have a free voice in a multidimensional and institutionally healthy community.

No podium for human rights violations

ven, 18/02/2022 - 16:12

Sports and politics have long been intertwined- historical figures like Jackie Robinson, Muhammad Ali, Arthur Ash, and Billie Jean King have played a huge role in advancing the cause of human rights both in the United States and around the world. Modern figures like Colin Kapernick, Megan Rapinoe, Enes Kanter Freedom, and many many others have continued to enhance the legacy of politically motivated athletes.

In past years, these efforts have continued at the Olympics. Athletes like Jesse Owens, Tommie Smith and John Carlos, and Fumino Sugiyama have used the platform they earned through sport as an opportunity to push back against repression. To the extent that these demonstrations were controversial in their time, history has vindicated (and will continue to vindicate) the actions taken by these politically minded athletes.

However, as we approach the end of these 2022 Olympic games, examples of athlete activism have, unfortunately, been few and far between- there are a number of reasons for this. 

The most obvious of these is the direct repression that the non-democratic Chinese regime enforces on Chinese nationals and international visitors alike. Most of you taking the time to read this article will already know that the government in Beijing has a long legacy of violating human rights and weaponizing the state against racial and religious minorities living in China.This threat was made even more clearly by the very public crackdown on domestic dissent that took place in the weeks leading up to the games.

However, not all examples of repression come from expected sources…Perhaps the most surprising of these examples comes directly from the International Olympic Committee. The IOC continues to enforce the infamous Rule 50, which bars athletes from participating in political demonstrations while in Olympic venues or other areas. This rule was put in place in the aftermath of the courageous demonstration carried out by Tommie Smith and John Carlos in 1968, and it remains as chilling and regressive today as it was when it was implemented to curb those demonstrations against racism.

Additionally, representatives from the United States and other liberal democracies have advised athletes against making political statements. Perhaps the most shameful of these statements comes from Rep. Nancy Pelossi who suggested that athletes, “(should) not risk incurring the anger of the Chinese government”, citing concerns about, “what the Chinese government might do to (American Olympian’s) reputation and families.”Cowardly statements such as these give credibility to the fundamentally un-American idea that any government can restrict fundamental human rights like the freedom of speech and religion through the threat of force.

Even worse, some Olympians have had their own “liberal” governments bar them from making statements regarding the human rights abuses that the Chinese government inflicts on its people by, functionally, issuing handlers to monitor statements made by their athletes. This precise thing took place when skiers from New Zealand were prevented from responding to a potentially political question when they were interrupted by a handler assigned to them by New Zealand and the IOC.

While there have been broad diplomatic boycotts of the games, these efforts have done little to increase public awareness regarding China’s human rights abuses- much less apply the sort of pressure that might actually lead to change. Further opportunities to increase public awareness about the severity of China’s human rights abuses have been wasted as a consequence of NBC’s unwillingness to highlight China’s continued violations of human rights while broadcasting the Games.

With all of this being said- to the extent that hosting the Olympic games is a sign of international prestige, it should also come with the responsibility to uphold global norms surrounding respect for human rights and individual autonomy. Without coupling the opportunity to host the Games with increased public scrutiny, the Olympics risk becoming an opportunity for repressive regimes to flex their muscles without fear of being shamed for their illiberal policies.

Sadly, it goes without saying that the current regime in China is no champion of either human rights or individual autonomy. Despite this, the authorities that promote, broadcast, and organize the Games have largely remained silent- this lack of active criticism is tantamount to a tacit endorsement of Beijing’s countless human rights violations.

The goal here is not to criticize the athletes who have not spoken out- it is reasonable that those individuals may not want to risk the wrath of a fundamentally illiberal regime. More than that, it is reasonable that these athletes may choose to dedicate their full attention to their crafts without concerning themselves with politics.

Insted, we should look critically at the public statements (or lack thereof as the case may be) made by the Olympic committee, mainstream media, leaders in the United States and in other democracies that have suggested that athletes would be better off staying quiet than they would be speaking out. Bestowing prestige on a bad actor by giving them the Olympic platform and then participating in the coverup is shameful and violates the most basic mission of the Olympic Games- “to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.”

 

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association.

Soviets at the Table

mer, 09/02/2022 - 16:47

Sergei Supinsky / AFP / Getty

 

What is intriguing about the latest military conflict between Russia and Ukraine is how similar both countries are culturally and politically. While many ethnic Russians live in Ukraine, and a fair number of Ukrainians live and work in Russia, their cultural, historical, linguistic and family ties are quite deep. As one of the largest and most influential members of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine made up a good portion of the population and territory of the European part of the former Soviet Union. Beyond having mainstay Russian military capabilities like Antonov being based in the Ukraine and until recently, the Soviet/Russian Fleet in Sevastopol as part of the territory of Ukraine SSR, many mixed families are fairly common. Discussions around the dinner table is likely very intriguing on the current political situation in the past few weeks.

There are many military focused websites putting out their predictions on the result of a possible hot war between Russia and Ukraine. The motivation for theories on these scenarios is likely spurned on by Western media promoting the idea that war is inevitable between the two countries. While I disagree with the inevitability of many of their conclusions, the tactical analysis given is likely true, that the Russian Armed Forces would defeat Ukraine’s Armed Forces in battle.

My impression of the capabilities of each force is that while countries like China in 2008, and Russia have invested more recently in many new weapons systems, Ukraine and the rest of the world have mostly relied on updating late Cold War technologies for conflicts that will never match a Cold War scenario. With the exception of US stealth technology and mostly Russian technological antidotes to stealth and drones via anti-aircraft systems, Ukraine is fielding some of the best late Cold War equipment against Russia’s post-2014 weapons systems. The late Soviet Army was likely the most effective it had ever been in the late 1980s, a concern for any invading army going against a force designed as the best defense force in the world, at least when Billy Joel was at the top of the charts.

Ukraine’s 1980s era tank divisions can more or less be described as the technological parents of Russia’s current systems. The T-64 tank that makes up much of Ukraine’s tank divisions was a model that was considered more expensive and more capable than the T-72 tanks, and were reserved for service within the Soviet Union almost exclusively. While the T-80s that came from the T-64 is possessed by both sides, Russia has more of them as well as the more modern T-72 variant, the T-90, with more modern defensive systems along the T-14 Armata modern battle tank. New technology may prove to keep Russian Forces protected, if it works as it should on the field of battle. NATO
Javelin missiles and Ukrainian Forces will certainly cause notable damage.

While stealth technology is possessed by Russia, much of the makeup of the military structure of the former Soviet Union was to defend against attacks from the West. Trauma from the Second World War created a ethos of integrated missile defence during the Cold War, and while the Soviets were not talented in making Bluejeans, they did and still lead the world on the creation of anti-aircraft radar systems and missiles. Ukraine, while likely being in a weaker position, is still one of the most capable armies in the world and do have possession of many advanced missile systems ranging from the TOR, BUK and S-300 missiles that are a major threat to many modern Russian aircraft. With NATO assistance, Ukraine may have been given some radar technology that can burn through stealth technology in close proximity to ground radars based on the battlefield in Ukraine. Computer systems that can manage a larger number of targets in the event Russia swarms them with drones and cruise missiles may also been distributed to them by NATO allies.

The conflict in Ukraine is really one of posturing against weak opposition to place Russia in a better defensive position physically and politically against the West after the disastrous pullout of Afghanistan and what is likely seen as a weak US and EU. Exporting fuel from North America would likely cause the most distress for Russia, reengage Germany and France in the defense of Ukraine, and put Russia into a more modest position while sorting out some inflationary issues at home. Unfortunately, Western leaders would prefer to choose short term strategies to win small victories in their local elections and play Olympics in places that disrespect human rights instead of uniting their people against real threats of war. It is likely not wise to increase inflationary pressures on food and fuel, while alienating those who feed and heat the local population while asking them to possibly donate their sons and daughters to a future war on the frozen plains of Ukraine. It will be no surprise that the adult youth in your town would rather be working to reduce inflationary pressures with much needed, community inspiring employment. What Ukrainians and Russians do know is that propaganda does not put food on the table, and that Western leaders have not figured that out yet. Plus ca change, unfortunately…

The Collective Loss to United Extremism

dim, 23/01/2022 - 22:36

There have been some welcomed comparisons published over the last few weeks focusing on elections and the possible political future of countries and regions as a whole. While some regions can be considered too diverse to compare properly to each other, Europe and Latin America share some political, cultural and structural similarities, albeit applied in very different ways over time. Despite this, various countries and their citizens make political calculations based on their own experiences, ones that differ greatly between regions and countries in those blocs.

It is difficult to compare different Latin American countries on why they vote for a left/right President, as it is to compare Europe to all of Latin America. While many of the political campaigns in Europe focus on their refugee policies, there is a notable refugee crisis in Latin America. Millions of Venezuelans escaping left wing Chavista policies have been accepted into other countries in the region and the United States. It is very apparent in the region, and blunts a lot of support for the more extreme policies of the left.

In Mexico this is apparent, as while they have a left wing President, he still works to support economic measures for his nation for the benefit of all of Mexico’s industrial sectors. Policy conflicts with the new USMCA agreement shows that Mexico has been more assertive than Canada in defending their national interests, and was pragmatic in getting a trade deal even though Canada wanted them to gamble some economic sectors to demonstrate a united front against the US. While Mexico has been assertive in defending their rights under the USMCA, Canada who is now getting locked out of many traditional economic areas that were sacrosanct since the 1960s era Auto Pact. In many cases, Canada often enters the disputes after Mexico commits to a strong response. Coming from the nation that on occasion still prides itself on the policies of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, Mexico is rightly focused on helping diverse sectors of its economy.

As France goes, so does much of Europe. With elections coming soon for French voters, the world is certainly watching. Polling is currently showing France giving a lot of support to the right of Macron, but as in the last election this likely will not give Macron a loss unless he agitates his citizens and destroys his centrist position. Centrists must not give way to more extreme policies from either wing of the electorate, the ending result is that citizens will vote for perceived stability, as occurred in Brazil.

Also approaching an election, Brazil’s electorate may not have forgotten the corruption that personally affected most citizens surrounding international sporting events before the last election. With the current inflationary pressures and an electoral response to past political corruption against all establishment parties, the result will be of great interest. Noting that traditional parties seem to only have ex-President Lula da Silva of the early 2000s era as an option, recent memories of corruption may unbalance the view of Lula’s Presidency from the earlier era. While his past stance of campaigning from the left and governing from the centre may help, it might backfire unless he can be seen as repairing the complex problems that came from the pre-Car Wash Scandal era.

The reality is that stability eventually becomes the issue of the day, and citizens often pull away from establishment candidates by electing other establishment politicians that will likely get counterbalanced by interests in their countries. Separate from corruption and economic tragedies, most functional systems are naturally pushed to the policy centre by the electorate. For the most part this has been the case in Mexico. The healthier alternative is often to run a country from the centre left or centre right with some varied policies to ensure resulting stability. Corruption and economic collapse in Latin America may have the army try and act as a power broker, or in the case of Europe, have the Russian Army perform a similar task. Corrupt governments end up in a spiral of loss and chaos as they switch between corruption of the left, then corruption of the right, then back again, never truly addressing poverty or injustice.

What can be certain is that no one will benefit from extreme policies by any Government. The reality is that extremists feed off each other to the detriment of noble citizens. In Latin America, no one wants a left wing Venezuela situation as now everyone has neighbours telling them in person what they experienced in one of the most naturally wealthy countries in the world. Extreme type policies in Europe would ensure a far right/left victory. Extremist policies always illicit a reaction and produces totalitarianism. An “other” is always needed, is intentional and is the method of governing by selective oppression. Extremists feed off each other, and it is not unique to Europe, Latin America or any other nation.

 

Taiwan and Ukraine: Beyond ‘Great Power Competition’

ven, 21/01/2022 - 22:36

They Really Don’t Know What We Want.  Do We?

 

At the outset of 2022, Russia has troops massed on the Ukraine border and China has heightened aerial testing of Taiwan’s defenses. While Russia and China may be coordinating their challenges, each has its own interest in reducing U.S. influence. China claims Taiwan and Russia aims to exclude the West from Ukraine. America, or its rules-based order, impede the interests and threaten the legitimacy of both. U.S. policy engages them in “great power competition,” but with too little thinking about what are we competing over.  As one for instance, do we value Taiwan as a free country or as a cog “in the defence of vital US interests”? If we do not give a coherent answer we let others interpret our goals for their purposes. If we ourselves do not know, we will keep “moving the goalposts” of our objectives as we did in Afghanistan. We will name incoherent priorities and pursue none fully, in a dissipation we cannot afford. No one will have reason to believe any intentions, much less values, we profess. Adversaries will use that mistrust to weaken our partnerships, rules-based order, and democracy.

America has a clear story to tell. Our nation conceived itself in a creed of rights, equal and unalienable to all persons, and of government to secure them by consent of the governed. In this self-conception, the creed defines our nationality. Betrayal, even by inattention, threatens this base of national legitimacy. Many U.S. interests are at stake in relations with China, Russia, and anyone else. Any nation must secure its tangible needs. But America must keep faith with our creed. Today our mounting self-doubts call us to reaffirm that existential base. Crises like Ukraine and Taiwan challenge our geopolitical position, but also offer a chance for reaffirmation. To conduct ourselves coherently across diverse and confusing issues, to answer the question of what we compete for, we need clarity in why we do what we do. With clarity, specific policies will fit together better than in serial reactions to today’s smorgasbord of challenges. If we orient policy by our founding tenets, we display consistent motives globally, set our international relations on our terms, and exhibit our core convictions to the world – and ourselves.

Parsing the Taiwan and Ukraine crises in light of our creed will illustrate how it could guide policy. Two step thinking is needed, one to stabilize the crises, the next to re-cast our relationships by the new theme. Actual dialogue will mix and mingle the two steps. Events, like an actual attack on Taiwan or Ukraine, could disrupt step two. Regardless of any outcomes, America can reaffirm our core purposes amid the crisis. If that potential fades, this speculation for a long term policy approach offers an image of opportunity for future reference.

Starting with Taiwan, Americans should understand that Taiwan is a free country as we understand the term, not some authoritarian regime with an electoral veneer. Like only a few dozen other countries it has repeatedly transferred power freely and without disruption, between parties of very different outlooks. In its entrenched democratic governance it supports not only elections and prosperity, but a society where individuals have great choice in how to live their lives. It grapples with the same issues, from food adulteration to language and gender diversity, as other advanced democracies. Taiwan displays as full a picture of freedom as any country in the world.  

Formally, U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s autonomy cites an old agreement with the PRC. Even we do not recognize Taiwan as an independent country, and though the agreement with the PRC remains in place, the idea of sovereignty gives China a claim to dominion. Also, our commitment to Taiwan originally supported a dictatorship, and we could squelch a PRC attack easily. Today, that geopolitical stance is outmoded and the PRC has developed a major military capacity. But Taiwan has developed in freedom, so America’s commitment to freedom is now on the line alongside Taiwanese autonomy.

Some policy discourse points this way. A Brookings paper of November 2021 rejects PRC faulting of the U.S. for “’creating Issues around’ China’s policies toward Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan.” The rejection reflects America’s creedal core: “these issues touch American values at the heart of its national identity …” Defense Secretary Austin has also echoed strategist Michael O’Hanlon’s concept of “integrated deterrence,” targeting other PRC interests to discourage attack. This effectively elevates Taiwan as a U.S. priority, as China would respond by targeting wider U.S. interests. And even if we cannot win a war, the U.S. should make clear, as O’Hanlon suggested in an autumn panel discussion, that an attack will mean that U.S. – PRC relations “would never be the same.” We should assume the costs, including to our shared interests with China – and in our stretching of the sovereignty principle. Fidelity to our founding tenets demands this full, first, commitment to Taiwan’s freedom.

AEI’s Giselle Donnelly notes an ideological flavor to Sino-American relations, which a creed-based commitment to Taiwan will evoke. But the Cold War’s ideological conflict does not apply, at least not yet. Containment was waged against “an ’irreconcilable’ competitor presenting a ‘mortal’ challenge.” A zero-sum confrontation can spur one of the rivals’ demise, as happened to the USSR. Adopting that stance before explicitly finding China’s ideology irreconcilable and its challenge mortal will co-opt our core interest to the goal of defeating China.

How do we avoid weaponizing our soul on one hand, or appeasing a mortal threat on the other? The Brookings paper offers a start for a next step in relations with the PRC, calling for “calibrated, monitored collaboration” on our shared interests. If the U.S. names our creed as core national interest, we can calibrate relationships to that standard. Assuming a well-designed rubric, America might assess PRC compatibility with our core interest at (say) “2 out of 10;” and “3 out of 10” before their clampdown in Hong Kong, repression in Xinjiang, and increased social surveillance. The two “points” acknowledge the Chinese people’s rising welfare and the CCP’s public-institutional, rather than clan-based, rule. (North Korea would stand at zero.) Calibrated assessments carry our founding tenets yet respect China’s discretion to choose closer or cooler relations. Assessment should not be used as a rhetorical weapon – we could rate our own conduct on this scale too. Rather, the mechanism would set our long term stance in terms of our creed. If the CCP wishes to reduce tensions, it has clear markers of America’s priorities. If it chooses further divergence, free nations stand alerted. The idea that relations would ‘never be the same’ if China attacks Taiwan becomes more explicit.

Thus we can imagine ways, building on serious thinking, to orient policy by our creed.   But invoking our core national interest only over Taiwan would co-opt America’s identity to the purpose of opposing China. U.S. policies must carry our tenets globally. How should we address the Ukraine crisis?

Ukraine is an independent nation, recognized by Russia despite Russian-installed rule over their territory. Ukraine is also freer than Russia, and freedom doesn’t grow when sovereignty is threatened. That said, the U.S. did not contest Soviet invasions of Hungary or Czechoslovakia. Further, while Ukraine is growing in its democracy it does not exemplify our creedal values as Taiwan does. Freedom House rates Ukraine at 60 out of 100 in overall freedom and rights, where Taiwan rates a 94. Russia is rated at 20, well below Ukraine, but still retains electoral forms and Vladimir Putin enjoys some popular support, while Ukraine still suffers from corruption. It is more to the point that Russia’s aggressiveness poses a wider danger to European security, including that of deeply rooted democracies and others developing toward greater freedom. We must oppose Russian threats to Ukraine but our deepest reason is to protect freedom where it holds sway and support its growth in places like Ukraine. Rules of sovereignty and non-aggression serve this end, and we defend those as much as we defend Ukraine itself.

Russia also cites international rules, for its own reasons. As it took over Crimea and eastern Donbas Putin claimed that Ukraine posed a threat. This claim, however contrived, cites NATO expansion, against the historical backdrop of European invasions of Russia. The West can, easily, assure non-aggression against Russia. If we recast anti-Russian sanctions and arms sales to Ukraine as measures to protect international rules, we open a possibility, after Russia drops its threats, of common ground. We could rebase relations on a concept that Russia shares, however our interests in rules. On that new base we could engage Russia for the long term in pragmatic discussion of security, and still protect and nurture freedom. In that engagement we offer – with our allies – what Richard Haass calls “a diplomatic path (including) … a willingness to discuss with Russia the architecture of European security.” On a shared interest in rules, we would trade that voice to Russia for European democracies’ security and Ukraine’s, and others’, space to grow in freedom.

Before any new engagement, though, Putin  “should first put down his gun.” Our first step, underway as of January, must face him down. The second step aims for workable long term relations with Russia – not Putin’s forbearance. The prospect of that second step might nudge him to adopt a new strategy, but no change will be meaningful if negotiated at gunpoint.

Addressing each crisis for its specific impact on our core interest, we value Taiwan for its freedom rather than as a check on China, and open a possibility for clearer relations with China. We oppose Russian designs on Ukraine not over claims for Ukrainian democracy but by rules of non-aggression – which Russia espouses but which also support freedom. These approaches are illustrative speculations. But America’s purpose demands policy orientation around our core interest, keeping freedom’s ethos safe and vibrant, and leaving doors open even for rivals to evolve toward freedom. Full orientation to our creed names the purpose under any pragmatic dealings and gives substance to our abstract founding tenets. Crises, even as ominous as those over Ukraine and Taiwan, offer a reason to examine our policies, and a chance to realize our premises.

On Russia and the crisis on the Ukrainian border

jeu, 20/01/2022 - 22:35

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and U.S President Joe Biden shake hands during their meeting at the ‘Villa la Grange’ in Geneva, Switzerland in Geneva, Switzerland, Wednesday, June 16, 2021. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko, Pool)

The threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine has been building for some time, and if recent reporting is any indication, the conflict appears to be coming to a head. If there is any way to avert fighting- now is the moment to bring ideas to the table.

If we are going to consider potential off-ramps, the first thing we need to consider is what each of the parties involved would need to see realized in order to walk away from the table satisfied. 

As the target of a potential invasion, it is simplest to identify the core Ukrainian interest. Ukrainian President Zelensky should be able to walk away from this potential conflict with his head held high if he can protect Ukrainian territorial integrity while keeping the long term prospect of Ukraine joining NATO on the table. The United States, coupled with partners in NATO, have a similar set of interests- prevent Russia from asserting itself as an imperial power in Eastern Europe and maintain the integrity of NATO in order to rebuff the threat of Russian expansion in the future.

Russia’s interest, especially if we are looking to identify potential off-ramps, is by far the most complicated to identify. Putin has demanded a promise that Ukraine will not be admitted into NATO now, or in the future. More than that, the Russian “President” has threatened that if this guarantee is not made, Russia may move to place nuclear weapons in Cuba or Venezuela- comfortably within striking distance of the United States and in clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The stakes are very high, for the United States, for Ukraine, and for the world as a whole.

The United States is likely to rebuff these demands, and beyond these measures, Putin has not identified other viable alternatives. However, there is one thing we can say with a high degree of confidence- given the very public nature of this armed escalation, Putin cannot afford to walk away from the table empty handed. Without some concession in the direction of Russia’s perceived security, it will be very difficult to avoid a conflict in Ukraine.

Despite these troubling signs, there is still an opportunity to avoid the worst case scenario. More than that, it very well might be in Putin’s interest to find an off-ramp. Given the slow and public build up of tension over the last few months, the Ukrainian military has had ample opportunity to prepare for an invasion. Coupled with direct military aid from the United States and other members of the international community, Putin knows that a conflict in Ukraine would be far from a painless endeavor. 

More than that, there is no avoiding the fact that, regardless of what happens over the next few days or weeks, NATO membership has become more attractive to other nations in Eastern and Northern Europe. Putin should be wary of this fact unless he envisions Russia as totally incapable of winning allies in the region through diplomacy. In a similar way, there are real questions about how willing individual Russians are to participate in a potential conflict, Putin’s preferences put to the side.

When these factors are coupled with the longer-term economic and political consequences that would come in the form of both sanctions and diplomatic distrust, Putin’s attempt to restore Russia to its historical greatness is at odds with alienating itself from the international community through a potential invasion of Ukraine. Personally, I find it unlikely that Russia finds itself better off in the year 2050 if Putin prioritizes small territorial gains over economic development and diplomatic integration. Perhaps Putin sees that truth as well.

Still, the question remains- what might a potential off ramp actually look like? I suggest that we use the Cuban missile crisis and the example set by President Kennedy as a guide. In order to prevent the potential threat of a Soviet backed Cuba possessing nuclear weapons, the administration employed two key tactics. First, similar to President Kennedy’s symbolic show of force by enforcing an embargo around Cuba, it could be argued that the United States has taken similar measures over the last two administrations by providing direct military aid to Ukraine. 

The second tactic, however, is what truly allowed the Kennedy administration to avoid the threat of a nuclear Cuba- namely, the removal of missiles from Turkey. Even though this agreement was carried out in secret, and despite the fact that the missiles based in Turkey were known to be outdated (in fact, the Kennedy administration was rumored to already be considering removing them), Khrushchev was able to save face in front of key domestic power-holders and protect his nation’s security interest.

I believe that a similar measure should be taken today. The United States should work with Russian negotiators to identify existing American or NATO military installations which, in exchange for a promise not to invade Ukraine, could be shut down or de-militarized. Given the strategic flexibility offered by America’s commitment to a nuclear triad, and in light of the gradual end of America’s wars in the Middle East, I am confident that there are a number of NATO military installations that could be shut down without meaningfully diminishing America’s (or NATO’s) ability to act in the region.

Frankly, these efforts may coincide with the closing of some of the NATO bases that were primarily tasked with serving as launch points for NATO missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would mirror the approach used by the Kennedy administration even more closely- removing military equipment that is past its peak usefulness in order to achieve an important diplomatic objective.

Perhaps in order to accommodate Putin’s ego and need to save face domestically, the Biden administration will be asked to make these concessions publicly as opposed to privately. In my opinion, so be it. The American people should be tolerant of that. Given the massive reach of the American military, the United States has an opportunity to present Putin with a functionally “free option” in exchange for sustained peace in Eastern Europe. If the Biden administration can take advantage of this potential off-ramp, or another like it, it would be a huge win both for the administration, for Ukraine, and for the freedom loving world at large.

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

Reshaping Ukraine’s Western Integration

mer, 12/01/2022 - 22:47

There is widespread fear of an escalation of the current Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict into a large and prolonged inter-state war in Europe. This could lead West European governments to agree to Putin’s key demand of reneging on NATO’s future inclusion pledge for Ukraine and Georgia. Should this happen, the West needs to compensate the two countries for the de facto broken 2008 Bucharest NATO summit promise. Ukraine and Georgia as well as Moldova can be provided with official EU membership perspectives and an assurance that Brussels will start accession negotiations once the three republics’ Association Agreements have been implemented.

In his yearly large press conference on 23 December 2021, Vladimir Putin has raised the stakes of Russia’s current confrontation with the West. In barely coded language, the Russian President has announced that Moscow will increase its military posture in Europe, and extend its current covert military invasion of Ukraine: “We must think about the prospects of our own security. We have to keep an eye on what is happening in Ukraine, and on when they might attack.” Putin is threatening Europe with a major war in its east, if Moscow’s demand for “security guarantees” from the West is not met.

This request is as ridiculous as Russia’s alleged worries about a Ukrainian offensive. Russia controls the world’s largest territory, is one of the two supreme nuclear-weapons states, and has one of the three biggest conventional armies. It is thus one of the militarily most secure countries in the world. The Kremlin recently extended Russia’s territory and has the capacity to erase the whole of humanity several times. Yet, Putin and his assistants represent Russia as a beleaguered underdog in fear of deadly assault from outside.

 

Playing Mad

Russian government officials and propaganda outlets are, on a daily basis, hammering into national and world public opinion the message that the Russian state is under an existential threat. Allegedly, NATO’s current cooperation programs and possible further enlargement in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus are posing fundamental risks to the future of the Russian nation. They are nothing less than “a matter of life and death for us,” in the words of the Kremlin’s official spokesman Dmitriy Peskov.

To be sure, few people outside Russia are buying into the Kremlin’s paranoid narratives. It is not the tale about NATO, however, but its deep resentment that the Russian leadership is communicating. Putin is purposefully signaling that he may be losing his mind, could snap, and might press the button if provoked. In 2018, the Russian president said: “An aggressor should know that vengeance is inevitable, that he will be annihilated, and we would be the victims of the aggression. We will go to heaven as martyrs, and they will just drop dead.”

Having had to deal with Russian imperialism for centuries, most East Europeans will see through the calculation behind the Kremlin’s warmongering. The US and UK too may not be impressed by Putin’s arguments. They might instead note the risks emanating from Russia’s continued undermining of the worldwide regime to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Russia is an official nuclear-weapons state, legal successor of the USSR, and, as such, together with the US and UK, a founder of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite far-reaching obligations emerging from this status, Moscow has, since 2014, put the purpose of the NPT on its head. Rather than providing security for non-nuclear weapons states, such as Ukraine, the NPT’s provisions have been transmuted into an advantage of an official nuclear-weapons state. The NPT guarantor Russia has increased its territory at the expense of a country forbidden to acquire atomic arms, under this ratified treaty. Moreover, Ukraine had, in the early 1990s, the world’s third larges nuclear warheads arsenal, but chose to give it not only partially, but fully up, in exchange for US, UK, and Russian security assurances, in the now infamous 1994 Budapest Memorandum, attached to the NPT.   

The fundamental incoherence and blatant contradictions in Russia’s current stand may not impede its psychological effectiveness in Western Europe, however. Among continental European political and intellectual elites, geopolitical naivety about the functioning of international affairs and simplistic pacifism oblivious of the reasons for war and peace are widespread. It is thus likely that various West European publics, above all the German, will eventually succumb to Russia’s shrill demands.

 

The German Predisposition

Germany is neither a nuclear-weapons state, nor a member of the UN Security Council, nor a signatory of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the NPT, nor an exporter of any weapons to Ukraine. The German government has thus little contributed in the past and little to offer in the future to increase Ukrainian hard security. Instead, Berlin has, during NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008 prevented, the start of Georgia’s and Ukraine’s accession to the North-Atlantic alliance.

The opening of the first Russian-German Nord Stream pipeline in 2011-2012 lowered Russian dependence on Ukraine’s gas transportation system. Nord Stream as well as Turk Stream, a new pipeline through the Black Sea that started operation in 2020, have deprived Kyiv of one of its key instruments of leverage vis-à-vis Moscow. The Nord Stream-2 pipeline scheduled to become operational in 2022-2023 would end any Russian future need for Ukrainian gas transportation capacity and fully free Putin’s hands regarding the recalcitrant “brother nation.”

Despite its ambivalent role in Eastern Europe, Germany has taken in the past and may also in the future assume a lead in the EU’s relations with Russia. Traditionally conciliatory German and other continental West European approaches to Russian imperialism could thus again trump more consistent and principled Western approaches towards Moscow. We might soon see a replay of the scandalous Germany- and France-promoted re-admission of the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). This controversial 2019 decision was an embarrassing reversal of the initial position that PACE had taken after the start of Russia’s military attack on Ukraine. The Russian PACE delegation had been banned from the Assembly in 2014, and none of the conditions for Russia’s readmission had been met five years later. Yet the delegation again became a full part of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly in summer 2019.

A similarly awkward West European backtracking could now be in the wings concerning the April 2008 NATO Bucharest summit declaration, in which the North-Atlantic alliance had announced that Ukraine and Georgia “will become” its members. NATO’s enlargement decisions are taken by full consensus meaning that each member country has the possibility to veto the accession of a new state to the alliance. Against the background of their 2019 behavior in the Council of Europe, it is possible that countries like Germany and France will, regarding NATO’s position toward Kyiv and Tbilisi, show now inconsistency similar to that about Russia’s membership in PACE.

Berlin, Paris, Rome, or/and other West European capitals may start sending public signals that Ukraine’s and Georgia’s future accession to NATO is conditional upon Russia’s agreement, or that the Alliance’s 2008 promise to them was not meant seriously, or even that the crucial message of the Bucharest declaration is null and void. Such a signal would cause disappointment throughout Eastern Europe and constitute a blow to the credibility of NATO. Still, such a course of events seems entirely plausible in view of Putin’s manifest determination to keep Ukraine in Russia’s orbit, and against the backdrop of earlier West European dovishness vis-à-vis the Kremlin.

 

The EU as an Alternative to NATO

If it indeed comes to a new self-denigration of the West and its fundamental values, it would be important that Western Europe does, at least, some reputation repair in Europe’s East. Regarding an im- or even explicit reversal of the North-Atlantic alliance’s 2008 entry promise to Ukraine and Georgia, various forms of bi- or multilateral damage control could be imagined. One can consist of a replacement of a serious NATO accession prospect with an official and written EU membership perspective for Ukraine and Georgia. The offer could be extended to Moldova which is also part of these three countries’ so-called Association Trio within the EU’s Eastern Partnership program, and has, like the other two, undesired Russian troops on its territory. An explicit EU membership perspective could especially smoothen Ukraine’s already third betrayal by the West, in the form of the devaluation of the 1994 NPT founders’ Budapest Memorandum, 2008 NATO members’ Bucharest Declaration, and 2014 demonstrative exclusion of Russia from PACE.

The announcement of an official EU membership perspective for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova would not be a big step, in fact. The three countries already possess fully ratified and especially far-reaching EU Association Agreements (AAs). The complicated multi-year implementation of the three AAs de facto constitutes a veiled preparation of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova for accession to the Union. A principal inconsistency of the three Agreements signed in 2014 has always been their lack of a membership prospect. The exceptional depth of the integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, via the AAs, into the EU’s economic and legal space, is in contradiction to the absence of a statement on the eventual aim of the vast approximation program that these three Agreements are meant to bring about.

Moreover, the EU’s unofficial constitution, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, already states, in its Article 49: “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 [respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities] and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.” There can be no doubt that Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova are European countries. Georgia, for instance, has one of the oldest Christian churches in Europe.

An official announcement that the three associated countries have the opportunity to become full members of the EU would thus be little more than explicating an already promulgated general provision. In substance, it would change little in the Union’s future relations with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Sooner or later, the three countries would have – in case they implement their AAs successfully – received official EU membership perspectives, in any way.

Symbolically, however, an official and written confirmation by Brussels of the EU accession prospect for the Association Trio already today would be important. It will constitute an especially appropriate gesture to Ukraine and Georgia once various West European countries start to soften, subvert, or sneak away from, NATO’s 2008 membership promise. A public commitment by the EU could function not only as a psychological compensation, as well as a demonstrative re-affirmation of Western values and solidarity concerning democracy in Europe.

It could also represent an alternative security-political framework for Ukraine and Georgia, as the EU has recently also become an official defense Union. The 2007 EU Treaty’s new Article 42.7 says: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter.”

The EU’s mutual aid guarantee is still a weaker security instrument than Washington Treaty’s Article 5 for NATO, to be sure. The EU does not primarily constitute a military alliance and excludes the US as, since 2016, also the UK as nuclear powers. Brussels prefers to use soft rather than hard power in its foreign affairs. Still, the Union’s considerable economic leverage and conventional military strength as well as France’s nuclear capability mean that the EU is, by no means, a mere paper tiger. Against this background, accession of the Association Trio to the EU would lift the three countries out of the geopolitical grey zone they are currently in.

 

Taking the Wind out of Putin’s Sail

Such a course of events would force Putin into a domestic and international oath of disclosure. The EU is perceived as far less threatening around the world, including in Russia’s population, than NATO (whose alleged aggressiveness is a misperception too). The Union’s enlargement cannot easily be portrayed as an existential military security risk to Russia. This makes the Union’s enlargement less geopolitically significant than NATO’s. It would be more easily justifiable vis-à-vis Russia whose various political and other representatives, before and under Putin, have made numerous and even today make occasionally pro-European statements.

Geopolitical dovishness and fundamentalist pacifism are widespread in Western Europe, including Germany. It is to be expected that the coming months will see a softening, in one way or another, of NATO’s 2008 membership commitment to Ukraine and Georgia. The consistency and coherence of NATO’s and its member states’ public communication have already suffered in the past. While the Bucharest Declaration may remain formally in place, the alliance’s credibility could decline even further in 2022. An EU membership perspective for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova can save the West’s and especially Western Europe’s face.

Such an announcement would pose a complicated conceptual challenge, to the neo-imperialist Russian elite. The Kremlin’s appetite for inclusion of post-Soviet states and especially of Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence would, to be sure, remain in place. In fact, an EU membership perspective for Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine may be seen as more threatening to the powerholders in the Kremlin than NATO’s accession promise. In view of the high popularity of Europe in Russia, it would suggest to ordinary Russians that the future of post-Soviet states is not predetermined by their common past as parts of the Tsarist and Soviet empires. The Kremlin would thus be as opposed to accession of Ukraine to the EU as to NATO.

Yet, the so-far dominant apology for Russian neo-imperialism – namely, its alleged defensiveness – would become implausible in the case of EU expansion. Conjuring up the image of an allegedly existential security threat to the Russian nation would not easily work regarding a possible new enlargement of the EU to the east. A public offer by Brussels to Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Chisinau of the possibility of a future accession of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova to the EU would create an ultimately unsolvable ideological conundrum for Moscow. It would revitalize the all-European integration process, bolster the international reputation of such countries as Germany and France, as well as energize domestic reform processes in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

 

Andreas Umland is an Analyst in the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and the general editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society” published by ibidem Press in Stuttgart. This article was first published by the French website Desk-Russie.EU.

 

Reflections on the Conquests of Lemberg

mar, 11/01/2022 - 22:47

Expected Coverage of Russian S-500 Missile Systems From Kaliningrad, Central Province and Crimea – Militarywatchmagazine.com

Lemberg, known today as Lviv under Ukrainian rule and Lvov/Lwow under former Polish administrations, was the principal city of the region of Galicia that is now split between Ukraine and Poland. The city of Lemberg was the historical name when that region was under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After being part of the front during First World War, Galicia switched hands between several different nations with many of the same residents often experiencing the horrific changeovers, ethnic conflicts, war and genocide. With the end of the Second World War, the region was officially ceded to Stalin’s Soviet Government and many of the residents expelled from their home region. Ethnic tensions were often the catalyst for the various bouts of violence, and were used as a cause de la guerre for regional power politics.

A foreshadowing of further military conflict in the region has been the focus on news reports regarding Russian relations with Ukraine. Russia looks to be seeking a reset of its boundaries in an effort to boost local support for its Government and play on national concerns of historic threats to Russia coming from Western powers. With the end of the Warsaw Pact, nations that were once controlled from Moscow and acted as a physical barrier to Germany and NATO were now becoming part of NATO. This placed NATO weapons and radar systems closer to Russia’s borders. The Ukraine, as one of the largest countries in Central/Eastern Europe, was always a large barrier between Russia and the West. Ukraine was always the focus of Moscow’s leadership in negotiations with NATO, placing Ukraine at a distance when NATO had no reservations accepting Poland, the Czechs or Hungarians into their fold.

Modern Russian expansion policy often takes place for tactical reasons, but is shrouded in claims of ethnic divisions in border regions between local people and local citizens of Russian descent living in the disputed territories. Conflicts between Russia and Georgia were based in this policy and lead to a short conflict. Russia assaulting and occupying Crimea also came from a similar catalyst, but it was well regarded as a strategic move as Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was always stationed at Sebastopol; even when under Ukraine’s Government, and is considered a key historic battle ground for Russia’s Government and people.

With Russian influence waning in Ukraine’s Government after the 2014 elections, Russian support for separatist forces in the Donbas region of Ukraine started to mirror Russian moves on Crimea a few months earlier. While political tactics lead to a takeover without much violent conflict in Crimea, heavy fighting took place between Russian supported forces and Ukrainian Defence Forces in the Donbas region. The conflict spilled outside the region and garnered international attention when Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 was shot down by a SA-11 BUK missile over the disputed territory, killing all abroad while the flight was peacefully making its journey from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur.

News of the larger conflict was reduced when the shooting down of MH17 occurred. In the past, international condemnation of the Soviet Union when its SU-15 fighter plane shot down a Korean Airlines 747 with two missiles lead to a permanent scar on Soviet relations with the rest of the world in the 1980s. This is said to have contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union, and President Putin likely was aware of this effect. Blame for the act was mixed with hidden information and spin, and created a blueprint for hiding the blame for these types of murders by military equipment when it occurred again over Iran in January of 2020.

The focus on relations with Russia changed drastically as Russia gave direct military support to Syria in combatting what they likely saw as fascist elements trying to overthrow the Assad Regime after months of gains by ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The US and other allies rhetorically opposed Russia’s increased influence in the Middle East, but did little to counter it, and coordinated with Russian Forces to avoid conflict and perhaps target their mutual enemy. Power politics in the Middle East shifted with Russian Armed Forces participating in the conflict, and showed that the US and Europeans were no longer to be depended on for full support. The long term effect was not only to legitimise Russian Foreign Policy actions in the region, but also took the focus off the Donbas and made US Foreign Policy appear as it was entering a phase of decline.

With a weak United States after the Afghanistan pullout, Russia is likely taking the opportunity to rearm and renegotiate the terms of its historical deal post Soviet Union in Europe. Russian fuel to Western Europe, combined with their influence in the Middle East and modernising military with S-500 missiles has been countered by US military aid to Poland and Ukraine, but has received little attention by media in the United States over the last few years. The Donbas has almost become a forgotten issue outside of Eastern Europe, and current posturing by President Putin may be successful as Americans would never support sending troops to fight in a muddy field in Ukraine when they have daily local political drama to contend with, to Russia’s benefit. While the value of the Donbas region may be limited to a large country like Russia, the current state of global affairs may the the biggest catalyst for the conflict, and Russia is likely using it to expand its distance from NATO to gain local support. Its a situation that will not be resolved by foreshadowing a hot war, insults, nor lost lives of soldiers or locals, but through appropriate and measured foreign policy measures.

No time to go it alone

lun, 10/01/2022 - 22:46

Though much has changed in the years since the end of the Second World War, much of the thinking in America’s mainline foreign policy has remained the same. Many Americans look out into the world as if the United States was the lone nation capable of taking on the world’s most daunting challenges, and, as a consequence, many expect the U.S to address major problems independent of cooperation from other nations. The reality, however, is that times have changed- while the United States remains the world’s greatest power, the rise of China, India, and Brazil, and the consolidation of Europe has given rise to a slowly growing list of nations or blocs that are capable of playing a significant role in true global governance. 

Faced with the prospect of rising powers, including some potential rivals, the United States has two meaningful options. First, the U.S. could choose to face this new reality head on and work collaboratively with emerging nations. Or, second, The United States could ignore the development of these nations and potential partners, instead attempting to carry the same amount of global responsibility with relatively less capacity.

Despite important questions about China’s continued rise, the world is slowly returning to a bipolar, or even multipolar order. Put more directly, the gap in “power” (defined as economic, military and even soft power) between the United States is smaller today than it was at the end of the Second World War, or even at the end of the Cold War. This is not to say that today’s America is somehow weaker than the United States was in the 1950’s or 80’s- instead, it is meant to highlight the fact that other nations have grown more quickly between now and those historical moments.

In light of this, it is more important now than it has been at any time in recent memory for the United States to double down on its diplomatic efforts. India and Brazil have both seen astonishing growth since the 1980’s, and both nations have strong, if sometimes flawed, democracies. It is already important to have cooperation from these nations on global issues like climate change and halting the withdrawal of democracy globally. As these nations continue to develop both economically and politically, it will prove even more important for the United States to have a positive relationship with both countries. 

A similar thing should be said about America’s partnerships with the nations in Europe. The troubling situation along the Ukrainian border proves the value of NATO membership, and it comes at a vital moment for Europe following a changing of the guard in Germany and the recency of Brexit.The United States would be wise to resolidify its commitment to NATO and work to promote a politically unified, democratic Europe. Through close relations and thoughtful negotiations, European partners may continue to increase their contributions to NATO.

While these developments have presented new opportunities, they also present a new set of challenges. China has emerged as a global power with undeniable influence and a global vision that is at odds with the Liberal free-market tendencies of the United States. Russia, though certainly not a rising power, has interfered in American elections and continues to disrupt international norms. Other nations like Iran and North Korea, present threats to international stability in a more acute way. Non-state actors like ISIS present a new sort of threat entirely.

Perhaps it is possible that continued economic development in China creates a middle class that actively desires democracy, as some predicted in the early 2000’s. Maybe China’s economy will stall out, and the famed “Grand Bargain” between the CCP and the Chinese people will collapse. It is also entirely possible that China will continue its economic development in the face of the harsh civic and political repression suffered by many Chinese people. In any event, a strong web of partnerships and alliances for the US could serve to both entice China into better behavior or, at a minimum, deter the worst imaginings of China’s global ambitions. A similar list of potential outcomes could be suggested for each of the other problem areas mentioned above, and in every circumstance, the United States will be more effective having strong and consistent partners. 

I have been careful to focus on the upsides of what could take place if the United States walks face first into the emerging bipolar world, but the downsides of failing to do so can be summarized pretty simply. If the United States attempts to take on the full weight of international leadership without cooperation from a long list of committed partners, it will result in overextension, which could bring about the sort of decline that presents a real threat not only to America’s international interests, but to democracy more broadly.

This is why it is important for individual Americans to participate in elections, and remain informed about important issues in both domestic and foreign policy. The next few decades represent a turning point in so many important ways, as climate change, the retreat of democracy, and the rise of China, India, and Brazil all come to a head. Faced with so much uncertainty and so many opportunities, the United States would be wise to make as many friends as it can.


Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

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